45 Cal. 4th 303, 196 P.3d 810, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 110
Filed 12/11/08 (this opn. should follow companion case, S150038, also filed 12/11/08)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
In re RAYMOND C., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S149728
v.
Ct.App.
4/3
G035822
RAYMOND C.,
Orange
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. DL020274
In this companion case to People v. Hernandez (Dec. 11, 2008, S150038)
__ Cal.4th __ (Hernandez), we conclude that the officer acted with sufficient
particularized suspicion to justify the traffic stop at issue here.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At 1:00 a.m. on October 24, 2004, Officer Timothy Kandler saw Raymond
C. driving an Acura without license plates or a temporary operating permit in the
rear window. The car was otherwise being driven lawfully. Kandler could not see
whether there was a temporary permit in the front window. He stopped the Acura
for the apparent license plate violation.
1
Kandler asked Raymond for his driver?s license, registration,1 and proof of
insurance. Raymond provided his driver?s license and proof of insurance and said
the temporary permit was displayed in the front window.2 In the course of the
conversation Kandler noticed the odor of alcohol emanating from Raymond?s
breath and person. Kandler then administered a field sobriety test, which
Raymond failed.
At a motion to suppress evidence3 Raymond?s father testified that he
purchased the 2005 Acura on October 2, 2004, and did not receive license plates
until early December. The two-week-old car was ?shiny and new? when his son
was arrested. There was a temporary permit in the front window.
Raymond?s motion to suppress was denied. The court found that he had
driven a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and with a blood-alcohol level of
0.08 percent or more.4 Raymond was declared a ward of the court and placed on
probation with conditions including a 10-day work program.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the officer had reasonable
grounds for the stop. He saw that Raymond?s car did not have license plates or a
temporary permit in the rear window; he could not see whether there was a
temporary permit in the front window. ?[T]he absence of a rear plate or, from the
officer?s vantage point, a temporary tag substituting for the plate, justified the
stop.?
1
A driver is required to show an officer a license and proof of registration.
(People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1137 (Saunders); Veh. Code, ? 4462,
subd. (a).)
2
A temporary permit is to be placed in the lower rear window. However, if
it would be obscured there, it may be placed in the lower right corner of either the
windshield or a side window. (Dept. Motor Veh. Handbook of Registration
Procedures (Oct. 2007) ch. 2, ? 2.020 p. 7 available online at
http://dmv.ca.gov/pubs/reg_hdbk_pdf/ch02.pdf [as of Dec. 11, 2008].)
3
Penal Code section 1538.5.
4
Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b).
2
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
We reviewed the fundamental principles of applicable law in the
companion case, Hernandez, supra, __ Cal.4th __, __.
In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court finds the historical facts,
then determines whether the applicable rule of law has been violated. (Saunders,
supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1133-1134.) ?We review the court?s resolution of the
factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. The ruling on
whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact
that is subject to independent review. [Citation.]? (Id. at p. 1134.) This case, like
Hernandez, supra, __ Cal.4th __, turns on a question of law.
?[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not
registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure
for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to
check his driver?s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. . . . [P]ersons in automobiles on public roadways
may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the
unbridled discretion of police officers.? (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S.
648, 663.)
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1.) ?A
detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer
can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may
be involved in criminal activity.? (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231
(Souza).) Ordinary traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions for which
the officer must be able to articulate specific facts justifying the suspicion that a
3
crime is being committed. (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082-1083;
People v. Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200.)
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the facts here supported the
officer?s reasonable suspicion that the car was being driven in violation of
vehicular license requirements. (Veh. Code, ?? 5200, 5201.)
The cases that Raymond relies upon are inapposite. In most of them the
officers saw temporary permits, but disregarded them, as in the companion case,
People v. Hernandez, supra, __ Cal.4th __.5 Here, Officer Kandler saw neither
license plates nor a temporary permit before he made the stop.6
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. (United States
v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 118.) Whether an officer?s conduct was
reasonable is evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of the totality of the
circumstances. (Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 231.)
Officer Kandler was driving behind Raymond?s car. Certainly further
observation was permitted. The question is whether Officer Kandler was allowed
to stop the car in order to continue his investigation. Raymond argues that the
officer should have driven around the vehicle to see all the windows. Such
maneuvering would require driving alongside the Acura on both sides and driving
5
United States v. Wilson (4th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 720, 721-722 [temporary
tag]; Berry v. State (Ga.Ct.App 2001) 547 S.E.2d 664, 668 [drive-out tag]; State v.
Aguilar (N.M.Ct.App. 2007) 155 P.3d 769, 770-771 [temporary dealer tag]; State
v. Butler (S.C.Ct.App. 2000) 539 S.E.2d 414, 415-416 [temporary tag]; State v.
Lord (Wis. 2006) 723 N.W.2d 425, 426 [temporary plate]; see also People v.
Nabong (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 3 [temporary registration tag].
6
United States v. Lopez-Soto (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 1101 is inapposite for
a different reason. In Lopez-Soto, the stop was predicated on the San Diego
officer?s mistaken belief that Baja California required that registration stickers be
visible from the rear of the vehicle. Here, there is no indication that Officer
Kandler believed that the rear window was the only place that a temporary permit
may lawfully be affixed. It is, however, the preferred location. (Ante, fn. 2.)
(footnote continued on next page)
4
ahead of it while scanning the windshield in the officer?s rear view mirror. Even
assuming the officer could have engaged in these potentially dangerous
maneuvers, he was not required to do so. ?The reasonableness of [an] officer?s
decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive
investigatory techniques.? (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 11.) Nor
is an officer required to eliminate all innocent explanations that might account for
the facts supporting a particularized suspicion. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11
Cal.4th 354, 373.) The course Kandler followed was reasonable as well as safer
for him, Raymond, and other motorists. Moreover, if Kandler had passed
Raymond in order to check his windshield for a temporary permit, he would have
lost control of the situation. Raymond could have turned into a side street and
driven away before the officer could turn around and follow. If the car had been
stolen, allowing the driver to fall in behind the officer would place the officer in
danger of attack by a felon seeking to avoid arrest. The course taken by Kandler
was entirely reasonable under the circumstances.
(footnote continued from previous page)
Therefore, when Kandler did not see a temporary permit in the rear window, it was
reasonable for him to stop the car to investigate further.
5
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
6
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion In re Raymond C.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 145 Cal.App.4th 1320
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S149728
Date Filed: December 11, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Caryl Lee
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Jean Ballantine, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette,
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, Steven T.
Oetting, Jennifer A. Jadovitz and Jeffrey J. Koch, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Jean Ballantine
12228 Venice Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90066
(310) 398-5462
Jeffrey J. Koch
Deputy Attorney General
110 West A Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 645-2204