Case Number: SC117797??? Hearing Date: May 31, 2016??? Dept: R
CASE NAME: A-1 BUSINESS PRODUCTS v. WIEBEL
CASE NUMBER: SC117797 (C/W SC121253) COMPLAINT FILED: 7/18/12
HEARING DATE: 5/31/16 TRIAL DATE: 10/27/15
ISSUING DATE: 5/27/16
TENTATIVE RULING
MOTION: Defendant Wiebel?s Motion for Reconsideration of Attorney?s Fees Award
HELD: DENIED
I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
In July 2012, Plaintiff A-1 Business Products brought this action against Defendant Wiebel based on Wiebel?s written guaranty of the monetary obligations of (non-party) Destiny Plastics, Inc. (?Destiny?). Destiny?s obligations arose from a Factoring and Security Agreement it had with A-1 Business Products whereby A-1 Business Products provided financing to Destiny for their ongoing operations. Destiny went under leaving Plaintiff A-1 with numerous unpaid invoices which Plaintiff then sought recompense from Defendant guarantor Wiebel.
In October 2012, Defendant issued a CCP ?998 offer of compromise in the amount of $200,001 plus interest, attorney?s fees, and costs. Plaintiff rejected this offer.
Wiebel then filed his own action (SC121253) against A-1 and others (including its principal, Jonathan Schuster) alleging numerous business tort claims concerning the guaranty at issue. On November 4, 2013, the Court consolidated the actions for all purposes.
On August 11-13, 2014, Judge Stone conducted a bench trial regarding the parties? respective statute of limitations defenses. On October 21, 2014, after the trial concluded, but before a decision was issued, Wiebel voluntarily dismissed his action/cross-complaint. On December 11, 2014, Judge Stone issued a ?Ruling on Submitted Matter? (?SOD?) in which he determined that although A-1 had not brought the action within the limitations period specified by CCP ?337(1), Wiebel had waived the statute of limitations defense via an August 10, 2010 e-mail from his attorney (Marchese) to A-1 and was, in any event, estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense based on A-1?s reasonable reliance on the e-mail.
On October 27, 2015, a jury trial on A-1?s breach of guaranty claim commenced and concluded on November 11, 2015, with the jury returning a verdict in A-1?s favor in the amount of $871,803.
Post-trial, Defendant filed a motion to be declared the prevailing party on the theory that the jury?s damages verdict was less than the CCP ?998 offer. This Court denied that motion in an Order issued in February 2016, finding that the ?998 offer was unenforceably vague and that in any event Defendant had not proven that his offer exceeded the jury?s verdict. See February 22, 2016 Order re Prevailing Parties.
On April 19, 2016, this Court issued its Order granting Plaintiffs attorney?s fees in the amount of $1,015,135. See April 19, 2016 Order re: Attorney?s Fees. Defendant now seeks reconsideration of that order, once again asking this Court to find that Defendant was the prevailing party.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Procedural Objections
1. Jurisdiction
Plaintiff?s argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction is rejected as the motion for reconsideration is not addressed to the Judgment itself which was entered on January 14, 2016 and is currently before the Court of Appeals, but rather (as shown below) this Court?s determination of prevailing party status which was issued post trial on February 22, 2016.
2. Timeliness
With respect to Plaintiff?s argument that this motion is untimely, Defendant asserts that the current motion is directed at this Court?s April 19, 2016 Order which would make the deadline for filing reconsideration of that motion (15 days including 5 days for mailing) May 4, 2016, and therefore the May 3, 2016 filing date was timely. However, in spite of Defendant?s assertions, as more fully set forth below, a reading of this reconsideration motion is clearly directed at having this Court reconsider and reverse its determination as to prevailing party status, which was determined by Order dated February 22, 2016. See Defendant?s Notice of Motion and Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1 where Plaintiff states it seeks reconsideration of ?the Court?s award of attorney?s fees . . . and the prevailing party determination upon which it was based . . . .?; see also Memorandum Brief at 1 (?this new evidence undermines entirely the Court?s determination A-1 was the prevailing party entitled to recover its attorney?s fees . . . [r]econsideration of the Court?s award of attorney?s fees to A-1 as the ?prevailing party? in this case is proper . . . .?)
Indeed, Defendant attempted to resurrect these same prevailing party arguments in their Motion to Tax Costs heard on April 19, 2016, which this Court summarily refused to ?revisit? as they had already been considered and rejected in the Court?s February 22, 2016 Order. In short, while the quantity of attorney?s fees awarded was litigated and decided at the April 19, 2016 hearing date, the status of prevailing party for purposes of ?998 (which defendant is seeking reconsideration on) was definitively (and finally) determined at the February 22, 2016 Order.
At the February 22, 2016 hearing, both parties filed briefs seeking a declaration that each was the prevailing party for purposes of awarding costs and attorney?s fees. Defendant raised the argument there that because their CCP ?998 offer was for $200,001 plus interest, they were entitled to prevailing party status because the jury awarded only $200,000 in actual damages and that the rest of the $871,803 was interest. This Court rejected Defendant?s argument on the grounds that (i) their ?998 offer was unenforceably vague, and (ii) in the alternative, Defendant failed to prove that their offer exceeded the actual verdict award of $871,803.
The entire gravamen of Defendant?s current reconsideration motion is to have this Court revisit their parsing of principal v. interest prevailing party argument, this time with the post-judgment juror declarations. Defendant is correct in that these declaration would be considered ?new evidence? to this Court?s February 22, 2016 analysis. However, since this issue was fully determined by the February 22, 2016 Order, this means that the 15 day reconsideration time period (10 days per CCP ?1008 plus 5 additional days per ?1013) began running on February 24, 2016 (Clerk?s mailing of notice of the February 22nd Order), and expired on March 10, 2016. As such, this reconsideration motion filed May 3rd is procedurally barred as untimely.
B. Merits
Even if Defendant?s reconsideration motion were timely, the new evidence would not have changed this Court?s conclusion that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for ?998 purposes. This Court does agree with Defendant that the new juror declarations (or at least the admissible portions thereof) are consistent with the pre-verdict juror note that ?without regard to interest and costs, the guarantee is $200,000,? and that they do confirm this Court?s stated commonsense suspicion that the jury had limited the guaranty award exclusive of interest and costs to $200,000. Had the verdict itself awarded only $200,000 and defendant?s ?998 offer provide for only $200,001, there would be no question that Defendant would be entitled to the ?998 cost shifting provision. But unfortunately for Defendant, their ?998 offer contained the unenforceably vague ?interest? provision, and the jury?s verdict was for a total sum of $871,803 without delineation between principal, interest, or costs. Thus, it was impossible for this Court to make a definitive comparison to determine whether plaintiff ?failed to obtain a more favorable judgment or award? under ?998. While the new juror declarations does help to clarify the thoughts and intentions of the jury with respect to the principal award under the guaranty, they do not and cannot cure the vagueness of Defendant?s ?998 offer. As set forth in the reasoning of this Court?s February 22, 2016 Order, Defendant?s ?998 offer was and still is unenforceably vague and therefore cannot entitle Defendant to the benefits of that Section.