Case Name:??? Vera Quijano, et al. v. Jennifer Torrecillas, et al.
Case No.:??????? 2015-1-CV-288812
This is a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident. On August 21, 2015, defendant Jennifer Torrecillas (?Jennifer?) was driving a 1994 Toyota Corolla with the consent and permission of the owner of the vehicle, defendant Cynthia Torrecillas (?Cynthia?).[1] (First Amended Complaint (?FAC?), ?? 7-8.) As Jennifer was driving on Highway 280, she collided with a vehicle driven by plaintiff David Willis (?Willis?), in which plaintiff Vera Quijano (?Quijano?) was a passenger. (Id., at ? 8.) Willis and Quijano (collectively ?Plaintiffs?) allege that the collision caused them injuries and was the direct result of Jennifer and Cynthia?s (collectively ?Defendants?) negligence. (Id., at ?? 8, 11-13.) Plaintiffs further allege that Jennifer?s intoxication was a direct and proximate cause of the accident as she ?voluntarily commenced, and thereafter continued, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of extreme intoxication, knowing from the outset that she would thereafter operate a motor vehicle.? (Id., at ? 15.) Jennifer allegedly ?knew at the time she began consuming the extreme amounts of alcohol that she would thereafter drive a motor vehicle and would be extremely intoxicated while driving, putting Plaintiffs and others at risk.? (Ibid.) Jennifer also ?knew that consuming alcohol to the point of extreme intoxication would sharply impair her mental and physical faculties and prevent her from safely operating a motor vehicle.? (Ibid.) Despite this knowledge, ?Jennifer ? chose to voluntarily consume large amounts of an alcoholic beverage and operate a motor vehicle anyway? with ?a blood alcohol level of .164%.? (Ibid.)
On April 1, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the operative FAC against Defendants, asserting causes of action for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress and seeking an award of punitive damages against Jennifer.
Currently before the Court is the motion by Defendants to strike the request for punitive damages from the complaint. Plaintiffs filed papers in opposition to the motion on May 11, 2016.
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 436, a court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted into any pleading or strike out all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., ? 436.) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from matters of which the court may take judicial notice. ?(Code Civ. Proc., ? 437, subd. (a).)?In ruling on a motion to strike, the court reads the complaint as a whole, all parts in their context, and assuming the truth of all well-pleaded allegations. (See Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (?Turman?) (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 citing Clauson v. Super. Ct. (?Clauson?) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)
To survive a motion to strike a request for punitive damages, ?the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled.? (Clauson, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255.) Punitive damages are permitted ?[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice ?.? ?(Civ. Code, ? 3294, subd. (a).) The statute defines ?malice? as ?conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.? (Civ. Code, ? 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Despicable conduct is conduct ??so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.?? (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1050 quoting Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.) Additionally, to demonstrate conscious disregard, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct, and that the defendant willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. (Taylor v. Super. Ct. (?Taylor?) (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages only from Jennifer. (FAC, Prayer, ? 4.) Thus, to the extent the motion to strike is brought on behalf of Cynthia, it is improper because punitive damages are not sought against her.
Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED to the extent it is brought by Cynthia.
Turning to the merits of the motion as it pertains to Jennifer, Defendants argue that request for punitive damages should be stricken because ?because [the] underlying facts are obviously untrue.? (Mem. Ps. & As., p. 3, emphasis and formatting omitted.)
This argument lacks merit because the Court assumes the truth of all well-pleaded allegations in ruling on a motion to strike. (See Turman, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.)
Moreover, the allegations of the FAC are sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages because they provide that Jennifer voluntarily commenced, and thereafter continued, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that she must thereafter operate a motor vehicle. (See Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 897-899 [?One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others.?]; see also Sumpter v. Matteson (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 928, 936 [finding that evidence indicating that a defendant knowingly ingested narcotics before driving sufficient to support the imposition of punitive damages].)
Accordingly, the motion to strike the request for punitive damages as it pertains to Jennifer is DENIED.
[1] Due to the multiplicity of parties with the surname Torrecillas, at times, the parties are referred to by their first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended. (See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136, fn. 1.)