Calvert?v.?State?Bar?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?765?,?1?Cal.Rptr.2d?684;?819?P.2d?424
[No.?S015184.?Nov?25,?1991.]CYNTHIA?S.?CALVERT,?Petitioner,?v.?THE?STATE?BAR?OF?CALIFORNIA,?Respondent.
(Opinion?by?The?Court).
COUNSEL
Cynthia?S.?Calvert,?in?pro.?per.,?and?L.?W.?Holt?for?Petitioner.
Diane?C.?Yu,?Richard?J.?Zanassi,?Colin?P.?Wong?and?E.?Lisa?Vorgias?for?Respondent.?[54?Cal.3d?770] OPINION
THE?COURT.fn.?*
The?Review?Department?of?the?State?Bar?Court?(review?department)?has?recommended?that?petitioner?Cynthia?S.?Calvert?be?suspended?from?the?practice?of?law?in?California?for?three?years,?that?execution?of?the?suspension?order?be?stayed,?and?that?she?be?placed?on?probation?for?one?year?upon?conditions?that?include?actual?suspension?from?the?practice?of?law?for?six?months.?The?recommendation?is?based?on?the?review?department’s?findings?that?in?one?matter?petitioner?failed?to?perform?competently,?continued?representation?of?her?client?though?she?knew?she?could?not?perform?competently,?and?withdrew?from?employment?without?taking?reasonable?steps?to?avoid?prejudice?to?the?client.
Petitioner?contends?that?a?new?hearing?should?be?held?before?a?new?hearing?panel?because?the?hearing?referee?failed?to?disqualify?himself?when?required?by?law?to?do?so,?that?prejudicial?errors?in?the?exclusion?of?evidence?require?a?new?hearing,?that?certain?aggravating?circumstances?were?improperly?found,?and?that?the?recommended?discipline?is?excessive.
We?conclude?the?following:?petitioner?waived?the?claim?that?the?hearing?referee?improperly?failed?to?disqualify?himself;?even?though?evidentiary?errors?occurred,?they?do?not?require?a?new?hearing;?the?evidence?is?insufficient?to?support?one?of?the?three?disciplinary?violations?found;?two?aggravating?circumstances?are?unsupported?by?the?record;?and?the?recommended?discipline?is?excessive.?We?further?conclude?that?the?period?of?actual?suspension?imposed?should?be?60?days,?not?6?months?as?recommended?by?the?review?department.
Background
Petitioner?was?admitted?to?the?practice?of?law?in?California?in?January?1978.?Petitioner?has?a?prior?record?of?discipline;?she?was?suspended?for?90?days?in?1990.?The?review?department’s?decision?states?that?petitioner?has?no?prior?record?of?discipline;?the?decision,?however,?was?issued?before?the?July?1990?order?suspending?petitioner.fn.?1?[54?Cal.3d?771]
- The?McKnight?Matter
This?disciplinary?proceeding?arises?from?petitioner’s?representation?of?Doris?McKnight?(McKnight).?This?matter?involves?two?critical?issues:?whether?petitioner?adequately?communicated?with?McKnight,?and?whether?petitioner’s?posttrial?legal?strategy?was?one?that?a?competent?attorney?could?reasonably?have?adopted.?The?parties?presented?sharply?conflicting?evidence?on?both?critical?issues.?Because?the?evidentiary?errors?that?are?discussed?below?require?an?analysis?of?the?effect?of?the?errors?on?the?hearing?as?a?whole,?a?somewhat?detailed?review?of?the?evidence?is?necessary.?Although?there?were?other?witnesses,?the?key?witnesses?were?McKnight?and?petitioner.
- The?State?Bar’s?Evidence
In?November?1982,?McKnight?substituted?petitioner?in?place?of?Mary?Louise?Frampton?as?her?attorney?in?an?employment?discrimination?suit?against?her?employer,?Commercial?Union?Insurance?Co.?(Commercial?Union).?In?May?1984,?the?case?was?tried.?The?trial?court?filed?a?statement?of?decision?in?McKnight’s?favor?in?September?1984?and?awarded?McKnight?$23,895?in?damages.
Five?days?later,?petitioner?wrote?to?McKnight?that?she?had?received?the?final?decision?of?the?court?and?would?”see?that?judgment?is?entered?and?the?cost?bill?and?attorneys?fee?bill?filed?with?the?court?and?opposing?counsel.”?But?judgment?was?not?entered.?Commercial?Union?made?a?motion?for?a?new?trial,?which?was?denied?in?November?1984.
In?December?1984,?petitioner?wrote?to?McKnight,?asking?her?to?”get?together?all?the?bills?and?expenses?[she]?had?incurred”?so?that?petitioner?could?”file?the?judgment?and?cost?bill?ASAP.”?In?early?January?1985,?McKnight?delivered?the?requested?documents?to?petitioner.
In?January?1985,?Commercial?Union?filed?a?notice?of?appeal,?which?was?eventually?withdrawn?pending?the?entry?of?judgment.?McKnight?stated?that?petitioner?called?her?to?notify?her?that?Commercial?Union?had?filed?the?notice?of?appeal.
In?February?1985,?the?Commercial?Union?office?in?Fresno?closed.?McKnight?called?petitioner?and?left?word?of?the?closure?and?her?layoff?with?petitioner’s?secretary.?[54?Cal.3d?772]
McKnight?testified?that,?apart?from?receiving?monthly?billing?statements?and?a?letter?concerning?witness?fees?from?petitioner,?she?had?no?further?communication?with?petitioner?until?December?1985.?But?McKnight?had?attempted?to?speak?with?petitioner?over?the?telephone?at?least?once?a?month?and?more?frequently?toward?the?end?of?the?year.?McKnight?stated?that?petitioner?was?not?available?and?did?not?return?her?calls.
In?late?1985,?McKnight?called?the?courthouse?to?check?on?the?status?of?the?case.?She?was?informed?that?Commercial?Union?had?abandoned?its?appeal?in?February?1985.?In?early?December?1985,?she?called?petitioner?at?home?and?spoke?with?her;?petitioner?told?McKnight?that?she?had?not?filed?the?judgment,?apologized?for?not?doing?so,?and?said?she?would?take?care?of?the?matter?when?she?returned?from?Christmas?vacation.
McKnight?testified?that?she?called?petitioner’s?office?nine?or?ten?times?in?the?first?three?months?of?1986?and?that?she?kept?notes?of?the?conversations?with?petitioner,?her?secretary,?or?her?law?partner.?These?notes?were?admitted?into?evidence.?In?February?1986,?McKnight?was?told?that?petitioner?had?insufficient?time?to?attend?to?her?case?and?that?her?case?was?not?”emergency?work.”?In?early?March?1986,?petitioner’s?secretary?called?McKnight?and?told?her?petitioner?was?working?on?her?case.?In?late?March,?McKnight?called?petitioner’s?office?for?the?last?time.?Petitioner?would?not?speak?to?McKnight,?but?her?secretary?told?McKnight?that?petitioner?was?working?on?her?case.
In?early?April?1986,?McKnight?filed?a?complaint?with?the?Client?Relations?Committee?of?the?Fresno?County?Bar?Association.?In?mid-May,?Jan?Biggs,?an?attorney?handling?the?matter?for?the?association,?sent?a?letter?to?petitioner?requesting?that?she?contact?him?regarding?the?complaint.?Biggs?called?petitioner?three?or?four?times?in?the?weeks?after?he?sent?the?letter,?but?petitioner?did?not?reply?to?the?letter?or?return?his?phone?calls.?In?mid-?June?1986,?Biggs?sent?petitioner?another?letter?about?McKnight’s?complaint;?petitioner?did?not?respond.
In?July?1986,?McKnight?filed?a?complaint?against?petitioner?with?the?State?Bar.?In?November?1986,?she?substituted?her?former?attorney,?Mary?Louise?Frampton,?as?her?attorney?to?replace?petitioner.?Frampton?subsequently?caused?the?judgment?to?be?filed,?and?made?a?motion?for?attorney?fees.?The?trial?court?awarded?attorney?fees?of?$21,199.95.?Commercial?Union?then?filed?a?notice?of?appeal.?Approximately?six?months?after?Frampton?became?McKnight’s?attorney,?the?court?reporter’s?notes?for?the?trial?were?destroyed.?Thereafter,?the?parties?settled?the?lawsuit?for?$21,500.?[54?Cal.3d?773]
- Petitioner’s?Evidence
Petitioner’s?evidence?consisted?of?her?own?testimony?and?the?testimony?of?Attorney?Mary?Louise?Frampton.fn.?2?Frampton’s?testimony,?which?was?stricken?by?the?hearing?panel,?is?discussed?below?in?connection?with?the?argument?that?it?was?error?to?strike?it.fn.?3
Petitioner?testified?that?in?early?1985,?after?Commercial?Union?filed?its?notice?of?appeal,?she?decided?to?use?a?strategy?of?waiting?before?having?the?judgment?entered.?This?strategy?was?based?on?the?”hard-line?position”?of?Commercial?Union?and?its?attorneys,?who?were?adamantly?opposed?to?settlement?and?intent?on?vindication.?Petitioner?concluded?that?with?the?passage?of?time?certain?events?might?occur?that?would?facilitate?settlement?of?the?case?on?favorable?terms?without?an?appeal.
Specifically,?these?anticipated?events?involved:?(1)?the?planned?retirement?of?McKnight’s?former?supervisor,?Mr.?Rubke,?who?had?appeared?to?be?influential?in?Commercial?Union’s?handling?of?the?case?and?who?had?exhibited?personal?animosity?toward?McKnight;?(2)?an?impending?consolidation?and?reorganization?of?Commercial?Union’s?management;?(3)?the?impending?closure?of?Commercial?Union’s?Fresno?office,?at?which?McKnight?continued?to?work;?(4)?the?lessening?of?the?”ego?involvement”?of?Commercial?Union’s?trial?attorney?with?the?passage?of?time;?and?(5)?the?possibility?of?a?new?attorney?taking?responsibility?for?the?litigation.?Petitioner?concluded?that?if?some?of?these?events?occurred,?Commercial?Union?and?its?counsel?would?begin?to?evaluate?the?case?”in?a?more?realistic?[fashion]?…?not?only?legally?but?economically.”
Petitioner?stated?that?the?judgment?would?include?a?provision?that?McKnight?would?receive?10?percent?interest?on?the?damages?from?the?date?the?complaint?was?filed,?and?petitioner?believed?that?this?added?to?the?attractiveness?of?the?waiting?strategy.?Petitioner?also?explained?that?McKnight?owed?her?approximately?$6,000?in?fees,?that?further?expenses?would?be?incurred?on?any?appeal,?and?that?the?strategy?would?give?McKnight?”time?to?regroup.”
Petitioner?explained?this?choice?of?strategy?to?McKnight?several?times?in?1985,?and?McKnight?acquiesced?in?the?strategy.?Also,?from?February?1985?through?May?1986,?petitioner?spoke?with?McKnight?about?her?case?several?[54?Cal.3d?774]?times,?and?was?known?by?McKnight?to?be?available?to?discuss?the?case?at?times?convenient?to?McKnight.
When?petitioner?received?the?letter?from?the?Fresno?County?Bar?Association?in?May?1986,?she?telephoned?McKnight.?McKnight?was?very?hostile?to?her.?Petitioner?asked?McKnight?to?contact?her?later,?but?did?not?remember?further?details?of?the?conversation.?Petitioner?explained?that?she?did?not?respond?to?the?letter?from?Attorney?Biggs?on?behalf?of?the?Fresno?County?Bar?Association?because?Biggs?had?previously?represented?her?in?another?matter?and?she?had?had?a?”very?bad?experience”?with?him,?and?because?Biggs’s?firm?had?”gone?on?record?saying?they?would?never?have?a?woman?lawyer?because?they?don’t?think?women?can?be?lawyers?….”?Petitioner?also?believed?that?it?would?hurt?her?relationship?with?McKnight?to?deal?with?Biggs.
Petitioner?considered?filing?a?motion?to?withdraw?from?the?case,?but?because?there?were?no?other?attorneys?in?Fresno?who?had?expertise?in?employment?discrimination?cases?brought?by?employees,?she?rejected?this?alternative?as?amounting?to?”abandonment.”?Petitioner?made?a?considered?decision?that?it?would?be?in?the?best?interests?of?her?client?to?continue?with?her?strategy.
Petitioner?discussed?with?Mary?Louise?Frampton?the?possibility?that?Frampton?would?take?over?McKnight’s?case,?and?McKnight?and?Frampton?made?arrangements?for?Frampton?to?do?so.?Petitioner?cooperated?by?preparing?the?substitution?of?attorney?form,?delivering?her?files?to?Frampton,?and?assisting?in?preparation?of?the?attorney?fee?motion?filed?by?Frampton.
- Proceedings?Before?Hearing?Panel?and?Review?Department
The?hearing?panel,?consisting?of?a?single?referee,?found?that?petitioner?had?violated?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct,?rules?2-111(A)(2)?(withdrawing?from?employment?without?taking?reasonable?steps?to?avoid?foreseeable?prejudice?to?client),?6-101(A)(2)?(intentionally?or?with?reckless?disregard?failing?to?perform?legal?services?competently),?and?6-101(B)(1)?(continuing?legal?representation?with?knowledge?of?insufficient?time,?resources?or?ability?to?perform?competently).
The?hearing?panel?generally?accepted?McKnight’s?version?of?events,?but?did?not?explain?how?petitioner’s?conduct?violated?each?of?the?rules?at?issue.?The?hearing?panel?found?that?petitioner’s?posttrial?legal?strategy?was?motivated?by?a?desire?to?discourage?Commercial?Union?from?pursuing?an?appeal;?that?petitioner?did?not?”clearly?explain?the?matter”?to?McKnight;?that?although?Commercial?Union’s?Fresno?office?did?close?down,?petitioner?did?not?[54?Cal.3d?775]?pursue?settlement?negotiations;?and?that?petitioner?intentionally?failed?to?return?McKnight’s?telephone?calls.
In?mitigation,?the?hearing?panel?found?that?petitioner?had?no?record?of?prior?discipline,?and?that?she?was?”known?to?be?among?the?few?attorneys?in?her?community?who?regularly?are?available?to?represent?minorities,?women?and?less?favored?members?of?society.”
In?aggravation,?the?hearing?panel?concluded?that?petitioner’s?violations?of?former?rules?2-111(A)(2),?6-101(A)(2)?and?6-101(B)(1)?of?the?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct?of?the?State?Bar?were?wilful,?and?that?although?petitioner?had?attended?the?first?four?hearing?sessions?in?the?matter,?she?had?failed?to?attend?the?remaining?four?hearing?sessions.?The?hearing?panel?deemed?this?failure?to?attend?to?be?a?lack?of?cooperation,?and?found?that?petitioner?had?deprived?the?State?Bar’s?counsel?of?the?opportunity?to?examine?her?regarding?issues?that?arose?during?cross-examination?by?petitioner’s?counsel.?The?hearing?panel?further?found?that?petitioner’s?delay?was?the?”primary?cause”?of?the?destruction?of?the?reporter’s?notes.
The?hearing?panel?recommended?that?petitioner?be?suspended?from?the?practice?of?law?for?three?years,?that?execution?of?the?suspension?be?stayed,?and?that?she?be?placed?on?probation?for?one?year?and?actually?suspended?for?six?months.
The?review?department,?by?a?vote?of?nine?to?two,?adopted?the?decision?and?recommendation?of?the?hearing?panel.
Discussion
- Disqualification?of?Referee
Petitioner?contends?a?new?hearing?is?necessary?because?the?hearing?referee?improperly?failed?to?disqualify?himself.
After?the?fourth?day?of?hearings?in?this?matter,?on?September?12,?1988,?petitioner?filed?a?”declaration?of?disqualification,”?seeking?to?disqualify?the?referee?for?cause?under?rule?230?of?the?Rules?of?Procedure?of?the?State?Bar?(rule?230)?and?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?170.3,?based?on?certain?comments?the?referee?made?off?the?record.
On?September?22,?1988,?the?referee?issued?a?written?ruling?declining?to?disqualify?himself,?but?drawing?petitioner’s?attention?to?her?right?to?seek?review?of?his?decision?under?the?Rules?of?Procedure?of?the?State?Bar.?[54?Cal.3d?776]
The?disciplinary?hearing?proceeded?on?several?hearing?dates?and,?on?March?30,?1989,?the?referee?issued?a?written?decision?on?the?merits.?Petitioner?did?not?raise?the?issue?of?disqualification?again?until?April?1989,?after?the?referee’s?decision.
[1]?The?State?Bar?contends?that?by?failing?to?timely?seek?review?of?the?referee’s?decision?not?to?disqualify?himself,?petitioner?waived?the?issue.?We?agree.Under?rule?230?petitioner?had?10?days?from?the?referee’s?denial?of?her?challenge?to?file?a?motion?with?the?presiding?referee?seeking?the?recusal?of?the?referee?she?had?challenged.fn.?4?Petitioner?did?not?do?so.?We?conclude?she?waived?the?claim?of?prejudice?by?failing?to?seek?timely?review.?(See?Tarver?v.?State?Bar?(1984)?37?Cal.3d?122,?130,?fn.?2?[207?Cal.Rptr.?302,?688?P.2d?911];?Hamilton?v.?State?Bar?(1979)?23?Cal.3d?868,?878?[153?Cal.Rptr.?602,?591?P.2d?1254].)
Petitioner’s?argument?that?the?final?paragraph?of?rule?230?compels?a?different?result?has?no?merit.?That?paragraph?provides:?”Situations?in?which?the?grounds?for?disqualification?are?discovered?or?arise?after?the?referee?has?made?one?or?more?rulings?shall?be?governed?by?the?provisions?of?section?170.3,?subdivision?(b)(3),?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure.”?That?subdivision,?which?has?since?been?renumbered?as?subdivision?(b)(4),?states:?”In?the?event?that?grounds?for?disqualification?are?first?learned?…?after?the?judge?has?made?one?or?more?rulings?…?the?judge?shall,?unless?the?disqualification?be?waived,?disqualify?himself?or?herself,?but?in?the?absence?of?good?cause?the?rulings?he?or?she?has?made?up?to?that?time?shall?not?be?set?aside?by?the?judge?who?replaces?the?disqualified?judge.”
Contrary?to?petitioner’s?contention,?rule?230’s?incorporation?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?170.3,?subdivision?(b)(4)?does?not?abrogate?the?10-day?period?within?which?to?seek?review?of?a?referee’s?refusal?to?disqualify?himself?or?herself.?The?rule?merely?addresses?the?continuing?effect?of?rulings?made?by?a?referee?before?the?referee?was?disqualified.
- Evidentiary?Errors
Petitioner?makes?two?claims?of?evidentiary?error.?She?contends?that?the?referee?erred?in?refusing?to?allow?petitioner?to?impeach?complaining?witness?[54?Cal.3d?777]?McKnight?with?evidence?of?financial?bias,?and?in?striking?the?entire?testimony?of?defense?witness?Mary?Louise?Frampton,?the?successor?to?petitioner?as?McKnight’s?attorney.
The?rules?of?evidence?in?civil?cases?are?generally?followed?in?attorney?discipline?hearings.?(Rules?Proc.?of?State?Bar,?rule?556.)
- Refusal?to?Allow?Impeachment?of?McKnight
As?noted?earlier,?petitioner’s?testimony?and?McKnight’s?differed?substantially?on?several?material?issues.?Petitioner?testified?that?McKnight?consented?to?the?strategy?to?delay?entering?the?judgment;?McKnight?testified?that?she?was?not?aware?of?the?strategy.?Petitioner?testified?that?during?the?period?from?February?1985?through?May?1986?she?spoke?with?McKnight?about?her?case?several?times,?and?was?known?by?McKnight?to?be?available?to?discuss?the?case?at?times?convenient?to?McKnight;?McKnight?testified?that?she?attempted?to?speak?with?petitioner?numerous?times?during?this?period,?but?was?never?able?to?reach?her,?and?petitioner?never?returned?McKnight’s?phone?calls.
On?cross-examination,?petitioner?attempted?to?impeach?McKnight?with?evidence?of?her?financial?interest?in?the?outcome?of?the?disciplinary?proceeding.?Specifically,?petitioner?sought?to?elicit?evidence?showing?that?McKnight?had?intentionally?failed?to?timely?pay?petitioner’s?bills?in?full?and?had?falsely?complained?to?the?State?Bar?as?part?of?a?scheme?to?evade?paying?the?remainder?of?her?attorney?fees.
The?referee?refused?to?allow?petitioner?to?inquire?into?these?matters?for?impeachment?purposes.?The?referee?cited?no?specific?evidentiary?basis?for?his?ruling,?but?stated?that?he?had?”never?heard?of?anything?so?outrageous?in?my?life.”
The?refusal?to?allow?impeachment?of?the?witness?was?erroneous.?Generally,?any?fact?or?circumstance?tending?to?show?that?a?witness?has?a?financial?interest?in?the?outcome?of?a?legal?proceeding?is?a?proper?ground?for?impeachment.?(3?Witkin,?Cal.?Evidence?(3d?ed.?1986)?Introduction?of?Evidence?at?Trial,????1915,?1918,?pp.?1870,?1873;?see?Evid.?Code,????780,?subd.?(f),?785.)?In?this?case,?the?hearing?panel?should?have?allowed?petitioner?to?attempt?to?show?that?McKnight?had?a?financial?incentive?in?seeing?that?petitioner?was?disciplined,?as?a?means?of?strengthening?her?malpractice?case.?[54?Cal.3d?778] [3]?This?court?generally?requires?a?showing?of?specific?prejudice?for?procedural?errors?to?invalidate?the?determination?of?the?hearing?panel.?(Stuart?v.?State?Bar?(1985)?40?Cal.3d?838,?845?[221?Cal.Rptr.?557,?710?P.2d?357].)?The?rules?of?criminal?procedure?do?not?apply?in?attorney?discipline?proceedings,?and?reversible?error?will?be?found?only?when?the?errors?complained?of?resulted?in?a?deprivation?of?a?fair?hearing.?(Id.?at?p.?845;?Walker?v.?State?Bar?(1989)?49?Cal.3d?1107,?1115-1116?[264?Cal.Rptr.?825,?783?P.2d?184];?Rosenthal?v.?State?Bar?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?612,?634?[238?Cal.Rptr.?377,?738?P.2d?723];?see?also?Rules?Proc.?of?State?Bar,?rule?556.)
[2b]?Here,?the?referee’s?erroneous?refusal?to?allow?petitioner?to?impeach?McKnight?does?not?require?a?new?hearing.?Petitioner?was?able?to?elicit?testimony?on?essentially?the?same?grounds?later?in?the?hearing.?Petitioner’s?further?cross-examination?of?McKnight?revealed?that?at?the?time?of?the?disciplinary?hearing?McKnight?had?owed?petitioner?more?than?$6,000?in?attorney?fees?for?almost?four?years.?Petitioner?also?elicited?from?McKnight?that?she?had?filed?a?civil?complaint?against?petitioner.?This?evidence,?though?not?precisely?congruent?with?the?impeachment?evidence?petitioner?was?precluded?from?introducing,?did?tend?to?show?that?McKnight?had?a?financial?interest?in?the?outcome?of?the?proceeding.?Under?the?circumstances,?we?conclude?that?the?referee’s?erroneous?refusal?to?allow?impeachment?of?McKnight?did?not?deprive?petitioner?of?a?fair?hearing.?(See?Stuart?v.?State?Bar,?supra,?40?Cal.3d?at?p.?845.)- Striking?of?Defense?Witness?Frampton’s?Testimony
On?direct?examination,?Frampton?testified?that?she?was?the?original?attorney?for?McKnight?in?the?action?against?her?employer;?that?Frampton?was?substituted?out?of?the?case?due?to?a?conflict?in?1982;?and?that?on?Frampton’s?recommendation,?petitioner?became?McKnight’s?new?counsel.?Frampton?described?petitioner?as?a?highly?qualified?and?competent?attorney?and?as?one?of?only?two?attorneys?in?the?Fresno?area?who?was?available?to?take?plaintiffs’?discrimination?cases?on?a?regular?basis.?Frampton?added?that?if?during?the?spring?of?1986?petitioner?had?withdrawn?as?counsel?for?McKnight,?it?would?have?been?difficult?for?McKnight?to?obtain?successor?counsel.
Frampton?testified?that?the?”tactical?waiting?strategy”?used?by?petitioner?could?be?a?”very?positive?strategy?for?the?plaintiff”?in?light?of?the?closing?of?the?Commercial?Union?office?in?Fresno?after?the?trial?and?in?view?of?the?uncertainties?of?appeal.?In?Frampton’s?opinion,?it?was?”very?likely”?that?if?a?[54?Cal.3d?779]?judgment?in?McKnight’s?case?had?been?entered?and?an?appeal?taken,?there?would?be?no?decision?yet.
Frampton?stated?that?petitioner?had?a?very?good?reputation?for?truthfulness?and?competency?in?the?community,?and?that?she?had?a?very?good?opinion?of?petitioner’s?truthfulness?and?competency.
On?cross-examination,?the?State?Bar?inquired?into?McKnight’s?communications?with?Frampton?during?the?period?petitioner?represented?McKnight.?Frampton?provided?details?concerning?when?she?had?been?contacted?by?McKnight,?but?when?the?hearing?examiner?for?the?State?Bar?asked?Frampton?about?the?purpose?of?a?particular?communication?with?McKnight,?petitioner?raised?the?issue?of?attorney-client?privilege.?Petitioner?further?requested?that?the?State?Bar?be?instructed?not?to?inquire?into?conversations?between?Frampton?and?McKnight?because?such?questions?went?beyond?the?scope?of?direct?examination.?Frampton?then?conferred?off?the?record?with?McKnight,?who?was?present.
When?the?hearing?resumed,?Frampton?said?that?she?was?”not?sure”?whether?the?testimony?she?had?previously?given?created?an?attorney-client?conflict?or?could?jeopardize?McKnight?in?forthcoming?negotiations?with?her?former?employer.?The?referee?then?stated?he?would?entertain?a?motion?to?excise?the?entire?testimony?of?Frampton.?The?State?Bar?so?moved,?petitioner?opposed?the?motion,?and?it?was?granted.
Petitioner?contends?that?it?was?prejudicial?error?for?the?referee?to?strike?Frampton’s?testimony.
The?apparent?basis?for?the?referee’s?ruling?was?Frampton’s?statement?that?she?was?unsure?whether?her?testimony?created?a?conflict?or?would?jeopardize?McKnight’s?case.?Thus,?although?the?referee?did?not?state?it?in?these?terms,?the?basis?for?striking?the?testimony?was?the?attorney-client?privilege.
The?attorney-client?privilege?protects?”confidential?communication?between?client?and?lawyer?….”?(Evid.?Code,???954.)?Confidential?communications?include?information?transmitted?between?attorney?and?client,?and?”a?legal?opinion?formed?and?the?advice?given?by?the?lawyer?in?the?course?of?that?relationship.”?(Evid.?Code,???952.)
Some?of?Frampton’s?testimony?was?not?privileged.?For?example,?not?falling?within?the?privilege?are?Frampton’s?statements?regarding?petitioner’s?reputation?for?truthfulness?and?competence,?Frampton’s?opinion?of?petitioner’s?truthfulness?and?competence,?and?Frampton’s?statements?about?the?[54?Cal.3d?780]?number?of?attorneys?available?to?litigate?discrimination?actions?in?the?Fresno?area?and?the?difficulty?of?obtaining?legal?services?in?such?cases.
Frampton’s?testimony?regarding?the?”tactical?waiting?strategy”?used?by?petitioner?presents?a?closer?question.?Although?this?testimony?comprises?neither?information?transmitted?between?Frampton?and?McKnight?nor?advice?given?to?McKnight?by?Frampton,?it?is?not?clear?whether?this?testimony?communicates?”a?legal?opinion?formed?…?by?the?lawyer?in?the?course?of”?the?attorney-client?relationship.?(Evid.?Code,???952.)
But?we?need?not?decide?whether?Frampton’s?testimony?concerning?petitioner’s?posttrial?strategy?was?a?confidential?communication,?because?we?conclude?that?even?if?the?testimony?may?have?been?a?confidential?communication,?the?attorney-client?privilege?was?waived.
Evidence?Code?section?912,?subdivision?(a)?provides?that?a?privilege?is?waived?when?a?holder?of?a?privilege?fails?to?claim?the?privilege?in?a?proceeding?in?which?he?or?she?has?the?standing?and?opportunity?to?do?so.?In?this?case,?those?conditions?were?met?and?the?privilege?must?be?held?waived.?McKnight?was?a?holder?of?the?privilege;?as?a?witness?who?was?present?at?the?hearing?she?had?standing?and?opportunity?to?claim?it;?she?consulted?with?her?attorney?when?the?issue?was?raised?by?petitioner;?and?she?evidently?failed?to?instruct?Frampton?to?claim?the?privilege.?Frampton,?as?McKnight’s?attorney,?stated?she?was?”not?sure”?whether?her?testimony?created?a?conflict?or?would?jeopardize?McKnight’s?case.?This?equivocal?statement?by?McKnight’s?attorney?after?consultation?with?McKnight?amounts?to?a?failure?to?claim?the?privilege?when?the?opportunity?arose.fn.?5
Moreover,?at?the?next?hearing?session,?the?State?Bar’s?attorney?testified?in?detail?as?to?confidential?communications?between?Frampton?and?McKnight?that?were?revealed?to?the?State?Bar;?and?at?a?later?hearing?date,?McKnight?herself?testified?in?detail?about?her?confidential?communications?with?Frampton.?These?subsequent?events?in?the?same?proceeding?fortify?our?conclusion?that?the?attorney-client?privilege?was?waived.?[5]?Accordingly,?it?follows?that?it?was?error?for?the?hearing?panel?to?strike?Frampton’s?testimony.
We?turn?to?an?assessment?of?this?error.?Frampton’s?testimony?about?petitioner’s?truthfulness?and?competence?were?important?to?petitioner’s?case.?On?the?questions?whether?petitioner?adequately?communicated?with?[54?Cal.3d?781]?McKnight?and?whether?McKnight?consented?to?petitioner’s?strategy,?the?case?was?essentially?a?credibility?contest.?Petitioner’s?argument?as?to?her?credibility?would?have?been?considerably?strengthened?by?Frampton’s?testimony.
Frampton’s?testimony?concerning?the?merits?of?petitioner’s?”tactical?waiting?strategy”?was?vital?to?petitioner’s?defense.?The?importance?of?the?issue?of?the?reasonableness?of?petitioner’s?choice?of?strategy?is?underscored?by?the?testimony?of?the?State?Bar’s?expert?witness,?Robert?A.?Hawley.?Hawley,?a?partner?in?a?San?Francisco?law?firm?who?generally?restricts?his?practice?to?the?defense?of?large?companies?in?employment?matters,?testified?in?response?to?a?hypothetical?question?based?on?the?facts?of?this?case,?that?a?delaying?strategy?such?as?that?used?by?petitioner?”is?not?a?strategy?that?makes?any?sense?to?me.”?He?further?stated?that?the?strategy?was?”totally?perplexing”?and?”inconceivable.”
Thus,?the?effect?of?striking?Frampton’s?testimony?concerning?the?reasonableness?of?petitioner’s?strategy?was?to?remove?from?consideration?the?only?testimony?from?a?disinterested?witness?that?supported?petitioner’s?choice?of?strategy?and?countered?the?testimony?of?the?State?Bar’s?expert?that?the?strategy?was?not?one?that?a?competent?attorney?could?reasonably?have?adopted.
Nevertheless,?we?conclude?that?this?error?does?not?require?a?new?hearing.?As?the?discussion?in?the?following?section?will?make?clear,?even?accepting?petitioner’s?version?of?events?and?petitioner’s?view?of?the?merits?of?the?legal?strategy,?discipline?is?still?warranted?in?this?case.
- Sufficiency?of?Evidence?fn.?6
As?noted?earlier,?the?review?department?found?that?petitioner?had?violated?former?rules?2-111(A)(2),?6-101(A)(2)?and?6-101(B)(1)?of?the?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct?(unless?otherwise?indicated,?all?further?references?to?former?rules?are?to?this?source).?We?discuss?the?application?of?each?of?these?rules.
[7]?Former?rule?6-101(A)(2)?provided?that?”[a]?member?of?the?State?Bar?shall?not?intentionally?or?with?reckless?disregard?or?repeatedly?fail?to?perform?legal?services?competently.”We?conclude?that?this?disciplinary?violation?is?supported?by?the?evidence.?Putting?aside?the?merits?of?petitioner’s?waiting?strategy,?and?even?accepting?petitioner’s?version?of?the?factual?dispute?as?to?communications?with?McKnight,?the?evidence?shows?that?petitioner?did?not?adequately?communicate?with?McKnight?even?after?receiving?the?letter?from?the?Fresno?County?Bar?Association?in?May?1986.?This?failure?to?communicate?was?unjustifiable.?Adequate?communication?with?clients?is?an?integral?part?of?competent?professional?performance?as?an?attorney.
[8]?Former?rule?6-101(B)?stated:?”[A]?member?of?the?State?Bar?shall?not?…?(1)?…?continue?representation?in?a?legal?matter?when?the?member?knows?that?the?member?does?not?have?…?sufficient?time,?resources?and?ability?to,?perform?the?matter?with?competence?….”The?finding?that?petitioner?violated?former?rule?6-101(B)(1)?is?supported?by?the?evidence.?Nothing?in?this?record?shows?that?petitioner?lacked?the?ability?or?resources?to?perform?competently?in?McKnight’s?case.?On?the?contrary,?the?evidence?demonstrates?that?petitioner?did?perform?competently,?obtaining?good?results?through?the?trial?phase?of?the?action.?But?there?is?considerable?evidence?that?petitioner?did?not?devote?sufficient?time?to?McKnight’s?case?after?trial.?Moreover,?certain?uncontradicted?testimony?of?McKnight?shows?that?when?she?did?speak?to?petitioner?and?petitioner’s?secretary?in?February?1986,?she?was?told?that?petitioner?had?insufficient?time?to?attend?to?her?case?and?that?her?case?was?not?”emergency?work.”?The?evidence?supports?the?finding?that?petitioner?continued?representation?of?McKnight?when?she?knew?she?lacked?sufficient?time?to?devote?to?McKnight’s?case.
[9]?Former?rule?2-111(A)(2)?provided?that?”a?member?of?the?State?Bar?shall?not?withdraw?from?employment?until?he?has?taken?reasonable?steps?to?avoid?foreseeable?prejudice?to?the?rights?of?his?client?….”?The?State?Bar’s?theory?is?that?petitioner’s?failure?to?adequately?communicate?with?her?client?amounted?to?a?withdrawal?from?employment.?We?have?previously?indicated?that?gross?negligence?in?failing?to?communicate?with?clients?may?be?construed?[54?Cal.3d?783]?as?abandonment.?(Walker?v.?State?Bar,?supra,?49?Cal.3d?1107,?1117.)?In?this?case,?however,?petitioner?continued?to?regard?herself?as?McKnight’s?attorney?and?continued?to?adhere?to?her?legal?strategy;?when?she?concluded?that?the?attorney-client?relationship?had?irretrievably?deteriorated,?petitioner?assisted?in?locating?other?counsel?for?McKnight.?Petitioner?then?fully?cooperated?in?making?the?successful?attorney?fees?motion.?Under?the?circumstances,?there?is?no?convincing?proof?of?client?abandonment,?as?distinguished?from?inexcusable?failure?to?communicate.?Moreover,?the?finding?that?petitioner?withdrew?from?employment?is?inconsistent?with?the?finding?that?petitioner?continued?representation?when?she?knew?she?did?not?have?sufficient?time?to?perform?competently.We?conclude?that?the?evidence?is?sufficient?to?support?the?findings?that?petitioner?failed?to?perform?legal?services?competently?and?continued?representation?though?she?knew?she?did?not?have?the?time?to?perform?competently,?in?violation?of?former?rules?6-101(A)(1)?and?6-101(B)(1),?respectively.?But?the?evidence?is?insufficient?to?support?the?finding?that?petitioner?withdrew?from?employment?without?taking?steps?to?avoid?prejudice?to?her?client,?in?violation?of?former?rule?2-111(A)(2).
- Challenged?Findings?in?Aggravation
Petitioner?contends?that?in?light?of?the?court?reporter’s?duty?to?preserve?trial?notes,?this?conclusion?cannot?stand.?We?agree.?Government?Code?section?69955,?subdivision?(d)?provides?that?no?court?reporter?or?court?clerk?may?destroy?reporting?notes?until?five?years?after?the?notes?are?taken,?and?then?only?upon?court?order.?The?notes?were?prematurely?destroyed,?contrary?to?the?provisions?of?the?Government?Code.?Petitioner?had?no?responsibility?for?this?act,?and?it?cannot?serve?as?a?factor?in?aggravation.
[11]?The?review?department?further?found?in?aggravation?that?although?petitioner?attended?the?first?four?hearing?sessions?in?this?matter,?she?did?not?attend?the?remaining?four?sessions.?Noting?that?petitioner?was?called?as?a?witness?and?examined?by?the?State?Bar,?and?then?cross-examined?by?her?own?[54?Cal.3d?784]?counsel,?the?review?department?concluded?that?petitioner’s?failure?to?appear?deprived?the?State?Bar?of?the?opportunity?to?further?examine?petitioner.Petitioner?contends?this?factor?in?aggravation?is?also?improper.?Petitioner?appeared?through?counsel?at?all?hearing?sessions.?Although?an?accused?attorney?must?initially?appear?and?answer?the?accusation?(Bus.?&?Prof.?Code,???6111),?there?is?no?absolute?obligation?for?attorneys?to?be?personally?present?at?all?sessions?of?a?disciplinary?hearing.?(See?Hawk?v.?State?Bar?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?589,?597?[247?Cal.Rptr.?599,?754?P.2d?1096].)?The?State?Bar?could?have?issued?a?subpoena?compelling?petitioner’s?presence?for?the?purpose?of?redirect?examination?(Bus.?&?Prof.?Code,???6049,?subd.?(a)(3)),?but?did?not.?Petitioner’s?brief?explains?that?she?was?not?present?because?she?practiced?and?lived?in?Fresno,?a?considerable?distance?from?the?hearing?site?in?San?Francisco,?and?attending?further?hearing?sessions?would?have?caused?financial?hardship.?The?review?department’s?findings?on?this?matter?are?contradictory;?although?it?found?petitioner’s?failure?to?be?present?to?be?an?aggravating?circumstance,?the?review?department?also?stated?it?was?”unaware?of?[petitioner]?being?uncooperative?with?the?State?Bar.”?We?conclude?that?the?review?department?erred?in?finding?petitioner’s?absence?from?some?of?the?hearing?sessions?was?an?aggravating?circumstance.
- Appropriate?Discipline
The?existence?of?a?prior?record?of?discipline?is?a?factor?in?aggravation.?(Rules?Proc.?of?State?Bar,?div.?V,?Stds.?for?Atty.?Sanctions?for?Prof.?Misconduct,?stds.?1.2(b)(i),?1.7.)?Petitioner?has?a?prior?record?of?discipline;?in?July?1990,?this?court?suspended?her?for?90?days?for?misconduct?in?a?matter?arising?from?her?failure?to?perfect?a?mechanic’s?lien.?The?misconduct?in?this?case?was?contemporaneous?with?the?misconduct?for?which?petitioner?was?earlier?disciplined.?In?imposing?the?earlier?discipline,?pursuant?to?a?stipulation?of?the?parties?we?considered?as?a?factor?in?aggravation?the?State?Bar?Court’s?decision?to?impose?discipline?in?this?case.?As?the?State?Bar’s?counsel?acknowledged?at?oral?argument,?for?this?reason?it?would?be?inappropriate?to?consider?the?earlier?discipline?as?a?factor?in?aggravation?in?this?proceeding.?A?contrary?determination?would?result?in?the?anomaly?that?petitioner?would?suffer?the?enhancement?for?two?prior?incidents?of?discipline?when?only?one?incident?could?be?prior?in?time?to?the?other.
In?mitigation,?the?review?department?found?that?petitioner?”is?known?to?be?among?the?few?attorneys?in?her?community?who?regularly?are?available?to?represent?minorities,?women?and?less?favored?members?of?society.”?In?addition,?the?record?in?petitioner’s?prior?disciplinary?matter?shows?that?petitioner?has?a?substantial?record?of?pro?bono?activities?and?community?service.?We?have?previously?held?that?service?to?the?community?is?a?mitigating?factor?that?is?entitled?to?”considerable?weight.”?(Schneider?v.?State?Bar?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?784,?799?[239?Cal.Rptr.?111,?739?P.2d?1279].)
Petitioner’s?misconduct?was?not?insignificant.?All?attorneys?owe?a?duty?to?communicate?adequately?with?their?clients?and?to?use?reasonable?speed?in?accomplishing?the?purposes?for?which?they?were?employed.?(Matthew?v.?State?Bar?(1989)?49?Cal.3d?784,?790-791?[263?Cal.Rptr.?660,?781?P.2d?952].)?Petitioner’s?breach?of?this?duty?in?this?case?is?a?cause?for?discipline?including?a?period?of?actual?suspension.?But?the?review?department’s?recommendation?of?six?months’?actual?suspension?is?based?in?significant?part?on?its?erroneous?findings?that?petitioner’s?conduct?was?the?cause?of?substantial?financial?and?emotional?harm?to?her?client.
Under?the?circumstances,?we?conclude?that?the?purposes?of?attorney?discipline?would?be?served?by?imposing?the?discipline?recommended?by?the?State?Bar,?with?the?exception?that?the?period?of?actual?suspension?be?60?days?instead?of?6?months.?This?discipline?is?proportionate?to?the?misconduct?and?[54?Cal.3d?786]?consistent?with?standard?2.4(b)?of?the?Standards?for?Attorney?Sanctions?for?Professional?Misconduct?(Rules?Proc.?of?State?Bar,?div.?V).?That?standard?provides:?”Culpability?of?a?member?of?wilfully?failing?to?perform?services?in?an?individual?matter?or?matters?not?demonstrating?a?pattern?of?misconduct?or?culpability?of?a?member?of?wilfully?failing?to?communicate?with?a?client?shall?result?in?reproval?or?suspension?depending?upon?the?extent?of?the?misconduct?and?the?degree?of?harm?to?the?client.”
Disposition
We?order?that?Cynthia?S.?Calvert?be?suspended?from?the?practice?of?law?for?three?years,?that?execution?of?the?suspension?order?be?stayed,?and?that?she?be?placed?on?probation?for?one?year?on?all?the?conditions?of?probation?adopted?by?the?review?department?at?its?September?14,?1989,?meeting,?except?that?petitioner?shall?be?actually?suspended?from?the?practice?of?law?for?only?the?first?sixty?days?of?the?probationary?period.?The?period?of?probation?shall?run?concurrently?with?the?probation?previously?imposed?in?case?No.?S015180.?The?period?of?actual?suspension?shall?commence?upon?finality?of?decision,?and?shall?be?consecutive?to?the?period?of?actual?suspension?imposed?in?case?No.?S015180.?Costs?are?awarded?to?the?State?Bar.
This?order?is?effective?upon?finality?of?this?decision?in?this?court.?(See?Cal.?Rules?of?Court,?rule?953(a).)
FN?*.?Before?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Mosk,?J.,?Panelli,?J.,?Kennard,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?George,?J.,?and?Low?(Harry),?J.?
??Presiding?Justice,?Court?of?Appeal,?First?Appellate?District,?Division?Five,?assigned?by?the?Chairperson?of?the?Judicial?Council.
FN?1.?The?prior?discipline?involved?a?failure?to?perfect?a?mechanic’s?lien,?and?a?failure?in?the?same?matter?to?respond?to?letters?from?the?State?Bar.?Petitioner?and?the?State?Bar?entered?into?a?stipulation?as?to?facts,?culpability,?and?recommended?discipline.?The?stipulation?provided?that?with?the?exception?of?the?period?of?actual?suspension,?the?discipline?imposed?would?be?concurrent?with?the?discipline?to?be?imposed?in?this?case.?The?parties?stipulated?that?the?period?of?actual?suspension?imposed?in?that?matter,?however,?would?be?served?consecutively?to?the?period?of?actual?suspension?in?this?case.
This?court?imposed?the?recommended?discipline?in?the?mechanic’s?lien?matter?in?July?1990,?and?denied?a?motion?to?consolidate?that?matter?with?this?case?in?August?1990.
FN?2.?Although?petitioner?was?called?as?a?witness?by?the?State?Bar,?her?testimony?formed?the?basis?of?her?defense?to?the?disciplinary?charges,?and?thus?is?summarized?in?this?section.
FN?3.?The?pertinent?testimony?of?the?State?Bar’s?witness?Robert?A.?Hawley?is?also?discussed?in?connection?with?this?issue.
FN?4.?Rule?230?provides,?in?pertinent?part:?”A?referee?assigned?to?a?particular?matter?may?recuse?himself?or?herself.?Where?grounds?for?a?challenge?have?been?established,?the?referee?shall?recuse?himself?or?herself.?If?recusal?is?not?made?…?[and?if]?the?challenged?referee?was?not?assigned?at?a?master?calendar?session?…?the?motion?for?disqualification?may?be?presented?to?the?presiding?referee?within?ten?(10)?days?after?the?affected?referee?denied?the?challenge,?and?the?presiding?referee?shall?act?on?the?motion?within?five?(5)?days?of?its?receipt.”
FN?5.?We?note?that?during?petitioner’s?testimony?and?prior?to?Frampton’s,?McKnight?orally?waived?the?attorney-client?privilege?as?to?petitioner?only.?But?nothing?in?Evidence?Code?section?912?indicates?that?an?assertion?of?a?privilege?at?one?time?precludes?its?waiver?by?conduct?at?a?later?time.
FN?6.?Petitioner?has?not?separately?raised?the?issue?of?the?sufficiency?of?the?evidence,?but?in?view?of?the?discussion?in?the?preceding?section,?we?conclude?that?an?analysis?of?the?sufficiency?of?the?evidence?is?warranted.