Droeger?v.?Friedman,?Sloan?&?Ross?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?26?,?283?Cal.Rptr.?584;?812?P.2d?931
[No.?S014984.?Jul?29,?1991.]JOHN?E.?DROEGER,?Plaintiff?and?Appellant,?v.?FRIEDMAN,?SLOAN?&?ROSS,?Defendant?and?Respondent.
(Superior?Court?of?the?City?and?County?of?San?Francisco,?No.?877550,?Alex?Saldamando,?Judge.fn.?*?)
(Opinion?by?Panelli,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Mosk,?Broussard,?Arabian?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.)
COUNSEL
Cory?A.?Birnberg?and?William?A.?Reppy,?Jr.,?for?Plaintiff?and?Appellant.
Friedman,?Sloan?&?Ross,?James?A.?Dorskind,?Jeffrey?S.?Ross,?Howard,?Rice,?Nemerovski,?Canady,?Robertson?&?Falk?and?Jerome?B.?Falk,?Jr.,?for?Defendant?and?Respondent.
Lorraine?C.?Gollub,?Ronald?Melin?Supancic,?Sandra?Blair,?James?Scott?Veltman,?Ronald?Rosenfeld,?E.?Stephen?Temko,?Denny?Kershek,?Frieda?Gordon?Daugherty?and?Diana?Gould-Saltman?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendant?and?Respondent.
OPINION
PANELLI,?J.
We?granted?review?to?determine?whether?a?security?interest?in?community?real?property?given?by?one?spouse?to?secure?attorney?fees?during?a?pending?marital?dissolution?proceeding?is?valid?under?Civil?Code?[54?Cal.3d?30]?section?5127.fn.?1?Resolution?of?this?question?requires?that?we?clarify?the?general?rules?governing?transfersfn.?2?by?one?spouse?in?violation?of?section?5127.fn.?3
[1a]?We?conclude?that?pursuant?to?section?5127,?both?spouses?must?consent?to?the?transfer?of?community?real?property.?Consequently,?when?a?nonconsenting?spouse,?during?the?marriage,?timely?challenges?a?transfer?made?in?violation?of?section?5127,?the?transfer?is?voidable.?In?the?present?case,?after?the?parties?had?separated,?Joanna?Droeger?unilaterally?encumbered?two?parcels?of?community?real?property.?Her?husband,?John?E.?Droeger,?did?not?join?in?the?execution?of?the?encumbrance.?Before?the?couple’s?marriage?dissolution?proceedings?were?completed,?John?Droeger?challenged?the?validity?of?the?encumbrance.?As?his?consent?was?required?under?section?5127?to?effect?the?encumbrance,?we?conclude?that?he?is?entitled?to?invalidate?the?encumbrance?in?its?entirety.- Facts?and?Proceedings
In?1982,?Joanna?Droeger?(Wife)?commenced?a?marital?dissolution?proceeding?against?appellant?John?Droeger?(Husband).?Wife?retained?Friedman,?Sloan?&?Ross?(Friedman)?as?her?counsel?in?the?proceeding.?In?October?1986,?Friedman?moved?in?the?family?law?court?for?an?order?awarding?attorney?fees?and?costs?of?over?$50,000?pendente?lite?pursuant?to?section?4370,?subdivision?(a)?(authorizing?court?orders?for?payment?of?attorney?fees?pendente?lite).?However,?the?court?only?granted?the?motion?in?part,?awarding?Friedman?$9,600,?and?reserving?consideration?of?the?request?for?additional?attorney?fees?and?costs?until?the?time?of?trial.
On?November?3,?1986,?Wife?executed?a?promissory?note?in?the?amount?of?$31,158.66?in?favor?of?Friedman?for?attorney?fees?and?costs.?On?the?same?day,?Wife?executed?a?deed?of?trust?on?two?parcels?of?the?community’s?real?property?securing?the?note.?Husband?did?not?join?in?the?execution?of?the?note?or?the?deed?of?trust.
Husband?commenced?action?in?superior?court?to?quiet?title?to?the?community?realty?that?is?encumbered?by?the?deed?of?trust.?Relying?on?Mitchell?v.?[54?Cal.3d?31]?American?Reserve?Ins.?Co.?(1980)?110?Cal.App.3d?220?[167?Cal.Rptr.?760]?(Mitchell),?Friedman?demurred?to?Husband’s?second?amended?complaint,?claiming?that?the?deed?of?trust?was?enforceable?against?Wife’s?one-half?interest?in?the?property.?The?court?sustained?the?demurrer?without?leave?to?amend?and?entered?a?judgment?of?dismissal.?Husband’s?motion?for?reconsideration?was?denied.
Concluding?that?the?intent?of?section?5127?was?to?prevent?division?of?community?real?property?except?by?agreement?of?both?spouses,?or?by?the?death?of?one?spouse,?or?by?dissolution?of?the?marriage,?the?Court?of?Appeal?reversed.?The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?Husband?was?entitled?to?void?the?encumbrance?in?its?entirety.?We?affirm.
- Section?5127
Section?5127,?which?applies?to?the?management?and?control?of?community?real?property,?states?in?part,?”either?spouse?has?the?management?and?control?of?the?community?real?property?…,?but?both?spouses?either?personally?or?by?duly?authorized?agent,?must?join?in?executing?any?instrument?by?which?such?community?real?property?or?any?interest?therein?is?leased?for?a?longer?period?than?one?year,?or?is?sold,?conveyed,?or?encumbered?….”
Since?1975,?when?reforms?of?the?community?property?laws?(discussed?post)?became?effective,?the?appellate?courts?have?reached?inconsistent?results?in?determining?the?effect?of?violations?of?section?5127?where?one?spouse?has?made?a?transfer?without?obtaining?the?other?spouse’s?signature?or?authorization.?Both?lines?of?cases?agree?that?a?deed?of?trust,?signed?by?only?one?spouse,?cannot?create?a?valid?lien?on?the?entire?community?real?property;?the?nonconsenting?spouse?has?authority?to?void?the?lien?on?his?or?her?one-half?interest?in?the?property.?The?cases?differ,?however,?on?whether?the?nonconsenting?spouse?has?the?authority?to?void?the?lien?entirely.?(See?Mitchell,?supra,?110?Cal.App.3d?220;?Andrade?Development?Co.?v.?Martin?(1982)?138?Cal.App.3d?330?[187?Cal.Rptr.?863]?(Andrade).)
The?conflict?in?the?Court?of?Appeal?cases?cannot?be?understood?or?resolved?without?examining?the?history?of?section?5127.?The?language?of?section?5127?is?substantially?derived?from?that?found?in?former?section?172a,?which?dates?back?to?1917.?The?history?of?former?section?172a?and?section?5127?reveals?the?evolution?of?the?recognition?of?the?wife’s?equal?status?in?California?community?property?law.?As?will?be?seen,?however,?the?evolving?recognition?of?the?wife’s?equality?has?not?always?been?reflected?in?the?case?law.?[54?Cal.3d?32]
At?the?beginning?of?the?California?community?property?system?in?1849,?the?husband?was?regarded?as?the?full?and?complete?owner?of?the?community?property?and?had?the?exclusive?management?and?control?of?the?community?property.?The?wife’s?interest?was?an?expectancy?which?was?limited?to?the?rights?she?would?accrue?only?if?she?survived?the?termination?of?the?marriage.?(See?Prager,?The?Persistence?of?Separate?Property?Concepts?in?California’s?Community?Property?System?(1977)?24?UCLA?L.Rev.?1,?35.)?The?first?provision?of?our?statutory?law?on?the?subject?of?the?rights?of?the?husband?and?wife?in?community?property?was?section?9?of?the?Community?Property?Act?of?April?17,?1850?(Stats.?1850,?ch.?103,???9,?p.?254).?Under?section?9?of?the?act?”[t]he?husband?shall?have?the?entire?management?and?control?of?the?common?property,?with?the?like?absolute?power?of?disposition?as?of?his?own?separate?estate.”
Construing?the?Community?Property?Act?of?1850,?early?cases?held?that,?during?the?marriage,?the?estate?of?the?husband?in?the?community?property?was?absolute,?while?that?of?the?wife?was?a?mere?expectancy,?as?that?of?an?heir.?(See?Spreckels?v.?Spreckels?(1916)?172?Cal.?775?[158?P.?537]?(Spreckels).)?Section?9?of?the?Community?Property?Act?of?1850?remained?in?force?until?the?enactment?of?the?Civil?Code?in?1872.?The?substance?of?section?9?of?the?act?was?covered?by?section?172?of?the?Civil?Code.?In?1891,?former?section?172?was?amended?to?read,?”[t]he?husband?has?the?management?and?control?of?the?community?property,?with?the?like?absolute?power?of?disposition,?other?than?testamentary,?as?he?has?of?his?separate?estate;?provided,?however,?that?he?cannot?make?a?gift?of?such?community?property,?or?convey?the?same?without?a?valuable?consideration,?unless?the?wife,?in?writing,?consent?[sic]?thereto.”?(Original?italics.)
Interpreting?the?1891?proviso,?the?Spreckels?court?upheld?the?concept?of?the?husband’s?almost?absolute?power?over?the?community?property.?According?to?the?court,?the?proviso?did?not?”vest?in?the?wife,?during?the?marriage,?any?present?interest?or?estate?in?the?community?property?given?away?by?the?husband?without?her?written?consent.?…?If?[the?proviso]?confers?upon?her,?during?the?marriage,?any?right?respecting?such?gifts,?it?is?nothing?more?than?a?right?to?revoke?the?gift?and,?if?necessary,?sue?to?recover?the?property,?not?as?her?separate?estate,?but?to?reinstate?it?as?a?part?of?the?community?property,?with?the?title?vested?in?the?husband?and?subject?to?sale?by?him,?as?before.”?(Spreckels,?supra,?172?Cal.?at?p.?782.)
Dargie?v.?Patterson?(1917)?176?Cal.?714?[169?P.?360]?(Dargie)?addressed?the?question?left?unanswered?by?Spreckels,?i.e.,?whether?the?wife?could?avoid?a?deed?in?its?entirety,?or?”only?so?far?as?is?necessary?to?protect?her?rights.”?(Id.?at?p.?718.)?In?Dargie?the?husband?had?made?a?gift?of?community?real?property?during?the?marriage?without?the?knowledge?or?consent?of?the?wife.?[54?Cal.3d?33]?After?the?husband?died,?the?wife?filed?an?action?to?set?aside?the?transfer.?We?held?that?”the?only?logical?conclusion?is?that?the?wife’s?right?to?assail?the?conveyance?where,?as?here,?the?action?is?brought?after?the?husband’s?death,?is?limited?to?an?undivided?half?of?the?property.”?(Ibid.)?The?rationale?for?the?decision?was?that?because?the?husband?had?died,?his?testamentary?power?existed?and?the?widow?need?not?be?given?greater?rights?than?she?would?have?enjoyed?if?the?gift?had?never?been?made.?Consequently,?we?invalidated?the?transfer?only?as?to?the?wife’s?portion?of?the?community?property.
In?1917?former?section?172a?was?added?to?the?Civil?Code.?(Stats.?1917,?ch.?583,???2,?p.?829.)?Former?section?172a?continued?to?uphold?the?husband’s?sole?management?and?control?of?the?community?real?property,?but,?significantly,?provided?that?”the?wife?must?join?with?him?in?executing?any?instrument?by?which?such?community?real?property?or?any?interest?therein?is?leased?for?a?longer?period?than?one?year,?or?is?sold,?conveyed,?or?encumbered?….”
The?concept?of?a?wife’s?interest?in?community?property?as?being?no?more?than?a?mere?expectancy?was?abrogated?in?1927.?Legislation?enacted?in?1927?(Stats.?1927,?ch.?265,???1,?p.?484)?gave?the?wife?a?”present,?existing,?and?equal?interest”?in?the?community?property.?(See?Byrd?v.?Blanton?(1983)?149?Cal.App.3d?987,?992?[197?Cal.Rptr.?190].)?This?enactment,?however,?was?motivated?by?the?desire?to?obtain?federal?income?tax?benefits?for?California?taxpayers?(i.e.,?to?allow?income?splitting?based?on?community?co-ownership,?before?joint?returns?were?allowed?for?all?married?couples)?and?did?not?increase?the?wife’s?power?to?manage?the?community?property.?(See?Reppy,?Retroactivity?of?the?1975?Community?Property?Reforms?(1978)?48?So.Cal.L.Rev.?977,?1089.)
In?Lahaney?v.?Lahaney?(1929)?208?Cal.?323?[281?P.?67]?we?addressed?a?case?under?former?section?172a?where?the?husband?had?died?prior?to?the?wife?instituting?an?action?to?set?aside?his?inter?vivos?gift?of?community?real?property.?We?held?that?the?deed?executed?by?the?husband?was?valid,?subject?only?to?the?wife’s?right?to?institute,?seasonably,?an?action?in?equity?to?revoke?the?deed?and?reinstate?the?property?as?community?property?with?the?title?vested?in?the?husband.?(208?Cal.?at?p.?326.)?As?the?wife?brought?the?action?after?the?husband’s?death,?we?concluded?that?the?community?was?already?divided?and?she?could?only?recover?her?one-?half?interest?in?the?property.
In?Pretzer?v.?Pretzer?(1932)?215?Cal.?659?[12?P.2d?429],?Trimble?v.?Trimble?(1933)?219?Cal.?340?[26?P.2d?477],?and?Heuer?v.?Heuer?(1949)?33?Cal.2d?268?[201?P.2d?385],?we?considered?similar?questions?of?the?effect?of?a?husband’s?disposition?of?community?real?property?without?the?wife’s?consent.?In?all?three?cases?the?community?had?been?dissolved,?either?by?death?or?[54?Cal.3d?34]?divorce,?prior?to?the?wife’s?action,?and?in?all?three?we?held?that?the?transfer?was?invalid?only?as?to?the?wife’s?remaining?one-?half?interest?in?the?property.fn.?4
In?Britton?v.?Hammel?(1935)?4?Cal.2d?690?[52?P.2d?221]?(Britton),?we?discussed?for?the?first?time?an?action?brought?by?a?nonconsenting?spouse?while?the?marriage,?and?hence?the?community,?was?still?in?existence.?John?Britton?procured?a?decree?of?divorce?from?his?first?wife,?Sophie?Britton,?in?1891.?He?acquired?property?in?1916,?and?in?1923?and?1924?he?conveyed?title?to?the?property?to?Rose?Britton,?supposedly?his?second?wife.?She?later?conveyed?it?back?to?him?as?his?separate?property.?Rose?died?in?1926?and?John?deeded?the?property?away.?Sophie?brought?action?to?declare?the?deeds?void?and?to?compel?the?return?of?the?property?to?the?community.?In?a?separate?action,?John’s?divorce?decree?from?Sophie?was?annulled?because?it?had?been?procured?by?fraud.?Because?the?first?marriage?was?determined?to?be?still?in?existence?when?the?deeds?were?made,?we?concluded?that?Sophie?was?entitled?to?set?aside?the?gift?of?community?real?property?in?its?entirety.
We?gave?four?reasons?for?our?decision?in?Britton?allowing?a?complete?set?aside?of?the?gift:?If?the?wife?”were?only?permitted?to?recover?a?one-half?interest,?and?that?one-half?interest?recovered?were?to?remain?community?property,?it?would?still?be?subject?to?the?husband’s?control,?with?the?result?that?the?protection?given?the?wife?by?the?statute?would?be?substantially?nullified.?If,?on?the?other?hand,?the?one-half?interest?recovered?were?regarded?as?her?separate?property,?there?would?be?a?resulting?division?or?partition?of?the?community?property?during?the?marriage?by?the?husband’s?arbitrary?act,?without?consent?of?the?wife.?Our?law?does?not?contemplate?this?means?of?dividing?the?community?property.?It?provides?only?for?division?after?dissolution?of?the?community?by?death?or?divorce,?[or?during?marriage?with?the?consent?of?both?spouses].”?(Britton,?supra,?4?Cal.2d?at?p.?692.)?As?mentioned,?we?also?noted?that?the?cases?allowing?the?wife?to?recover?only?one-half?are?based?on?the?right?of?the?husband?to?testamentary?disposition?of?one-half?of?the?property.?Hence,?gifts?before?death?are?will?substitutes.?We?noted?that?this?reasoning?does?not?apply?in?an?ongoing?marriage.?Finally,?under?the?laws?in?effect?at?the?time?the?case?was?decided,?if?the?wife?could?not?recover?the?whole?property?during?the?marriage,?the?husband?could?impair?the?wife’s?right?to?receive?a?larger?share?of?the?community?property?at?dissolution?where?the?grounds?for?divorce?were?adultery?or?extreme?cruelty?of?the?husband.?(Id.?at?pp.?692-?693.)?[54?Cal.3d?35]
In?Britton,?we?distinguished?Trimble?v.?Trimble,?supra,?219?Cal.?340,?and?Lahaney?v.?Lahaney,?supra,?208?Cal.?323,?as?cases?that?were?concerned?with?an?action?by?the?wife?after?her?husband’s?death?and?premised?on?the?theory?that?at?his?death,?the?husband?had?a?right?to?dispose?of?his?one-half?interest?in?the?property.fn.?5
In?1969,?former?section?172a?became?part?of?the?Family?Law?Act?as?section?5127?(Stats.?1969,?ch.?1608,???8,?p.?3342,?operative?Jan.?1,?1970).?In?1975,?reforms?of?the?community?property?laws?became?effective,?including?legislation?giving?either?spouse?the?management?and?control?of?the?community?property?(??5125)?and?making?section?5127?gender?neutral.?(Stats.?1974,?ch.?1206,???5,?p.?2610.)?The?1975?reforms,?therefore,?changed?the?context?in?which?section?5127?must?be?interpreted.?As?can?be?seen?from?the?cases?discussed,?the?concept?of?equal?management?was?a?radical?and?significant?change?in?community?property?law?and?was?a?landmark?step?toward?recognizing?equality?of?the?spouses.?Accordingly,?the?1975?reform?legislation?marked?a?significant?dividing?line?between?the?husband-dominated?community?property?law?of?the?past?and?the?equal?managerial?rights?of?the?present?day.
Before?the?1975?reforms,?the?law?was?clear?as?to?the?extent?of?relief?allowed?to?a?spouse?who?disapproved?of?a?transfer?made?in?violation?of?section?5127.?If?the?action?was?brought?after?the?transferor-spouse’s?death?or?after?dissolution?of?the?marriage,?the?set-aside?was?limited?to?the?nonconsenting?spouse’s?one-half?community?property?interest.?(See?Trimble?v.?Trimble,?supra,?219?Cal.?340;?Pretzer?v.?Pretzer,?supra,?215?Cal.?659.)?If?the?action?was?brought?during?the?ongoing?marriage,?however,?the?nonconsenting?spouse?was?permitted?to?set?aside?the?transfer?in?its?entirety.?(See?Britton,?supra,?4?Cal.2d?690;?Vaughan?v.?Roberts,?supra,?45?Cal.App.2d?246.)
After?the?1975?reforms,?however,?a?split?of?authority?developed?in?the?appellate?courts?concerning?the?extent?of?relief?available?when?the?nonconsenting?spouse?brought?an?action?during?the?marriage.?One?line?of?decisions?holds?that?transfers?are?voidable?only?as?to?the?nonconsenting?spouse’s?[54?Cal.3d?36]?one-half?interest,?regardless?of?when?the?action?is?brought.?(See?Wolfe?v.?Lipsy?(1985)?163?Cal.App.3d?633?[209?Cal.Rptr.?801];?Head?v.?Crawford?(1984)?156?Cal.App.3d?11?[202?Cal.Rptr.?534];?Mitchell,?supra,?110?Cal.App.3d?220.)?Equally?recent?decisions,?including?the?Court?of?Appeal?decision?in?this?case,?expressly?disapprove?of?the?Mitchell?line?of?authority,?and?hold?that?if?relief?is?sought?during?marriage,?the?entire?transfer?should?be?set?aside.?(See?Harper?v.?Raya?(1984)?154?Cal.App.3d?908?[201?Cal.Rptr.?563];?Andrade,?supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?330;?In?re?Jones?(C.D.Cal.?1985)?51?Bankr.?834.?See?also,?Hogoboom?&?King,?Cal.?Practice?Guide:?Family?Law?1?(The?Rutter?Group?1990)???8:163-8:163.3,?rev.?#1,?1991.)
As?indicated,?the?leading?and?most?frequently?cited?cases?on?each?side?of?the?issue?are?Mitchell,?supra,?110?Cal.App.3d?220,?and?Andrade,?supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?330.?Mitchell?holds?that?a?transfer?by?one?spouse?is?valid?as?to?the?transferring?spouse’s?one-half?interest?in?the?property,?but?may?be?invalidated?by?the?nonconsenting?spouse?as?to?his?or?her?one-half?interest?in?the?property.?Andrade,?on?the?other?hand,?allows?the?nonconsenting?spouse?to?invalidate?the?transfer?entirely.?[1]?(See?fn.?6.)?Both?cases?are?similar?in?that?the?applicable?law?was?the?same,?the?transfer?was?deemed?by?the?court?not?to?be?a?gift,?title?to?the?property?was?held?in?the?names?of?both?spouses,?and?the?marriage?was?continuing?at?the?time?that?the?nonconsenting?spouse?moved?to?set?aside?the?transfer.?(In?re?Jones,?supra,?51?Bankr.?834,?837.)fn.?6
[1b]?Since?the?confusion?in?this?area?of?the?law?appears?to?have?developed?after?enactment?of?the?1975?amendments?to?the?community?property?laws,?we?must?determine?whether?the?amendments?are?such?that?the?reasoning?of?the?Britton?(supra,?4?Cal.2d?690)?court?is?no?longer?controlling?when?the?nonconsenting?spouse?brings?an?action?while?the?community?is?still?in?existence.?We?shall?conclude?that?our?reasoning?supporting?Britton?is?still?valid,?and?hence?the?Andrade?(supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?330)?line?of?cases?is?correct.In?our?view,?Mitchell?did?not?completely?analyze?section?5127?and?the?relevant?case?law.?The?Mitchell?court?reasoned?that?because?the?community?is?liable?for?the?contracts?of?either?spouse?which?are?made?after?marriage?(??5116),?the?community?realty?is?subject?to?execution?for?the?debts?contracted?[54?Cal.3d?37]?during?the?marriage.?Hence,?the?Mitchell?court?concluded,?it?follows?that?the?deed?of?trust?must?also?be?valid.?(Mitchell,?supra,?110?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?223.)
This?analysis?ignores?section?5127’s?plain?language?requiring?the?signature?of?both?spouses?for?a?valid?transfer?of?community?realty.?Furthermore,?Mitchell?makes?no?mention?of?Britton?but?instead?relies?on?Gantner?v.?Johnson?(1969)?274?Cal.App.2d?869?[79?Cal.Rptr.?381]?(Gantner).?Yet,?Gantner?specifically?notes?that?its?discussion?concerned?the?”rules?applying?to?transfers?of?community?property?by?the?husband?as?manager?of?the?community?property.”?(Id.?at?p.?876,?italics?added.)fn.?7
In?its?disapproval?of?Mitchell?and?related?cases,?the?Andrade?court?pointed?out?that?since?Gantner,?supra,?274?Cal.App.2d?869,?section?5127?has?been?amended?to?provide?both?spouses?with?equal?management?and?control?of?community?real?property.?”It?is?highly?questionable?whether?the?rules?espoused?in?Gantner?survive?after?the?amendments?to?section?5127?which?have?significantly?altered?former?concepts?of?the?spouses’?respective?rights?and?responsibilities?concerning?their?community?property.”?(Andrade,?supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?337.)?Like?the?Andrade?court,?we?conclude?that?the?correct?rule?is?the?one?that?protects?each?spouse?from?the?unauthorized?acts?of?the?other?that?may?defeat?the?community?interests?in?the?real?property.?(Andrade,?supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?337.)
Of?the?four?reasons?(see,?ante,?p.?34)?for?our?opinion?in?Britton,?only?one?is?called?into?question?by?the?1975?amendments.?In?Britton?we?said?that?allowing?the?husband’s?gift?of?community?real?property?to?stand?might?defeat?the?power?of?the?court?to?award?more?than?half?of?the?community?property?to?an?”innocent”?wife?at?the?time?of?dissolution.?(Britton,?supra,?4?Cal.2d?at?p.?692)?[3]?The?1975?Family?Law?Act?amendments?also?removed?the?concept?of?fault?in?divorce,?and?courts?are?now?generally?required?to?make?an?equal?division?of?the?community?property.?(??4800,?subd.?(a).)?However,?in?making?an?equal?division,?each?individual?piece?of?community?property?does?not?have?to?be?equally?divided.?(??4800,?subd.?(b).)?Although?the?court?may?not?award?a?greater?part?of?the?community?property?to?one?spouse,?it?can?determine?to?which?spouse?a?particular?piece?of?community?property?shall?be?awarded.?Since?the?court?retains?power?to?award?a?specific?asset?to?a?spouse,?[54?Cal.3d?38]?the?change?in?the?law?is?not?so?significant?as?to?undermine?our?holding?in?Britton.?The?other?reasons?underlying?our?decision?in?Britton?are?still?valid?and?support?the?right?of?the?nonconsenting?spouse?during?the?marriage?to?invalidate?the?transfer?in?its?entirety.
More?importantly,?the?Britton?(supra,?4?Cal.2d?690)?and?Andrade?(supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?330)?line?of?cases?is?consistent?with?the?plain?language?of?section?5127.?[4]?”It?is?axiomatic?that?in?the?interpretation?of?a?statute?where?the?language?is?clear,?its?plain?meaning?should?be?followed.”?(Great?Lakes?Properties,?Inc.?v.?City?of?El?Segundo?(1977)?19?Cal.3d?152,?155?[137?Cal.Rptr.?154,?561?P.2d?244].)?[1c]?The?statute?requires?that?both?spouses?join?in?executing?”any?instrument”?conveying?”any?interest”?in?the?community’s?real?property.?(Italics?added.)?The?term?”any”?(particularly?in?a?statute)?means?”all”?or?”every.”?(California?State?Auto.?Assn.?Inter-Ins.?Bureau?v.?Warwick?(1976)?17?Cal.3d?190,?195?[130?Cal.Rptr.?520,?550?P.2d?1056]?[“From?the?earliest?days?of?statehood?we?have?interpreted?’any’?to?be?broad,?general?and?all?embracing.”];?Estate?of?Wyman?(1962)?208?Cal.App.2d?489,?492?[25?Cal.Rptr.?280];?Emmolo?v.?Southern?Pacific?Co.?(1949)?91?Cal.App.2d?87,?92?[204?P.2d?427].)?The?language,?”any?interest,”?would?include?the?consenting?spouse’s?one-half?undivided?interest.?Therefore,?under?the?plain?language?of?section?5127,?both?spouses?”must?join?in?executing?any?instrument”?encumbering?such?interest.fn.?8
Friedman?argues?that?encumbrances?under?section?5127?should?be?treated?differently?than?leases,?sales,?and?conveyances.?We?disagree.?[5]?As?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?has?stated,?”[it]?is?a?familiar?principle?of?statutory?construction?that?words?grouped?in?a?list?should?be?given?related?meaning.”?(Third?National?Bank?v.?Impac?Limited,?Inc.?(1974)?432?U.S.?312,?322?[53?L.Ed.2d?368,?376,?97?S.Ct.?2307];?see?also,?Schreiber?v.?Burlington?Northern,?Inc.?(1985)?472?U.S.?1,?8?[86?L.Ed.2d?1,?7,?105?S.Ct.?2458];?Securities?Industry?Ass’n?v.?Board?of?Governors?(1984)?468?U.S.?207,?218?[82?L.Ed.2d?158,?167-168,?104?S.Ct.?3003].)?In?each?of?these?cases?the?high?court?rejected?an?argument?that?one?word?in?a?list?should?be?construed?to?have?a?substantially?different?effect?than?others.?[1d]?Furthermore,?the?Mitchell?analysis,?which?Friedman?urges?us?to?adopt,?does?not?support?the?argument?that?encumbrances?should?be?treated?differently.?Mitchell?noted?that?Gantner,?supra,?274?Cal.App.2d?869,?876-877,?involved?a?conveyance,?and?then?applied?Gantner’s?analysis,?by?analogy,?to?cases?involving?encumbrances.?[54?Cal.3d?39]?The?Mitchell?court?did?not?indicate?that?encumbrances?should?in?any?way?be?treated?differently.?(Mitchell,?supra,?110?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?223.)
Amicus?curiae?Mortgage?Institute?of?California?argues?that?after?the?1975?reforms,?the?power?of?either?spouse?to?transfer?community?property?is?greater?than?before?the?reforms.?In?effect,?it?argues?that?equal?management?concepts?lead?to?the?conclusion?that?both?spouses?should?now?be?able?to?transfer?community?property?during?the?marriage,?and?that?the?transfer?should?be?valid?as?to?the?consenting?spouse’s?one-half?interest.?However,?the?earlier?cases?upholding?a?husband’s?ability?to?transfer?his?one-half?community?property?interest?during?the?marriage?were?based?on?the?husband’s?power?as?sole?manager?of?the?community?property.?(See,?e.g.,?Gantner,?supra,?274?Cal.App.2d?at?p.?876.)?The?1975?reforms,?and?the?advent?of?concepts?of?equal?management?and?shared?responsibility?for?the?community?property,?support?our?interpretation?of?section?5127?as?requiring?both?spouses’?consent?for?the?effective?transfer?of?community?real?property.
Amicus?curiae?Mortgage?Institute?of?California?also?contends?that?the?Legislature?has?expressed?its?approval?of?Mitchell?by?failing?to?enact?legislation?proposed?by?the?California?Law?Revision?Commission?that?would?have?expressly?overruled?that?case.?We?disagree.?In?our?view,?the?Law?Revision?Commission?did?not?believe?that?its?recommended?legislation?would?change?California?law.?The?commission?stated?that?enactment?of?its?recommendations?would?”[codify]?general?California?law?and?overrule[?]?the?contrary?case?of?Mitchell?….”?(Recommendations?Relating?to?Disposition?of?Community?Property?(Sept.?1983)?17?Cal.?Law?Revision?Com.?Rep.?(1984)?p.?279,?fn.?33.)fn.?9?It?is?apparent?that?the?commission?viewed?the?recommended?statutes?as?codifying?the?general?law?as?it?existed,?and?saw?Mitchell?as?an?aberrant?case,?inconsistent?with?general?California?law.?Given?the?deficiencies?in?the?Mitchell?analysis,?the?soundness?of?the?Britton?and?Andrade?line?of?cases,?and?our?own?interpretation?of?section?5127,?the?fact?that?Mitchell?has?not?specifically?been?legislatively?abrogated?is?not?sufficient?evidence?that?the?Legislature?approves?of?the?decision.fn.?10?[54?Cal.3d?40] III.?Transfers?to?Secure?Attorney?Fees
In?the?present?case,?after?the?parties?had?separated,?but?before?a?dissolution?of?the?marriage,?Wife?unilaterally?encumbered?two?parcels?of?the?community’s?realty?to?secure?attorney?fees.?Husband?brought?an?action?to?quiet?title?to?the?community?realty.?As?the?character?of?the?property?as?community?property?had?not?changed?at?the?time?Wife?made?the?unilateral?encumbrance?and?at?the?time?Husband?challenged?the?encumbrance,?we?conclude?that?Husband?is?entitled?to?invalidate?the?encumbrance?in?its?entirety.
Seeking?a?contrary?result,?Friedman?and?various?amicus?curiae?groups?have?advanced?some?policy?reasons?for?allowing?a?spouse?to?unilaterally?transfer?community?real?property?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?a?dissolution?proceeding.?Their?concerns?are?primarily?for?economically?weak?spouses.?Before?the?granting?of?pendente?lite?orders?for?litigation?expenses,?an?economically?weak?spouse?seeking?legal?representation?may?be?in?a?disadvantageous?position.?(See,?e.g.,?In?re?Marriage?of?Mulhern?(1973)?29?Cal.App.3d?988,?995?[106?Cal.Rptr.?78].)?Lacking?economic?parity?and?access?to?liquid?funds,?the?economically?weak?spouse’s?only?assets?available?for?the?payment?of?attorney?fees?may?consist?of?his?or?her?interest?in?the?community?real?property.?If?an?economically?weak?spouse?is?unable?to?take?advantage?of?his?or?her?interest?in?the?community?real?property,?then?that?spouse?may?either?have?to?retain?inexperienced?or?incompetent?counsel,?find?counsel?or?a?lender?willing?to?extend?unlimited,?unsecured?credit,?or?appear?in?propria?persona.?Moreover,?important?prehearing?discovery?may?not?be?possible?and?the?retention?of?experts?would?be?most?difficult.
We?are?not?unmindful?of?the?concerns?of?economically?weak?spouses?which?are?expressed?by?amici?curiae.?Although,?sections?4370,?4370.5?and?5125.1,?subdivision?(e)?serve?to?protect?the?economically?weak?spouse?to?some?extent,?they?are?not?totally?adequate?to?assure?legal?representation.?Sections?4370?and?4370.5?permit?the?court,?during?the?pendency?of?a?dissolution?proceeding,?to?order?a?party?to?pay?attorney?fees?pendente?lite.?”The?basis?for?awarding?attorney’s?fees?is?that?each?party?must?have?access?to?legal?representation?in?order?to?preserve?all?of?his?or?her?rights.”?(In?re?Marriage?of?Barnert?(1978)?85?Cal.App.3d?413,?428?[149?Cal.Rptr.?616].)?Sections?4370?and?4370.5,?though?helpful?in?many?instances,?admittedly?do?not?always?guarantee?an?award,?or?an?adequate?award,?of?fees?to?a?spouse?without?funds.fn.?11?Moreover,?these?sections?may?also?have?the?unintended?[54?Cal.3d?41]?effect?of?placing?an?economically?weak?spouse?at?the?mercy?of?the?courts.fn.?12?(169?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?1215-1216.)?Section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e),?which?empowers?the?court?to?dispense?with?the?requirements?of?section?5127?in?certain?circumstancesfn.?13?may,?as?a?practical?matter,?not?always?prove?effective.?For?example,?a?spouse?who?is?without?funds?to?initially?hire?an?attorney?in?a?dissolution?proceeding?may?find?himself?or?herself?in?the?incongruous?position?of?also?having?to?hire?an?attorney?to?commence?an?action?under?section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e).?In?most?cases,?then,?section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e)?may?prove?to?be?an?illusory?remedy?for?the?economically?weak?spouse.
Although?we?are?sympathetic?to?the?problems?economically?weak?spouses?may?have?in?obtaining?legal?representation?and?recognize?the?limitations?of?sections?4370,?4370.5,?and?5125.1,?subdivision?(e),?we?are?nonetheless?compelled?to?conclude?that?nothing?in?the?language?of?section?5127,?or?in?its?legislative?history,?allows?us?to?carve?out?an?exception?to?the?general?rule?against?unilateral?transfers?of?community?realty.?If?section?5127?is?to?be?amended?to?create?an?exception?allowing?a?spouse?to?unilaterally?transfer?community?realty?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?a?dissolution?proceeding,?it?is?the?task?of?the?Legislature?and?not?the?courts?to?create?that?exception.?”In?the?construction?of?a?statute?or?instrument,?the?office?of?the?judge?is?simply?to?ascertain?and?declare?what?is?in?terms?or?in?substance?contained?therein,?not?to?insert?what?has?been?omitted,?or?to?omit?what?has?been?inserted?….”?(Code?Civ.?Proc.,???1858.?See?also,?Moore?v.?Regents?of?University?of?California?(1990)?51?Cal.3d?120,?147?[271?Cal.Rptr.?146,?793?P.2d?479]?[“Complex?policy?choices?affecting?all?society?are?involved,?and?'[l]egislatures,?in?making?such?policy?decisions,?have?the?ability?to?gather?empirical?evidence,?solicit?the?advice?of?experts,?and?hold?hearings?at?which?all?interested?parties?present?evidence?and?express?their?views?….’?(Foley?v.?Interactive?Data?Corp.?[(1988)]?47?Cal.3d?654,?694,?fn.?31?[254?Cal.Rptr.?211,?765?P.2d?373].).”)
While?we?recognize?that?the?separation?period?is?sometimes?treated?differently?from?the?ongoing?marriage,?this?different?treatment?is?based?on?specific?provisions?of?our?code?sections?and?is?not?the?result?of?judicial?fiat.?(See,?e.g.,?section?5118,?providing?that?the?earnings?and?accumulations?of?either?[54?Cal.3d?42]?spouse?during?separation?are?the?separate?property?of?that?spouse;?section?5120.140,?subdivision?(a)(2),?providing?that?debts?incurred?after?separation,?other?than?debts?for?the?necessaries?of?life,?are?the?separate?obligation?of?the?spouse?who?incurred?the?debt;?and?section?4359,?subdivision?(a),?providing?that?during?the?pendency?of?a?dissolution?proceeding,?the?court?may?issue?ex?parte?protective?orders?restraining?any?person?from?transferring,?encumbering,?hypothecating,?concealing?or?disposing?of?any?property,?real?or?personal,?whether?community,?quasi-community,?or?separate.)?Hence,?the?Legislature,?if?it?chooses,?may?decide?to?fashion?a?solution?to?the?problems?faced?by?economically?weak?spouses?in?dissolution?proceedings?in?some?fashion.?Given?the?plain?language?of?section?5127,?and?the?fact?that?community?property?does?not?change?its?character?as?such?upon?separation?of?the?spouses,?we?are?not?the?body?authorized?to?create?an?exception?to?the?statute.
[6a]?We?also?note?that?the?Legislature?is?not?unaware?of?some?of?the?problems?we?discuss?above.?The?Legislature?recently?amended?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?provisions?relating?to?the?restraint?on?alienation?of?property,?which?is?contained?in?every?dissolution?summons?after?July?1,?1990.?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21,?subdivision?(a)(2)?(hereafter?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2))?sets?forth?the?provisions?of?the?”automatic”?restraining?order?and?now?concludes?that?”nothing?in?the?restraining?order?shall?preclude?the?parties?from?using?community?property?to?pay?reasonable?attorney’s?fees?in?order?to?retain?legal?counsel?in?the?action.”Amicus?curiae?asserts?that?by?enacting?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2),?the?Legislature?was?”carving?out”?an?exception?to?section?5127?to?allow?transfers?of?community?real?property?for?the?payment?of?attorney?fees.?The?dissent?maintains?that?when?”harmonized,”?section?5127?and?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?allow?a?spouse?to?unilaterally?transfer?community?real?property?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?a?dissolution?action.?Although?we?share?the?concern?for?economically?weak?spouses,?we?do?not?believe?that?either?the?plain?language?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?or?its?legislative?history?supports?the?conclusion?that?the?Legislature?intended?to?create?an?exception?to,?or?implicitly?alter?the?effect?of,?section?5127.
As?a?preliminary?matter,?we?observe?that?the?provisions?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?do?not?even?apply?to?the?present?case.?Wife?unilaterally?encumbered?the?community?real?property?more?than?three?years?before?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)’s?effective?date?of?July?1,?1990.?As?we?have?often?observed,?”[n]o?part?of?[the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure]?is?retroactive,?unless?expressly?so?declared.”?(Code?Civ.?Proc.,???3.?See?also,?Aetna?Cas.?&?Surety?Co.?v.?Ind.?Acc.?Com.?(1947)?30?Cal.2d?[54?Cal.3d?43]?388,?393?[182?P.2d?159]?[“It?is?an?established?canon?of?interpretation?that?statutes?are?not?to?be?given?a?retrospective?operation?unless?it?is?clearly?made?to?appear?that?such?was?the?legislative?intent.?[Citations.]”].)?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?contains?no?such?explicit?language?making?its?provisions?retroactive.
More?importantly,?neither?the?plain?language?nor?the?legislative?history?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?support?the?conclusion?that?the?Legislature?intended?to?create?an?explicit?exception?to?section?5127?or?allow?an?interpretation?of?section?5127?that?would?create?an?implicit?exception?to?the?general?rule?forbidding?unilateral?transfers?of?community?real?property.?The?general?principle?that?statutes?must?be?construed?in?the?context?of?the?entire?statutory?system?of?which?they?are?a?part,?in?order?to?achieve?harmony?among?the?parts,?applies?equally?to?this?case.?(People?v.?Woodhead?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?1002,?1009?[239?Cal.Rptr.?656,?741?P.2d?154].)?The?portion?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?pertaining?to?attorney?fees?merely?frees?a?party?from?the?prohibitions?of?the?automatic?restraining?order?so?that?community?property?may?be?used?to?pay?reasonable?attorney?fees.?The?statute?does?not?attempt?to?address?the?substantive?issue?of?the?legality?of?unilateral?sales,?leases,?conveyances,?or?encumbrances?of?community?real?property.?Hence,?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?may?be?interpreted?as?applying?to?community?property?that?is?readily?accessible?or?”liquid,”?such?as?funds?in?a?bank?account,?and?not?to?transfers?of?community?real?property.?This?interpretation?harmonizes?the?two?sections?by?giving?effect?to?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?without?abrogating?section?5127.
Furthermore,?nothing?in?the?legislative?history?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?reveals?a?legislative?intent?to?create?an?explicit?or?implicit?exception?to,?or?amendment?of,?section?5127.?Significantly,?section?5127?is?not?even?mentioned?or?referred?to?in?the?legislative?history?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2).?[7]?”?’?”Repeals?by?implication?are?disfavored?and?are?recognized?only?when?potentially?conflicting?statutes?cannot?be?harmonized.”?(Dew?v.?Appleberry?(1979)?23?Cal.3d?630,?636?[153?Cal.Rptr.?219,?591?P.2d?509].)?Indeed,?”[s]o?strong?is?the?presumption?against?implied?repeals?that?when?a?new?enactment?conflicts?with?an?existing?provision,?'[i]n?order?for?the?second?law?to?repeal?or?supersede?the?first,?the?former?must?constitute?a?revision?of?the?entire?subject,?so?that?the?court?may?say?that?it?was?intended?to?be?a?substitute?for?the?first.’?”?(Board?of?Supervisors?v.?Lonergan?(1980)?27?Cal.3d?855,?868?[167?Cal.Rptr.?820,?616?P.2d?802],?quoting?Penziner?v.?West?American?Finance?Co.?(1937)?10?Cal.2d?160,?176?[74?P.2d?252].?See?also?Kennedy?Wholesale,?Inc.?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?245,?249?[279?Cal.Rptr.?325,?806?P.2d?1360].)?[54?Cal.3d?44]
In?addition,?the?fact?that?section?5127?is?neither?analyzed?nor?mentioned?in?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)’s?legislative?history?makes?it?impossible?to?conclude?that?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?”illuminates?the?Legislature’s?understanding?of?the?statutory?scheme?it?created?as?not?precluding?resort?to?community?real?property?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?a?dissolution?action.”?(Dis.?opn.,?post,?at?p.?55.)?[8]?(See?fn.?14.)?Because?we?do?not?believe?that?the?Legislature?would?create?an?exception?to?the?general?rule?against?unilateral?transfers?of?community?real?property,?or?express?its?understanding?of?that?prohibition,?without?mentioning?section?5127,?we?are?unwilling?to?create?a?judicial?exception?to?the?same?rule.fn.?14
[6b]?Finally,?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?codifies?the?procedural?rules?governing?the?inclusion?of?temporary?restraining?orders?in?summonses?for,?among?other?things,?the?dissolution?of?a?marriage.?By?contrast,?section?5127?codifies?the?substantive?law?relating?to?community?property.?Having?considered?the?language?and?legislative?history?of?both?section?5127?and?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2),?we?cannot?believe?the?Legislature?chose?to?create?an?exception?to?the?substantive?law,?contained?in?the?Civil?Code,?by?amending?a?procedural?rule?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure.?As?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?cannot?be?applied?retroactively,?we?have?no?occasion?in?the?present?case?to?definitively?interpret?the?section.?Nonetheless,?we?cannot?accept?the?contention?that?this?procedural?rule?creates?an?explicit?or?implicit?exception?to?section?5127?that?would?permit?unilateral?transfers?of?community?real?property?in?violation?of?the?general?rule?against?such?unilateral?transfers.fn.?15?[54?Cal.3d?45]- Retroactivity
Furthermore,?Mitchell?is?neither?a?long-standing?precedent?nor?has?it?enjoyed?near?unanimous?support?in?the?lower?courts.?Mitchell?was?decided?[54?Cal.3d?46]?fairly?recently,?1980,?and?was?questioned?by?Andrade?only?two?years?later.?(Andrade,?supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?337,?fn.?3.?Accord,?Harper?v.?Raya,?supra,?154?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?913;?In?re?Jones,?supra,?51?Bankr.?835.)?Moreover,?as?we?discussed?above,?Mitchell’s?analysis?of?section?5127?was?incomplete.?Under?these?circumstances,?we?cannot?conclude?that?reliance?on?Mitchell,?without?due?regard?to?the?contrary?rule?of?Andrade,?was?reasonable?and?justifiable.fn.?16?Consequently,?we?decline?to?depart?from?the?general?rule?that?favors?giving?judicial?decisions?retroactive?effect.
- Conclusion
In?summary,?we?conclude?that?during?the?existence?of?the?community,?the?nonconsenting?spouse?should?be?fully?protected?against?efforts?by?the?other?spouse?to?transfer?community?real?property?in?contravention?of?section?5127.?In?such?cases,?the?attempted?transfer?is?subject?to?a?timely?action?during?the?marriage?to?avoid?it.?A?transfer?of?the?community?real?property?without?both?spouses?consent?adversely?affects?the?nonconsenting?spouse’s?interests?and?the?dissolution?court’s?ability?to?make?an?equitable?division?of?the?community?property.?Allowing?the?transfer?to?stand?against?a?challenge?by?the?nonconsenting?spouse?could?have?the?effect?of?partitioning?the?community?property?during?the?marriage,?an?event?the?Legislature?has?expressly?sought?to?avoid.?(See?Code?Civ.?Proc.,???872.210,?subd.?(b).)?The?effect?of?enforcing?one-spouse?transfers?would?be?to?make?community?property?more?like?property?held?as?tenants?in?common?and?could?result?in?the?nonconsenting?spouse?being?forced?to?become?a?tenant?in?common?with?a?stranger.
We?believe?the?Britton?(supra,?4?Cal.2d?690)?and?Andrade?(supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?330)?line?of?cases?to?be?consistent?with?the?nature?of?community?property?in?California?today.?Both?spouses?hold?equal?undivided?one-half?interests?in?the?property.?Joint?ownership?of?the?property?requires?that?during?[54?Cal.3d?47]?an?ongoing?marriage?both?spouses?must?consent?before?such?property?is?leased?for?a?period?longer?than?one?year,?sold,?conveyed,?or?encumbered.?(??5127.)?Community?property?principles?of?equal?management?and?shared?responsibility?mandate?that?the?nonconsenting?spouse?is?entitled?to?invalidate?in?its?entirety?the?other?spouse’s?transfer?of?community?real?property.?The?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?that?section?5127?prevents?one?spouse?from?encumbering?the?community’s?real?property?without?the?other?spouse’s?consent?is?affirmed.fn.?17
Lucas,?C.?J.,?Mosk,?J.,?Broussard,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?and?Baxter,?J.,?concurred.
KENNARD,?J.
I?respectfully?dissent.
The?issue?in?this?case?is?whether,?after?the?parties?to?a?marriage?have?separated,?a?spouse?has?the?right?to?encumber?his?or?her?one-half?interest?in?community?real?property?without?the?consent?of?the?other?spouse?to?secure?the?payment?of?attorney?fees?incurred?in?a?marital?dissolution?proceeding.?Construed?under?well-established?rules,?the?controlling?statutes?disclose?a?legislative?intent?to?grant?spouses?that?right.?Today’s?decision?not?only?contravenes?that?intent,?but?will?make?it?virtually?impossible?for?many?economically?weaker?spouses?to?obtain?adequate?legal?representation?in?contested?divorce?proceedings.
I
In?1982,?Joanna?Droeger?(Wife)?commenced?a?marital?dissolution?action?against?her?husband,?John?Droeger?(Husband),?a?partner?in?a?San?Francisco?law?firm.?She?retained?the?law?firm?of?Friedman,?Sloan?&?Ross?to?represent?her?in?this?action,?and?entered?into?a?written?fee?agreement?with?the?law?firm.
The?litigation?was?lengthy,?as?dissolution?proceedings?sometimes?are;?Wife?was?unable?to?pay?her?attorney?fees?on?a?current?basis,?and?by?November?1986?had?fallen?seriously?in?arrears.?Rather?than?withdraw?as?counsel,?Friedman,?Sloan?&?Ross?accepted?a?promissory?note?for?its?attorney?fees?from?Wife;?the?promissory?note?was?secured?by?a?deed?of?trust?on?her?interest?[54?Cal.3d?48]?in?certain?community?real?property.?Wife?executed?the?promissory?note?after?being?advised?by?the?law?firm?that?she?had?the?right?to?consult?independent?counsel?concerning?this?transaction.
In?December?1986,?the?parties?reached?a?settlement,?which?was?never?implemented.?The?attorneys?for?both?Wife?and?Husband?successfully?moved?to?withdraw?from?the?case.?Wife?and?Husband?apparently?remain?married,?and?Wife?has?never?paid?her?attorney?fees.
Friedman,?Sloan?&?Ross?did?not?seek?to?enforce?its?deed?of?trust.?But?Husband?then?filed?this?lawsuit?against?Friedman,?Sloan?&?Ross,?seeking?to?quiet?title?and?void?the?deed?of?trust?not?only?as?to?his?interest?in?the?property?but?also?as?to?Wife’s?interest.
Wife’s?financial?arrangement?with?her?attorneys?is?representative?of?a?practice?commonly?utilized?in?family?law?cases.?As?one?manual?on?California?family?law?observes:?”[T]he?right?to?place?a?lien?on?the?client’s?property?[in?dissolution?actions]?is?often?created?in?the?fee?agreement?to?provide?security?for?the?payment?of?fees.?Typically,?such?a?lien?may?be?in?the?form?of?a?second?deed?of?trust?on?the?client’s?real?property,?such?as?a?residence.”?(Cal.?Family?Law?Service?(1986)?Termination?of?Marital?Relationship???21:18,?p.?330.)fn.?1?Another?legal?text?advises:?”If?the?money?[to?pay?the?attorney?a?retainer?in?a?dissolution?proceeding]?cannot?be?obtained?from?community?bank?accounts,?the?spouse?should?consider?borrowing?the?money?using?community?property?as?security?….”?(3?Markey,?Cal.?Family?Law?Practice?&?Procedure?(1991?rev.?ed.)???40.32[4],?p.?40-80.)
The?common?practice?of?retaining?counsel?whose?fees?are?secured?by?a?deed?of?trust?is,?by?its?nature,?not?one?that?an?economically?stronger?spouse?will?frequently?wish?to?utilize.?Rather,?retaining?counsel?by?executing?a?promissory?note?secured?by?a?deed?of?trust?on?the?spouse’s?interest?in?community?real?property?is?desirable?primarily?for?those?spouses?who?do?not?have?access?to?substantial?sums?of?money.?For?such?spouses,?the?alternative?[54?Cal.3d?49]?may?simply?be?that?they?will?not?be?represented?by?a?lawyer?in?dissolution?proceedings.
Legal?representation?in?dissolution?cases?is?particularly?important?when?child?custody?is?contested?or?there?are?complex?property?issues,?such?as?determining?the?value?of?the?other?spouse’s?business?or?professional?practice.?To?effectively?litigate?such?issues,?an?attorney?must?engage?in?extensive?factual?and?legal?investigations,?and?must?charge?correspondingly?high?attorney?fees.?Economically?weaker?spouses?who?cannot?secure?payment?of?attorney?fees?may?be?unable?to?conduct?adequate?discovery?or?to?sufficiently?prepare?for?motions?that?may?be?critical?to?the?outcome?of?the?case.?Economically?stronger?spouses,?on?the?other?hand,?can?afford?to?protect?their?interests?by?funding?legal?efforts?through?current?earnings?or?separate?property.?Thus,?spouses?who?cannot?secure?their?fee?obligations?through?liens?on?community?real?property,?and?are?thereby?denied?the?ability?to?utilize?their?property?to?protect?their?interests,?may?be?unable?to?meaningfully?contest?the?demands?of?economically?stronger?spouses?in?family?law?actions.
In?marital?dissolution?proceedings,?a?trial?court?may?order?either?spouse?to?pay?the?other’s?attorney?fees.?(Civ.?Code,???4370.)?But?this?trial?court?power?does?little?to?assist?economically?weaker?spouses?in?obtaining?representation?because?attorneys?are?naturally?reluctant?to?accept?a?case?when?they?know?that?payment?for?their?services?will?be?neither?prompt?nor?certain,?but?will?depend?on?a?future?and?discretionary?court?order?awarding?fees?in?an?uncertain?and?possibly?inadequate?amount.?That?court-?ordered?attorney?fees?in?marital?dissolution?proceedings?are?often?delayed?and?inadequate?in?amount?was?acknowledged?in?a?recent?report?of?the?Judicial?Council?Advisory?Committee?on?Gender?Bias?in?the?Courts,?based?on?a?survey?conducted?in?21?California?counties.?The?report?states:?”Most?counties?reported?that?the?majority?of?family?law?judges?reserve?attorney’s?fees?at?the?time?of?the?temporary?order.?…?Most?counties?responded?that?where?fees?are?ordered?based?upon?the?ability?to?pay,?they?are?not?adequate.?Most?respondents?noted?that?this?practice?adversely?affects?the?ability?of?the?spouse?with?no?income?or?a?very?low?income,?most?often?women,?to?retain?counsel.”?(Advisory?Com.?Rep.?for?Judicial?Council?of?Cal.,?Achieving?Equal?Justice?for?Women?and?Men?in?the?Courts,?Draft?Rep.,?Achieving?Equal?Justice?in?Family?Law?(1990)?p.?100.)?The?committee?concluded?that?this?situation?had?contributed?to?a?”crisis?in?representation”?in?family?law?cases.?(Id.?at?p.?106.)
II
Husband?contends?that?the?deed?of?trust?given?by?Wife?is?void?even?as?to?her?share?of?the?community?property?under?Civil?Code?section?5127?(hereafter?[54?Cal.3d?50]?section?5127).?That?statute?provides?in?pertinent?part:?”[B]oth?spouses?either?personally?or?by?duly?authorized?agent,?must?join?in?executing?any?instrument?by?which?such?community?real?property?or?any?interest?therein?is?leased?for?a?longer?period?than?one?year,?or?is?sold,?conveyed,?or?encumbered?….”
Husband?relies?on?the?”plain?meaning?rule”?in?support?of?his?argument.?(See,?e.g.,?Great?Lakes?Properties,?Inc.?v.?City?of?El?Segundo?(1977)?19?Cal.3d?152,?155-156?[137?Cal.Rptr.?154,?561?P.2d?244].)?He?argues?that?one?spouse’s?interest?is?”any?interest,”?and?that?under?the?statute’s?plain?language?both?spouses?must?join?in?an?instrument?encumbering?that?interest,?or?the?instrument?is?entirely?void.
“[O]ur?first?task?in?construing?a?statute?is?to?ascertain?the?intent?of?the?Legislature?so?as?to?effectuate?the?purpose?of?the?law.”?(Dyna-Med,?Inc.?v.?Fair?Employment?&?Housing?Com.?(1987)43?Cal.3d?1379,?1386?[241?Cal.Rptr.?67,?743?P.2d?1323];?accord,?e.g.,?Altaville?Drug?Store,?Inc.?v.?Employment?Development?Department?(1988)?44?Cal.3d?231,?238?[242?Cal.Rptr.?732,?746?P.2d?871];?Select?Base?Materials?v.?Board?of?Equal.?(1959)?51?Cal.2d?640,?645?[335?P.2d?672].)?In?doing?so,?we?employ?a?number?of?canons?of?statutory?construction,?including,?when?appropriate,?the?plain?meaning?rule.?But?the?separate?canons?are?”merely?aids?to?ascertaining?probable?legislative?intent.”?(Stone?v.?Superior?Court?(1982)?31?Cal.3d?503,?521,?fn.?10?[183?Cal.Rptr.?647,?646?P.2d?809].)?No?single?canon?of?statutory?construction?is?an?infallible?guide?to?correct?interpretation?in?all?circumstances.?We?have?for?many?decades?adhered?to?the?rule?that?”?'[t]he?mere?literal?construction?of?a?section?in?a?statute?ought?not?to?prevail?if?it?is?opposed?to?the?intention?of?the?legislature?….’?”?(In?re?Haines?(1925)?195?Cal.?605,?613?[234?P.?883];?accord,?e.g.,?Lungren?v.?Deukmejian?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?727,?735?[248?Cal.Rptr.?115,?755?P.2d?299].)
Thus,?in?construing?a?statute,?the?task?of?the?court?is?to?determine?legislative?intent;?in?doing?so,?the?court?should?utilize?those?tools?of?interpretation?that?most?clearly?illuminate?the?legislative?objective.
One?”elementary?rule”?of?statutory?construction?is?that?statutes?in?pari?materia-that?is,?statutes?relating?to?the?same?subject?matter-should?be?construed?together.?(Hunstock?v.?Estate?Development?Corp.?(1943)?22?Cal.2d?205,?210?[138?P.2d?1,?148?A.L.R.?968].)?We?have?long?recognized?the?principle?that?even?though?a?statute?may?appear?to?be?unambiguous?on?its?face,?when?it?is?considered?in?light?of?closely?related?statutes?a?legislative?purpose?may?emerge?that?is?inconsistent?with,?and?controlling?over,?the?language?read?without?reference?to?the?entire?scheme?of?the?law.?(E.g.,?Great?Lakes?Properties,?Inc.?v.?City?of?El?Segundo,?supra,?19?Cal.3d?at?pp.?155-156;?[54?Cal.3d?51]?Leroy?T.?v.?Workmen’s?Comp.?Appeals?Bd.?(1974)?12?Cal.3d?434,?438?[115?Cal.Rptr.?761,?525?P.2d?665].)?The?rule?of?in?pari?materia?is?a?corollary?of?the?principle?that?the?goal?of?statutory?interpretation?is?to?determine?legislative?intent.
In?this?case,?the?surest?guide?to?the?intent?of?the?Legislature?is?a?statute?that?deals?with?the?same?subject?matter?as?section?5127?and?expresses?the?Legislature’s?approval?of?the?long-standing?practice?of?relying?on?community?real?property?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?dissolution?cases.
In?1989,?the?Legislature?enacted?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21.?Subdivision?(a)?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(hereafter?section?412.21(a))?provides?in?relevant?part:
“[I]n?an?action?for?dissolution?of?marriage,?…?the?summons?shall?…?contain?temporary?restraining?orders?set?forth?in?this?section.?Upon?the?filing?of?a?petition?for?dissolution?…?and?issuance?of?the?summons?and?upon?personal?service?of?the?petition?and?summons?on?the?respondent?…?a?temporary?restraining?order?shall?be?in?effect?against?both?parties?until?the?final?decree?is?entered?or?the?petition?is?dismissed,?or?until?further?order?of?the?court:
“?*?*?*
“(2)?Restraining?both?parties?from?transferring,?encumbering,?hypothecating,?concealing,?or?in?any?way?disposing?of?any?property,?real?or?personal,?whether?community,?quasi-community,?or?separate,?without?the?written?consent?of?the?other?party?or?an?order?of?the?court,?except?in?the?usual?course?of?business?or?for?the?necessities?of?life?and?requiring?each?party?to?notify?the?other?party?of?any?proposed?extraordinary?expenditures?….?However,?nothing?in?the?restraining?order?shall?preclude?the?parties?from?using?community?property?to?pay?reasonable?attorney’s?fees?in?order?to?retain?legal?counsel?in?the?action.”?(Italics?added.)
There?can?be?no?explanation?of?the?last?sentence?of?section?412.21(a)(2)?except?that?the?Legislature?specifically?intended?that?spouses?have?the?power?to?use?community?property?to?pay?attorney?fees?in?dissolution?actions.?The?Legislature,?though?not?mandating?that?community?property?be?used?to?pay?attorney?fees,?clearly?contemplated?the?practice?and?approved?it.?If?the?Legislature?had?been?of?the?view?that?section?5127?precluded?resort?to?community?property?to?pay?attorney?fees,?there?would?have?been?no?reason?to?include?the?statement?in?question.
Moreover,?section?412.21(a)(2)?does?not?limit?the?community?property?that?may?be?used?to?pay?attorney?fees?to?readily?accessible?or?”liquid”?community?[54?Cal.3d?52]?personal?property,?as?the?majority?suggests.?Rather,?the?first?sentence?of?the?section?expressly?refers?to?both?real?and?personal?community?property;?the?second?sentence?refers?generally?to?community?property,?and?does?not?state?that?only?one?type?of?community?property?may?be?used?to?pay?attorney?fees.?The?obvious?conclusion?is?that?when?the?Legislature?in?the?last?sentence?of?section?412.21(a)(2)?used?the?phrase?”community?property”?without?limitation,?it?meant?both?types?of?community?property.?Because?community?real?property?is?ordinarily?not?”liquid,”?the?only?practical?means?to?use?it?to?pay?attorney?fees?is?through?an?encumbrance.
It?is?the?duty?of?this?court?to?harmonize?statutes?on?the?same?subject?(e.g.,?Dyna-Med,?Inc.?v.?Fair?Employment?&?Housing?Com.,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?1387;?Long?Beach?Police?Officers?Assn.?v.?City?of?Long?Beach?(1988)?46?Cal.3d?736,?746?[250?Cal.Rptr.?869,?759?P.2d?504]),?giving?effect?to?all?parts?of?all?statutes?if?possible?(e.g.,?Select?Base?Materials?v.?Board?of?Equal.,?supra,?51?Cal.2d?at?p.?645).?In?applying?that?duty?to?the?issue?presented?here,?this?court?must?give?preference?to?a?reasonable?construction?of?section?5127?that?harmonizes?it?with?section?412.21(a).
Read?literally?and?without?regard?to?its?underlying?purpose,?section?5127?appears?to?forbid?what?section?412.21(a)?implicitly?but?unmistakably?approves:?a?spouse’s?unilateral?encumbrance?of?community?real?property?to?secure?reasonable?attorney?fees,?and?thereby?to?obtain?legal?representation,?in?a?marital?dissolution?action.?Because?section?5127?relates?to?conveyances?and?encumbrances?of?community?real?property?in?general,?while?section?412.21(a)?refers?specifically?to?the?use?of?community?property?to?retain?counsel?in?marital?dissolution?proceedings,?the?two?provisions?can?be?harmonized?as?follows:?Under?sections?5127?and?412.21(a),?the?parties?to?a?dissolution?action?may?encumber?community?real?property?to?the?extent?of?their?interests?to?secure?reasonable?attorney?fees?in?a?dissolution?action,?but?they?may?not?otherwise?independently?convey?or?encumber?community?real?property?after?separation;?and?the?parties?to?a?continuing?marriage?may?not?do?so?at?all?without?the?written?consent?of?the?other?spouse.fn.?2
Harmonizing?the?two?provisions?in?this?manner?serves?the?purpose?of?section?412.21(a)?by?allowing?what?the?Legislature?expressly?intended?to?permit.?And,?as?I?will?show,?it?comports?fully?with?the?legislative?purpose?[54?Cal.3d?53]?underlying?section?5127,?which?is?to?protect?one?spouse?from?fraudulent?or?improvident?expenditures?by?the?other?spouse?during?the?continued?existence?of?the?marriage.
The?predecessor?to?section?5127?was?former?Civil?Code?section?172a,?enacted?in?1917;?it?provided?that?”[t]he?husband?has?the?management?and?control?of?the?community?real?property,?but?the?wife?must?join?with?him?in?executing?any?instrument?by?which?such?community?real?property?or?any?interest?therein?is?leased?for?a?longer?period?than?one?year,?or?is?sold,?conveyed?or?encumbered;?…”?(Stats.?1917,?ch.?583,???2,?pp.?829-?830.)
This?court?discussed?the?purpose?of?former?Civil?Code?section?172a?in?1926,?in?connection?with?a?parallel?amendment?to?former?Civil?Code?section?172,?concerning?alienation?of?community?personal?property.?We?said:?”All?that?the?legislature?by?these?amendments?did?do?or?attempt?to?do?was?to?cast?about?the?interest?of?the?wife?in?both?the?real?and?personal?property?of?the?community?during?the?continued?existence?of?the?marriage?relation?added?safeguards?and?protection?against?the?fraudulent?or?inconsiderate?acts?of?the?husband?….”?(Stewart?v.?Stewart?(1926)?199?Cal.?318,?340?[249?P.?197],?italics?added;?accord,?e.g.,?Strong?v.?Strong?(1943)?22?Cal.2d?540,?544?[140?P.2d?386];?Morghee?v.?Rouse?(1964)?224?Cal.App.2d?745,?748?[37?Cal.Rptr.?112].)
In?the?years?since?we?first?construed?former?Civil?Code?section?172a,?community?property?law?has?evolved.?In?1927,?the?Legislature?declared?ownership?of?community?property?by?both?spouses?to?be?”present,?existing?and?equal.”?(Stats.?1927,?ch.?265,???1,?p.?484.)?In?1973,?the?Legislature?gave?”either?spouse”?management?and?control?of?community?real?and?personal?property.?(Stats.?1973,?ch.?987,???15,?p.?1901.)
The?restriction?that?section?5127?imposes?is?the?same?as?that?imposed?by?its?predecessor,?former?Civil?Code?section?172a.?The?only?difference?is?that?section?5127?imposes?the?restriction?equally?on?both?spouses?rather?than?on?the?husband?alone.?There?has?been?no?change?in?the?essential?purpose?of?section?5127,?namely,?to?protect?one?spouse?from?the?other’s?fraudulent?or?improvident?expenditures?of?community?property?”during?the?continued?existence?of?the?marriage?relation?….”?(Stewart?v.?Stewart,?supra,?199?Cal.?at?p.?340.)
Legally,?a?marriage?continues?until?the?entry?of?a?judgment?of?dissolution,?and?the?parties?have?a?continuing?duty?of?good?faith?toward?each?other.?(Civ.?Code,????4501,?5125,?subd.?(e).)?Realistically,?however,?when?the?parties?to?a?marriage?have?separated?and?commenced?a?dissolution?lawsuit,?their?relations?have?fundamentally?changed.?(See?In?re?Marriage?of?Connolly?[54?Cal.3d?54]?(1979)?23?Cal.3d?590,?600?[153?Cal.Rptr.?423,?591?P.2d?911].)?They?are?living?apart,?and?they?are?legal?adversaries.?In?such?circumstances,?the?protective?rationale?of?section?5127?is?not?frustrated?by?allowing?spouses?to?encumber?community?real?property?to?secure?attorney?fees.?The?interests?of?the?parties?are?protected?by?the?efforts?of?counsel?and?the?equitable?powers?of?the?court.
Giving?full?effect?to?the?legislative?intent?reflected?in?section?412.21(a)?does?not?at?all?impair?the?purpose?of?section?5127,?which?is?to?protect?nonconsenting?spouses?in?ongoing?marriages?from?fraudulent?or?ill-?advised?transfers?of?community?real?property.?Accordingly,?I?would?hold?that?under?sections?412.21(a)?and?5127?the?parties?to?a?dissolution?action?may?encumber?community?real?property?to?the?extent?of?their?interests?to?secure?reasonable?attorney?fees?in?the?dissolution?action.fn.?3
In?this?case,?Wife?unilaterally?encumbered?her?undivided?one-half?interest?in?community?real?property?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?her?dissolution?action?against?Husband.?Since?then,?the?parties?have?apparently?decided?to?remain?married,?and?Husband?now?contends?that?the?encumbrance?must?be?held?entirely?void.?In?accordance?with?the?analysis?set?forth?above,?I?would?hold?the?encumbrance?valid?as?to?Wife’s?interest.
The?security?interest?in?Wife’s?share?of?the?property?was?given?in?1986,?three?years?before?the?Legislature?enacted?section?412.21.?But?the?purpose?of?section?5127,?which?was?set?forth?in?our?cases?long?before?the?enactment?of?section?412.21,?is?to?protect?spouses?in?continuing?marriages?from?the?[54?Cal.3d?55]?fraudulent?and?improvident?acts?of?their?marital?partners,?not?to?prevent?parties?to?a?dissolution?lawsuit?from?protecting?their?interests.?The?Legislature’s?enactment?of?section?412.21(a)?does?not?alter?the?meaning?of?section?5127,?but?illuminates?the?Legislature’s?understanding?of?the?statutory?scheme?it?created?as?not?precluding?resort?to?community?real?property?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?a?dissolution?action.?(See?In?re?Marriage?of?Bouquet?(1976)?16?Cal.3d?583,?590?[128?Cal.Rptr.?427,?546?P.2d?1371]?[it?is?proper?to?look?to?a?subsequent?expression?of?legislative?intent?in?construing?a?prior?statute].)?Irrespective?of?the?date?of?enactment?of?section?412.21,?it?would?not?serve?the?purpose?of?section?5127?to?interpret?section?5127?to?preclude?encumbrances?given?to?secure?attorney?fees?after?the?parties?have?separated.?Therefore,?section?5127?should?not?be?applied?in?this?case?to?bar?the?encumbrance.?(See?2A?Sutherland,?Statutory?Construction?(4th?ed.?1984)???54.04,?p.?570?[“where?there?is?doubt?about?how?inclusively?a?statute?should?be?applied,?it?will?be?construed?to?apply?only?so?far?as?is?needed?to?remedy?the?perceived?mischief”].)
For?these?reasons,?I?would?reverse?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal.
FN?*.?Judge?of?the?San?Francisco?Municipal?Court?sitting?under?assignment?by?the?Chairperson?of?the?Judicial?Counsil.
FN?1.?Hereafter,?all?statutory?references?are?to?the?California?Civil?Code?unless?otherwise?indicated.
FN?2.?Section?5127?applies?to?leases?for?a?longer?period?than?one?year,?sales,?conveyances,?and?encumbrances?of?community?real?property.?For?convenience,?these?actions?will?collectively?be?referred?to?as?”transfers.”
FN?3.?The?precise?order?we?issued?to?the?parties?stated:?”The?issues?to?be?argued?before?this?court?shall?be?limited?to?(1)?whether?Civil?Code?section?5127?permits?one?spouse?to?encumber?his/her?interest?in?community?property?without?the?consent?of?the?other?spouse,?and?(2)?if?so,?whether?a?security?interest?in?community?property?given?by?one?spouse?for?attorney?fees?during?a?pending?dissolution?is?valid.”
FN?4.?Heuer?v.?Heuer,?supra,?33?Cal.2d?268,?involved?somewhat?unique?facts?in?that?the?wife,?suing?after?she?was?validly?divorced,?agreed?during?appeal?that?she?would?be?satisfied?if?her?one-half?community?interest?in?the?property?was?restored?to?her.?We?noted?that?”[t]his?would?be?proper?since?the?conveyances?by?the?husband?may?be?deemed?valid?as?to?his?community?interest?[citations]?in?the?property?….”?(Id.?at?p.?271.)
FN?5.?The?Britton?rule?was?approved?in?Vaughan?v.?Roberts?(1941)?45?Cal.App.2d?246?[113?P.2d?884].?In?Vaughan,?the?husband?signed?a?promissory?note?and?also?executed?a?deed?of?trust?on?community?real?property?to?secure?the?note.?The?Court?of?Appeal?stated:?”The?[trial]?court?also?found?that?the?note?and?trust?deed?were?neither?signed?nor?authorized?to?be?signed?by?Mrs.?Vaughan,?and?that?the?instruments?which?affect?the?title?to?real?property?were?therefore?void.?We?are?of?the?opinion?that?is?a?correct?conclusion?of?law?….?[?]?It?has?been?held?that?a?conveyance?of?community?real?property?by?the?husband,?without?the?authorization?of?his?wife,?contrary?to?the?provisions?of?section?172a?of?the?Civil?Code,?is?at?least?voidable?in?a?suit?by?the?wife?during?the?marriage.?(Britton?v.?Hammell,?4?Cal.?(2d)?690?….)”?(Vaughan?v.?Roberts,?supra,?45?Cal.App.2d?at?p.?259.)
FN?6.?In?Jones,?the?husband,?during?the?ongoing?marriage,?executed?a?deed?of?trust?on?community?real?property?without?his?wife’s?consent?to?secure?a?bail?bond.?The?court?held?that?under?section?5127,?during?the?existence?of?the?community,?the?nonconsenting?spouse?can?set?aside?a?unilateral?transfer?of?real?property?by?the?other?spouse?in?its?entirety?and?can?restore?the?real?property?to?its?status?as?undivided?community?property.?(51?Bankr.?at?p.?839.)?While?we?note?that?”federal?decisions?are?in?no?event?controlling?in?matters?of?state?law”?(see?Estate?of?D’India?(1976)?63?Cal.App.3d?942,?948?[134?Cal.Rptr.?165];?accord,?Ware?v.?Heller?(1944)?63?Cal.App.2d?817,?821?[148?P.2d?410]),?the?Jones?opinion?is?instructive?and?helpful?as?it?is?interpreting?similar?issues?as?those?in?this?case?and?discusses?the?same?California?cases.)
FN?7.?Gantner?relies?on?two?cases,?Heuer?v.?Heuer,?supra,?33?Cal.2d?268,?and?Woods?v.?Bradford?(1967)?254?Cal.App.2d?501?[62?Cal.Rptr.?391],?which?are?dissimilar?to?the?facts?in?Mitchell.?In?Heuer,?the?transfer?was?made?by?the?husband?before?divorce,?and?the?former?spouse,?suing?after?the?divorce,?agreed?during?an?appeal?that?she?would?be?satisfied?”if?her?one-half?community?interest?in?the?property?involved?[was]?restored?to?her.”?(Heuer,?supra,?33?Cal.2d?at?pp.?270-271.)?Woods?involved?a?transfer?of?only?an?undivided?one-half?interest?made?after?divorce?pursuant?to?court?order.?The?court?found?that?section?5127?(then?former?section?172a)?had?no?application?to?the?case.?(Woods,?supra,?254?Cal.App.2d?at?p.?505.)
FN?8.?A?spouse?wishing?to?transfer?community?real?property?during?the?marriage?who?is?unable?to?obtain?the?consent?of?the?other?spouse?is?not?completely?without?recourse.?Section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e)?permits?the?courts?to?”dispense?with?the?requirement?of?the?other?spouse’s?[arbitrarily?refused]?consent?…?if?the?proposed?transaction?is?in?the?best?interests?of?the?community.”
FN?9.?The?commission?further?noted?that?its?proposed?new?section?would?codify?”general?California?law?that?a?disposition?avoided?during?marriage?must?be?set?aside?as?to?the?interest?of?both?spouses,?not?just?the?interest?of?the?non-joining?or?non-consenting?spouse.?See,?e.g.,?Britton?v.?Hammell,?4?Cal.2d?690?(1935)?…;?Andrade?Development?Co.?v.?Martin,?138?Cal.App.3d?330?….?This?overrules?Mitchell?….”?(Id.?at?p.?291.)
FN?10.?The?Mortgage?Institute?of?California?also?argues?that?the?enactment?of?section?5125.1,?operative?July?1,?1987,?is?further?evidence?of?the?Legislature’s?approval?of?Mitchell?and?establishes?the?remedies?for?a?transfer?in?violation?of?section?5127.?Section?5125.1?states?in?part?that?”[a]?spouse?has?a?claim?against?the?other?spouse?for?a?breach?of?the?duty?imposed?by?Section?5125?or?5127?that?results?in?substantial?impairment?to?the?claimant?spouse’s?present?undivided?one-half?interest?in?the?community?estate.”
Our?review?of?the?legislative?history?of?section?5125.1?does?not?support?amicus?curiae’s?contention?that?enactment?of?section?5125.1?signals?legislative?approval?of?Mitchell?or?the?view?that?section?5125.1?amended?section?5127?to?provide?the?exclusive?remedy?to?a?spouse?who?objects?to?the?unilateral?transfer?of?community?property.
FN?11.?In?the?instant?case,?for?example,?the?section?4370?award?to?Wife?only?represented?approximately?25?percent?of?the?Wife’s?obligation?to?her?attorneys.?(See,?ante,?pp.?30.)
FN?12.?But?see,?In?re?Marriage?of?Hatch?(1985)?169?Cal.App.3d?1213?[215?Cal.Rptr.?789],?holding?that?it?is?an?abuse?of?discretion?for?trial?courts?to?deny?motions?for?pendente?lite?attorney?fees?and?costs?in?a?marital?dissolution?proceeding?without?considering?the?needs?of?the?requesting?spouse?and?the?ability?to?pay?of?the?spouse?against?whom?the?award?is?sought.?”California’s?public?policy?in?favor?of?expeditious?and?final?resolution?of?marital?dissolution?actions?is?best?accomplished?by?providing?at?the?outset?of?litigation,?consistent?with?the?financial?circumstances?of?the?parties,?a?parity?between?spouses?in?their?ability?to?obtain?effective?legal?representation.”
FN?13.?See,?ante,?page?38,?footnote?8.
FN?14.?The?dissent?agrees?with?our?conclusion?that?enactment?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?does?not?alter?the?meaning?of?section?5127.?(Dis.?opn.,?post,?at?p.?55.)?Rather,?the?dissent?contends,?enactment?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?”illuminates”?the?Legislature’s?understanding?of?the?statutory?framework?governing?transfers?of?community?real?property.?However,?even?if?we?were?to?accept?the?dissent’s?contention?for?the?sake?of?argument,?a?subsequent?expression?of?the?Legislature?as?to?the?intent?of?a?prior?statute?is?not?binding.?(California?Emp.?etc.?Com.?v.?Payne?(1947)?31?Cal.2d?210,?213-214?[187?P.2d?702].?See?also,?Harris?v.?Capital?Growth?Investors?XIV?(1991)?52?Cal.3d?1142,?1157-1158,?fn.?6?[278?Cal.Rptr.?614,?805?P.2d?873];?California?Teachers?Assn.?v.?Cory?(1984)?155?Cal.App.3d?494,?506-507?[202?Cal.Rptr.?611].)?More?importantly,?nothing?in?the?language?or?history?of?section?5127?itself?supports?the?conclusion?that?the?Legislature?understood?the?section?to?encompass?an?exception?to?the?general?rule?against?unilateral?transfers?of?community?real?property?for?the?payment?of?attorney?fees?in?dissolution?actions.
FN?15.?Interpreting?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?as?creating?an?exception?to?section?5127?might,?in?some?cases,?harm,?rather?than?help,?economically?weak?spouses.?As?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?does?not?expressly?limit?its?application?to?economically?weak?spouses,?an?economically?strong?spouse?could?also?use?the?section?to?unilaterally?transfer?one’s?interest?in?community?real?property,?such?as?an?interest?in?the?couple’s?home,?to?secure?attorney?fees.?Such?a?transfer?could?harm?the?nonconsenting?spouse,?especially?if?the?home?is?the?sole?community?asset?and?the?nonconsenting?spouse?has?custody?of?minor?children.?For?example,?if?the?consenting?spouse?defaults,?the?nonconsenting?spouse?could?be?forced?to?become?a?tenant?in?common?with?a?total?stranger-the?mortgage?holder.?The?mortgage?holder,?after?becoming?a?tenant?in?common?with?the?nonconsenting?spouse,?might?be?able?to?force?a?partition?or?sale?of?the?home.?Furthermore,?the?transfer?of?any?interest?in?the?real?property?might?make?it?difficult?or?impossible?for?the?court?to?make?an?equal?and?equitable?division?of?the?community?property.?(??4800.)?Hence,?it?cannot?be?assumed?that?interpreting?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?as?creating?an?exception?to?section?5127?would?always?benefit?an?economically?weak?spouse.
FN?16.?Our?recent?decision?in?Woods?v.?Young?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?315?[279?Cal.Rptr.?613,?807?P.2d?455]?supports?retroactive?application?of?our?opinion?in?this?case.?In?Woods?we?gave?prospective?application?to?our?opinion?interpreting?a?provision?of?the?Medical?Injury?Compensation?Reform?Act?(MICRA).?We?noted?that?although?the?appellate?courts?were?divided?on?part?of?the?interpretation?of?the?relevant?MICRA?provision,?they?were?also?all?in?agreement?respecting?another?part?of?the?interpretation?of?the?provision.?”This?unanimous?conclusion?established?a?settled?rule?upon?which?plaintiff?could?reasonably?rely?….”?(Woods?v.?Young,?supra,?53?Cal.3d?at?p.?330.)
We?noted,?however,?that?when?the?appellate?courts?are?divided?on?an?issue,?reasonable?reliance?on?one?particular?interpretation?cannot?be?presumed.?Hence,?we?stated?that?”[b]ecause?the?Courts?of?Appeal?were?divided?on?this?issue,?a?plaintiff?could?not?reasonably?rely?on?the?interpretation?under?which?the?time?for?bringing?suit?after?discovery?of?the?injury?could?exceed?1?year?and?90?days.?This?interpretation,?first?advanced?in?Gomez?v.?Valley?View?Sanitorium?[(1987)]?87?Cal.App.3d?507?[151?Cal.Rptr.?97],?was?vigorously?disputed?by?other?appellate?decisions.”?(Woods?v.?Young,?supra,?53?Cal.3d?at?p.?330,?fn.?6.)?Here?the?appellate?courts?were?clearly?divided?in?their?interpretation?of?section?5127.
FN?17.?Friedman?argues?that?if?we?affirm?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal,?Friedman?should?be?given?an?opportunity?to?meet?the?requirements?of?section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e).?We?disagree.?Section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e)?is?intended?for?the?benefit?of?a?party?to?the?marital?community,?not?a?party’s?lawyers.?Section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e)?specifically?states?that?a?court?may?dispense?with?the?requirement?of?the?other?spouse’s?consent?”upon?the?motion?of?a?spouse”?(italics?added).
FN?1.?Under?the?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct?and?the?decisions?of?this?court,?an?attorney?may?ensure?payment?of?fees?by?acquiring?a?promissory?note?secured?by?a?deed?of?trust?on?the?client’s?real?property?so?long?as?(1)?the?attorney?fully?discloses?the?terms?of?the?transaction?to?the?client?in?an?understandable?fashion,?(2)?the?terms?are?fair?and?reasonable,?and?(3)?the?client?consents?in?writing?after?having?had?an?opportunity?to?consult?independent?counsel.?(Rules?Prof.?Conduct,?rule?3-300;?Hawk?v.?State?Bar?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?589,?593?[247?Cal.Rptr.?599,?754?P.2d?1096].)
Of?course,?even?when?an?attorney?holds?a?promissory?note?secured?by?a?deed?of?trust,?the?attorney?is?not?necessarily?entitled?to?fees?in?any?given?amount.?In?this?context,?as?well?as?others,?clients?are?protected?from?overreaching?by?rule?4-200?of?the?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct,?the?general?law?of?contracts?(see?Civ.?Code,????1670.5,?1770,?subd.?(s)),?and?the?inherent?powers?of?the?courts?to?review?attorney-fee?contracts?to?prevent?unfairness?(see?Roa?v.?Lodi?Medical?Group,?Inc.?(1985)?37?Cal.3d?920,?933?[211?Cal.Rptr.?77,?695?P.2d?164]).
FN?2.?Husband?suggests?that?the?problems?of?economically?weaker?spouses?in?obtaining?adequate?representation?are?solved?by?Civil?Code?section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e),?which?empowers?the?trial?court?to?dispense?with?the?requirement?of?both?spouses’?consent?to?encumber?or?dispose?of?community?real?property?when?the?”proposed?transaction?is?in?the?best?interest?of?the?community”?and?consent?is?”arbitrarily?refused.”?He?is?mistaken.?For?the?reasons?given?by?the?majority,?”[i]n?most?cases,?…?[Civil?Code]?section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e)?may?prove?to?be?an?illusory?remedy?for?the?economically?weak?spouse.”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?p.?41.)
FN?3.?The?majority?contends?that?section?412.21(a)?does?not?”create?an?exception”?to?section?5127,?or?impliedly?repeal?that?section.?These?contentions?miss?the?dissent’s?point.?The?dissent?has?shown?that?when?section?5127?is?interpreted?in?light?of?the?legislative?purpose?to?protect?spouses?in?continuing?marriages,?and?construed?with?a?view?toward?harmonizing?it?with?section?412.21(a),?the?conclusion?is?inescapable?that?the?Legislature?did?not?intend?to?bar?spouses?from?using?their?interests?in?community?real?property?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?a?dissolution?action.?No?discussion?of?exceptions?or?implied?repeal?is?necessary?to?resolve?this?issue.
The?majority?claims?that?harm?could?result?under?the?dissent’s?approach?if?an?economically?stronger?spouse?encumbered?his?or?her?interest?in?the?community?residence?to?secure?attorney?fees,?the?spouse?defaulted,?the?mortgage?lender?foreclosed,?and?the?mortgage?lender?then?brought?an?action?for?partition?against?the?other?spouse.?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?pp.?44-45,?fn.?15.)?Although?harm?according?to?this?scenario?might?occur?in?isolated?cases,?this?possibility?should?be?contrasted?with?the?certainty?that,?under?the?majority’s?approach,?injustice?and?hardship?for?economically?weaker?spouses?will?result?in?an?entire?class?of?cases?when?the?spouses’?inability?to?use?their?property?to?secure?attorney?fees?deprives?them?of?effective?legal?representation.
Finally,?the?majority?contends?that?under?the?dissent’s?approach?the?trial?court’s?role?might?be?made?more?difficult?in?some?cases.?Although?the?trial?court’s?duty?of?equal?division?of?community?assets?under?Civil?Code?section?4800?might?be?made?more?complicated?after?an?encumbrance,?this?factor?is?no?reason?to?deprive?spouses?of?their?rights.