Izazaga?v.?Superior?Court?(People)?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?356?,?285?Cal.Rptr.?231;?815?P.2d?304
[No.?S017642.Aug?30,?1991.]
JAVIER?VALLE?IZAZAGA,?Petitioner,?v.?THE?SUPERIOR?COURT?OF?TULARE?COUNTY,?Respondent;?THE?PEOPLE,?Real?Party?in?Interest.
(Superior?Court?of?Tulare?County,?No.?29058,?Robert?C.?Van?Auken,?Judge.)
(Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?with?Panelli,?Arabian?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.?Separate?dissenting?opinions?by?Mosk?and?Broussard,?JJ.)
COUNSEL
Neal?Pereira,?Public?Defender,?Tim?Bazar,?Assistant?Public?Defender,?and?Hugo?Loza,?Deputy?Public?Defender,?for?Petitioner.?[54?Cal.3d?363]
Norwood?Nedom,?Michael?E.?Cantrall,?Linda?F.?Robertson,?Thomas?Havlena,?Kevin?J.?Phillips,?Wilbur?Littlefield,?Public?Defender?(Los?Angeles),?Laurence?M.?Sarnoff?and?Albert?J.?Menaster,?Deputy?Public?Defenders,?Jay?B.?Gaskill,?Public?Defender?(Alameda),?and?Harold?G.?Friedman,?Assistant?Public?Defender,?as?Amici?Curiae?on?Behalf?of?Petitioner.
No?appearance?for?Respondent.
John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart?and?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Arnold?O.?Overoye?and?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Michael?J.?Weinberger?and?David?D.?Salmon,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Real?Party?in?Interest.
Edwin?L.?Miller,?Jr.,?District?Attorney?(San?Diego),?Thomas?F.?McArdle,?Deputy?District?Attorney,?and?Kent?S.?Scheidegger?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Real?Party?In?Interest.
OPINION
LUCAS,?C.?J.
In?this?case?we?resolve?several?issues?presented?by?the?adoption?on?June?5,?1990,?of?an?initiative?measure?designated?on?the?ballot?as?Proposition?115?and?entitled?the?”Crime?Victims?Justice?Reform?Act.”?Petitioner?raises?various?challenges?under?the?federal?and?state?Constitutions?to?the?provisions?of?the?measure?authorizing?reciprocal?discovery?in?criminal?cases.?(See?also?Raven?v.?Deukmejian?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?336?[276?Cal.Rptr.?326,?801?P.2d?1077]?[Raven;?single-subject?and?revision?challenges?to?Prop.?115];?Tapia?v.?Superior?Court?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?282?[279?Cal.Rptr.?592,?807?P.2d?434]?[challenge?to?retroactive?application?of?Prop.?115].)
We?conclude?that,?properly?construed?and?applied,?the?discovery?provisions?of?Proposition?115?are?valid?under?the?state?and?federal?Constitutions,?and?that?Proposition?115?effectively?reopened?the?two-way?street?of?reciprocal?discovery?in?criminal?cases?in?California.
- Facts
Petitioner?was?charged?with?two?counts?of?forcible?rape?(Pen.?Code,?former???261,?subd.?(2)),?one?count?of?kidnapping?(Pen.?Code,???207),?and?numerous?enhancement?allegations.?The?acts?were?alleged?to?have?occurred?on?June?18,?1990.?The?People?served?on?petitioner?an?informal?request?for?[54?Cal.3d?364]?discovery?pursuant?to?newly?adopted?Penal?Code?section?1054.5,?subdivision?(b)?(section?1054.5(b)).?After?petitioner?refused?the?informal?discovery?request,?the?People?filed?a?formal?motion?for?discovery?in?superior?court,?to?which?petitioner?filed?an?opposition.?Following?a?hearing,?the?court?granted?the?motion?and?issued?an?order?requiring?discovery.fn.?1
The?Court?of?Appeal?summarily?denied?petitioner’s?application?for?a?writ?of?mandate?or?prohibition.?We?stayed?the?discovery?order?and?issued?an?alternative?writ?of?mandate?to?consider?the?important?constitutional?and?interpretive?questions?presented.?Petitioner?raises?several?arguments?regarding?the?constitutionality?of?the?discovery?provisions?added?by?Proposition?115.?Before?we?consider?these?contentions,?we?first?review?these?new?discovery?provisions.
- Constitutional?and?Statutory?Provisions
Proposition?115?added?both?constitutional?and?statutory?language?authorizing?reciprocal?discovery?in?criminal?cases.?Section?30,?subdivision?(c),?added?to?article?I?of?the?California?Constitution?(article?I,?section?30(c))?by?Proposition?115,?declares?discovery?to?be?”reciprocal”?in?criminal?cases.?(“In?order?to?provide?for?fair?and?speedy?trials,?discovery?in?criminal?cases?shall?be?reciprocal?in?nature,?as?prescribed?by?the?Legislature?or?by?the?People?through?the?initiative?process.”)
Proposition?115?also?added?a?new?Penal?Code?chapter?on?discovery.?(Pen.?Code,???1054?et?seq.?[hereafter,?the?new?discovery?chapter].)?The?new?Penal?Code?sections?relevant?to?the?issues?that?arise?in?this?case?are?section?1054?(providing?for?interpretation?of?the?chapter?to?give?effect?to?certain?specified?purposes),?section?1054.1?(providing?for?defense?discovery),?section?1054.3?(providing?for?prosecutorial?discovery),?section?1054.5?(providing?mechanism?for?compelled?discovery),?section?1054.6?(providing?that?discovery?shall?not?be?required?of?work?product?or?otherwise?privileged?information?and?material),?and?section?1054.7?(requiring?disclosure?at?least?30?days?prior?to?trial,?placing?a?continuing?duty?to?disclose?on?both?prosecution?and?[54?Cal.3d?365]?defense,?and?providing?for?denial?of?disclosure?on?a?showing?of?”good?cause”).fn.?2
Proposition?115?also?repealed?several?discovery?provisions,?including?former?Penal?Code?section?1102.5?(previously?declared?unconstitutional?in?In?re?Misener?(1985)?38?Cal.3d?543?[213?Cal.Rptr.?569,?698?P.2d?637]?[Misener],?discussed?below),?and?Penal?Code?former?section?1430?(requiring?prosecutor?to?furnish?defendant?with?police?and?arrest?reports).?Furthermore,?Proposition?115?repealed?the?provisions?in?Penal?Code?section?859?requiring?prosecutors?to?furnish?defendants?with?police?and?arrest?reports.
III.?Discussion
- Privilege?Against?Self-incrimination
Petitioner?asserts?application?of?the?discovery?provisions?enacted?by?Proposition?115?would?violate?his?state?and?federal?constitutional?privileges?against?compelled?self-?incrimination.?We?disagree.
- Federal?Constitutional?Challenge.?The?Fifth?Amendment?of?the?United?States?Constitution?recites?in?pertinent?part:?”No?person?…?shall?be?compelled?in?any?criminal?case?to?be?a?witness?against?himself?….”?Petitioner?asserts?that?the?new?discovery?chapter?enacted?by?Proposition?115?compels?a?criminal?defendant?to?be?a?witness?against?oneself?in?violation?of?the?foregoing?self-incrimination?clause.
In?Williams?v.?Florida?(1970)?399?U.S.?78?[26?L.Ed.2d?446,?90?S.Ct.?1893]?(Williams),?the?high?court?upheld?against?a?self-incrimination?clause?challenge?[54?Cal.3d?366]?Florida’s?”notice-of-alibi”?rule,?which?required?a?criminal?defendant?intending?to?rely?on?an?alibi?defense?to?notify?the?prosecution?of?the?place?where?the?defendant?claimed?to?be?at?the?time?in?question,?and?of?the?names?and?addresses?of?the?witnesses?the?defendant?intended?to?call?in?support?of?the?alibi.?Petitioner,?noting?that?section?1054.3?is?not?limited?to?situations?involving?an?alibi?defense,?attempts?to?distinguish?Williams?and?argues?that?the?self-?incrimination?clause?prohibits?the?compelled?discovery?of?defense?witnesses?in?the?absence?of?an?alibi?defense?and?the?special?problems?it?presents.?As?support?for?this?argument?petitioner?cites?the?language?in?Williams?that,?”Given?the?ease?with?which?an?alibi?can?be?fabricated,?the?State’s?interest?in?protecting?itself?against?an?eleventh-hour?defense?is?both?obvious?and?legitimate.”?(Id.?at?p.?81?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?450].)
Petitioner’s?argument?is?misguided.?The?language?in?Williams?on?which?he?relies?relates?to?the?due?process?and?fair?trial?issues?addressed?in?that?case,?and?is?not?relevant?to?the?Fifth?Amendment?analysis.?Moreover,?petitioner’s?argument?misinterprets?the?scope?of?the?self-incrimination?clause,?which?”protects?a?person?only?against?being?incriminated?by?his?own?compelled?testimonial?communications.”?(Fisher?v.?United?States?(1976)?425?U.S.?391,?409?[48?L.Ed.2d?39,?55,?96?S.Ct.?1569],?italics?added.)?Under?cases?of?the?Supreme?Court,?there?are?four?requirements?that?together?trigger?this?privilege:?the?information?sought?must?be?(i)?”incriminating”;?(ii)?”personal?to?the?defendant”;?(iii)?obtained?by?”compulsion”;?and?(iv)?”testimonial?or?communicative?in?nature.”?(See?United?States?v.?Nobles?(1975)?422?U.S.?225?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?95?S.Ct.?2160]?[Nobles];?Schmerber?v.?California?(1966)?384?U.S.?757,?761?[16?L.Ed.2d?908,?914,?86?S.Ct.?1826];?Doe?v.?United?States?(1988)?487?U.S.?201,?207?[101?L.Ed.2d?184,?194-195,?108?S.Ct.?2341].)fn.?4
Statutorily?mandated?discovery?of?evidence?that?meets?these?four?requirements?is?prohibited.?Conversely,?discovery?of?evidence?that?does?not?meet?each?of?these?requirements?is?not?barred?by?the?self-?incrimination?clause.?(See?Schmerber?v.?California,?supra,?384?U.S.?757,?761?[16?L.Ed.2d?908,?914].)?This?is?so?even?in?the?absence?of?special?state?interests?such?as?protection?against?easily?fabricated?”eleventh-hour”?defenses.?The?absence?of?particular?state?interests?in?disclosure?affects?none?of?these?four?requirements,?and?thus?cannot?itself?trigger?the?self-incrimination?clause.?(See?New?Jersey?v.?Portash?(1979)?440?U.S.?450,?459?[59?L.Ed.2d?501,?510,?99?S.Ct.?1292].)
In?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?the?high?court?held?that?discovery?of?the?names?and?addresses?of?a?defendant’s?alibi?witnesses?is?not?”compelled”?self-incrimination,?and?therefore?does?not?violate?the?Fifth?Amendment.?(Id.?[54?Cal.3d?367]?at?p.?85?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?452].)?The?court?reasoned,?”At?most,?the?rule?only?compelled?[defendant]?to?accelerate?the?timing?of?his?disclosure,?by?forcing?him?to?divulge?at?an?earlier?date?information?that?the?[defendant]?from?the?beginning?planned?to?divulge?at?trial.”?(Ibid.?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?452],?italics?added.)?Thus,?discovery?of?the?names?and?addresses?of?the?witnesses?that?the?defense?intends?to?call?at?trial,?whether?or?not?in?support?of?an?alibi?defense,?merely?forces?the?defendant?”to?divulge?at?an?earlier?date?information?that?the?[defendant]?from?the?beginning?planned?to?divulge?at?trial.”?(Ibid.?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?452].)?Under?the?rationale?of?Williams,?such?discovery?does?not?constitute?compelled?self-incrimination,?and?therefore?does?not?implicate?the?privilege.fn.?5
[2a]?We?thus?address?petitioner’s?second?contention,?that?insofar?as?section?1054.3?requires?the?defense?to?disclose?before?trial?any?statements?of?the?witnesses?it?intends?to?call?at?trial,?that?section?violates?the?self-incrimination?clause.?Once?again,?decisions?of?the?Supreme?Court?compel?a?contrary?conclusion.Compelled?disclosure?of?the?statements?of?defense?witnesses?does?not?meet?all?of?the?requirements?necessary?to?implicate?the?self-incrimination?clause.?We?agree?with?petitioner?that?the?acceleration?doctrine?of?Williams?discussed?above?is?not?dispositive?here,?for?it?is?not?a?matter?of?merely?forcing?the?defendant?”to?divulge?at?an?earlier?date?information?that?the?[defendant]?from?the?beginning?planned?to?divulge?at?trial.”?(Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?85?[26?L.Ed.2d?446,?452].)?Some?statements?of?witnesses?the?defense?intends?to?call?might?never?be?offered?at?trial?by?the?defense.?Thus,?to?the?extent?that?the?statements?are?incriminating,?such?incrimination?is?indeed?compelled.?And?clearly?such?statements?are?”testimonial?or?communicative?in?nature.”?(See?Schmerber?v.?California,?supra,?384?U.S.?757,?761?[16?L.Ed.2d?908,?914].)?Such?statements?are?not,?however,?”personal?to?the?defendant.”?[54?Cal.3d?368] [3]?As?the?high?court?stated?in?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?”?’is?a?personal?privilege:?it?adheres?basically?to?the?person,?not?to?information?that?may?incriminate?him.’?”?(Id.?at?p.?233?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?150-151],?quoting?Couch?v.?United?States?(1973)?409?U.S.?322,?327?[34?L.Ed.2d?548,?553-554,?93?S.Ct.?611],?italics?in?original.)?In?Nobles,?the?court?rejected?a?self-incrimination?challenge?to?a?trial?court?order?requiring?the?defense?to?disclose?its?investigator’s?report?of?statements?made?by?prosecutorial?witnesses?once?the?defense?called?its?investigator?as?a?trial?witness.
In?Nobles?the?high?court?reasoned:?”The?fact?that?these?statements?of?third?parties?were?elicited?by?a?defense?investigator?on?[defendant’s]?behalf?does?not?convert?them?into?[defendant’s]?personal?communications.?Requiring?their?production?from?the?investigator?therefore?would?not?in?any?sense?compel?[defendant]?to?be?a?witness?against?himself?or?extort?communications?from?him.”?(Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?234?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?151].)?The?court?concluded,?”the?Fifth?Amendment?privilege?against?compulsory?self-incrimination,?being?personal?to?the?defendant,?does?not?extend?to?the?testimony?or?statements?of?third?parties?called?as?witnesses?at?trial.”?(Ibid.?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?151].)
The?high?court’s?reasoning?in?Nobles?is?controlling?here.?Section?1054.3?requires?disclosure?by?the?defense?of?statements,?and?reports?of?statements,?of?”persons,?other?than?defendant,”?that?the?defense?intends?to?call?as?witnesses?at?trial.?[2b]?Thus,?the?compelled?statements?are?those?of?”third?parties”?within?the?meaning?of?Nobles?and?are?therefore?outside?of?the?scope?of?the?self-incrimination?clause.?(Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?234?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?151].)fn.?6
Petitioner?attempts?to?distinguish?Nobles,?noting?that?the?Supreme?Court?has?never?upheld?disclosure?of?statements?of?defense?witnesses?before?trial.fn.?7?He?further?observes?that?the?Federal?Rules?of?Criminal?Procedure?provide?for?disclosure?of?statements?of?defense?witnesses?only?after?they?testify?at?trial,?citing?rule?26?of?the?Federal?Rules?of?Criminal?Procedure?(18?U.S.C.).
Here?again?petitioner’s?argument?misinterprets?the?scope?of?the?self-?incrimination?clause.?The?timing?of?the?disclosure,?whether?before?or?during?[54?Cal.3d?369]?trial,?does?not?affect?any?of?the?four?requirements?that?together?trigger?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination,?and?therefore?cannot?implicate?the?privilege.?The?acceleration?doctrine?of?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?compels?this?conclusion.?We?conclude?that?statements?of?the?witnesses?that?the?defense?intends?to?call?at?trial?are?not?personal?to?the?defendant,?and?therefore?compelled?discovery?of?such?statements?does?not?implicate?the?self-incrimination?clause.fn.?8
Having?concluded?that?application?of?the?discovery?provisions?enacted?by?Proposition?115?does?not?violate?petitioner’s?Fifth?Amendment?privilege?against?self-incrimination,?we?turn?now?to?the?privilege?under?the?state?Constitution.
- State?Constitutional?Challenge.?Section?15?of?article?I?of?the?California?Constitution?(hereafter?article?I,?section?15)?guarantees?the?defendant?in?a?criminal?case?certain?procedural?rights,?including?the?right?not?to?be?compelled?to?testify?against?oneself.?This?court?relied?on?that?provision?in?Misener,?supra,?38?Cal.3d?543,?to?invalidate?former?Penal?Code?section?1102.5,?which?permitted?the?prosecution?to?discover?from?the?defendant,?following?testimony?on?direct?examination?of?defense?witnesses?other?than?the?defendant,?prior?statements?made?by?those?witnesses.?[4a]?Petitioner?asserts?the?new?discovery?chapter?is?unconstitutional?under?our?decisions?in?Misener?and?other?cases?interpreting?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-?incrimination.
Misener,?supra,?38?Cal.3d?543,?was?preceded?by?a?long?line?of?decisions?of?this?court?on?the?subject?of?prosecutorial?discovery,?beginning?with?Jones?v.?Superior?Court?(1962)?58?Cal.2d?56[22?Cal.Rptr.?879,?372?P.2d?919,?96?A.L.R.2d?1213]?(Jones;?holding?that?pretrial?discovery?by?prosecution?of?identities?and?written?reports?of?expert?witnesses?defendant?intends?to?call?at?trial?does?not?violate?state?self-incrimination?clause?or?attorney-client?privilege).?It?is?appropriate?that?our?analysis?of?the?state?Constitution?begin?with?the?observation?of?then-Justice?Traynor?in?Jones?that?”absent?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?or?other?privileges?provided?by?law,?the?defendant?in?a?criminal?case?has?no?valid?interest?in?denying?the?prosecution?access?to?evidence?that?can?throw?light?on?issues?in?the?case.”?(Jones,?supra,?58?Cal.2d?at?p.?59.)?In?Jones?the?court?concluded?that?discovery,?functioning?so?as?to?[54?Cal.3d?370]?promote?”the?orderly?ascertainment?of?truth,”?”should?not?be?a?one-way?street.”?(Id.?at?p.?60.)
The?two-way?street?envisioned?by?then-Justice?Traynor?in?Jones?was?short?lived?as?the?road?to?prosecutorial?discovery?was?effectively?closed?in?Prudhomme?v.?Superior?Court?(1970)?2?Cal.3d?320?[85?Cal.Rptr.?129,?466?P.2d?673]?(Prudhomme).?In?Prudhomme,?we?reasoned?that?”certain?significant?developments?in?the?law?since?Jones,”?including?a?decision?of?the?Supreme?Court?applying?the?Fifth?Amendment?privilege?against?self-incrimination?to?the?states?(Malloy?v.?Hogan?(1964)?378?U.S.?1?[12?L.Ed.2d?653,?84?S.Ct.?1489]),?and?the?high?court’s?”increasing?emphasis?upon?the?role?played?by”?that?privilege,?were?cause?to?reexamine?the?policies?underlying?prosecutorial?discovery.?(Prudhomme,?supra,?2?Cal.3d?at?p.?323.)?Prudhomme,?essentially?limiting?Jones?to?its?facts,?reasoned?that?the?focus?must?be?whether?the?compelled?discovery?”conceivably?might?lighten?the?prosecution’s?burden?of?proving?its?case?in?chief”?and?held?that?the?privilege?”forbids?compelled?disclosures?which?could?serve?as?a?’link?in?a?chain’?of?evidence?tending?to?establish?guilt?of?a?criminal?offense.”?(Id.?at?p.?326.)?Accordingly,?Prudhomme?annulled?a?discovery?order?that?would?have?required?the?defendant?to?disclose?to?the?prosecution?the?names,?addresses?and?expected?testimony?of?all?witnesses?he?intended?to?call?at?trial.?(Id.?at?p.?328.)
The?federal?trend?that?we?perceived?in?Prudhomme,?supra,?2?Cal.3d?320,?was?abruptly?terminated?two?months?later?by?the?high?court’s?decision?in?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?upholding?Florida’s?notice-of-alibi?rule?against?a?Fifth?Amendment?self-incrimination?challenge.?Thereafter,?in?a?case?addressing?the?validity?of?a?nonstatutory?discovery?order?requiring?the?defense?to?disclose?to?the?prosecution?the?names?and?addresses?of?the?witnesses?it?would?call,?we?retained?the?Prudhomme?rule,?resting?it?on?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?contained?in?the?California?Constitution.?(Reynolds?v.?Superior?Court?(1974)?12?Cal.3d?834?[117?Cal.Rptr.?437,?528?P.2d?45]?[Reynolds].)?We?stated?in?Reynolds,?”it?cannot?be?gainsaid?that?Prudhomme?put?this?court?on?record?as?being?considerably?more?solicitous?of?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?than?federal?law?currently?requires.”?(Id.?at?p.?843;?see?also?Allen?v.?Superior?Court?(1976)?18?Cal.3d?520,?524-526?[134?Cal.Rptr.?774,?557?P.2d?65]?[invalidating?court?order?requiring?disclosure?by?defendant?of?prospective?witnesses,?so?jurors?could?ascertain?whether?they?were?acquainted?with?them,?as?violative?of?state?privilege?against?self-incrimination?in?absence?of?finding?that?such?disclosure?could?not?possibly?tend?to?incriminate?defendant?or?lessen?prosecution’s?burden?of?proof].)
Any?possibility?that?the?state?privilege?against?self-incrimination?would?nonetheless?permit?some?form?of?prosecutorial?discovery?was?eliminated?in?[54?Cal.3d?371]?Misener,?supra,?38?Cal.3d?543,?in?which?we?struck?down?the?Legislature’s?attempt?to?fashion?a?reciprocal?discovery?statute,?reasoning?that?to?the?extent?a?compelled?disclosure?is?useful?to?the?prosecution’s?case,?it?violates?the?defendant’s?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.
The?foregoing?cases?represented?the?state?of?the?law?facing?the?voters?in?June?1990?when?they?voted?to?amend?the?California?Constitution.?As?discussed?above,?Proposition?115?added?article?I,?section?30(c)?to?the?California?Constitution,?providing?that?”discovery?in?criminal?cases?shall?be?reciprocal?in?nature,?as?prescribed?by?the?Legislature?or?by?the?people?through?the?initiative?process.”?The?concept?of?”reciprocal”?discovery?mandated?by?article?I,?section?30(c)?is?inherently?inconsistent?with?the?roadblock?to?prosecutorial?discovery?created?by?our?earlier?interpretations?of?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination?as?developed?in?the?Prudhomme?line?of?cases.?Thus,?in?resolving?this?inconsistency?we?must?apply?principles?of?constitutional?interpretation.
[5]?Rudimentary?principles?of?construction?dictate?that?when?constitutional?provisions?can?reasonably?be?construed?so?as?to?avoid?conflict,?such?a?construction?should?be?adopted.?(Serrano?v.?Priest?(1971)?5?Cal.3d?584,?596?[96?Cal.Rptr.?601,?487?P.2d?1241,?41?A.L.R.3d?1187];?see?also?Lungren?v.?Deukmejian?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?727,?735?[248?Cal.Rptr.?115,?755?P.2d?299].)?As?a?means?of?avoiding?conflict,?a?recent,?specific?provision?is?deemed?to?carve?out?an?exception?to?and?thereby?limit?an?older,?general?provision.?(See,?e.g.,?People?v.?Valentine?(1986)?42?Cal.3d?170,?181?[228?Cal.Rptr.?25,?720?P.2d?913];?Serrano?v.?Priest,?supra,?5?Cal.3d?at?p.?596;?People?v.?Western?Airlines,?Inc.?(1954)?42?Cal.2d?621,?637?[268?P.2d?723].)?[4b]?Therefore,?to?the?extent?that?the?Prudhomme?line?of?cases?impeded?reciprocal?discovery,?article?I,?section?30(c)?must?be?seen?as?abrogating?those?cases,?and?limiting?the?scope?of?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination?as?it?relates?to?reciprocal?discovery.?(See?People?v.?Valentine,?supra,?42?Cal.3d?at?p.?181.)fn.?9?Article?I,?section?30(c)?constitutes?a?specific?exception?to?the?broad?[54?Cal.3d?372]?privilege?against?self-?incrimination?set?forth?in?article?I,?section?15?of?the?California?Constitution.?(Ibid.)Such?an?interpretation?gives?effect?to?the?intent?of?the?voters?in?passing?Proposition?115.?[6]?The?manifest?intent?behind?the?measure?was?to?reopen?the?two-way?street?of?reciprocal?discovery.?The?preamble?to?Proposition?115?states?that?”comprehensive?reforms?are?needed?to?restore?balance?and?fairness?to?our?criminal?justice?system.”?(Prop.?115,???1(a),?italics?added.)?In?order?to?accomplish?this?goal,?the?voters?intended?to?remove?the?roadblock?to?prosecutorial?discovery?created?by?our?interpretations?of?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-?incrimination?as?developed?in?the?Prudhomme?line?of?cases.?The?preamble?further?states,?”In?order?to?address?these?concerns?and?to?accomplish?these?goals,?we?the?people?further?find?that?it?is?necessary?to?reform?the?law?as?developed?in?numerous?California?Supreme?Court?decisions?….”?(Prop.?115,???1(b).)
[4c]?We?note?the?California?Constitution?continues?to?afford?criminal?defendants?an?independent?source?of?protection?from?infringement?of?certain?rights,?including?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?(See?Raven,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?336?[invalidating?Prop.?115?to?extent?it?would?have?required?interpretation?of?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination,?and?other?rights?of?criminal?defendants,?consistently?with?analogous?rights?in?federal?Constitution].)?These?general?rights?of?criminal?defendants,?however,?are?necessarily?limited?to?the?extent?they?are?inconsistent?with?article?I,?section?30(c),?pertaining?to?reciprocal?discovery.?(See?People?v.?Valentine,?supra,?42?Cal.3d?at?p.?181.)?Thus,?petitioner’s?reliance?on?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination?as?a?restriction?on?reciprocal?discovery?is?unavailing.- Right?to?Due?Process?of?Law
Petitioner?asserts?the?new?discovery?chapter?violates?his?right?to?due?process?of?the?law?under?the?Fourteenth?Amendment?of?the?United?States?Constitution.?We?disagree.?The?Fourteenth?Amendment?recites?in?pertinent?part:?”No?state?shall?…?deprive?any?person?of?life,?liberty,?or?property,?without?due?process?of?law?….”
- Reciprocity?Challenge.?[7]?The?foregoing?due?process?clause?has?little?to?say?about?the?amount?of?discovery?which?must?be?afforded?the?parties?in?a?criminal?prosecution.?(Wardius?v.?Oregon,?supra,?412?U.S.?470,?474[37?L.Ed.2d?82,?87]?[Wardius];?but?cf.?Brady?v.?Maryland?(1963)?373?U.S.?83?[10?L.Ed.2d?215,?83?S.Ct.?1194]?[Brady;?prosecutor?has?obligation?to?disclose?exculpatory?evidence].)?The?due?process?clause,?however,?”does?[54?Cal.3d?373]?speak?to?the?balance?of?forces?between?the?accused?and?his?accuser.”?(Wardius,?supra,?at?p.?474?[37?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?87],?italics?added.)?That?is,?when?the?prosecution?is?allowed?discovery?of?the?defense,?that?discovery?must?be?reciprocal.?(Ibid.?[37?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?87.].)?In?Wardius?the?Supreme?Court?held?that?under?the?due?process?clause,?a?criminal?defendant?cannot?be?compelled?by?discovery?procedures?to?reveal?his?alibi?defense?in?the?absence?of?fair?notice?that?he?would?have?the?opportunity?to?discover?the?prosecution’s?rebuttal?witnesses.
First,?article?I,?section?30(c),?the?new?constitutional?provision?enacted?contemporaneously?with?the?new?discovery?chapter,?expressly?provides?that?”discovery?in?criminal?cases?shall?be?reciprocal?in?nature,?as?prescribed?by?the?Legislature?or?by?the?People?through?the?initiative?process.”?It?follows?that?the?voters,?in?requiring?that?any?initiative?prescribing?that?discovery?in?criminal?cases?be?”reciprocal?in?nature,”?would?naturally?intend?that?their?contemporaneous?enactment?of?a?discovery?scheme?for?criminal?cases?would?in?fact?provide?for?such?reciprocity.
Second,?turning?to?the?statutory?enactment?itself,?Penal?Code?section?1054?(section?1054)?expressly?provides?that?the?entire?new?discovery?chapter?”shall?be?interpreted?to?give?effect?to?all?of?the?following?purposes,”?including?the?provision?that?”no?discovery?shall?occur?in?criminal?cases?except?as?provided?by?this?chapter,?other?express?statutory?provisions,?or?as?mandated?by?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States.”?(??1054,?subd.?(e),?italics?added.)?Given?that?the?due?process?clause?mandates?reciprocity?when?the?prosecution?obtains?discovery?materials?from?the?defense?(Wardius,?supra,?412?U.S.?470),?and?given?that?the?new?discovery?chapter?provides?for?prosecutorial?discovery?of?defense?evidence?(see?Pen.?Code,???1054.1?[section?1054.1]),fn.?10?it?follows?that?the?new?discovery?chapter?should,?if?possible,?be?interpreted?as?providing?such?reciprocity.?[54?Cal.3d?374]
With?this?in?mind,?we?review?the?new?discovery?chapter?to?determine?whether,?explicitly?or?implicitly,?it?meets?the?requirement?of?reciprocity?under?the?due?process?clause.?Comparing?the?obligations?of?the?defense?under?section?1054.3?(see,?ante,?p.?365,?fn.?3)?with?those?of?the?prosecutor?under?section?1054.1?(see,?ante,?p.?371,?fn.?9),?it?is?clear?that?the?two?provisions?closely?track?each?other,?with?any?imbalance?favoring?the?defendant?as?required?by?reciprocity?under?the?due?process?clause.?(See?Wardius,?supra,?412?U.S.?470,?475,?fn.?9?[37?L.Ed.2d?82,?88]?[“If?there?is?to?be?any?imbalance?in?discovery?rights,?it?should?work?in?the?defendant’s?favor.”].)
Both?the?prosecution?and?the?defense?must?disclose?the?identities?and?addresses?of?all?persons?they?intend?to?call?as?witnesses?at?trial,?although?the?defense?need?not?disclose?whether?the?defendant?will?testify.?Any?relevant?written?or?recorded?statements?of?such?witnesses,?or?reports?of?the?statements?of?such?witnesses,?must?also?be?disclosed.?And?while?the?prosecution?must?disclose?all?”relevant?real?evidence?seized?or?obtained?as?part?of?the?investigation,”?the?defense?need?disclose?only?that?real?evidence?it?intends?to?offer?at?trial.?Moreover,?the?provisions?relating?to?the?timing?of?disclosure?and?the?mechanics?of?enforcement?apply?evenhandedly?to?both?the?prosecution?and?the?defense.?In?reviewing?these?new?provisions,?it?is?clear?that?the?scheme?is?”carefully?hedged?with?reciprocal?duties?requiring?state?disclosure?to?the?defendant.”?(Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?81?[26?L.Ed.2d?446,?450].)?Petitioner?nonetheless?makes?several?arguments?asserting?insufficiency?or?lack?of?reciprocity?in?the?new?discovery?chapter,?which?we?address?in?turn.
[9]?First,?petitioner?claims?the?new?discovery?chapter?is?inadequate?because?under?it,?following?a?compelled?disclosure?by?the?defense,?the?prosecution?is?not?compelled?to?reciprocate;?rather,?discovery?of?the?prosecution?is?required?only?”upon?demand”?by?the?defendant.?Petitioner?appears?to?argue?that?once?a?discovery?of?the?defense?is?compelled,?discovery?of?the?prosecution?should?be?automatic.?We?disagree.Section?1054.5(b)?provides?that?before?either?party?may?seek?court?enforcement?of?any?disclosure?required?by?the?new?discovery?scheme,?the?party?must?first?make?an?informal?request?to?the?other?party?for?the?information.?Given?that?the?prosecution?must?also?obtain?discovery?of?the?defense?through?the?mechanism?of?section?1054.5(b),?the?due?process?clause?is?not?violated?by?requiring?the?defendant?to?use?the?same?mechanism?to?effectuate?his?or?her?reciprocal?discovery?rights.?The?scheme?is?reciprocal?in?that?the?same?enforcement?mechanism?is?used?by?both?the?prosecution?and?the?defense.?[54?Cal.3d?375]?The?high?court?in?Wardius,?supra,?412?U.S.?470,?held?that?the?due?process?clause?requires?”notice?that?[the?defendant]?would?have?an?opportunity?to?discover?the?State’s?rebuttal?witnesses.”?(Id.?at?p.?479?[37?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?90].)?Section?1054.5(b)?provides?a?defendant?with?notice?of?such?an?opportunity.
[10a]?Second,?petitioner?asserts?the?new?discovery?chapter?is?insufficient?because?following?a?compelled?disclosure?of?a?defendant’s?witnesses,?there?is?no?duty?on?the?part?of?the?prosecutor?to?disclose?to?the?defense?the?prosecution’s?rebuttal?witnesses,?as?required?by?Wardius,?supra,?412?U.S.?470.?Petitioner?notes?that?the?prosecutor?must?disclose?only?those?witnesses?he?or?she?”intends”?to?call?at?trial,?and?argues?that?prosecutors?can?take?the?position?that?disclosure?of?rebuttal?witnesses?is?not?required?because?their?intent?to?call?any?such?witnesses?is?dependent?on?whom?the?defense?calls?and?the?testimony?of?the?defense?witnesses.?We?find?no?constitutional?infirmity.The?due?process?clause?requires?notice?that?the?defendant?will?have?the?opportunity?to?discover?the?prosecutor’s?rebuttal?witnesses.?(Wardius,?supra,?412?U.S.?470,?479?[37?L.Ed.2d?82,?90].)?Before?addressing?petitioner’s?argument,?we?note?that?the?enumeration?of?a?criminal?defendant’s?discovery?rights?under?section?1054.1?does?not?specify?that?rebuttal?witnesses?are?included.?However,?the?only?reasonable?interpretation?of?the?requirement?that?the?prosecution?disclose?”[t]he?names?and?addresses?of?persons?the?prosecutor?intends?to?call?as?witnesses?at?trial”?is?that?this?section?includes?both?witnesses?in?the?prosecution’s?case-in-chief?and?rebuttal?witnesses?that?the?prosecution?intends?to?call.?The?phrase?”at?trial”?means?exactly?that-at?the?trial,?not?merely?during?the?prosecution’s?case-in-chief.?A?like?provision?of?Ohio’s?discovery?scheme?was?similarly?interpreted?by?the?Ohio?Supreme?Court,?which?held?the?requirement?that?the?prosecution?disclose?the?witnesses?it?”intends?to?call?at?trial”?includes?”all?witnesses?it?reasonably?anticipates?it?is?likely?to?call,?whether?in?its?case-in-chief?or?in?rebuttal.”?(State?v.?Howard?(1978)?56?Ohio?St.2d?328?[100?Ohio?Op.3d?448,?383?N.E.2d?912,?915],?italics?added.)
Addressing?petitioner’s?argument,?we?begin?with?the?observation?that?the?prosecution’s?right?to?discover?defendant’s?witnesses?under?section?1054.3?is?triggered?by?the?intent?of?the?defense?to?call?that?witness.?Thus,?the?disclosure?by?the?defense?of?its?witnesses?under?section?1054.3?signals?to?the?prosecution?that?the?defense?”intends”?to?call?those?witnesses?at?trial.?It?follows?that?the?prosecution?must?necessarily?”intend”?to?call?any?of?its?witnesses?who?will?be?used?in?refutation?of?the?defense?witnesses?if?called.?A?prosecutor?cannot?”sandbag”?the?defense?by?compelling?disclosure?of?witnesses?the?defense?intends?to?call,?and?then?in?effect?redefining?the?meaning?of?”intends”?when?it?comes?time?to?disclose?rebuttal?witnesses.?[11]?(See?fn.?11.),?[10b]?The?same?definition?applies?to?both?the?prosecution?[54?Cal.3d?376]?and?the?defense?and?thereby?assures?reciprocity.fn.?11?A?disclosure?of?witnesses?under?section?1054.3?thus?triggers?a?defendant’s?right?to?discover?rebuttal?witnesses?under?section?1054.1,?fulfilling?the?requirement?of?reciprocity?under?Wardius,?supra,?412?U.S.?470.
[12]?Third,?petitioner?claims?that?reciprocity?under?the?due?process?clause?requires?that?the?prosecution?disclose?not?only?its?rebuttal?witnesses?(and?their?recorded?statements?or?reports?of?their?statements),?but?also?all?other?evidence?it?intends?to?use?to?refute?the?evidence?disclosed?by?the?defense,?and?that?the?new?discovery?chapter?fails?to?require?such?reciprocity.fn.?12?We?agree?with?petitioner?that?under?the?new?discovery?chapter?the?prosecutor?need?not?disclose?any?evidence?not?otherwise?discoverable?by?the?defense?under?section?1054.1.?We?conclude,?however,?that?the?due?process?clause?does?not?require?such?disclosure.In?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?the?high?court?held?a?discovery?rule?under?which?the?prosecution?is?not?required?to?disclose?its?evidence?in?refutation?of?the?alibi?evidence?disclosed?by?the?defense?(other?than?its?rebuttal?witnesses?and?their?statements)?does?not?violate?the?due?process?requirement?of?reciprocity?(Id.?at?pp.?81-82?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?449-?450].)?The?high?court?concluded?that?Florida’s?rule,?requiring?the?prosecution?to?disclose?the?witnesses?it?proposes?to?offer?to?rebut?the?alibi?defense?in?exchange?for?the?defendant’s?disclosure?of?alibi?witnesses,?met?the?due?process?requirement?of?reciprocity.?(Ibid.?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?450].)
We?recognize?that?general?language?in?the?Wardius?opinion?gives?some?support?to?petitioner’s?argument:?”It?is?fundamentally?unfair?to?require?a?defendant?to?divulge?the?details?of?his?own?case?while?at?the?same?time?subjecting?him?to?a?hazard?of?surprise?concerning?refutation?of?the?very?pieces?of?evidence?which?he?disclosed?to?the?State.”?(Wardius,?supra,?412?U.S.?470,?476?[37?L.Ed.2d?82,?88].)?Although?this?language?could?be?read?to?require?disclosure?of?all?evidence?in?the?possession?of?the?prosecutor?that?will?be?used?to?refute?the?defendant’s?alibi,?this?is?an?incorrect?interpretation?of?the?Wardius?opinion?and?the?due?process?clause.
We?stated?in?Reynolds,?supra,?12?Cal.3d?834,?that?under?Wardius?the?federal?constitutional?requirement?of?reciprocity?requires?disclosure?only?of?[54?Cal.3d?377]?rebuttal?witnesses?in?response?to?a?defendant’s?disclosure?of?an?alibi?defense?and?alibi?witnesses:?”Two?passages?in?Wardius?indicate?that?discovery?to?the?defendant?of?the?identities?of?the?witnesses?by?which?the?prosecution?will?seek?to?rebut?or?refute?an?alibi?defense?is?the?sine?qua?non?of?the?reciprocity?constitutionally?required?of?notice-of-alibi?procedures.”?(Id.?at?p.?844,?fn.?13,?italics?added.)?We?then?quoted?the?two?sections?of?Wardius?that?make?this?point?clear.fn.?13
Reciprocity?under?the?due?process?clause?requires?notice?that?the?defendant?will?have?the?opportunity?to?discover?the?prosecutor’s?rebuttal?witnesses?(and?their?statements)?following?discovery?of?defense?witnesses?by?the?prosecutor.?(Wardius,?supra,?412?U.S.?470,?479?[37?L.Ed.2d?82,?90].)?Reciprocity?requires?a?fair?trade,?defense?witnesses?for?prosecution?witnesses,?and?nothing?more.?We?glean?nothing?from?the?Supreme?Court’s?interpretations?of?the?due?process?clause?to?lead?us?to?conclude?that?reciprocity?requires?the?prosecutor?to?disclose?other?evidence?gathered?in?response?to?a?compelled?defense?disclosure?that?may?be?used?to?refute?the?defendant’s?case,?when?the?defense?is?not?required?to?do?the?same?following?discovery?of?the?prosecution’s?witnesses.fn.?14
In?summary,?we?conclude?that?the?new?discovery?chapter?enacted?by?Proposition?115?creates?a?nearly?symmetrical?scheme?of?discovery?in?criminal?cases,?with?any?imbalance?favoring?the?defendant?as?required?by?reciprocity?under?the?due?process?clause.?(See?Wardius,?supra,?412?U.S.?470,?475,?fn.?9?[37?L.Ed.2d?82,?88].)
- “Brady”?Evidence?Challenge.?[13a]?Petitioner?asserts?the?new?discovery?chapter?violates?the?due?process?clause?by?failing?to?require?the?prosecutor?to?disclose?all?exculpatory?evidence?as?mandated?by?the?high?court?in?Brady,?supra,?373?U.S.?83,?and?its?progeny.?(See,?e.g.,?United?States?v.?Bagley?(1985)?473?U.S.?667[87?L.Ed.2d?481,?105?S.Ct.?3375];?California?v.?Trombetta?(1984)467?U.S.?479?[81?L.Ed.2d?413,?104?S.Ct.?2528];?United?[54?Cal.3d?378]?States?v.?Agurs?(1976)?427?U.S.?97?[49?L.Ed.2d?342,?96?S.Ct.?2392];?Giglio?v.?United?States?(1972)?405?U.S.?150?[31?L.Ed.2d?104,?92?S.Ct.?763].)
The?prosecutor’s?duties?of?disclosure?under?the?due?process?clause?are?wholly?independent?of?any?statutory?scheme?of?reciprocal?discovery.?The?due?process?requirements?are?self-executing?and?need?no?statutory?support?to?be?effective.?Such?obligations?exist?whether?or?not?the?state?has?adopted?a?reciprocal?discovery?statute.?Furthermore,?if?a?statutory?discovery?scheme?exists,?these?due?process?requirements?operate?outside?such?a?scheme.?The?prosecutor?is?obligated?to?disclose?such?evidence?voluntarily,?whether?or?not?the?defendant?makes?a?request?for?discovery.
No?statute?can?limit?the?foregoing?due?process?rights?of?criminal?defendants,?and?the?new?discovery?chapter?does?not?attempt?to?do?so.?On?the?contrary,?the?new?discovery?chapter?contemplates?disclosure?outside?the?statutory?scheme?pursuant?to?constitutional?requirements?as?enunciated?in?Brady,?supra,?373?U.S.?83,?and?its?progeny.?Section?1054?expressly?provides?that?the?new?discovery?chapter?shall?be?interpreted?to?give?effect?to?the?provision?that?”no?discovery?shall?occur?in?criminal?cases?except?as?provided?by?this?chapter,?other?express?statutory?provisions,?or?as?mandated?by?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States.”?(??1054,?subd.?(e),?italics?added.)fn.?15?We?conclude?there?is?no?due?process?violation?because?the?new?discovery?chapter?does?not?affect?the?defendant’s?constitutional?right?to?disclosure?of?all?exculpatory?evidence?in?the?hands?of?the?prosecution?as?mandated?by?the?high?court?in?Brady,?supra,?373?U.S.?83,?and?its?progeny.?[54?Cal.3d?379]
- Right?to?Effective?Assistance?of?Counsel
Petitioner?asserts?the?new?discovery?chapter?violates?his?right?to?effective?assistance?of?counsel?under?the?Sixth?Amendment?of?the?United?States?Constitution.?We?disagree.?The?Sixth?Amendment?recites?in?pertinent?part:?”In?all?criminal?prosecutions,?the?accused?shall?enjoy?the?right?…?to?have?the?assistance?of?counsel?for?his?defense.”
- Assistance?of?Counsel?Challenge.?[15a]?Petitioner?asserts?prosecutorial?discovery?of?the?statements?of?defense?witnesses?violates?the?foregoing?right?to?counsel?clause?by?chilling?defense?counsel’s?trial?preparation.?In?petitioner’s?view,?such?discovery?penalizes?the?defendant?whose?attorney?is?most?vigilant?in?preparing?the?defense.?We?perceive?no?Sixth?Amendment?violation.
We?first?note?that?the?Supreme?Court?has?never?struck?down?a?discovery?scheme?as?violative?of?the?right?to?effective?assistance?of?counsel.?Furthermore,?under?the?new?discovery?chapter,?a?criminal?defendant?need?disclose?only?those?witnesses?(and?their?statements)?the?defendant?intends?to?call?at?trial.?It?is?logical?to?assume?that?only?those?witnesses?defense?counsel?deems?helpful?to?the?defense?will?appear?on?a?defendant’s?witness?list.?The?identity?of?damaging?witnesses?that?the?defense?does?not?intend?to?call?at?trial?need?not?be?disclosed.?Thus,?there?is?nothing?in?the?new?discovery?chapter?that?would?penalize?exhaustive?investigation?or?otherwise?chill?trial?preparation?of?defense?counsel?such?that?criminal?defendants?would?be?denied?the?right?to?effective?assistance?of?counsel?under?the?Sixth?Amendment.
Our?conclusion?is?in?line?with?that?of?the?high?court?in?Nobles,?which?rejected?an?argument?that?the?court?order?violated?the?Sixth?Amendment?by?requiring?the?defense,?once?it?called?its?investigator?as?a?trial?witness,?to?disclose?the?investigator’s?report?of?statements?made?by?prosecutorial?witnesses.?(Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?240,?fn.?15?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?154-155].)?In?Nobles?the?court?stated,?”The?Sixth?Amendment?does?not?confer?the?right?to?present?testimony?free?from?the?legitimate?demands?of?the?adversarial?system;?one?cannot?invoke?the?Sixth?Amendment?as?a?justification?for?presenting?what?might?have?been?a?half-?truth.”?(Id.?at?p.?241?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?155].)?[16]?Prosecutorial?discovery?of?the?statements?of?intended?defense?witnesses?is?a?”legitimate?demand”?of?the?criminal?justice?system?aimed?at?avoiding?testimonial?”half-truths”?by?promoting?what?then-Justice?Traynor?referred?to?as?”the?orderly?ascertainment?of?the?truth.”?(Jones,?supra,?58?Cal.2d?56,?60.)
Petitioner?attempts?to?distinguish?Nobles,?arguing?that?its?rejection?of?the?right?to?counsel?challenge?was?based?on?a?theory?of?waiver,?i.e.,?the?defendant?[54?Cal.3d?380]?waived?his?Sixth?Amendment?claim?by?his?”voluntary?election?to?make?testimonial?use?of?[the?defense]?investigator’s?report.”?(Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?240,?fn.?15?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?154-155].)?The?high?court,?however,?expressly?stated?that?waiver?was?not?the?sole?basis?for?rejecting?the?right?to?counsel?challenge.?As?the?court?stated,?”Moreover,?apart?from?this?waiver,?we?think?that?the?concern?voiced?by?[defendant]?fails?to?recognize?the?limited?and?conditional?nature?of?the?court’s?order.”?(Ibid.?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?155],?italics?added.)fn.?16?[15b]?Under?the?new?discovery?chapter,?discovery?is?limited?to?relevant?statements?and?reports?of?statements?of?defense?witnesses?and?conditioned?upon?the?defendant’s?intent?to?call?the?witnesses?at?trial.?(See?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?240,?fn.?15?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?154-155].)?The?new?discovery?provisions?do?not?give?the?prosecution?free?rein?over?all?defense?files.fn.?17
Petitioner?also?attempts?to?distinguish?Nobles?as?involving?disclosure?during?trial,?whereas?the?new?discovery?chapter?contemplates?discovery?before?trial.?We?discern?no?credible?argument?that?would?lead?us?to?conclude?the?fact?that?discovery?occurs?before,?rather?than?during,?trial?renders?such?discovery?violative?of?the?Sixth?Amendment.?The?limited?and?conditional?discovery?authorized?by?the?new?discovery?chapter?is?constitutionally?acceptable?under?the?reasoning?of?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?regardless?of?the?timing?of?the?discovery.
- Attorney?Work?Product?Challenge.?[17]?Petitioner?contends?the?provision?of?the?new?discovery?chapter?requiring?pretrial?disclosure?of?statements?of?defense?witnesses?implicates?the?Sixth?Amendment?by?violating?the?work?product?doctrine?enunciated?by?the?high?court?in?Hickman?v.?Taylor?(1947)?329?U.S.?495[91?L.Ed.?451,?67?S.Ct.?385]?(Hickman).?[54?Cal.3d?381]
Petitioner?misreads?Hickman,?supra,?329?U.S.?495.?The?doctrine?developed?in?Hickman,?and?applied?in?the?context?of?discovery?in?criminal?cases?in?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?is?not?based?on?the?right?to?counsel?clause;?rather,?it?is?”a?form?of?federally?created?privilege”?based?on?federal?supervisory?policy?and?federal?statute.?(Greyhound?Corp.?v.?Superior?Court?(1961)?56?Cal.2d?355,?399-401?[15?Cal.Rptr.?90,?364?P.2d?266]?[Greyhound;?Hickman?work?product?privilege?did?not?exist?in?California].)?There?is?no?privilege?for?attorney?work?product?in?the?California?Constitution.?Because?the?work?product?doctrine?is?not?constitutionally?founded,?there?is?no?basis?for?a?facial?challenge?to?the?constitutionality?of?the?new?discovery?chapter?on?work?product?grounds.fn.?18
Moreover,?we?note?the?new?discovery?chapter?expressly?provides?that?attorney?work?product?is?nondiscoverable.?Because?there?is?no?constitutional?basis?for?a?work?product?privilege,?any?protection?in?California?of?the?work?product?of?an?attorney?must?be?based?on?state?common?or?statutory?law.?Section?2018?(formerly???2016)?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?codified?the?work?product?doctrine?that?developed?in?the?common?law?as?to?civil?cases?subsequent?to?our?decision?in?Greyhound,?supra,?56?Cal.2d?355.?(See?People?v.?Collie,?supra,?30?Cal.3d?43,?59.)?Under?that?section,?the?work?product?of?an?attorney?is?nondiscoverable?unless?the?court?determines?that?the?denial?of?discovery?will?unfairly?prejudice?the?party?seeking?discovery?or?will?result?in?an?injustice.?(Code?Civ.?Proc.,???2018,?subd.?(b).)?Furthermore,?any?writing?that?reflects?”an?attorney’s?impressions,?conclusions,?opinions,?or?legal?research?or?theories?shall?not?be?discoverable?under?any?circumstances.”?(Code?Civ.?Proc.,???2018,?subd.?(c),?italics?added.)
Prior?to?the?enactment?of?Proposition?115,?we?held?that?the?work?product?doctrine?also?applies?to?criminal?cases.?(People?v.?Collie,?supra,?30?Cal.3d?43,?59.)?The?new?discovery?chapter?recognizes?this.?Penal?Code?section?1054.6?(section?1054.6)?of?the?new?discovery?chapter?provides,?”Neither?the?defendant?nor?the?prosecuting?attorney?is?required?to?disclose?any?materials?or?information?which?are?work?product?as?defined?in?subdivision?(c)?of?[54?Cal.3d?382]?Section?2018?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?….”?[18]?(See?fn.?19.)?This?section?thus?expressly?provides?that?attorney?work?product?is?nondiscoverable.fn.?19
- Other?Issues
Constitutional?rights?of?criminal?defendants?are?self-executing?and?need?no?statutory?enforcement?mechanism.?Just?as?in?other?areas?of?criminal?prosecutions,?a?defendant?may?file?opposition?to?the?prosecution’s?(??1054.5(b))?motion?for?formal?discovery?and?have?the?motion?calendared?for?hearing?before?the?trial?court.?The?normal?avenues?of?opposition?to?prosecutorial?motions?are?available?to?defendants?claiming?infringement?of?constitutional?rights.?(See?City?of?Alhambra?v.?Superior?Court?(1988)?205?Cal.App.3d?1118,?1130-1131?[252?Cal.Rptr.?789].)?These?procedural?safeguards?are?adequate?to?protect?the?constitutional?rights?of?criminal?defendants.?[54?Cal.3d?383]
Moreover,?section?1054.5(b)?empowers?the?trial?court?to?”make?any?order?necessary?to?enforce?the?provisions?of?this?chapter?….”?Among?those?provisions?is?section?1054.6,?which?states?unequivocally?that?defendants?are?not?required?”to?disclose?any?materials?or?information?which?are?…?privileged?as?provided?by?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States.”?Thus,?under?the?new?discovery?chapter?the?trial?court?may,?in?its?discretion,?order?briefing?and?argument?on?a?contested?issue?of?privilege,?and?conduct?an?in?camera?hearing?where?necessary.?The?procedural?history?in?petitioner’s?case?belies?his?argument?to?the?contrary.?[21]?(See?fn.?21.)?After?petitioner?filed?opposition?papers?raising?constitutional?claims,?the?motion?was?heard?by?the?trial?court?prior?to?its?decision?on?the?discovery?order.fn.?21
Last,?petitioner?contends?section?3?of?Proposition?115,?which?purports?to?require?that?interpretation?of?certain?state?constitutional?rights?of?criminal?defendants,?including?the?rights?to?due?process?and?a?speedy?and?public?trial,?be?consistent?with?analogous?rights?in?the?federal?Constitution,?denies?him?equal?protection?of?the?law?because?the?interpretation?of?the?People’s?new?constitutional?rights?to?due?process?and?a?speedy?and?public?trial?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?I,???29)?are?not?so?limited?by?federal?law.?Our?recent?decision?in?Raven,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?336,?striking?and?severing?section?3?of?Proposition?115,?and?thus?acknowledging?the?continued?independent?vitality?of?these?enumerated?state?constitutional?rights,?renders?this?claim?moot.
- Disposition
Because?we?conclude?that,?properly?construed,?the?new?discovery?chapter?enacted?by?Proposition?115?is,?on?its?face,?constitutionally?valid?under?the?federal?and?state?Constitutions,?the?alternative?writ?of?mandate?issued?by?this?court?on?February?22,?1991,?is?discharged,?and?the?peremptory?writ?is?denied.?The?order?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?affirmed.
Panelli,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?and?Baxter,?J.,?concurred.
KENNARD,?J.,
Concurring.
I?concur?in?the?result?reached?by?the?majority?opinion,?and?I?agree?with?most?of?the?majority’s?reasoning.?I?disagree,?[54?Cal.3d?384]?however,?with?the?majority’s?analysis?of?petitioner’s?contention?that?the?discovery?provisions?of?Proposition?115?implicate?the?Sixth?Amendment?by?violating?the?work?product?doctrine.?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?pp.?380-381.)
In?this?case,?which?is?at?the?pretrial?stage,?the?trial?court?ordered?petitioner?to?disclose?the?names,?addresses,?and?statements?of?witnesses?whom?the?defense?intends?to?call?at?trial.?Petitioner?contends?the?order?is?illegal,?because?it?requires?his?attorney?to?disclose?matters?that?are?protected?by?the?work?product?privilege.?Petitioner?recognizes?that?in?criminal?cases?Proposition?115?has?limited?California’s?statutory?privilege?for?an?attorney’s?work?product.?He?argues,?however,?that?a?broader?privilege?is?inherent?in?his?Sixth?Amendment?right?to?counsel,?and?that?this?broader?privilege?has?been?violated?by?the?trial?court’s?discovery?order.?Petitioner?relies?primarily?on?Hickman?v.?Taylor?(1947)?329?U.S.?495?[91?L.Ed.?451,?67?S.Ct.?385],?in?which?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?established?a?broad?work?product?privilege?for?proceedings?in?federal?court.
The?majority?correctly?points?out?that?the?work?product?privilege?created?by?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?in?Hickman?v.?Taylor,?supra,?329?U.S.?495,?is?based?on?federal?statutes?and?the?high?court’s?supervisory?powers?over?the?federal?judiciary.?From?this?general?observation,?the?majority?leaps?to?the?conclusion?that?”the?work?product?doctrine?is?not?constitutionally?founded?….”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?p.?381.)?But?this?conclusion?finds?no?support?in?Hickman?or?in?other?decisions?of?the?United?States?Supreme?Court.?In?Hickman,?the?high?court?did?not?hold?that?there?was?no?constitutional?basis?for?the?work?product?privilege.?Once?the?court?established?a?nonconstitutional?basis?for?the?privilege?there?was?no?need?to,?and?the?court?therefore?did?not,?determine?whether?the?federal?Constitution?provided?a?separate?basis?for?the?attorney?work?product?privilege.fn.?1
Although?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?has?never?expressly?decided?whether?the?attorney?work?product?privilege?is?founded?on?the?federal?Constitution,?in?United?States?v.?Nobles?(1975)422?U.S.?225?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?95?S.Ct.?2160],?it?has?strongly?hinted?that?in?criminal?cases?the?privilege?is?grounded?in?the?Sixth?Amendment?right?to?counsel.?In?Nobles,?the?defense?attempted?to?attack?the?credibility?of?a?prosecution?witness?by?calling?a?defense?investigator?to?testify?regarding?statements?that?the?witness?had?[54?Cal.3d?385]?made?to?the?investigator.?The?prosecution?then?sought?discovery?of?the?investigator’s?written?report?of?his?interview?with?the?witness,?for?use?in?cross-examining?the?investigator.
Although?in?Nobles?the?high?court?ultimately?found?that?the?defense?in?that?case?had?waived?the?work?product?privilege,?it?did?so?only?after?explaining-quoting?from?its?decision?in?Hickman?v.?Taylor,?supra,?329?U.S.?495-how?the?work?product?privilege?plays?an?essential?role?in?enabling?attorneys?to?properly?represent?their?clients’?interests:?”?’In?performing?his?[or?her]?various?duties?…?it?is?essential?that?a?lawyer?work?with?a?certain?degree?of?privacy,?free?from?unnecessary?intrusion?by?opposing?parties?and?their?counsel.?…?That?is?the?historical?and?the?necessary?way?in?which?lawyers?act?within?the?framework?of?our?system?of?jurisprudence?to?promote?justice?and?to?protect?their?clients’?interests.?This?work?is?reflected,?of?course,?in?interviews,?statements,?memoranda,?correspondence,?briefs,?mental?impressions,?personal?beliefs,?and?countless?other?tangible?and?intangible?ways-aptly?…?termed?…?as?the?”work?product?of?the?lawyer.”?Were?such?materials?open?to?opposing?counsel?on?mere?demand,?much?of?what?is?now?put?down?in?writing?would?remain?unwritten.?An?attorney’s?thoughts,?heretofore?inviolate,?would?not?be?his?[or?her]?own.?Inefficiency,?unfairness?and?sharp?practices?would?inevitably?develop?in?the?giving?of?legal?advice?and?in?the?preparation?of?cases?for?trial.?The?effect?on?the?legal?profession?would?be?demoralizing.?And?the?interests?of?the?clients?and?the?cause?of?justice?would?be?poorly?served.’?”?(United?States?v.?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?at?p.?237?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?153].)
After?noting?that?Hickman?was?a?civil?case,?the?Nobles?court?pointed?out?that?the?role?of?the?attorney?work?product?privilege?”in?assuring?the?proper?functioning?of?the?criminal?justice?system?is?even?more?vital.”?(United?States?v.?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?at?p.?238?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?153].)?Finally,?the?court?discussed?the?various?aspects?that?form?the?essence?of?the?privilege.?At?its?core,?the?court?said,?are?”the?mental?processes?of?the?attorney.”?The?court?then?observed?that?one?of?the?”realities?of?litigation”?is?that?attorneys?often?rely?on?investigators?for?assistance.?(Ibid.?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?154].)?Accordingly,?the?court?concluded:?”It?is?therefore?necessary?that?the?doctrine?protect?material?prepared?by?agents?for?the?attorney?as?well?as?those?prepared?by?the?attorney?himself.”?(Id.?at?pp.?238-239?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?154].)
By?stressing?the?fact?that?the?attorney?work?product?privilege?is?”vital”?and?”necessary”?to?ensure?that?lawyers?can?properly?represent?their?clients’?interests,?Nobles?implies?that?this?privilege?is?an?integral?part?of?a?criminal?defendant’s?Sixth?Amendment?right?to?counsel.?Although?the?high?court?in?Nobles?expressly?declined?to?delineate?the?scope?of?the?privilege?(United?States?v.?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?at?p.?239?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?154]),?it?implied?[54?Cal.3d?386]?that?reports?of?the?statements?of?witnesses,?whether?prepared?by?attorneys?themselves?or?by?defense?investigators,?are?included?within?the?privilege.?(Id.?at?pp.?237-238?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?153-154].)?Thus,?in?this?case,?by?ordering?disclosure?of?reports?of?the?statements?of?witnesses?the?defense?intends?to?call,?the?trial?court?may?have?directed?discovery?of?materials?that?fall?within?the?protection?afforded?by?the?Sixth?Amendment.
Even?if?the?work?product?privilege?is?grounded?in?the?right?to?counsel,?however,?the?discovery?ordered?here?may?be?upheld?on?the?ground?of?waiver.?In?United?States?v.?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?the?high?court?held?that?if?a?defendant?calls?a?witness?to?testify?at?trial,?the?defendant?waives?the?work?product?privilege?with?regard?to?that?witness’s?statements?gathered?by?the?defendant’s?attorney?and?the?attorney’s?agents.?(Id.?at?p.?239?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?154].)
Because?this?case?is?at?the?pretrial?stage,?the?defense?has?yet?to?call?any?witnesses.?The?trial?court?has?ordered?discovery?of?statements?only?of?witnesses?the?defense?intends?to?call.?But?despite?the?fact?that?no?waiver?has?occurred?(because?the?defense?has?not?called?any?witnesses),?I?see?no?constitutional?impediment?to?a?rule?permitting?discovery?to?take?place?in?advance?of?trial,?in?anticipation?of?defendant’s?expected?waiver?of?the?work?product?privilege,?so?that?when?the?waiver?actually?occurs,?the?prosecution?will?be?in?a?position?to?effectively?rebut?the?evidence?presented?by?the?defense.?If?the?defense?provides?no?discovery?until?the?time?of?trial,?when?the?waiver?takes?place,?the?prosecution?may?not?have?sufficient?time?to?undertake?the?investigation?necessary?to?prepare?an?adequate?rebuttal?to?the?defense?testimony.?To?address?this?problem,?Proposition?115?appropriately?allows?discovery?to?take?place?before?trial,?in?order?to?give?the?prosecution?an?opportunity?to?investigate?and?prepare?a?response.?Because?this?discovery?is?limited?to?witnesses?with?regard?to?whom?the?defense?intends?to?waive?the?work?product?privilege?by?calling?them?to?testify?at?trial,?it?does?not?violate?a?defendant’s?Sixth?Amendment?rights.
In?my?view,?however,?there?is?a?limitation?on?the?manner?in?which?the?prosecution?may?use?the?discovery.?If?the?discovery?is?justified?only?by?the?expectation?that?the?defendant?will?waive?the?work?product?privilege,?the?prosecution?should?not?be?allowed?to?utilize?at?trial?the?fruits?of?such?discovery?until?that?waiver?actually?takes?place.?If?prosecution?witnesses?testify?in?an?unanticipated?fashion,?the?defense?may?decide?not?to?call?its?intended?witnesses,?and?the?waiver?of?the?work?product?privilege?thus?may?not?occur.?Therefore,?it?would?be?impermissible?for?the?prosecution?to?use,?as?part?of?its?case-in-chief,?evidence?gained?through?discovery?of?statements?of?potential?defense?witnesses.?[54?Cal.3d?387]
In?this?case,?there?is?no?reason?to?believe?that?the?prosecution?will?use?the?court-ordered?discovery?as?part?of?its?case-in-chief.?Moreover,?the?trial?court’s?discovery?order?was?proper.?As?the?majority?correctly?points?out,?the?order?does?not?violate?defendant’s?rights?under?the?California?Constitution,?nor?does?it?violate?his?Fifth?Amendment?privilege?against?self-?incrimination.?Because?defendant’s?constitutional?rights?have?not?been?violated,?his?petition?for?writ?of?mandate?should?be?denied.?I?therefore?agree?with?the?majority’s?holding?denying?the?writ,?although,?for?the?reasons?I?have?expressed,?I?cannot?concur?in?the?majority’s?analysis?of?petitioner’s?Sixth?Amendment?claim.
MOSK,?J.
I?dissent.?As?I?shall?explain,?the?statutory?discovery?scheme?in?question?is?invalid?and?therefore?the?challenged?discovery?order?is?unsupported?as?a?matter?of?law.
I
At?the?June?5,?1990,?Primary?Election,?the?voters?approved?an?initiative?constitutional?amendment?and?statute?that?was?designated?on?the?ballot?as?Proposition?115-the?self-styled?”Crime?Victims?Justice?Reform?Act.”
Section?23?of?Proposition?115?purportedly?added?chapter?10?to?title?6?of?part?2?of?the?Penal?Code,?entitled?”Discovery,”?comprising?Penal?Code?sections?1054?through?1054.7.?Within?the?chapter,?section?1054.1?provides?for?discovery?by?the?defensefn.?1?and?section?1054.3?provides?for?discovery?by?the?prosecution.fn.?2?[54?Cal.3d?388]
On?June?6,?1990,?Proposition?115?purportedly?became?effective.?(See?Cal.?Const.,?art.?II,???10,?subd.?(a)?[statutory?provisions];?id.,?art.?XVIII,???4?[constitutional?provisions].)
Subsequently,?the?People?filed?an?information?in?the?Tulare?Superior?Court?against?petitioner,?Javier?Valle?Izazaga,?and?a?codefendant.?The?pleading?charged?the?pair?with?the?commission,?on?June?18,?1990,?of?two?counts?of?forcible?rape?(Pen.?Code,?former???261,?subd.?(2))?and?one?count?of?simple?kidnapping?(Pen.?Code,???207,?subd.?(a));?it?also?alleged?many?and?varied?sentence?enhancements.
The?People?made?an?informal?request?of?Izazaga?and?his?counsel?for?discovery?pursuant?to?the?procedural?requirements?of?Penal?Code?section?1054.5,?seeking?all?the?information?and?material?covered?by?Penal?Code?section?1054.3.?Izazaga?refused.
Thereupon,?the?People?moved?the?superior?court?for?an?order?under?Penal?Code?section?1054.5?compelling?Izazaga?and?his?counsel?to?disclose?the?information?and?material?they?had?informally?requested.
Izazaga?opposed?the?motion.?He?attacked?the?statutory?discovery?scheme,?including?especially?Penal?Code?section?1054.3?permitting?prosecutorial?discovery,?as?violative?of?the?following?protections?granted?criminal?defendants?by?the?United?States?Constitution:?the?right?to?due?process?of?law?under?the?Fourteenth?Amendment;?the?privilege?against?self-?incrimination?of?the?Fifth?and?Fourteenth?Amendments;?the?right?to?the?assistance?of?counsel?under?the?Sixth?and?Fourteenth?Amendments;?and?the?right?to?the?equal?protection?of?the?laws?under?the?Fourteenth?Amendment.?He?did?not?attack?the?scheme?as?violative?of?the?California?Constitution,?evidently?because?of?section?3?of?Proposition?115.fn.?3?[54?Cal.3d?389]
The?superior?court?conducted?a?hearing?on?the?People’s?motion?to?compel.?In?its?course,?defense?counsel?unsuccessfully?requested?the?court?to?hold?certain?proceedings?in?camera,?outside?the?presence?of?the?prosecutor,?on?the?ground?that?all?the?information?and?material?sought?came?directly?and?exclusively?from?Izazaga?himself?and?hence?that?its?compelled?disclosure?might?violate?his?federal?constitutional?privilege?against?self-?incrimination.
After?the?hearing,?the?superior?court?granted?the?People’s?motion?to?compel.?It?ordered?the?immediate?disclosure?of?”(1)?The?names?and?addresses?of?persons,?other?than?the?Defendant,?counsel?or?Defendant?intends?to?call?as?witnesses?at?trial”;?”(2)?Any?relevant?written?or?recorded?statements?of?the?persons?in?#1?above?and/or?reports?of?the?statements?of?such?persons”;?”(3)?Any?reports?or?statements?of?experts?made?in?connection?with?this?case,?including,?but?not?limited?to,?the?results?of?physical?or?mental?examinations,?scientific?tests,?experiments,?or?comparisons?which?the?Defendant?or?counsel?intend[s]?to?offer?as?evidence?at?the?trial?of?this?case”;?and?”(4)?Any?’real’,?i.e.?tangible?or?physical,?evidence?which?the?Defendant?or?counsel?intend[s]?to?offer?in?evidence?at?the?trial.”
Thereafter,?Izazaga?submitted?to?the?Court?of?Appeal?for?the?Fifth?Appellate?District?a?petition?for?writ?of?prohibition?and/or?mandate?against?the?superior?court?with?a?request?for?a?stay,?seeking?to?restrain?the?court?from?enforcing?its?order?compelling?prosecutorial?discovery.?He?attacked?the?statutory?discovery?scheme,?including?especially?Penal?Code?section?1054.3?permitting?prosecutorial?discovery,?on?the?same?federal?constitutional?grounds?he?relied?on?in?his?opposition?to?the?People’s?motion?to?compel.?The?Court?of?Appeal?summarily?denied?relief?solely?on?the?procedural?ground?that?this?court?was?the?appropriate?forum.
Izazaga?then?petitioned?this?court?for?review?with?a?request?to?stay?enforcement?of?the?superior?court’s?order?compelling?prosecutorial?discovery?pendente?lite.?He?made?the?same?federal?constitutional?attack?he?had?made?in?the?Court?of?Appeal.?We?stayed?enforcement?as?prayed.?Not?long?thereafter,?we?granted?review.?We?then?caused?an?alternative?writ?of?mandate?to?issue.
In?response,?the?People?as?real?party?in?interest?simultaneously?submitted?a?return?and?a?”Motion?for?Briefing?and?Argument?of?Additional?Issue.”
In?their?motion,?drafted?in?the?wake?of?our?decision?in?Raven?v.?Deukmejian?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?336,?349-355?[276?Cal.Rptr.?326,?801?P.2d?1077],?invalidating?section?3?of?Proposition?115,?the?People?requested,?in?substance,?that?we?consider?the?question?whether?the?statutory?discovery?scheme?is?violative?of?a?criminal?defendant’s?privilege?against?self-incrimination?under?[54?Cal.3d?390]?article?I,?section?15,?of?the?California?Constitution.?Izazaga?subsequently?joined?in?the?motion.?We?granted?the?request.
In?their?return,?the?People?maintain?that?Izazaga?has?not?mounted?a?successful?challenge?based?on?the?federal?constitutional?protections?on?which?he?has?relied.?They?also?maintain?that?he?cannot?mount?a?successful?challenge?based?on?any?state?constitutional?protection,?including?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination.
In?a?supplemental?brief,?Izazaga?essentially?makes?an?attack?on?state?constitutional?grounds-including?the?privilege?against?self-?incrimination-parallel?to?the?attack?he?had?already?made?on?federal?constitutional?grounds.
II
As?noted?above,?Izazaga?has?raised?several?claims?against?the?validity?of?the?statutory?discovery?scheme,?including?especially?Penal?Code?section?1054.3?permitting?prosecutorial?discovery.?In?my?view,?at?least?one?is?meritorious.?As?I?shall?show,?the?scheme?fails?muster?under?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?of?article?I,?section?15,?of?the?California?Constitution:?”Persons?may?not?…?be?compelled?in?a?criminal?cause?to?be?a?witness?against?themselves?….”
Before?undertaking?the?analysis?properly?so?called,?I?shall?set?out?the?necessary?legal?background.
In?Jones?v.?Superior?Court?(1962)?58?Cal.2d?56?[22?Cal.Rptr.?879,?372?P.2d?919,?96?A.L.R.2d?1213],?we?were?presented?with?a?petition?for?a?writ?of?prohibition?attacking?an?order?compelling?prosecutorial?discovery.
On?the?day?set?for?trial?on?a?charge?of?rape,?the?defendant?successfully?moved?for?a?continuance,?stating?that?he?had?long?been?impotent?and?that?he?needed?time?to?gather?medical?evidence?in?connection?with?certain?injuries?he?had?suffered.?Subsequently,?the?People?successfully?moved?for?discovery?of?the?following?information?and?material:?(1)?the?names?and?addresses?of?all?physicians?the?defendant?subpoenaed?to?testify?about?the?injuries?bearing?on?impotence;?(2)?the?names?and?addresses?of?all?physicians?who?had?treated?him;?(3)?all?reports?about?his?physical?condition?and?the?injuries?bearing?on?impotence;?and?(4)?all?X-rays?taken?immediately?after?the?injuries.
We?restrained?the?trial?court?from?enforcing?the?order?compelling?prosecutorial?discovery?as?framed?because?it?was?violative?of,?inter?alia,?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?[54?Cal.3d?391]
A?bare?majority?of?this?court?held?that?prosecutorial?discovery?is?not?absolutely?prohibited?by?the?privilege.?Speaking?through?Justice-later?Chief?Justice-Traynor,?they?stated?that?discovery?”should?not?be?a?one-?way?street”?(58?Cal.2d?at?p.?60),?allowing?the?flow?of?information?and?material?from?the?People?to?the?defendant?but?not?from?the?defendant?to?the?People.?They?also?stated?that?discovery?could?be?ordered?pursuant?to?rules?of?procedure?promulgated?under?this?court’s?inherent?power?to?provide?for?the?orderly?administration?of?justice,?even?in?the?absence?of?constitutional?mandate?or?legislative?authorization.?(Id.?at?pp.?59-60.)?They?concluded:?”Insofar?as?the?trial?court’s?order?herein?requires?[defendant]?to?reveal?the?names?and?addresses?of?witnesses?he?intends?to?call?and?to?produce?reports?and?X-rays?he?intends?to?introduce?in?evidence?to?support?his?defense?of?impotence,?it?does?not?violate?the?privilege?against?self-crimination.?…?It?simply?requires?[defendant]?to?disclose?information?that?he?will?shortly?reveal?anyway.?Such?information?is?discoverable.?The?order,?however,?is?not?limited?to?the?discovery?of?such?information,?and?therefore?cannot?be?enforced?in?its?present?form.”?(Id.?at?p.?62.)
In?separate?concurring?and?dissenting?opinions,?Justice?Peters?and?Justice?Dooling?declared?that?prosecutorial?discovery?was?totally?barred?by?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?In?Justice?Peters’s?words:?”The?’one-way?street’?argument?is?obviously?fallacious.?The?simple?fact?is?that?our?system?of?criminal?procedure?is?founded?upon?the?principle?that?the?ascertainment?of?the?facts?is?a?’one-way?street.’?It?is?the?constitutional?right?of?the?defendant,?who?is?presumed?to?be?innocent,?to?stand?silent?while?the?state?attempts?to?meet?its?burden?of?proof,?that?is,?to?prove?the?defendant’s?guilt?beyond?a?reasonable?doubt.?The?defendant,?up?until?now,?did?not?have?to?take?an?active?part?in?the?ascertainment?of?the?facts.?The?majority?opinion?does?not?merely?enlarge?a?simple?judicial?principle?of?pretrial?procedure,?it?fundamentally?alters?our?concepts?of?the?rights?of?the?accused,?and?forces?him?to?come?forward?with?information?before?the?prosecution?has?presented?a?case?against?him.”?(58?Cal.2d?at?pp.?64-65,?italics?in?original?(conc.?&?dis.?opn.?of?Peters,?J.).)?Justice?Peters?also?concluded?(id.?at?pp.?67-68?(conc.?&?dis.?opn.?of?Peters,?J.)),?as?did?Justice?Dooling?(id.?at?pp.?68-69?(conc.?&?dis.?opn.?of?Dooling,?J.)),?that?even?if?prosecutorial?discovery?was?not?totally?barred,?it?could?not?be?ordered?absent?constitutional?mandate?or?legislative?authorization.
Next,?in?People?v.?Pike?(1969)?71?Cal.2d?595?[78?Cal.Rptr.?672,?455?P.2d?776],?a?majority?of?this?court?followed?Jones?in?perfunctorily?rejecting?the?defendant’s?claim?that?an?order?compelling?prosecutorial?discovery?of?the?names,?addresses,?and?expected?testimony?of?defense?witnesses?was?violative?of,?inter?alia,?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?Justice?Peters?again?dissented.?[54?Cal.3d?392]
The?following?year,?in?Prudhomme?v.?Superior?Court?(1970)?2?Cal.3d?320?[85?Cal.Rptr.?129,?466?P.2d?673],?we?effectively?limited?Jones?to?its?facts?(at?p.?323)?and?expressly?disapproved?Pike?(at?p.?327,?fn.?11).
We?did?so?after?considering,?among?other?things,?the?United?States?Supreme?Court’s?expanding?interpretation?of?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?of?the?Fifth?Amendment,?which?had?been?held?applicable?to?the?states?through?the?due?process?clause?of?the?Fourteenth?Amendment,?two?years?after?Jones,?in?Malloy?v.?Hogan?(1964)?378?U.S.?1?[12?L.Ed.2d?653,?84?S.Ct.?1489].
“…?[I]f?we?analyze?Jones?in?the?light?of?the?policy?considerations?[underlying?the?federal?constitutional?privilege],?it?is?apparent?that?the?principal?element?in?determining?whether?a?particular?demand?for?discovery?should?be?allowed?is?not?simply?whether?the?information?sought?pertains?to?an?’affirmative?defense,’?or?whether?defendant?intends?to?introduce?or?rely?upon?the?evidence?at?trial,?but?whether?disclosure?thereof?conceivably?might?lighten?the?prosecution’s?burden?of?proving?its?case?in?chief.”?(2?Cal.3d?at?p.?326,?fn.?omitted.)
We?made?plain,?however,?that?prosecutorial?discovery?was?not?absolutely?prohibited?by?the?federal?constitutional?privilege?against?self-?incrimination.?”We?do?not?intend?to?suggest?that?the?prosecution?should?be?barred?from?any?discovery?in?this,?or?any?other,?case.?A?reasonable?demand?for?factual?information?which,?as?in?Jones,?pertains?to?a?particular?defense?or?defenses,?and?seeks?only?that?information?which?defendant?intends?to?introduce?at?trial,?may?present?no?substantial?hazards?of?self-incrimination?….”?(2?Cal.3d?at?p.?327,?italics?in?original.)
Less?than?three?months?after?Prudhomme?was?decided,?the?United?States?Supreme?Court’s?theretofore?expanding?interpretation?of?the?Fifth?Amendment’s?privilege?against?self-incrimination?began?to?contract.?In?Williams?v.?Florida?(1970)?399?U.S.?78?[26?L.Ed.2d?446,?90?S.Ct.?1893],?a?majority?of?the?court-over?the?vigorous?dissent?of?Justice?Black-upheld?a?Florida?rule?of?criminal?procedure?against?a?challenge?based?on?the?federal?constitutional?privilege.?The?rule?required?a?defendant?who?intended?to?rely?on?a?defense?of?alibi?to?disclose?to?the?state?the?names?of?his?alibi?witnesses,?and?in?turn?required?the?state?to?disclose?to?the?defendant?the?names?of?its?rebutting?witnesses.?The?majority?found?no?violation?of?the?privilege.?In?their?view-clearly?derived?from?the?reasoning?of?Jones-“At?most,?the?rule?only?compelled?[defendant]?to?accelerate?the?timing?of?his?disclosure,?forcing?him?to?divulge?at?an?earlier?date?information?that?the?[defendant]?from?the?beginning?planned?to?divulge?at?trial.”?(399?U.S.?at?p.?85?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?452].)?[54?Cal.3d?393]
In?Wardius?v.?Oregon?(1973)?412?U.S.?470?[37?L.Ed.2d?82,?93?S.Ct.?2208],?the?court?revisited?the?question?of?prosecutorial?discovery.?Oregon?had?a?statutory?notice-of-alibi?rule.?The?rule?required?a?defendant?who?intended?to?rely?on?a?defense?of?alibi?to?disclose?to?the?state?both?his?whereabouts?at?the?time?of?the?offense?and?the?names?and?addresses?of?his?alibi?witnesses.?By?contrast,?it?did?not?require?any?responsive?disclosures?to?the?defendant?by?the?state.?The?court?struck?down?the?rule?as?violative?of?the?due?process?clause?of?the?Fourteenth?Amendment.
“Although?the?Due?Process?Clause?has?little?to?say?regarding?the?amount?of?discovery?which?the?parties?must?be?afforded,?it?does?speak?to?the?balance?of?forces?between?the?accused?and?his?accuser.?The?Williams?Court?was?therefore?careful?to?note?that?’Florida?law?provides?for?liberal?discovery?by?the?defendant?against?the?State,?and?the?notice-of-alibi?rule?is?itself?carefully?hedged?with?reciprocal?duties?requiring?state?disclosure?to?the?defendant.’?The?same?cannot?be?said?of?Oregon?law.?…
“We?do?not?suggest?that?the?Due?Process?Clause?of?its?own?force?requires?Oregon?to?adopt?such?provisions.?But?we?do?hold?that?in?the?absence?of?a?strong?showing?of?state?interests?to?the?contrary,?discovery?must?be?a?two-?way?street.?The?State?may?not?insist?that?trials?be?run?as?a?’search?for?truth’?so?far?as?defense?witnesses?are?concerned,?while?maintaining?’poker?game’?secrecy?for?its?own?witnesses.?It?is?fundamentally?unfair?to?require?a?defendant?to?divulge?the?details?of?his?own?case?while?at?the?same?time?subjecting?him?to?the?hazard?of?surprise?concerning?refutation?of?the?very?pieces?of?evidence?which?he?disclosed?to?the?State.”?(412?U.S.?at?pp.?474-?476?[37?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?87-88],?citations?and?fns.?omitted.)
In?Reynolds?v.?Superior?Court?(1974)?12?Cal.3d?834?[117?Cal.Rptr.?437,?528?P.2d?45],?we?turned?yet?again?to?the?issue?of?prosecutorial?discovery.?On?the?People’s?motion,?the?trial?court?issued?an?order?compelling?discovery,?to?the?following?effect:?the?defendant?had?to?give?the?People?at?least?three?days’?notice?in?advance?of?calling?any?alibi?witnesses,?and?had?to?disclose?to?them?the?names,?addresses,?and?telephone?numbers?of?such?witnesses;?for?their?part,?the?People?had?to?disclose?to?the?defendant?any?evidence?they?might?possess?or?obtain?that?could?impeach?his?alibi?witnesses;?failure?to?disclose?a?witness?or?evidence?would?result?in?exclusion.?The?defendant?petitioned?for?a?writ?of?prohibition?against?the?trial?court?to?restrain?enforcement?of?the?order.?We?directed?issuance?of?the?writ.
In?an?opinion?for?a?unanimous?court?by?Chief?Justice?Wright,?we?expressed?our?view?that?”such?a?procedural?innovation?as?requiring?defendants?in?criminal?cases?to?give?advance?notice?of?alibis?should?be?introduced,?if?at?all,?only?upon?the?considered?judgment?of?the?Legislature.?…?[C]omplex?[54?Cal.3d?394]?and?closely?balanced?questions?of?state?and?federal?constitutional?law?are?presented?by?a?notice-of-alibi?order.?The?gravity?of?these?questions?counsels?against?the?exercise?of?our?rule-making?power?so?as?to?promulgate?a?notice-of-alibi?procedure.”?(12?Cal.3d?at?p.?837.)
“When?the?discovery?order?here?in?issue?is?viewed?in?the?light?of?[Jones,?Prudhomme,?Williams,?and?Wardius]?it?is?manifest?that?the?order?presents?delicate?and?difficult?questions?of?constitutional?law,?both?state?and?federal.?While?Williams?may?have?laid?to?rest?the?contention?that?notice-of-alibi?procedures?are?inconsistent?with?the?federally?guaranteed?privilege?against?self-incrimination,?this?privilege?is?also?secured?to?the?people?of?California?by?our?state?Constitution,?whose?construction?is?left?to?this?court,?informed?but?untrammelled?by?the?United?States?Supreme?Court’s?reading?of?parallel?federal?provisions.?[Citations.]?The?Supreme?Court?did?not?hesitate?in?Williams?to?send?defendants?with?alibi?defenses?down?the?’two-way?street’?mapped?out?in?Jones?for?a?defendant?making?the?partially?analogous?claim?of?impotence?in?a?rape?case;?but?this?court?in?Prudhomme?has?itself?cast?doubt?on?the?analogical?utility?of?Jones.?Of?course,?Prudhomme’s?concern?for?the?possible,?collaterally?incriminatory?consequences?to?an?accused?of?revealing?in?advance?of?trial?the?names?of?defense?witnesses?…?was?in?part?based?on?this?court’s?reading?of?pre-Williams?federal?law.?Nevertheless,?it?cannot?be?gainsaid?that?Prudhomme?put?this?court?on?record?as?being?considerably?more?solicitous?of?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?than?federal?law?currently?requires.?Thus,?there?is?no?foregone?answer?to?the?question?we?would?necessarily?face?were?we?to?pass?on?the?merits?of?the?…?court’s?order:?whether?notice-of-alibi?discovery?procedures?in?general?are?permissible?under?the?California?Constitution.
“Consideration?of?the?merits?of?the?…?court’s?order?would?require?us?to?decide?not?only?this?far-reaching?issue?of?state?law,?but?also?whether?the?order?is?sufficiently?reciprocal?in?scope?to?pass?federal?constitutional?muster?under?the?Wardius?test?of?fundamental?fairness.”?(12?Cal.3d?at?pp.?842-843,?fn.?omitted.)
The?next?year,?in?United?States?v.?Nobles?(1975)?422?U.S.?225?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?95?S.Ct.?2160],?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?again?addressed?the?issue?of?prosecutorial?discovery.?During?the?defendant’s?criminal?trial?in?federal?court,?defense?counsel?sought?to?impeach?the?credibility?of?key?prosecution?witnesses?by?testimony?of?a?defense?investigator?regarding?statements?he?had?previously?obtained?from?them?during?interviews.?Counsel?called?the?investigator.?The?court?told?counsel?he?would?have?to?submit?the?investigator’s?report?to?the?prosecution?at?the?close?of?the?investigator’s?testimony.?Counsel?said?he?did?not?intend?to?comply.?The?court?then?ruled?the?investigator?could?not?testify?about?the?interviews.?After?conviction,?the?[54?Cal.3d?395]?Court?of?Appeals?concluded,?inter?alia,?that?the?Fifth?Amendment’s?privilege?against?self-incrimination?prohibited?imposition?of?the?conditional?disclosure?requirement.?The?Supreme?Court?held?to?the?contrary.?It?reasoned?that?the?privilege?is?”personal?to?the?defendant”?and?as?such?”does?not?extend?to?the?testimony?or?statements?of?third?parties?called?as?witnesses?at?trial.”?(Id.?at?p.?234?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?151].)
The?year?following,?in?Allen?v.?Superior?Court?(1976)?18?Cal.3d?520?[134?Cal.Rptr.?774,?557?P.2d?65],?we?were?presented?with?yet?another?petition?for?a?writ?of?prohibition?to?restrain?a?trial?court?from?enforcing?an?order?compelling?discovery.?On?the?day?set?for?trial,?the?court?ordered?both?the?People?and?the?defendant?to?disclose?the?names?of?their?intended?witnesses?so?that?it?could?ascertain?whether?any?of?them?was?known?to?the?prospective?jurors.?The?court?stated?that?it?would?not?identify?any?of?the?witnesses?as?the?People’s?or?the?defendant’s,?and?that?it?would?enjoin?the?People?from?contacting?any?of?the?defendant’s?witnesses?until?the?witness’s?name?was?otherwise?disclosed?during?trial.?The?defendant?sought?a?writ?of?prohibition.?We?directed?issuance?of?the?writ.
In?an?opinion?by?Chief?Justice?Wright,?we?recalled?at?the?outset?that?”In?Prudhomme?we?concluded?that?the?principal?element?in?determining?whether?a?compelled?disclosure?should?be?allowed?is?’whether?disclosure?thereof?conceivably?might?lighten?the?prosecution’s?burden?of?proving?its?case?in?chief.’?”?(18?Cal.3d?at?p.?524.)
Citing?Nobles?and?Williams,?we?stated?that?we?were?”mindful?that?the?trend?of?the?federal?high?court’s?decisions?on?questions?of?compelled?defense?disclosure?to?the?prosecution?is?not?wholly?consistent?with?our?interpretation?of?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination.”?(18?Cal.3d?at?p.?524.)
But?we?declared?that?”It?is?established?that?our?Constitution?is?’a?document?of?independent?force’?[citations],?’whose?construction?is?left?to?this?court,?informed?but?untrammeled?[sic]?by?the?United?States?Supreme?Court’s?reading?of?parallel?federal?provisions.?[Citations.]’
“In?Reynolds?we?noted?that?’Prudhomme?put?this?court?on?record?as?being?considerably?more?solicitous?of?the?privilege?against?self-?incrimination?than?federal?law?currently?requires.’?[Citation.]?We?maintain?that?solicitude?and?affirm?the?continued?vitality?of?the?stringent?standards?set?forth?in?Prudhomme?for?the?protection?of?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?as?embodied?in?article?I,?section?15.”?(18?Cal.3d?at?p.?525.)
Applying?Prudhomme,?we?concluded?that?the?discovery?order?in?question?could?not?stand.?[54?Cal.3d?396]
Justice?Richardson?and?Justice?Clark?filed?separate?dissenting?opinions.?In?Justice?Richardson’s?view,?the?court?had?”erect[ed]?artificial?barriers?preventing?two-way?passage?on?the?street”?of?discovery.?(18?Cal.3d?at?p.?533?(dis.?opn.?of?Richardson,?J.).)
Next,?in?People?v.?Collie?(1981)?30?Cal.3d?43?[177?Cal.Rptr.?458,?634?P.2d?534,?23?A.L.R.4th?776],?we?proceeded?beyond?Prudhomme?to?generally?disapprove?of?prosecutorial?discovery,?absent?express?legislative?authorization,?on?the?ground?that?such?discovery?would?inevitably?raise?serious?questions?under?the?United?States?and?California?Constitutions,?including?the?state?charter’s?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?(Id.?at?pp.?48,?49-56.)?We?made?plain,?however,?that?the?prosecutorial?discovery?we?deemed?problematic?was?such?as?is?directed?at?”testimonial?evidence”?(id.?at?p.?55,?fn.?7)?and?not?”nontestimonial?evidence”?(ibid.):?”we?leave?intact?the?firmly?established?precedents?that?hold?the?self-incrimination?privilege?inapplicable?to,?and?allow?mandatory?production?of,?nontestimonial?evidence?such?as?fingerprints,?blood?samples,?breath?samples,?appearances?in?lineups,?and?handwriting?and?voice?exemplars.”?(Ibid.)
Justice?Richardson?concurred?in?the?judgment.?He?disagreed,?however,?with?the?court’s?analysis.?”Today’s?decision?entirely?blocks?the?People’s?access?to?’Discovery?Street’?by?judicial?fiat,?leaving?them?without?knowledge?as?to?what?constitutional?principles,?if?any,?have?created?the?roadblock,?or?how?the?obstruction?can?be?cleared.”?(30?Cal.3d?at?p.?69?(conc.?opn.?of?Richardson,?J.).)
Finally,?in?In?re?Misener?(1985)?38?Cal.3d?543?[213?Cal.Rptr.?569,?698?P.2d?637],?we?struck?down?Penal?Code?section?1102.5?as?violative?of?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?The?statutory?provision?required?the?defendant?and?his?counsel?to?disclose?to?the?People,?on?their?request,?prior?statements?by?defense?witnesses?after?they?testified?on?direct?examination.?Its?sole?apparent?purpose?was?to?facilitate?the?impeachment?of?such?witnesses.?(38?Cal.3d?at?p.?554.)?We?construed?the?privilege?more?broadly?than?we?had?in?Prudhomme-concluding,?in?effect,?that?it?barred?prosecutorial?discovery?that?could?help?the?People?carry?the?entire?burden?of?proving?the?defendant?guilty?beyond?a?reasonable?doubt,?whether?the?compelled?disclosure?might?serve?to?make?the?People’s?case?or?to?unmake?the?defendant’s.?(Id.?at?pp.?554-558.)
Dissenting,?Justice-now?Chief?Justice-Lucas?criticized?the?court’s?”holdings?in?the?present?case?and?prior?cases,”?which?he?claimed?”creat[ed]?a?devastating?’roadblock’?in?the?search?for?the?truth.”?(38?Cal.3d?at?p.?562?(dis.?opn.?of?Lucas,?J.).)?[54?Cal.3d?397]
I?now?turn?to?the?question?presently?before?the?court.?When?that?issue?is?considered?against?the?legal?background?set?out?above,?the?following?conclusion?is?practically?compelled:?the?statutory?discovery?scheme,?including?especially?Penal?Code?section?1054.3?permitting?prosecutorial?discovery,?is?on?its?face?violative?of?a?criminal?defendant’s?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.
It?matters?not?whether?the?privilege?is?construed?narrowly,?as?in?Prudhomme,?or?broadly,?as?in?Misener.?As?noted,?the?former?interpretation?prohibits?prosecutorial?discovery?when?the?compelled?disclosure?might?conceivably?lighten?the?People’s?burden?of?establishing?their?case-in-chief,?whereas?the?latter?bars?such?discovery?when?the?disclosure?could?help?the?People?carry?the?entire?burden?of?proving?the?defendant?guilty?beyond?a?reasonable?doubt,?whether?by?making?their?case?or?by?unmaking?his.
It?is?clear?that?the?intent?underlying?the?statutory?discovery?scheme?is?to?generally?and?broadly?assist?the?People?in?obtaining?the?conviction?of?criminal?defendants.?It?is?clearer?still?that?the?effect?of?the?scheme-indeed,?its?necessary?effect-is?to?furnish?just?such?assistance.
Certainly,?we?cannot?reasonably?construe?the?statutory?discovery?scheme?in?a?such?manner?as?to?avoid?conflict?with?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.
The?drafters?of?Proposition?115?declared?in?Penal?Code?section?1054.6?that?”Neither?the?defendant?nor?the?prosecuting?attorney?is?required?to?disclose?any?materials?or?information?…?which?are?privileged?pursuant?to?an?express?statutory?provision,?or?are?privileged?as?provided?by?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States.”?By?so?stating,?they?made?plain?that?the?Constitution?of?the?State?of?California-including?its?privilege?against?self-incrimination-was?not?within?their?consideration.?We?cannot?overlook?their?meaning?or?ignore?its?effect.
It?is?true?that?in?Penal?Code?section?1054.7?the?drafters?declared?that?a?”disclosure”?may?be?”denied,?restricted,?or?deferred”?if?”good?cause”?is?shown.?But?in?that?same?provision?they?added:?”?’Good?cause’?is?limited?to?threats?or?possible?danger?to?the?safety?of?a?victim?or?witness,?possible?loss?or?destruction?of?evidence,?or?possible?compromise?of?other?investigations?by?law?enforcement.”?(Italics?added.)?As?so?limited,?”good?cause”?is?clearly?not?broad?enough?to?encompass?a?claim?under?the?California?Constitution?generally?or?under?its?privilege?against?self-incrimination?specifically.
The?question,?of?course,?arises?whether?the?passage?of?Proposition?115?affects?the?foregoing?analysis?under?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?As?will?appear,?the?answer?is?negative.?[54?Cal.3d?398]
It?is?manifest?that?those?who?drafted?Proposition?115?had?a?tripartite?intent?as?to?the?issue?under?consideration.
First,?the?drafters?had?an?intent?as?to?the?past,?viz.,?to?remove?the?alleged?”roadblock”?to?prosecutorial?discovery?assertedly?established?by?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?Consider?section?3?of?Proposition?115,?which?would?have?added?the?following?relevant?text?to?section?24?of?article?I?of?the?state?charter:?”In?criminal?cases?the?right[?]?of?a?defendant?…?to?not?be?compelled?to?be?a?witness?against?himself?or?herself?…?shall?be?construed?by?the?courts?of?this?state?in?a?manner?consistent?with?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States.?This?Constitution?shall?not?be?construed?by?the?courts?to?afford?greater?rights?to?criminal?defendants?than?those?afforded?by?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States?….”
Plainly,?the?design?of?the?drafters?was?not?simply?to?breach?the?alleged?”roadblock,”?as?by?overruling?any?one?or?more?judicial?decisions?construing?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?Rather,?it?was?to?remove?the?alleged?”roadblock”?altogether,?by?abrogating?the?privilege?as?a?guaranty?independent?of?its?federal?constitutional?analogue.?Recall?Penal?Code?section?1054.6,?which?is?quoted?above:?”Neither?the?defendant?nor?the?prosecuting?attorney?is?required?to?disclose?any?materials?or?information?…?which?are?privileged?pursuant?to?an?express?statutory?provision,?or?are?privileged?as?provided?by?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States.”?The?absence?of?any?mention?of?the?Constitution?of?the?State?of?California?evidences?an?assumption?that?the?state?constitutional?privilege?was,?in?fact,?abrogated.
Second,?the?drafters?had?an?intent?as?to?the?present,?viz.,?to?enact?a?statutory?discovery?scheme?that?would?permit?discovery?for?the?People?as?well?as?for?the?defendant.?We?need?look?no?further?for?proof?than?to?section?23?of?Proposition?115,?which?purportedly?adds?Penal?Code?sections?1054?through?1054.7.
Third,?the?drafters?had?an?intent?as?to?the?future,?viz.,?to?require?that?henceforth?all?discovery?must?be?a?”two-way?street”?with?each?”lane”?roughly?the?same?width?as?the?other.?Section?5?of?Proposition?115?adds?section?30?to?article?I?of?the?California?Constitution.?Subdivision?(c)?of?the?new?section?30?of?article?I-hereafter?new?section?30(c)-declares,?”In?order?to?provide?for?fair?and?speedy?trials,?discovery?in?criminal?cases?shall?be?reciprocal?in?nature,?as?prescribed?by?the?Legislature?or?by?the?people?through?the?initiative?process.”?The?concept?of?reciprocity?was?evidently?derived?from?Wardius.?The?notion,?as?defined?in?its?source,?describes?both?the?direction?of?the?flow?of?information?and?material-i.e.,?from?the?People?to?the?defendant?and?from?the?defendant?to?the?People-and?the?character?of?the?flow?of?such?information?and?material-i.e.,?balanced.?[54?Cal.3d?399]
Not?only?is?the?tripartite?intent?of?those?who?drafted?Proposition?115?manifest.?Manifest?too?is?the?means?they?chose?to?attain?what?they?sought.
Thus,?section?3?of?Proposition?115,?which?would?have?added?the?text?quoted?above?to?section?24?of?article?I?of?the?California?Constitution,?would?have?removed?the?alleged?”roadblock”?to?prosecutorial?discovery?assertedly?established?by?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-?incrimination.?In?the?arguments?they?made?before?section?3?was?invalidated?in?Raven,?both?the?People?and?Izazaga?impliedly?recognized?the?point.?In?those?arguments,?neither?party?addressed?the?question?whether?the?state?constitutional?privilege?might?have?survived?the?passage?of?the?measure.
Next,?section?23?of?Proposition?115,?which?purportedly?adds?Penal?Code?sections?1054?through?1054.7,?would?have?enacted?a?statutory?discovery?scheme?that?would?have?permitted?discovery?for?the?People?as?well?as?for?the?defendant.
Finally,?section?5?of?Proposition?115,?which?adds?new?section?30(c),?requires?”discovery?in?criminal?cases”?to?be?”reciprocal?in?nature,”?i.e.,?flowing?to?the?People?as?well?as?to?the?defendant?and?also?balanced?in?character.
The?discussion?set?out?above?leads?to?the?following?conclusion:?the?passage?of?Proposition?115?does?not?affect?the?determination?that?the?statutory?discovery?scheme,?including?especially?Penal?Code?section?1054.3?permitting?prosecutorial?discovery,?is?on?its?face?violative?of?a?criminal?defendant’s?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-?incrimination.?The?reason?is?plain.?The?means?chosen?by?the?drafters?of?the?initiative?measure?to?remove?the?alleged?”roadblock”?to?prosecutorial?discovery?assertedly?established?by?the?privilege?failed?to?attain?what?they?sought.?As?noted?above,?in?Raven?we?invalidated?section?3?of?the?measure.
It?might?perhaps?be?argued?that?new?section?30(c)?itself?removes?the?alleged?”roadblock.”?Such?an?argument?should?be?rejected?out?of?hand.?It?is?evidently?based?on?an?interpretation?of?new?section?30(c)?that?would?render?it?redundant?in?pertinent?part?to?the?text?that?would?have?been?added?to?section?24?of?article?I?of?the?state?charter?by?section?3?of?Proposition?115.?An?interpretation?of?that?kind?should?be?avoided.?(City?and?County?of?San?Francisco?v.?Farrell?(1982)32?Cal.3d?47,?54?[184?Cal.Rptr.?713,?648?P.2d?935].)?In?any?event,?an?argument?such?as?the?preceding?would?be?unpersuasive.
First,?new?section?30(c)?does?not?remove?the?alleged?”roadblock”?expressly.?In?accordance?with?the?clear?meaning?of?its?plain?terms,?the?provision?invalidates?each?and?every?statutory?discovery?scheme?that?is?not?[54?Cal.3d?400]?reciprocal.?But?it?simply?does?not?validate?any?such?scheme-whether?the?scheme?in?question?or?any?other-that?happens?to?be?reciprocal.?Simply?put,?it?does?not?immunize?any?statutory?discovery?scheme?against?attack?under?the?California?Constitution,?including?its?privilege?against?self-incrimination.
Second,?new?section?30(c)?does?not?remove?the?alleged?”roadblock”?by?implication.
Of?course,?as?we?recently?reaffirmed?in?Kennedy?Wholesale,?Inc.?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization?(1991)53?Cal.3d?245,?249-250?[279?Cal.Rptr.?325,?806?P.2d?1360],?”?’the?law?shuns?repeals?by?implication?….’?[Citation.]?Indeed,?'[s]o?strong?is?the?presumption?against?implied?repeals?that?when?a?new?enactment?conflicts?with?an?existing?provision,?”[i]n?order?for?the?second?law?to?repeal?or?supersede?the?first,?the?former?must?constitute?a?revision?of?the?entire?subject,?so?that?the?court?may?say?that?it?was?intended?to?be?a?substitute?for?the?first.”?’?[Citation.]?Thus,?to?avoid?repeals?by?implication?’we?are?bound?to?harmonize?…?constitutional?provisions’?that?are?claimed?to?stand?in?conflict.”
There?is?no?conflict?between?the?state?constitutional?requirement?of?reciprocity?in?discovery?and?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-?incrimination.?To?be?sure,?the?reciprocity?requirement?may?be?read?to?permit?prosecutorial?discovery.?But?as?explained?above,?the?privilege?simply?does?not?prohibit?such?discovery.?Even?as?construed?broadly,?as?in?Misener,?it?allows?prosecutorial?discovery?of?at?least?nontestimonial?evidence.?It?follows?a?fortiori?that?the?reciprocity?requirement?does?not?amount?to?a?revision?of?the?entire?subject?covered?by?the?privilege.fn.?4?[54?Cal.3d?401]
An?argument,?I?acknowledge,?can?be?made?to?the?effect?that?new?section?30(c)?works?a?restricted?change?by?implication.?One?might?perhaps?read?the?provision?as?intended?to?foster?substantial?reciprocal?discovery:?”In?order?to?provide?for?fair?and?speedy?trials,?discovery?in?criminal?cases?shall?be?reciprocal?in?nature?….”?(Italics?added.)?Under?such?a?reading,?the?provision?might?be?deemed?to?impliedly?reject?Misener’s?broad?construction?of?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?But?it?certainly?could?not?be?held?to?extend?further,?as?for?example?to?affect?Prudhomme’s?narrow?interpretation.?Prudhomme?could?conceivably?permit?prosecutorial?discovery?not?dissimilar?to?that?which?rules?12.1,?16,?and?26.2?of?the?Federal?Rules?of?Criminal?Procedure?(28?U.S.C.)?currently?allow?in?federal?criminal?proceedings.?Such?discovery?would?surely?be?”substantial”?under?any?reasonable?definition?of?the?term.
I?recognize?that?the?drafters?of?Proposition?115?must?have?”intended”?and?”assumed”?that?the?statutory?discovery?scheme?would?pass?muster?under?the?California?Constitution.?But?they?must?have?had?a?similar?intent?and?assumption?as?to?section?3?of?the?measure-which?we?struck?down?in?Raven.?Such?an?intent?and?assumption?could?not?validate?what?was?invalid?there.?Neither?can?they?do?so?here.
In?conclusion,?the?statutory?discovery?scheme,?including?especially?Penal?Code?section?1054.3?permitting?prosecutorial?discovery,?is?on?its?face?violative?of?a?criminal?defendant’s?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?As?such,?it?is?invalid.?If?the?scheme?could?somehow?be?interpreted?and?given?effect?after?Penal?Code?section?1054.3?had?been?severed-a?dubious?proposition,?at?best,?in?light?of?its?comprehensive?nature-it?would?be?facially?offensive?to?new?section?30(c),?which?requires?that?”discovery?in?criminal?cases?shall?be?reciprocal?in?nature?….”?As?such,?it?would?be?invalid?on?that?separate?and?independent?ground.
It?follows?that?the?challenged?order?compelling?prosecutorial?discovery?is?without?the?requisite?support?in?law:?it?was?not?issued?in?accordance?with?valid?legislative?authorization.?It?is?of?no?consequence?whether?the?United?States?or?California?Constitution?might?possibly?mandate?some?hypothetical?order?compelling?some?undefined?prosecutorial?discovery?in?some?conceivable?case.?This?is?because?neither?the?federal?nor?state?charter?imposes?any?such?mandate?here.?In?any?event,?the?challenged?order-as?its?very?words?reveal-is?broad?and?unqualified,?entered?as?it?was?in?response?to?the?People’s?broad?and?unqualified?motion?to?compel.?Even?under?Prudhomme’s?narrow?interpretation?of?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination,?it?cannot?stand.?[54?Cal.3d?402]
III
For?all?the?reasons?stated?above,?I?conclude?that?the?statutory?discovery?scheme?purportedly?added?by?Proposition?115?is?invalid.?Further,?I?conclude?that?the?challenged?order?compelling?prosecutorial?discovery?is?unsupported?as?a?matter?of?law.
I?would?therefore?discharge?the?alternative?writ,?vacate?the?stay,?and?reverse?the?order?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?with?directions?to?cause?the?issuance?of?a?peremptory?writ?as?prayed.
BROUSSARD,?J.
I?dissent.
Contrary?to?the?implications?in?the?majority?opinion,?the?prosecutorial?discovery?authorized?by?the?relevant?provisions?of?Proposition?115?is?much?broader?than?the?discovery?that?has?been?approved?by?any?of?the?applicable?United?States?Supreme?Court?decisions?to?date.?Unlike?the?notice-of-alibi?provision?at?issue?in?Williams?v.?Florida?(1970)?399?U.S.?78?[26?L.Ed.2d?446,?90?S.Ct.?1893]?(hereafter?Williams)-which?simply?required?a?defendant?to?disclose?the?identity?of?alibi?witnesses?that?the?defendant?intended?to?call?at?trial-the?discovery?provisions?at?issue?here?require?a?defendant?to?disclose?the?identity?of?proposed?witnesses?who?may?testify?to?any?aspect?of?the?defense?case,?without?regard?to?the?potentially?incriminating?nature?of?the?information?the?witnesses?may?possess?or?to?the?degree?to?which?such?disclosure?might?lighten?the?prosecution’s?burden?in?its?case-in-chief.?Furthermore,?unlike?United?States?v.?Nobles?(1975)?422?U.S.?225?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?95?S.Ct.?2160]?(hereafter?Nobles),?in?which?the?Supreme?Court?upheld?a?court?order,?issued?at?trial,?requiring?defense?counsel?to?disclose?relevant?portions?of?statements?made?to?a?defense?investigator?if?the?investigator?testified?with?regard?to?such?statements?at?trial,?the?provisions?of?Proposition?115?require?disclosure?of?such?statements?pretrial,?at?a?time?when?defense?counsel?cannot?yet?know?whether?counsel?will?in?fact?have?to?call?such?witnesses?and?when?it?will?be?impossible?to?limit?the?disclosure?to?those?portions?of?the?witnesses’?statements?that?relate?to?their?actual?testimony?at?trial.?Although?the?majority?hold?that?the?Williams?and?Nobles?decisions?demonstrate?that?the?discovery?sanctioned?by?Proposition?115?is?compatible?with?the?Fifth?and?Sixth?Amendments?of?the?federal?Constitution,?I?cannot?agree.
I.
The?majority?read?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?as?standing?for?the?broad?proposition?that?no?discovery?provision?that?requires?a?defendant?to?disclose?to?the?prosecution?the?identity?of?any?or?all?witnesses?that?the?defendant?intends?to?call?at?trial?can?ever?violate?the?Fifth?Amendment?privilege?against?[54?Cal.3d?403]?self-incrimination?because?such?disclosure?is?not?a?”compelled”?disclosure?within?the?meaning?of?the?Fifth?Amendment.?Relying?on?a?passage?in?Williams?in?which?the?court?stated?that?the?notice-of-alibi?rule?at?issue?in?that?case?”only?compelled?[the?defendant]?to?accelerate?the?timing?of?his?disclosure,?forcing?him?to?divulge?at?an?earlier?date?information?that?the?[defendant]?from?the?beginning?planned?to?divulge?at?trial”?(399?U.S.?at?p.?85?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?452],?italics?added),?the?majority?reason?that?insofar?as?pretrial?discovery?pertains?to?witnesses?or?evidence?that?the?defendant?plans?to?disclose?at?trial,?a?”required?acceleration”?of?the?timing?of?the?defendant’s?disclosure?never?impinges?on?the?defendant’s?Fifth?Amendment?rights,?apparently?without?regard?to?the?potentially?incriminatory?nature?of?the?disclosure.
But?the?United?States?Supreme?Court’s?subsequent?decision?in?Brooks?v.?Tennessee?(1972)?406?U.S.?605?[32?L.Ed.2d?358,?92?S.Ct.?1891]?(hereafter?Brooks),?decided?only?two?years?after?the?Williams?decision,?demonstrates,?in?my?view,?that?the?majority’s?broad?reading?of?Williams?cannot?be?sustained.?In?Brooks,?the?court?addressed?the?constitutionality?of?a?state?rule?of?criminal?procedure?that?provided?that?if?a?criminal?defendant?was?to?testify?in?his?or?her?own?behalf,?he?or?she?was?required?to?testify?before?any?other?defense?witness?testified.?Defending?the?rule?as?a?permissible?means?of?furthering?a?legitimate?state?interest?in?preventing?a?defendant?from?tailoring?his?or?her?testimony?to?fit?the?testimony?of?other?defense?witnesses,?the?state?argued?that?the?rule?did?not?”compel”?the?defendant?to?disclose?any?information?that?the?defendant?did?not?voluntarily?choose?to?disclose,?but?at?most?provided?for?an?”acceleration”?of?such?disclosure?by?requiring?the?defendant?to?testify?first?or?not?at?all.?The?Supreme?Court?squarely?rejected?that?line?of?reasoning,?explaining:?”Pressuring?the?defendant?to?take?the?stand,?by?foreclosing?later?testimony?if?he?refuses,?is?not?a?constitutionally?permissible?means?of?ensuring?his?honesty.?It?fails?to?take?into?account?the?very?real?and?legitimate?concerns?that?might?motivate?a?defendant?to?exercise?his?right?of?silence.?And?it?may?compel?even?a?wholly?truthful?defendant,?who?might?otherwise?decline?to?testify?for?legitimate?reasons,?to?subject?himself?to?impeachment?and?cross-examination?at?a?time?when?the?strength?of?his?other?evidence?is?not?yet?clear.?For?these?reasons?we?hold?that?[the?state?rule]?violates?an?accused’s?constitutional?right?to?remain?silent?insofar?as?it?requires?him?to?testify?first?for?the?defense?or?not?at?all.”?(406?U.S.?at?pp.?611-612?[32?L.Ed.2d?363],?italics?added.)
In?my?view,?Brooks,?supra,?406?U.S.?605,?establishes?that?in?some?circumstances?a?rule?which?requires?a?defendant?to?”accelerate”?the?disclosure?of?witnesses?or?evidence?that?he?may?disclose?at?trial?can?impinge?on?the?defendant’s?Fifth?Amendment?rights,?and?that,?contrary?to?the?majority’s?conclusion,?a?more?sensitive?analysis?of?both?the?purpose?of?the?state?law?and?[54?Cal.3d?404]?the?effect?of?the?acceleration?on?the?defendant’s?rights?is?needed?to?determine?the?validity?of?the?state?practice.
Further,?contrary?to?the?majority’s?assertion?(see?maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?pp.?366-367),?the?high?court?has?found?Fifth?Amendment?violations?even?when?the?state?has?not?technically?”compelled”?a?defendant?to?produce?testimonial?disclosures.?In?Griffin?v.?California?(1965)?380?U.S.?609?[14?L.Ed.2d?106,?85?S.Ct.?1229],?the?high?court?observed?that?comment?on?a?defendant’s?failure?to?testify?”is?a?penalty?imposed?by?courts?for?exercising?a?constitutional?privilege.?It?cuts?down?on?the?privilege?by?making?its?assertion?costly.”?(Id.?at?p.?614?[14?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?109-110].)?The?court?found?that?”cutting?down”?the?privilege,?regardless?of?compulsion,?constituted?a?Fifth?Amendment?violation.?Similarly,?in?Simmons?v.?United?States?(1968)?390?U.S.?377?[19?L.Ed.2d?1247,?88?S.Ct.?967]?the?high?court?explicitly?rejected?the?argument?that?a?criminal?defendant’s?testimony?at?a?suppression?hearing?was?not?”compelled”?and?therefore?could?be?used?against?the?defendant?in?the?prosecution’s?case-in-chief.?”Those?courts?which?have?allowed?the?admission?of?testimony?given?to?establish?standing?[to?object?to?the?admission?of?incriminating?evidence]?have?reasoned?that?there?is?no?violation?of?the?Fifth?Amendment’s?Self-Incrimination?Clause?because?the?testimony?was?voluntary.?As?an?abstract?matter,?this?may?well?be?true.”?(Id.?at?p.?393?[19?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?1258-1259],?italics?added,?fn.?omitted.)?The?absence?of?”compulsion”?notwithstanding,?the?high?court?held?that?”when?a?defendant?testifies?in?support?of?a?motion?to?suppress?evidence?on?Fourth?Amendment?grounds,?his?testimony?may?not?thereafter?be?admitted?against?him?at?trial?on?the?issue?of?guilt?unless?he?makes?no?objection.”?(Id.?at?p.?394?[19?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?1259].)
Indeed,?many?academic?commentators?who?have?considered?the?question?have?concluded?that?the?broad?interpretation?of?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?adopted?by?the?majority,?conflicts?with?the?high?court’s?analysis?in?Brooks,?supra,?406?U.S.?605,?Griffin?v.?California,?supra,?380?U.S.?609,?or?Simmons?v.?United?States,?supra,?390?U.S.?377.?(See,?e.g.,?Mosteller,?Discovery?Against?the?Defense:?Tilting?the?Adversarial?Balance?(1986)?74?Cal.L.Rev.?1569?(hereafter?Mosteller);?Westen,?Order?of?Proof:?An?Accused’s?Right?to?Control?the?Timing?and?Sequence?of?Evidence?in?His?De?fense?(1978)?66?Cal.L.Rev.?935,?947-952;?Lapides,?Cross-Currents?in?Prosecutorial?Discovery:?A?Defense?Counsel’s?Viewpoint?(1972)?7?U.S.F.?L.Rev.?217,?227-228.)?Professors?LaFave?and?Israel,?in?their?leading?criminal?procedure?textbook,?note?that?Williams?has?been?harmonized?with?the?Supreme?Court’s?other?self-incrimination?precedents?by?recognizing?the?generally?nonincriminatory?nature?of?the?disclosure?upheld?in?Williams:?”Williams?itself?did?not?involve?a?situation?in?which?the?defendant?even?remotely?suggested?that?his?alibi?witness?might?furnish?the?state?with?incriminating?information?relating?to?another?offense.?[54?Cal.3d?405]?Neither?was?there?any?suggestion?that?the?alibi?witness?there?had?helped?the?prosecution?in?building?his?case-in-chief.?Alibi?witnesses,?by?the?very?nature?of?the?defense?they?support,?are?not?furnishing?information?that?relates?directly?to?the?government’s?proof?of?the?elements?of?the?crime.?Moreover,?the?Williams?Court?noted?that?the?prosecution?there?had?confined?its?use?of?the?deposition?of?the?alibi?witness?to?challenging?the?credibility?of?that?witness.”?(2?LaFave?&?Israel,?Criminal?Procedure?(1984)???19.4,?p.?516.)
In?Estelle?v.?Smith?(1981)?451?U.S.?454,?462?[68?L.Ed.2d?359,?368,?101?S.Ct.?1866],?the?Supreme?Court?concisely?captured?one?of?the?fundamental?policies?reflected?in?the?Fifth?Amendment’s?privilege?against?self-incrimination:?”The?essence?of?this?basic?constitutional?principle?is?’the?requirement?that?the?State?which?proposes?to?convict?and?punish?an?individual?produce?the?evidence?against?him?by?the?independent?labor?of?its?officers,?not?by?the?simple,?cruel?expedient?of?forcing?it?from?his?own?lips.’?”?(Italics?omitted?and?added,?citation?omitted.)?Like?Lafave?and?Israel,?other?commentators?suggest?that?this?basic?principle?is,?in?practice,?rarely?violated?by?a?notice-of-alibi?statute:?”Pretrial?disclosure?of?the?alibi?defense?is?unlikely?to?supply?the?government?with?new?leads,?because?if?the?alibi?is?true,?an?alibi?witness?would?be?unable?to?connect?the?defendant?with?the?crime?in?any?way.?If?the?alibi?is?fabricated,?it?is?unlikely?that?a?witness?who?is?willing?to?perjure?himself?for?the?defendant?will?reveal?any?incriminating?evidence?to?the?prosecution.”?(Note,?Proposed?Rule?12.3:?Prosecutorial?Discovery?and?the?Defense?of?Federal?Authority?(1986)?72?Va.L.Rev.?1299,?1312,?fn.?omitted;?see?also?Mosteller,?supra,?74?Cal.L.Rev.?at?pp.?1628-1631.)
The?relative?safety?involved?in?disclosing?an?alibi?defense?to?be?used?at?trial?stands?in?stark?contrast?to?other?forms?of?pretrial?witness?disclosure?that?will?necessarily?include?the?admission?of?incriminating?evidence.?For?instance,?a?defendant,?who?anticipates?calling?a?witness?who?will?testify?that?the?defendant?committed?a?killing?in?self-defense,?is?faced?with?the?choice?of?either?providing?the?state?with?perhaps?the?sole?witness?to?the?killing?or?forgoing?use?of?the?witness?if?the?defendant?instead?chooses?to?test?the?state’s?ability?to?prove?the?defendant’s?guilt?beyond?a?reasonable?doubt.?It?is?not?sufficient?to?assert?that?compelling?a?defendant?to?provide?such?a?witness?furthers?the?courts’?truth-finding?mission;?Estelle?v.?Smith,?supra,?451?U.S.?454,?is?absolutely?clear?in?its?insistence?that?it?is?the?state’s?sole?responsibility?to?establish?the?case?against?a?defendant?without?requiring?that?defendant’s?complicity.fn.?1?[54?Cal.3d?406]
Thus,?I?disagree?with?the?majority’s?conclusion?that?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?is?sufficient,?in?itself,?to?demonstrate?that?the?discovery?provisions?of?Proposition?115?do?not?violate?the?Fifth?Amendment.?Insofar?as?Proposition?115?purports?to?go?beyond?the?alibi-witness?context,?and?to?require?a?defendant?to?disclose?all?of?the?witnesses?or?evidence?that?he?intends?to?introduce?at?trial,?I?would?hold?that?the?required?”accelerated?disclosure”?is?unconstitutional?under?the?general?Fifth?Amendment?principles?reflected?in?Brooks,?supra,?406?U.S.?605,?and?Estelle?v.?Smith,?supra,451?U.S.?454.
II.
Although,?for?reasons?well?expressed?by?Justice?Black?(see?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?at?pp.?106-116?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?479-485]?(dis.?opn.?by?Black,?J.))?and?Justice?Peters?(see?Jones?v.?Superior?Court?(1962)?58?Cal.2d?56,?62-68?[22?Cal.Rptr.?879,?372?P.2d?919,?96?A.L.R.2d?1213]?(dis.?opn.?by?Peters,?J.)),?I?find?it?hard?to?accept?the?proposition?that?a?discovery?order?which?compels?a?defense?attorney?or?defense?investigator?to?turn?over?investigative?material?to?the?prosecution?does?not?raise?Fifth?Amendment?problems,?recent?Supreme?Court?decisions?do?hold,?as?the?majority?note,?that?the?Fifth?Amendment?only?applies?to?the?compelled?disclosure?of?testimonial?material?from?the?defendant?himself,?rather?than?to?the?compelled?disclosure?of?evidence?that?was?obtained?by?his?attorney?or?investigator?from?other?sources.?(See,?e.g.,?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?at?pp.?233-234?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?150-?151].)?Under?those?cases,?the?majority?are?correct?in?finding?no?Fifth?Amendment?obstacle?to?the?portion?of?Proposition?115’s?discovery?provisions?which?require?defense?counsel?to?disclose?the?contents?of?written?statements?in?counsel’s?possession?of?witnesses?counsel?intends?to?call?at?trial.
But?while,?under?the?recent?Supreme?Court?authority,?the?compelled?disclosure?of?such?investigative?material?may?raise?no?Fifth?Amendment?concerns,?such?disclosure,?in?my?view,?raises?very?serious?questions?with?regard?to?the?defendant’s?right?to?the?effective?assistance?of?counsel?guaranteed?by?the?Sixth?Amendment.
With?respect?to?the?Sixth?Amendment?issue,?the?majority?”perceives”?that?”there?is?nothing?in?the?new?discovery?chapter?that?would?penalize?exhaustive?investigation?or?otherwise?chill?trial?preparation?of?defense?counsel?such?that?criminal?defendants?would?be?denied?the?right?to?effective?assistance?of?counsel?under?the?Sixth?Amendment.”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?p.?379.)?They?[54?Cal.3d?407]?reach?that?conclusion?in?part?because?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?”has?never?struck?down?a?discovery?scheme?as?violative?of?the?right?to?effective?assistance?of?counsel”?and?in?part?because?they?find?support?for?their?holding?in?the?high?court’s?decision?in?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225.?Of?course,?the?fact?that?the?high?court?has?not?struck?down?a?discovery?statute?on?Sixth?Amendment?grounds,?if?true,?says?nothing?about?the?constitutionality?of?Penal?Code?section?1054?et?seq.?under?the?Sixth?Amendment.?Further,?I?find?little?support?in?Nobles?for?the?majority’s?assertions.?Indeed,?a?close?reading?of?Nobles?actually?suggests?that?Proposition?115’s?discovery?provisions?run?afoul?of?the?Sixth?Amendment?guaranty?of?effective?assistance?of?counsel.
In?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?the?defendant’s?principal?contention?was?that?the?trial?court?had?violated?the?work?product?doctrine?by?ruling?that?if?the?defense?called?a?defense?investigator?to?testify?to?the?contents?of?pretrial?interviews?the?investigator?had?with?two?prosecution?witnesses,?the?defense?would?be?required?to?disclose?to?the?prosecution?relevant?portions?of?the?investigator’s?written?notes?of?the?interviews.?In?analyzing?this?contention,?the?Nobles?court?recognized?the?general?importance?of?protecting?the?investigative?efforts?of?defense?counsel?and?defense?investigators?in?criminal?cases.?The?court?stated?in?this?regard:?”Although?the?work-product?doctrine?most?frequently?is?asserted?as?a?bar?to?discovery?in?civil?litigation,?its?role?in?assuring?the?proper?functioning?of?the?criminal?justice?system?is?even?more?vital.?The?interests?of?society?and?the?accused?in?obtaining?a?fair?and?accurate?resolution?of?the?question?of?guilt?or?innocence?demand?that?adequate?safeguards?assure?the?thorough?preparation?and?presentation?of?each?side?of?the?case.?[?]?At?its?core,?the?work-product?doctrine?shelters?the?mental?processes?of?the?attorney,?providing?a?privileged?area?within?which?he?can?analyze?and?prepare?his?client’s?case.?But?the?doctrine?is?an?intensely?practical?one,?grounded?in?the?realities?of?litigation?in?our?adversary?system.?One?of?those?realities?is?that?attorneys?often?must?rely?on?the?assistance?of?investigators?and?other?agents?in?the?compilation?of?materials?in?preparation?for?trial.?It?is?therefore?necessary?that?the?doctrine?protect?material?prepared?by?agents?for?the?attorney?as?well?as?those?prepared?by?the?attorney?himself.”?(422?U.S.?at?pp.?238-239?[45?L.Ed.2d?153-154],?italics?added,?fns.?omitted.)
After?noting?the?applicability?and?importance?of?these?concerns?in?criminal?cases?generally,?however,?the?Nobles?court?ultimately?concluded?that?in?the?case?before?it?the?defendant?”by?electing?to?present?the?investigator?as?a?witness,?waived?the?privilege?with?respect?to?matters?covered?in?his?testimony.”?(422?U.S.?at?p.?239?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?154],?fn.?omitted.)?Thus,?on?those?facts,?the?court?held?that?the?trial?court?had?not?erred?in?its?”limited”?ruling,?”opening?to?prosecution?scrutiny?only?the?portion?of?the?report?that?related?to?[54?Cal.3d?408]?the?testimony?the?investigator?would?offer?to?discredit?the?witnesses’?identification?testimony.”?(Id.?at?p.?240?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?155].)
Although?the?main?focus?of?the?Nobles?decision?related?to?the?work?product?doctrine,?the?defendant?had?also?challenged?the?trial?court’s?ruling?as?a?violation?of?the?Sixth?Amendment,?and?the?Nobles?court?addressed?that?claim?in?a?footnote.?The?court?stated:?”This?claim?is?predicated?upon?the?assumption?that?disclosure?of?a?defense?investigator’s?notes?in?this?and?similar?cases?will?compromise?counsel’s?ability?to?investigate?and?prepare?the?defense?case?thoroughly.?Respondent?maintains?that?even?the?limited?disclosure?required?in?this?case?will?impair?the?relationship?of?trust?and?confidence?between?client?and?attorney?and?will?inhibit?other?members?of?the?’defense?team’?from?gathering?information?essential?to?the?effective?preparation?of?the?case.”?(Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?at?p.?240,?fn?15?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?154].)?The?court?rejected?the?defendant’s?argument,?not?because?it?perceived?any?misstatement?of?Sixth?Amendment?principles?on?the?defendant’s?part,?but?because?”the?[trial?court’s]?disclosure?order?resulted?from?respondent’s?voluntary?election?to?make?testimonial?use?of?his?investigator’s?report.?Moreover,?apart?from?this?waiver,?we?think?that?the?concern?voiced?by?respondent?fails?to?recognize?the?limited?and?conditional?nature?of?the?court’s?order.”?(Ibid.?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.154-155].)
It?is?apparent?from?the?high?court’s?treatment?of?the?defendant’s?Sixth?Amendment?contention?that?it?treated?his?concerns?seriously.?The?majority?does?not?even?attempt?to?sketch?out?the?Sixth?Amendment?limitations?to?requiring?pretrial?disclosure?of?defense?evidence,?but?instead?determines?that?the?language?of?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225-in?approving?the?limited?and?conditional?order?of?the?trial?court?in?that?case-specifically?approves?of?the?discovery?provided?in?Proposition?115:?”Under?the?new?discovery?chapter,?discovery?is?limited?to?relevant?statements?and?reports?of?statements?of?defense?witnesses?and?conditioned?upon?the?defendant’s?intent?to?call?the?witnesses?at?trial.”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?p.?380,?italics?in?original.)
It?should?be?obvious?from?the?facts?of?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?that?the?discovery?authorized?by?the?provisions?of?Proposition?115?is?of?an?entirely?different?magnitude?than?the?discovery?permitted?by?the?high?court?in?Nobles.?In?Nobles,?the?statement?of?the?defense?investigator?was?”limited”?by,?and?”conditioned”?on,?not?the?defendant’s?intent?to?call?the?investigator?but?by?the?fact?that?the?discovery?order?in?Nobles?only?reached?”the?relevant?portion?of?the?investigator’s?report,”?i.e.,?the?witnesses’?statements,?after?the?investigator?had?been?called?to?testify?for?the?defense.?(See?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?at?pp.?228-229?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?147-?148].)?It?is?simply?disingenuous?to?compare?a?discovery?order?allowing?the?prosecution?to?review?all?potential?[54?Cal.3d?409]?witness?statements?before?trial?pursuant?to?Penal?Code?section?1054.3?with?the?”limited?and?conditional”?order?at?issue?in?Nobles.
It?is?not?only?the?facts?of?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?that?resist?the?majority’s?expansive?interpretation?of?that?case;?the?language?of?the?court?in?Nobles?suggests?that?Proposition?115?cannot?survive?Sixth?Amendment?scrutiny.?The?Nobles?court?discussed?in?detail?the?policy?considerations?that?apply?to?the?protections?of?the?Sixth?Amendment?no?less?than?to?the?work?product?doctrine.?Again,?the?court?approved?the?trial?court’s?order,?but?emphasized?the?defendant’s?waiver?and?the?fact?that?the?court’s?order?was?narrowly?tailored?to?the?state’s?particularized?needs:?the?defendant,?”by?electing?to?present?the?investigator?as?a?witness,?waived?the?privilege?with?respect?to?matters?covered?in?[the]investigator’s]?testimony.”?(Nobles,?supra,?225?U.S.?at?p.?239?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?154],?italics?added.)
In?a?typical?criminal?prosecution,?the?discovery?provisions?of?Proposition?115?will?include?neither?a?waiver?nor?a?narrowly?tailored?order?for?the?defense?to?produce?evidence.?The?majority’s?definition?of?”intent?to?use?at?trial”?(see?maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?p.?376,?fn.?11)?leaves?such?a?strong?possibility?that?the?defense?will?not?produce?the?evidence?at?trial?that?the?defense’s?”intent?to?use?at?trial”?is?certainly?not?tantamount?to?a?waiver,?i.e.,?when?the?defense?actually?uses?the?evidence?in?question.?Similarly,?an?order?to?produce?all?statements?of?a?witness?the?defense?”intends?to?use?at?trial”?is?in?no?way?narrowly?tailored?to?produce?only?the?relevant?portions?of?the?statement?of?a?witness?certain?to?be?called?at?trial.fn.?2
Even?if?we?were?to?assume?that?all?of?a?potential?witness’s?pretrial?statements?were?relevant?to?the?issues?that?would?appear?before?the?trial?court,?the?fact?that?the?defense?must?release?those?statements?prior?to?trial?raises?serious?Sixth?Amendment?concerns.fn.?3?By?compelling?a?defense?attorney?to?surrender?the?fruits?of?the?investigation?before?trial,?we?necessarily?chill?an?attorney’s?zeal?to?investigate?potentially?damaging?or?incriminating?leads.?For?instance,?defense?investigators?will?hereafter?be?instructed?not?to?take?witnesses’?statements?for?fear?that?they?will?be?discoverable;?yet?without?[54?Cal.3d?410]?such?statements,?the?defendant’s?ability?to?impeach?a?witness’s?testimony?with?a?prior?inconsistent?statement?is?seriously?impaired.?Similarly,?defense?attorneys?will?be?pressured?not?to?disclose?witnesses?that?would?testify?to?both?incriminating?and?exculpatory?evidence?(e.g.,?percipient?witnesses?that?would?testify?to?an?affirmative?defense),?and?thereby?may?be?forced?to?forgo?the?opportunity?to?call?such?witnesses?at?trial.?(See,?e.g.,?Taylor?v.?Illinois,?supra,?484?U.S.?400.)?Because?the?discovery?provisions?of?Proposition?115?so?tie?a?defense?attorney’s?hands,?I?conclude?that?the?provisions?impermissibly?impinge?on?a?defendant’s?right?to?the?effective?assistance?of?counsel?as?guaranteed?by?the?Sixth?Amendment?of?the?United?States?Constitution.
III.
I?do?not?believe?that?the?cases?relied?upon?by?the?majority?to?interpret?the?Fifth?and?Sixth?Amendments?of?the?United?States?Constitution,?particularly?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?68,?and?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?authorize?prosecutorial?discovery?to?the?extent?provided?in?the?trial?court’s?order.?Accordingly,?I?cannot?join?the?majority.
FN?1.?The?court’s?order?required?that?petitioner?disclose?to?the?People?the?following:?”(1)?The?names?and?addresses?of?persons,?other?than?the?Defendant,?counsel?or?Defendant?intends?to?call?at?trial.?[?]?(2)?Any?relevant?written?or?recorded?statements?of?the?persons?in?#1?above?and/or?reports?of?the?statements?of?such?persons.?[?]?(3)?Any?reports?or?statements?of?experts?made?in?connection?with?this?case,?including,?but?not?limited?to,?the?results?of?physical?or?mental?examinations,?scientific?tests,?experiments,?or?comparisons?which?the?Defendant?or?counsel?intend?to?offer?as?evidence?at?the?trial?of?this?case.?[?]?(4)?Any?’real,’?i.e.?tangible?or?physical,?evidence?which?the?Defendant?or?counsel?intend?to?offer?in?evidence?at?trial.”?This?order?required?that?petitioner?disclose?all?the?information?that?he?could?be?compelled?to?disclose?pursuant?to?new?Penal?Code?section?1054.3?(section?1054.3).?(See,?post,?p.?365,?fn.?3.)
FN?2.?The?new?discovery?chapter?of?the?Penal?Code?also?includes?section?1054.2?(prohibiting?disclosure?to?defendant,?but?not?to?defense?counsel,?of?address?and?telephone?number?of?victims?and?prosecution?witnesses)?and?section?1054.4?(providing?that?the?chapter?does?not?limit?law?enforcement?from?lawfully?gathering?nontestimonial?evidence).
FN?3.?Section?1054.3?provides?that?”The?defendant?and?his?or?her?attorney?shall?disclose?to?the?prosecuting?attorney:?[?]?(a)?The?names?and?addresses?of?persons,?other?than?the?defendant,?he?or?she?intends?to?call?as?witnesses?at?trial,?together?with?any?relevant?written?or?recorded?statements?of?those?persons,?or?reports?of?the?statements?of?those?persons,?including?any?reports?or?statements?of?experts?made?in?connection?with?the?case,?and?including?the?results?of?physical?or?mental?examinations,?scientific?tests,?experiments,?or?comparisons?which?the?defendant?intends?to?offer?in?evidence?at?the?trial.?[?]?(b)?Any?real?evidence?which?the?defendant?intends?to?offer?in?evidence?at?the?trial.”
FN?4.?These?four?requirements?emanate?directly?from?the?wording?of?the?self-incrimination?clause:?”No?person?…?shall?be?compelled?in?any?criminal?case?to?be?a?witness?against?himself?….”?(Italics?added.)
FN?5.?In?rejecting?our?analysis?here,?Justice?Broussard’s?dissent?relies?on?Brooks?v.?Tennessee?(1972)?406?U.S.?605?[32?L.Ed.2d?358,?92?S.Ct.?1891]?[Brooks;?holding?rule?requiring?defendant?to?testify?before?other?defense?witnesses,?or?not?at?all,?violative?of?accused’s?constitutional?right?to?remain?silent],?and?Griffin?v.?California?(1965)?380?U.S.?609?[14?L.Ed.2d?106,?85?S.Ct.?1229]?[Griffin;?holding?prosecutorial?comment?on?defendant’s?failure?to?testify?a?violation?of?defendant’s?rights?under?Fifth?Amendment],?for?the?proposition?that?the?”accelerated?disclosure”?under?section?1054.3?violates?the?self-incrimination?clause.?(See?dis.?opn.?by?Broussard,?J.,?post,?pp.?403-404.)?These?cases,?dealing?with?the?special?component?of?the?Fifth?Amendment?protecting?an?accused’s?choice?of?whether?or?not?to?testify,?are?inapposite?to?the?situation?we?face?here.?The?new?discovery?chapter?does?not?affect,?directly?or?indirectly,?defendant’s?decision?to?take?the?stand.?Section?1054.3?applies?only?to?witnesses?”other?than?the?defendant.”?Justice?Broussard’s?reliance?on?Brooks?and?Griffin?is?therefore?misplaced.?We?also?note?that?the?language?Justice?Broussard?quotes?from?Estelle?v.?Smith?(1981)?451?U.S.?454,?462?[68?L.Ed.2d?359,?368,?101?S.Ct.?1866],?eloquently?supports?our?analysis:?”The?essence?of?this?basic?constitutional?principle?is?’the?requirement?that?the?State?which?proposes?to?convict?and?punish?an?individual?produce?the?evidence?against?him?by?the?independent?labor?of?its?officers,?not?by?the?simple,?cruel?expedient?of?forcing?it?from?his?own?lips.’?”?(See?dis.?opn.?by?Broussard,?J.,?post,?p.?405,?italics?omitted?and?added.)
FN?6.?We?note?that?the?high?court’s?holding?in?Nobles?that?statements?of?such?third?persons?are?outside?the?scope?of?the?self-?incrimination?clause?is?no?less?applicable?to?the?statements?of?defense?witnesses?than?it?is?to?the?statements?of?prosecution?witnesses?in?the?hands?of?the?defense,?as?was?the?situation?in?Nobles.?In?either?case,?such?statements?are?of?”third?parties?[to?be]?called?as?witnesses?at?trial,”?rather?than?defendant’s?”personal?communications.”?(Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?234?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?151].)
FN?7.?As?support?for?his?reading?of?Nobles,?petitioner?cites?Middleton?v.?United?States?(D.C.?1979)?401?A.2d?109;?United?States?v.?Felt?(D.D.C.?1980)?502?F.Supp.?71;?and?United?States?v.?Layton?(N.D.Cal.?1981)?90?F.R.D.?520.?Petitioner?misreads?these?cases,?none?of?which?interprets?the?self-?incrimination?clause?analysis?of?Nobles.
FN?8.?In?determining?whether?the?compelled?discovery?of?statements?of?defense?witnesses?implicates?the?self-incrimination?clause,?we?have?thus?far?focused?on?the?materials?actually?disclosed.?We?also?note,?however,?that?the?act?of?handing?over?the?statements?of?defense?witnesses?to?the?prosecutor?does?not?implicate?the?privilege.?This?act?is?not?”testimonial?or?communicative?in?nature”?because?the?act?itself?does?not?”reveal,?directly?or?indirectly,?[defendant’s]?knowledge?of?facts?relating?him?to?the?offense?or?…?[require?defendant]?to?share?his?thoughts?and?beliefs?with?the?Government.”?(Doe?v.?United?States,?supra,?487?U.S.?201,?213?[101?L.Ed.2d?184,?199],?italics?added.)
FN?9.?In?dissent,?Justice?Mosk?incorrectly?argues?our?interpretation?of?article?I,?section?30(c)?as?removing?the?Prudhomme?roadblock?renders?article?I,?section?30(c)?redundant?to?section?3?of?Proposition?115?(“[T]he?rights?of?a?defendant?…?to?due?process?of?law?…?[and]?to?not?be?compelled?to?be?a?witness?against?himself?or?herself?…?shall?be?construed?by?the?courts?of?this?state?in?a?manner?consistent?with?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States.?…”),?invalidated?by?our?decision?in?Raven,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?336.?(See?dis.?opn.?by?Mosk,?J.,?post,?p.?399.)?Although?overlapping?to?some?extent,?the?two?provisions?are?by?no?means?entirely?redundant.?Section?3?of?Proposition?115?clearly?was?written?much?more?broadly?than?the?narrowly?tailored?amendment?of?the?state?Constitution?effected?by?the?addition?of?article?I,?section?30(c).?More?important,?article?I,?section?30(c)?does?what?section?3?of?Proposition?115?never?intended?to?do:?it?provides?the?people?of?the?state?of?California?with?a?right?to?reciprocal?discovery?in?criminal?cases?to?parallel?the?federal?constitutional?right?of?criminal?defendants?under?Wardius?v.?Oregon?(1973)?412?U.S.?470[37?L.Ed.2d?82,?93?S.Ct.?2208].
FN?10.?Section?1054.1?provides,?”The?prosecuting?attorney?shall?disclose?to?the?defendant?or?his?or?her?attorney?all?of?the?following?materials?and?information,?if?it?is?in?the?possession?of?the?prosecuting?attorney?or?if?the?prosecuting?attorney?knows?it?to?be?in?the?possession?of?the?investigating?agencies:?[?]?(a)?The?names?and?addresses?of?persons?the?prosecutor?intends?to?call?as?witnesses?at?trial.?[?]?(b)?Statements?of?all?defendants.?[?]?(c)?All?relevant?real?evidence?seized?or?obtained?as?a?part?of?the?investigation?of?the?offenses?charged.?[?]?(d)?The?existence?of?a?felony?conviction?of?any?material?witness?whose?credibility?is?likely?to?be?critical?to?the?outcome?of?the?trial.?[?]?(e)?Any?exculpatory?evidence.?[?]?(f)?Relevant?written?or?recorded?statements?of?witnesses?or?reports?of?the?statements?of?witnesses?whom?the?prosecutor?intends?to?call?at?the?trial,?including?any?reports?or?statements?of?experts?made?in?conjunction?with?the?case,?including?the?results?of?physical?or?mental?examinations,?scientific?tests,?experiments,?or?comparisons?which?the?prosecutor?intends?to?offer?in?evidence?at?the?trial.”
FN?11.?The?Ohio?Supreme?Court?defined?the?requirement?that?the?prosecution?disclose?the?witnesses?it?”intends?to?call?at?trial”?as?including?”all?witnesses?it?reasonably?anticipates?it?is?likely?to?call.?…”?(State?v.?Howard,?supra,?383?N.E.2d?912,?915.)?We?adopt?this?definition?for?purposes?of?interpreting?the?requirements?of?the?new?discovery?chapter.
FN?12.?We?note?that?on?both?his?informal?and?formal?motions?for?discovery,?the?district?attorney?included?a?provision?stating?it?would?voluntarily?furnish?defendant?with?”All?evidence?possessed?or?obtained?by?the?prosecution?that?impeaches?or?corroborates?defense?materials?….”?Such?a?voluntary?promise,?however,?is?apart?from?the?obligations?created?by?the?new?discovery?chapter,?and?is?therefore?not?relevant?to?a?facial?challenge?of?the?constitutionality?of?the?provisions?enacted?by?Proposition?115.
FN?13.?The?relevant?passages?in?Wardius?read:?”Oregon?grants?no?discovery?rights?to?criminal?defendants?….?More?significantly,?Oregon,?unlike?Florida,?has?no?provision?which?requires?the?State?to?reveal?the?names?and?addresses?of?witnesses?it?plans?to?use?to?refute?an?alibi?defense?….?[W]hile?conceding?that?Oregon?law?fails?to?provide?for?reciprocal?discovery?on?its?face,?the?State?contends?that?if?petitioner?had?given?notice?of?his?alibi?defense,?the?state?courts?might?have?read?the?Oregon?statute?as?requiring?the?State?to?give?the?petitioner?the?names?and?addresses?of?state?witnesses?used?to?refute?the?alibi?defense.”?(412?U.S.?at?pp.?475-476?[37?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?87-88],?italics?added.)
FN?14.?We?note?the?near?mirror-?image?symmetry?under?California’s?new?discovery?chapter.?Following?disclosure?of?the?prosecution’s?witnesses,?on?demand?the?defense?must?disclose?only?the?witnesses?(and?their?statements)?it?intends?to?call?in?refutation?of?the?prosecution’s?case,?rather?than?all?the?evidence?developed?by?the?defense?in?refutation.?(See????1054.1,?1054.3.)?Thus,?the?defense?is?not?required?to?disclose?any?statements?it?obtains?from?prosecution?witnesses?that?it?may?use?to?refute?the?prosecution’s?case?during?cross-examination.?Were?this?otherwise,?we?would?be?presented?with?a?significant?issue?of?reciprocity.
FN?15.?Petitioner?also?asserts?the?new?discovery?chapter?violates?the?due?process?clause?by?requiring?disclosure?of?only?that?favorable?evidence?in?the?possession?of?the?prosecutor,?or?known?by?the?prosecutor?to?be?in?the?possession?of?the?investigating?agencies,?rather?than?all?favorable?evidence?”within?the?control?of?law?enforcement.”?(United?States?v.?Hsieh?Hui?Mei?Chen?(9th?Cir.?1985)?754?F.2d?817,?824.)?This?argument?merely?goes?to?the?scope?of?the?Brady?duties?of?prosecutors?and,?as?such,?is?also?both?outside,?and?independent?of,?any?statutory?discovery?scheme.
FN?16.?In?support?of?his?reading?of?Nobles,?petitioner?cites?Middleton?v.?United?States,?supra,?401?A.2d?109.?We?are?unpersuaded?by?Middleton?as?it?makes?no?mention?of?the?high?court’s?statement?that?waiver?was?not?the?sole?basis?for?rejecting?the?Sixth?Amendment?challenge.?Petitioner?also?cites?two?federal?cases,?United?States?v.?Felt,?supra,?502?F.Supp.?71,?and?United?States?v.?Layton,?supra,?90?F.R.D.?520,?for?the?same?proposition.?Petitioner?misreads?the?federal?cases.?Neither?stands?for?the?proposition?that?Nobles?was?based?solely?on?a?theory?of?waiver?or?that?compelled?disclosure?of?statements?of?defense?witnesses?prior?to?trial?denies?a?defendant?the?effective?assistance?of?counsel?guaranteed?by?the?Sixth?Amendment.?Petitioner?also?cites?dictum?in?People?v.?Collie?(1981)?30?Cal.3d?43,?55?[177?Cal.Rptr.?458,?634?P.2d?534,?23?A.L.R.4th?776],?that?if?discovery?of?a?defense?investigator’s?report?of?interviews?of?defense?witnesses?is?allowed,?”defendant’s?constitutional?right?to?assistance?of?counsel?is?potentially?threatened.”?(Italics?added.)?After?being?squarely?presented?with?the?issue,?we?find?no?threat?to?the?effective?assistance?of?counsel.
FN?17.?In?dissent,?Justice?Broussard?attempts?to?distinguish?Nobles?by?pointing?out?that?there?the?trial?court’s?discovery?order?was?”limited”?in?that?it?only?reached?”the?relevant?portion?of?the?investigator’s?report.?…”?(See?dis.?opn.?by?Broussard,?J.,?post,?p.?408,?italics?in?original.)?The?distinction?fails;?section?1054.3?similarly?limits?discovery?to?only?the?”relevant?written?or?recorded?statements”?of?witnesses.?(Italics?added.)
FN?18.?Justice?Kennard?asserts?in?her?concurring?opinion?that?we?”leap”?to?this?conclusion.?(See?conc.?opn.?by?Kennard,?J.,?post,?p.?384.)?To?the?contrary,?our?analysis?follows?our?conclusion?in?Greyhound,?supra,?56?Cal.2d.?355,?that?the?Hickman?work?product?doctrine?is?not?rooted?in?the?federal?Constitution.?Justice?Kennard’s?assertion?that?the?prosecution?may?use?evidence?gained?through?discovery?only?in?rebuttal?is?premised?on?her?view?that?in?criminal?cases?the?work?product?doctrine?is?grounded?in?the?right?to?counsel?clause.?(See?conc.?opn.?by?Kennard,?J.,?post,?p.?384.)?However,?the?only?authority?for?this?novel?proposition?is?the?assertion?that?the?high?court?”strongly?hinted”?to?this?effect?in?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225.?If?there?is?any?such?hint,?it?must?not?be?so?strong?for?we?cannot?find?it.?Moreover,?we?find?untenable?the?proposition?that?the?work?product?doctrine,?created?by?the?Supreme?Court?in?a?civil?case,?is?in?actuality?founded?in?the?right?to?counsel?clause?applicable?only?to?criminal?defendants.
FN?19.?We?note,?however,?that?section?1054.6?expressly?limits?the?definition?of?”work?product”?in?criminal?cases?to?”core”?work?product,?that?is,?any?writing?reflecting?”an?attorney’s?impressions,?conclusions,?opinions,?or?legal?research?or?theories.”?Thus,?the?qualified?protection?of?certain?materials?under?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?2018,?subdivision?(b),?applicable?in?civil?cases,?is?no?longer?available?in?criminal?cases.?The?more?recent?statute?limiting?the?definition?of?work?product?in?criminal?cases?carves?out?an?exception?to?the?older?work?product?rule?applicable?to?civil?and?criminal?cases?alike.?(See?Estate?of?Kramme?(1978)?20?Cal.3d?567?[143?Cal.Rptr.?542,?573?P.2d?1369].)
FN?20.?Penal?Code?section?1054.7?limits?”good?cause”?to?”threats?or?possible?danger?to?the?safety?of?a?victim?or?witness,?possible?loss?or?destruction?of?evidence,?or?possible?compromise?of?other?investigations?by?law?enforcement.”
FN?21.?We?note?that?petitioner?requested?an?ex?parte?in?camera?hearing?on?the?basis?that?the?self-incrimination?clause?would?be?violated?by?disclosing?the?name?and?address?of?a?witness?whose?identity?the?defense?learned?directly?from?petitioner.?The?trial?court?properly?rejected?petitioner’s?request.?The?court?has?inherent?discretion?to?conduct?in?camera?hearings?to?determine?objections?to?disclosure?based?on?asserted?privileges.?(City?of?Alhambra?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?205?Cal.App.3d?1118,?1130-1131.)?The?trial?court?properly?reasoned?that?even?if?petitioner?could?make?a?showing?in?camera?to?this?effect,?the?self-incrimination?clause?would?not?bar?compelled?discovery?of?the?identity?of?the?witness,?given?that?petitioner?intended?to?call?that?witness?later?at?trial.?(Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?81-82?[26?L.Ed.2d?446,?449-450].)
FN?1.?The?majority?claims?it?”follows”?this?court’s?decision?in?Greyhound?Corp.?v.?Superior?Court?(1961)?56?Cal.2d?355,?399-401?[15?Cal.Rptr.?90,?364?P.2d?266],?and?that?Greyhound?held?”that?the?…?work?product?doctrine?is?not?rooted?in?the?federal?Constitution.”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?p.?381,?fn.?18.)?I?find?no?discussion?of?the?federal?Constitution?in?Greyhound.?Because?Greyhound?involved?a?civil?action,?and?the?Sixth?Amendment’s?right?to?counsel?applies?only?in?criminal?cases,?any?discussion?of?the?relationship?between?the?right?to?counsel?and?the?work?product?privilege?would?have?been?irrelevant?under?the?facts?of?that?case.
FN?1.?”The?prosecuting?attorney?shall?disclose?to?the?defendant?or?his?or?her?attorney?all?of?the?following?materials?and?information,?if?it?is?in?the?possession?of?the?prosecuting?attorney?or?if?the?prosecuting?attorney?knows?it?to?be?in?the?possession?of?the?investigating?agencies:
“(a)?The?names?and?addresses?of?persons?the?prosecutor?intends?to?call?as?witnesses?at?trial.
“(b)?Statements?of?all?defendants.
“(c)?All?relevant?real?evidence?seized?or?obtained?as?a?part?of?the?investigation?of?the?offenses?charged.
“(d)?The?existence?of?a?felony?conviction?of?any?material?witness?whose?credibility?is?likely?to?be?critical?to?the?outcome?of?the?trial.
“(e)?Any?exculpatory?evidence.
“(f)?Relevant?written?or?recorded?statements?of?witnesses?or?reports?of?the?statements?of?witnesses?whom?the?prosecutor?intends?to?call?at?the?trial,?including?any?reports?or?statements?of?experts?made?in?conjunction?with?the?case,?including?the?results?of?physical?or?mental?examinations,?scientific?tests,?experiments,?or?comparisons?which?the?prosecutor?intends?to?offer?in?evidence?at?the?trial.”
FN?2.?”The?defendant?and?his?or?her?attorney?shall?disclose?to?the?prosecuting?attorney:
“(a)?The?names?and?addresses?of?persons,?other?than?the?defendant,?he?or?she?intends?to?call?as?witnesses?at?trial,?together?with?any?relevant?written?or?recorded?statements?of?those?persons,?or?reports?of?the?statements?of?those?persons,?including?any?reports?or?statements?of?experts?made?in?connection?with?the?case,?and?including?the?results?of?physical?or?mental?examinations,?scientific?tests,?experiments,?or?comparisons?which?the?defendant?intends?to?offer?in?evidence?at?the?trial.
“(b)?Any?real?evidence?which?the?defendant?intends?to?offer?in?evidence?at?the?trial.”
FN?3.?Section?3?of?Proposition?115?purported?to?add?the?following?text?to?section?24?of?article?I?of?the?California?Constitution:?”In?criminal?cases?the?rights?of?a?defendant?to?equal?protection?of?the?laws,?to?due?process?of?law,?to?the?assistance?of?counsel,?to?be?personally?present?with?counsel,?to?a?speedy?and?public?trial,?to?compel?the?attendance?of?witnesses,?to?confront?the?witnesses?against?him?or?her,?to?be?free?from?unreasonable?searches?and?seizures,?to?privacy,?to?not?be?compelled?to?be?a?witness?against?himself?or?herself,?to?not?be?placed?twice?in?jeopardy?for?the?same?offense,?and?to?not?suffer?the?imposition?of?cruel?or?unusual?punishment,?shall?be?construed?by?the?courts?of?this?state?in?a?manner?consistent?with?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States.?This?Constitution?shall?not?be?construed?by?the?courts?to?afford?greater?rights?to?criminal?defendants?than?those?afforded?by?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States,?nor?shall?it?be?construed?to?afford?greater?rights?to?minors?in?juvenile?proceedings?on?criminal?causes?than?those?afforded?by?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States.”
FN?4.?The?majority?attempt?to?avoid?the?presumption?against?repeal?by?implication?and?its?patent?applicability?in?this?matter.?They?appear?to?reason?that?the?presumption?does?not?cover?repeal?by?implication?that?is?limited?or?pro?tanto.?Such,?however,?is?not?the?case.?(See?Kennedy?Wholesale,?Inc.?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization,?supra,?53?Cal.3d?at?pp.?249-250.)
The?majority?also?attempt?to?find?a?conflict?between?the?state?constitutional?requirement?of?reciprocity?in?discovery?and?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?They?conclude?that?the?latter?prohibits?the?former.?But?as?shown,?that?conclusion?is?unsound.?Certainly,?the?majority’s?assertion?that?the?privilege,?as?narrowly?construed?in?Prudhomme,?bars?prosecutorial?discovery?falls?under?its?own?weight.?In?discussing?the?federal?constitutional?privilege?in?Prudhomme,?we?implied?that?the?state?constitutional?privilege?might?be?implicated?in?a?compelled?disclosure?that?”conceivably?might?lighten?the?prosecution’s?burden?of?proving?its?case?in?chief.”?(2?Cal.3d?at?p.?326,?italics?added.)?But?we?also?implied?that?the?state?constitutional?privilege?did?not?prohibit?prosecutorial?discovery:?”We?do?not?intend?to?suggest?that?the?prosecution?should?be?barred?from?any?discovery?in?this,?or?any?other,?case.?A?reasonable?demand?for?factual?information?which,?as?in?Jones,?pertains?to?a?particular?defense?or?defenses,?and?seeks?only?that?information?which?defendant?intends?to?introduce?at?trial,?may?present?no?substantial?hazards?of?self-incrimination?….”?(Id.?at?p.?327,?italics?in?original.)
FN?1.?Indeed,?in?Taylor?v.?Illinois?(1988)?484?U.S.?400,?415?[98?L.Ed.2d?798,?814,?108?S.Ct.?646],?at?footnote?20,?the?high?court?has?acknowledged?that?in?certain?instances?a?defendant?may?refuse?to?disclose?witnesses:?”There?may?be?cases?in?which?a?defendant?has?legitimate?objections?to?disclosing?the?identity?of?a?potential?witness.”?Though?Penal?Code?section?1054.7?makes?provisions?for?defendants?to?refuse?to?disclose?information?where?”good?cause?is?shown?why?a?disclosure?should?be?denied,?restricted?or?deferred,”?the?majority’s?analysis?forecloses?the?possibility?that?any?evidence?the?defendant?”intends?to?use?at?trial”?can?be?withheld?from?production.
FN?2.?It?is?significant?that?the?federal?discovery?rule?that?is?analogous?to?that?provided?under?Penal?Code?section?1054.3,?amended?in?the?wake?of?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?forbids?all?disclosure?of?witness?statements?before?trial.?(See?Fed.?Rules?Crim.Proc.,?rule?16,?18?U.S.C.)
FN?3.?Typically,?these?questions?are?raised?and?resolved?pursuant?to?the?work?product?doctrine;?however,?Proposition?115?has?so?limited?the?work?product?privilege?that?it?no?longer?covers?witness?statements.?(See?Pen.?Code,???1054.6.)?Yet?the?arguments?that?the?high?court?advances?in?support?of?the?policy?underlying?the?work?product?doctrine?must?also?be?considered?in?evaluating?a?defense?attorney’s?opportunity?to?fully?investigate?and?present?an?effective?defense?on?his?or?her?client’s?behalf.?(See?generally?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?at?pp.?236-240?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?152-155];?see?also?conc.?opn.?of?Kennard,?J.,?ante,?at?pp.?384-385.)