Legislature?v.?Eu?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?492?,?286?Cal.Rptr.?283;?816?P.2d?1309
[No.?S019660.Oct?10,?1991.]
LEGISLATURE?OF?THE?STATE?OF?CALIFORNIA?et?al.,?Petitioners,?v.?MARCH?FONG?EU,?as?Secretary?of?State,?etc.,?et?al.,?Respondents;?CALIFORNIANS?FOR?A?CITIZEN?GOVERNMENT,?Intervener.
(Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?with?Panelli,?Kennard,?Arabian,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.)
COUNSEL
Denise?Hulett,?Antonia?Hernandez,?Remcho,?Johansen?&?Purcell,?Joseph?Remcho,?Robin?B.?Johansen,?Lowell?Finley,?Barbara?A.?Brenner?and?Charles?C.?Marson?for?Petitioners.
Brad?Sherman,?Ralph?Santiago?Abascal,?Jenner?&?Block,?Brent?N.?Rushforth,?Bruce?J.?Ennis,?Jonathan?B.?Sallett,?Donald?B.?Verrilli?and?Scott?A.?Sinder?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Petitioners.
Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorney?General,?Robert?L.?Mukai,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?N.?Eugene?Hill,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Cathy?A.?Neff,?Manuel?M.?Medeiros,?Linda?A.?Cabatic,?Ramon?M.?de?la?Guardia,?Daniel?G.?Stone?and?Richard?Thomson,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?Lloyd?M.?Harmon,?Jr.,?County?Counsel?(San?Diego),?Diane?Bardsley,?Chief?Deputy?County?Counsel,?Pamela?T.?Jones,?Deputy?County?Counsel,?Lawrence?E.?Gercovich,?D.?Robert?Shuman,?Richard?J.?Chivaro,?Hufstedler,?Kaus?&?Ettinger,?Otto?M.?Kaus,?Joseph?L.?Wyatt,?Jr.,?Michael?V.?Toumanoff?and?Judith?R.?Starr?for?Respondents.
Stephen?R.?Barnett?as?Amicus?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Respondents.
Ronald?A.?Zumbrun,?John?H.?Findley,?Jonathan?M.?Coupal,?Meredith?M.?Chang?and?Deborah?J.?Martin?for?Intervener.
Martin?A.?Schainbaum,?Daniel?J.?Popeo?and?John?C.?Scully?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Respondents?and?Intervener.
OPINION
LUCAS,?C.?J.
In?this?proceeding,?we?consider?constitutional?challenges?to?an?initiative?measure?adopted?at?the?November?6,?1990,?General?Election.?This?measure,?entitled?by?its?framers?as?”The?Political?Reform?Act?of?1990,”?was?designated?on?the?ballot?as?Proposition?140.?Its?stated?purpose?is?to?”restore?a?free?and?democratic?system?of?fair?elections,?and?to?encourage?qualified?candidates?to?seek?public?office”?by?limiting?”the?powers?of?[54?Cal.3d?500]?incumbency.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.5,?added?by?Prop.?140.)?The?measure?seeks?to?accomplish?these?goals?by?these?three?separate?reforms:?”Retirement?benefits?[of?legislators]?must?be?restricted,?state-financed?incumbent?staff?and?support?services?limited,?and?limitations?placed?upon?the?number?of?terms?which?may?be?served.”?(Ibid.)
Petitioners?herein?include?the?California?Legislature?(both?Senate?and?Assembly),?certain?individual?legislators?from?both?houses,?and?various?citizens,?voters?and?taxpayers.?Petitioners?jointly?assert?a?variety?of?challenges?to?the?constitutionality?of?Proposition?140.
Respondents?are?various?public?officials?(including?the?Secretary?of?State,?the?state?Controller,?and?the?Board?of?Administration?of?the?Public?Employees?Retirement?System?[PERS])?responsible?for?implementing,?enforcing?or?applying?the?new?measure.?Intervener,?Californians?for?a?Citizen?Government,?is?the?organization?that?sponsored?Proposition?140.?Several?amici?curiae?have?filed?briefs?supporting?the?various?parties.
Only?intervener?(represented?by?the?Pacific?Legal?Foundation)?and?respondent?Secretary?of?State?(represented?by?the?Attorney?General)?have?filed?briefs?adverse?to?petitioners.?Respondent?state?Controller?remains?neutral,?while?respondent?PERS?supports?petitioners’?challenge?to?the?pension?limitations?of?Proposition?140,?but?takes?no?position?on?the?remaining?issues.?Nonetheless,?for?convenience,?we?sometimes?refer?to?intervener?and?respondent?Secretary?of?State?jointly?as?”respondents.”
[1]?The?petition?for?mandate?sought?original?relief?in?this?court.?Although?we?customarily?decline?to?exercise?such?jurisdiction,?preferring?initial?disposition?by?the?lower?courts,?the?present?case?involves?issues?of?sufficient?public?importance?to?justify?departing?from?our?usual?course.?As?we?recently?observed?in?Raven?v.?Deukmejian?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?336,?340?[276?Cal.Rptr.?326,?801?P.2d?1077]?(assessing?the?constitutionality?of?Proposition?115,?an?initiative?measure?adopted?at?the?June?1990?Primary?Election),?quoting?from?an?earlier?case,?”?’It?is?uniformly?agreed?that?the?issues?are?of?great?public?importance?and?should?be?resolved?promptly.?Accordingly,?under?well?settled?principles,?it?is?appropriate?that?we?exercise?our?original?jurisdiction.?[Citations.]’?…”?(See?also?Planned?Parenthood?Affiliates?v.?Van?de?Kamp?(1986)?181?Cal.App.3d?245,?262-265?[226?Cal.Rptr.?361].)Pending?our?review?of?the?issues,?on?June?14,?1991,?we?temporarily?stayed?operation?of?section?5?of?Proposition?115,?which?imposes?budgetary?restrictions?on?the?Legislature,?as?hereafter?discussed.
The?principles?that?guide?us?in?evaluating?the?validity?of?initiative?measures?such?as?Proposition?140?are?likewise?well?settled.?[2]?Although?the?[54?Cal.3d?501]?legislative?power?under?our?state?Constitution?is?vested?in?the?Legislature,?”the?people?reserve?to?themselves?the?powers?of?initiative?and?referendum.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.)?Accordingly,?the?initiative?power?must?be?liberally?construed?to?promote?the?democratic?process.?(Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?p.?341.)?Indeed,?it?is?our?solemn?duty?to?jealously?guard?the?precious?initiative?power,?and?to?resolve?any?reasonable?doubts?in?favor?of?its?exercise.?(Ibid.,?and?cases?cited.)?As?with?statutes?adopted?by?the?Legislature,?all?presumptions?favor?the?validity?of?initiative?measures?and?mere?doubts?as?to?validity?are?insufficient;?such?measures?must?be?upheld?unless?their?unconstitutionality?clearly,?positively,?and?unmistakably?appears.?(Calfarm?Ins.?Co.?v.?Deukmejian?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?805,?814?[258?Cal.Rptr.?161,?771?P.2d?1247]?[evaluating?the?constitutionality?of?Prop.?103,?an?insurance?rate?initiative?measure?adopted?at?the?Nov.?1988?Gen.?Elec.].)
As?will?appear,?we?conclude?that?although?the?pension?restrictions?of?Proposition?140?are?invalid?as?to?incumbent?legislators,?the?measure?is?constitutionally?valid?in?all?other?respects.?Before?addressing?petitioners’?challenges,?we?briefly?outline?the?basic?provisions?of?the?new?measure,?which?consists?entirely?of?various?amendments?to?the?state?Constitution.
- Summary?of?Proposition?140
- Statement?of?Purpose?and?Findings
Section?1.5?is?added?to?article?IV?of?the?Constitution?(the?”Legislative”?article),?to?set?forth?various?findings?and?statements?of?the?framers’?intent.?In?pertinent?part,?this?introductory?provision?recites?that?although?”the?Founding?Fathers?established?a?system?of?representative?government?based?upon?free,?fair,?and?competitive?elections,”?nonetheless?an?”extremely?high?number?of?incumbents”?are?reelected?by?reason?of?”[t]he?ability?of?legislators?to?serve?unlimited?number?of?terms,?to?establish?their?own?retirement?system,?and?to?pay?for?staff?and?support?services?at?state?expense?….”
The?introductory?statement?continues?by?noting?that?”These?unfair?incumbent?advantages?discourage?qualified?candidates?from?seeking?public?office?and?create?a?class?of?career?politicians,?instead?of?the?citizen?representatives?envisioned?by?the?Founding?Fathers.”?The?statement?concludes?by?stating?that,?”To?restore?a?free?and?democratic?system?of?fair?elections,?and?to?encourage?qualified?candidates?to?seek?public?office,?the?people?find?and?declare?that?the?powers?of?incumbency?must?be?limited,”?as?provided?by?the?substantive?amendments?we?now?discuss.
- Term?Limitations
The?measure?imposes?specific?term?limitations?for?state?legislators?and?various?state?constitutional?officers.?Persons?elected?or?appointed?on?or?after?[54?Cal.3d?502]?November?6,?1990,?to?the?office?of?Governor?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?V,???2),?Lieutenant?Governor?(id.,???11),?Attorney?General?(ibid.),?Controller?(ibid.),?Secretary?of?State?(ibid.),?Treasurer?(ibid.),?Superintendent?of?Public?Instruction?(id.,?art.?IX,???2),?or?to?the?State?Board?of?Equalization?(id.,?art.?XIII,???17),?or?the?state?Senate?(id.,?art.?IV,???2,?subd.?(a)),?are?limited?to?two?terms.?Members?of?the?Assembly?are?limited?to?three?terms?(ibid.).
Section?7?is?added?to?article?XX?of?the?Constitution?(the?”Miscellaneous?Subjects”?article),?to?explain?that?the?foregoing?term?limitations?”apply?only?to?terms?to?which?persons?are?elected?or?appointed?on?or?after?November?6,?1990,?except?that?an?incumbent?Senator?whose?office?is?not?on?the?ballot?for?the?general?election?on?that?date?may?serve?only?one?additional?term,”?and?that?the?foregoing?term?limits?”shall?not?apply?to?any?unexpired?term?to?which?a?person?is?elected?or?appointed?if?the?remainder?of?the?term?is?less?than?half?of?the?full?term.”
- Budgetary?Limitations
The?measure?imposes?a?budgetary?limitation?for?the?Legislature.?Section?7.5?is?added?to?article?IV?of?the?Constitution?to?provide?that,?for?the?forthcoming?fiscal?year,?”the?total?aggregate?expenditures?of?the?Legislature?for?the?compensation?of?members?and?employees?of,?and?the?operating?expenses?and?equipment?for,?the?Legislature?may?not?exceed”?$950,000?”per?member”?for?that?fiscal?year,?or?80?percent?of?the?amount?of?money?expended?for?such?purposes?in?the?preceding?year,?whichever?is?less.
Additionally,?new?section?7.5?of?article?IV?of?the?Constitution?provides?that,?for?each?fiscal?year?thereafter,?the?total?aggregate?expenditures?may?not?exceed?the?amount?expended?during?the?previous?year,?”adjusted?and?compounded?by?an?amount?equal?to?the?percentage?increase?in?the?appropriations?limit?for?the?state?established?pursuant?to?Article?XIII?B”?of?the?Constitution.
- Pension?Limitations
Finally,?the?measure?imposes?limitations?on?legislators’?pension?rights.?New?section?4.5?is?added?to?article?IV?of?the?Constitution?to?provide?that?the?state?will?contribute?the?employer’s?share?to?the?federal?Social?Security?system?on?behalf?of?participating?legislators?”elected?to?or?serving?in?the?Legislature?on?or?after?November?1,?1990,”?but?”[n]o?other?pension?or?retirement?benefit?shall?accrue?as?a?result?of?service?in?the?Legislature,?such?service?not?being?intended?as?a?career?occupation.”
This?same?provision?further?provides?that?”This?Section?shall?not?be?construed?to?abrogate?or?diminish?any?vested?pension?or?retirement?benefit?[54?Cal.3d?503]?which?may?have?accrued?under?an?existing?law?…,?but?upon?adoption?of?this?Act?no?further?entitlement?to?nor?vesting?in?any?existing?program?shall?accrue?to?any?such?person,?other?than?[federal]?Social?Security?….”
Respondent?state?Controller?confirms?that,?as?of?the?effective?date?of?Proposition?140,?he?ceased?making?deductions?from?the?salaries?of?incumbent?legislators?for?the?Legislators’?Retirement?Fund?in?connection?with?services?rendered?after?that?date,?and?has?also?terminated?paying?employer?or?state?contributions?to?that?fund?for?those?services.
- Severance?Clause
In?addition?to?the?foregoing?provisions,?subdivision?(d)?is?added?to?section?11?of?article?VII?of?the?Constitution?(the?”Public?Officers?and?Employees”?article).?Section?11?of?article?VII?previously?had?limited?the?obligations?of?the?Legislators’?Retirement?System?to?persons?first?entering?state?office?after?January?1,?1987.?Subdivision?(d)?now?sets?forth?a?severance?clause?reciting?that?”If?any?part?of?this?measure?or?the?application?to?any?person?or?circumstance?is?held?invalid,?the?invalidity?shall?not?affect?other?provisions?or?applications?which?reasonably?can?be?given?effect?without?the?invalid?provision?or?application.”?We?discuss?the?matter?of?severance?below?in?connection?with?our?discussion?of?the?invalid?pension?restrictions.
- Discussion
- Lifetime?Ban?or?Limit?on?Consecutive?Terms
We?focus?first?on?the?language?of?the?new?measure.?The?introduction?to?Proposition?140?refers?to?curtailing?”[t]he?ability?of?legislators?to?serve?unlimited?…?terms,”?by?limiting?”the?number?of?terms?which?may?be?served.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.5.)?Thus,?the?limitation?on?the?term?of?state?[54?Cal.3d?504]?Senators?adds?the?language,?”No?Senator?may?serve?more?than?2?terms,”?to?the?existing?language?of?the?Constitution?that?”The?Senate?has?a?membership?of?40?Senators?elected?for?4-?year?terms,?20?to?begin?every?2?years.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???2,?subd.?(a).)?The?limitation?on?Assembly?members?is?similarly?phrased,?stating?that?”No?member?of?the?Assembly?may?serve?more?than?3?terms.”?(Ibid.)?As?petitioners?observe,?the?foregoing?provisions?do?not?expressly?refer?to?the?number?of?consecutive?terms?served.?Moreover,?the?measure?repeatedly?announces?its?intent?to?eliminate?”career?politicians”?(see?Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,????1.5,?4.5),?language?which?would?support?the?view?that?a?lifetime?ban?was?intended.
Respondent?Secretary?of?State?points?out,?however,?that?these?limitations?are?directed?to?a?”Senator”?or?”member?of?the?Assembly,”?rather?than?a?”person,”?and?she?argues?that?a?literal?interpretation?of?the?measure?thus?discloses?an?intent?to?limit?the?right?of?an?incumbent?legislator?to?continue?unabated?terms?in?office.?In?respondent?Eu’s?view,?once?the?incumbent?legislator?has?left?office,?he?or?she?can?no?longer?be?described?as?a?”Senator”?or?”member?of?the?Assembly”?to?which?the?term?limitation?provision?would?apply.
Petitioners?argue?that?even?a?purely?literal?reading?of?Proposition?140?would?support?their?interpretation:?A?person?who,?having?already?served?two?prior?terms?as?Senator,?surrenders?his?or?her?seat?for?one?term?and?thereafter?enters?on?a?third?Senate?term,?could?be?accurately?described?as?a?”Senator”?who?is?”serv[ing]?more?than?2?terms”?contrary?to?the?language?of?Proposition?140.?Intervener?suggests?that?respondent?Eu’s?interpretation,?with?its?emphasis?on?limiting?only?incumbents,?could?lead?to?absurd?results,?permitting?a?legislator?to?avoid?the?term?limitations?by?resigning?shortly?before?his?or?her?final?term?had?expired,?and?thereupon?announcing?an?intent?to?run?for?reelection?unencumbered?by?any?term?limitations?applicable?to?”incumbents.”
Nonetheless,?we?agree?with?respondent?Eu?that?the?language?of?Proposition?140?is?ambiguous?as?to?its?intent?to?impose?a?lifetime?ban.?[4]?As?we?have?previously?recognized,?to?help?resolve?such?ambiguities?”it?is?appropriate?to?consider?indicia?of?the?voters’?intent?other?than?the?language?of?the?provision?itself.?[Citation.]”?(Kennedy?Wholesale,?Inc.?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?245,?250?[279?Cal.Rptr.?325,?806?P.2d?1360].)?Such?indicia?include?the?analysis?and?arguments?contained?in?the?official?ballot?pamphlet.?(See?ibid.;?Amador?Valley?Joint?Union?High?Sch.?Dist.?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?208,?245-246?[149?Cal.Rptr.?239,?583?P.2d?1281]?[hereafter?Amador].)?[3b]?These?materials?strongly?support?the?position?of?petitioners?and?intervener?that?a?lifetime?ban?from?office?was?contemplated?by?the?framers?of,?and?voters?for,?Proposition?140.?[54?Cal.3d?505]
First,?the?analysis?by?the?Legislative?Analyst?described?the?term?limitations?as?limiting?”the?number?of?terms?that?an?elected?state?official?can?serve?in?the?same?office?….”?(Ballot?Pamp.,?Proposed?Stats.?and?Amends.?to?Cal.?Const.?with?argument?to?voters,?Gen.?Elec.?(Nov.?6,?1990)?p.?69,?italics?in?original?[hereafter?Ballot?Pamphlet].)?No?suggestion?is?made?that?only?a?consecutive?term?limitation?was?contemplated.
Second,?and?more?significantly,?the?opponents’?ballot?arguments?against?Proposition?140?forcefully?and?repeatedly?stressed?the?measure’s?”lifetime?ban,”?and?criticized?the?proponents’?failure?to?disclose?that?particular?aspect?of?the?measure?in?their?arguments?to?the?voters.?Indeed,?the?primary?thrust?of?the?opponents’?ballot?arguments?was?directed?to?this?aspect?of?the?measure.?(See?Ballot?Pamp.,?supra,?at?pp.?70-71.)?The?argument?against?Proposition?140?used?the?phrases?”lifetime?ban,”?”banned?for?life,”?or?similar?terminology?11?times.?(Ibid.)
We?are?mindful?of?the?fact?that?ballot?measure?opponents?frequently?overstate?the?adverse?effects?of?the?challenged?measure,?and?that?their?”fears?and?doubts”?are?not?highly?authoritative?in?construing?the?measure.?(DeBartolo?Corp.?v.?Fla.?Gulf?Coast?Trades?Council?(1988)?485?U.S.?568,?585?[99?L.Ed.2d?645,?661,?108?S.Ct.?1392].)?Nonetheless,?we?find?it?significant?that?the?proponents?failed?to?contradict?the?opponents’?”lifetime?ban”?argument.?(See?D’Amico?v.?Board?of?Medical?Examiners?(1970)?6?Cal.App.3d?716,?725?[86?Cal.Rptr.?245].)?Moreover,?the?proponents?stressed?that?Proposition?140?was?directed?at?eliminating?”career?politicians”?or?”career?legislators,”?and?suggested?that?”good?legislators?will?always?have?the?opportunity?to?move?up?the?ladder.”?(Italics?added.)?These?arguments?seem?to?reinforce?the?idea?that?a?lifetime?ban?was?intended.
We?think?it?likely?the?average?voter,?reading?the?proposed?constitutional?language?as?supplemented?by?the?foregoing?analysis?and?arguments,?would?conclude?the?measure?contemplated?a?lifetime?ban?against?candidacy?for?the?office?once?the?prescribed?maximum?number?of?terms?had?been?served.?[5]?As?we?stated?in?In?re?Lance?W.?(1985)?37?Cal.3d?873,?889?[210?Cal.Rptr.?631,?694?P.2d?744],?”In?construing?constitutional?and?statutory?provisions,?whether?enacted?by?the?Legislature?or?by?initiative,?the?intent?of?the?enacting?body?is?the?paramount?consideration.”?(Italics?added.)
Respondent?Eu?suggests?that?the?applicable?principle?of?interpretation?requires?us?to?avoid?any?constitutional?”doubts”?or?”difficulties”?by?adopting?a?construction?which?will?render?the?measure?constitutional.?(E.g.,?Kortum?v.?Alkire?(1977)?69?Cal.App.3d?325,?333-?334?[138?Cal.Rptr.?26].)?We?find?no?cases?suggesting,?however,?that?this?interpretive?principle?precludes?resort?to?extrinsic?evidence?to?resolve?possible?ambiguities?in?a?measure.?Moreover,?as?[54?Cal.3d?506]?we?explain?in?this?opinion,?the?measure’s?lifetime?ban?is?constitutional?in?all?respects.
[3c]?We?conclude?that?Proposition?140’s?term?limitations?extend?over?the?lifetime?of?each?affected?officeholder.- Constitutional?Revision?or?Amendment
Raven?suggested?that?the?revision?provision?is?based?on?the?principle?that?”comprehensive?changes”?to?the?Constitution?require?more?formality,?discussion?and?deliberation?than?is?available?through?the?initiative?process.?(52?Cal.3d?at?pp.?349-350.)?We?should?bear?in?mind,?however,?that?the?initiative?process?may?represent?the?only?practical?means?of?achieving?the?kind?of?”reforms”?of?the?Legislature?involved?here,?because?the?revision?process?can?be?initiated?only?with?the?consent?of?two-thirds?membership?of?each?house?of?the?Legislature.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?XVIII,????1,?2.)
In?Raven,?citing?earlier?cases,?we?observed,?”Although?the?Constitution?does?not?define?the?terms?’amendment’?or?’revision,’?the?courts?have?developed?some?guidelines?helpful?in?resolving?the?present?issue.?[7a]?As?explained?[in?prior?cases],?our?revision/amendment?analysis?has?a?dual?aspect,?requiring?us?to?examine?both?the?quantitative?and?qualitative?effects?of?the?measure?on?our?constitutional?scheme.?Substantial?changes?in?either?respect?could?amount?to?a?revision.”?(52?Cal.3d?at?p.?350.)
Thus,?a?constitutional?”revision”?need?not?involve?widespread?deletions,?additions?and?amendments?affecting?a?host?of?constitutional?provisions?and?resulting?in?a?quantitative?revision.?”[E]ven?a?relatively?simple?enactment?may?accomplish?such?far?reaching?changes?in?the?nature?of?our?basic?governmental?plan?as?to?amount?to?a?revision?also.”?(Amador,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?p.?223;?see?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?pp.?351-352.)
In?Raven,?we?unanimously?struck?down?as?an?improper?revision?the?provision?of?Proposition?115?that,?in?essence,?would?have?vested?in?the?[54?Cal.3d?507]?United?States?Supreme?Court?all?interpretive?power?as?to?certain?fundamental?procedural?rights?of?criminal?defendants?under?the?state?Constitution.?We?observed?that?the?challenged?provision?would?have?”devastating”?effects,?by?drastically?limiting?the?procedural?rights?of?criminal?defendants,?by?infringing?on?the?power?of?the?state?judiciary?to?protect?California?citizens?from?arbitrary?or?capricious?legislation,?and?by?substantially?altering?the?substance?and?integrity?of?the?state?Constitution?as?a?document?of?independent?force?and?effect.?(52?Cal.3d?at?pp.?352-354.)
[6b]?Petitioners?assert?the?effects?of?the?term?and?budgetary?limitations?of?Proposition?140?on?the?Legislature?are?similarly?dramatic,?causing?far-reaching?changes?in?our?basic?governmental?plan.?As?they?phrase?the?argument,?”Weakened?by?budget?cuts?and?harsh?term?limits,?the?Legislature?will?be?unable?to?discharge?its?traditional?duties?of?policymaker,?keeper?of?the?purse,?and?counterweight?to?the?executive?branch?in?the?way?the?Constitution?intends.?The?result?is?a?change?so?profound?in?the?structure?of?our?government?that?it?constitutes?a?revision?….”In?petitioners’?words,?the?new?term?limitations?will?”virtually?guarantee?that?California?will?have?a?new?Legislature-that?is,?a?Legislature?in?which?the?vast?majority?of?the?members?are?new-every?six?years.”?Petitioners?note?that?legislators?with?”substantial?experience”?and?valuable?”expertise”?ultimately?will?be?required?to?surrender?forever?their?legislative?offices,?and?persons?with?minimal?legislative?experience?will?be?appointed?chairpersons?of?major?committees.?Petitioners?predict?that?the?Governor’s?role?in?the?delicately?balanced?state?governmental?process?will?grow?as?inexperienced?legislators?become?”susceptible?to?the?subtle?pressures?of?the?gubernatorial?power?of?appointment.”
Additionally,?according?to?petitioners,?the?power?of?special?interest?groups?to?defeat?legislative?programs?will?be?enhanced.?Those?groups?opposing?legislation?proposed?by?”lame?duck?legislators”?can?merely?”wait?until?they?leave?to?dismantle?it.”?Petitioners?suggest?that?inexperienced?legislators,?lacking?any?background?in?”dealing?with?the?budget”?or?”dealing?with?each?other,”?will?be?greatly?hindered?in?their?ability?to?review?and?pass?a?satisfactory?state?budget.?They?note?that?several?legislators?currently?serving?on?key?budget?committees?have?done?so?for?periods?far?in?excess?of?the?terms?now?permitted?by?Proposition?140.
As?for?the?budgetary?limitations?imposed?by?Proposition?140,?petitioners?observe?that?the?new?measure?will?force?a?substantial?reduction?in?the?funds?available?for?compensating?legislators?and?their?staffs,?and?defraying?legislative?operating?expenses.?Approximately?$176?million?was?appropriated?for?the?Legislature?for?the?1990-1991?fiscal?year,?but?under?Proposition?140?only?[54?Cal.3d?508]?$114?million?would?be?appropriated?for?the?current?fiscal?year,?resulting?in?a?substantial?reduction?in?funds.?As?the?Legislative?Analyst?explained?in?the?voters’?ballot?pamphlet,?”In?1991-?92,?expenditures?by?the?Legislature?would?be?reduced?by?about?38?percent,?or?$70?million.”?(Ballot?Pamp.,?supra,?at?p.?69.)
According?to?petitioners,?and?undisputed?by?respondents,?in?anticipation?of?the?forthcoming?budgetary?reduction,?”as?of?March?1,?1991,?more?than?640?employees?will?have?left?the?Legislature?as?a?result?of?Proposition?140.”?For?the?current?fiscal?year,?”all?[Senate]?standing?committee?budgets?will?be?reduced?by?20%?and?all?subcommittees?and?select?committees?will?be?eliminated.?…?The?Assembly?expects?to?have?to?take?similar?steps.”
Petitioners?note?that?among?those?departing?from?the?Legislature?are?experienced?consultants?previously?hired?to?provide?accurate?information?concerning?proposed?or?pending?legislation.?Petitioners?predict?the?Legislature?will?become?”an?essentially?reactive?body,”?dependent?on?lobbyists?and?special?interest?groups?as?a?source?of?information,?and?lacking?sufficient?funds?to?develop?its?own?”legislative?agenda.”
After?we?granted?review?in?this?matter,?petitioners?sought?a?stay?of?the?budgetary?limitation?provisions?of?Proposition?140,?claiming?that?the?offices?of?Legislative?Analyst?and?Auditor?General?would?be?jeopardized?unless?a?stay?were?granted?prior?to?June?15,?1991,?when?the?proposed?budget?for?the?forthcoming?fiscal?year?must?be?sent?to?the?Governor.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???12,?subd.?(c).)?Although?intervener?suggested?that?petitioners’?request?amounted?to?mere?”gamesmanship”?designed?to?lend?support?to?their?revision?challenge,?as?previously?indicated?we?issued?a?temporary?stay?pending?our?review?of?the?issues.
As?previously?noted,?petitioners?contend?that?the?combined?effects?of?the?foregoing?term?and?budgetary?limitations?on?California’s?”basic?governmental?plan”?will?be?as?devastating?and?far?reaching?as?those?involved?in?the?provision?of?Proposition?115?invalidated?by?us?in?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?336.?They?thus?assert?that?Proposition?140?has?achieved?a?qualitative?revision?of?the?Constitution.?We?disagree.
First,?the?basic?and?fundamental?structure?of?the?Legislature?as?a?representative?branch?of?government?is?left?substantially?unchanged?by?Proposition?140.?Term?and?budgetary?limitations?may?affect?and?alter?the?particular?legislators?and?staff?who?participate?in?the?legislative?process,?but?the?process?itself?should?remain?essentially?as?previously?contemplated?by?our?Constitution.?This?aspect?distinguishes?the?present?case?from?Raven,?in?which?we?struck?down?a?provision?that?would?have?fundamentally?changed?and?[54?Cal.3d?509]?subordinated?the?constitutional?role?assumed?by?the?judiciary?in?the?governmental?process.?(See?also?Amador,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?208,?223?[posing?hypothetical?example?of?provision?vesting?all?judicial?power?in?Legislature].)
[7b]?As?indicated?in?Raven,?a?qualitative?revision?includes?one?that?involves?a?change?in?the?basic?plan?of?California?government,?i.e.,?a?change?in?its?fundamental?structure?or?the?foundational?powers?of?its?branches.?(Raven,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?pp.?352-355.)?Raven?invalidated?a?portion?of?Proposition?115?because?it?deprived?the?state?judiciary?of?its?foundational?power?to?decide?cases?by?independently?interpreting?provisions?of?the?state?Constitution,?and?delegated?that?power?to?the?United?States?Supreme?Court.?(Ibid.) [6c]?By?contrast,?Proposition?140?on?its?face?does?not?affect?either?the?structure?or?the?foundational?powers?of?the?Legislature,?which?remains?free?to?enact?whatever?laws?it?deems?appropriate.?The?challenged?measure?alters?neither?the?content?of?those?laws?nor?the?process?by?which?they?are?adopted.?No?legislative?power?is?diminished?or?delegated?to?other?persons?or?agencies.?The?relationships?between?the?three?governmental?branches,?and?their?respective?powers,?remain?untouched.Second,?although?the?immediate?foreseeable?effects?of?the?foregoing?term?and?budgetary?limitations?are?indeed?substantial?(primarily,?the?eventual?loss?of?experienced?legislators?and?some?support?staff),?the?assertedly?momentous?consequences?to?our?governmental?scheme?are?largely?speculative?ones,?dependent?on?a?number?of?as?yet?unproved?premises.
Petitioners?assume,?for?example,?that?the?eventual?loss?of?experienced?legislators,?and?the?arrival?of?their?relatively?unseasoned?replacements,?will?irreparably?hinder?and?damage?the?legislative?process.?Yet?respondents?argue?with?equal?conviction?that?Proposition?140’s?term?limitations?will?free?the?entire?process?from?the?control?of?assertedly?entrenched,?apathetic,?veteran?incumbents,?thereby?allowing?fresh?creative?energies?to?flourish?free?of?vested,?self-serving?legislative?interests.?Respondents?also?note?that?the?office?of?Governor?is?likewise?subject?to?the?limitation?of?two?terms?under?Proposition?140,?thus?lessening?the?likelihood?that?the?Legislature?will?become?a?subordinate?branch.
In?similar?fashion,?whereas?petitioners?forecast?bleak?consequences?from?the?budgetary?limitations?and?consequent?loss?of?experienced?support?staff,?respondents?assume?the?monetary?restraints?will?contribute?in?a?positive?manner?toward?eliminating?excessive?legislative?spending?and?terminating?surplus?or?inefficient?personnel.?[54?Cal.3d?510]
Petitioners?view?these?budgetary?limitations?as?akin?to?infringements?on?the?Legislature’s?inherent?”power?of?self-preservation”?as?an?independent?branch?of?government.?(See?Millholen?v.?Riley?(1930)?211?Cal.?29,?33-34?[293?P.?69];?see?also?Brown?v.?Superior?Court?(1982)?33?Cal.3d?242,?248,?fn.?5?[188?Cal.Rptr.?425,?655?P.2d?1260].)?In?petitioners’?words,?”a?38%?reduction?in?funds?for?the?Legislature?threatens?the?functioning?of?that?branch?and?alters?the?structure?of?government.”?Respondents,?on?the?other?hand,?assert?that?the?remaining?budget?allocation?(nearly?$1?million?per?legislator?for?the?current?fiscal?year)?is?more?than?ample?to?provide?an?effective?and?efficient?legislative?staff.
Intervener?declares?that?the?Legislature’s?budget?has?increased?838?percent?during?the?period?from?1968?to?1990,?while?the?Governor’s?budget?increased?only?417?percent?during?this?same?period.?Thus,?even?after?the?38?percent?budget?cut?attributable?to?Proposition?140,?the?Legislature’s?budget?will?have?increased?at?a?substantially?greater?rate?than?the?Governor’s?budget?over?the?last?22?years.
We?are?in?no?position?to?resolve?the?controversy?between?the?parties?regarding?the?long-term?consequences?of?Proposition?140,?for?the?future?effects?of?that?measure?on?our?”basic?governmental?plan”?are?simply?unfathomable?at?this?time.?Indeed,?that?very?uncertainty?inhibits?us?from?holding?that?a?constitutional?revision?has?occurred?in?this?case.?[8]?Our?prior?decisions?have?made?it?clear?that?to?find?such?a?revision,?it?must?necessarily?or?inevitably?appear?from?the?face?of?the?challenged?provision?that?the?measure?will?substantially?alter?the?basic?governmental?framework?set?forth?in?our?Constitution.?(Brosnahan?v.?Brown?(1982)?32?Cal.3d?236,?261?[186?Cal.Rptr.?30,?651?P.2d?274]?[rejecting?argument?that?Prop.?8?(see?Cal.?Const.,?art.?I,???28)?involved?improper?constitutional?revision];?id.,?at?pp.?258-259?[rejecting?argument?that?Prop.?8?would?improperly?cause?impairment?of?essential?governmental?functions];?Amador,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?pp.?224-226?[nothing?on?face?of?Prop.?13?(see?Cal.?Const.,?art.?XIII?A)?”necessarily?and?inevitably”?would?result?in?loss?of?home?rule];?see?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?p.?349?[“nothing?on?the?face?of?the?challenged?measures?[Prop.?115]?’necessarily?or?inevitably’?compels”?dire?economic?consequences?predicted?by?petitioners?in?context?of?single-subject?rule?challenge].)
In?Amador,?we?considered?and?rejected?a?similar?revision?challenge?based?on?the?predicted?dire?economic?consequences?to?home?rule?in?California?arising?from?the?property?tax?limitations?of?Proposition?13.?We?recognized?the?potential?”limiting?effect”?on?local?government?that?would?result?from?the?substantial?reduction?in?tax?revenues?contemplated?by?the?measure,?but?we?[54?Cal.3d?511]?concluded?that?such?economic?consequences?were?insufficient?to?accomplish?a?constitutional?revision.?(22?Cal.3d?at?p.?225.)
Similarly,?in?Brosnahan?v.?Brown,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?page?261,?we?observed?that?”petitioners’?forecast?of?judicial?and?educational?chaos?is?exaggerated?and?wholly?conjectural,?based?primarily?upon?essentially?unpredictable?fiscal?or?budgetary?constraints.”?In?the?present?case,?petitioners’?prediction?that?Proposition?140?will?”profoundly?alter?the?Legislature’s?ability?to?perform?its?constitutional?functions,”?seems?similarly?conjectural?and?speculative.?The?same?objection?disposes?of?petitioners’?suggestion,?raised?only?in?a?footnote,?that?Proposition?140?may?threaten?to?”impair?essential?governmental?functions”?(see?Brosnahan?v.?Brown,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?pp.?258-260),?or?to?”radically?undercut[]?representative?democracy”?(see?Amador,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?pp.?227-228).
Petitioners?assert?that,?from?an?historical?standpoint,?changes?similar?in?nature?to?Proposition?140?have?been?achieved?only?through?formal?constitutional?revisions.?They?note?that?in?1878,?as?a?result?of?convening?a?constitutional?convention,?provisions?were?adopted?that?”reduced?the?Legislature?from?a?full-time?body?to?one?that?met?only?biennially?and?then?was?only?allowed?to?be?paid?for?sixty?days.?…?That?system?prevailed?until?1966,?when?the?Constitution?was?revised?a?second?time?and?the?Legislature?once?again?became?a?full-time?body.”?According?to?petitioners,?any?such?changes?”could?only?have?been?done?as?part?of?a?revision.”
Of?course,?the?fact?that?a?particular?constitutional?change?was?adopted?at?a?constitutional?convention?does?not?necessarily?indicate?the?change?was?a?revision.?Mere?amendments?may?also?be?adopted?during?the?course?of?such?proceedings.?[6d]?But?the?main?difficulty?with?petitioners’?argument?in?this?regard?is?that?its?acceptance?could,?as?a?practical?matter,?insulate?the?Legislature?from?any?severe?reform?measures?directed?at?that?branch?and?initiated?by?the?people,?because?proceedings?to?adopt?constitutional?revisions?must?be?initiated?by?a?two-thirds?vote?of?both?houses?of?the?Legislature.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?XVIII,????1,?2.)?To?hold?that?reform?measures?such?as?Proposition?140,?which?are?directed?at?reforming?the?Legislature?itself,?can?be?initiated?only?with?the?Legislature’s?own?consent?and?approval,?could?eliminate?the?only?practical?means?the?people?possess?to?achieve?reform?of?that?branch.?Such?a?result?seems?inconsistent?with?the?fundamental?provision?of?our?Constitution?placing?”[a]ll?political?power”?in?the?people.?(Id.,?art.?II,???1.)?As?that?latter?provision?also?states,?”Government?is?instituted?for?[the?people’s]?protection,?security,?and?benefit,?and?they?have?the?right?to?alter?or?reform?it?when?the?public?good?may?require.”?(Italics?added.)
It?seems?indisputable?that?Proposition?140?represents?an?attempt?by?the?people?to?”alter?or?reform”?their?own?government.?To?construe?article?XVIII?[54?Cal.3d?512]?as?vesting?the?Legislature?with?a?power?to?veto?such?reform?measures?would?be?seriously?inconsistent?with?the?democratic?principles?expressed?in?article?II.?If,?as?petitioners?predict,?Proposition?140?ultimately?produces?grave,?undesirable?consequences?to?our?governmental?plan,?the?Legislature?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?XVIII,???1)?or?the?people?(id.,?art.?XVIII,???3)?are?empowered?to?propose?a?new?constitutional?amendment?to?correct?the?situation.?Resolving,?as?we?must,?all?doubts?in?favor?of?the?initiative?process,?we?conclude?that?nothing?on?the?face?of?Proposition?140?effects?a?constitutional?revision.
- The?Single-subject?Requirement
The?principles?that?guide?our?resolution?of?the?issue?are?well?settled:?”?'[A]n?initiative?measure?does?not?violate?the?single-subject?requirement?if,?despite?its?varied?collateral?effects,?all?of?its?parts?are?”reasonably?germane”?to?each?other,’?and?to?the?general?purpose?or?object?of?the?initiative.?[Citations.]”?(Brosnahan?v.?Brown,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?p.?245;?see?also?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?p.?346,?and?cases?cited.)
In?the?two?foregoing?cases,?we?upheld?separate?crime?reform?initiatives?(Propositions?8?and?115)?against?single-subject?challenges,?even?though?each?initiative?contained?widely?disparate?procedural?and?substantive?provisions.?We?observed?that?the?various?elements?of?each?of?these?initiatives?united?to?form?a?comprehensive?criminal?justice?reform?package?with?one?single?unifying?theme:?promoting?the?rights?of?actual?and?potential?crime?victims.?(See?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?p.?347;?Brosnahan?v.?Brown,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?p.?247.)
In?Brosnahan,?we?admonished?that?the?single-subject?rule?”obviously?forbids?joining?disparate?provisions?which?appear?germane?only?to?topics?of?excessive?generality?such?as?’government’?or?’public?welfare.’?”?(32?Cal.3d?at?p.?253.)?We?continued?by?referring?to?our?”liberal?interpretative?tradition?…?of?sustaining?statutes?and?initiatives?which?fairly?disclose?a?reasonable?and?common?sense?relationship?among?their?various?components?in?furtherance?of?a?common?purpose.”?(Ibid.)
The?unifying?theme?or?common?purpose?of?Proposition?140?is?incumbency?reform,?a?subject?not?excessively?general?when?compared?with?prior?measures?upheld?by?this?court.?(See?also?Fair?Political?Practices?Com.?v.?[54?Cal.3d?513]?Superior?Court?(1979)?25?Cal.3d?33,?43?[157?Cal.Rptr.?855,?599?P.2d?46]?[reasonably?germane?subject?of?”political?practices”];?Amador,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?p.?231?[valid?subject?of?”property?tax?relief”];?cf.?Harbor?v.?Deukmejian?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?1078,?1097,?1100?[240?Cal.Rptr.?569,?742?P.2d?1290]?[invalid?subjects?of?”fiscal?affairs”?and?”statutory?adjustments”].)
The?present?measure’s?introductory?statement?declares?that?an?”extremely?high?number?of?incumbents”?are?reelected?by?reason?of?”The?ability?of?legislators?to?serve?unlimited?number?of?terms,?to?establish?their?own?retirement?system,?and?to?pay?for?staff?and?support?services?at?state?expense?….”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.5.)?The?declared?purpose?of?Proposition?140?is?”To?restore?a?free?and?democratic?system?of?fair?elections,?and?to?encourage?qualified?candidates?to?seek?public?office,”?by?limiting?”the?powers?of?incumbency.”?(Ibid.)
Petitioners?observe?that?Proposition?140?is?broader?than?mere?reform?of?the?legislative?branch,?because?the?measure?imposes?term?limitations?on?various?constitutional?officers?as?well?as?legislators.?Moreover,?petitioners?dispute?the?idea?that?reducing?or?limiting?legislators’?pension?rights?could?effectively?assist?in?achieving?incumbency?reform.?In?their?view,?reducing?state?contributions?to?the?Legislators’?Retirement?System?would?not?eliminate?any?true?advantage?incumbents?possess?over?challengers.?Petitioners?suggest?the?topic?of?pension?reductions?falls?into?the?separate?category?or?subject?of?”reducing?expenditures.”
Petitioners?appear?to?be?confusing?germaneness?with?functional?relationship.?As?we?have?previously?held,?the?single-subject?provision?does?not?require?that?each?of?the?provisions?of?a?measure?effectively?interlock?in?a?functional?relationship.?(See?Brosnahan?v.?Brown,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?pp.?248-249.)?It?is?enough?that?the?various?provisions?are?reasonably?related?to?a?common?theme?or?purpose.?(Id.,?at?pp.?246-248;?see?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?pp.?347-348.)
The?framers?of?Proposition?140?evidently?believed?that?”the?powers?of?incumbency”?could?be?reduced?or?checked?by?making?an?extended?career?in?public?office?both?less?available?and?less?attractive?to?incumbent?legislators,?through?term?and?budgetary?limitations?as?well?as?reduced?pension?benefits.?Budgetary?reductions?may?have?been?deemed?necessary?to?reduce?the?advantages?incumbents?possess?vis-…-vis?other?candidates,?as?discussed?in?part?D,?post.?As?for?limited?pension?benefits,?the?measure?expressly?states?that?the?limitation?was?appropriate?because?service?in?the?Legislature?is?no?longer?”intended?as?a?career?occupation.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???4.5.)?The?framers?presumably?did?not?believe?budgetary?or?pension?limitations?were?needed?[54?Cal.3d?514]?with?respect?to?the?other?constitutional?officers?subject?to?the?term?limitations?of?the?measure.
Whether?or?not?these?various?provisions?are?wise?or?sensible,?and?will?combine?effectively?to?achieve?their?stated?purpose,?is?not?our?concern?in?evaluating?the?present?single-subject?challenge.?(See?Amador,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?p.?219?[“We?do?not?consider?or?weigh?the?economic?or?social?wisdom?or?general?propriety?of?the?[property?tax]?initiative.?Rather,?our?sole?function?is?to?evaluate?[the?measure]?legally?in?the?light?of?established?constitutional?standards.”];?see?also?CalFarm?Ins.?Co.?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pp.?841-842?[single-subject?rule?does?not?require?determination?whether?each?section?effectively?will?further?the?measure’s?overall?purpose];?In?re?Lance?W.,?supra,?37?Cal.3d?at?p.?887?[wisdom?of?Prop.?8?irrelevant?to?constitutional?challenge];?Brosnahan?v.?Brown,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?p.?248?[same].)?Sensible?or?not,?the?separate?aspects?of?Proposition?140?relate?to?the?furtherance?of?a?common?purpose.
We?conclude?that?the?various?provisions?of?Proposition?140?are?reasonably?germane?to?the?single?subject?of?incumbency?reform.
- Effect?on?Voting?and?Candidacy?Rights
Petitioners?next?assert?that?the?term?limitations?of?Proposition?140?violate?the?First?and?Fourteenth?Amendments?of?the?federal?Constitution.?They?observe?that?under?Proposition?140,?as?previously?discussed,?once?the?prescribed?maximum?terms?have?expired,?officeholders?are?forever?barred?from?running?for?the?office?they?held.?According?to?petitioners,?this?lifetime?ban?substantially?burdens?two?fundamental?rights,?namely,?the?right?to?vote?and?the?right?to?be?a?candidate?for?public?office.?Petitioners,?urging?”strict?scrutiny”?of?the?new?measure,?suggest?that?no?”compelling?state?interest”?supports?such?a?lifetime?ban.?(See?Eu?v.?San?Francisco?Democratic?Comm.?(1989)?489?U.S.?214,?222?[103?L.Ed.2d?271,?281,?109?S.Ct.?1013]?[hereafter?Eu];?Johnson?v.?Hamilton?(1975)?15?Cal.3d?461,?466-468?[125?Cal.Rptr.?129,?541?P.2d?881]?[applying?strict?scrutiny?to?review?constitutionality?of?candidates’?durational?residence?requirement].)
Respondents,?on?the?other?hand,?assert?the?measure?is?valid?under?the?balancing?test?announced?in?Anderson?v.?Celebrezze?(1983)?460?U.S.?780?[75?L.Ed.2d?547,?103?S.Ct.?1564],?discussed?below.?Respondents,?noting?certain?mitigating?aspects?of?the?measure,?contend?that?the?public?policy?served?by?Proposition?140?is?both?rational?and?compelling,?having?only?minimal?effects?on?voting?or?candidacy?rights.?We?first?turn?to?the?question?of?the?proper?standard?for?resolving?petitioners’?challenge.?[54?Cal.3d?515]
Because?Proposition?140?amends?the?California?Constitution?itself,?it?is?appropriate?that?we?look?to?the?decisions?of?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?for?guidance?in?determining?the?validity?of?the?measure?under?the?federal?Constitution.?We?have?observed?that?”[i]n?analyzing?constitutional?challenges?to?election?laws,?this?court?has?followed?closely?the?analysis?of?the?United?States?Supreme?Court.?[Citations.]?[?]?The?high?court?has?generally?addressed?the?validity?of?election?regulations?under?the?equal?protection?clause.?However,?the?basis?for?the?court’s?selection?of?that?approach?and?the?precise?nature?of?the?equal?protection?tests?employed?has?not?always?been?easily?discernible.?And,?as?is?true?for?equal?protection?doctrine?in?general,?the?standard?of?review?utilized?in?voting?and?election?cases?has?been?in?a?state?of?flux.?[Citations.]”?(Canaan?v.?Abdelnour?(1985)?40?Cal.3d?703,?710-711?[221?Cal.Rptr.?468,?710?P.2d?268,?69?A.L.R.4th?915];?see?also?Munro?v.?Socialist?Workers?Party?(1986)?479?U.S.?189,?200-201?[93?L.Ed.2d?499,?509-510,?107?S.Ct.?533]?[dis.?opn.?of?Marshall,?J.,?observing?majority’s?failure?to?articulate?appropriate?level?of?scrutiny?for?appraising?validity?of?restrictions?on?ballot?access].)
Petitioners?assume?that?a?”compelling?interest”?standard?is?required?by?Eu,?supra,?in?which?the?justices?unanimously?invalidated?California’s?prohibition?on?primary?endorsements?by?political?parties.?To?the?contrary,?it?seems?clear?the?high?court?in?Eu?imposed?such?a?strict?standard?because?of?the?serious?impact?on?First?Amendment?freedoms?of?speech?and?association,?interests?not?as?directly?impacted?by?Proposition?140,?which?does?not?affect?speech?interests?and?which?impacts?all?political?parties?on?an?equal?basis.?(See?489?U.S.?at?pp.?222-225?[103?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?281-283].)?As?Eu?concluded,?”Because?the?ban?[on?endorsements]?burdens?appellees’?rights?to?free?speech?and?free?association,?it?can?only?survive?constitutional?scrutiny?if?it?serves?a?compelling?governmental?interest.”?(Id.?at?p.?225?[103?L.Ed.2d?at?P.283],?fn.?omitted.)?Thus,?Eu?is?probably?inapposite.?(See?also?Clements?v.?Fashing?(1982)?457?U.S.?957,?963?[73?L.Ed.2d?508,?515-516,?102?S.Ct.?2836]?[plurality?opinion?stating?barriers?to?candidate’s?access?to?ballot?do?not?compel?close?scrutiny];?Erum?v.?Cayetano?(9th?Cir.?1989)?881?F.2d?689,?692,?fn.?7?[discussing?Eu,?but?concluding?that?in?cases?involving?restrictions?on?ballot?access?”heightened?scrutiny?is?not?the?rule”].)?In?any?event,?as?will?appear,?it?is?unlikely?we?would?reach?a?different?result?applying?strict?scrutiny?to?evaluate?Proposition?140.
In?Rodriguez?v.?Popular?Democratic?Party?(1982)?457?U.S.?1?[72?L.Ed.2d?628,?102?S.Ct.?2194],?the?court?considered?the?constitutional?validity?of?Puerto?Rico’s?system?of?allowing?only?certain?designated?political?parties?access?to?the?vote?needed?to?fill?legislative?vacancies?on?an?interim?basis.?In?another?unanimous?opinion,?the?court?noted?that?the?federal?Constitution?does?not?specify?the?procedure?a?state?must?use?in?filling?legislative?[54?Cal.3d?516]?vacancies?(id.,?at?p.?8?[72?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?634]),?that?the?Constitution?does?not?compel?a?fixed?method?of?choosing?state?or?local?officers?or?representatives?(id.,?at?p.?9?[72?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?635]),?that?the?right?to?vote?for?state?offices?is?not?a?constitutionally?protected?right?(ibid.?[72?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?635]),?but?that?once?a?state?or?commonwealth?provides?for?elected?representatives,?a?citizen?has?a?constitutional?right?to?participate?on?an?equal?basis?with?other?citizens?(id.,?at?p.?10?[72?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?635]).
Rodriguez?v.?Popular?Democratic?Party,?supra,?457?U.S.?1,?indicates?the?high?court?will?give?wide?latitude?to?state?election?laws,?even?those?that?may?restrict?the?electorate’s?choice?of?representatives,?so?long?as?those?laws?are?applied?in?an?even-handed?manner?without?discriminating?against?particular?citizens?or?classes?of?citizens.?The?incumbency?limitations?involved?here?satisfy?that?standard.?(See?also?Burdick?v.?Takushi?(9th?Cir.?1991)?927?F.2d?469,?473-474?[voters?have?no?constitutional?right?to?vote?for?particular?candidate];?Stiles?v.?Blunt?(8th?Cir.?1990)?912?F.2d?260,?266,?fn.?10,?cert.?den.?(1991)?___?U.S.?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?241,?111?S.Ct.?1307]?[same];?Zielasko?v.?State?of?Ohio?(6th?Cir.?1989)?873?F.2d?957,?961?[same];?but?see?Caanan?v.?Abdelnour,?supra,?40?Cal.3d?at?p.?713.)
In?Canaan?v.?Abdelnour,?supra,?40?Cal.3d?703,?we?struck?down?a?city’s?blanket?prohibition?against?write-in?voting?in?municipal?elections.?In?so?doing,?we?applied?the?balancing?test?set?forth?in?Anderson?v.?Celebrezze,?supra,?460?U.S.?780,?wherein?the?court?held?unduly?burdensome?an?Ohio?law?requiring?independent?candidates?for?the?November?1980?Presidential?Election?to?file?their?statements?of?candidacy?by?March?of?that?year.?The?high?court?in?Anderson,?acknowledging?that?a?state’s?regulatory?interests?in?determining?the?eligibility?of?candidates?”are?generally?sufficient?to?justify?reasonable,?nondiscriminatory?restrictions”?(id.,?at?p.?788?[75?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?557],?fn.?omitted),?announced?the?following?test:
“Constitutional?challenges?to?specific?provisions?of?a?State’s?election?laws?…?cannot?be?resolved?by?any?’litmus-paper?test’?that?will?separate?valid?from?invalid?restrictions.?[Citation.]?Instead,?a?court?must?resolve?such?a?challenge?by?an?analytical?process?that?parallels?its?work?in?ordinary?litigation.?It?must?first?consider?the?character?and?magnitude?of?the?asserted?injury?to?the?rights?protected?by?the?First?and?Fourteenth?Amendments?that?the?plaintiff?seeks?to?vindicate.?It?must?then?identify?and?evaluate?the?precise?interests?put?forward?by?the?State?as?justifications?for?the?burden?imposed?by?its?rule.?In?passing?judgment,?the?Court?must?not?only?determine?the?legitimacy?and?strength?of?each?of?those?interests;?it?must?also?consider?the?extent?to?which?those?interests?make?it?necessary?to?burden?the?plaintiff’s?rights.?Only?after?weighing?all?these?factors?is?the?reviewing?court?in?a?position?to?decide?whether?the?challenged?provision?is?unconstitutional.?[Citations.]?The?[54?Cal.3d?517]?results?of?this?evaluation?will?not?be?automatic;?as?we?have?recognized,?there?is?’no?substitute?for?the?hard?judgments?that?must?be?made.’?[Citation.]”?(460?U.S.?at?pp.?789-790?[75?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?558].)
With?respect?to?Anderson’s?requirement?of?showing?the?”necessity”?of?the?particular?burden?imposed?by?the?state,?we?must?also?consider?whether?there?are?any?less?drastic?alternatives?to?a?lifetime?ban.?(See?Anderson?v.?Celebrezze,?supra,?460?U.S.?at?p.?806?[75?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?568];?Canaan?v.?Abdelnour,?supra,?40?Cal.3d?703,?719,?fn.?13.)
[10]?Thus,?Anderson?v.?Celebrezze,?supra,?460?U.S.?780,?requires?us?to?consider?three?separate?elements?in?ascertaining?the?constitutionality?of?state?laws?restricting?access?to?the?ballot:?(1)?the?nature?of?the?injury?to?the?rights?affected,?(2)?the?interests?asserted?by?the?state?as?justifications?for?that?injury,?and?(3)?the?necessity?for?imposing?the?particular?burden?affecting?the?plaintiff’s?rights,?rather?than?some?less?drastic?alternatives.?Lacking?any?more?specific?guidance?from?the?high?court,?we?now?apply?Anderson’s?balancing?test?to?the?challenged?provisions?of?Proposition?140.- Character?and?Extent?of?Injury?to?Protected?Rights
- Effect?on?Candidates
As?previously?explained,?Proposition?140?imposes?a?lifetime?ban?on?legislators?once?they?have?completed?the?maximum?number?of?terms.?Petitioners?argue,?”In?the?long?run,?the?term?limitations?permanently?ban?those?who?are?arguably?the?most?qualified?candidates-incumbents?with?the?experience?and?expertise?in?the?legislative?process?necessary?to?the?most?effective?representation?of?their?constituencies.”?According?to?petitioners,?qualified?incumbents?will?be?”purged”?solely?to?seat?”massive?numbers”?of?inexperienced?”newcomers.”?Petitioners?predict?that?only?a?few?qualified?persons?will?be?attracted?to?short?term?public?office.
Respondents,?of?course,?dispute?petitioners’?premise?that?long-term?legislators?are?inevitably?better?qualified?than?other?candidates,?and?they?believe?that?term?limitations?will?encourage,?rather?than?inhibit,?new?qualified?[54?Cal.3d?518]?candidates?seeking?short?term?public?service.?They?characterize?the?term?limitations?of?Proposition?140?as?additional?candidacy?requirements,?akin?to?age,?integrity,?training?or?residency,?which?have?generally?been?upheld.?(See,?e.g.,?Zeilenga?v.?Nelson?(1971)?4?Cal.3d?716,?721?[94?Cal.Rptr.?602,?484?P.2d?578];?25?Am.Jur.2d,?Elections,???175,?pp.?870-871,?and?cases?cited;?Note,?Developments?in?the?Law:?Elections?(1975)?88?Harv.L.Rev.?1111,?1217?et?seq.)
Respondents?also?stress?three?features?of?Proposition?140?that?assertedly?serve?to?mitigate?the?severity?of?its?lifetime?ban:?First,?the?affected?incumbent?is?not?barred?from?seeking?any?other?public?office,?including?a?seat?in?another?legislative?house?or?a?statewide?constitutional?office.?A?former?Senator?may?seek?a?seat?in?the?Assembly,?and?vice?versa.?Second,?the?term?limitations?arise?only?after?the?incumbent?already?has?had?the?opportunity?to?serve?a?significant?period?in?office?(i.e.,?eight?years?for?a?Senator,?and?six?years?for?a?member?of?the?Assembly).?Finally,?the?term?limitations?are?generally?applicable?to?persons?elected?or?appointed?on?or?after?November?6,?1990.?Except?for?some?incumbent?Senators,?past?terms?served?do?not?count?in?calculating?the?limitation.?Thus,?by?the?time?the?term?limitations?of?Proposition?140?come?into?play,?the?incumbent?will?have?already?served,?and?indeed?may?continue?to?serve,?several?terms?in?public?office.
- Effect?on?Voters
Petitioners?also?stress?the?impact?on?the?voters?who?are?prevented?from?casting?their?ballots?for?the?particular?candidate?of?their?choice.?Just?as?incumbent?legislators?are?permanently?barred?from?running?for?another?term?once?they?have?served?the?prescribed?numbers?of?terms,?the?voters?are?permanently?barred?from?voting?for?such?persons,?at?least?for?the?legislative?office?they?once?held.?According?to?petitioners,?the?voters?thus?will?be?denied?the?right?to?vote?for?those?persons?who?arguably?possess?the?best?qualifications.
Additionally,?petitioners?note?that?because?Proposition?140?was?adopted?on?a?statewide?basis,?”the?disability?[on?candidates?and?voters]?is?imposed?not?by?those?who?have?the?right?to?vote?for?the?candidate,?but?rather?by?those?outside?the?district.”?Petitioners?thus?suggest?the?resulting?impact?on?or?injury?to?the?voters?is?aggravated?or?enhanced?by?reason?of?the?ability?of?voters?residing?outside?a?particular?voting?district?to?essentially?”veto”?particular?candidates?within?that?district.
Respondents?reply?by?citing?federal?court?cases?(e.g.,?Burdick?v.?Takushi,?supra,?927?F.2d?469,?473-474)?stating?that?voters?have?no?constitutional?right?to?vote?for?particular?candidates.?Additionally,?respondents?observe?that?the?[54?Cal.3d?519]?challenged?measure?does?not?fall?into?any?of?the?categories?of?prior?cases?in?which?the?right?to?vote?was?found?impermissibly?infringed.?No?identifiable?groups?of?voters?are?excluded?from?voting?or?otherwise?unduly?burdened?in?the?exercise?of?their?franchise.?Characterizing?the?term?limitations?of?Proposition?140?as?additional?candidacy?qualifications?akin?to?age?or?residency,?respondents?submit?that?Proposition?140?does?not?truly?impair?the?franchise,?for?the?voters?retain?the?basic?fundamental?right?to?cast?their?ballots?for?the?qualified?candidate?of?their?choice.
Moreover,?respondents?observe?that?neither?voter?choice?nor?candidate?eligibility?is?restricted?based?on?the?content?of?protected?expression,?political?affiliation,?or?inherently?arbitrary?factors?such?as?race,?religion?or?sex.?The?only?criterion?used?is?incumbency.?Voters?retain?the?ability?to?vote?for?any?qualified?candidate?holding?the?beliefs?or?possessing?the?attributes?they?may?desire?in?a?public?officeholder.?Under?these?circumstances,?First?Amendment?protection?of?political?expression?and?promotion?of?the?marketplace?for?ideas?continue?unabated.
Respondents?further?note?that?petitioners?have?cited?no?case?supporting?their?theory?that?a?voting?restriction?on?”local”?offices?would?be?invalid?if?imposed?by?voters?on?a?statewide?basis.?Indeed,?such?a?rule?would?seemingly?call?in?question?any?statewide?legislation?affecting?the?qualification?of?candidates?for?local?elections,?such?as?age?or?residency?requirements.
Finally,?respondents?suggest?that?because?Proposition?140?was?an?initiative?measure?adopted?by?the?people?at?a?statewide?election,?any?resulting?injury?to?the?exercise?of?the?franchise?should?be?deemed?self-?inflicted,?and?thus?not?constitutionally?protected.
- Summary?of?Impact?on?Candidates?and?Voters
In?sum,?although?Proposition?140?does?affect?the?rights?of?voters?and?candidates?to?a?degree,?there?are?several?mitigating?aspects,?including?the?voters’?continued?right?to?vote?for?any?qualified?candidates,?as?well?as?the?candidates’?ability?to?run?for?other?public?offices,?their?entitlement?to?a?significant?period?of?service?in?office?before?the?term?limitations?apply,?and?the?”prospective”?application?of?the?limitation?provision.?Additionally,?we?should?bear?in?mind?that?it?is?presently?unclear?under?federal?law?whether?and?to?what?extent?voters?retain?a?constitutional?right?to?vote?for?particular?candidates?such?as?the?incumbent?legislators?affected?by?the?challenged?measure.?Thus,?the?legal?impact?of?Proposition?140?on?the?voters?remains?uncertain.
Having?discussed?the?extent?of?the?”asserted?injury?to?the?rights?protected”?(Anderson?v.?Celebrezze,?supra,?460?U.S.?at?p.?789?[75?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?558]),?[54?Cal.3d?520]?we?next?analyze?the?”precise?interests?put?forward?by?the?State?as?justifications?for?the?burden?imposed?by?its?rule”?(ibid.).
- The?Interests?of?the?State
Balanced?against?the?foregoing?negative?impact?on?candidates?and?voters?flowing?from?the?challenged?measure?are?the?considerable?state?interests?assertedly?promoted?thereby.?In?the?words?of?new?article?IV,?section?1.5,?of?the?state?Constitution,?term?limitations?are?deemed?necessary?to?restore?”free,?fair,?and?competitive?elections,”?to?”encourage?qualified?candidates?to?seek?public?office,”?and?to?eliminate?”unfair?incumbent?advantages”?that?have?resulted?in?an?”extremely?high?number?of?incumbents”?and?created?”a?class?of?career?politicians”?instead?of?the?”citizen?representatives?envisioned?by?the?Founding?Fathers.”
According?to?respondents,?the?state’s?interests?in?limiting?incumbency?should?support?measures?considerably?stronger?than?a?mere?temporary?disability?from?holding?office.?As?respondents?argue,?the?state’s?strong?interests?in?protecting?against?an?entrenched,?dynastic?legislative?bureaucracy,?and?in?thereby?encouraging?new?candidates?to?seek?public?office,?are?both?legitimate?and?compelling?ones?that?support?a?lifetime?ban?from?the?office?and?outweigh?any?interest?the?incumbent?legislators,?or?the?voting?public,?may?have?in?perpetuating?the?incumbents’?positions?of?control.
The?legitimacy?of?the?foregoing?asserted?state?interests?in?limiting?incumbency?are?well?recognized?in?analogous?contexts.?As?stated?by?the?West?Virginia?Supreme?Court?of?Appeals?in?rejecting?a?similar?challenge?to?a?state?constitutional?amendment?limiting?the?right?of?the?Governor?to?seek?a?third?consecutive?term,?”Constitutional?restrictions?circumscribing?the?ability?of?incumbents?to?succeed?themselves?appear?in?over?twenty?state?constitutions,?and?exist?in?the?Twenty-second?Amendment?to?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States?with?regard?to?the?Presidency.?The?universal?authority?is?that?restriction?upon?the?succession?of?incumbents?serves?a?rational?public?policy?and?that,?while?restrictions?may?deny?qualified?men?an?opportunity?to?serve,?as?a?general?rule?the?over-all?health?of?the?body?politic?is?enhanced?by?limitations?on?continuous?tenure.?[Citations?and?fn.?omitted].”?(State?ex?rel.?Maloney?v.?McCartney?(1976)?159?W.Va.?513?[223?S.E.2d?607,?611]?[hereafter?Maloney],?app.?dism.?sub?nom.?Moore?v.?McCartney?(1976)?425?U.S.?946?[48?L.Ed.2d?190,?96?S.Ct.?1689];?see?Maddox?v.?Fortson?(1970)?226?Ga.?71?[172?S.E.2d?595,?598-599],?cert.?den.?397?U.S.?149?[25?L.Ed.2d?183,?90?S.Ct.?999];?cf.?Chemerinsky,?Protecting?the?Democratic?Process:?Voter?Standing?to?Challenge?Abuses?of?Incumbency?(1988)?49?Ohio?St.?L.J.?773?et?seq.;?Tribe,?American?Constitutional?Law?(2d?ed.?1988)???13-18,?at?p.?1097?[“Democracy?envisions?rule?by?successive?temporary?majorities.?The?capacity?to?displace?[54?Cal.3d?521]?incumbents?in?favor?of?the?representatives?of?a?recently?coalesced?majority?is,?therefore,?an?essential?attribute?of?the?election?system?in?a?democratic?republic.”];?cf.?Annot.?(1958)?59?A.L.R.2d?716?[construction?and?effect?of?incumbency?limitation?laws].)
The?Maloney?decision?continues?by?describing?at?length?the?substantial?reasons?for?limiting?the?right?of?incumbents?to?succeed?themselves.?These?include?”The?power?of?incumbent?officeholders?to?develop?networks?of?patronage?and?attendant?capacities?to?deliver?favorably?disposed?voters?to?the?polls,”?”fears?of?an?entrenched?political?machine?which?could?effectively?foreclose?access?to?the?political?process,”?and?the?belief?that?regularly?disrupting?those?”machines”?”would?stimulate?criticism?within?political?parties”?and?”insure?a?meaningful,?adversary,?and?competitive?election.”?(223?S.E.2d?at?p.?611.)
In?addition,?Maloney?explains?that?”it?has?long?been?felt?that?a?limitation?upon?succession?of?incumbents?removes?the?temptation?to?prostitute?the?government?to?the?perpetuation?of?a?particular?administration.?[Citation.]?…?Meretricious?policies?which?sacrifice?the?well-being?of?economic,?social,?racial,?or?geographic?minorities?are?most?likely?where?a?political?figure,?political?party,?or?political?interest?group?can?rely?upon?electorate?inertia?fostered?by?the?hopelessness?of?encountering?a?seemingly?invincible?political?machine.”?(223?S.E.2d?at?pp.?611-612.)
Petitioners?observe?that?Maloney?involved?a?limitation?on?consecutive?terms?of?a?Governor,?rather?than?a?lifetime?ban?on?incumbent?legislators.?They?suggest?that?term?limitations?on?the?executive?branch?are?justified?by?the?need?to?check?the?substantial?concentration?of?power?that?the?chief?executive?possesses,?a?consideration?assertedly?not?applicable?to?the?legislative?branch.?But?we?think?that?many,?if?not?all,?of?the?considerations?mentioned?in?Maloney?(e.g.,?eliminating?unfair?incumbent?advantages,?dislodging?entrenched?political?machines,?restoring?open?access?to?the?political?process,?and?stimulating?electorate?participation)?would?apply?with?equal?force?to?the?legislative?branch.
In?connection?with?petitioners’?argument?that?Proposition?140’s?lifetime?ban?is?unconstitutional,?two?other?cases?are?instructive,?though?factually?distinguishable.?In?Clements?v.?Fashing,?supra,457?U.S.?957,?cited?with?apparent?approval?in?Anderson?v.?Celebrezze,?supra,?460?U.S.?at?page?789,?footnote?9?[75?L.Ed.2d?at?page?558],?the?high?court?upheld?the?validity?of?a?Texas?statute?that?rendered?incumbent?justices?of?the?peace?ineligible?for?the?Texas?Legislature.?The?disability?from?office?extended?only?during?the?term?for?which?the?justices?were?elected?or?appointed.?A?plurality?of?the?high?court?took?the?position?that?barriers?to?a?candidate’s?access?to?the?ballot?do?not?[54?Cal.3d?522]?compel?close?scrutiny?(457?U.S.?at?p.?963?[73?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?516]),?and?stressed?the?”de?minimis”?nature?of?the?restriction,?noting?that?the?act?merely?imposed?a?brief?”waiting?period”?on?current?officeholders,?and?therefore?could?be?sustained?by?a?mere?showing?of?some?”rational?predicate”?to?support?it?(id.?at?pp.?967-968?[73?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?518-519]).
The?Clements?v.?Fashing?plurality?did?not?affirmatively?indicate?that?a?lifetime?bar?to?legislative?service?necessarily?would?be?invalid.?Significantly,?unlike?Proposition?140,?the?Texas?act?apparently?was?not?aimed?at?limiting?the?powers?of?incumbency,?but?was?based?on?the?”rational?predicate”?that?an?affected?justice?will?be?less?inclined?to?abuse?his?position?or?neglect?his?duties?because?of?the?justice’s?aspirations?for?higher?office.?(457?U.S.?at?p.?968?[73?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?519].)
In?De?Bottari?v.?Melendez?(1975)?44?Cal.App.3d?910?[119?Cal.Rptr.?256],?the?Court?of?Appeal?struck?down?a?local?ordinance?prohibiting?recalled?council?members?from?running?for?city?council?within?a?year?of?the?recall.?Although?petitioners?believe?the?case?supports?their?position,?closer?scrutiny?indicates?otherwise.?Finding?the?candidacy?restriction?too?severe,?the?De?Bottari?court?observed,?”Cases?in?other?jurisdictions?upholding?limitations?on?successive?terms?in?office?[citations]?involve?similar?restrictions?but?are?not?authoritative?here?since?such?limitations?serve?totally?different?governmental?interests.”?(44?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?913,?fn.?1,?italics?added.)?De?Bottari,?using?strict?scrutiny,?reviewed?the?interests?that?assertedly?supported?a?temporary?ban?on?candidacy?by?recalled?candidates?and?found?them?insufficient?to?sustain?the?restriction.?The?court?had?no?occasion?to?review?the?”different”?interests?served?by?general?limitations?on?incumbency,?as?outlined?by?Maloney,?supra.
In?sum,?despite?its?distinguishing?features,?we?conclude?that?Maloney’s?(supra,?223?S.E.2d?607)?analysis?is?quite?pertinent?to?our?determination?whether?permanent?incumbency?limitations?are?supported?by?legitimate?and?compelling?considerations.?We?conclude?they?are?so?supported.
- Necessity?of?Imposing?Restrictions
We?turn?next?to?the?”necessity”?of?imposing?the?restrictions?of?Proposition?140?on?the?dual?rights?at?issue?here?(see?Anderson?v.?Celebrezze,?supra,?460?U.S.?at?pp.?789-790?[75?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?558-559]).?Petitioners?contend?that?a?lifetime?ban?on?candidacy?was?unnecessary,?and?that?other?less?”drastic”?alternatives,?such?as?a?limitation?on?consecutive?terms,?together?with?additional?restrictions?on?campaign?contributions?to?legislators,?decreased?fringe?and?pension?benefits,?and?additional?incentives?for?early?retirement,?would?[54?Cal.3d?523]?have?been?sufficient?to?promote?and?accomplish?the?state?interests?previously?discussed.
As?will?appear,?we?conclude?that?the?less?drastic?alternatives?suggested?by?petitioners?would?have?been?inadequate?to?accomplish?the?declared?purpose?of?Proposition?140?to?eliminate?the?”class?of?career?politicians”?that?assertedly?had?been?created?by?virtue?of?the?”unfair?incumbent?advantages”?referred?to?in?that?measure.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.5.)
Respondents?stress?the?substantial?advantages?incumbent?legislators?enjoy?in?this?state,?advantages?that?permitted?92?percent?of?all?incumbents?to?win?reelection?at?this?state’s?November?1990?General?Election.?Indeed,?respondents?note?that?nine?of?these?incumbents?ran?unopposed.
Respondents?seem?correct?in?this?regard.?Whether?by?reason?of?superior?fund?raising?ability,?greater?media?coverage,?larger?and?more?experienced?staffs,?greater?name?recognition?among?the?voters,?favorably?drawn?voting?districts,?or?other?factors,?incumbents?do?indeed?appear?to?enjoy?considerable?advantages?over?other?candidates.?(See?Service?Employees?v.?Fair?Political?Practices?(E.D.Cal.?1990)?747?F.Supp.?580,?588;?Watson?v.?Fair?Political?Practices?Com.?(1990)?217?Cal.App.3d?1059,?1074?[266?Cal.Rptr.?408],?&?fn.?13.)?As?Proposition?140’s?introductory?statement?indicates,?the?framers?of?the?measure?believed?these?substantial?advantages?of?incumbency?were?unfair?to?other?candidates?and?tended?to?create?”a?class?of?career?politicians,?instead?of?the?citizen?representatives?envisioned?by?the?Founding?Fathers.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.5.)
Petitioners?suggest?that?a?more?reasonable?alternative?existed?to?the?measure’s?lifetime?ban:?disqualification?of?the?incumbent?for?the?forthcoming?term,?thus?”forcing?the?legislator?to?take?one?term?off,?before?being?eligible?to?run?for?the?body.”?Yet,?as?respondents?observe,?the?framers?reasonably?could?conclude?that?a?lifetime?ban?was?necessary?to?assure?that?a?former?officeholder?could?not?reinvoke?at?least?some?of?the?advantages?of?incumbency?to?gain?reelection?after?leaving?office?for?a?term?or?more.
Additionally,?we?believe?the?framers?might?well?have?reasonably?concluded?that?a?mere?ban?on?consecutive?terms?could?encourage?popular?”career?politicians”?to?trade?terms?with?each?other,?or?to?attempt?to?arrange?for?a?”caretaker”?candidate,?such?as?a?spouse?or?relative,?to?hold?office?for?them?during?the?interrupted?term.?For?example,?when?in?1966?George?Wallace?became?legally?ineligible?to?run?for?reelection?as?Governor?of?Alabama?because?of?state?term?limitations?applicable?to?that?office,?his?wife,?Lurleen,?successfully?ran?in?his?place,?and?served?as?Governor?until?her?death?in?1968.?George?Wallace?was?reelected?as?Governor?in?1970?and?again?in?[54?Cal.3d?524]?1974.?(See?12?The?New?Encyclopedia?Britannica,?Micropaedia?(15th?ed.?1990)?Wallace,?George?C.,?at?p.?467.)
Realistically,?only?a?lifetime?ban?could?protect?against?various?kinds?of?continued?exploitation?of?the?”advantages?of?incumbency”?captured?through?past?terms?in?office.?The?remainder?of?petitioners’?suggested?”alternatives”?essentially?involve?narrow?changes?in?the?system?of?providing?contributions?or?compensation?for?legislators,?changes?that?would?afford?”career?politicians”?with?independent?resources?little?incentive?to?voluntarily?terminate?public?service.
- Conclusion
On?balance,?we?conclude?the?interests?of?the?state?in?incumbency?reform?outweigh?any?injury?to?incumbent?officeholders?and?those?who?would?vote?for?them.?As?Maloney?observed?(223?S.E.2d?at?p.?612),?no?decisions?of?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?have?been?found?that?suggest?a?limitation?on?incumbency?would?be?unconstitutional.?Although?such?limitations?may?restrict?the?franchise?(but?see?cases?indicating?voters?have?no?right?to?vote?for?particular?candidates,?e.g.,?Burdick?v.?Takushi,?supra,?927?F.2d?469,?473-474),?if?we?use?a?balancing?test?that?weighs?”the?enlargement?of?the?franchise?by?guaranteeing?competitive?primary?and?general?elections”?against?”incidental?disenfranchisement”?of?some?voters,?the?court?”must?conclude?that?restrictive?provisions?on?the?succession?of?incumbents?do[]?not?frustrate?but?rather?further[]?the?policy?of?the?Fourteenth?Amendment.”?(Maloney,?supra,?223?S.E.2d?at?pp.?612-613.)
It?is?true,?as?petitioners?observe,?that?respondents?have?not?offered?evidence?to?support?all?of?the?various?premises?on?which?Proposition?140?is?based.?But?as?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?pointed?out?in?Munro?v.?Socialist?Workers?Party,?supra,?479?U.S.?189,?upholding?state?restrictions?on?minority?party?candidacy,?a?state?need?not?demonstrate?empirically?all?of?the?various?evils?that?its?regulations?seek?to?combat:?”Such?a?requirement?would?necessitate?that?a?State’s?political?system?sustain?some?level?of?damage?before?the?legislature?could?take?corrective?action.?Legislatures,?we?think,?should?be?permitted?to?respond?to?potential?deficiencies?in?the?electoral?process?with?foresight?rather?than?reactively,?provided?that?the?response?is?reasonable?and?does?not?significantly?impinge?on?constitutionally?protected?rights.”?(Id.,?at?pp.?195-196?[93?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?506].)?We?have?no?reason?to?doubt?that?the?high?court?would?give?similar?leeway?to?state?regulations?imposed?directly?by?the?people?through?the?initiative?process.
In?sum,?it?would?be?anomalous?to?hold?that?a?statewide?initiative?measure?aimed?at?”restor[ing]?a?free?and?democratic?system?of?fair?elections,”?and?[54?Cal.3d?525]?”encourag[ing]?qualified?candidates?to?seek?public?office”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.5),?is?invalid?as?an?unwarranted?infringement?of?the?rights?to?vote?and?to?seek?public?office.?We?conclude?the?legitimate?and?compelling?interests?set?forth?in?the?measure?outweigh?the?narrower?interests?of?petitioner?legislators?and?the?constituents?who?wish?to?perpetuate?their?incumbency.
- Bill?of?Attainder
We?conclude?that?petitioners’?argument?should?be?rejected.?[14]?As?the?high?court?explained?in?Nixon?v.?Administrator?of?General?Services,?supra,?433?U.S.?425,?in?determining?whether?particular?legislation?constitutes?a?bill?of?attainder,?courts?have?applied?three?different?tests.?We?believe?the?challenged?measure?meets?none?of?them.
First,?an?”historical”?test?has?been?used?to?determine?whether?the?subject?legislation?imposes?a?kind?of?punishment?traditionally?deemed?prohibited?by?the?federal?Constitution.?(433?U.S.?at?p.?475?[53?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?911].)?Second,?the?courts?have?used?a?”functional?test?of?the?existence?of?punishment,?analyzing?whether?the?law?under?challenge,?viewed?in?terms?of?the?type?and?severity?of?burdens?imposed,?reasonably?can?be?said?to?further?nonpunitive?legislative?purposes.?[Citations.]”?(Id.,?at?pp.?475-476?[53?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?911],?italics?added?and?fn.?omitted.)?Finally,?the?courts?have?used?a?”motivational”?test,?”inquiring?whether?the?legislative?record?evinces?a?congressional?intent?to?punish.?[Citations.]”?(Id.,?at?p.?478?[53?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?913].)
[12c]?Petitioners?appear?to?concede?that?the?historical?test?is?inapplicable?here,?and?we?have?found?no?cases?involving?term?limitations?as?a?form?of?”punishment.”?As?for?the?functional?test,?the?measure?itself?expresses?broad,?nonpunitive?purposes,?namely,?”[t]o?restore?a?free?and?democratic?system?of?fair?elections,?and?to?encourage?qualified?candidates?to?seek?public?office”?by?limiting?”the?powers?of?incumbency.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.5.)Although?petitioners?point?to?the?”self-serving”?nature?of?these?declarations?of?intent,?we?have?no?reason?to?dispute?the?accuracy?of?their?description?of?the?measure’s?primary?intent.?As?in?Nixon?v.?Administrator?of?General?Services,?supra,?433?U.S.?at?page?477?[53?L.Ed.2d?at?page?912],?”Evaluated?in?terms?of?these?[express?congressional]?asserted?purposes,?the?law?plainly?must?be?held?to?be?an?act?of?nonpunitive?legislative?policymaking.”?(Italics?added.)
Petitioners?rely?primarily?on?the?motivational?test,?stressing?the?framers’?express?intent?to?dislodge?such?long-term?incumbents?as?Brown?and?Roberti.?Petitioners?cite?the?ballot?pamphlet?arguments?of?the?measure’s?proponents,?which?describe?these?legislators?in?unflattering?terms?(“legislative?dictators”?[54?Cal.3d?527]?participating?in?”Sacramento’s?web?of?special?favors?and?patronage”),?and?urge?passage?of?the?measure?as?a?means?of?ending?their?long?incumbency.
But?the?ballot?arguments?contain?no?indication?of?an?intent?to?punish?those?individuals?for?any?particular?past?misconduct.?Broad?reform?measures?are?frequently?prompted?by?particular?acts?or?circumstances?involving?specific?individuals,?but?in?our?view?such?measures?would?not?constitute?improper?bills?of?attainder?unless?an?intent?to?punish?such?individuals?clearly?appears?from?their?face,?or?from?the?circumstances?surrounding?their?passage.
As?stated?in?Connecticut?Judicial?Selection?Com’n?v.?Larson,?supra,?745?F.Supp.?at?page?96,?quoting?from?an?earlier?case,?”?'[i]t?is?clear?that?general?legislation?such?as?this?…?aimed?at?the?office?…?rather?than?the?incumbent?office?holders,?has?none?of?the?objectionable?attributes?of?a?bill?of?attainder.’?[Citation.]”?(Italics?added.)?Proposition?140?applies?with?equal?force?to?all?state?legislators,?current?and?future.?Although?it?is?unquestionable?the?proponents?sought?to?limit?the?terms?of?incumbent?legislators,?including?such?long-term?legislators?as?Brown?and?Roberti,?we?find?no?evidence?of?an?intent?to?single?out?and?punish?those?individuals?for?any?supposed?misconduct?on?their?part.?Accordingly,?we?conclude?that?Proposition?140?does?not?constitute?a?bill?of?attainder?under?the?federal?Constitution.
- Impairment?of?Contracts
Finally,?petitioners?maintain?that?Proposition?140’s?limitations?on?the?pension?rights?of?incumbent?legislators?is?unconstitutional?as?an?invalid?impairment?of?contract?under?the?federal?Constitution.?(U.S.?Const.,?art.?I,???10?[“No?State?shall?…?pass?any?…?law?impairing?the?obligation?of?contracts?….”].)
As?previously?indicated,?new?section?4.5?is?added?to?article?IV?of?the?state?Constitution?to?provide?that?although?the?state?will?contribute?the?employer’s?share?to?the?federal?Social?Security?program?on?behalf?of?participating?legislators?”elected?to?or?serving?in?the?Legislature?on?or?after?November?1,?1990,”?nonetheless?”[n]o?other?pension?or?retirement?benefit?shall?accrue?as?a?result?of?service?in?the?Legislature,?such?service?not?being?intended?as?a?career?occupation.”
This?same?provision?further?provides?that?”This?Section?shall?not?be?construed?to?abrogate?or?diminish?any?vested?pension?or?retirement?benefit?which?may?have?accrued?under?an?existing?law?…,?but?upon?adoption?of?[54?Cal.3d?528]?this?Act?no?further?entitlement?to?nor?vesting?in?any?existing?program?shall?accrue?to?any?such?person,?other?than?[federal]?Social?Security?….”
[15a]?Petitioners?assert?that,?as?to?incumbent?legislators?continuing?to?serve?on?or?after?November?6,?1990?(either?by?reelection?to?a?new?term?or?continuation?of?a?prior?term),?Proposition?140?constitutes?an?improper?impairment?of?their?”vested”?contractual?or?statutory?right?to?continued?participation?in?the?pension?program?administered?by?the?Legislators’?Retirement?System?(LRS).?(See?Gov.?Code,???9350?et?seq.)?In?petitioners’?view,?supported?by?respondent?PERS,?incumbent?legislators?who?were?members?of?the?LRS?immediately?prior?to?November?6,?1990,?are?entitled?to?continue?to?earn?pension?benefits?so?long?as?they?remain?otherwise?qualified?to?receive?such?benefits?through?continued?state?service.?Petitioners?(not?joined?in?this?respect?by?PERS)?assert?similar?contract?claims?on?behalf?of?nonincumbent?legislators?newly?elected?on?November?6.- Incumbent?Legislators
Petitioners’?find?ample?support?for?their?position?in?California?cases?confirming?that?both?the?federal?and?state?contract?clauses?protect?the?vested?pension?rights?of?public?officers?and?employees?from?unreasonable?impairment.?(See?Allen?v.?Board?of?Administration?(1983)?34?Cal.3d?114,?119-120,?124?[192?Cal.Rptr.?762,?665?P.2d?534]?[legislators];?Olson?v.?Cory?(1980)27?Cal.3d?532,?540-541?[178?Cal.Rptr.?568,?636?P.2d?532]?[judges);?Betts?v.?Board?of?Administration?(1978)?21?Cal.3d?859,?863-864?[148?Cal.Rptr.?158,?582?P.2d?614]?[state?Treasurer];?Miller?v.?State?of?California?(1977)?18?Cal.3d?808,?814-817?[135?Cal.Rptr.?386,?557?P.2d?970]?[public?employees];?see?also?Allen?v.?City?of?Long?Beach?(1955)?45?Cal.2d?128,?131?[287?P.2d?765]?[same];?Kern?v.?City?of?Long?Beach?(1947)?29?Cal.2d?848,?852-853?[179?P.2d?799]?[same].)
Petitioners?(joined?by?respondent?PERS)?argue?that?when?incumbent?legislators?first?assumed?office,?they?were?impliedly?promised?pension?benefits?substantially?equivalent?to?those?offered?by?the?then-existing?provisions?of?the?LRS,?and?that?these?benefits?included?both?the?primary?right?to?receive?any?vested?pension?benefits?upon?retirement?(see?City?of?Long?Beach?v.?Allen?(1956)?143?Cal.App.2d?35,?38-39?[300?P.2d?356]),?as?well?as?the?collateral?right?to?earn?future?pension?benefits?through?continued?service,?on?terms?substantially?equivalent?to?those?then?offered?(see?Carman?v.?Alvord?(1982)?31?Cal.3d?318,?325?[182?Cal.Rptr.?506,?644?P.2d?192]).?Although?Proposition?140?by?its?terms?assures?that?incumbent?legislators’?right?to?receive?vested?pension?benefits?will?not?be?lost?or?diminished,?the?measure?also?purports?to?terminate?their?collateral?right?to?accrue?additional?benefits?through?further?contributions?and?continued?service?to?the?state.?[54?Cal.3d?529]
According?to?petitioners,?the?applicable?principle?is?set?forth?in?Miller?v.?State?of?California,?supra,?18?Cal.3d?at?page?817:?”[U]pon?acceptance?of?public?employment?plaintiff?acquired?a?vested?right?to?a?pension?based?on?the?system?then?in?effect.?That?system?allowed?him?to?earn?successively?higher?levels?of?benefits?based?on?his?years?of?service?and?his?highest?average?salary?during?three?consecutive?years.”?(See?also?Olson?v.?Cory,?supra,?27?Cal.3d?at?p.?541;?Betts?v.?Board?of?Administration,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?at?p.?863;?Kern?v.?City?of?Long?Beach,?supra,?29?Cal.2d?at?pp.?855-856.)?Similar?increased?benefits?from?continued?service?were?provided?legislators?under?the?LRS.?(See?Gov.?Code,???9350.)
In?response?to?petitioners’?assertions,?respondent?Eu?and?intervener?first?contend?that?incumbent?legislators?do?not?have?a?vested?right?under?the?LRS?to?continue?to?accrue?pension?benefits?through?continued?service.?In?this?regard,?they?suggest?that?article?IV,?section?4,?of?the?state?Constitution?precludes?legislators?from?acquiring?any?vested?right?to?continue?to?earn?pension?benefits.?We?disagree.
Article?IV,?section?4?of?the?state?Constitution,?provides?in?pertinent?part?that?”The?Legislature?may,?prior?to?their?retirement,?limit?the?retirement?benefits?payable?to?Members?of?the?Legislature?….”?(Italics?added.)?That?provision,?seemingly?empowering?the?Legislature?to?exercise?some?measure?of?control?over?the?pension?rights?of?its?own?members?prior?to?their?retirement,?may?create?some?uncertainty?as?to?the?full?amount?or?extent?of?a?legislator’s?pension?rights?during?his?term?of?office.?But?the?provision?neither?states?nor?implies?that?these?rights?are?thus?deemed?inchoate?and?unprotected?from?impairment?by?the?initiative?process.?Significantly,?we?have?never?suggested?that?the?mere?existence?of?article?IV,?section?4,?precludes?legislators?from?acquiring?pension?rights?protected?by?the?state?or?federal?contract?clauses.?(Cf.?Allen?v.?Board?of?Administration,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?at?pp.?119-120.)
[16]?Petitioners?acknowledge?that?the?state?as?employer?is?permitted?to?make?reasonable?modifications?to?the?pension?system?during?the?employment?relationship,?so?long?as?employees?receive?”comparable?new?advantages”?in?return?for?any?substantial?reduction?in?benefits.?(Olson?v.?Cory,?supra,?27?Cal.3d?at?p.?541;?Betts?v.?Board?of?Administration,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?at?p.?864;?Allen?v.?City?of?Long?Beach,?supra,?45?Cal.2d?at?p.?131.)?As?we?stated?in?Olson,?”Although?an?employee?does?not?obtain?any?’absolute?right?to?fixed?or?specific?benefits?…?there?[are]?strict?limitation[s]?on?the?conditions?which?may?modify?the?pension?system?in?effect?during?employment.’?[Citation.]?Such?modifications?must?be?reasonable?and?any?’?”changes?in?a?pension?plan?[54?Cal.3d?530]?which?result?in?disadvantage?to?employees?should?be?accompanied?by?comparable?new?advantages.”?’?[Citation.]”?(27?Cal.3d?at?p.?541.) [15b]?Petitioners?correctly?observe?that?the?pension?provisions?of?Proposition?140?do?not?merely?modify?the?LRS?pension?system;?rather?they?terminate?that?system?entirely?as?to?additional?benefits?accruing?for?future?services.?Intervener?argues?that?the?”transfer”?or?”redirection”?of?pension?funds?to?the?federal?Social?Security?system?operates?as?a?”comparable?new?advantage”?which?justifies?the?impairment?and?consequently?sustains?the?measure.?Petitioners?respond?by?asserting?that?every?legislator?already?possessed?the?right?to?join?the?federal?Social?Security?system,?that?99?out?of?120?legislators?were?already?contributing?to?that?system?when?Proposition?140?was?adopted,?and?that?the?anticipated?federal?benefits?will?be?far?less?than?those?provided?by?the?LRS.?Neither?respondent?Eu?nor?intervener?has?disputed?those?allegations.We?conclude?that?incumbent?legislators?had?a?vested?right?to?earn?additional?pension?benefits?through?continued?service,?despite?the?potential?but?unexercised?limitations?contemplated?by?article?IV,?section?4,?of?the?state?Constitution.?We?also?conclude?that?the?pension?restriction?of?Proposition?140?must?be?deemed?an?impairment,?not?a?mere?”modification”?or?”adjustment,”?of?the?vested?pension?rights?of?incumbent?legislators.
Respondent?Eu?and?intervener?next?argue?that,?assuming?an?incumbent?legislator?may?acquire?such?vested?rights,?a?different?rule?should?apply?to?incumbent?legislators?who?commenced?new?terms?after?Proposition?140?became?effective.?They?rely?primarily?on?our?decision?in?Olson?v.?Cory,?supra,?27?Cal.3d?532,?which?had?upheld?a?statute?limiting?certain?cost-of-living?increases?in?judges’?salaries?after?they?commenced?new?terms?of?office.?As?Olson?held,?”A?judge?who?completes?one?term?during?which?he?was?entitled?to?unlimited?cost-of-living?increases?and?elects?to?enter?a?new?term?has?impliedly?agreed?to?be?bound?by?salary?benefits?then?offered?by?the?state?for?the?different?term.”?(27?Cal.3d?at?p.?540.)?Similarly,?it?is?argued,?incumbent?legislators?commencing?new?terms?on?or?after?November?6,?1990,?have?impliedly?agreed?to?serve?under?the?conditions?mandated?by?the?new?measure.
Petitioners?and?respondent?PERS?contend,?however,?that?pension?rights?fall?into?a?different?category?than?salary?rights.?Although?a?state?officer?may?have?no?protectible?right?to?continuation?of?his?former?salary?from?term?to?term,?nonetheless?on?commencing?to?serve?the?state?the?officer?thereupon?acquires?a?vested?right?to?earn,?through?continued?service,?additional?pension?benefits?in?an?amount?reasonably?comparable?to?those?available?when?he?or?she?first?took?office.?According?to?petitioners,?that?right?is?not?extinguished?[54?Cal.3d?531]?when?one?term?of?office?ends?and?another?commences.?(See?In?re?Marriage?of?Alarcon?(1983)?149?Cal.App.3d?544,?552-553?[196?Cal.Rptr.?887]?[hereafter?Alarcon].)?To?hold?otherwise,?petitioners?argue,?could?unduly?penalize?public?officers?who?serve?elective?or?appointive?terms.
We?agree?with?petitioners.?It?would?be?anomalous?to?hold?that?a?legislator’s?supposedly?”vested”?right?to?acquire?a?reasonable?pension?is?subject?to?absolute?divesting?at?the?conclusion?of?the?period?comprising?his?or?her?immediate?term?of?office?(assuming?no?right?to?receive?actual?benefits?has?yet?accrued).?Under?such?a?holding,?a?legislator?could?entirely?lose?future?pension?benefits?on?the?very?eve?of?entitlement?thereto.
The?state,?in?adopting?the?LRS,?elected?to?treat?legislators?in?a?manner?similar?to?other?state?employees,?providing?them?with?a?plan?whereby?pension?benefits?could?be?acquired?through?continued?service?beyond?their?initial?term?of?office.?Having?done?so,?the?state?cannot?thereafter?abandon?that?plan?as?to?incumbent?legislators?without?providing?them?comparable?new?benefits.
As?stated?in?Alarcon,?”The?state’s?obligation?to?pay?a?specific?salary?extends?to?the?end?of?each?term?of?office.?There?is?no?promise?express?or?implied?the?state?will?continue?to?pay?an?existing?salary?beyond?the?end?of?a?term.?Thus,?no?contractual?rights?are?impaired?if?different?salary?or?cost?of?living?differentials?are?payable?during?and?for?a?future?term.?[?]?A?pension,?however,?is?different?from?a?salary.?A?right?to?pension?benefits?provided?by?the?state?payable?upon?fulfillment?of?age,?service?and?other?requirements?may?not?be?destroyed,?once?vested,?without?impairment?of?the?state’s?contractual?obligation.?[Citations.]”?(149?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?552.)
Alarcon?is?factually?distinguishable,?for?in?that?case?the?affected?officer?(a?state?judge?who?later?accepted?a?federal?judgeship)?had?already?acquired?a?vested,?though?deferred,?right?under?state?law?to?a?full?pension?prior?to?the?enactment?of?the?challenged?restriction?on?pension?benefits?for?persons?accepting?federal?positions.?Under?such?circumstances,?the?fact?the?judge?served?additional?terms?as?a?state?judge?following?the?adoption?of?that?restriction?could?not?defeat?his?previously?vested?pension?rights.
Nonetheless,?the?principle?of?Alarcon?seems?controlling?here.?In?the?present?case,?incumbent?legislators?acquired?a?vested?right?to?earn?increased?pension?benefits?in?return?for?continued?service.?By?analogy?to?Alarcon,?their?commencement?of?a?new?term?following?adoption?of?the?pension?restriction?of?Proposition?140?would?not?defeat?that?vested?right.
Alarcon?further?observed?that?although?vested?pension?rights?could?be?modified?before?retirement?”to?keep?a?pension?system?flexible?and?permit?[54?Cal.3d?532]?adjustments?to?accord?with?changing?conditions,?such?modifications?must?be?reasonable?and?may?not?destroy?or?impair?a?vested?contractual?right?to?a?pension.?[Citations.]”?(149?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?553.)?As?we?have?previously?discussed,?the?pension?provisions?of?Proposition?140,?which?abruptly?terminate?an?incumbent?legislator’s?right?to?earn?future?pension?benefits?through?continued?service,?must?be?deemed?an?impairment,?not?a?mere?”modification”?or?”adjustment,”?of?the?vested?pension?rights?of?incumbent?legislators,?whether?or?not?they?will?enter?a?new?term?on?or?after?November?6,?1990.
Thus,?we?hold?that,?under?California?law,?all?incumbent?legislators?acquired?a?vested?right?to?earn?additional?pension?benefits?through?continued?service,?a?right?which?Proposition?140?clearly?impairs.
[17a]?After?granting?review?in?this?case,?we?asked?for?further?briefing?on?the?additional?question?whether?the?contract?clause?of?the?federal?Constitution?protects?the?salary?or?pension?rights?of?state?public?officials?such?as?legislators.?(See,?e.g.,?Higginbotham?v.?Baton?Rouge?(1939)?306?U.S.?535,?538-539?[83?L.Ed.?968,?971-972,?59?S.Ct.?705],?rehg.?den.?307?U.S.?649?[83?L.Ed.?968,?59?S.Ct.?705]?[hereafter?Higginbotham];?Dodge?v.?Board?of?Education?(1937)?302?U.S.?74,?78-79;?Crenshaw?v.?United?States?(1890)?134?U.S.?99,?105-106?[33?L.Ed.?825,?827-828,?10?S.Ct.?431];?Butler?v.?Pennsylvania?(1850)?51?U.S.?(10?How.)?402,?416-418?[13?L.Ed.?472,?478-479].)In?Higginbotham,?supra,?a?public?officer?(commissioner?of?public?parks)?was?discharged?in?the?middle?of?his?term?and?sued?to?recover?the?balance?of?his?salary?for?the?stated?term,?asserting?a?federal?contracts?clause?claim.?The?high?court,?in?a?brief,?unanimous?opinion?(citing?earlier?cases),?denied?relief,?holding?that?the?contract?clause?does?not?protect?the?tenure?assigned?to?a?state’s?public?officers.?[18]?The?court?relied?on?the?”familiar?principle?that?’the?legislative?power?of?a?State,?except?so?far?as?restrained?by?its?own?constitution,?is?at?all?times?absolute?with?respect?to?all?offices?within?its?reach.?It?may?at?pleasure?create?or?abolish?them,?or?modify?their?duties.?It?may?also?shorten?or?lengthen?the?term?of?service.’?[Citations.]”?(306?U.S.?at?p.?538?[83?L.Ed?at?p.?971].)
The?Higginbotham?(supra,?306?U.S.?535)?principle,?though?stated?in?terms?of?”tenure,”?extends?to?matters?of?compensation?of?public?officers.?As?stated?in?Dodge?v.?Board?of?Education,?supra,?302?U.S.?at?pages?78-79?[83?L.Ed?at?page?62],?cited?with?approval?in?Higginbotham,?state?legislation?fixing?the?compensation?of?public?officers?”creates?no?contract?in?their?favor?and?the?compensation?named?may?be?altered?at?the?will?of?the?legislature.”?(See?also?Crenshaw?v.?United?States,?supra,?134?U.S.?at?p.?105?[33?L.Ed?at?p.?828]?[54?Cal.3d?533]?[compensation?paid?to?state?public?officers?is?not?protected?by?federal?contract?clause].)
The?applicable?principle?to?be?gleaned?from?Higginbotham,?supra,?306?U.S.?535,?appears?to?be?that?a?state?(or?its?local?subdivisions)?has?the?power?at?any?time?to?create,?alter?or?abolish?state?or?local?public?offices,?and?thereby?reduce?the?affected?officers’?salaries?or?other?compensation,?unfettered?by?federal?contract?clause?restrictions.?[17b]?Respondent?Eu?and?intervener?argue?that?if,?under?Higginbotham,?a?state?can?terminate?a?public?officer?in?the?midst?of?his?or?her?term?without?providing?compensation?for?the?remainder?thereof,?then?it?would?follow?that?the?state?likewise?can?terminate?future?contributions?toward?his?or?her?pension,?assuming?state?statutory?and?constitutional?guaranties?are?satisfied.?But?as?petitioners?observe,?none?of?these?high?court?cases?involved?the?special?area?of?vested?pension?rights,?or?concerned?the?rights?of?persons?remaining?in?office?for?additional?terms.
Although?the?issue?is?not?entirely?free?of?doubt,?we?conclude?that?the?foregoing?federal?cases?would?not?withhold?federal?contract?clause?protection?from?incumbent?state?legislators?who?have?acquired?vested?pension?rights?under?state?law.
Higginbotham?involved?the?tenure?of?public?officials?and?the?consequences?arising?from?prematurely?terminating?that?tenure.?The?case?did?not?concern?the?quite?distinct?matter?of?the?pension?rights?of?public?officials?or?employees.?As?we?explained?in?Miller,?although?the?Legislature?may?reduce?the?tenure?of?a?public?employee’s?position,?and?thereby?shorten?his?or?her?state?service,?public?employee?pension?rights?involve?constitutionally?protected?obligations.?”Pension?rights,?unlike?tenure?of?civil?service?employment,?are?deferred?compensation?earned?immediately?upon?the?performance?of?services?for?a?public?employer?'[and]?cannot?be?destroyed?…?without?impairing?a?contractual?obligation.?…’?[Citation.]”?(18?Cal.3d?at?p.?814.)
Decisions?of?this?court?have?assumed?the?federal?contract?clause?protects?the?vested?pension?rights?of?public?officers.?Olson?and?Betts,?both?supra,?involved?public?officers?(a?state?court?judge?and?a?state?constitutional?officer,?respectively),?and?those?cases?concluded,?without?discussion?of?the?Higginbotham/Dodge?line?of?decisions,?that?the?federal?contract?clause?would?apply?to?such?persons.?(See?also?Allen?v.?Board?of?Administration,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?at?p.?119.)
In?Lyon?v.?Flournoy?(1969)?271?Cal.App.2d?774?[76?Cal.Rptr.?869],?appeal?dismissed?396?U.S.?274[24?L.Ed.2d?465,?90?S.Ct.?564],?a?case?likewise?involving?the?rights?of?a?state?public?official,?the?Court?of?Appeal?[54?Cal.3d?534]?acknowledged?the?federal?rule?limiting?federal?contract?clause?protection?for?discharged?state?public?officers?(citing?Dodge?v.?Board?of?Education,?supra,?302?U.S.?74),?and?further?observed?that?the?public?employee?pension?decisions?of?this?court?(e.g.,?Kern?v.?City?of?Long?Beach,?supra,?29?Cal.2d?848)?”plac[ed]?earned?retirement?rights?within?the?shelter?of?the?prohibition?against?contract?impairment,?without?specific?citation?of?either?the?federal?or?state?clauses.”?(271?Cal.App.2d?at?p.?781.)?The?Lyon?court?nonetheless?concluded,?”Certainly?the?California?pension?decisions?have?never?rejected?the?federal?clause?as?a?source?of?protection.?It?is?now?too?late?to?do?so.?California?law?places?earned?pension?rights?of?public?officers?and?employees?under?the?protection?of?the?contract?clause?regardless?of?any?characterization?adopted?by?the?federal?courts.”?(Ibid.,?italics?added.)
We?agree?with?Lyon?v.?Flournoy,?supra,?271?Cal.App.2d?774,?that,?in?light?of?prior?California?decisions?consistently?extending?federal?contract?clause?protection?to?state?public?officers,?it?is?simply?”too?late”?to?retreat?from?the?clear?implication?of?those?holdings.?We?conclude?that?the?pension?restrictions?of?Proposition?140?are?unconstitutional?under?the?federal?contract?clause?as?applied?to?incumbent?legislators?because?they?infringe?on?the?vested?pension?rights?of?those?persons.
- Nonincumbent?Legislators
- Severability
Although?the?drafters?of?Proposition?140?included?a?severance?clause?(section?11?of?the?measure),?by?its?terms?it?pertains?only?to?the?subject?matter?of?article?VII,?section?11,?of?the?state?Constitution?(regarding?the?obligations?of?the?LRS)?rather?than?to?the?entire?initiative?measure.?It?is?possible?the?framers?intended?to?apply?the?severance?clause?to?the?entire?measure,?as?the?clause?referred?to?”this?measure”?and?was?placed?at?the?conclusion?of?the?[54?Cal.3d?535]?substantive?provisions?of?Proposition?140.?But?in?any?event,?it?is?clear?that?severance?of?particular?provisions?is?permissible?despite?the?absence?of?a?formal?severance?clause.?(See,?e.g.,?People?v.?Mirmirani?(1981)?30?Cal.3d?375,?387,?fn.?9?[178?Cal.Rptr.?792,?636?P.2d?1130].)
As?we?stated?in?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?pages?355-356,?quoting?from?an?earlier?case,?”?'[t]he?cases?prescribe?three?criteria?for?severability:?the?invalid?provision?must?be?grammatically,?functionally,?and?volitionally?separable.?[Citations.]’?”?In?Raven,?we?invalidated?a?portion?of?Proposition?115?(an?initiative?pertaining?to?the?rights?of?criminal?defendants),?but?preserved?the?remainder,?relying?on?the?foregoing?criteria?for?severability.?The?present?measure?likewise?satisfies?each?of?those?criteria.
First,?the?invalid?pension?restriction,?contained?in?new?section?4.5?of?article?IV?of?the?state?Constitution,?can?be?grammatically?severed?without?affecting?the?operation?of?the?remaining?clauses.?In?order?to?preserve?the?section’s?application?to?nonincumbent?legislators,?such?severance?would?involve?(1)?striking?from?that?section?the?words?”or?serving?in,”?so?that?the?section?applies?only?to?”a?person?elected?to?[TEXT?STRICKEN]or?serving?in?the?Legislature?on?or?after?November?1,?1990,”?and?(2)?construing?the?resulting?language?as?applicable?only?to?nonincumbent?legislators?first?elected?to?the?Legislature?on?or?after?that?date.?(See?Walnut?Creek?Manor?v.?Fair?Employment?&?Housing?Com.?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?245,?266-267?[284?Cal.Rptr.?718,?814?P.2d?704].)
Second,?the?invalid?restriction?is?functionally?severable,?as?its?removal?would?not?affect?the?function?or?operation?of?the?remaining?provisions.?The?term?and?budgetary?limitations,?together?with?the?restriction?on?nonincumbent?legislators’?pension?rights,?can?operate?entirely?independently?of?the?invalid?restriction.
Finally,?the?invalid?portion?of?the?measure?is?volitionally?severable,?in?that?the?framers?and?voters?undoubtedly?would?have?adopted?the?remaining?provisions?had?they?foreseen?the?success?of?petitioners’?challenge.?The?framers?included?language?preserving?any?”vested”?rights?which?may?have?accrued,?disclosing?an?intent?to?accommodate?any?interests?protected?by?federal?contract?clause?principles.?As?for?the?voters,?there?is?no?indication?they?placed?undue?emphasis?on?the?pension?rights?provision?as?it?applied?to?incumbent?legislators.
III.?Conclusion
We?conclude?that,?except?for?the?restriction?on?pensions?of?incumbent?legislators,?Proposition?140?is?constitutionally?valid.?The?petition?for?a?[54?Cal.3d?536]?peremptory?writ?of?mandate?is?granted?to?the?extent?it?seeks?to?compel?respondents?to?refrain?from?enforcing?section?4?of?Proposition?140?as?applied?to?incumbent?legislators.?In?all?other?respects,?the?petition?for?mandate?is?denied.?The?temporary?stay?issued?on?June?14,?1991,?is?vacated.?The?parties?should?bear?their?own?costs.?(See?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?p.?356.)?Panelli,?J.,?Kennard,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?Baxter,?J.,?and?George,?J.,?concurred.
MOSK,?J.,
Concurring?and?Dissenting.
I?concur?in?the?judgment?insofar?as?it?invalidates?Proposition?140’s?purported?restrictions?on?the?retirement?benefits?of?incumbent?legislators.
Otherwise,?I?dissent.
In?this?case,?we?are?presented?with?a?broad?challenge?to?Proposition?140-the?promotionally?self-styled?”Political?Reform?Act?of?1990″-under?both?the?United?States?and?California?Constitutions.?As?will?appear,?the?attack?is?successful?on?at?least?two?separate?and?independent?points:?the?initiative?violates?the?single-subject?rule?of?the?state?charter?and?also?amounts?to?an?unconstitutional?revision?of?that?instrument.
- Proposition?140?and?the?Single-subject?Rule
Beyond?any?doubt,?Proposition?140?violates?the?single-subject?rule?on?its?face?and,?as?a?result,?is?invalid:?”An?initiative?measure?embracing?more?than?one?subject?may?not?be?submitted?to?the?electors?or?have?any?effect.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?II,???8,?subd.?(d).)
At?the?outset,?I?must?observe?that?”The?initiative?process?is?out?of?control?in?California.?Voters?are?often?unable?to?comprehend?all?that?an?initiative?measure?proposes?to?accomplish,?and?they?are?often?asked?to?vote?on?a?multitude?of?issues?by?casting?a?single?ballot.”?(Note,?Putting?the?”Single”?Back?in?the?Single-Subject?Rule:?A?Proposal?for?Initiative?Reform?in?California?(1991)?24?U.C.?Davis?L.Rev.?879,?929?(hereafter?Note).)?Much,?of?course,?is?at?stake.?The?inference?is?compelled?by?a?consideration?of?the?staggering?costs?of?initiative?campaigns.?For?example,?in?1988?proponents?and?opponents?spent?more?than?$130?million?in?attempting?to?persuade?the?voters?of?the?merits?of?their?respective?positions.?(Id.?at?p.?889,?fn.?55.)
Regrettably,?I?must?also?observe?that?in?large?part,?the?blame?for?this?chaos?must?be?laid?to?the?court.?”One?way”?to?prevent?such?a?situation?”is?by?limiting?measures?to?a?single?subject.”?(Note,?supra,?24?U.C.?Davis?L.Rev.?at?[54?Cal.3d?537]?pp.?929-930.)?Such?a?means?is?available:?the?single-subject?rule-which?was?designed?to?simplify?and?clarify?initiatives?(Ballot?Pamp.,?Proposed?Stats.?and?Amends.?to?Cal.?Const.?with?arguments?to?voters,?Gen.?Elec.?(Nov.?2,?1948),?pt.?I,?argument?in?favor?of?Prop.?10,?p.?8)-“is?already?part?of?the?California?Constitution?….”?(Note,?supra,?24?U.C.?Davis?L.Rev.?at?pp.?929-930.)?But?it?is?now?notorious-and?irresponsible-that?”the?California?Supreme?Court?is?reluctant?to?enforce?it.?In?over?forty?years,?the?court?has?never?invalidated?an?initiative?measure?for?violating?the?single-subject?rule.”?(Id.?at?p.?896,?italics?added.)?It?is?also?notorious-and?irresponsible-that?the?court?not?only?”avoid[s]?invalidating?initiatives?under?the?single-subject?rule,”?but?also?”avoid[s]?altogether?a?meaningful?application?of?the?rule.”?(Id.?at?p.?899.)
I?return?to?Proposition?140.?In?my?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion?in?Raven?v.?Deukmejian?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?336?[276?Cal.Rptr.?326,?801?P.2d?1077],?I?discussed?the?single-subject?rule?at?length?with?regard?to?Proposition?115?and?its?31?sections.?(52?Cal.3d?at?pp.?357-364?[conc.?&?dis.?opn.?of?Mosk,?J.].)?The?substance?of?that?discussion?was?this:?”…?[T]he?single-subject?rule?requires?an?initiative?measure?to?constitute?a?coherent?enactment?in?and?of?itself.?It?is?not?enough?for?such?a?measure?to?be?capable?of?bearing?some?label?of?indefinite?scope.?It?follows?that?the?’reasonably?germane’?test?[which?is?used?to?apply?the?rule]?must?contain?as?its?ultimate?criterion?whether?an?initiative?measure?is?internally?interrelated?as?a?whole?and?parts.?A?standard?that?focuses?on?whether?the?measure?is?capable?of?bearing?some?label?is?simply?empty.”?(Id.?at?p.?364?[conc.?&?dis.?opn.?of?Mosk,?J.].)
Examined?under?the?foregoing?principles,?Proposition?140?does?not?satisfy?the?single-subject?rule.?The?rule?requires?a?coherent?enactment.?The?test?is?whether?the?initiative?is?internally?interrelated.?The?measure?here?fails.
By?its?very?terms,?Proposition?140?reveals?itself?to?be?incoherent:?it?lacks?the?requisite?internal?interrelationship.?The?initiative?embraces?three?separate?and?independent?subjects-subjects?that?are?unquestionably?of?major?significance.?The?first?concerns?term?limits?for?132?elected?state?officials,?excluding-for?no?discernible?reason-only?the?Insurance?Commissioner.?The?second?deals?with?restrictions?on?the?retirement?benefits?of?legislators?only.?The?third?relates?to?limits?on?expenditures?by?the?Legislature?and?no?other?branch?of?government.
The?Legislative?Analyst?so?understood?Proposition?140.?Indeed,?in?the?analysis?presented?to?the?voters?in?the?Ballot?Pamphlet,?he?expressly?declared?that?”This?initiative?makes?three?major?changes?to?the?California?Constitution.”?(Ballot?Pamp.,?Proposed?Stats.?and?Amends.?to?Cal.?Const.?with?[54?Cal.3d?538]?arguments?to?voters,?Gen.?Elec.?(Nov.?6,?1990),?analysis?of?Prop.?140?by?Legis.?Analyst,?at?p.?69?(hereafter?Ballot?Pamphlet).)
Proposition?140?must?be?read?to?have,?as?a?broad?purpose,?the?transformation?of?the?California?Constitution?from?an?instrument?that?allows-and?in?the?view?of?the?initiative’s?proponents,?actually?invites-the?election?and?reelection?to?the?Legislature?of?”politicians,”?to?one?that?prohibits?such?a?result?and?in?fact?encourages?service?by?”citizens.”
Such?a?reading?is?compelled?by?the?clear?meaning?of?Proposition?140’s?plain?words.?Its?provisions?seek?to?bar?any?professional?cadre?from?entering?into,?or?arising?out?of,?the?Legislature.
This?reading?is?confirmed?by?all?the?Ballot?Pamphlet?arguments?relating?to?the?initiative.?Of?course,?proponents?and?opponents?expressed?conflicting?opinions?as?to?the?wisdom?of?such?a?transformation.?But?both?recognized?its?reality.
The?majority?find?no?single-subject?violation.?They?reason?that?the?initiative?deals?with?a?”unifying?theme?or?common?purpose”?that?they?call?”incumbency?reform.”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?p.?512.)?Such?a?theme?is?not?”unifying”;?such?a?purpose?is?not?”common.”?The?term?”incumbency?reform”?is?nothing?more,?and?nothing?less,?than?a?seductive?label?of?indefinite?scope-a?label?that?can?be?applied?to?any?”grab?bag”?containing?any?provisions,?no?matter?how?numerous?or?heterogeneous,?that?relate?to?some?officeholder?in?some?way.?It?begs?reality?to?hold?that?an?initiative?that?”makes?three?major?changes?to?the?California?Constitution”?(Ballot?Pamp.,?supra,?analysis?of?Prop.?140?by?Legis.?Analyst,?at?p.?69)?embraces?only?one?subject.?But?the?majority?cavalierly?do?so.fn.?1
- Proposition?140?and?the?Revision?Requirements
Proposition?140?amounts?to?an?unconstitutional?revision?of?the?state?charter?on?its?face?and,?as?a?result,?is?invalid.
Article?XVIII?of?the?California?Constitution,?which?is?entitled?”Amending?and?Revising?the?Constitution,”?provides?for?(1)?amendment?by?proposal?of?[54?Cal.3d?539]?the?Legislature?or?initiative?by?the?people?and?(2)?revision?by?proposal?of?the?Legislature?or?constitutional?convention?called?by?the?Legislature?with?the?approval?of?the?people.?Manifestly,?these?procedures?are?exclusive.?Thus,?an?amendment?may?be?effected?only?by?legislative?proposal?or?popular?initiative.?And?a?revision?may?be?effected?only?by?legislative?proposal?or?constitutional?convention.?It?follows?that?a?popular?initiative?may?amend?but?may?not?revise.?(Brosnahan?v.?Brown,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?p.?260;?Amador?Valley?Joint?Union?High?Sch.?Dist.?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?208,?221?[149?Cal.Rptr.?239,?583?P.2d?1281].)
“Amendment”?and?”revision”?are?not?defined?in?article?XVIII?or?elsewhere?in?the?California?Constitution?in?express?terms.?But?almost?100?years?ago,?in?Livermore?v.?Waite?(1894)?102?Cal.?113?[36?P.?424],?the?court?suggested?their?meaning.
At?that?time,?article?XVIII?provided?”two?methods”?for?effecting?changes?in?the?Constitution:?revision?by?constitutional?convention?and?amendment?by?legislative?proposal.?(Livermore?v.?Waite,?supra,?102?Cal.?at?p.?117.)
The?Livermore?court?declared:?”Under?the?first?of?these?methods?the?entire?sovereignty?of?the?people?is?represented?in?the?convention.?The?character?and?extent?of?a?constitution?that?may?be?framed?by?that?body?is?freed?from?any?limitations?other?than?those?contained?in?the?constitution?of?the?United?States.?…?The?constitution?itself?has?been?framed?by?delegates?chosen?by?the?people?for?that?express?purpose,?and?has?been?afterwards?ratified?by?a?vote?of?the?people,?…?and?the?provision?in?article?XVIII?that?it?can?be?revised?only?in?the?same?manner,?and?after?the?people?have?had?an?opportunity?to?express?their?will?in?reference?thereto,?precludes?the?idea?that?it?was?the?intention?of?the?people,?by?the?provision?for?amendments?authorized?in?the?…?article,?to?afford?the?means?of?effecting?the?same?result?which?…?has?been?guarded?with?so?much?care?and?precision.?The?very?term?’constitution’?implies?an?instrument?of?a?permanent?and?abiding?nature,?and?the?provisions?contained?therein?for?its?revision?indicate?the?will?of?the?people?that?the?underlying?principles?upon?which?it?rests,?as?well?as?the?substantial?entirety?of?the?instrument,?shall?be?of?a?like?permanent?and?abiding?nature.?On?the?other?hand,?the?significance?of?the?term?’amendment’?implies?such?an?addition?or?change?within?the?lines?of?the?original?instrument?as?will?effect?an?improvement,?or?better?carry?out?the?purpose?for?which?it?was?framed.”?(Livermore?v.?Waite,?supra,?102?Cal.?at?pp.?117-119.)
More?than?50?years?later,?in?McFadden?v.?Jordan?(1948)?32?Cal.2d?330?[196?P.2d?787],?the?court?considered?whether?the?so-called?”California?Bill?of?Rights,”?if?approved,?would?effect?an?amendment?or?a?revision.?[54?Cal.3d?540]
At?the?threshold,?the?McFadden?court?set?out?the?principles?stated?in?Livermore.?It?then?proceeded?to?determine?their?applicability?to?initiatives.?”The?initiative?power?reserved?by?the?people?by?amendment?to?the?Constitution?in?1911?[citation]?applies?only?to?the?proposing?and?the?adopting?or?rejecting?of?’laws?and?amendments?to?the?Constitution’?and?does?not?purport?to?extend?to?a?constitutional?revision.”?(McFadden?v.?Jordan,?supra,?32?Cal.2d?at?p.?333.)?It?went?on?to?explain:?”The?differentiation”?”between?amend?and?revise”?”is?not?merely?between?two?words;?more?accurately?it?is?between?two?procedures?and?between?their?respective?fields?of?application.?…?The?people?of?this?state?have?spoken;?they?made?it?clear?when?they?adopted?article?XVIII?and?made?amendment?relatively?simple?but?provided?the?formidable?bulwark?of?a?constitutional?convention?as?a?protection?against?improvident?or?hasty?(or?any?other)?revision,?that?they?understood?that?there?was?a?real?difference?between?amendment?and?revision.”?(Id.?at?p.?347.)
Among?other?things,?observed?the?McFadden?court,?the?”California?Bill?of?Rights”?would?(1)?add?what?were?in?actuality?12?articles?in?208?sections?with?over?21,000?words?to?a?document?containing?25?articles?in?347?sections?with?about?55,000?words;?(2)?repeal?or?substantially?alter?at?least?15?of?those?25?articles;?(3)?treat?a?minimum?of?4?new?topics;?and?(4)?substantially?curtail?the?functions?of?both?the?legislative?and?executive?branches.?(McFadden?v.?Jordan,?supra,?32?Cal.2d?at?pp.?334-345.)
“Applying?the?long?established?law?to?any?tenable?view?of?the?facts?which?have?been?related,”?the?McFadden?court?concluded,?”it?is?overwhelmingly?certain?that?the?measure?now?before?us?would?constitute?a?revision?of?the?Constitution?rather?than?an?amendment?or?’such?an?addition?or?change?within?the?lines?of?the?original?instrument?as?will?effect?an?improvement?or?better?carry?out?the?purposes?for?which?it?was?framed.’?”?(McFadden?v.?Jordan,?supra,?32?Cal.2d?at?pp.?349-?350,?quoting?Livermore?v.?Waite,?supra,?102?Cal.?at?pp.?118-119.)
Next,?in?Amador?Valley?Joint?Union?High?Sch.?Dist.?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?208,?the?court?addressed?the?question?whether?Proposition?13,?which?added?article?XIII?A?to?the?California?Constitution,?was?amendatory?or?revisory.?It?stated:?”Taken?together?our?Livermore?and?McFadden?decisions?mandate?that?our?analysis?in?determining?whether?a?particular?constitutional?enactment?is?a?revision?or?an?amendment?must?be?both?quantitative?and?qualitative?in?nature.?For?example,?an?enactment?which?is?so?extensive?in?its?provisions?as?to?change?directly?the?’substantial?entirety’?of?the?Constitution?by?the?deletion?or?alteration?of?numerous?existing?provisions?may?well?constitute?a?revision?thereof.?However,?even?a?relatively?simple?enactment?may?accomplish?such?far?reaching?changes?in?[54?Cal.3d?541]?the?nature?of?our?basic?governmental?plan?as?to?amount?to?a?revision?also.”?(22?Cal.3d?at?p.?223.)?Applying?the?foregoing?standard,?the?court?determined?that?Proposition?13?had?insufficient?qualitative?or?quantitative?effect?to?constitute?a?revision.
Then,?in?People?v.?Frierson?(1979)?25?Cal.3d?142?[158?Cal.Rptr.?281,?599?P.2d?587],?a?plurality?of?the?court?considered?in?dictum?whether?a?1972?initiative?measure?was?amendatory?or?revisory.?The?measure?added?section?27?to?article?I?of?the?California?Constitution,?validating?the?death?penalty?as?a?permissible?punishment?under?that?instrument.?The?plurality?concluded?that?the?initiative?effected?an?amendment?only:?”In?Amador?Valley,?we?observed?that?’even?a?relatively?simple?enactment?may?accomplish?such?far?reaching?changes?in?the?nature?of?our?basic?governmental?plan?as?to?amount?to?a?revision.?…’?(P.?223.)?Section?27,?however,?accomplishes?no?such?sweeping?result.”?(25?Cal.3d?at?pp.?186-187?(plur.?opn.),?[dictum].)
Next,?in?Brosnahan?v.?Brown,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?236,?the?court?addressed?whether?Proposition?8,?as?a?whole,?was?amendatory?or?revisory.?Applying?the?”dual?analysis”?of?Amador?Valley,?which?”examin[es]?both?the?quantitative?and?qualitative?effects?of”?an?initiative?”upon?our?constitutional?scheme,”?the?court?concluded?that?the?measure?”did?not?accomplish?a?’revision’?….”?(32?Cal.3d?at?pp.?260-261.)
Finally,?in?In?re?Lance?W.?(1985)?37?Cal.3d?873?[210?Cal.Rptr.?631,?694?P.2d?744],?the?court?considered?whether?section?3?of?Proposition?8,?which?added?article?I,?section?28,?subdivision?(d),?to?the?California?Constitution,?was?revisory.?It?had?first?determined?that?section?3?of?the?initiative?abrogated?the?judicially?created?exclusionary?rule?as?a?remedy?for?the?violation?of?a?criminal?defendant’s?state?constitutional?right?against?unreasonable?searches?and?seizures.?It?reasoned?that?the?people’s?exercise?of?the?legislative?power?to?restrict?judicial?authority?in?this?area?”does?not,?either?qualitatively?or?quantitatively,?’accomplish?such?far?reaching?changes?in?the?nature?of?[judicial?authority]?as?to?amount?to?a?revision’?of?the?Constitution”?because?such?power?is?constitutionally?recognized?and?its?use?in?this?matter?does?not?amount?to?”a?sweeping?change?either?in?the?distribution?of?powers?made?in?the?organic?document?or?in?the?powers?which?it?vests?in?the?judicial?branch?….”?(37?Cal.3d?at?pp.?891-892.)
In?light?of?the?case?law,?the?definitional?standard?applicable?for?purposes?of?article?XVIII?of?the?California?Constitution?is?as?follows.?A?”revision”?denotes?a?change?that?is?qualitatively?or?quantitatively?extensive,?affecting?the?”underlying?principles?upon?which?[the?Constitution]?rests”?or?the?”substantial?entirety?of?the?instrument.”?(Livermore?v.?Waite,?supra,?102?Cal.?at?[54?Cal.3d?542]?p.?118.)?By?contrast,?an?”amendment”?denotes?a?change?that?is?qualitatively?and?quantitatively?limited,?making?a?modification?”within?the?lines?of?the?original?instrument?as?will?effect?an?improvement,?or?better?carry?out?the?purpose?for?which?it?was?framed.”?(Id.?at?pp.?118-?119.)fn.?2
I?now?turn?to?the?question?whether?Proposition?140?amounts?to?an?unconstitutional?revision.
As?explained?above,?the?initiative?has?as?a?broad?purpose?the?transformation?of?the?California?Constitution?from?an?instrument?that?allows,?and?perhaps?actually?invites,?the?election?and?reelection?to?the?Legislature?of?”politicians,”?to?one?that?prohibits?such?a?result?and?in?fact?encourages?service?by?”citizens.”
I?observe?at?the?outset?that?the?wisdom?of?Proposition?140?is?of?no?consequence?to?the?analysis.?To?be?sure,?the?initiative?may?be?judged?foolish?and?impractical.?But?it?may?also?be?viewed?otherwise.?Certainly,?the?exercise?of?governmental?authority?by?”citizens”?as?opposed?to?”politicians,”?including?the?wielding?of?legislative?power,?has?long?been?an?ideal?within?the?Western?political?tradition,?and?sometimes?even?a?reality.?(See?Maio,?Politeia?and?Adjudication?in?Fourth-Century?B.C.?Athens?(1983)?28?Am.?J.?Juris.?16,?17-23.)?Again,?however,?the?desirability?of?the?measure?is?immaterial.
The?basic?governmental?plan?of?California?is?established,?of?course,?by?the?California?Constitution.?The?powers?are?the?legislative,?executive,?and?judicial.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?III,???3.)?The?branches?that?are?vested?with?those?powers?are,?respectively,?the?Legislature?(id.,?art.?IV,???1),?the?Governor?(id.,?art.?V,???1),?and?the?judiciary?(id.,?art.?VI,???1).
The?nature?of?the?three?powers?and?the?function?of?the?three?branches?have?been?settled?since?virtually?the?inception?of?our?polity.?[54?Cal.3d?543]
In?Nougues?v.?Douglass?(1857)?7?Cal.?65,?the?court?stated:?”The?three?great?departments?are?essentially?different?in?their?constitution,?nature,?and?powers,?and?in?the?means?provided?for?each?by?the?Constitution,?to?enable?each?to?perform?its?appropriate?functions.?These?three?departments?are?all?equally?necessary?to?the?very?existence?of?the?government.?[?]?The?legislative?power?is?the?creative?element?in?the?government,?and?was?exercised?partly?by?the?people?in?the?formation?of?the?Constitution.?It?is?primarily?[sic]?and?original,?antecedent?and?fundamental,?and?must?be?exercised?before?the?other?departments?can?have?anything?to?do.?Its?exercise?is?a?condition?precedent,?and?the?exercise?of?the?executive?and?judicial?functions?are?conditions?subsequent.?The?legislative?power?makes?the?laws,?and?then,?after?they?are?so?made,?the?judiciary?expounds?and?the?executive?executes?them.”?(Id.?at?pp.?69-70,?italics?in?original.)
Manifestly,?Proposition?140?amounts?to?an?unconstitutional?revision?because?of?its?significant?effect?on?the?Legislature.
As?the?discussion?above?reveals,?the?Legislature?is?a?fundamental?component?of?the?state?constitutional?system.?It?is?one?of?the?”three?great?departments”?and?is?”necessary?to?the?very?existence?of?the?government.”?(Nougues?v.?Douglass,?supra,?7?Cal.?at?pp.?69-?70.)?Indeed,?its?power?is?the?”creative?element”?in?the?scheme.?(Id.?at?p.?70.)
Moreover,?the?Legislature?must?be?deemed?fundamentally?altered?by?any?substantial?change?in?its?nature?or?character.
Finally,?the?change?that?would?be?effected?by?Proposition?140?would?be?substantial.?In?the?state’s?history,?only?two?such?changes?have?clearly?been?of?this?sort:?the?movement?from?a?full-time?Legislature?with?broad?powers?to?a?part-time?body?subject?to?narrow?limitations,?which?was?effected?when?the?present?Constitution?superseded?the?original?instrument?in?1879;?and?a?movement?in?the?opposite?direction,?which?was?accomplished?under?the?successful?proposal?of?the?California?Constitutional?Revision?Commission?in?1966.?The?change?here?would?be?of?similar?magnitude:?”citizens”?would?be?put?in?the?Legislature?in?the?place?of?”politicians.”
In?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?336,?we?held?that?section?3?of?Proposition?115?amounted?to?an?unconstitutional?revision?because?of?its?significant?effect?on?the?judiciary.?The?provision?in?question,?designed?to?amend?article?I,?section?24,?of?the?California?Constitution,?would?have?restricted?the?power?of?state?courts?to?interpret?certain?state?constitutional?rights?of?criminal?defendants.?Like?the?Legislature,?the?judiciary?is?one?of?the?”three?great?departments”?and?is?”necessary?to?the?very?existence?of?the?government.”?(Nougues?v.?Douglass,?supra,?7?Cal.?at?pp.?69-?70.)?Also?like?[54?Cal.3d?544]?the?Legislature,?it?must?be?deemed?fundamentally?altered?by?any?substantial?change?in?its?nature?or?character.?The?change?threatened?by?section?3?of?Proposition?115?would?have?been?such.
It?follows?a?fortiori?that?an?initiative?that?would?put?laypersons?into?the?judiciary?in?the?place?of?jurists?would?amount?to?an?unconstitutional?revision?because?of?its?significant?effect?on?that?branch.?Clearly,?such?a?provision?would?go?far?beyond?section?3?of?Proposition?115?in?fundamentally?altering?the?courts?by?effecting?a?substantial?change?in?their?nature?and?character.
If?an?initiative?like?the?foregoing?would?be?an?unconstitutional?revision,?so?too?Proposition?140.?The?one?would?improperly?affect?the?judiciary,?the?other?the?Legislature.
In?sum,?Proposition?140?would?fundamentally?alter?a?fundamental?component?of?the?state?constitutional?system?by?effecting?a?substantial?change?in?the?nature?and?character?of?the?Legislature.?Such?an?alteration,?of?course,?would?be?qualitatively?extensive,?affecting?the?”underlying?principles?upon?which?[the?Constitution]?rests.”?(Livermore?v.?Waite,?supra,?102?Cal.?at?p.?118.)?Therefore,?it?would?be?revisory.
The?majority?conclude?to?the?contrary.?They?reason?that?Proposition?140’s?possible?future?consequences?for?the?Legislature?are?not?dispositive.?I?agree.?They?also?reason?that?the?initiative?does?not?affect?the?Legislature’s?constitutional?structure?or?powers.?Again,?I?agree.?But?as?explained?above,?a?judiciary?comprising?laypersons?is?fundamentally?different?from?one?made?up?of?jurists-even?if?its?structure?and?powers?are?the?same.?Similarly,?a?Legislature?of?”citizens”?is?fundamentally?different?from?one?of?”politicians.”?It?is?a?”citizen”?Legislature?that?is?the?measure’s?object?and?also?its?necessary?and?inevitable?effect.
The?majority’s?claim?that?”the?initiative?process?may?represent?the?only?practical?means?of?achieving?the?kind?of?’reforms’?of?the?Legislature?involved?here”?(maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?p.?506,?italics?added)?is?simply?immaterial.?The?initiative?process?is?not?a?proper?means?of?achieving?”reforms”?that?are?revisory.?True,?”our?Constitution?plac[es]?'[a]ll?political?power’?in?the?people”?and?recognizes?their?”?’…?right?to?alter?or?reform?[government]?when?the?public?good?may?require.’?”?(Id.?at?p.?511,?italics?deleted.)?But?it?also?restricts?the?wielding?of?that?power?and?the?exercise?of?that?right?through?various?provisions-among?which,?of?course,?are?the?requirements?governing?revision.?[54?Cal.3d?545]
III.?Conclusion
For?all?the?reasons?stated?above,?I?would?invalidate?Proposition?140?in?its?entirety?as?violative?of?the?single-subject?rule?and?as?unconstitutionally?revisory.fn.?3
FN?1.?I?recognize?that?the?majority?opinions?in?Brosnahan?v.?Brown?(1982)?32?Cal.3d?236,?245-253?[186?Cal.Rptr.?30,?651?P.2d?274],?and?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?336,?346-349,?furnish?some?support?for?the?conclusion?of?the?majority?here.?But?the?reasoning?of?Brosnahan?in?this?regard?is?demonstrably?faulty.?(Brosnahan?v.?Brown,?supra,?at?p.?299?[dis.?opn.?of?Mosk,?J.];?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?at?pp.?363-364?[conc.?&?dis.?opn.?of?Mosk,?J.].)?So?too?is?that?of?Raven.?(Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?at?pp.?364-365?[conc.?&?dis.?opn.?of?Mosk,?J.].)?It?is?never?too?late,?or?too?early,?to?correct?error.?My?colleagues,?however,?fail?to?take?the?opportunity?presented?by?this?case?to?overrule?Brosnahan?and?Raven?to?the?extent?that?they?are?implicated?here.?No?justification?or?excuse?appears.
FN?2.?It?could?perhaps?be?argued?that?the?definitional?standard?may?require?modification.?In?Livermore,?the?court?reasoned?in?substance?that?”revision”?denoted?qualitatively?or?quantitatively?extensive?change?because?the?process?of?revision?as?then?defined,?i.e.,?by?constitutional?convention,?was?exceptionally?difficult.?In?McFadden,?the?court?adhered?to?that?reasoning?because?its?predicate?still?obtained.?In?Amador?Valley,?the?court?recognized?that?a?change?had?been?wrought:?formerly,?”a?constitutional?revision?could?be?accomplished?only?by?the?elaborate?procedure?of?the?convening?of,?and?action?by,?a?constitutional?convention”?(22?Cal.3d?at?p.?222,?italics?in?original);?now,?it?can?also?be?effected?by?the?relatively?simple?procedure?of?legislative?proposal?(id.?at?p.?221).?The?court?implied?the?change?was?”significant.”?(Id.?at?p.?222.)?But?it?apparently?failed?to?appreciate?precisely?what?its?”significance”?was.?Because?the?process?of?revision?as?now?defined?is?slightly,?if?at?all,?more?difficult?than?the?process?of?amendment,?”revision”?might?perhaps?be?deemed?to?denote?a?change?that?is?slightly,?if?at?all,?more?extensive?than?that?accomplished?by?”amendment.”?In?a?word,?if?an?”amendment”?is?a?modification?”within?the?lines?of?the?original?instrument,”?a?”revision”?is?any?change?beyond?those?lines?in?any?degree.
FN?3.?Because?of?the?result?I?reach,?I?need?not?proceed?further.?I?note?in?passing?that?Proposition?140?is?also?arguably?invalid?as?a?bill?of?attainder?proscribed?by?article?I,?section?10,?clause?1,?of?the?United?States?Constitution.?Bills?of?attainder,?within?the?meaning?of?the?federal?charter,?are?”legislative?acts,?no?matter?what?their?form,?that?apply?either?to?named?individuals?or?to?easily?ascertainable?members?of?a?group?in?such?a?way?as?to?inflict?punishment?on?them?without?a?judicial?trial?….”?(United?States?v.?Lovett?(1946)?328?U.S.?303,?315?[90?L.Ed.?1252,?1259,?66?S.Ct.?1073].)?In?substance?and?effect,?the?measure?here?is?such:?it?is?a?popular?initiative?that?imposes?the?nonjudicial?penalty?of?disqualification?on?the?”easily?ascertainable?members”?of?the?Legislature?who?were?its?primary?targets.?With?apparent?reason,?the?punishment?of?disqualification?is?visited?on?those?who?are?convicted?of?certain?crimes?specified?in?the?Constitution?and?statutes?of?California.?(See?Gov.?Code,???1021.)?With?no?reason?whatever,?the?same?penalty?now?awaits?those?who?were?Proposition?140’s?primary?targets.?With?less?reason?still,?it?also?awaits?all?others?who?hold?or?will?hold?the?offices?specified?in?the?initiative.
Wilson?v.?Eu