Pacific?Southwest?Realty?Co.?v.?County?of?Los?Angeles?(1991)?1?Cal.4th?155?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?536;?820?P.2d?1046
[No.?S021134.?Dec?26,?1991.]PACIFIC?SOUTHWEST?REALTY?COMPANY,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?COUNTY?OF?LOS?ANGELES?et?al.,?Defendants?and?Appellants.
(Superior?Court?of?Los?Angles?County,?No.?C607197,?Harvey?A.?Schneider,?Judge.)
(Opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.)
COUNSEL
De?Witt?W.?Clinton,?County?Counsel,?Halvor?Melom?and?Albert?Ramseyer,?Deputy?County?Counsel,?for?Defendants?and?Appellants.
Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorney?General,?Edmond?B.?Mamer?and?Carol?H.?Rehm,?Jr.,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?Louise?H.?Renne,?City?Attorney?(San?Francisco),?John?J.?Doherty?and?Robin?M.?Reitzes,?Deputy?City?Attorneys,?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendants?and?Appellants.
O’Melveny?&?Myers,?Frederick?A.?Richman,?Gregg?A.?Oppenheimer?and?Marcy?Jo?Mandel?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent.
OPINION
MOSK,?J.
In?1978?the?voters?adopted?Proposition?13,?which?provides?that?until?a?change?in?ownership?occurs?real?property?may?be?taxed?at?no?more?[1?Cal.4th?159]?than?1?percent?of?its?1975-1976?assessed?value?adjusted?for?inflation.?When?ownership?changes,?the?property?may?be?reassessed?at?its?current?market?value.?We?are?asked?to?decide?whether,?when?a?vendor?sells?a?fee?simple?interest?to?a?purchaser?and?simultaneously?acquires?from?the?latter?a?leasehold?interest?in?the?property,?a?change?in?ownership?has?occurred.?We?conclude?that?the?California?Constitution?and?implementing?statutes?compel?an?affirmative?answer?to?that?question,?and?therefore?reverse?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal.
I.
The?parties?have?jointly?stipulated?to?the?following?facts:?Under?a?purchase?agreement?dated?September?28,?1984,?plaintiff?agreed?to?convey?title?to?Security?Pacific?Plaza,?an?office?building?complex,?”in?fee?simple?absolute”?to?Metropolitan?Life?Insurance?Company?(hereafter?Metropolitan?Life)?for?$310?million.?The?conveyance?was?made?by?grant?deed?recorded?the?same?day.?As?relevant?here,?the?deed?provided?that?”all?of?Grantor’s?right,?title?and?interest”?was?conveyed,?”excepting?and?reserving?to?Grantor?an?estate?for?years?subject?to?conditions?subsequent,?upon?and?subject?to?all?of?the?terms,?covenants,?conditions?and?provisions?contained?in?that?certain?unrecorded?Security?Pacific?Plaza?Office?Building?Lease?of?even?date?herewith.”
The?purchase?agreement?set?forth?the?terms?of?the?transaction.?One?condition?precedent?to?the?sale?was?the?execution?of?the?lease,?which?conveyed?an?estate?for?years?in?two?towers?constituting?73?percent?of?the?property.?Plaintiff?was?to?lease?one?tower?for?60?years,?including?10?consecutive?renewal?options?of?5?years?each.?The?term?of?plaintiff’s?occupancy?of?the?other?tower?was?21?months,?including?a?renewal?option.?The?lease?permitted?Metropolitan?Life?to?raise?the?rent?in?accordance?with?changes?in?the?consumer?price?index.?The?lease?also?gave?plaintiff?substantial?control?over?the?structure,?including?the?exclusive?use?of?the?building?exterior?to?display?its?corporate?logo,?exclusive?use?of?the?cafeteria?and?helipad,?and?control?over?security.?The?lease?required?plaintiff?to?pay?its?share?of?the?property?taxes.
For?federal?and?state?income?tax?purposes?plaintiff?treated?the?transaction?as?a?sale,?deducting?its?payments?under?the?lease?as?business?expenses.?For?the?same?purposes?Metropolitan?Life?treated?the?transaction?as?a?purchase,?claiming?a?tax?basis?in?the?property?equal?to?the?price?paid.?Metropolitan?Life?used?that?tax?basis?to?calculate?depreciation?deductions,?excluding?the?portion?of?the?purchase?price?attributable?to?the?land.?The?parties?did?not?[1?Cal.4th?160]?stipulate?whether?Metropolitan?Life?paid?the?market?price?for?the?property,?but?did?stipulate?that?plaintiff?pays?rent?at?the?market?rate?under?the?lease.?fn.?1
Following?the?sale,?the?Los?Angeles?County?Assessor?asked?the?State?Board?of?Equalization?(board)?for?advice?regarding?the?correct?method?of?reassessing?the?property.?The?board?advised?the?assessor?to?reassess?only?the?portion?of?the?property?not?subject?to?the?lease,?and?the?assessor?fixed?the?valuation?at?$169,514,243.?Seven?months?later?the?assessor?asked?the?board?to?review?the?transaction?anew.?Upon?reconsideration?the?board?reversed?itself,?concluding?that?the?sale?and?leaseback?had?resulted?in?a?change?in?ownership?of?the?whole?parcel?and?therefore?the?property?should?be?reassessed?in?its?entirety.?The?assessor?accordingly?raised?the?valuation?to?$323?million.?Plaintiff?paid?tax?bills?pursuant?to?the?increased?valuation?but?applied?for?a?reduction?of?the?assessment,?which?it?later?amended?into?a?claim?for?a?refund?under?Revenue?and?Taxation?Code?section?5097,?subdivision?(b).?fn.?2?The?board?denied?the?claim?without?prejudice?and?plaintiff?sought?relief?in?court.
The?first?amended?complaint?claimed?an?improper?and?illegal?assessment?on?the?1984-1985?and?1985-1986?tax?rolls?and?sought?a?refund?of?property?taxes?and?attorney?fees.?After?a?hearing?the?court?entered?judgment?for?plaintiff.?The?court?ruled?that?under?the?statutes?and?regulations?implementing?Proposition?13?plaintiff?was?entitled?to?a?refund.?The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed.
II.
The?essence?of?Proposition?13?is?its?provision?that?all?real?property?in?the?state?shall?be?taxed?at?an?ad?valorem?rate?not?to?exceed?1?percent?of?its?full?cash?value.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?XIII?A,???1,?subd.?(a).)?”The?full?cash?value?means?the?county?assessor’s?valuation?of?real?property?as?shown?on?the?1975-76?tax?bill?under?’full?cash?value’?or,?thereafter,?the?appraised?value?of?real?property?when?purchased?[or]?newly?constructed,?or?[when]?a?change?in?ownership?has?occurred?after?the?1975?assessment.”?(Id.,???2,?subd.?(a).)?The?only?possible?adjustment?relevant?here?is?for?inflation,?and?that?increase?may?not?exceed?2?percent?per?annum.?(Id.,???2,?subd.?(b).)
Because?Proposition?13?did?not?explicate?the?meaning?of?”change?in?ownership”?(Title?Ins.?&?Trust?Co.?v.?County?of?Riverside?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?[1?Cal.4th?161]?84,?95?[255?Cal.Rptr.?670,?767?P.2d?1148];?Industrial?Indemnity?Co.?v.?City?and?County?of?San?Francisco?(1990)?218?Cal.App.3d?999,?1004?[267?Cal.Rptr.?445]),?it?fell?to?the?Legislature?to?define?the?phrase,?a?task?it?has?striven?to?perform?during?the?13?years?since?Proposition?13?was?adopted?by?the?electorate.?The?main?effort?to?create?consistent?and?uniform?guidelines?to?implement?Proposition?13’s?undefined?”change?in?ownership”?provision?was?undertaken?by?a?35-member?panel?that?included?legislative?and?board?staff,?county?assessors?(including?defendant),?trade?associations,?and?lawyers?in?the?public?and?private?sectors.?The?panel’s?work?culminated?in?the?Report?of?the?Task?Force?on?Property?Tax?Administration?(hereafter?task?force?report),?which?was?submitted?to?the?Assembly?Committee?on?Revenue?and?Taxation?on?January?22,?1979.
As?plaintiff?notes,?the?task?force?recommendations?resulted?in?the?enactment?of?the?Revenue?and?Taxation?Code?provisions?now?before?us.?The?Legislature?adopted?some?of?the?recommendations?verbatim?or?with?non-?substantive?technical?revisions,?and?others?with?rather?minor?changes.?The?report’s?key?change-in-ownership?test?was?adopted?verbatim?and?is?now?codified?as?section?60,?quoted?hereafter.
The?task?force?report?drafters?stressed?the?need?for?uniformity?and?consistency?in?the?application?of?section?60’s?general?rule.?They?stated?that?they?”sought?to?distill?the?basic?characteristics?of?a?’change?in?ownership’?and?embody?them?in?a?single?test?[now?section?60]?which?could?be?applied?evenhandedly?to?distinguish?between?’changes’?and?’non-?changes,’?both?those?which?the?Task?Force?could?and?those?which?it?did?not?foresee.?The?Task?Force?was?also?anxious?that?the?single?test?be?sufficiently?consistent?with?the?normal?understanding?of?’change?in?ownership’?to?withstand?legal?attack.”?(Task?force?rep.,?supra,?at?p.?38.)
The?task?force?”recommends?that?its?general?definition?of?change?in?ownership?(proposed?Section?60?Rev?&?Tax?Code)?should?control?all?transfers,?both?foreseen?and?unforeseen.?The?Task?Force?also?recommends?the?use?of?statutory?’examples’?to?elaborate?on?common?transactions.?Lay?assessors?and?taxpayers?would?otherwise?have?difficulty?applying?legal?concepts?such?as?’beneficial?use’?and?’substantially?equivalent.’?Thus,?common?types?of?transfers?were?identified?and?concrete?rules?for?them?were?set?forth?in?proposed?Sections?61?and?62.”?(Task?force?rep.,?supra,?at?p.?40.)
“It?is?important?that?the?specific?statutory?examples?be?consistent?with?the?general?test,”?the?report?drafters?explained.?”The?entire?statutory?design?would?be?destroyed?by?providing?statutory?treatment?for?specific?transfers?[1?Cal.4th?162]?which?are?inconsistent?with?the?general?test.?In?that?case,?the?general?test?would?be?overruled?by?the?specific?rules?and?the?entire?statutory?design?might?be?held?invalid?because?of?the?lack?of?any?consistent,?rational?interpretation?of?the?constitutional?phrase,?’change?in?ownership.’?”?(Task?force?rep.,?supra,?at?pp.?40-41.)
Because?the?Legislature,?in?enacting?section?60,?adopted?its?language?verbatim?after?reviewing?the?task?force?report,?it?is?evident?that?the?Legislature?intended?for?section?60?to?contain?the?overarching?definition?of?a?”change?in?ownership”?for?reassessment?purposes.
- Application?of?the?Three-part?Test
- “Transfer?of?a?Present?Interest?in?Real?Property”
Plaintiff?maintains?that?the?transaction?failed?to?meet?the?portion?of?the?test?requiring?a?transfer?of?a?present?interest.?As?will?appear,?plaintiff’s?view?of?the?nature?of?the?conveyance?is?incorrect.
It?is?undisputed?that?plaintiff?transferred?the?entire?fee?to?Metropolitan?Life.?An?estate?in?fee?simple?is?a?freehold?estate.?(Civ.?Code,????762,?765.)?[2]?A?freehold?estate?is?distinguished?from?other?forms?of?estates?in?that?it?is?of?indeterminate?duration?(Millsap?v.?Quinn?(Mo.?1990)?785?S.W.2d?82,?84?[appointed?officeholder?qualification?case];?Board?of?Transp.?v.?Turner?(1978)?37?N.C.App.?14?[245?S.E.2d?223,?225]?[“the?true?test?of?a?freehold?is?its?indeterminate?tenure”]),?and?carries?with?it?title?to?land?(see?Cohn?v.?Litwin?(1941)?311?Ill.App.?55?[35?N.E.2d?410,?413]).?But?an?estate?for?years-in?this?case,?a?nonperiodic?tenancy?under?a?lease-is?not?a?freehold?estate.?(Civ.?Code,???765.)?Indeed,?under?California?law?an?estate?for?years?is?not?real?property?at?all?but?rather?a?chattel?real-a?form?of?personalty-even?though?the?substance?of?the?estate,?being?land,?is?real?property.?(Id.,????761,?765;?Dabney?v.?Edwards?(1935)?5?Cal.2d?1,?11?[53?P.2d?962,?103?A.L.R.?822];?see?also?Weaver?v.?Superior?Court?(1949)?93?Cal.App.2d?729,?734?[209?P.2d?830]?[“The?sale?of?a?lease?for?a?term?of?years?is?not?the?sale?of?real?[1?Cal.4th?163]?property.”];?Parker?v.?Superior?Court?(1970)?9?Cal.App.3d?397,?400?[88?Cal.Rptr.?352,?67?A.L.R.3d?743]?[although?a?leasehold?is?not?real?property,?it?is?nevertheless?an?estate?in?land].)
Notwithstanding?the?fact?that?a?lease?is?a?present?possessory?interest?in?land,?there?is?no?question?that?as?a?nonfreehold?estate?it?is?a?different?species?of?interest?from?a?freehold?estate?in?fee?simple.?Any?other?conclusion?would?be?contrary?to?centuries?of?English?and?American?common?law?and?its?codification,?as?modified,?in?our?Civil?Code.?A?leasehold?is?not?an?ownership?interest,?unlike?the?possession?of?land?in?fee?simple?even?when?encumbered?by?a?mortgage,?for?in?the?latter?situation?the?mortgagor?acquires?equity?over?time?through?periodic?payments.?It?is?for?that?reason?that?common?parlance?refers?to?the?”owner”?of?a?freehold?estate,?encumbered?or?unencumbered,?but?to?the?”holder”?of?a?lease;?the?freeholder?is?seised?of?land,?whereas?the?leaseholder?is?not.
Thus?plaintiff’s?contention?that?it?did?not?convey?a?present?interest?in?real?property?is?simply?incorrect?and?cannot?forestall?a?conclusion?that?a?transfer?of?a?present?interest?in?real?property?occurred.?Plaintiff?did?not?retain?the?same?interest?when?it?sold?its?fee?and?reserved?an?estate?for?years.?[3]?(See?fn.?3.),?[1b]?The?entire?fee?was?transferred?to?Metropolitan?Life;?the?simultaneous?creation?of?a?different?interest?in?plaintiff?will?not?defeat?the?first?prong?of?section?60.?fn.?3
- “Including?the?Beneficial?Use?Thereof”
The?second?prong?of?section?60?requires?that?to?constitute?a?change?in?ownership?there?must?be?a?transfer?not?only?of?bare?legal?title?but?also?of?the?transferor’s?beneficial?or?equitable?interest?in?the?land.?Plaintiff?contends?it?conveyed?no?beneficial?use?of?the?entire?parcel?because?it?continues?to?enjoy?the?exclusive?use?of?the?portion?under?its?control.?We?disagree.?[1?Cal.4th?164]
“The?owner?of?the?legal?title?to?property?is?presumed?to?be?the?owner?of?the?full?beneficial?title.?This?presumption?may?be?rebutted?only?by?clear?and?convincing?proof.”?(Evid.?Code,???662.)?Here,?plaintiff?has?presented?no?evidence?that?Metropolitan?Life?holds?title?to?the?property?for?plaintiff’s?benefit:?there?is?no?evidence?showing?a?custodial?or?trust?relationship,?or?that?plaintiff?sold?the?property?for?less?than?essentially?the?market?price.?Nor?is?plaintiff?paying?below-market?rent?under?the?lease;?rather,?the?record?reveals?the?contrary.?There?can?therefore?be?no?question?that?when?Metropolitan?Life?purchased?the?property?in?fee?simple?absolute?it?acquired?its?beneficial?use?during?the?lease?term.
Metropolitan?Life’s?decision?to?exercise?its?beneficial?interest?by?exacting?rent?from?plaintiff?rather?than?acquiring?physical?control?of?the?demised?premises?does?not?alter?the?character?of?the?transaction.?”The?fact?that?[Metropolitan?Life]?may?not?occupy?the?property?during?the?lease?period?does?not?deprive?it?of?its?right?to?enjoy?the?value?of?its?property?represented?by?the?rent.?[Citations.]?The?sale?and?leaseback?constituted?a?transfer?of?the?beneficial?use?of?the?property?within?the?meaning?of?section?60.”?(Industrial?Indemnity?Co.?v.?City?and?County?of?San?Francisco,?supra,?218?Cal.App.3d?999,?1005.)?Any?other?conclusion?would?ignore?the?commercial?realities?of?the?transaction:?as?counsel?for?amicus?curiae?City?and?County?of?San?Francisco?observed?at?oral?argument,?any?other?interpretation?would?mean,?in?the?case?of?a?large?commercial?building,?that?a?change?in?ownership?would?rarely?occur,?for?there?would?usually?be?tenants?remaining?in?the?building.?It?follows?that?the?second?prong?of?section?60’s?test?was?also?met?at?the?time?of?sale.
- “The?Value?of?Which?Is?Substantially?Equal?to?the?Value?of?the?Fee?Interest”
The?third?prong?of?section?60?requires?that?the?value?of?the?interest?transferred?be?”substantially?equal?to?the?value?of?the?fee?interest.”?The?facts?show?this?test?was?met.
Because?Metropolitan?Life?acquired?the?entire?fee,?not?only?did?the?value?of?the?interest?transferred?”substantially?equal?…?the?value?of?the?fee?interest,”?it?was?of?identical?value?because?it?was?a?transfer?of?the?fee?itself.?(See?Industrial?Indemnity?Co.?v.?City?and?County?of?San?Francisco,?supra,?218?Cal.App.3d?999,?1005.)?The?property?sold?essentially?for?the?market?price,?and?plaintiff?is?now?paying?rent?at?the?market?rate.?There?is?no?indication?that?the?property?would?resell?for?less?than?the?market?price.?Hence,?notwithstanding?the?reservation?of?an?encumbrance?in?the?form?of?an?estate?for?years,?the?value?of?the?transfer?equaled?that?of?a?conveyance?of?fee?simple.?[1?Cal.4th?165] [4]?In?enacting?the?third?prong?of?section?60?the?Legislature?meant?to?insulate?from?Proposition?13’s?effect?transfers?in?which?only?an?estate?of?lesser?value?was?conveyed.?Two?examples?illustrate?the?Legislature’s?intent?when?it?adopted?the?task?force?report’s?findings?and?enacted?the?statutory?scheme?before?us.
One?example?considers?the?conveyance?of?a?lease?for?one?year.?It?would?not?be?rational?to?apply?a?constitutional?provision?for?reassessment?following?a?”change?in?ownership”?when?the?owner?of?an?apartment?leases?it?to?another?for?one?year,?thereby?conveying?an?estate?of?lesser?value?than?that?retained.
By?contrast,?the?Legislature?decided,?following?the?task?force’s?recommendation,?that?the?creation?of?a?35-year?lease?would?achieve?a?change?in?ownership?(??61,?subd.?(c)(1))?because?the?length?of?the?lease?would?give?the?lessee’s?interest?some?of?the?practical?attributes?of?a?conveyance?of?fee?simple.?A?lease?of?such?duration?will?constitute?the?main?economic?value?of?the?land,?even?though?the?leaseholder?does?not?own?a?freehold?estate-lenders?are,?in?the?report?drafters’?view,?willing?to?lend?on?the?security?of?such?an?instrument.?(See?task?force?rep.,?supra,?at?pp.?39-41.)
Another?example?is?the?conveyance?of?fee?simple?from?parent?to?child?subject?to?the?reservation?of?a?life?estate.?The?Legislature?desired?to?avoid?creating?a?rule?that?would?characterize?such?a?conveyance?as?a?change?in?ownership.?Because?this?is?a?relatively?common?form?of?conveyance,?the?Legislature,?again?following?the?task?force’s?recommendation,?included?it?in?its?list?of?examples?of?exempt?transfers.?(??62,?subd.?(e).)?But?even?if?the?Legislature?had?not?done?so,?reassessment?would?be?barred?under?the?carefully?drafted?basic?test?of?section?60,?not?only?because?the?beneficial?use?would?not?have?transferred,?but?also?because?the?value?of?each?divided?interest?in?the?estate?would?not?approach?that?of?a?fee.?A?purchaser?of?the?reserved?estate?would?be?buying?a?life?estate?per?autre?vie-a?freehold?estate,?to?be?sure,?but?an?estate?of?questionable?value?because?subject?to?complete?defeasance?at?an?unknown?time.?Rare?is?the?mortgagee?willing?to?lend?on?the?security?of?an?estate?so?ephemeral.?The?value?of?the?reversionary?or?remainder?interest?would?also?be?reduced?because?the?time?of?vesting?would?be?uncertain?and,?depending?on?the?care?with?which?the?original?conveyance?was?drafted,?the?value?of?the?ultimate?estate?might?be?less?at?the?[1?Cal.4th?166]?time?of?vesting?because?of?intervening?conveyances,?creditors’?demands,?and?the?like.?fn.?4
By?contrast,?when?the?life?estate?ends?and?the?remainder?or?reversion?indefeasibly?vests?in?the?grantees?the?value?of?the?estate?is?known?and?is?identical?to?the?value?of?the?fee.?It?is?at?that?point?that?a?change?in?ownership?has?occurred,?as?the?Legislature?specifically?provided?in?accord?with?the?task?force’s?recommendation.?(??61,?subd.?(f).)
[1c]?As?stated?above,?we?find?nothing?in?the?nature?of?the?transaction?before?us?to?suggest?that?Metropolitan?Life?is?unable?to?sell?its?fee?interest?in?the?property?to?a?purchaser?for?anything?less?than?its?full?market?value.?There?are?no?contingent?interests?that?make?the?value?of?Metropolitan?Life’s?interest?uncertain?or?questionable.?Nor?is?it?likely?that?Metropolitan?Life?would?have?paid?substantially?the?market?price?for?the?land?if?any?such?contingency?had?presented?itself?at?the?time?of?the?conveyance.?We?find,?therefore,?that?all?prongs?of?section?60’s?test?have?been?met,?and?that?the?transaction?worked?a?”change?in?ownership”?under?Proposition?13.- Alleged?Exemption?Under?Section?62
It?remains?to?be?seen?whether?the?present?transaction?falls?within?any?item?on?the?list?of?tax-exempt?transfers?enumerated?in?section?62.?[5]?As?we?approach?this?task?we?pay?heed?to?two?precepts?that?govern?interpretation?of?the?statutes?at?issue:?the?drafters?intended?section?62?to?provide?”examples”?of?common?applications?of?section?60?rather?than?exceptions?to?it?(task?force?rep.,?supra,?at?p.?40),?and?therefore?our?reading?of?section?62?must?be?consistent?with?section?60?(Industrial?Indemnity?Co.?v.?City?and?County?of?San?Francisco,?supra,?218?Cal.App.3d?999,?1006).?In?light?of?those?precepts,?we?conclude?that?no?subpart?of?section?62?exempts?the?conveyance?before?us.
- Transfer?of?Lessor’s?Interest?in?Property?Subject?to?35-year?Lease
Two?rules?of?statutory?construction?guide?our?inquiry.?We?look?to?the?plain?language?of?the?statute.?(People?v.?Woodhead?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?1002,?1007?[239?Cal.Rptr.?656,?741?P.2d?154].)?And?because?sections?60,?61?and?62?are?in?pari?materia,?we?strive?to?interpret?them?in?a?manner?that?gives?effect?to?each?yet?does?not?lead?to?disharmony?with?the?other?two.?(See?Title?Ins.?&?Trust?Co.?v.?County?of?Riverside,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?84,?91;?California?Mfrs.?Assn.?v.?Public?Utilities?Com.?(1979)?24?Cal.3d?836,?844?[157?Cal.Rptr.?676,?598?P.2d?836].)?The?rules?of?statutory?construction?are?not?akin?to?Robert’s?Rules?of?Order?and?we?do?not?apply?them?hierarchically,?but?rather?to?achieve?the?primary?and?overriding?goal?of?all?statutory?interpretation:?ascertaining?the?lawmakers’?intent.?(See?People?v.?Woodhead,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?1007.)?Applying?these?principles,?we?conclude?that?the?Legislature?did?not?intend?that?its?rule?against?finding?a?change?in?ownership?upon?the?transfer?of?a?lessor’s?interest?encumbered?by?a?35-year?lease?should?apply?to?a?sale?and?leaseback.
We?have?already?observed?that?the?task?force?decided?that?the?creation,?transfer?or?termination?of?a?leasehold?of?35?years?or?more?should?achieve?a?change?in?ownership?because?in?that?case?the?primary?economic?value?of?the?land?resides?in?the?lease.?(See?ante,?p.?165;?task?force?rep.,?supra,?at?pp.?39-41.)?The?Legislature?followed?that?recommendation.?(??61,?subd.?(c).)?By?contrast,?the?Legislature?decided?that?when?the?remaining?term?of?an?existing?lease?equaled?or?exceeded?35?years,?any?transfer?of?a?lessor’s?interest?would?be?excluded?from?a?change?in?ownership.?(??62,?subd.?(g).)
In?the?transaction?before?us?there?was?no?existing?lease?and?hence?no?remaining?term.?Because?section?62,?subdivision?(g),?by?its?plain?language?does?not?apply?to?the?present?transaction,?our?inquiry?could?end?here.?(People?v.?Woodhead,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?1007.)?But?we?believe?the?better?method?for?extracting?the?legislative?intent?is?to?look?to?the?language?and?purpose?of?sections?60,?61,?and?62?as?a?whole.?(See?California?Mfrs.?Assn.?v.?Public?Utilities?Com.,?supra,?24?Cal.3d?at?p.?844.)
The?Legislature’s?intent?is?apparent?when?viewed?through?the?filter?of?those?sections?and?the?task?force?report.?Both?the?report?and?the?statutes?demonstrate?that?the?drafters?and?the?Legislature?intended?to?find?a?change?in?ownership?when?the?primary?economic?value?of?the?land?is?transferred?from?one?person?or?entity?to?another.?That?general?rule?applies?here.?When?parties?enter?into?a?lease?they?create?the?legal?relationship?that?governs?their?[1?Cal.4th?168]?respective?rights?in?the?land,?and?either’s?successor?in?interest?will?be?bound?thereby.?When?the?parties?are?sophisticated?commercial?entities?of?the?type?likely?to?sign?leases?for?35?or?more?years,?such?leases?will?often?confer?substantial?rights?on?the?lessee,?such?as?the?right?to?develop?or?modify?capital?assets,?the?long-term?use?or?uses?to?which?the?land?is?to?be?put,?and?the?like.?fn.?5?A?long-?term?lease?may?also?require?the?lessee?to?pay?property?taxes;?indeed,?the?lease?here?imposes?that?duty?on?plaintiff.?In?sum,?the?primary?economic?value?of?land?encumbered?by?a?lease?of?such?duration?rests?with?the?lessee;?the?lessor’s?rights?as?a?practical?matter?are?limited?to?receiving?rental?payments?under?a?relationship?the?terms?of?which?are?fixed?by?prior?agreement?for?a?time?substantially?equivalent?to?the?duration?of?a?fee.
The?Legislature’s?determination?that?a?change?in?the?lessor?under?these?circumstances?will?not?work?a?change?in?ownership?is?consonant?with?the?concern?of?the?task?force?report?drafters?that?a?transaction?should?not?trigger?reassessment?unless?it?transfers?the?interest?of?the?party?carrying?the?primary?economic?weight?of?the?property.?(Task?force?rep.,?supra,?at?p.?40.)?Such?a?determination?also?comports?with?commercial?reality?and?public?expectations,?both?subjects?of?concern?to?the?drafters?of?the?report.?(See?id.?at?pp.?38,?41,?61.)?The?mischief?a?contrary?rule?could?create?is?evident:?for?example,?a?rule?permitting?reassessment?whenever?the?fee?changed?hands?in?land?subject?to?a?lease?with?a?remaining?term?of?35?years?could?result?in?an?enormous?tax?increase?for?a?lessee?that?has?erected?major?capital?improvements?on?the?land?and?whose?lease?requires?the?lessee?to?pay?property?taxes.?The?increase?could?occur?merely?because?the?lessor?has?sold?that?interest?to?a?third?party-a?transfer?over?which?the?lessee?has?no?control.
The?foregoing?counterexample?is?well?removed?from?the?reality?of?the?present?transaction.?Both?parties?did?change?their?position.?No?prior?agreement?bound?plaintiff?to?the?terms?of?a?lease?of?long?duration.?Plaintiff?and?Metropolitan?Life?established?their?relationship?at?the?time?of?the?conveyance,?creating?new?interests?both?in?plaintiff?and?in?Metropolitan?Life.?Plaintiff’s?status?changed?from?freeholder?to?tenant?for?years.?To?apply?the?rule?of?subdivision?(g)?of?section?62?to?such?a?transaction?would?be?anomalous?indeed:?it?would?contravene?the?plain?language?of?the?code?section?and?would?defy?Proposition?13’s?mandate?that?a?change?in?ownership?triggers?reassessment?of?California?property.?We?hold,?therefore,?that?the?Legislature?did?not?intend?the?exception?created?in?subdivision?(g)?of?section?62?to?apply?to?this?transaction.?[1?Cal.4th?169]
- Reservation?of?an?Estate?for?Years
We?cannot?agree.?Although?plaintiff’s?interpretation?arguably?comports?with?the?language?of?the?code?provision,?it?disregards?other?pertinent?sections?of?chapter?2?of?part?0.5?of?division?1?of?the?Revenue?and?Taxation?Code.
As?we?have?already?observed,?code?sections?in?pari?materia?must?be?harmonized?with?each?other?to?the?extent?possible;?a?section?should?be?construed?in?light?of?the?whole?system?of?law?of?which?it?is?a?part.?(People?v.?Comingore?(1977)?20?Cal.3d?142,?147?[141?Cal.Rptr.?542,?570?P.2d?723];?see?Moore?v.?Panish?(1982)?32?Cal.3d?535,?541?[186?Cal.Rptr.?475,?652?P.2d?32].)
Considered?in?isolation,?we?might?agree?with?plaintiff?that?the?language?of?subdivision?(e)?of?section?62?appears?to?confer?an?exemption?from?reassessment,?for?it?provides?that?”Any?transfer?by?an?instrument?whose?terms?reserve?to?the?transferor?an?estate?for?years”?shall?not?work?a?change?in?ownership.?(Italics?added;?see?Title?Ins.?&?Trust?Co.?v.?County?of?Riverside,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?84,?93-?94?[“Statutes?often?use?the?word?’any’?to?designate?all?those?referred?to?…?.”].)
But?we?have?already?explained?that?the?transaction?did?achieve?a?change?in?ownership?within?the?meaning?of?section?60,?which?was?intended?as?the?fundamental?rule?implementing?Proposition?13.?As?we?have?also?observed,?the?report?drafters?declared?their?intention?that?the?examples?set?forth?in?sections?61?and?62?were?to?be?derivative?or?explanatory,?and?not?to?conflict?with?section?60’s?general?rule.?(Task?force?rep.,?supra,?at?p.?40.)?We?therefore?conclude?that?the?Legislature?did?not?intend?for?a?sale?and?leaseback?to?fall?within?the?ambit?of?section?62,?subdivision?(e).?Any?other?conclusion?would?render?meaningless?the?preeminent?command?of?section?60-a?result?we?are?constrained?to?avoid.?Moreover,?we?find?support?for?our?conclusion?in?the?task?force?report.?[1?Cal.4th?170]
The?report?originally?proposed?the?following?language?for?subdivision?(e)?of?section?62:?”(e)?Retained?Life?Estates.?Any?transfer?in?which?the?transferor?retains?beneficial?use?of?the?property?for?his?lifetime.”?(Task?force?rep.,?supra,?at?p.?51.)?As?codified,?however,?the?subdivision?exempts?”Any?transfer?by?an?instrument?whose?terms?reserve?to?the?transferor?an?estate?for?years?or?an?estate?for?life?….”?We?believe?the?evolution?of?the?provision?explains?the?Legislature’s?intent?as?clearly?as?possible?given?the?sparse?legislative?history.
The?drafters?were?concerned?that?individuals?who?proposed?to?convey?title?to?property?to?others?but?retain?the?beneficial?use?of?that?property?not?have?a?change?in?ownership?forced?upon?them?while?they?retained?the?beneficial?use?and?thereby?the?”dominant?or?primary?[economic]?interest?….”?(Task?force?rep.,?supra,?at?p.?44.)?A?contrary?rule?would?frustrate?the?intent?of?the?voters,?who?adopted?Proposition?13?in?part?out?of?concern?that?high?property?tax?rates?were?burdening?senior?citizens?and?others?whose?home?values?had?soared?but?whose?incomes?were?fixed.?(See?Sears,?Tax?Revolt:?Something?for?Nothing?in?California?(1982)?p.?122.)
Of?course,?a?conveyance?of?fee?simple?with?a?reserved?life?estate?is?a?common?means?for?parents?to?convey?property?to?children.?But?the?Legislature?was?apparently?also?mindful?of?the?desire?of?some?parents?to?convey?a?remainder?or?reversionary?interest?to?their?children?to?vest?at?adulthood,?at?an?age?of?greater?maturity?(e.g.,?35?years),?or,?as?suggested?at?oral?argument,?upon?the?planned?retirement?of?the?fee?owner.?The?reservation?of?a?life?estate?would?not?serve?the?transferor’s?goals?if?the?intent?was?to?convey?property?in?this?manner,?but?the?reservation?of?an?estate?for?years?in?the?transferor?would?accomplish?that?end.?It?is?therefore?not?surprising?that?the?Legislature?added?the?phrase?”estate?for?years”?to?subdivision?(e)?of?section?62;?and?it?is?equally?unsurprising?that?the?”beneficial?use”?language?in?the?task?force’s?proposed?subdivision?disappeared?from?the?codified?version,?because?section?60?includes?that?language,?making?its?repetition?superfluous.?Construing?subdivision?(e)?of?section?62?to?provide?an?exemption?from?the?general?rule?of?section?60?when?the?transferor?retains?the?beneficial?use?of?the?property?during?the?transferor’s?life?or?for?years?harmonizes?those?two?sections?and?meets?the?voters’?and?the?Legislature’s?apparent?intent.?We?therefore?adopt?that?construction.
It?is?immediately?evident?that?the?transaction?before?us?does?not?fall?within?the?exemption?set?forth?in?subdivision?(e)?of?section?62?as?we?have?construed?it.?Plaintiff?did?not?retain?a?beneficial?use?of?the?property?for?itself;?it?pays?rent?to?Metropolitan?Life,?which?enjoys?the?entire?beneficial?interest?in?the?[1?Cal.4th?171]?property.?Therefore,?we?cannot?apply?the?rule?of?subdivision?(e)?of?section?62?to?provide?the?relief?plaintiff?seeks.
- Effect?of?Pertinent?Regulation
For?the?foregoing?reasons?we?also?cannot?accept?plaintiff’s?view?of?the?effect?of?section?462,?subdivision?(k)(4)?of?title?18?of?the?California?Code?of?Regulations.?That?administrative?rule?provides:?”Sale?and?leaseback.?A?sale?of?real?property,?coupled?with?a?leaseback?which?is?not?reserved?to?the?transferor?by?the?terms?of?the?sale?instrument,?constitutes?a?change?in?ownership?of?such?property;?provided?however,?a?sale?and?leaseback?transaction?shall?be?rebuttably?presumed?to?be?a?non-reappraisable?financing?transaction?upon?a?proper?written?showing?[that?the?transaction?is?a?financing?for?income-tax?purposes].”?As?plaintiff?was?constrained?to?concede?at?oral?argument,?an?administrative?rule?that?exceeds?the?Legislature’s?grant?of?authority?as?expressed?in?section?60?et?seq.?is?without?effect?and?may?not?be?enforced.?(See?Ralphs?Grocery?Co.?v.?Reimel?(1968)?69?Cal.2d?172,?176,?fn.?3?[70?Cal.Rptr.?407,?444?P.2d?79];?University?Ford?Chrysler-Plymouth,?Inc.?v.?New?Motor?Vehicle?Bd.?(1986)?179?Cal.App.3d?796,?805?[224?Cal.Rptr.?908].)?Therefore,?to?the?extent?the?regulation?conflicts?with?the?Constitution?and?the?Revenue?and?Taxation?Code?as?construed?in?this?opinion,?well-settled?principles?of?administrative?law?proscribe?its?enforcement.?fn.?6
The?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?reversed?with?directions?to?order?the?trial?court?to?enter?judgment?for?defendants.?[1?Cal.4th?172]?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?J.,?Kennard,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?Baxter,?J.,?and?Lillie,?J.,?fn.?*?concurred.
FN?1.?Because?the?sale?price?approximates?the?assessed?value?and?the?rent?is?at?the?market?rate,?we?will?assume?that?the?purchaser?paid?the?market?price?for?the?property.?The?State?Board?of?Equalization?reached?a?similar?conclusion.
FN?2.?Unlabeled?references?are?to?this?code.
FN?3.?We?note?that?the?definitions?of?property?embodied?in?the?Revenue?and?Taxation?Code?prevail?for?tax?purposes?even?if?they?are?inconsistent?with?the?common?law?definitions?codified?in?the?Civil?Code.?(Atlantic?Oil?Co.?v.?County?of?Los?Angeles?(1968)?69?Cal.2d?585,?594?[72?Cal.Rptr.?886,?446?P.2d?1006].)?Thus?a?leasehold?interest,?which?would?be?a?chattel?real?under?the?Civil?Code,?is?treated?as?real?property?for?tax?purposes.?(??104;?American?Airlines,?Inc.?v.?County?of?Los?Angeles?(1976)?65?Cal.App.3d?325,?329?[135?Cal.Rptr.?261].)?But?the?Revenue?and?Taxation?Code?does?not?differentiate?among?estates?in?land.?It?should?not?”?’be?presumed?that?the?Legislature?in?the?enactment?of?statutes?intends?to?overthrow?long-?established?principles?of?law?unless?such?intention?is?made?clearly?to?appear?either?by?express?declaration?or?by?necessary?implication.’?”?(Theodor?v.?Superior?Court?(1972)?8?Cal.3d?77,?92?[104?Cal.Rptr.?226,?501?P.2d?234].)?Nothing?in?section?104?establishes?that?the?Legislature?intended?to?overthrow?principles?of?property?law?dating?to?the?reign?of?Edward?I?(1272-1307).?Our?Civil?Code?therefore?governs?this?issue.
FN?4.?The?wording?of?a?grant?of?a?future?interest?can?present?pitfalls?for?the?unwary.?For?an?example,?see?Recent?Legislation,?Future?Interests:?Statutory?Abolition?of?the?Doctrine?of?Worthier?Title?(1959)?47?Cal.L.Rev.?740,?741?(discussing?Civ.?Code,???1073).
FN?5.?”Property?types?that?are?typically?leased?on?a?long-term?basis?include?banks,?supermarkets,?restaurants,?major?drug?stores,?department?stores,?and?discount?stores.”?(Assessment?Practices?Survey:?A?Report?on?the?Assessment?of?Property?that?Has?Had?a?Change?in?Ownership?or?Control”?(1984)?Assessment?Standards?Div.,?Property?Taxes?Dept.,?Cal.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization,?p.?10.)
FN?6.?Plaintiff?observes?that?the?Legislature?passed?a?bill?that?would?have?provided?explicitly?that?the?exemption?in?subdivision?(e)?of?section?62?does?not?apply?”to?the?transfer?of?a?present?interest?…?coupled?with?or?conditioned?upon?a?lease?of?the?property?from?the?transferee?to?the?transferor.”?(Assem.?Bill?No.?2528?(1985-1986?Reg.?Sess.)???1.)?The?Governor?vetoed?the?bill?because?it?might?”require?a?reassessment?of?property?when?there?has?not?been?a?transfer?of?a?present?beneficial?use?of?a?property?to?the?transferee?equivalent?to?a?fee?estate.”?(Governor’s?Veto?Message?to?Assem.?on?Assem.?Bill?No.?2528?(Sept.?26,?1986)?6?Assem.?J.?(1985-1986?Reg.?Sess.)?p.?10140.)?But?we?have?explained?that?the?transaction?at?bar?did?transfer?beneficial?use?to?Metropolitan?Life.?Moreover,?the?passage?of?this?bill?sheds?little?light?on?the?Legislature’s?original?intent?in?enacting?subdivision?(e)?of?section?62,?particularly?when,?as?here,?the?Legislature?specified?in?the?bill?that?the?amendment?did?not?purport?to?reflect?on?the?effect?of?the?original?legislation.?The?legislation?stated,?”it?is?not?the?intent?of?the?Legislature?in?enacting?this?act?to?express?its?opinion?regarding?the?past?state?of?the?law?on?the?subject?of?their?[sic]?transfers?or?to?prejudice?the?merits?of?any?litigation?involving?the?proper?interpretation?of?Section?62?of?the?Revenue?and?Taxation?Code?for?any?period?prior?to?the?effective?date?of?this?act.”?(Assem.?Bill?No.?2528?(1985-1986?Reg.?Sess.)???2.)
FN?*.?Presiding?Justice,?Court?of?Appeal,?Second?Appellate?District,?Division?Seven,?assigned?by?the?Chairperson?of?the?Judicial?Council.