People?v.?Cookson?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?1091?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?176;?820?P.2d?278
[No.?S015205.?Dec?12,?1991.]THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?RANDALL?LEE?COOKSON,?Defendant?and?Appellant.
(Superior?Court?of?Monterey?County,?No.?MCR5876,?William?M.?Wunderlich,?Judge.)
(Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?with?Panelli,?Arabian,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?with?Kennard,?J.,?concurring.)
COUNSEL
Julia?Kai?Barreto?and?Mark?D.?Greenberg?for?Defendant?and?Appellant.
Wilbur?F.?Littlefield,?Public?Defender?(Los?Angeles),?Laurence?M.?Sarnoff?and?John?Hamilton?Scott,?Deputy?Public?Defenders,?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendant?and?Appellant.
John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Stan?Helfman,?John?T.?Murphy?and?Sharon?Birenbaum,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent.
OPINION
LUCAS,?C.?J.
Defendant?Randall?Lee?Cookson?pleaded?nolo?contendere?to?violating?Penal?Code?section?484b?(all?further?statutory?references,?unless?otherwise?noted,?are?to?this?code)?and?was?placed?on?three?years’?probation?on?condition,?inter?alia,?that?he?pay?restitution?as?determined?by?the?probation?department.?Thereafter,?the?department?ordered?that?defendant?pay?$12,000,?and?devised?a?monthly?payment?schedule.?Defendant?made?all?monthly?payments?as?required?by?the?department,?but?at?the?end?of?three?years?he?had?paid?only?a?part?of?the?total?amount?originally?ordered.?On?motion?by?the?department,?the?trial?court?ordered?defendant’s?probation?extended?for?two?years?to?assure?further?restitution?would?be?made.?Defendant?challenged?the?imposition?of?an?additional?probationary?period,?contending?the?extension?was?improper?absent?proof?he?had?the?ability?to?pay?and?willfully?failed?to?pay.?The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed.?For?the?reasons?given?below,?we?affirm?its?decision.
- Facts
In?1985,?Dr.?Robert?Slaughter?paid?defendant?approximately?$18,000?to?build?an?addition?to?Slaughter’s?home.?The?addition?was?never?made.?Defendant?later?entered?a?plea?of?nolo?contendere?to?one?count?of?diverting?[54?Cal.3d?1094]?construction?funds?in?excess?of?$1,000?(??484b).?A?presentence?probation?report?valued?the?loss?to?Dr.?Slaughter?at?$12,000.?The?court?sentenced?defendant?to?three?years’?probation?on?condition,?inter?alia,?that?he?serve?a?ninety-day?jail?sentence,?pay?a?$120?restitution?fine?to?the?probation?department,?and?make?restitution?as?determined?by?the?probation?officer.?In?fashioning?its?decree,?the?court?contemplated?that?the?amount?of?restitution?would?equal?the?actual?loss?suffered?by?Dr.?Slaughter.fn.?1
One?week?after?defendant?was?sentenced,?the?probation?department?set?the?ultimate?amount?of?restitution?at?$12,000.?Although?the?record?is?not?entirely?clear,?the?department?at?the?same?time?apparently?fixed?defendant’s?monthly?payments?at?$100.?The?payment?amount?was?increased?in?September?1988?to?$135?per?month.?Defendant?made?each?monthly?payment?as?required?by?the?department,?but?pursuant?to?that?schedule?three?years?of?payments?amounted?to?only?$4,085.
On?the?day?before?defendant’s?probation?was?to?expire,?the?department?filed?a?petition?to?extend?his?probation?for?two?yearsfn.?2?to?allow?continued?supervised?payments?to?Dr.?Slaughter.fn.?3The?trial?court?agreed?to?modify?the?terms?of?probation?and?stated:?”It?is?my?finding?that?…?[the?sentencing?court]?made?two?orders:?that?[defendant]?pay?restitution?in?an?amount?to?be?determined?by?the?probation?officer,?with?the?manner?of?payment?to?be?determined?by?the?probation?officer.?[?]?It?is?the?conclusion?of?this?court?that?[defendant]?has?not?paid?restitution?in?the?amount?determined?by?the?probation?officer,?and?in?fact?owes?[$7,912],?and?therefore?is?in?violation?of?probation.?…?[?]?I’m?just?going?to?advise?you?…?that?were?you?to?divide?the?amount?of?restitution?owed?into?23?equal?parts,?it?would?be?$344?a?month.?I?expect?restitution?to?be?paid?in?the?full?amount.”?[54?Cal.3d?1095]
Defendant?appealed,?claiming?probation?was?improperly?extended?without?proof?he?willfully?failed?to?pay?restitution?as?ordered.?The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed.?It?first?concluded?that?the?trial?court?had?jurisdiction?to?modify?the?probation?because?defendant’s?inability?to?pay?amounted?to?a?change?of?circumstances.?Rejecting?contrary?language?in?People?v.?Ryan?(1988)?203?Cal.App.3d?189?[249?Cal.Rptr.?750],?the?court?then?interpreted?section?1203.2?as?enabling?courts?to?modify?a?term?of?probation?for?nonwillful?failure?to?pay?restitution,?even?though?such?a?failure?would?not?support?a?revocation.
- Discussion
A?change?in?circumstances?is?required?before?a?court?has?jurisdiction?to?extend?or?otherwise?modify?probation.?As?we?held?in?In?re?Clark?(1959)?51?Cal.2d?838?[337?P.2d?67],?”An?order?modifying?the?terms?of?probation?based?upon?the?same?facts?as?the?original?order?granting?probation?is?in?excess?of?the?jurisdiction?of?the?court,?for?the?reason?that?there?is?no?factual?basis?to?support?it.”?(Id.?at?p.?840,?italics?added.)?In?this?case,?the?Court?of?Appeal?correctly?determined?that?a?change?in?circumstance?could?be?found?in?a?fact?”not?available?at?the?time?of?the?original?order,”?namely,?”that?setting?the?pay?schedule?consistent?with?defendant’s?ability?to?pay?had?resulted?in?defendant’s?inability?to?pay?full?restitution?as?contemplated?within?the?original?period?of?probation.”
Defendant?initially?argues?that?”modification?of?probation?as?authorized?in?[section?1203.2(b)]?is?perfectly?congruent?with?the?power?of?revocation?set?[54?Cal.3d?1096]?forth?in?[section?1203.2(a)].”?Thus,?he?suggests?that?because?section?1203.2(a)?prohibits?revoking?probation?for?nonwillful?failure?to?pay?restitution,?modification?under?section?1203.2(b)?for?such?failure?to?pay?restitution?is?also?prohibited.?He?also?contends?that?the?trial?court?may?modify?probation?only?if?there?is?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation.?For?the?reasons?discussed?below,?we?reject?both?assertions.?A.?Court’s?Power?to?Modify?Probation?for?Nonwillful?Failure?to?Pay?Restitution
[2]?Defendant?relies?on?People?v.?Ryan,?supra,?203?Cal.App.3d?189,?to?support?his?argument?that?the?statutory?limitation?on?the?court’s?power?to?revoke?probation?for?failure?to?pay?restitution?likewise?limits?the?court’s?power?to?modify?probation.?In?Ryan?the?court?said,?”The?period?of?probation?may?not?be?extended?for?failure?to?make?full?restitution?to?the?victim?unless?said?failure?is?willful?and?the?defendant?has?the?ability?to?pay.”?(Id.?at?p.?199.)In?light?of?the?legislative?history?of?the?provision?in?section?1203.2(a),?which?bars?revocation?for?nonwillful?failure?to?pay?restitution,?we?reject?the?Ryan?court’s?conclusion.?On?June?30,?1983,?this?provision?was?added?to?the?Senate?version?of?the?bill?that?eventually?became?section?1203.2.?(3?Sen.?J.?(1983-1984?Reg.?Sess.)?p.?4288.)?One?month?earlier,?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?decided?Bearden?v.?Georgia?(1982)?461?U.S.?660?[76?L.Ed.2d?221,?103?S.Ct.?2064]?(hereafter?Bearden).?In?Bearden,?the?high?court?held?that?in?probation?revocation?proceedings?based?on?failure?to?pay?a?fine?or?restitution,?a?sentencing?court?must?”inquire?into?the?reasons?for?the?failure?to?pay.”?(Id.?at?p.?672?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?233].)?”If?the?probationer?has?willfully?refused?to?pay?the?fine?or?restitution?when?he?has?the?means?to?pay,?the?State?is?perfectly?justified?in?using?imprisonment?as?a?sanction?to?enforce?collection.”?(Id.?at?p.?668?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?230],?italics?added.)?This?language?closely?resembles?that?employed?by?the?Legislature?for?the?first?time?in?section?1203.2(a)?when?it?stated?that?probation?could?not?be?revoked?unless?”the?court?determines?that?the?defendant?has?willfully?failed?to?pay?and?has?the?ability?to?pay.”?(Italics?added.)?Because?of?the?temporal?and?linguistic?nexus?linking?the?decision?in?Bearden?with?the?Senate?amendment,?it?appears?the?Legislature?sought?to?codify?the?Bearden?holding.
The?Bearden?court?also?stated,?”If?the?probationer?could?not?pay?despite?sufficient?bona?fide?efforts?…?the?court?must?consider?…?measures?of?punishment”?other?than?imprisonment.?(Bearden,?supra,?461?U.S.?at?p.?672?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?252].)?Only?if?such?alternative?measures?are?inadequate?to?meet?a?state’s?interests?in?punishment?may?the?court?imprison?a?probationer?who?has?made?bona?fide?efforts?to?pay.?The?court?reasoned?that?”To?do?[54?Cal.3d?1097]?otherwise?would?deprive?the?probationer?of?his?conditional?freedom?simply?because,?through?no?fault?of?his?own,?he?cannot?pay?the?fine.?Such?a?deprivation?would?be?contrary?to?the?fundamental?fairness?required?by?the?Fourteenth?Amendment.”?(Id.?at?pp.?672-673?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?233];?see?also?In?re?Antazo?(1970)?3?Cal.3d?100,?116?[89?Cal.Rptr.?255,?473?P.2d?999]?[absent?compelling?state?interest,?imprisoning?indigent?defendant?for?failing?to?pay?fine?violates?equal?protection?clause?of?Fourteenth?Amendment].)
As?the?Supreme?Court?noted?in?Bearden,?a?state?”?’is?not?powerless?to?enforce?judgments?against?those?financially?unable?to?pay?a?fine.’?For?example,?the?sentencing?court?could?extend?the?time?for?making?payments,?or?reduce?the?fine,?or?direct?that?the?probationer?perform?some?form?of?labor?or?public?service?in?lieu?of?the?fine.”?(Bearden,?supra,?461?U.S.?at?p.?672?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?232],?quoting?Tate?v.?Short?(1971)?401?U.S.?395,?399?[28?L.Ed.2d?130,?134,?91?S.Ct.?668],?italics?added.)?The?court?thus?contemplated?that?an?indigent’s?probation?might?be?extended?if?he?failed?to?pay?as?required?because?he?was?financially?unable?to?do?so.?(United?States?v.?Ortiz?(10th?Cir.?1984)?733?F.2d?1416,?1418.)?The?Legislature,?in?codifying?Bearden,?indicated?no?disagreement?with?this?aspect?of?the?decision.?We?think?it?reasonable?to?conclude?that?the?Legislature?intended?trial?courts?to?have?the?option?to?do?as?Bearden?suggested?and,?in?appropriate?cases,?extend?or?otherwise?modify?probation.
Additionally,?common?sense?and?the?policies?behind?our?system?of?probation?buttress?this?conclusion.?Conditions?are?imposed?on?probation?”to?the?end?that?justice?may?be?done,?that?amends?may?be?made?to?society?for?the?breach?of?the?law,?for?any?injury?done?to?any?person?resulting?from?that?breach,?and?generally?and?specifically?for?the?reformation?and?rehabilitation?of?the?probationer?….”?(??1203.1.)?Restitution?”may?serve?the?salutary?purpose?of?making?a?criminal?understand?that?he?has?harmed?not?merely?society?in?the?abstract?but?also?individual?human?beings,?and?that?he?has?a?responsibility?to?make?them?whole.”?(People?v.?Richards?(1976)17?Cal.3d?614,?620?[131?Cal.Rptr.?537,?552?P.2d?97].)?Thus,?aside?from?making?the?victim?whole,?restitution?serves?valid?punitive,?deterrent,?and?rehabilitative?objectives?by?requiring?the?defendant?to?return?his?ill-gotten?gains?and?helping?him?appreciate?the?harm?done?to?the?victim.?(See?Cohen?&?Gobert,?The?Law?of?Probation?and?Parole?(1983)???6.33,?p.?280.)?Allowing?modification?of?probation?to?facilitate?the?recovery?of?restitution?as?originally?contemplated?by?the?court?enables?the?court?to?fashion?a?remedy?that?best?serves?the?goals?of?probation.
Accordingly,?section?1203.2(a)?does?not?prohibit?a?court?from?extending?a?term?of?probation?when?the?probationer?fails?to?pay?restitution?as?ordered?because?of?an?inability?to?pay.?[54?Cal.3d?1098]?B.?Court’s?Power?to?Modify?Probation?Without?a?Prior?Violation?Thereof
[3]?Defendant?argues?that?section?1203.1?provides?for?modification?of?probation?only?if?there?has?been?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation,?that?he?did?not?violate?probation,?and?that?his?probation,?therefore,?could?not?be?modified.?Defendant?relies?on?In?re?Stallings?(1970)?5?Cal.App.3d?322?[85?Cal.Rptr.?96],?which?concluded?the?trial?court?in?that?case?”lacked?the?authority?to?extend?the?period?of?probation?without?a?finding?that?the?petitioner?had?violated?a?condition?of?probation.”?(Id.?at?p.?333.)?Defendant?rejects?the?notion?that?other?bases?for?modifying?probation?exist?and?urges?us?to?disapprove?cases?that?hold?to?the?contrary.?We?decline?to?do?so.Section?1203.1?provides,?”should?the?probationer?violate?any?of?the?terms?or?conditions?imposed?by?the?court?in?the?matter,?it?shall?have?authority?to?modify?and?change?any?and?all?such?terms?and?conditions?….”?The?statute?thus?vests?the?court?with?jurisdiction?to?modify?probation?if?there?is?a?violation?thereof.?Defendant?draws?from?this?the?conclusion?that?a?court?may?modify?probation?only?if?there?is?a?violation.?His?assertion?fails,?however,?because?it?does?not?take?into?consideration?other?statutes?governing?modification?and?the?statutory?scheme?governing?probation?in?general.
Two?other?statutes?are?relevant.?The?first?is?section?1203.3,?which?states,?”The?court?shall?have?authority?at?any?time?during?the?term?of?probation?to?revoke,?modify,?or?change?its?order?of?suspension?of?imposition?or?execution?of?sentence.”?Next,?as?discussed?above,?section?1203.2(b)?provides?that?a?court?may?modify?probation?on?the?grounds?listed?in?section?1203.2(a),?which?in?turn?provides?for?revocation?in?certain?circumstances?including,?among?others,?a?violation?of?probation.
In?our?view,?based?on?the?foregoing?statutes?and?in?light?of?the?purposes?of?probation?(??1203.1),?the?sentencing?court?need?not?await?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation?before?it?may?modify?the?conditions?of?probation.?As?one?commentator?has?explained,?permitting?modification?even?absent?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation?is?often?consistent?with?the?flexibility?necessary?to?achieve?the?rehabilitative?goals?of?probation:?”[R]equiring?a?court?or?parole?board?to?await?a?violation?of?a?condition?may?be?disadvantageous?to?the?probationer?or?parolee.?After?a?violation?has?occurred?the?respective?authorities?may?be?disinclined?to?do?anything?other?than?revoke,?although?they?might?have?been?receptive?to?modification?prior?to?the?actual?commission?of?the?violation.?Allowing?modification?even?absent?a?violation?of?a?release?condition?may?therefore?be?in?the?long-term?interest?of?the?parolee?or?probationer.”?(Cohen?&?Gobert,?The?Law?of?Probation?and?Parole,?[54?Cal.3d?1099]?supra,???7.05,?at?p.?360.)?Our?courts?have?taken?this?approach?in?a?variety?of?circumstances.
For?example,?in?In?re?Peeler?(1968)?266?Cal.App.2d?483?[72?Cal.Rptr.?254],?the?Court?of?Appeal?denied?a?petition?for?a?writ?of?habeas?corpus?and?rejected?the?assertion,?also?made?here,?that?probation?may?be?modified?only?if?there?were?a?violation?of?a?condition?of?probation.?After?pleading?guilty?to?possessing?marijuana,?the?petitioner?in?Peeler?was?placed?on?probation,?conditioned?on?serving?30?days?in?jail?and?thereafter?not?associating?with?known?users?of?marijuana?or?dangerous?drugs.?After?serving?the?jail?term,?the?petitioner?moved?to?eliminate?certain?conditions?of?probation.?At?the?hearing?on?the?motion,?the?court?learned?for?the?first?time?that?the?petitioner’s?husband?was?charged?with?narcotics?violations.?The?court?considered?revoking?probation,?but?instead?modified?it?to?include?an?additional?60?days?in?jail?and?a?bar?against?associating?with?”reputed”?drug?users.
The?petitioner?unsuccessfully?challenged?the?latter?modification.?The?Court?of?Appeal?stated,?”Read?as?a?whole?we?do?not?construe?either?the?Penal?Code?sections?covering?probation?or?the?cases?…?construing?those?sections?to?limit?the?power?of?the?court?to?modify?conditions?of?probation?to?cases?in?which?there?has?been?…?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation?by?the?probationer?thereafter.?…?[?]?…?We?have?no?doubt?whatever?that?the?facts?before?the?court?justified?the?imposition?of?the?new?conditions?of?probation?….”?(In?re?Peeler,?supra,?266?Cal.App.2d?at?pp.?490-491.)
In?People?v.?Miller?(1967)?256?Cal.App.2d?348?[64?Cal.Rptr.?20],?the?defendant?was?placed?on?three?years’?probation?on?condition?that?he?make?restitution?as?directed?by?his?probation?officer.?Before?probation?ended,?the?probation?officer?concluded?that?the?victim’s?monetary?loss?was?greater?than?originally?thought?and?that?other?creditors?existed?because?the?defendant?had?breached?other?contracts?arising?out?of?the?same?business?used?to?commit?the?charged?offense.?The?sentencing?court?informally?ordered?that?the?restitution?payments?be?allocated?among?the?victim?and?the?other?creditors.?The?defendant?continued?to?make?the?monthly?payments.?Subsequently,?the?probation?department?applied?for?and?the?trial?court?granted?an?extension?of?probation?to?facilitate?full?payment?to?the?victim?and?the?other?creditors.?The?Court?of?Appeal?concluded?the?increased?amount?of?restitution?to?the?victim?was?not?a?modification?because?the?probation?department?was?operating?within?the?scope?of?the?original?order?in?determining?the?amount?due.?Requiring?restitution?to?the?other?creditors?was?a?modification,?but?the?court?concluded?it?was?appropriate?because?the?claims?arose?out?of?the?same?business?as?the?victim’s?claim.?The?court?thus?approved?a?modification?absent?a?violation?of?probation.?[54?Cal.3d?1100]
In?1970,?the?Legislature?amended?section?1203.2?by?adding?subdivision?(b),?which?provides?that?a?court?may?modify?probation?on?the?grounds?listed?in?section?1203.2(a).?(Stats.?1970,?ch.?333,???1,?p.?729.)?Although?it?could?be?argued?that?the?Legislature,?by?amending?the?statute,?intended?to?overturn?the?interpretations?detailed?above?and?to?limit?the?court’s?power?to?modify?to?the?grounds?listed?in?section?1203.2(a),?we?find?no?direct?evidence?of?such?an?intent?in?the?available?legislative?history.?Instead?it?appears?the?Legislature?added?section?1203.2(b)?in?an?effort?to?improve?supervision?of?probationers?by?enabling?law?enforcement?officials?to?petition?for?revocation?or?modification.?Moreover,?the?language?used?in?section?1203.2(b)?does?not?indicate?an?intent?to?limit?the?court’s?power?to?modify.?We?also?note?that?the?Legislature?did?not?alter?section?1203.3,?which?broadly?states?the?court’s?power?to?modify.
In?light?of?the?foregoing?analysis,?we?conclude?that?the?Legislature,?by?adding?subdivision?(b)?to?section?1203.2,?did?not?intend?to?alter?the?power?of?courts?to?modify?probation?absent?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation.?To?the?extent?that?In?re?Stallings,?supra,?5?Cal.App.3d?322,?is?inconsistent?with?this?opinion,?it?is?disapproved.
- Defendant’s?Other?Arguments
Defendant?argues?that?equal?protection?requires?that?his?restitution?be?fixed?by?a?county?financial?evaluation?officer?and?that?due?process?has?been?violated?because?of?the?vagueness?of?the?restitution?order?and?because?of?the?timing?of?the?modification.?He?also?argues?that?when?the?court?modified?his?probation?its?order?was?void?for?failing?to?set?the?amount?of?restitution?to?fit?his?ability?to?pay.?These?arguments?were?raised?for?the?first?time?in?defendant’s?opening?brief?on?the?merits?in?this?court.?[4]?As?a?matter?of?policy,?we?normally?will?not?consider?”any?issue?that?could?have?been?but?was?not?timely?raised?in?the?briefs?filed?in?the?Court?of?Appeal.”?(Cal.?Rules?of?Court,?rule?29(b).)?In?his?briefs?in?the?Court?of?Appeal,?defendant?did?not?raise?the?issues?of?the?constitutionality?of?the?modification?and?the?validity?of?the?order?modifying?probation?to?require?higher?restitution.?We?therefore?do?not?address?them?now.
III.?Disposition
The?decision?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?affirming?the?modification?of?defendant’s?probation?is?affirmed.
Panelli,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?Baxter,?J.,?and?George,?J.,?concurred.?[54?Cal.3d?1101]
MOSK,?J.
I?dissent.
The?majority?acknowledge?that?”[a]?change?in?circumstances?is?required?before?a?court?has?jurisdiction?to?extend?or?otherwise?modify?probation.”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?p.?1095.)?I?agree.?They?go?on?to?assert,?quoting?the?Court?of?Appeal,?that?such?a?change?in?circumstances?”could?be?found?in?a?fact?’not?available?at?the?time?of?the?original?order,’?namely,?’that?setting?the?pay?schedule?consistent?with?defendant’s?ability?to?pay?had?resulted?in?defendant’s?inability?to?pay?full?restitution?as?contemplated?within?the?original?period?of?probation.’?”?(Ibid.)?Here?I?disagree.
Information?on?defendant’s?economic?status?was?available?at?sentencing?and?cannot?be?considered?a?new?fact?merely?because?the?court?overlooked?it.?The?failure?of?full?restitution?cannot?be?attributed?to?any?default?on?defendant’s?part;?he?made?each?and?every?payment?required?by?the?pay?schedule.?The?court?should?have?considered?whether?setting?the?pay?schedule?consistent?with?defendant’s?income?would?allow?full?restitution?to?be?paid?in?the?probation?period.
The?extension?of?a?probation?period?must?be?based?on?a?change?in?circumstances?relevant?to?the?defendant’s?ability?to?fulfill?the?terms?of?probation.?For?example,?in?People?v.?Miller?(1967)?256?Cal.App.2d?348,?354?[64?Cal.Rptr.?20],?the?court?extended?the?probation?period?to?allow?the?defendant?to?make?further?restitution?payments?after?it?learned?that?he?had?defrauded?additional?creditors.fn.?1?In?In?re?Peeler?(1968)?266?Cal.App.2d?483,?491?[72?Cal.Rptr.?254],?the?court?imposed?additional?conditions?on?the?defendant’s?probation?after?it?became?aware?that?she?was?married?to,?and?planned?to?live?with,?a?man?charged?with?narcotics?violations.?Finally,?in?In?re?Medina?(1983)?143?Cal.App.3d?562,?564?[191?Cal.Rptr.?783],?the?court?imposed?additional?conditions?of?probation?after?it?learned?that?the?defendant?committed?another?crime?while?free?on?bail,?pending?an?appeal?of?the?original?judgment?granting?him?probation.
In?the?present?case,?there?is?no?change?in?circumstances?affecting?defendant’s?ability?to?make?restitution.?As?noted,?the?trial?court?did?not?consider?the?available?facts.?It?cannot?use?its?own?default?to?burden?a?defendant?who?has?faithfully?fulfilled?the?precise?terms?of?his?probation.?Accordingly,?its?extension?[54?Cal.3d?1102]?of?defendant’s?term?of?probation?is?improper.?Although?a?change?in?circumstances?can?be?found?in?many?situations,?I?cannot?find?it?here.
For?these?reasons,?I?would?reverse?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal.
Kennard,?J.,?concurred.
FN?1.?During?the?sentencing?hearing,?the?deputy?district?attorney?commented?on?defendant’s?conduct?in?the?charged?offense?and?in?an?uncharged?offense.?The?court?then?said,?”$12,000?,”?to?which?the?probation?officer?responded,?”Dr.?Slaughter.”?When?the?court?sentenced?defendant,?it?ordered?him?to?pay?restitution?and?noted,?”it?looks?like?we?do?have?a?figure?concerning?Dr.?Slaughter.?We?don’t?have?one?as?to?the?other?individual.?But?it?would?be?the?total?actual?loss?to?the?other?individual.”
FN?2.?Because?the?maximum?term?of?incarceration?that?defendant?could?have?suffered?was?less?than?five?years?(??484b),?probation?could?not?extend?past?five?years?(??1203.1).
FN?3.?One?month?earlier,?the?probation?department?had?filed?a?section?1203.3?petition?(revocation?or?modification?of?probation),?reporting?that?defendant?had?failed?to?pay?the?full?amount?of?restitution.?At?that?hearing?the?probation?officer?admitted?that?defendant?had?not?violated?the?conditions?of?probation.?”He’s?paid?every?cent?that?we’ve?asked?from?him.?In?the?probation?department?we?assumed,?maybe?falsely,?that?if?we?ordered?somebody?to?pay?a?certain?amount?and?they?paid?that?but?couldn’t?pay?off?full?restitution,?that?probation?would?be?extended.?But?now?we?find?that?we?couldn’t?have-we?wouldn’t?recommend?a?violation?at?probation?hearing?[sic]?in?this?case,?because?he?has?paid?everything?that?we’ve?asked,?according?to?his?ability?to?pay.”?The?court?allowed?the?probation?department?to?withdraw?the?petition?without?prejudice?to?filing?a?new?petition?if?the?department?concluded?defendant?was?in?violation?of?probation.
FN?1.?In?People?v.?Richards?(1976)?17?Cal.3d?614,?622-623,?footnote?6?[131?Cal.Rptr.?537,?552?P.2d?97],?footnote?6,?we?questioned?the?Miller?court’s?order?of?modification?because?it?was?made?without?proof?that?the?defendant?breached?his?contracts?with?the?other?creditors?with?the?same?fraudulent?intent?that?formed?the?basis?of?his?original?theft?conviction.?The?issue?in?Richards?was?whether?a?restitution?order?served?a?rehabilitative?purpose.?The?opinion?did?not?call?into?question?the?requirement?that?a?modification?order?must?be?based?on?new?facts.