In?re?Horton?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?82?,?284?Cal.Rptr.?305;?813?P.2d?1335
[No.?S012531.?Aug?12,?1991.]In?re?JAMES?F.?HORTON?II?on?Habeas?Corpus.
(Opinion?by?Broussard,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?Kennard,?Arabian?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.)
COUNSEL
Altshuler?&?Berzon,?Altshuler,?Berzon,?Nussbaum,?Berzon?&?Rubin,?Michael?Rubin?and?Marsha?S.?Berzon?for?Petitioner.
John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Marc?E.?Turchin,?Susan?L.?Frierson?and?Joan?Comparet,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Respondent.
OPINION
BROUSSARD,?J.
The?issue?in?this?case?is?whether?a?court?commissioner?may?conduct?a?trial?in?a?capital?case?when?no?oral?or?written?stipulation?of?the?parties?authorized?him?to?sit?as?a?temporary?judge,?but?when?defense?counsel?proceeded?to?trial?without?objection,?knowing?that?the?judge?was?a?court?commissioner.?Petitioner?contends?that?the?right?to?be?tried?by?a?regularly?appointed?or?elected?superior?court?judge?is?a?fundamental?and?personal?one?that?can?only?be?waived?after?full?admonition?of?the?defendant?and?after?he?has?entered?an?express?waiver?of?the?right?on?the?record.?We?conclude?that?the?right?is?not?a?fundamental?personal?one?requiring?an?admonition?and?express?waiver,?and?that?the?stipulation?necessary?to?vest?the?commissioner?with?authority?to?try?the?case?can?be?inferred?from?the?conduct?of?counsel.
I
Petitioner?was?charged?with?the?October?11,?1982,?murder?and?robbery?of?Herschel?Bowser.?The?complaint?alleged?as?special?circumstances?that?petitioner?murdered?Bowser?in?the?commission?of?a?robbery,?and?that?petitioner?had?previously?been?convicted?of?a?murder.?An?information?was?filed?on?October?11,?1983,?and?petitioner?was?arraigned?in?the?Norwalk?branch?of?the?[54?Cal.3d?87]?Los?Angeles?County?Superior?Court?on?the?same?date.?On?April?6,?1984,?petitioner’s?case?was?transferred?to?Department?E?of?the?Norwalk?branch?of?the?Los?Angeles?County?Superior?Court,?where?Los?Angeles?County?Commissioner?Michael?Cowell?presided.?The?transfer?to?Department?E?was?automatic?under?Norwalk’s?direct?calendaring?system,?and?petitioner?was?not?asked?to?nor?did?he?give?his?consent?to?the?transfer.?The?case?proceeded?to?trial,?and?on?April?1,?1985,?the?jury?found?petitioner?guilty?of?murder?and?robbery?and?found?true?a?felony-murder?special?circumstance?and?a?prior-?murder?special?circumstance.?On?April?16,?1985,?the?jury?returned?a?death?verdict.?The?court?formally?imposed?the?sentence?of?death?on?petitioner?on?October?7,?1985.?Petitioner’s?automatic?appeal?is?pending?before?this?court.
On?October?17,?1989,?petitioner?filed?a?petition?for?writ?of?habeas?corpus,?or?in?the?alternative,?a?motion?for?summary?reversal.?Though?the?record?on?appeal?had?not?been?completed,?he?argued?that?he?was?entitled?to?relief?either?by?way?of?writ?of?habeas?corpus?or?by?way?of?summary?reversal?because?his?trial?had?been?conducted?before?a?court?commissioner,?and?neither?he?nor?counsel?had?entered?a?formal?written?or?oral?stipulation?to?trial?by?a?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge.?On?July?11,?1990,?this?court?issued?an?order?to?show?cause?why?the?relief?prayed?for?in?the?petition?for?writ?of?habeas?corpus?should?not?be?granted.
The?following?facts?can?be?stated?on?the?basis?of?the?allegations?in?the?pleadings?in?the?habeas?corpus?proceeding.?It?is?uncontroverted?that?Commissioner?Cowell’s?standard?practice?was?to?inquire?of?all?counsel?whether?a?stipulation?had?been?filed?appointing?him?as?a?temporary?judge,?and?that?neither?petitioner,?nor?his?counsel,?nor?the?district?attorney?had?ever?executed?a?written?stipulation?appointing?Commissioner?Cowell?as?temporary?judge?in?petitioner’s?case.?It?is?further?uncontroverted?that?neither?Commissioner?Cowell?nor?defense?counsel?informed?petitioner?that?he?had?the?right?to?be?tried?by?a?regularly?appointed?or?elected?superior?court?judge,?that?petitioner?was?not?given?a?copy?of?a?stipulation?form?to?sign,?and?that?he?did?not,?either?orally?or?in?writing,?stipulate?to?trial?by?the?commissioner?as?a?temporary?judge.
Petitioner?alleges?that?he?did?not?know?of?his?right?to?trial?by?a?superior?court?judge,?and?that?if?he?had?been?informed?of?the?right,?he?would?not?have?waived?it.?He?alleges?that?he?did?not?intend?to?stipulate?to?trial?by?a?commissioner.?Respondent?denies?these?allegations.
Petitioner’s?lead?counsel?executed?a?declaration?stating?that?petitioner?never?stipulated,?either?orally?or?in?writing,?to?have?his?trial?before?a?[54?Cal.3d?88]?commissioner,?that?neither?of?petitioner’s?counsel?ever?discussed?the?subject?of?a?stipulation,?that?petitioner?was?never?advised?of?his?right?to?trial?before?a?regularly?appointed?or?elected?superior?court?judge,?and?that?to?the?best?of?counsel’s?knowledge,?petitioner?first?learned?of?the?right?to?trial?before?such?a?judge?when?appellate?counsel?informed?him?of?the?right.?He?further?declared?that?petitioner?never?authorized?him?or?cocounsel?to?waive?his?right,?that?neither?he?nor?cocounsel?ever?purported?to?waive?the?right?on?behalf?of?petitioner,?and?that?it?was?his?opinion?that?counsel?lacked?the?power?to?waive?the?right?for?petitioner.?He?explained,?however,?that?he?believed?at?the?time?of?trial?that?petitioner?had?signed?a?written?stipulation?and?that?it?was?on?file.
Respondent?admits?that?counsel?did?not?discuss?the?stipulation?with?petitioner,?but?denies?that?defense?counsel?did?not?intend?to?stipulate?and?were?not?authorized?to?stipulate?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge,?and?also?denies?that?they?did?not?actually?stipulate?by?their?actions?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge.
The?clerk’s?and?reporter’s?transcripts?prepared?in?the?course?of?petitioner’s?trial?establish?these?further?facts.?At?the?first?hearing?in?the?capital?trial?before?Commissioner?Cowell,?on?April?6,?1984,?petitioner?was?not?present.?The?clerk?of?the?court?reminded?the?court?that?a?stipulation?to?the?commissioner?serving?as?a?temporary?judge?was?needed?from?petitioner.?The?hearing?(on?discovery?compliance)?was?put?over?one?week,?and?the?court?asked?counsel:?”Do?you?promise?to?get?a?stipulation?when?he?comes?out?on?that?date,”?and?counsel?responded:?”I?will?get?a?stipulation.”?The?bailiff?commented?that?unless?the?court?ordered?petitioner?out?of?jail,?he?would?not?be?present?at?the?continued?hearing.?The?court?said:?”The?Court?will?order?him?out,?because?we?do?need?a?stipulation.”?Counsel?responded:?”Will?the?Court?permit?me?to?take?one?to?the?County?Jail.?I’ll?be?seeing?him,?and?bring?it?in?and?file?it.”?The?court?stated:?”Fine.?As?long?as?the?stipulation?is?filed?we?don’t?need?him?present.”?The?hearing?ended?with?this?exchange:?”The?Court:?My?understanding?is?that?you?will?secure?a?stipulation-[?]?Mr.?Newton?[defense?counsel]:?Yes,?your?Honor.?[?]?The?Court:-on?the?matter?before?that?date.”
Respondent?also?submits?the?declaration?of?Commissioner?Cowell?that?he?habitually?solicited?stipulations?to?his?presiding,?that?he?reminded?petitioner’s?counsel?to?get?a?stipulation,?that?both?defense?counsel?had?appeared?before?him?on?many?occasions?and?knew?that?he?was?a?commissioner?and?that?neither?had?ever?declined?to?stipulate?to?his?presiding?in?the?past.?He?had?no?reason?to?doubt?that?counsel?would?obtain?and?file?the?necessary?stipulation.?Petitioner?was?absent?on?one?or?both?of?the?hearing?dates.?When?petitioner?finally?appeared?in?his?courtroom,?Commissioner?Cowell?assumed?[54?Cal.3d?89]?that?the?stipulation?had?been?filed,?and?believed?that?counsel?shared?this?assumption.?He?added?that?at?the?front?of?his?bench?is?a?large?nameplate?bearing?his?name?and?title.?In?a?supplemental?declaration?filed?by?petitioner,?Commissioner?Cowell?added?that?he?did?not?construe?counsel’s?statements?at?the?April?6,?1984,?hearing?as?indicating?that?petitioner?had?already?agreed?to?enter?into?a?stipulation.
The?reporter’s?transcript,?as?well?as?a?settled?statement,?indicate?that?petitioner?appeared?before?Commissioner?Cowell?twice?early?in?the?proceedings,?once?to?waive?his?right?to?a?speedy?trial,?and?once?for?a?continuance.?On?his?third?appearance,?some?10?months?after?the?case?was?transferred?to?Commissioner?Cowell’s?department,?there?was?a?Marsden?hearing?(People?v.?Marsden?(1970)?2?Cal.3d?118?[84?Cal.Rptr.?156,?465?P.2d?44])?at?which?petitioner?attempted?to?remove?his?counsel?on?account?of?their?incompetence.?(He?had?filed?a?malpractice?action?against?them?in?the?Los?Angeles?County?Superior?Court.)?He?contended?that?they?were?not?properly?preparing?the?case,?that?they?had?refused?to?contact?witnesses?whom?petitioner?had?identified,?that?they?had?refused?to?file?certain?motions,?and?that?they?were?pressuring?him?to?accept?a?guilty?plea?despite?his?innocence.?After?a?series?of?rulings?adverse?to?him,?and?as?the?court?was?about?to?take?a?time?waiver?from?petitioner,?this?interchange?took?place:?”[Petitioner:]?May?I?ask?you?a?question??[?]?The?Court:?Yes,?sir.?[?]?The?defendant:?With?no?offense?intended,?but?are?you?a?Judge?or?are?you?a?Commissioner??[?]?The?court:?A?Commissioner,?Mr.?Horton,?for?this?case,?you?having?signed?a?stipulation,?I’m?a?Judge?for?all?purposes.?[?]?The?Defendant:?I?signed?it??[?]?The?Court:?Yes,?sir.?When?the?matter?was?first?brought?before?this?Court.?No?offense?intended,?no?offense?taken.”?The?settled?statement?indicated?that?after?Commissioner?Cowell?stated?that?petitioner?had?signed?a?written?stipulation,?petitioner?responded,?”I?signed?it”?in?a?questioning?tone?of?voice,?and?shook?his?head?from?side?to?side?to?indicate?disagreement.?He?was?interrupted?by?counsel,?who?spoke?to?him?on?another?topic.?Petitioner?dropped?the?subject?and?moved?on?to?discuss?his?motions.?The?case?proceeded?to?trial?and?the?subject?of?the?stipulation?was?not?renewed?until?this?collateral?attack?on?the?judgment.
II
The?judicial?power?of?the?state?is?vested?in?the?Supreme?Court,?Courts?of?Appeal,?superior?courts,?municipal?courts,?and?justice?courts.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???1;?McHugh?v.?Santa?Monica?Rent?Control?Bd.?(1989)?49?Cal.3d?348,?355?[261?Cal.Rptr.?318,?777?P.2d?91].)?The?California?Constitution?provides?that?the?Governor?appoints?superior?court?judges?when?there?are?vacancies,?but?that?after?appointment,?on?completion?of?the?term,?superior?court?judges?must?sit?for?nonpartisan?election.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???16,?&?art.?II,???6.)?It?[54?Cal.3d?90]?also?provides?for?qualifications?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???15),?a?six-year?term?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???16),?and?limited?grounds?for?removal?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???18).
Since?1862,?our?Constitution?has?contemplated?the?use?of?court?commissioners?to?perform?”chamber?business”?(see?Cal.?Const.?of?1849,?art.?VI,???11,?as?amended?Sept.?3,?1862;?Cal.?Const.,?former?art.?VI,???14),?now?referred?to?as?”subordinate?judicial?duties.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???22;?Rooney?v.?Vermont?Investment?Corp.?(1973)?10?Cal.3d?351,?361-362?[110?Cal.Rptr.?353,?515?P.2d?297].)?In?addition,?since?1879,?our?Constitution?has?permitted?a?cause?to?be?tried?in?the?superior?court?by?a?temporary?judge.?(Cal.?Const.?of?1879,?former?art.?VI,???8;?see?also?Cal.?Const.,?former?art.?VI,???5,?as?amended?in?1928.)?The?original?provision?was?that?such?a?judge?must?be?”a?member?of?the?bar,?agreed?upon?in?writing?by?the?parties?litigant?or?their?attorneys?of?record,?approved?by?the?Court,?and?sworn?to?try?the?cause.”?(Ibid.)?This?provision?was?repealed?in?1926,?but?was?reinstated?in?article?VI,?section?5?in?1928?to?provide?for?trial?by?a?temporary?judge?”[u]pon?stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant?or?their?attorneys?of?record.?…”?(Cal.?Const.,?former?art.?VI,???5,?as?amended?in?1928.)?The?current?version?of?this?language,?as?revised?in?1966,?provides:?”On?stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant?the?court?may?order?a?cause?to?be?tried?by?a?temporary?judge?who?is?a?member?of?the?State?Bar,?sworn?and?empowered?to?act?until?final?determination?of?the?cause.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???21.)fn.?1
[1]?The?jurisdiction?of?a?court?commissioner,?or?any?other?temporary?judge,?to?try?a?cause?derives?from?the?parties’?stipulation.?(Rooney?v.?Vermont?Investment?Corp.,?supra,?10?Cal.3d?at?p.?360.)?Thus?in?the?absence?of?a?proper?stipulation,?the?judgment?entered?by?the?court?commissioner?in?this?case?would?be?void.?(People?v.?Tijerina,?supra,?1?Cal.3d?at?p.?49;?In?re?Frye?(1983)?150?Cal.App.3d?407,?409-?410?[197?Cal.Rptr.?755].) [2a]?Petitioner?contends?that?the?right?to?be?tried?by?a?regularly?elected?or?appointed?superior?court?judge?rather?than?a?court?commissioner?or?other?temporary?judge?is?a?fundamental?one,?so?that?he?cannot?be?charged?with?stipulating?to?trial?by?commissioner?without?a?full,?on?the?record?admonition?regarding?his?right?to?trial?by?a?regularly?appointed?judge,?and?his?personal,?knowing?and?voluntary?waiver?of?that?right.?He?draws?an?analogy?between?this?case?and?Boykin?v.?Alabama?(1969)?395?U.S.?238?[23?L.Ed.2d?274,?89?S.Ct.?1709]?and?In?re?Tahl?(1969)?1?Cal.3d?122?[81?Cal.Rptr.?577,?460?P.2d?449],?which?impose?requirements?of?admonition?and?knowing?waiver?of?a?number?of?fundamental?constitutional?rights?in?the?context?of?a?guilty?plea.?[54?Cal.3d?91]For?several?reasons,?we?do?not?accept?this?argument.?First,?although?the?original?constitutional?language?providing?for?temporary?judges,?as?well?as?the?current?language?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure,fn.?2?speaks?of?a?written?stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant,?we?have?ratified?a?line?of?cases?recognizing?that?a?valid?stipulation?for?purposes?of?the?constitutional?provision?may?arise?as?a?result?of?the?conduct?of?the?parties.?These?cases?hold?that?conduct?short?of?an?express?oral?or?written?stipulation?may?be?tantamount?to?a?stipulation?that?a?court?commissioner?may?sit?as?a?temporary?judge.?(In?re?Mark?L.?(1983)?34?Cal.3d?171,?178-179?[193?Cal.Rptr.?165,?666?P.2d?22];?E.N.W.?v.?Michael?W.?(1983)?149?Cal.App.3d?896,?899-900?[198?Cal.Rptr.?355];?Estate?of?Lacy?(1975)?54?Cal.App.3d?172,?182?[126?Cal.Rptr.?432];?People?v.?Oaxaca?(1974)?39?Cal.App.3d?153?[114?Cal.Rptr.?178];?Estate?of?Soforenko?(1968)?260?Cal.App.2d?765,?766?[67?Cal.Rptr.?563];?see?also?2?Witkin,?Cal.?Procedure?(3d?ed.?1985)?Courts,???283,?pp.?306-307.)?As?one?Court?of?Appeal?has?said,?”An?attorney?may?not?sit?back,?fully?participate?in?a?trial?and?then?claim?that?the?court?was?without?jurisdiction?on?receiving?a?result?unfavorable?to?him.”?(Estate?of?Lacy,?supra,?54?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?182.)
The?idea?that?parties?may,?through?their?conduct,?be?held?to?have?stipulated?to?trial?by?a?court?commissioner?is?not?controversial.?The?tantamount?stipulation?doctrine?apparently?first?arose?in?Estate?of?Soforenko,?supra,?260?Cal.App.2d?765.?In?that?probate?matter,?the?appellate?court?explained:?”[A]ppellant?was?represented?by?an?attorney?who?noted?his?appearance?on?the?record;?he?voiced?no?objection?to?the?matter?being?heard?by?the?commissioner,?and?he?participated?fully?in?the?hearing?which?ensued.?He?examined?the?executor?as?a?witness?at?some?length.?He?argued?appellant’s?objections?to?the?account,?and?the?asserted?inadequacy?of?the?report.?At?the?conclusion?of?the?hearing?and?in?response?to?the?court’s?inquiry?as?to?findings,?the?attorney?replied?’Findings?waived,’?as?did?the?attorney?for?the?executor.?We?construe?all?this?deportment?on?the?part?of?appellant’s?attorney?as?tantamount?to?a?stipulation?that?the?matter?could?be?heard?by?the?commissioner.”?(Id.?at?p.?766.)
The?doctrine?was?first?applied?in?the?criminal?context?in?People?v.?Oaxaca,?supra,?39?Cal.App.3d?153,?where?the?defendant?sought?to?vacate?his?guilty?[54?Cal.3d?92]?plea?and?sentence?on?the?ground?that?the?judge?presiding?over?them?was?merely?a?commissioner.?The?court?relied?on?Estate?of?Soforenko,?supra,?260?Cal.App.2d?765,?observing?that:?”The?fact?that?defendant?was?represented?by?an?experienced?public?defender,?participated?in?the?plea?bargaining,?and?accepted?the?sentence?which?was?part?of?that?plea?bargain,?strongly?suggests?that?the?proceedings?were?in?accordance?with?a?de?facto?stipulation?that?the?commissioner?might?act?as?a?temporary?judge.”?(People?v.?Oaxaca,?supra,?39?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?161.)?The?doctrine?subsequently?has?been?applied?in?several?juvenile?cases.?(See?In?re?Lamonica?H.?(1990)?220?Cal.App.3d?634,?640,?644?[270?Cal.Rptr.?60]?[dependency?proceeding];?In?re?P.?I.?(1989)?207?Cal.App.3d?316,?322?[254?Cal.Rptr.?774]?[wardship?proceeding];?In?re?Robert?S.?(1988)?197?Cal.App.3d?1260,?1264?[243?Cal.Rptr.?459];?but?see?In?re?Heather?P.?(1988)?203?Cal.App.3d?1214,?1225?[250?Cal.Rptr.?468];?In?re?Damian?V.?(1988)?197?Cal.App.3d?933?[243?Cal.Rptr.?185]?[termination?of?parental?rights],?refusing?to?apply?the?doctrine?where?rule?244?of?the?California?Rules?of?Court?requires?a?written?stipulation.)fn.?3
We?applied?the?doctrine?in?In?re?Mark?L.,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?171,?where?we?rejected?a?district?attorney’s?claim?that?a?court?commissioner?who?took?a?negotiated?plea?in?a?juvenile?wardship?matter?and?entered?a?dispositional?order?actually?lacked?authority?to?sit?as?a?juvenile?court?judge.?”The?District?Attorney?of?San?Mateo?County?initiated?this?[Welfare?and?Institutions?Code]?section?602?proceeding.?Through?his?deputy,?he?willingly?appeared?before?[the?commissioner],?raising?no?objection?when?that?officer?announced?he?was?proceeding?under?an?Arbuckle?[People?v.?Arbuckle?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?749?(150?Cal.Rptr.?778,?587?P.2d?220,?3?A.L.R.4th?1171)]?condition?[that?the?disposition?would?be?by?the?same?judge]?and?later?entered?a?disposition?on?that?basis.?Such?conduct,?we?think,?was?’tantamount?to?a?stipulation’?that?Browning,?by?virtue?of?his?status?as?a?commissioner,?was?acting?as?a?temporary?judge?rather?than?as?a?referee.”?(34?Cal.3d?at?p.?179.)
The?constitutional?language?providing?for?trial?by?a?temporary?judge?has?not?been?interpreted?to?mean?that?the?authority?to?stipulate?rests?solely?with?the?client,?or?that?the?client’s?express?stipulation?is?necessary.?On?the?contrary,?the?cases?establishing?the?doctrine?of?tantamount?stipulation?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge?refer?routinely?both?to?the?client’s?and?to?the?attorney’s?conduct?in?entering?the?stipulation.?(See?In?re?Frye,?supra,?150?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?408-?409;?People?v.?Oaxaca,?supra,?39?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?161;?but?see?In?re?Samkirtana?S.?(1990)?222?Cal.App.3d?1475,?1484?[272?Cal.Rptr.?489]?[dictum?[54?Cal.3d?93]?suggests,?without?analysis,?that?client?must?expressly?consent?to?stipulation?in?normal?civil?case].)?Frequently,?only?the?attorney’s?conduct?is?discussed?and?is?dispositive.?(See?Yetenekian?v.?Superior?Court?(1983)?140?Cal.App.3d?361?[189?Cal.Rptr.?458]?[attorney’s?conduct?alone?analyzed;?held?not?to?amount?to?stipulation];?Estate?of?Lacy,?supra,?54?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?182?[attorney’s?conduct?held?tantamount?to?stipulation];?People?v.?Benedict?(1969)?2?Cal.App.3d?400,?405?[82?Cal.Rptr.?759]?[express?stipulation?by?counsel?alone?upheld];?Estate?of?Soferenko,?supra,?260?Cal.App.2d?at?pp.?766-767?[counsel’s?conduct?alone?tantamount?to?stipulation].)
Thus,?our?ratification?of?the?doctrine?of?tantamount?stipulation?strongly?suggests?not?only?that?an?express?stipulation?by?the?client?is?unnecessary,?but?also?that?counsel’s?conduct?may?provide?the?basis?for?the?tantamount?stipulation.
Second,?we?have?already?strongly?suggested?that?the?right?to?trial?by?a?regularly?appointed?or?elected?superior?court?judge,?rather?than?a?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge,?is?not?so?fundamental?that?it?necessitates?the?kind?of?admonition?and?waiver?that?must?precede?a?guilty?plea.?In?People?v.?Haskett?(1982)?30?Cal.3d?841?[180?Cal.Rptr.?640,?640?P.2d?776],?also?a?capital?case,?the?defendant?contended?that?his?oral?stipulation?to?have?a?court?commissioner?preside?at?his?preliminary?hearing?was?ineffective?because?he?had?not?been?admonished?regarding?his?right?to?have?the?hearing?before?a?magistrate.?We?said:?”The?right?to?have?a?magistrate?rather?than?a?qualified?court?commissioner?preside?at?the?preliminary?hearing?is?palpably?less?fundamental?than?the?rights?of?confrontation,?jury?trial,?and?protection?from?compelled?self-incrimination?safeguarded?in?Boykin?and?Tahl.?Furthermore,?there?is?no?inherent?danger?here,?as?there?is?when?a?plea?of?guilty?is?entered,?that?the?defendant?will?be?irretrievably?prejudiced?by?unknowing?waiver?of?the?underlying?right.?To?act?as?magistrate?at?a?preliminary?hearing,?a?court?commissioner?must?attain?the?status?of?’temporary?judge.’?[Citations.]?Consequently,?he?must?be?a?member?of?the?State?Bar?and?must?obtain?the?’stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant.’?[Citation.]?Moreover,?the?law?…?required?that?…?the?commissioner?be?appointed?and?supervised?by?the?trial?court?and?be?’otherwise?qualified.’?[Citation.]?These?safeguards?minimize?the?risk?that?the?defendant?will?be?incompetently?tried?or?prejudicially?affected?by?a?commissioner?acting?as?magistrate.”?(People?v.?Haskett,?supra,?30?Cal.3d?at?p.?858.)
Our?decision?in?People?v.?Haskett?(supra,?30?Cal.3d?841)?seems?dispositive?on?the?question?whether?petitioner?was?entitled?to?an?admonition?regarding?his?right?to?trial?before?a?regularly?appointed?superior?court?judge.?As?petitioner?points?out,?however,?since?Haskett?had?actually?stipulated?to?a?[54?Cal.3d?94]?hearing?before?a?commissioner,?that?decision?is?not?fully?dispositive?of?the?question?whether?the?defendant?must?personally?waive?the?right.?Nonetheless,?our?refusal?to?equate?the?right?at?stake?with?the?personal?rights?secured?by?the?decisions?in?Boykin?and?Tahl?suggests?that?no?personal?waiver?is?constitutionally?required.
[3]?We?see?no?indication?that?the?constitutional?language?authorizing?trial?by?a?temporary?judge?was,?as?a?general?proposition,?intended?to?vest?in?the?client,?as?opposed?to?counsel,?the?sole?authority?to?decide?whether?to?stipulate?to?trial?by?such?a?judge.?As?we?have?noted,?the?original?constitutional?language?spoke?in?terms?of?a?stipulation?by?the?party?or?the?attorney?of?record.?(Cal.?Const.,?former?art.?VI,???5.)?Though?the?reference?to?stipulation?by?the?attorney?was?eliminated?in?the?revision?of?1966,?we?have?said?that?the?purpose?of?the?revision?was?simply?to?state?the?prior?provision?concisely?in?modern?terms,?not?to?change?its?meaning.?(People?v.?Tijerina,?supra,?1?Cal.3d?at?p.?48;?see?also?Sarracino?v.?Superior?Court?(1974)?13?Cal.3d?1,?6-8?[118?Cal.Rptr.?21,?529?P.2d?53];?Estate?of?Soforenko,?supra,?260?Cal.App.2d?at?p.?766,?fn.?2.)?Further,?though?a?statute?may?refer?to?procedural?steps?to?be?taken?by?”the?parties,”?normally?this?language?is?not?taken?literally?but?is?interpreted?in?accordance?with?the?normal?rule?that?procedural?steps?must?be?taken?for?the?party?by?the?attorney?of?record.?(See?Boca?etc.?R.?R.?Co.?v.?Superior?Court?(1907)?150?Cal.?153,?157?[88?P.?718];?Toy?v.?Haskell?(1900)?128?Cal.?558,?560?[61?P.?89];?see?also?1?Witkin,?Cal.?Procedure?(3d?ed.?1985)?Attorneys,???188,?p.?217.)?Finally,?the?term?”stipulation”?normally?refers?to?an?agreement?between?attorneys.?(See?1?Witkin,?Cal.?Procedure,?Attorneys,?supra,???207,?at?p.?238,?and?cases?cited.) [4]?We?must?read?the?constitutional?language?in?light?of?the?general?rule?that?in?both?civil?and?criminal?matters,?a?party’s?attorney?has?general?authority?to?control?the?procedural?aspects?of?the?litigation?and,?indeed,?to?bind?the?client?in?these?matters.?(Blanton?v.?Womancare,?Inc.?(1985)?38?Cal.3d?396,?403?[212?Cal.Rptr.?151,?696?P.2d?645,?48?A.L.R.4th?109];?People?v.?Hamilton?(1989)48?Cal.3d?1142,?1163?[259?Cal.Rptr.?701,?774?P.2d?730],?and?cases?cited.)?In?the?civil?context,?the?attorney?has?authority?to?enter?into?stipulations?binding?on?the?client?in?all?matters?of?procedure,?though?he?or?she?may?not?stipulate?in?a?manner?to?”?’impair?the?client’s?substantial?rights?or?the?cause?of?action?itself.’?”?(Blanton?v.?Womancare,?Inc.,?supra,?38?Cal.3d?at?p.?404.)?Thus?the?attorney?cannot?without?authorization?settle?the?suit,?stipulate?to?a?matter?that?would?eliminate?an?essential?defense,?agree?to?entry?of?a?default?judgment,?or?stipulate?to?nominal?damages.?(Ibid.;?see?also?Linsk?v.?Linsk?(1969)?70?Cal.2d?272,?277-278?[74?Cal.Rptr.?544,?449?P.2d?760];?In?re?Marriage?of?Helsel?(1988)?198?Cal.App.3d?332,?337-338?[243?Cal.Rptr.?657].)?[54?Cal.3d?95]In?the?criminal?context,?too,?counsel?is?captain?of?the?ship.?[5]?As?we?said?recently:?”When?the?accused?exercises?his?constitutional?right?to?representation?by?professional?counsel,?it?is?counsel,?not?defendant,?who?is?in?charge?of?the?case.?By?choosing?professional?representation,?the?accused?surrenders?all?but?a?handful?of?’fundamental’?personal?rights?to?counsel’s?complete?control?of?defense?strategies?and?tactics.”?(People?v.?Hamilton,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?1163;?see?also?Townsend?v.?Superior?Court?(1975)?15?Cal.3d?774,?781?[126?Cal.Rptr.?251,?543?P.2d?619];?1?ABA?Standards?for?Criminal?Justice,?std.?4-5.2?(2d?ed.?1980)?pp.?4.65-4.68.)?It?is?for?the?defendant?to?decide?such?fundamental?matters?as?whether?to?plead?guilty?(Brookhart?v.?Janis?(1966)?384?U.S.?1,?7-8?[16?L.Ed.2d?314,?318-319,?86?S.Ct.?1245]),?whether?to?waive?the?right?to?trial?by?jury?(People?v.?Holmes?(1960)?54?Cal.2d?442,?443-444?[5?Cal.Rptr.?871,?353?P.2d?583]),?whether?to?waive?the?right?to?counsel?(Faretta?v.?California?(1975)?422?U.S.?806,?834?[45?L.Ed.2d?562,?581,?95?S.Ct.?2525]),?and?whether?to?waive?the?right?to?be?free?from?self-incrimination?(In?re?Tahl,?supra,?1?Cal.3d?122,?132).?As?to?these?rights,?the?criminal?defendant?must?be?admonished?and?the?court?must?secure?an?express?waiver;?as?to?other?fundamental?rights?of?a?less?personal?nature,?courts?may?assume?that?counsel’s?waiver?reflects?the?defendant’s?consent?in?the?absence?of?an?express?conflict.?(People?v.?Guzman?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?915,?936?[248?Cal.Rptr.?467,?755?P.2d?917].)?When?the?decision?is?whether?to?testify?(see?People?v.?Robles?(1970)?2?Cal.3d?205,?215?[85?Cal.Rptr.?166,?466?P.2d?710])?or?whether?to?present?a?defense?at?the?guilt?phase?of?a?capital?trial?(see?People?v.?Frierson?(1985)?39?Cal.3d?803,?817-818?[218?Cal.Rptr.?73,?705?P.2d?396]),?it?is?only?in?case?of?an?express?conflict?arising?between?the?defendant?and?counsel?that?the?defendant’s?desires?must?prevail.?In?the?latter?situation,?there?is?no?duty?to?admonish?and?secure?an?on?the?record?waiver?unless?the?conflict?comes?to?the?court’s?attention.?(Id.,?at?p.?818,?fn.?8.)
[6]?Contrary?to?petitioner’s?claim,?the?fact?that?a?right?is?of?constitutional?stature?does?not?mean?that?only?the?defendant?can?waive?the?right.?(People?v.?Guzman,?supra,?45?Cal.3d?at?p.?935.)?We?have?explained?that?a?right?may?exist?to?secure?community?interests?as?well?as?to?safeguard?personal?rights?of?the?defendant?to?a?fair?trial?or?to?basic?respect?as?an?individual.?Thus?in?the?case?of?the?right?to?trial?in?the?vicinage?of?the?crime,?we?concluded?that?though?this?right?is?an?essential?feature?of?the?state?and?federal?constitutional?right?to?jury?trial,?and?is?important?to?protect?the?accused’s?constitutional?rights,?it?also?is?important?to?vindicate?the?interests?of?the?community.?The?right?is?therefore?not?comparable?to?the?essential?rights?to?jury?trial?or?to?counsel,?and?counsel?has?authority?to?waive?it?even?over?the?defendant’s?objection.?”A?change?of?venue?to?ensure?a?fair?trial,?even?over?an?accused’s?objections,?does?not?threaten?’?”that?respect?for?the?individual?which?is?the?lifeblood?of?the?law.”?’?[Citation.]?Nor?does?the?right?exist?solely?to?protect?[54?Cal.3d?96]?fair?and?impartial?factfinding.?Its?waiver?…?is?a?tactical?matter?within?counsel’s?power?to?control.”?(Id.,?at?p.?937.)Petitioner?places?great?weight?on?federal?authority?establishing?the?primacy?of?article?III?courts.?(U.S.?Const.,?art.?III.)?[7]?We?are?well?aware?that?under?article?III?of?the?federal?Constitution,?litigants?enjoy?a?personal?interest?in?being?tried?by?an?article?III?judge,?whose?independence?from?other?branches?of?government?and?from?public?outcry?is?secured?by?life?tenure.?(Commodity?Futures?Trading?Comm’n?v.?Schor?(1986)?478?U.S.?833,?847-848?[92?L.Ed.2d?675,?690-691,?106?S.Ct.?3245];?Northern?Pipeline?Co.?v.?Marathon?Pipe?Line?Co.?(1981)?458?U.S.?50,?57-60?[73?L.Ed.2d?598,?606-608,?102?S.Ct.?2858];?Pacemaker?Diagnostic?Clinic?of?America?v.?Instromedix?(9th?Cir.?1984)?725?F.2d?537,?541?(opn.?of?Kennedy,?J.).)?The?federal?courts?have?been?jealous?to?protect?the?judicial?power?of?article?III?courts,?and?their?care?is?grounded?on?the?understanding?that?the?founders?of?our?nation?considered?it?essential?to?the?balance?of?power?among?the?three?branches?of?government?that?the?federal?judiciary?have?lifetime?tenure?in?order?to?assure?their?independence?from?the?other?branches.?(Northern?Pipeline?Co.?v.?Marathon?Pipe?Line?Co.,?supra,?458?U.S.?at?pp.?57-60?[73?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?606-608].)?We?recognize,?too,?that?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?has?found?that?article?III?secures?both?institutional?and?personal?interests,?and?that?it?primarily?”?’was?designed?as?a?protection?for?the?parties?from?the?risk?of?legislative?or?executive?pressure?on?judicial?decision.’?”?(Commodity?Futures?Trading?Comm’n?v.?Schor,?supra,?478?U.S.?at?p.?848?[92?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?691].)
[2b]?On?the?other?hand,?nothing?in?these?cases?suggests?that?a?state?constitution?cannot?provide,?as?our?Constitution?does,?that?the?parties?may?consent?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge.?Even?in?the?federal?system,?the?high?court?has?recognized?that?although?article?III?of?the?federal?Constitution?secures?a?personal?right,?that?right?may?be?waived?by?consent?to?trial?in?a?lesser?tribunal.?(Commodity?Futures?Trading?Comm’n?v.?Schor,?supra,?478?U.S.?at?pp.?848-849?[92?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?690-692];?Pacemaker?Diagnostic?Clinic?of?America?v.?Instromedix,?supra,?725?F.2d?at?pp.?542-544,?547;?Geras?v.?Lafayette?Display?Fixtures,?Inc.?(7th?Cir.?1984)?742?F.2d?1037,?1041-1042.)?Although?some?circuits?have?said?that?when?trial?is?under?the?Federal?Magistrates?Act?(28?U.S.C.???636(b)(3)),?the?act?requires?that?the?waiver?be?express?and?personal?(see?Hall?v.?Sharpe?(11th?Cir.?1987)?812?F.2d?644,?647;?Adams?v.?Heckler?(7th?Cir.?1986)?794?F.2d?303,?307),?recent?authority?from?the?high?court?suggests?that?failure?to?object?may?be?considered?as?consent,?or?at?least?as?waiver?of?the?article?III?claim.?(See?Peretz?v.?United?States?(1991)?501?U.S.?___,?___?[115?L.Ed.2d?808,?822,?111?S.Ct.?2661,?2669].)?In?other?contexts,?too,?consent?may?be?expressed?by?the?litigant’s?conduct.?Thus,?for?example,?in?the?context?of?hearings?before?the?Commodities?[54?Cal.3d?97]?Futures?Trading?Commission,?where?there?is?a?right?to?trial?de?novo,?the?waiver?need?not?be?express,?but?can?be?derived?from?the?conduct?of?the?litigant.?(Commodity?Futures?Trading?Comm’n?v.?Schor,?supra,?478?U.S.?at?p.?849?[92?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?691-692].) [8]?The?California?Constitution,?too,?is?based?on?the?doctrine?of?the?separation?of?powers,?and?preserves?the?fundamental?power?of?the?courts?to?”test?legislative?and?executive?acts?by?the?light?of?constitutional?mandate?and?in?particular?to?preserve?constitutional?rights,?whether?of?individual?or?minority,?from?obliteration?by?the?majority.”?(Bixby?v.?Pierno?(1971)?4?Cal.3d?130,?141?[93?Cal.Rptr.?234,?481?P.2d?242].)?Our?judicial?system?is?grounded?on?the?existence?of?a?nonpartisan,?independent?judiciary,?but?our?state?Constitution,?unlike?the?federal?Constitution,?also?contemplates?in?the?interest?of?judicial?efficiency?that?the?ranks?of?the?regular?judiciary?may?be?extended?from?time?to?time?by?qualified?temporary?judges?who?serve?as?officers?of?the?superior?court.?(See?Estate?of?Kent?(1936)?6?Cal.2d?154,?158?[57?P.2d?901].)fn.?4?This?community?interest?in?judicial?efficiency?is?of?constitutional?magnitude,?and?somewhat?tempers?the?individual’s?interest?in?trial?by?a?regularly?appointed?judge.?This?distinction?between?our?Constitution?and?the?federal?Constitution?persuades?us?that?litigants?lack?the?essential,?personal?interest?in?trial?by?a?regularly?appointed?judge?that?requires?personal?waiver.Petitioner?points?to?the?decision?of?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?in?Gomez?v.?United?States?(1989)?490?U.S.?858?[104?L.Ed.2d?923,?109?S.Ct.?2237],?which?held?under?the?Federal?Magistrates?Act,?a?federal?magistrate?lacks?jurisdiction?to?preside?over?jury?selection?in?a?felony?trial?over?the?defendant’s?objection.?The?court?has?subsequently?explained,?however,?that?under?article?III?of?the?federal?Constitution?and?under?the?act,?a?magistrate?may?conduct?voir?dire?in?a?felony?trial?when?the?defendant?does?not?object?to?the?procedure.?(Peretz?v.?United?States,?supra,?501?U.S.?___,?___?[115?L.Ed.2d?808,?822,?111?S.Ct.?2661,?2669].)?In?the?particular?case,?the?magistrate?secured?counsel’s?verbal?representation?that?the?defendant?consented?to?the?assignment?of?the?magistrate,?but?the?opinion?clearly?suggests?that?a?mere?failure?to?object?would?be?fatal.?(Id.,?at?pp.?___-___?[115?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?821-822,?111?S.Ct.?at?pp.?2668-2669].)?Petitioner?can?take?no?comfort?from?this?case.
[2c]?In?conclusion,?in?view?of?our?constitutional?provision?for?trial?by?temporary?judge?by?stipulation,?and?in?view?of?counsel’s?traditional?authority?to?act?for?the?client?in?the?procedural?aspects?of?the?case,?we?are?confident?[54?Cal.3d?98]?that?counsel?can?enter?a?stipulation?to?a?temporary?judge?even?though?the?court?has?not?secured?an?express?waiver?from?the?litigant.?The?original?constitutional?language?referred?to?stipulation?by?an?attorney,?and?the?later?omission?of?this?language?was?not?intended?to?change?the?law.?Regardless?of?the?identity?of?the?judge,?the?defendant?retains?the?basic?right?to?present?a?defense?under?the?same?rule?of?law?applicable?in?any?courtroom?in?the?state.?A?stipulation?to?trial?by?a?court?commissioner?in?no?way?impairs?the?defendant’s?right?to?a?hearing.?(Compare?Linsk?v.?Linsk,?supra,?70?Cal.2d?at?p.?278.)?Just?as?counsel?has?authority?to?decide?whether?to?challenge?a?judge?under?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?170.6?(People?v.?Jackson?(1960)?186?Cal.App.2d?307,?317?[8?Cal.Rptr.?849],?cited?with?approval?in?People?v.?Frierson,?supra,?39?Cal.3d?at?p.?813),?we?think?that?counsel?has?authority?to?enter?the?stipulation?at?issue?here,?without?an?on?the?record?admonition?of?the?defendant,?or?the?defendant’s?express,?on?the?record?waiver?of?the?right.fn.?5III [9]?Petitioner?argues?that?even?if?an?admonition?and?express?waiver?are?not?required,?neither?his?conduct?nor?that?of?his?attorneys?was?tantamount?to?a?stipulation.?He?relies?on?declarations,?both?his?own?and?those?of?counsel,?denying?any?intent?to?enter?into?a?stipulation,?and?his?own?declaration?that?he?did?not?know?he?had?a?right?to?a?regularly?appointed?judge,?and?would?not?have?stipulated?to?waive?that?right?had?he?known?of?it.
Petitioner?argues?that?since?neither?he?nor?counsel?specifically?intended?to?enter?a?stipulation,?none?can?be?found.?We?disagree.?We?have?explained?that?”[u]nder?the?’tantamount?stipulation’?doctrine,?the?parties?confer?judicial?power?not?because?they?thought?in?those?terms;?had?they?done?so,?the?stipulation?presumably?would?be?express.?Rather,?an?implied?stipulation?arises?from?the?parties’?common?intent?that?the?subordinate?officer?hearing?their?case?do?things?which,?in?fact,?can?only?be?done?by?a?judge.”?(In?re?Mark?L.,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?at?p.?179,?fn.?6.)?Here,?it?is?uncontroverted?that?counsel?participated?fully?and?vigorously?in?the?trial,?at?every?point?treating?the?commissioner?as?competent?to?rule?on?matters?which?rest?solely?in?the?discretion?of?a?superior?court?judge.?This?conduct?was?a?tacit?recognition?of,?and?reliance?upon,?the?authority?of?the?commissioner?to?act?as?a?temporary?judge.
Petitioner?also?refers?us?to?cases?calling?for?a?knowing?stipulation,?and?argues?that?without?evidence?that?he?knew?he?had?a?right?to?trial?by?a?[54?Cal.3d?99]?regularly?appointed?judge,?there?can?be?no?knowing?stipulation.?An?examination?of?the?cases?exposes?petitioner’s?misunderstanding?of?them.?In?In?re?Frye,?supra,?150?Cal.App.3d?at?page?409,?there?was?no?indication?that?either?counsel?or?the?defendant?in?a?contempt?proceeding?were?aware?that?the?judicial?officer?sitting?on?the?bench?was?a?commissioner?rather?than?a?judge.?In?fact?counsel,?who?practiced?rarely?in?the?particular?superior?court,?was?under?the?impression?that?the?commissioner?was?a?judge.?It?was?in?this?context?that?the?reviewing?court,?in?an?opinion?by?Justice?Kaufman,?held?that?the?constitutional?provision?regarding?temporary?judges?”contemplates?a?knowing?and?voluntary?assent”?that?was?absent?under?the?facts?of?the?case.?Here,?by?contrast,?it?is?uncontroverted?that?both?counsel?and?petitioner?were?aware?that?the?judge?was?a?commissioner;?indeed,?counsel?had?appeared?before?the?same?commissioner?many?times?and?had?always?stipulated?to?his?presiding?in?the?past.
Petitioner?also?relies?on?Yetenekian?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?140?Cal.App.3d?361,?where?counsel?announced?”ready,”?under?the?mistaken?impression?that?the?commissioner?was?sitting?only?as?a?master?calendar?court.?The?Court?of?Appeal?found?no?stipulation,?since?counsel?objected?to?the?commissioner’s?authority?as?soon?as?he?realized?that?the?commissioner?proposed?to?try?the?case.?This?case?lends?no?support?to?petitioner’s?position,?however,?since?here?counsel?never?objected?to?trial?by?the?commissioner,?though?they?were?well?aware?that?he?was?a?commissioner?and?that?he?proposed?to?try?the?case.
Petitioner?argues?that?he?cannot?be?bound?by?a?stipulation?to?the?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge,?because?he?was?not?”voluntarily?before?the?court,”?but?rather?was?haled?in?involuntarily?as?a?criminal?defendant.?He?refers?to?language?in?In?re?Mark?L.,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?at?page?179,?where?we?distinguished?two?cases?finding?no?stipulation?(People?v.?Tijerina,?supra,?1?Cal.3d?41,?and?Rooney?v.?Vermont?Investment?Corp.,?supra,?10?Cal.3d?351)?on?the?ground?that?”the?party?asserting?the?absence?of?a?stipulation?had?not?initiated?the?disputed?proceeding?and?had?participated?involuntarily.”?We?did?not?suggest?in?Mark?L.,?however,?that?criminal?defendants?were?exempt?from?the?tantamount?stipulation?doctrine.?In?fact?we?cited?with?approval?the?criminal?case?of?People?v.?Oaxaca,?supra,?39?Cal.App.3d?153,?as?representing?an?instance?in?which?the?conduct?of?a?criminal?defendant’s?attorney?was?tantamount?to?a?stipulation?that?a?commissioner?would?act?as?a?temporary?judge.?Far?from?creating?an?exemption?for?criminal?cases,?we?carefully?explained?that?in?Tijerina?the?defendant?was?not?a?willing?participant?because?he?had?requested?a?continuance?of?the?hearing?to?obtain?counsel.?He?was?forced?to?proceed?without?counsel,?so?his?participation?was?not?tantamount?to?a?stipulation?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge.?(In?re?Mark?L.,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?[54?Cal.3d?100]?at?p.?179.)?The?same?distinction?from?Tijerina?was?offered?by?the?court?in?People?v.?Oaxaca,?supra,?39?Cal.App.3d?at?pages?162-163.?We?explained?our?decision?in?Rooney,?that?there?had?been?no?stipulation?by?conduct?of?the?parties?in?a?confession?of?judgment?case,?on?the?grounds?that?”?’defendants?[there]?were?not?notified?of?any?date?of?hearing?and?were?not?present?at?the?presentation?to?the?commissioner?of?plaintiffs’?application?for?entry?of?the?judgment.’?”?(In?re?Mark?L.,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?at?p.?179.)
Here,?petitioner?was?represented?by?counsel?who?willingly?participated?in?the?trial?on?petitioner’s?behalf.?This?is?not?a?case?like?Tijerina,?where?the?defendant?was?forced?over?protest?to?represent?himself?in?a?proceeding?he?was?trying?to?postpone.?Nor?is?it?a?case?like?Rooney,?where?the?defendants?not?only?did?not?participate,?they?lacked?notice?of?the?proceedings,?and?thus?could?not?be?held?to?have?stipulated.?Here?petitioner,?through?his?counsel,?participated?in?a?lengthy?trial?presided?over?by?a?person?known?to?all?parties?as?a?court?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge.?Counsel?never?objected?to?proceeding?before?the?commissioner;?the?first?objection?came?in?this?collateral?attack?on?the?judgment.?Further,?counsel?evinced?every?intention?of?securing?petitioner’s?personal?written?stipulation?to?trial?by?the?commissioner;?that?through?some?oversight?they?failed?to?do?so?does?not?change?the?meaning?of?their?conduct.?They?knowingly?presented?their?motions,?objections,?and?arguments?to?the?commissioner,?treating?him?in?every?respect?as?a?judge?of?the?superior?court,?vested?with?the?authority?to?make?binding?rulings?in?a?trial?involving?the?most?serious?of?criminal?charges.?This?conduct,?we?think,?satisfied?the?constitutional?requirement?that?a?temporary?judge?may?be?authorized?to?try?a?cause?on?the?stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant.
IV
Petitioner?argues?finally?that?the?commissioner’s?exercise?of?jurisdiction?over?his?capital?trial?without?any?express?stipulation?to?the?commissioner’s?authority?violates?defendant’s?state?and?federal?constitutional?rights?to?due?process,?equal?protection,?a?fair?trial,?and?reliable?capital?trial?proceedings.?This?argument?is?presented?in?the?most?summary?terms?and?is?not?supported?by?any?analysis.?We?fail?to?see?how?trial?by?a?commissioner?under?a?tantamount?stipulation?violates?these?rights,?since?the?commissioner?takes?on?the?mantle?of?a?regularly?appointed?superior?court?judge?in?presiding?over?the?trial?and?applies?all?the?usual?rules?and?procedures?applicable?in?such?a?proceeding.?Unless?all?trials?by?commissioner?are?unconstitutional?under?the?federal?Constitution-an?argument?petitioner?does?not?make-there?seems?to?[54?Cal.3d?101]?be?no?basis?for?questioning?the?authority?of?a?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge?under?conduct?tantamount?to?a?stipulation?to?try?a?capital?case.?The?order?to?show?cause?is?discharged?and?the?petition?for?writ?of?habeas?corpus?is?denied.
Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?J.,?Kennard,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?and?Baxter,?J.,?concurred.
MOSK,?J.
I?dissent.
Defense?counsel?stated?in?open?court?that?they?would?obtain?defendant’s?signature?on?a?stipulation?form?to?permit?the?court?commissioner?to?try?this?capital?case.fn.?1?They?never?did.?Neglecting?to?check?the?file,?the?commissioner?apparently?believed?a?signed?stipulation?was?in?the?file.?It?was?not.?Defendant?made?it?clear?in?open?court?that?he?had?not?signed?a?stipulation.?He?was?ignored.?Despite?those?crucial?omissions,?the?majority?approve?of?one?who?is?not?a?superior?court?judge?hearing?a?capital?case?and?imposing?a?death?sentence.?This?cannot?be?condoned.
Article?VI,?section?21?of?the?Constitution?permits?a?cause?to?be?tried?by?”a?temporary?judge”?but?only?on?”stipulation?of?the?parties.”?The?operative?words?are?”stipulation”?and?”parties.”?This?defendant,?being?a?party,?must?consent?to?a?nonjudge?trying?his?case.?The?consent?must?be?by?the?defendant?personally,?not?by?the?prosecutor,?a?friend,?a?spouse,?or?a?lawyer.?And?certainly,?in?the?absence?of?a?stipulation?by?anyone,?not?merely?by?implication.
Indeed,?I?find?it?shocking?that?one?who?is?not?a?judge?chosen?by?and?responsible?to?society?can?merely?by?inference?and?implication?be?given?the?awesome?power?of?determining?life?or?death?for?a?human?being.
The?majority?rationalize?that?the?stipulation?necessary?to?vest?the?commissioner?with?authority?to?try?the?case?could?be?inferred?from?the?conduct?of?defense?counsel.?However,?it?appears?that?defense?counsel?were?operating?under?the?mistaken?premise?that?defendant?had?signed?a?stipulation?form?when?in?fact?they?had?failed?to?ask?for?his?signature?and?indeed?forgot?to?even?broach?the?subject.?Consequently,?defendant?never?learned?that?he?had?the?right?to?be?tried?by?a?superior?court?judge?or?that?he?could?object?to?the?commissioner?sitting?as?a?judge.?I?fail?to?see?how?the?necessary?stipulation?[54?Cal.3d?102]?can?be?inferred?from?counsel’s?conduct?when?their?client?was?not?made?aware?of?the?existence?of?the?right.
The?cases?cited?by?the?majority?for?the?proposition?that?an?attorney’s?conduct?alone?may?substitute?for?the?necessary?stipulation?are?not?persuasive.?Each?case?is?distinguishable?on?the?ground?that?counsel?acted?with?their?client’s?consent.?Thus?in?Yetenekian?v.?Superior?Court?(1983)?140?Cal.App.3d?361,?366?[189?Cal.Rptr.?458],?no?stipulation?was?found?because?the?attorney?informed?the?court?early?in?the?proceedings?that?his?client?did?not?stipulate?to?the?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge.?In?People?v.?Benedict?(1969)?2?Cal.App.3d?400,?405?[82?Cal.Rptr.?759],?a?stipulation?was?found?because?counsel?entered?into?and?signed?the?stipulation?for?his?client.?In?Estate?of?Lacy?(1975)?54?Cal.App.3d?172,?182?[126?Cal.Rptr.?432],?and?Estate?of?Soforenko?(1968)?260?Cal.App.2d?765,?766?[67?Cal.Rptr.?563],?although?a?stipulation?was?found?because?the?attorneys?voiced?no?objection?and?fully?participated?in?the?proceedings,?there?was?no?indication?that?the?clients?themselves?did?not?agree?to?the?matter?being?heard?by?a?commissioner.
Not?so?here.?In?the?instant?case,?counsel?never-on?defendant’s?behalf-expressly?objected,?expressly?agreed,?or?by?their?conduct?impliedly?agreed?to?the?commissioner?sitting?as?a?judge.?Instead,?their?conduct?merely?conformed?to?their?mistaken?belief?that?defendant?personally?had?signed?a?stipulation.?Thus,?this?is?not?a?situation?in?which?the?attorneys?sat?back,?fully?participated?in?the?trial,?and?then?on?receiving?an?unfavorable?result?claimed?that?the?court?was?without?jurisdiction.?(Estate?of?Lucy,?supra,?54?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?182.)?Rather?this?appears?to?be?a?case?of?an?inexplicably?careless,?but?innocent?mistake.
The?majority?read?the?constitutional?language?authorizing?trial?by?temporary?judge?in?light?of?”the?general?rule?that?in?both?civil?and?criminal?matters,?a?party’s?attorney?has?general?authority?to?control?the?procedural?aspects?of?the?litigation?and,?indeed,?to?bind?the?client?in?these?matters.”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?p.?94.)?Yet?the?decision?on?whether?to?stipulate?to?the?matter?being?heard?by?one?who?is?not?a?judge?is?not?merely?procedural.
A?judge,?whether?temporary?or?not,?is?required?to?adjudicate?many?critical?trial?issues?including?what?evidence?will?be?admitted,?what?objections?are?meritorious,?what?instructions?are?proper,?and?ultimately?what?sentence?should?be?pronounced.?In?a?capital?case?the?trial?judge?has?the?special?duty,?whenever?the?jury?returns?a?verdict?of?death,?to?independently?review?and?weigh?the?evidence?of?aggravating?and?mitigating?factors?and?then?pronounce?sentence.?(Pen.?Code,???190.4,?subd.?(e).)?Thus?the?decision?whether?to?stipulate?to?trial?before?a?commissioner?may?very?well?involve?the?[54?Cal.3d?103]?substantive?rights?of?the?accused.?(See?Coleman?v.?McCormick?(9th?Cir.?1989)?874?F.2d?1280,?1287?(en?banc)?[“It?is?one?thing?to?accept?a?judge?for?the?purpose?of?conducting?a?fair?trial,?and?quite?another?to?accept?that?judge?not?only?to?conduct?the?trial?but?to?become?the?sole?decisionmaker?on?the?question?of?life?or?death.”].)
In?Blanton?v.?Womancare,?Inc.?(1985)?38?Cal.3d?396,?407?[212?Cal.Rptr.?151,?696?P.2d?645,?48?A.L.R.4th?109],?a?unanimous?court?held?that?an?attorney?without?express?authorization?did?not?have?implied?or?apparent?authority?to?submit?litigation?to?arbitration.?The?client?was?entitled?to?a?court?trial?before?a?qualified?judge.?In?the?seminal?case?of?Linsk?v.?Linsk?(1969)?70?Cal.2d?272?[74?Cal.Rptr.?544,?449?P.2d?760],?this?court?in?a?unanimous?opinion?discussed?in?depth?the?authority?of?counsel.?Although?Linsk?was?a?civil?case,?it?dealt?with?unauthorized?action?by?counsel?in?the?absence?of?a?stipulation?by?the?litigant.?Construing?the?concept?that?an?attorney?may?bind?his?client?”in?any?of?the?steps?of?an?action?or?proceeding”?(Code?Civ.?Proc.,???283),?we?held?that?counsel?may?act?for?his?client?in?procedural?matters?arising?during?the?course?of?the?action,?but?he?may?not?impair?the?client’s?substantive?rights.?(70?Cal.2d?at?p.?278.)
Fundamental?constitutional?rights?are?not?susceptible?of?waiver?except?by?the?defendant?personally?or?by?the?defendant’s?approval?of?a?waiver?undertaken?by?counsel.?(E.g.,?In?re?Mosley?(1970)?1?Cal.3d?913,?924?[83?Cal.Rptr.?809,?464?P.2d?473]?[right?to?plead?not?guilty?and?stand?trial];?People?v.?Holmes?(1960)?54?Cal.2d?442,?443-444?[5?Cal.Rptr.?871,?353?P.2d?583]?[jury?trial];?People?v.?Robles?(1970)?2?Cal.3d?205,?215?[85?Cal.Rptr.?166,?466?P.2d?710]?[right?to?testify];?Townsend?v.?Superior?Court?(1975)?15?Cal.3d?774,?785?[126?Cal.Rptr.?251,?543?P.2d?619]?(dis.?opn.?by?Mosk,?J.)?[right?to?speedy?trial].)
To?have?a?capital?case,?involving?the?defendant’s?life?or?death,?tried?by?a?duly?qualified?judge?would?seem?to?be?in?the?same?category?of?fundamental?rights.
There?are,?of?course,?significant?differences?between?commissioners?and?judges.?Without?denigrating?the?administrative?and?subordinate?judicial?services?often?rendered?by?commissioners,?they?do?not?have?the?qualifications,?responsibilities,?independence?and?protections?of?judges.?This?principle?is?recognized?in?article?VI?of?the?California?Constitution?creating?a?judicial?appointment?and?retention?procedure?designed?to?foster?an?independent?judiciary.?For?example,?section?18?of?article?VI?provides?that?judges?may?be?removed?from?office?prior?to?the?completion?of?their?term?only?for?wilful?misconduct,?persistent?failure?to?perform?judicial?duties,?or?other?seriously?detrimental?conduct.?Court?commissioners,?in?contrast,?are?not?institutionally?[54?Cal.3d?104]?protected?by?the?Constitution?and?serve?solely?at?”the?pleasure?of?the?court?appointing?[them].”?(Gov.?Code,???70142.)
In?the?instant?case?the?court?commissioner?lacked?authority?to?preside?over?defendant’s?capital?trial?because?defendant?personally?did?not?stipulate,?as?required?by?the?Constitution.?I?would?grant?defendant’s?petition?for?habeas?corpus?relief.
Petitioner’s?application?rehearing?was?denied?October?2,?1991.?Mosk,?J.,?was?of?the?opinion?that?the?application?should?be?granted.
FN?1.?The?purpose?of?the?revision?was?to?state?the?substance?of?the?prior?provision?”concisely?in?modern?terms.”?(People?v.?Tijerina?(1969)?1?Cal.3d?41,?48?[81?Cal.Rptr.?264,?459?P.2d?680].)
FN?2.?Since?1989,?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?259?has?provided?that?subject?to?the?supervision?of?the?court,?a?court?commissioner?has?the?power?to?”[a]ct?as?temporary?judge?when?otherwise?qualified?so?to?act?when?appointed?for?that?purpose,?or?by?written?consent?of?an?appearing?party.”?(Code?Civ.?Proc.,???259,?subd.?(e).)?At?the?time?of?this?trial,?however,?section?259?simply?stated?that?a?commissioner?had?the?power?to?act?as?a?temporary?judge?”when?otherwise?qualified?so?to?act?and?when?appointed?for?that?purpose.”?(Former?Code?Civ.?Proc.,???259,?subd.?(4).)?While?rule?244?of?the?California?Rules?of?Court?also?provides?for?a?written?stipulation?that?a?case?may?be?tried?by?a?temporary?judge,?that?rule?specifies?that?it?does?not?apply?to?court?commissioners?who?are?selected?to?act?as?temporary?judges.?(Cal.?Rules?of?Court,?rule?244.)
FN?3.?In?re?Heather?P.,?supra,?203?Cal.App.3d?1214,?and?In?re?Damian?V.,?supra,?197?Cal.App.3d?933,?interpret?rule?244?of?the?California?Rules?of?Court,?requiring?a?written?stipulation?to?the?appointment?of?temporary?judges,?as?mandatory?and?jurisdictional.?By?its?own?terms,?however,?rule?244?does?not?apply?to?the?appointment?of?a?court?commissioner?to?sit?as?a?temporary?judge.?(Cal.?Rules?of?Court,?rule?244.)
FN?4.?The?provision?for?temporary?judges?was?omitted?from?our?state?Constitution?in?1926?since?it?was?contemplated?that?the?newly?formed?Judicial?Council?would?fill?the?need?for?temporary?judges?by?the?transfer?of?judges?among?counties.?(See?Martello?v.?Superior?Court?(1927)?202?Cal.?400,?404?[261?P.?476].)?After?two?years,?however,?the?provision?was?reinstated.
FN?5.?We?need?not?decide?what?should?be?the?court’s?response?to?an?express?conflict?between?the?defendant?and?his?or?her?attorney?on?the?stipulation,?since?no?such?conflict?appeared?in?this?case.?(Compare?People?v.?Frierson,?supra,?39?Cal.3d?at?p.?818,?fn.?8.)
FN?1.?Although?this?is?a?habeas?corpus?matter?and?Horton?is?technically?the?petitioner,?since?he?was?the?defendant?in?the?underlying?criminal?trial?I?refer?to?him?herein?as?the?defendant.