Whitman?v.?Superior?Court?(People)?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?1063?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?160;?820?P.2d?262
[No.?S018847.?Dec?9,?1991.]THOMAS?PAUL?WHITMAN,?Petitioner,?v.?THE?SUPERIOR?COURT?OF?SANTA?CLARA?COUNTY,?Respondent;?THE?PEOPLE,?Real?Party?in?Interest.
(Superior?Court?of?Santa?Clara?County,?No.?141525,?Nathan?D.?Mihara,?Judge.)
(Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?with?Panelli,?Arabian,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.?concurring?in?the?judgment.?Separate?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.)
COUNSEL
Stuart?Rappaport,?Public?Defender,?Susan?R.?Bernardini?and?Barbara?B.?Fargo,?Deputy?Public?Defenders,?for?Petitioner.
Wilbur?F.?Littlefield,?Public?Defender?(Los?Angeles),?Laurence?M.?Sarnoff?and?Albert?J.?Menaster,?Deputy?Public?Defenders,?Gary?M.?Madinach?and?Madeline?McDowell?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Petitioner.
No?Appearance?for?Respondent.
Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorney?General,?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Clifford?K.?Thompson,?Jr.,?Laurence?K.?Sullivan?and?Joan?Killeen?Haller,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Real?Party?In?Interest.
Dennis?Kottmeier,?District?Attorney?(San?Bernadino),?Joseph?A.?Burns,?Deputy?District?Attorney,?Kent?S.?Scheidegger?and?Charles?L.?Hobson?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Real?Party?in?Interest.
OPINION
LUCAS,?C.?J.
In?this?case,?we?resolve?some?issues?presented?by?the?adoption?in?June?1990?of?an?initiative?measure?designated?on?the?ballot?as?Proposition?115?and?entitled?the?”Crime?Victims?Justice?Reform?Act.”?Petitioner?[54?Cal.3d?1068]?herein?raises?various?challenges?under?the?federal?and?state?Constitutions?to?the?provisions?of?the?measure?that?authorize?the?admission?of?hearsay?evidence?at?preliminary?hearings?in?criminal?cases.?(See?also?Izazaga?v.?Superior?Court,?ante,?p.?356?[285?Cal.Rptr.?231,?815?P.2d?304]?[challenge?to?reciprocal?discovery?provisions?of?Prop.?115];?Tapia?v.?Superior?Court?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?282?[279?Cal.Rptr.?592,?807?P.2d?434]?[challenge?to?retroactive?application?of?Prop.?115];?Raven?v.?Deukmejian?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?336?[276?Cal.Rptr.?326,?801?P.2d?1077]?[single-subject?and?revision?challenges?to?Prop.?115].)?He?also?contests?the?sufficiency?and?competency?of?the?evidence?presented?at?his?preliminary?hearing.
As?will?appear,?we?conclude?that,?properly?construed?and?applied,?the?hearsay?provisions?of?Proposition?115?are?constitutionally?valid.?We?also?conclude,?however,?that?the?evidence?admitted?at?petitioner’s?preliminary?hearing,?consisting?entirely?of?hearsay?testimony?by?a?noninvestigating?officer?lacking?any?personal?knowledge?of?the?case,?was?insufficient?and?incompetent?to?constitute?probable?cause?to?bind?petitioner?over?for?trial,?and?that?his?motion?to?dismiss?the?charges?should?have?been?granted.
Facts
Petitioner?was?charged?with?one?felony?count?of?driving?under?the?influence?of?alcohol?and/or?drugs?with?three?or?more?prior?similar?convictions?(Veh.?Code,????23152,?subd.?(a),?23175),?one?felony?count?of?driving?with?a?blood-alcohol?level?of?0.08?percent?or?more?(id.,????23152,?subd.?(b),?23175),?as?well?as?misdemeanor?counts?of?driving?with?a?suspended?or?revoked?license?(id.,???14601.2,?subd.?(a)),?and?being?under?the?influence?of?methamphetamine?(Health?&?Saf.?Code,???11550).?These?offenses?were?alleged?to?have?occurred?on?August?8,?1990.?A?preliminary?hearing?was?held?on?September?19,?1990,?leading?to?the?filing?of?an?information?containing?these?charges.
At?the?hearing,?the?People?called?only?a?single?witness,?Officer?Bruce?Alexander,?who?was?not?one?of?the?arresting?or?investigating?officers?and?who?had?no?direct,?personal?knowledge?of?petitioner’s?alleged?offenses.?Over?petitioner’s?continuing?objection?to?the?use?of?hearsay?evidence,?Alexander?attested?to?his?eight?years?of?employment?as?a?police?officer,?and?thereupon?recounted?to?the?magistrate?various?entries?made?in?the?report?of?the?investigating?officer,?Officer?Navin.?Alexander?confirmed?that?he?had?never?discussed?Navin’s?report?with?that?officer,?was?not?personally?acquainted?with?Navin,?and?first?became?aware?of?Navin’s?report,?and?of?the?case?against?petitioner,?on?the?morning?of?the?preliminary?hearing?after?the?district?attorney?handed?him?a?copy?of?Navin’s?report.?[54?Cal.3d?1069]
In?response?to?the?prosecutor’s?questioning,?Alexander?indicated?that,?according?to?Navin’s?report,?on?August?8,?while?in?a?marked?patrol?car,?Navin?saw?a?1969?Chevrolet?traveling?eastbound?on?Cherry?Avenue.?Navin?heard?someone?shout?and?saw?the?driver?of?the?Chevrolet?lean?out?the?window?to?raise?his?right?fist.?Navin?watched?as?a?white?Ford?quickly?passed?the?Chevrolet.?Navin?paced?the?Chevrolet,?which?was?traveling?50?miles?per?hour?in?a?40?miles?per?hour?zone.?Navin?thereupon?made?a?traffic?stop.
Alexander?further?testified?that,?according?to?Navin’s?report,?the?driver?of?the?car?identified?himself?as?Thomas?Paul?Whitman.?Among?other?things,?Navin?noticed?the?strong?odor?of?alcohol,?bloodshot?eyes,?and?dilated?pupils.?The?driver’s?mood?changed?from?passive?to?belligerent,?leading?Navin?to?believe?that?the?driver?might?be?under?the?influence?of?drugs.?Alexander?continued?his?”testimony,”?relating,?according?to?Navin,?that?the?driver?successfully?completed?the?finger-dexterity?test?and?balanced?on?one?foot,?but?swayed?when?asked?to?walk?a?straight?line.?Believing?the?driver?was?under?the?influence,?Navin?transported?him?to?the?station?where?a?blood?test?was?administered.?Counsel?stipulated?that?a?blood?test?revealed?a?blood-?alcohol?level?of?0.08?percent?and?was?positive?for?the?presence?of?methamphetamine.
Thereupon,?Alexander?was?permitted?to?state?his?opinion,?based?solely?on?the?information?revealed?in?Navin’s?report,?that?petitioner?had?been?under?the?influence?of?alcohol?and?”perhaps?some?type?of?stimulant.”
Defense?counsel?moved?to?strike?all?of?Alexander’s?direct?testimony?for?lack?of?proper?foundation?regarding?Navin’s?qualifications?as?a?police?officer.?The?magistrate?denied?the?motion,?after?permitting?Alexander?to?opine?that?because?Navin’s?badge?number?was?considerably?lower?than?his,?Navin?probably?had?12?years’?experience?as?a?police?officer.
On?cross-examination,?Alexander?admitted?he?did?not?know?the?time?or?circumstances?of?the?preparation?of?Navin’s?report,?or?the?various?tests?conducted?to?determine?petitioner’s?sobriety.?Additionally,?Alexander?was?unable?to?explain?certain?discrepancies?and?omissions?in?the?report.?Counsel?elicited?the?fact?that?although?Navin’s?report?indicated?petitioner’s?eyes?were?brown,?in?fact?they?are?green.
Despite?petitioner’s?objections?and?his?argument?that?Alexander?could?not?personally?identify?him?as?the?suspect?stopped?by?Navin,?the?magistrate?held?petitioner?to?answer?on?the?counts?charged.?The?magistrate?noted?that?the?description?of?petitioner?contained?in?Navin’s?report?closely?matched?the?description?in?the?records?of?the?Department?of?Motor?Vehicles,?which?was?also?placed?in?evidence.?[54?Cal.3d?1070]
Thereafter,?petitioner?moved?the?superior?court?to?dismiss?the?information?(Pen.?Code,???995),?on?the?ground?that?the?evidence?elicited?at?the?preliminary?hearing?was?incompetent?and?insufficient?to?establish?probable?cause.?The?motion?was?denied,?and?the?Court?of?Appeal?summarily?denied?petitioner’s?application?for?mandate.?We?issued?an?alternative?writ?of?mandate?to?consider?the?important?constitutional?and?interpretive?questions?presented.
Petitioner?raises?a?variety?of?arguments?regarding?the?admissibility,?and?constitutional?propriety,?of?Officer?Alexander’s?hearsay?testimony.?Before?we?consider?these?contentions,?we?first?review?the?new?constitutional?and?statutory?hearsay?provisions?added?by?Proposition?115.
Constitutional?and?Statutory?Provisions
Proposition?115?added?both?constitutional?and?statutory?language?pertinent?to?our?present?inquiry.?Section?30,?subdivision?(b),?is?added?to?article?I?of?the?state?Constitution,?declaring?hearsay?evidence?admissible?at?preliminary?hearings?in?criminal?cases,?as?may?be?provided?by?law.?(“In?order?to?protect?victims?and?witnesses?in?criminal?cases,?hearsay?evidence?shall?be?admissible?at?preliminary?hearings,?as?prescribed?by?the?Legislature?or?by?the?people?through?the?initiative?process.”)
In?addition,?the?measure?amends?section?872,?subdivision?(b),?of?the?Penal?Code?to?provide?that?a?probable?cause?determination?at?a?preliminary?hearing?may?be?based?on?hearsay?statements?related?by?a?police?officer?with?certain?qualifications?and?experience.?(“Notwithstanding?Section?1200?of?the?Evidence?Code?[(the?hearsay?rule)],?the?finding?of?probable?cause?may?be?based?in?whole?or?in?part?upon?the?sworn?testimony?of?a?law?enforcement?officer?relating?the?statements?of?declarants?made?out?of?court?offered?for?the?truth?of?the?matter?asserted.?Any?law?enforcement?officer?testifying?as?to?hearsay?statements?shall?either?have?five?years?of?law?enforcement?experience?or?have?completed?a?training?course?certified?by?the?Commission?on?Peace?Officer?Standards?and?Training?which?includes?training?in?the?investigation?and?reporting?of?cases?and?testifying?at?preliminary?hearings.”)
Additionally,?section?1203.1?is?added?to?the?Evidence?Code?to?provide?a?preliminary?hearing?exception?to?the?general?requirement?that?all?hearsay?declarants?be?made?available?for?cross-examination.?(“Section?1203?is?not?applicable?if?the?hearsay?statement?is?offered?at?a?preliminary?examination,?as?provided?in?Section?872?of?the?Penal?Code.”)
Further,?Penal?Code?section?866,?subdivision?(a),?is?amended?to?give?the?magistrate?discretion?to?limit?the?defendant’s?right?to?call?witnesses?on?the?[54?Cal.3d?1071]?defendant’s?behalf.?(“The?magistrate?shall?not?permit?the?testimony?of?any?defense?witness?unless?the?offer?of?proof?discloses?to?the?satisfaction?of?the?magistrate,?in?his?or?her?discretion,?that?the?testimony?of?that?witness,?if?believed,?would?be?reasonably?likely?to?establish?an?affirmative?defense,?negate?an?element?of?a?crime?charged,?or?impeach?the?testimony?of?a?prosecution?witness?or?the?statement?of?a?declarant?testified?to?by?a?prosecution?witness.”)
Finally,?Penal?code?section?866,?subdivision?(b),?explains?that?”It?is?the?purpose?of?a?preliminary?examination?to?establish?whether?there?exists?probable?cause?to?believe?that?the?defendant?has?committed?a?felony.?The?examination?shall?not?be?used?for?purposes?of?discovery.”
We?note?that?our?discussion?herein?relates?solely?to?proceedings?initiated?by?complaint?and?information?rather?than?by?indictment,?because?under?Proposition?115,?”If?a?felony?is?prosecuted?by?indictment,?there?shall?be?no?postindictment?preliminary?hearing.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?I,???14.1.)?The?validity?of?this?provision?of?the?measure?is?presently?before?this?court?in?Bowens?v.?Superior?Court,?SO19774.fn.?*
Discussion
As?previously?indicated,?in?addition?to?contesting?the?sufficiency?of?the?evidence?elicited?at?the?preliminary?hearing,?petitioner?raises?various?constitutional?challenges?to?the?foregoing?provisions?of?Proposition?115.?He?argues?that?the?use?of?hearsay?testimony?without?confrontation?or?cross-?examination?of?the?declarants?violates?his?federal?Sixth?Amendment?right?to?confrontation,?his?Fourteenth?Amendment?right?to?due?process?of?law,?and?the?separation?of?powers?doctrine?of?article?III?of?the?state?Constitution.?In?addition,?he?asserts?Proposition?115?violates?the?single-subject?and?revision?provisions?(art.?II,???8,?subd.?(d),?&?art.?XVIII)?of?the?California?Constitution.
In?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?336,?we?rejected?an?identical?single-subject?rule?challenge?to?Proposition?115.?We?also?rejected?a?revision?challenge?to?the?entire?measure,?invalidating?only?a?severable?provision?that?would?have?required?state?courts?to?interpret?certain?enumerated?state?constitutional?rights?consistently?with?the?federal?Constitution.?The?principles?expressed?in?Raven?adequately?dispose?of?petitioner’s?single-subject?rule?and?revision?challenges.?(See?52?Cal.3d?at?pp.?349-350.)
[1a]?Before?discussing?the?merits?of?petitioner’s?various?remaining?constitutional?challenges,?we?first?turn?to?his?alternative?argument?to?the?effect?[54?Cal.3d?1072]?that,?as?an?interpretive?matter,?the?hearsay?provisions?of?Proposition?115?did?not?contemplate,?and?do?not?permit,?reliance?on?hearsay?of?the?kind?involved?in?this?case.?Thereafter,?we?address?petitioner’s?constitutional?arguments.- Testimony?of?Noninvestigating?Officers?or?”Readers”
Petitioner’s?primary?argument?is?that,?as?a?matter?of?sound?statutory?interpretation,?Officer?Alexander?should?not?have?been?permitted?to?relate?the?contents?of?Officer?Navin’s?investigative?report?because?Alexander?was?not?involved?in?the?investigation?of?the?case?and?had?no?personal?knowledge?of?the?circumstances?under?which?Navin’s?report?was?prepared.?We?agree.?Properly?construed,?Proposition?115?does?not?authorize?a?finding?of?probable?cause?based?on?the?testimony?of?a?noninvestigating?officer?or?”reader”?merely?reciting?the?police?report?of?an?investigating?officer.?We?believe?the?probable?intent?of?the?framers?of?the?measure?was?to?allow?a?properly?qualified?investigating?officer?to?relate?out-of-court?statements?by?crime?victims?or?witnesses,?including?other?law?enforcement?personnel,?without?requiring?the?victims’?or?witnesses’?presence?in?court.?The?testifying?officer,?however,?must?not?be?a?mere?reader?but?must?have?sufficient?knowledge?of?the?crime?or?the?circumstances?under?which?the?out-of-court?statement?was?[54?Cal.3d?1073]?made?so?as?to?meaningfully?assist?the?magistrate?in?assessing?the?reliability?of?the?statement.
New?Penal?Code?section?872,?subdivision?(b),?by?its?terms?refers?to?”testimony?of?a?law?enforcement?officer?relating?the?statements?of?declarants?made?out?of?court?….”?(Italics?added.)?A?”declarant”?is?defined?by?Evidence?Code?section?135?as?”a?person?who?makes?a?statement.”?As?the?Legislative?Analyst?described?it?to?the?voters,?the?intent?underlying?this?provision?was?to?allow?introduction?of?”out-of-court?statements”?at?preliminary?hearings?if?those?statements?are?”introduced?through?the?testimony?of?certain?trained?and?experienced?law?enforcement?officers.”?(Ballot?Pamp.,?Proposed?Stats.?and?Amends.?to?Cal.?Const.?with?arguments?to?voters,?Primary?Elec.?(June?5,?1990)?p.?33.)?As?the?People?observe,?the?section?and?its?use?of?the?term?”declarants”?is?not?limited?to?the?statements?of?civilian?or?citizen?witnesses?but?would?include?the?statements?or?reports?of?any?persons,?including?other?law?enforcement?officers?such?as?Officer?Navin?herein.
But?other?provisions?of?the?measure?convince?us?that?the?use?of?mere?”readers”?such?as?Officer?Alexander?was?not?contemplated?by?the?measure.?To?permit?testimony?by?noninvestigating?officers?that?merely?recites?the?contents?of?the?reports?of?the?investigating?officers?would?render?largely?meaningless?or?nugatory?the?new?statutory?provision,?also?added?by?Proposition?115,?that?requires?that?the?testifying?officer?have?at?least?five?years?of?law?enforcement?experience?or?have?completed?a?training?course?covering?the?”investigating?and?reporting”?of?criminal?cases.?(Pen.?Code,???872,?subd.?(b).)?This?provision?undoubtedly?was?intended?to?enhance?the?reliability?of?hearsay?testimony?at?preliminary?hearings.?Yet?such?reliability?is?not?furthered?if?the?only?testimonial?function?of?the?”qualified”?noninvestigating?officer?such?as?Officer?Alexander?is?to?parrot?information?contained?in?a?report?prepared?by?another?officer?who?may?lack?such?extensive?experience?or?training.
As?petitioner?observes,?the?experience?and?training?requirements?of?Penal?Code?section?872,?subdivision?(b),?could?be?readily?circumvented?if?prosecutors?were?permitted?routinely?to?designate?the?same?”qualified”?officer?as?a?”reader”?of?the?reports?of?other?officers,?regardless?of?their?own?qualifications,?or?lack?thereof.?The?alternate?requirement?of?training?in?”investigating?and?reporting”?crimes?strongly?supports?petitioner’s?position?that?Proposition?115’s?hearsay?provisions?were?intended?to?foreclose?the?testimony?of?a?noninvestigating?officer?lacking?personal?knowledge?of?either?the?crime?or?the?circumstances?under?which?the?out-of-court?statements?were?made.?(See?generally,?Cowell,?When?Prelims?Turn?Pro?Forma?(Mar.?1991)?11?Cal.?Law.,?at?p.?104.)?[54?Cal.3d?1074]
Thus,?in?permitting?only?officers?with?lengthy?experience?or?special?training?to?testify?regarding?out-of-court?statements,?Penal?Code?section?872,?subdivision?(b),?plainly?contemplates?that?the?testifying?officer?will?be?capable?of?using?his?or?her?experience?and?expertise?to?assess?the?circumstances?under?which?the?statement?is?made?and?to?accurately?describe?those?circumstances?to?the?magistrate?so?as?to?increase?the?reliability?of?the?underlying?evidence.
Moreover,?to?allow?testimony?by?noninvestigating?officers?or?readers?would?seemingly?sanction?a?form?of?double?or?multiple?hearsay?beyond?the?contemplation?of?the?framers?of,?and?voters?for,?Proposition?115.?(See?Evid.?Code,???1201?[multiple?hearsay?admissible?only?if?each?hearsay?statement?admissible?under?hearsay?rule?exception].)?Although?such?multiple?hearsay?was?not?present?in?this?case,?we?doubt?that?Proposition?115?was?intended?to?sanction?a?procedure?whereby?a?noninvestigating?officer,?lacking?any?personal?knowledge?of?the?matter,?nonetheless?would?be?permitted?to?relate?not?only?what?the?investigating?officer?told?him?or?her,?but?also?what?the?other?witnesses?told?the?investigating?officer.?It?is?noteworthy?that?although?Proposition?115?created?an?exception?to?the?basic?hearsay?rule?contained?in?Evidence?Code?section?1200?(see?new?Pen.?Code,???872,?subd.?(b)),?the?measure?did?not?purport?to?create?a?similar?exception?for?the?multiple?hearsay?rule?of?Evidence?Code?section?1201.
In?addition,?an?interpretation?of?Proposition?115?that?would?allow?”reader”?or?multiple?hearsay?testimony?would?raise?constitutional?questions?that?we?can?and?should?avoid?by?limiting?admissible?hearsay?testimony?to?testimony?by?qualified?investigative?officers.?(See,?e.g.,?People?v.?Smith?(1983)?34?Cal.3d?251,?259?[193?Cal.Rptr.?692,?667?P.2d?149]?[construing?Prop.?8,?”The?Victims’?Bill?of?Rights”?initiative?measure,?to?avoid?constitutional?doubts].)?As?discussed?below,?we?believe?that?the?latter,?more?limited,?form?of?hearsay?evidence?satisfies?federal?requirements?of?reliability?(see?Ohio?v.?Roberts?(1980)?448?U.S.?56,?63-65?[65?L.Ed.2d?597,?605-607,?100?S.Ct.?2531]),?and?thus?properly?may?be?admitted?at?preliminary?hearings?despite?the?defendant’s?inability?to?confront?and?cross-examine?the?declarant?witness?or?victim.?But?substantial?additional?objections?to?the?reliability?of?the?evidence?might?arise?if?multiple?hearsay?were?involved,?and?the?defendant?were?also?deprived?of?the?opportunity?to?meaningfully?cross-examine?the?testifying?officer?regarding?the?circumstances?under?which?the?out-of-court?statement?was?made.
In?the?present?case,?for?example,?on?cross-examination,?Officer?Alexander?was?unable?to?answer?potentially?significant?questions?regarding?the?methods?and?circumstances?of?Officer?Navin’s?investigation,?including?the?time?the?report?was?written,?the?details?of?the?sobriety?test?given?petitioner,?and?[54?Cal.3d?1075]?petitioner’s?pupil?reaction?and?degree?of?dilation.?Indeed,?Alexander?was?even?uncertain?how?long?Navin?had?been?employed?on?the?force?or?even?whether?Navin?was?a?male?or?female?officer.?Similar?uncertainties?are?inherent?in?any?procedure?in?which?the?testifying?officer?acts?as?no?more?than?a?”reader”?of?another?officer’s?investigative?report.
[3]?In?her?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion,?Justice?Kennard?suggests?that?the?term?”declarant”?in?section?872,?subdivision?(b)?should?be?interpreted?to?refer?only?to?”citizen”?declarants?and?not?to?police?officer?declarants.?The?statutory?language?contains?no?such?limitation,?however,?and?one?of?the?principal?purposes?of?Proposition?115-to?increase?the?efficient?administration?of?the?criminal?justice?system,?and,?in?particular,?to?streamline?the?preliminary?hearing?procedure?(see,?e.g.,?Prop.?115,????1,?subd.?(c),?16,?17,?18,?Primary?Elec.?(June?5,?1990)?[Deering’s?Ann.?Cal.?Const.?(1991?pocket?supp.)?note?foll.?art.?I,???14.1,?pp.?44-45;?Pen.?Code,????866,?871.6,?872])-strongly?supports?an?interpretation?of?the?provision?in?accordance?with?its?”plain?meaning,”?permitting?a?qualified?officer?to?testify?to?out-of-court?statements?by?fellow?officers?and?thereby?eliminating?the?need?for?the?separate?appearance?and?testimony?of?a?substantial?number?of?police?officers?at?preliminary?hearings.?Although?the?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion?suggests?that?its?proposed?interpretation?has?the?advantage?of?establishing?a?”bright?line”?test?that?the?court’s?opinion?lacks,?in?reality?the?suggested?interpretation?would?simply?narrow?the?class?of?persons?whose?out-of-court?statements?could?be?introduced,?but?would?still?require?a?further?standard?for?determining?the?required?relationship?between?the?testifying?officer?and?the?out-of-court?statement. [1c]?Thus,?we?conclude?that?the?magistrate?erred?in?allowing?Officer?Alexander?to?read?or?relate?portions?of?Officer?Navin’s?report,?and?that?such?error?requires?dismissal?of?the?information.?It?appears,?however,?that?the?People?will?be?entitled?to?refile?the?information?(see?Pen.?Code,???1387),?and?a?new?preliminary?hearing?may?be?held.?Accordingly,?for?purposes?of?guiding?the?lower?courts?during?any?such?further?proceedings,?we?will?consider?petitioner’s?alternative?contentions.- Constitutional?Right?to?Confrontation
In?the?foregoing?discussion,?we?construe?Proposition?115?to?allow?an?investigating?officer?to?relate?at?the?preliminary?hearing?any?relevant?statements?of?victims?or?witnesses,?if?the?testifying?officer?has?sufficient?knowledge?of?the?crime?or?the?circumstances?under?which?the?out-of-court?statement?was?made?so?as?to?meaningfully?assist?the?magistrate?in?assessing?the?reliability?of?the?statement.?The?new?measure?would?permit?the?magistrate?to?base?a?finding?of?probable?cause?entirely?on?that?testimony.?(Pen.?Code,?[54?Cal.3d?1076]???872,?subd.?(b).)?Petitioner?asserts?that?such?a?procedure?would?violate?his?state?and?federal?constitutional?rights?to?confront?his?accusers.?We?disagree.
- State?Confrontation?Clause
Section?15?of?article?I?of?the?state?Constitution?guarantees?to?the?defendant?in?a?criminal?case?various?procedural?rights,?including?the?right?”to?be?confronted?with?the?witnesses?against?the?defendant.”?We?relied?on?that?provision?in?Mills?v.?Superior?Court?(1986)?42?Cal.3d?951,?956-960?[232?Cal.Rptr.?141,?728?P.2d?211],?to?invalidate?a?former?version?of?Penal?Code?section?872?that?deprived?defendants?of?certain?confrontation?and?cross-examination?rights?at?preliminary?hearings.
Under?the?former?statute?at?issue?in?Mills?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?a?finding?of?probable?cause?could?be?based?on?the?hearsay?statements?of?a?witness?who?was?neither?an?eyewitness?nor?a?victim,?but?only?if?the?defendant?failed?to?make?reasonable?efforts?to?secure?the?presence?of?the?witness?at?the?preliminary?hearing.?We?grounded?our?decision?invalidating?the?statute?on?prior?California?cases?acknowledging?the?”critical?importance”?of?the?preliminary?hearing?as?a?mechanism?to?weed?out?groundless?claims.?As?we?stated,?”Only?by?preserving?the?adversarial?character?of?the?preliminary?hearing?can?we?enable?the?magistrate?responsibly?to?’weigh?the?evidence,?resolve?conflicts?and?give?or?withhold?credence?to?particular?witnesses.’?[Citations.]”?(42?Cal.3d?at?p.?957.)?We?concluded?that?the?challenged?statute,?by?requiring?a?defendant?to?expend?”reasonable?efforts”?to?secure?a?witness’s?presence?at?the?hearing,?”unduly?strains?defendant’s?rights?under?article?I,?section?15,?of?the?California?Constitution.”?(Id.?at?p.?958.)
[4]?By?virtue?of?the?passage?of?Proposition?115,?Mills?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?42?Cal.3d?951,?is?no?longer?controlling?authority.?Although?the?state?Constitution?continues?to?afford?an?independent?source?of?relief?from?infringement?of?the?right?to?confront?one’s?accusers?(see?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?336?[invalidating?Prop.?115?to?extent?it?would?have?required?interpretation?of?confrontation?clause,?and?other?procedural?rights,?consistently?with?federal?Constitution]),?nonetheless,?by?reason?of?the?adoption?of?new?section?30,?subdivision?(b),?of?article?I,?the?state?Constitution?now?expressly?permits?the?admission?of?”hearsay”?evidence?at?preliminary?hearings,?as?provided?by?law.?(Cf.?Cal.?Const.,?art.?I,???28,?subd.?(d)?[added?in?1982?by?Prop.?8?to?provide?that?all?relevant?evidence?is?admissible?at?trial?or?pretrial?hearings,?subject?to?then?existing?statutory?hearsay?rules].)The?new?constitutional?provision?thus?represents?a?specific?exception?to?the?broad?confrontation?right?set?forth?in?article?I,?section?15?of?the?California?Constitution.?(See?Izazaga?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?ante,?356,?at?p.?371,?[54?Cal.3d?1077]?and?cases?cited?[applying?to?reciprocal?discovery?provisions?of?Prop.?115?the?rule?that?more?recent,?specific?constitutional?provisions?override?or?limit?older,?more?general?provisions];?cf.?People?v.?Valentine?(1986)?42?Cal.3d?170,?181?[228?Cal.Rptr.?25,?720?P.2d?913]?[express?constitutional?provision?of?Prop.?8?allowing?in-court?proof?of?defendant’s?ex-felon?status?overrides?prior?decisions?stating?contrary?rule?under?state?due?process?clause].)?Thus,?in?this?state,?any?future?constitutional?objection?to?the?admission?of?such?hearsay?evidence?at?preliminary?hearings?must?be?founded?on?federal?constitutional?principles.
- Federal?Confrontation?Clause
The?foregoing?confrontation?clause?is?not?an?absolute?bar?to?all?hearsay?evidence?or?other?procedures?which?may?limit?or?preclude?a?direct?face-to-?face?confrontation?between?accused?and?accuser.?Thus?far,?at?least,?the?clause?has?operated?to?exclude?admission?at?trial?of?some?otherwise?admissible?hearsay?evidence,?although?many?exceptions?exist?to?that?bar.?(See?Idaho?v.?Wright?(1990)?497?U.S.?805?[111?L.Ed.2d?638,?110?S.Ct.?3139]?[admissibility?at?trial?of?hearsay?statements?by?child?victims?of?sexual?abuse];?Ohio?v.?Roberts,?supra,?448?U.S.?at?pp.?63-65?[65?L.Ed.2d?605-607]?[admissibility?at?trial?of?hearsay?statements?if?elements?of?reliability?of?testimony?and?unavailability?of?declarant?are?shown];?Bourjaily?v.?United?States?(1987)?483?U.S.?171,?182-184?[97?L.Ed.2d?144,?156-158,?107?S.Ct.?2775]?[requirement?of?reliability?of?testimony?satisfied?by?”firmly?rooted”?coconspirator?exception?to?hearsay?rule];?United?States?v.?Inadi?(1986)475?U.S.?387,?394-400?[89?L.Ed.2d?390,?397-402,?106?S.Ct.?1121]?[requirement?of?unavailability?of?declarant?inapplicable?to?statements?made?by?nontestifying?coconspirator];?see?also?Maryland?v.?Craig?(1990)?497?U.S.?836?[111?L.Ed.2d?666,?110?S.Ct.?3157]?[invalidity?of?one-way?closed?circuit?television?procedure?to?elicit?testimony?at?trial?of?child?abuse?victim];?Coy?v.?Idaho?(1988)487?U.S.?1012?[101?L.Ed.2d?857,?108?S.Ct.?2798]?[propriety?of?placing?screen?between?defendant?and?child?victim?at?trial];?Kentucky?v.?Stincer?(1987)?482?U.S.?730,?737-740?[96?L.Ed.2d?631,?642-644,?107?S.Ct.?2658]?[excluding?defendant?from?child?victims’?competency?hearing?was?not?confrontation?clause?violation?because?victims?were?available?for?cross-examination?at?trial];?Herbert?v.?Superior?Court?(1981)?117?Cal.App.3d?661,?667?[172?Cal.Rptr.?850,?19?A.L.R.4th?1276].)
Petitioner,?focusing?on?the?foregoing?”reliability”?element?for?evaluating?hearsay?evidence,?contends?that?new?Penal?Code?section?872,?subdivision?(b),?”has?no?provision?for?guaranteeing?the?reliability?of?the?hearsay.”?As?we?[54?Cal.3d?1078]?construe?the?section,?however,?it?does?not?permit?hearsay?testimony?by?a?noninvestigating?officer?lacking?any?personal?knowledge?of?the?circumstances?under?which?the?out-of-court?statement,?declaration?or?report?was?made.?Additionally,?the?experience?and?training?requirements?of?the?section?help?assure?that?the?hearsay?testimony?of?the?investigating?officer?will?indeed?be?as?reliable?as?appropriate?in?light?of?the?limited?purpose?of?the?preliminary?hearing,?as?discussed?in?greater?detail?below.?(See?Manson?v.?Brathwaite?(1977)?432?U.S.?98,?115?[53?L.Ed.2d?140,?154-155,?97?S.Ct.?2243]?[reliability?of?trained,?experienced?police?officers].)?Although?the?underlying?reliability?of?the?victim?or?witness?may?remain?untested?until?trial,?we?think?the?evaluation?and?cross-examination?of?the?testimony?of?the?qualified?investigating?officer?provides?sufficient?basis?for?a?pretrial?probable?cause?determination.
Finally,?under?new?Penal?Code?section?866,?subdivision?(a),?the?magistrate?has?authority?to?permit?the?defendant?to?call?any?witness?whose?proposed?testimony?would?be?reasonably?likely?to?establish?an?affirmative?defense,?negate?a?crime?element,?or?impeach?prosecution?evidence.?Based?on?the?foregoing?safeguards?or?limitations,?the?new?provisions?appear?to?satisfy?petitioner’s?reliability?objections.
Moreover,?aside?from?questions?of?reliability,?it?is?doubtful?that?the?federal?confrontation?clause?operates?to?bar?hearsay?evidence?offered?at?a?preliminary?hearing?held?to?determine?whether?probable?cause?exists?to?hold?the?defendant?for?trial.
Several?California?appellate?cases?have?assumed?that?either?the?Sixth?or?Fourteenth?Amendments?to?the?federal?Constitution?guarantees?a?right?of?confrontation?and?cross-examination?at?preliminary?hearings.?(E.g.,?People?v.?Harris?(1985)?165?Cal.App.3d?1246,?1256?[212?Cal.Rptr.?216],?and?cases?cited;?Herbert?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?117?Cal.App.3d?661,?665-666,?&?fn.?3;?Gallaher?v.?Superior?Court?(1980)?103?Cal.App.3d?666,?671?[162?Cal.Rptr.?389];?see?also?Jennings?v.?Superior?Court?(1967)?66?Cal.2d?867,?875?[59?Cal.Rptr.?440,?428?P.2d?304];?but?see?Herbert?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?117?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?671-672?[conc.?opn.?by?Puglia,?P.?J.].)?As?petitioner?acknowledges,?however,?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?has?never?so?held.?Indeed,?as?we?will?explain,?there?are?indications?in?prior?high?court?cases?that?a?constitutional?challenge?to?the?hearsay?procedures?now?permitted?by?Proposition?115?would?fail.?Moreover,?the?scope?and?purpose?of?California?preliminary?hearings?were?considerably?broader?when?the?foregoing?appellate?cases?were?decided,?thus?calling?in?question?the?continued?validity?of?their?conclusion.
First,?as?petitioner?acknowledges,?other?than?the?probable?cause?hearing?held?to?justify?continued?detention?of?the?accused?(discussed?below),?there?[54?Cal.3d?1079]?exists?no?federal?constitutional?right?to?a?preliminary?hearing?to?determine?whether?a?case?should?proceed?to?trial.?Instead,?in?the?federal?system,?most?felonies?and?capital?offenses?are?prosecuted?by?indictment.?(U.S.?Const.,?Fifth?Amend.;?see?Smith?v.?United?States?(1959)?360?U.S.?1,?6-7?[3?L.Ed.2d?1041,?1046-?1047,?79?S.Ct.?991];?United?States?v.?Luxenberg?(6th?Cir.?1967)?374?F.2d?241,?248,?and?cases?cited.)?Moreover,?it?is?well?established?that?hearsay?is?admissible?in?indictment?proceedings?before?federal?grand?juries.?(Costello?v.?United?States?(1956)?350?U.S.?359,?363-364?[100?L.Ed.?397,?402-403,?76?S.Ct.?406].)
Indeed,?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?has?repeatedly?stated?that?”The?right?to?confrontation?is?basically?a?trial?right.”?(Barber?v.?Page?(1968)?390?U.S.?719,?725?[20?L.Ed.2d?255,?260,?88?S.Ct.?1318],?italics?added;?accord?Kentucky?v.?Stincer,?supra,?482?U.S.?at?p.?737?[96?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?642];?Pennsylvania?v.?Ritchie?(1987)?480?U.S.?39,?52?[94?L.Ed.2d?40,?54,?107?S.Ct.?989];?California?v.?Green?(1970)?399?U.S.?149,?156-157?[26?L.Ed.2d?489,?495-497,?90?S.Ct.?1930]?[federal?confrontation?clause?was?aimed?at?eliminating?practice?of?trying?defendants?on?basis?of?witnesses’?out-of-court?statements?and?declarations].)?As?Barber?explained?(in?the?context?of?contrasting?the?utility?of?confrontation?at?a?preliminary?hearing),?the?confrontation?right?”includes?both?the?opportunity?to?cross-examine?and?the?occasion?for?the?jury?to?weigh?the?demeanor?of?the?witness.?A?preliminary?hearing?is?ordinarily?a?much?less?searching?exploration?into?the?merits?of?a?case?than?a?trial,?simply?because?its?function?is?the?more?limited?one?of?determining?whether?probable?cause?exists?to?hold?the?accused?for?trial.”?(390?U.S.?at?p.?725?[20?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?260].)
A?few?years?later,?the?high?court?squarely?held?that?the?federal?confrontation?clause?does?not?require?that?full?adversarial?safeguards,?such?as?presentation?of?witnesses?and?cross-examination?of?their?testimony,?be?made?available?for?every?pretrial?probable?cause?hearing.?(Gerstein?v.?Pugh?(1975)?420?U.S.?103,?119-124?[43?L.Ed.2d?54,?68-71,?95?S.Ct.?854],?hereafter?Gerstein.)?Gerstein?explained?that,?for?purposes?of?Fourth?Amendment?analysis?in?determining?whether?probable?cause?exists?to?detain?an?arrestee?for?a?significant?time?pending?trial,?a?full?adversarial?hearing,?together?with?confrontation?and?cross-examination?of?witnesses,?need?not?be?afforded?so?long?as?a?”timely?judicial?determination”?of?probable?cause?is?made?as?a?prerequisite?to?continued?detention.?(Id.?at?p.?126?[43?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?72].)
The?court?in?Gerstein?contrasted?Fourth?Amendment?detention?hearings?with?the?more?formal?preliminary?hearings?used?in?many?states?to?determine?whether?the?evidence?justifies?going?to?trial.?(420?U.S.?at?pp.?119-120?[43?[54?Cal.3d?1080]?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?68-69].)?The?court?observed?that?”adversary?procedures?are?customarily?employed”?during?such?formal?hearings?(id.?at?p.?120?[43?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?69]),?but?it?avoided?suggesting?that?such?procedures?are?constitutionally?mandated.?Instead,?Gerstein?simply?noted?”that?state?systems?of?criminal?procedure?vary?widely,”?encouraged?such?”experimentation,”?and?concluded?that?”There?is?no?single?preferred?pretrial?procedure,?and?the?nature?of?the?probable?cause?determination?usually?will?be?shaped?to?accord?with?a?State’s?pretrial?procedure?viewed?as?a?whole.”?(Id.?at?p.?123?[43?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?71].)
Significantly,?Gerstein?observed?that,?by?their?very?nature,?probable?cause?determinations?do?not?involve?”the?fine?resolution?of?conflicting?evidence?that?a?reasonable-doubt?or?even?a?preponderance?standard?demands,?and?credibility?determinations?are?seldom?crucial?in?deciding?whether?the?evidence?supports?a?reasonable?belief?in?guilt.?[Citation.]?This?is?not?to?say?that?confrontation?and?cross-?examination?might?not?enhance?the?reliability?of?probable?cause?determinations?in?some?cases.?In?most?cases,?however,?their?value?would?be?too?slight?to?justify?holding,?as?a?matter?of?constitutional?principle,?that?these?formalities?and?safeguards?designed?for?trial?must?also?be?employed?in?making?the?Fourth?Amendment?determination?of?probable?cause.”?(420?U.S.?at?pp.?121-122?[43?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?69-70],?fn.?omitted.)
The?Gerstein?court?acknowledged?that?a?prior?decision?(Coleman?v.?Alabama?(1970)?399?U.S.?1[26?L.Ed.2d?387,?90?S.Ct.?1999])?had?held?an?Alabama?preliminary?hearing?was?a?”critical?stage”?of?the?prosecution?for?which?the?presence?of?counsel?was?required.?But?the?court?noted?that?under?the?Alabama?law?involved?in?Coleman,?not?only?was?the?purpose?of?the?hearing?to?determine?probable?cause?to?charge?an?offense,?but?the?suspect?was?specifically?allowed?to?confront?and?cross-?examine?prosecution?witnesses?at?such?hearings,?thus?making?it?essential?that?the?defendant?have?counsel’s?assistance.?The?Gerstein?court?continued?by?stating?that?”This?consideration?[need?for?counsel’s?assistance]?does?not?apply?when?the?prosecution?is?not?required?to?produce?witnesses?for?cross-examination.”?(420?U.S.?at?p.?123?[43?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?70-71].)?Gerstein’s?implication?seems?to?be?that?state?limitations?on?the?purpose?and?scope?of?the?preliminary?hearing?may?reduce?the?necessity?for?adversarial?procedural?safeguards?such?as?right?to?counsel.
Assuming,?based?on?the?foregoing?language?in?Gerstein,?supra,?420?U.S.?103,?and?Coleman?v.?Alabama,?supra,?399?U.S.?1,?that?the?confines?of?the?federal?confrontation?clause?may?vary?depending?on?the?purpose?and?scope?of?the?hearing?provided?by?state?law,?it?seems?reasonable?to?conclude?that?the?federal?clause?is?not?violated?by?allowing?hearsay?testimony?at?post-Proposition?115?preliminary?hearings?in?this?state.?Under?that?measure,?the?very?purpose?of?the?hearing?has?been?considerably?narrowed:?”It?is?the?purpose?of?[54?Cal.3d?1081]?a?preliminary?examination?to?establish?whether?there?exists?probable?cause?to?believe?that?the?defendant?has?committed?a?felony.?The?examination?shall?not?be?used?for?purposes?of?discovery.”?(Pen.?Code,???866,?subd.?(b),?italics?added.)
The?foregoing?statutory?pronouncement?marks?a?sharp?contrast?to?this?court’s?previous?expansive?concept?of?the?preliminary?hearing?as?a?discovery?and?trial?preparation?device,?allowing?counsel?the?opportunity?to?”fashion”?their?impeachment?tools?for?use?in?cross-examination?at?trial,?to?preserve?testimony?favorable?to?the?defense,?and?to?provide?the?defense?”with?valuable?information?about?the?case?against?the?accused,?enhancing?its?ability?to?evaluate?the?desirability?of?entering?a?plea?or?to?prepare?for?trial.”?(Hawkins?v.?Superior?Court?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?584,?588?[150?Cal.Rptr.?435,?586?P.2d?916].)?Significantly,?the?utility?of?the?preliminary?hearing?as?a?discovery?tool?has?been?cited?in?support?of?the?minority?position?that?the?use?of?hearsay?at?such?hearings?violates?the?defendant’s?confrontation?rights.?(See,?e.g.,?State?v.?Anderson?(Utah?1980)?612?P.2d?778,?784-786?[relying?on?confrontation?clause?of?Utah?Const.].)
[6]?As?Justice?Puglia?explained?in?his?concurring?opinion?in?Herbert?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?117?Cal.App.3d?at?pages?671-672,?”The?constitutional?right?of?confrontation?is?’basically?a?trial?right’?[citations].?Although?the?federal?Constitution?requires?a?probable?cause?hearing?to?justify?significant?pretrial?detention?of?defendant,?that?hearing?need?not?include?traditional?adversary?safeguards?such?as?the?right?of?confrontation?[citing?Gerstein,?supra,?420?U.S.?103].?Moreover,?the?federal?Constitution?does?not?require?a?judicial?hearing?at?all?as?a?prerequisite?to?prosecution?by?information.?[Citation.]?A?fortiori,?when?state?procedure?nevertheless?provides?for?such?a?hearing,?it?would?logically?follow?that?the?federal?Constitution?does?not?require?the?entire?panoply?of?procedural?rights?available?at?trial?to?be?observed?in?the?pretrial?hearing?[citation].”We?agree?with?Justice?Puglia’s?analysis.?We?note?that,?under?the?express?language?of?rule?5.1(a)?of?the?Federal?Rules?of?Criminal?Procedure?(18?U.S.C.),?as?approved?by?the?United?States?Supreme?Court,?a?magistrate?at?a?federal?preliminary?examination?may?base?his?or?her?finding?of?probable?cause?in?whole,?or?in?part,?on?hearsay?evidence.?(See?Wright,?Federal?Practice?and?Procedure?(2d?ed.?1982)?Criminal,???85,?pp.?183-184.)?We?think?it?would?be?anomalous?to?hold?that?the?admission?of?such?evidence?at?a?comparable?state?proceeding?violates?federal?confrontation?clause?principles.?The?wide?majority?of?sister?state?courts?agree.?(See?Note,?Confrontation?Rights?and?Preliminary?Hearings,?(1986)?Utah?L.?Rev.?75,?83,?fn.?54,?and?cases?cited?[criticizing?State?v.?Anderson,?supra,?612?P.2d?778].)?As?stated?in?one?of?the?cases?representing?the?majority?rule,?”to?impose?the?same?rules?of?evidence?at?the?preliminary?hearing?as?at?the?trial?stage?would?amount?to?the?[54?Cal.3d?1082]?granting?of?a?second?trial?and?this?would?be?judicial?waste?and?delay.?A?preliminary?hearing?is?not?designed?to?be?a?dress?rehearsal?for?the?trial.”?(Wilson?v.?State?(Wyo.?1982)?655?P.2d?1246,?1251.)
[5b]?We?conclude?that?the?new,?limited?form?of?preliminary?hearing?in?this?state?sufficiently?resembles?the?Fourth?Amendment?probable?cause?hearing?examined?in?Gerstein,?supra,?420?U.S.?103,?to?meet?federal?confrontation?clause?standards?despite?reliance?on?hearsay?evidence.- Federal?Due?Process?Concerns
We?find?no?similar?unfairness?here?for,?properly?construed,?the?new?hearsay?statute?contains?no?broad?grant?of?authority?to?the?prosecutor?to?rely?on?hearsay?evidence.?The?section?merely?specifies?a?further,?limited?exception?to?the?general?hearsay?exclusionary?rule?of?Evidence?Code?section?1200,?by?allowing?a?probable?cause?finding?to?be?based?on?certain?hearsay?testimony?by?law?enforcement?officers?having?specified?experience?or?training.?In?light?of?the?specialized?nature?of?the?exception,?we?see?nothing?fundamentally?unfair?in?failing?to?provide?some?similar?hearsay?exception?favoring?the?defense.?(Indeed,?although?we?leave?the?question?open,?the?new?provision?might?be?interpreted?as?permitting?the?defendant?to?call?a?law?enforcement?officer?to?relate?statements?which?might?rebut?a?finding?of?probable?cause.)?Defendants?continue?to?enjoy?the?benefits?of?all?preexisting?hearsay?exceptions.?(See?Evid.?Code,???1220?et?seq.)?The?burden?of?proof?remains?on?the?prosecutor?to?establish?probable?cause?to?believe?an?offense?was?committed.?We?note?that?petitioner?has?not?indicated?he?unsuccessfully?sought?to?introduce?hearsay?evidence?comparable?to?the?law?enforcement?testimony?permitted?under?the?new?section.
- State?Separation?of?Powers?Doctrine
First,?as?previously?noted,?by?reason?of?Proposition?115,?the?state?Constitution?now?expressly?permits?the?admission?of?hearsay?evidence?at?preliminary?hearings.?Thus,?the?prosecutor’s?ensuing?”control”?over?the?kind?of?evidence?admitted?at?such?hearings?is?specifically?authorized?by?the?Constitution,?and?the?general?separation?of?powers?doctrine?would?not?apply.?(See?Serrano?v.?Priest?(1971)?5?Cal.3d?584,?596?[96?Cal.Rptr.?601,?487?P.2d?1241,?41?A.L.R.3d?1187].)
Moreover,?we?discern?no?separation?of?powers?violation?here.?Although?the?prosecutor?is?allowed?to?rely?on?hearsay?evidence?in?presenting?his?or?her?case?at?the?preliminary?hearing,?and?may?require?the?defendant?to?make?a?satisfactory?proof?offer?before?the?defendant?may?call?any?defense?witnesses?(Pen.?Code,???866,?subd.?(a)),?the?magistrate?retains?full?authority?and?discretion?to?rule?on?the?sufficiency?of?the?defendant’s?proof?offer,?to?allow?the?admission?of?relevant?defense?evidence,?and?ultimately?to?determine?whether?the?proffered?evidence?demonstrates?probable?cause?to?hold?the?defendant?to?answer?for?the?charged?offenses.?The?foregoing?procedures?are?readily?distinguishable?from?the?prosecutor’s?absolute?”veto”?powers?deemed?excessive?in?People?v.?Tenorio,?supra,?3?Cal.3d?89,?and?Esteybar?v.?Municipal?Court,?supra,?5?Cal.3d?119.
Conclusion
Because?the?magistrate’s?finding?of?probable?cause?in?this?case?was?based?on?the?improper?and?unauthorized?use?of?”reader”?testimony,?we?conclude?that?the?superior?court?erred?in?denying?petitioner’s?motion?to?set?aside?the?information?under?Penal?Code?section?995.?Accordingly,?the?order?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?denying?such?relief?is?reversed?and?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?directed?to?issue?a?peremptory?writ?of?mandate?compelling?the?superior?court?to?vacate?its?prior?order?and?to?enter?a?new?order?granting?defendant’s?motion?to?set?aside?the?information.
Panelli,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?Baxter,?J.,and?George,?J.,?concurred.
MOSK,?J.,
Concurring.
I?concur?in?the?judgment.?Manifestly,?petitioner?is?entitled?to?the?relief?he?seeks.
I?write?separately?to?address?the?crucial?issue?of?statutory?construction.?[54?Cal.3d?1084]
The?people?added?a?new?subdivision?(b)?to?Penal?Code?section?872-hereafter?section?872(b)-when?the?voters?approved?an?initiative?constitutional?amendment?and?statute?designated?as?Proposition?115?on?the?June?5,?1990,?Primary?Election?ballot.?The?provision?declares?that?”Notwithstanding?Section?1200?of?the?Evidence?Code”-which?states?the?rule?generally?barring?hearsay-“the?finding?of?probable?cause?may?be?based?in?whole?or?in?part?upon?the?sworn?testimony?of?a?law?enforcement?officer?relating?the?statements?of?declarants?made?out?of?court?offered?for?the?truth?of?the?matter?asserted.?Any?law?enforcement?officer?testifying?as?to?hearsay?statements?shall?either?have?five?years?of?law?enforcement?experience?or?have?completed?a?training?course?certified?by?the?Commission?on?Peace?Officer?Standards?and?Training?which?includes?training?in?the?investigation?and?reporting?of?cases?and?testifying?at?preliminary?hearings.”
Plainly,?section?872(b)?creates?a?new?exception?to?the?hearsay?rule.?What?is?not?plain,?however,?is?its?meaning.
Section?872(b)?may?be?construed?narrowly?to?allow?hearsay?if?given?by?an?officer?who?simply?possesses?specified?training?or?experience?in,?among?other?things,?the?investigation?of?cases.?This?interpretation?cleaves?to?the?literal?meaning?of?the?words?used?in?the?statutory?provision.
Section?872(b)?may?also?be?construed?somewhat?more?broadly?to?allow?hearsay?if?given?by?an?officer?who?possesses?such?training?or?experience?in?investigation?and?has?actually?investigated?the?case?in?question.?This?interpretation?seeks?to?read?the?condition?stated?in?the?statutory?provision?in?light?of?the?condition’s?evident?purpose,?i.e.,?to?assure?the?reliability?of?the?hearsay?given?by?the?officer.
In?choosing?between?these?two?constructions?of?section?872(b),?I?believe?that?we?should?make?our?decision?against?the?background?of?the?principles?that?underlie?the?law?of?hearsay.?It?is?manifest?that?in?enacting?the?statutory?provision,?the?people?legislated?in?this?doctrinal?context:?they?recognized?the?rule?against?hearsay?and?created?an?exception?thereto.?Accordingly,?we?should?seek?to?adopt?the?interpretation?that?is?the?more?consonant?with?those?principles.
The?hearsay?rule?generally?rejects?out-of-court?statements?offered?for?their?truth?because,?without?the?test?of?cross-examination,?they?are?not?deemed?sufficiently?reliable?for?admission.?(E.g.,?1?Witkin,?Cal.?Evidence?(3d?ed.?1986)?The?Hearsay?Rule,???558,?p.?534?[Cal.?law];?5?Wigmore,?Evidence?(Chadbourn?ed.?1974)?Analytic?Rules:?The?Hearsay?Rule,???1362,?p.?3?(hereafter?Wigmore)?[general?Anglo-?American?common?law].)?Exceptions?exist?for?classes?of?statements?that?meet?requirements?including?possession?[54?Cal.3d?1085]?of?adequate?indicia?of?trustworthiness.?(E.g.,?5?Wigmore,?supra,?Exceptions?to?the?Hearsay?Rule,???1422,?at?pp.?253-254?[general?Anglo-American?common?law];?see?People?v.?Tewksbury?(1976)?15?Cal.3d?953,?966?[127?Cal.Rptr.?135,?544?P.2d?1335]?[Cal.?law].)
The?narrow?construction?of?section?872(b)-viz.,?hearsay?may?be?given?by?an?officer?with?specified?training?or?experience?in?investigation-is?discordant?when?played?against?the?principles?set?forth?above.?Under?this?reading?of?the?statutory?provision,?the?exception?created?is?not?only?new?but?apparently?novel.?Reliability?is?not?assured?for?the?extrajudicial?statements?at?issue.?Like?all?such?statements,?they?are?not?subject?to?cross-examination.fn.?1?Neither?can?they?be?held?to?possess?adequate?indicia?of?trustworthiness.?If?they?could,?they?would?be?admissible?if?offered?by?any?otherwise?competent?witness.?They?are?not.?As?stated,?they?are?admissible?only?if?given?by?an?officer?with?specified?training?or?experience.?To?be?sure,?such?training?or?experience?may?give?grounds?for?expectation?that?the?statements?are?reported?accurately.?But?in?no?way?does?it?guarantee?that?they?are?trustworthy?in?and?of?themselves.
The?somewhat?broader?construction?of?section?872(b)-viz.,?hearsay?may?be?given?by?an?officer?who?possesses?specified?training?or?experience?in?investigation?and?has?actually?investigated?the?case?in?question-is?far?less?discordant.?True,?even?under?this?reading?of?the?statutory?provision,?the?exception?created?is?apparently?novel.?But?here?at?least,?reliability?can?be?assured?to?some?extent.?As?explained,?the?extrajudicial?statements?at?issue?cannot?be?held?to?possess?adequate?indicia?of?trustworthiness.?They?are,?however,?subject?to?a?kind?of?indirect?cross-examination.?An?officer?who?possesses?specified?training?or?experience?in?investigation?and?has?actually?investigated?the?case?can?be?meaningfully?questioned?about?all?the?matters?that?might?be?included?in?any?relevant?statement.?Through?such?questioning,?the?trustworthiness?of?the?statement?canbetestedinsomeappreciable?way.fn.?2?[54?Cal.3d?1086]
Because?the?latter?construction?of?section?872(b)?is?more?harmonious?than?the?former?within?the?principles?that?underlie?the?law?of?hearsay,?I?would?adopt?it?as?our?interpretation?of?the?statutory?provision.fn.?3
I?now?turn?briefly?to?the?case?at?bar.?Petitioner?seeks?a?writ?of?prohibition?against?the?superior?court?to?compel?it?to?dismiss?the?information?and?to?restrain?it?from?proceeding?further.?After?a?preliminary?examination,?the?magistrate?made?an?order?holding?petitioner?to?answer?the?charges?in?the?complaint.?Petitioner?unsuccessfully?moved?the?superior?court?to?dismiss?the?ensuing?information?under?Penal?Code?section?995.?He?should?have?succeeded.?The?magistrate’s?order?was?based?essentially?on?hearsay?given?by?Officer?Bruce?Alexander,?who?related?an?extrajudicial?statement?by?Officer?Navin.?Alexander?evidently?had?sufficient?training?or?experience?in?investigation.?But?he?did?not?actually?investigate?the?case-and,?indeed,?did?not?have?any?significant?knowledge?thereof.?Consequently,?the?hearsay?was?inadmissible.?As?a?result,?the?order?was?without?sufficient?support.?Therefore,?petitioner?is?entitled?to?the?relief?he?requests.
For?the?reasons?stated?above,?I?concur?in?the?judgment.
KENNARD,?J.,
Concurring?and?Dissenting.
I?agree?with?the?majority?that?those?portions?of?Proposition?115?authorizing?the?use?of?certain?hearsay?evidence?at?preliminary?hearings?do?not?violate?the?state?or?the?federal?Constitution.?I?also?agree?that?”reader”?testimony,?such?as?that?offered?by?the?prosecution?in?this?case,?is?inconsistent?with?the?purposes?underlying?Proposition?115,?and?thus?defendant?should?not?have?been?held?to?answer?in?the?superior?court.
But?the?manner?in?which?the?majority?dispenses?with?”reader”?testimony?is?deficient.?Presented?with?language?in?Proposition?115?of?uncertain?meaning,?the?majority?reaches?a?decision?that?compounds,?rather?than?resolves,?the?uncertainty.?In?legal?proceedings,?uncertainty?means?litigation,?and?litigation?means?delay.?By?failing?to?articulate?a?workable?”bright?line”?rule?for?hearsay?evidence?at?preliminary?hearings,?the?majority?opinion?poses?a?perplexing?problem?for?magistrates?and?attorneys?who?will?have?to?decipher?its?Delphic?utterances,?frustrating?Proposition?115’s?goal?of?making?our?system?of?criminal?justice?both?”swift?and?fair.”
I.
To?determine?the?scope?of?Proposition?115’s?scheme?permitting?the?use?of?hearsay?testimony?at?preliminary?hearings,?it?is?necessary?to?focus?on?two?of?[54?Cal.3d?1087]?its?provisions:?a?constitutional?amendment?authorizing?the?use?of?hearsay?testimony?and?a?statutory?provision?implementing?the?constitutional?authorization.fn.?1
The?initiative’s?amendment?adds?article?I,?section?30,?subdivision?(b)?(article?I,?section?30(b))?to?the?California?Constitution.?That?provision?reads:?”In?order?to?protect?victims?and?witnesses?in?criminal?cases,?hearsay?evidence?shall?be?admissible?at?preliminary?hearings,?as?prescribed?by?the?Legislature?or?by?the?people?through?the?initiative?process.”
To?implement?this?amendment?to?the?state?Constitution,?Proposition?115?adds?to?the?Penal?Code?section?872,?subdivision?(b)?(section?872(b);?all?further?statutory?references?are?to?the?Penal?Code),?which?provides:?”[At?a?preliminary?hearing]?the?finding?of?probable?cause?may?be?based?in?whole?or?in?part?upon?the?sworn?testimony?of?a?law?enforcement?officer?relating?the?statements?of?declarants?made?out?of?court?offered?for?the?truth?of?the?matter?asserted.?Any?law?enforcement?officer?testifying?as?to?hearsay?statements?shall?either?have?five?years?of?law?enforcement?experience?or?have?completed?a?training?course?certified?by?the?Commission?on?Peace?Officer?Standards?and?Training?which?includes?training?in?the?investigation?and?reporting?of?cases?and?testifying?at?preliminary?hearings.”
As?I?shall?explain,?in?determining?whether?the?hearsay?testimony?offered?in?this?case?was?admissible,?both?of?these?provisions?must?be?considered.
II.
In?this?case,?Officer?Navin?stopped?defendant?for?speeding,?and,?based?on?observations?leading?her?to?believe?that?defendant?had?been?driving?under?the?influence?of?alcohol?and/or?drugs,?arrested?him.?But?Navin?did?not?testify?at?defendant’s?preliminary?hearing,?at?which?the?only?witness?called?by?the?People?was?Officer?Alexander.?He?had?the?requisite?five?years?of?law?enforcement?experience?set?forth?in?section?872(b).?He?had,?however,?never?discussed?the?case?with?Officer?Navin,?and?did?not?even?know?whether?Navin?was?a?man?or?a?woman.?Nevertheless,?the?magistrate?allowed?Officer?Alexander?to?testify?about?Officer?Navin’s?observations,?by?reading?from?Navin’s?police?report.?Based?on?this?testimony,?the?magistrate?held?defendant?to?answer?in?the?superior?court.?[54?Cal.3d?1088]
I?agree?with?the?majority?that?Officer?Alexander’s?”reader”?testimony?is?inadmissible?under?section?872(b).?As?the?majority?observes,?section?872(b)’s?requirement?that?officers?who?give?hearsay?testimony?must?either?have?five?years?of?experience?or?complete?a?training?course?covering?the?”investigation?and?reporting”?of?criminal?cases?”was?intended?to?enhance?the?reliability?of?hearsay?testimony?at?preliminary?hearings.”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?pp.?1073,?italics?in?original.)?That?requirement?would?be?rendered?meaningless?if?a?police?officer?simply?read?from?another?officer’s?report.
The?majority,?however,?would?permit?”reader”?testimony?if?the?testifying?officer?has?”sufficient?knowledge?of?the?crime?or?the?circumstances?under?which?the?out-of-court?statement?was?made?so?as?to?meaningfully?assist?the?magistrate?in?assessing?the?reliability?of?the?statement.”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?pp.?1072-1073.)?This?is?where?I?part?company?with?the?majority.?By?permitting?hearsay?testimony?in?these?circumstances,?the?majority?fails?to?take?into?account?Proposition?115’s?express?purpose?in?permitting?hearsay?testimony?at?preliminary?hearings,?as?described?in?article?I,?section?30(b).
Article?I,?section?30(b)?explains?that?Proposition?115?permits?hearsay?at?the?preliminary?hearing?”to?protect?victims?and?witnesses?in?criminal?cases?….”?Although?the?provision?does?not?explain?what?victims?and?witnesses?are?to?be?protected?from,?several?possibilities?come?immediately?to?mind.?Testifying?causes?victims?and?witnesses?to?relive?an?often?stressful?and?traumatic?experience,?it?disrupts?their?daily?routines,?and?it?provides?an?opportunity?for?harassment?or?retaliation?by?the?defendant?or?friends?of?the?defendant.?If?the?recollections?of?victims?and?witnesses?can?be?presented?through?the?hearsay?testimony?of?an?officer,?these?hazards?and?inconveniences?are?avoided.
The?objective?of?article?I,?section?30(b),?can?be?achieved?by?applying?its?protections?to?victims?and?witnesses?other?than?police?officers.?Compared?to?private?citizens?who?are?victims?of?or?witnesses?to?a?crime,?officers?testifying?at?a?preliminary?hearing?are?significantly?less?likely?to?be?harassed?or?intimidated?by?criminal?defendants,?and?less?likely?to?be?reliving?an?unusually?stressful?or?traumatic?experience.?And?although?officers?may?have?their?daily?routines?disrupted?by?court?appearances,?such?appearances?are?within?the?scope?of?their?duties.?An?officer’s?job?is?not?finished?when?a?suspect?is?arrested;?rather,?it?continues?through?conviction?and?punishment.?Like?prosecutors?and?judges,?officers?are?an?integral?part?of?the?criminal?justice?system.?Attendance?at?court?is?an?occupational?hazard?of?a?career?in?law?enforcement.
In?sum,?protection?of?private?citizens?rather?than?police?officer?witnesses?appears?to?have?been?the?fundamental?concern?underlying?the?phrase?”to?[54?Cal.3d?1089]?protect?victims?and?witnesses?in?criminal?cases,”?as?expressed?in?article?I,?section?30(b).?Accordingly,?section?872(b),?which?implements?article?I,?section?30(b),?should?be?construed?as?establishing?a?new?general?hearsay?exception?for?the?out-of-court?statements?of?private?citizens?only,?not?those?of?police?officers.?Not?only?would?this?construction?implement?the?purposes?of?Proposition?115,?it?would?also?create?a?clear,?workable?standard?that?would?meaningfully?assist?magistrates?and?attorneys.
The?majority?opinion?makes?no?attempt?to?explain?how?its?interpretation?of?section?872(b)?is?consistent?with?the?purpose?of?”protect[ing]?victims?and?witnesses”?set?forth?in?article?I,?section?30(b).?It?merely?makes?a?broad?and?unsupported?assertion?that?qualified?officers?may?”relate?out-of-court?statements?by?crime?victims?or?witnesses,?including?other?law?enforcement?personnel?….”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?p.?1072.)?For?the?reasons?I?have?expressed?above,?this?assertion?is?inconsistent?with?the?intent?of?Proposition?115.
III.
Not?only?is?the?majority’s?holding?unfaithful?to?the?intent?of?Proposition?115,?it?is?also?likely?to?mire?the?criminal?justice?system?in?confusion.
The?majority?holds?that?an?officer?can?testify?based?on?another?officer’s?report?if?the?testifying?officer’s?”knowledge?of?the?crime?or?the?circumstances”?is?sufficient?to?”meaningfully?assist?the?magistrate”?in?determining?reliability.?This?vague?test?contains?no?guidance?whatsoever?for?magistrates?and?litigators,?leaving?them?adrift?on?the?flood?of?litigation?likely?to?ensue?from?efforts?to?grasp?the?meaning?of?the?majority’s?ill?defined?terminology?regarding?the?testifying?officer’s?”knowledge?of?the?crime?or?the?circumstances”?and?ability?to?”meaningfully?assist?the?magistrate.”
Can?officers?”meaningfully?assist?the?magistrate”?if?they?observed?the?preparation?of?the?police?report,?but?have?no?independent?knowledge?of?the?circumstances?of?the?offense??Is?the?majority’s?”meaningful?assistance”?requirement?met?if,?before?testifying?at?the?preliminary?hearing,?the?testifying?officer?spoke?to?the?officer?who?prepared?the?report?and?was?assured?of?the?reliability?of?the?report,?but?the?two?officers?did?not?discuss?the?contents?of?the?report??What?if?the?testifying?officer’s?”knowledge?of?the?crime”?was?gained?from?reading?a?number?of?police?reports?that?had?been?prepared?by?various?officers-can?that?officer?then?testify?as?to?the?contents?of?each?of?the?reports?he?or?she?has?read??And?if,?after?the?magistrate?ruled?the?testimony?to?be?inadmissible,?the?testifying?officer?telephones?the?officer?who?prepared?the?report?and?discusses?its?contents?for?five?or?ten?minutes,?can?the?testifying?[54?Cal.3d?1090]?officer?then?resume?the?witness?stand?and?read?from?the?other?officer’s?report?
Because?the?majority’s?vague?and?confusing?test?will?not?answer?these?questions,?different?magistrates?presented?with?similar?facts?will?make?inconsistent?rulings.?To?resolve?the?inconsistencies?and?uncertainties,?the?parties?will?be?required?to?resort?to?the?time-consuming?pursuit?of?appellate?remedies.?Eventually?the?Courts?of?Appeal?will?provide?content?to?the?majority’s?empty?formulation.?In?the?meantime,?however,?the?majority’s?failure?to?create?a?workable?”bright?line”?rule?for?hearsay?evidence?at?preliminary?hearings?will?serve?to?obstruct,?rather?than?to?streamline,?the?criminal?justice?system,?thereby?frustrating?the?people’s?expressed?purpose?to?create?”a?system?in?which?justice?is?swift?and?fair”?(Prop.?115,???1,?subd.?(c),?Primary?Elec.?(June?5,?1990)?[Stats.?1990,?No.?1?Deering’s?Adv.?Legis.?Service,?p.?265]).
FN?*.?For?Supreme?Court?opinion,?see?Bowens?v.?Superior?Court?(1991)?1?Cal.?4th?36?[2?Cal.Rptr.2d?376,?820?P.2d?600].
FN?1.?I?note?in?passing?that?Evidence?Code?section?1203?generally?provides?that?”The?declarant?of?a?statement?that?is?admitted?as?hearsay?evidence?may?be?called?and?examined?by?any?adverse?party?as?if?under?cross-examination?concerning?the?statement.”?(Id.,?subd.?(a).)?Evidence?Code?section?1203.1,?which?was?added?by?the?people?when?the?voters?approved?Proposition?115,?declares?that?that?provision?”is?not?applicable?if?the?hearsay?statement?is?offered?at?a?preliminary?examination”?pursuant?to?section?872(b).
FN?2.?Of?course,?on?occasion?an?officer?who?might?otherwise?be?said?to?possess?specified?training?or?experience?in?investigation?and?to?have?actually?investigated?the?case?may?prove?to?have?inadequate?knowledge?of?the?matters?included?in?a?particular?extrajudicial?statement?to?allow?meaningful?questioning?thereon.?Such?an?officer?cannot?be?deemed?to?satisfy?the?training-or-experience?and?actual-investigation?requirements?of?section?872(b).
FN?3.?It?hardly?bears?noting?after?one?has?read?their?opinion?that?the?majority?come?close?to?adopting?the?foregoing?interpretation?of?section?872(b),?but?for?some?reason?shy?away?from?doing?so.
FN?1.?As?the?majority?explains,?a?constitutional?amendment?was?required?because?under?previous?California?law?the?confrontation?clause?of?the?California?Constitution?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?I,???15)?limited?the?use?of?hearsay?evidence?at?preliminary?hearings.?(Mills?v.?Superior?Court?(1986)?42?Cal.3d?951?[232?Cal.Rptr.?141,?728?P.2d?211];?see?maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?pp.?1076-1077.)