Case Number: BC528192??? Hearing Date: September 08, 2016??? Dept: B
# 7. Matthew Laurence Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Company, et al.
Case No.: BC528192
Matter on calendar for: Hearing on (1) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (2) Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication
Moving Parties: Alpha Beta Company dba Ralphs and Gloria Solic
RP: Plaintiff Matthew Laurence Brown
Notes:
Tentative ruling:
I. Background
This is a false imprisonment action arising out of two alleged incidents at a Ralphs Grocery store in Compton on February 5, 2013 and on April 3, 2013. Plaintiff Matthew Laurence Brown alleges that he was wrongfully detained by employees of Defendant Legions Protective Services, LLC and accused of shoplifting, for which he contends he was wrongfully arrested and incarcerated (incident one). Plaintiff further alleges that after his release from jail, he returned to the Ralphs store, whereupon he was refused entry and subsequently arrested a second time (incident two).
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action on 11/20/13. On 5/22/14, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (FAC), alleging causes of action for:
1. False imprisonment (incident one)
2. False imprisonment (incident two)
3. Civil rights violation (incident one)
4. Civil rights violation (incident two)
5. Negligence (incident one)
6. Negligence (incident two)
On 8/5/14, Judge Barry sustained Defendant Legions? demurrer to the second and fourth causes of action with leave to amend, and overruled the demurrer to the first cause of action. Judge Barry denied Legions? Motion to Strike, as Plaintiff clarified that he is seeking punitive damages from natural persons only.
On 8/20/14, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (SAC), asserting the same causes of action.
On 10/23/14, Judge Barry granted American Guard Services? Motion to Strike punitive damages, from the SAC, sustained its general and special demurrer to cause of action 3 with leave to amend, and overruled its general and special demurrer to causes of action 1-2. Judge Barry overruled Legions Protective Services? general demurrer to cause of action 4.
On 11/12/14, Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint (TAC), asserting the same causes of action.
On 1/16/15, Judge Barry granted American Guard Services? Motion to Strike punitive damages (again). Judge Barry granted County of LA?s motion to strike punitive damages as it pertained to Defendants Clark, Leons, Bell, Sandoval, and Walk, and denied the motion as it pertained to Defendants Lopez and Castillo.
On 7/14/15, Judge Barry granted Plaintiff?s motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint (4thAC), although Plaintiff agreed to dismiss the punitive damages allegation from the false arrest cause of action (see 6/9/15 Minute Order). The 4thAC asserts causes of action for:
1. False imprisonment (incident one)
2. Malicious prosecution (incident one)
3. Civil rights violation (CC ? 52.1 ? Bane Act) (incident one)
4. False imprisonment (incident two)
5. Malicious prosecution (incident two)
6. Civil rights violation (CC ? 52.1 ? Bane Act) (incident two)
7. Negligence (incident one)
8. Negligence (incident two)
On 10/8/15, Judge Barry granted County of LA?s motion to strike punitive damages. Judge Barry clarified punitive damages may be alleged against Defendants Lopez and Del Castillo only. Judge Barry overruled Legion?s demurrer to causes of action 2 and 5, and the Court later denied American Guard/Rincon?s motion to strike. (10/8/15 Minute Order, 10/14/15 Minute Order.)
On 12/11/15, Plaintiff substituted Compton Commercial Redevelopment Company as Doe 3.
Trial is set for 2/27/17.
B. Present Motions
On 6/3/16, Defendants Alpha Beta Company dba Ralphs and Gloria Solic (?Ralphs?) filed the present motion for summary judgment/adjudication.
On 7/26/16, Defendants County of Los Angeles, City of Compton, Jerry Lopez, Jr., Cesar Del Castillo, Ryan Clarke, Andrew Leos, Terrance Bell, Jose Sandoval, Kevin Walk filed the present motion for judgment on the pleadings.
II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
The Court issued its tentative ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings on 8/18/16, and allowed the parties to submit additional briefing regarding when the first cause of action for false imprisonment accrued. The Court has reviewed the additional briefing and issues this revised tentative ruling.
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on causes of action 1-3 and 7 (incident 1 claims) on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Government Tort Claims Act presentation requirement. Defendants further contend causes of action 1 and 4 (false imprisonment) fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants because the individual deputies are immune from civil liability under Penal Code ? 847, and Lt. Walk, Sgt. Sandoval, and Sgt. Bell are immune from Plaintiff?s claims under Gov. Code ? 820.2. Defendants argue causes of action 2 and 5 (malicious prosecution) fail to state a claim because the individual deputies are immune from civil liability under Gov. Code ? 821.6. Finally, Defendants contend causes of action 3 and 6 (Civil Code ? 52.1) fail to state a cause of action under the Bane Act. Defendants have not moved for judgment on the pleadings on the eighth cause of action for negligence.
Defendants? moving papers are two pages over the page limit. Additionally, the table of contents does not correspond with the arguments made in the moving papers. The Court admonishes counsel for failing to submit a correct table of contents or abide by the 15 page limit, and warns that future papers will not be considered by the Court should they fail to follow the applicable requirements.
Defendants? request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code ? 452(c), (d), and (h).
A. Malicious Prosecution ? Causes of Action 2 and 5
Plaintiff appears to concede that the moving defendants are immune from Plaintiff?s claims for malicious prosecution under Government Code ? 821.6. (Opp., 15:18-20.) Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to causes of action 2 and 5 without leave to amend.
B. Filing of Timely Claim ? Causes of Action 1, 2, 3, and 7 (Incident One)
?As part of the California Tort Claims Act, Government Code section 900 et seq. establishes certain conditions precedent to the filing of a lawsuit against a public entity. As relevant here, a plaintiff must timely file a claim for money or damages with the public entity.? (State v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1237, fn. omitted.) Specifically, Government Code ? 911.2 requires that a claim relating to a cause of action for personal injury be presented no later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.
It is important to note that a criminal defendant cannot maintain a damages action against a police officer (or the governmental employer) for conduct relating to pending criminal charges. (See Gov. Code ? 945.3.) Consequently, the statute of limitations on a civil action is tolled while the criminal charges are pending. (Id.) However, the claim-filing requirement is not tolled during this period. (Id.) Thus, any claim for personal injury, death, or damage to personal property must be presented within 6 months after the cause of action accrues even though the pending criminal charges bar prosecution of the civil remedy. (Id.; see McMartin v. County of Los Angeles (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 848, 859-860.)
1. False Imprisonment ? Cause of Action 1
With respect to Defendants? first contention that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act, Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to file a timely claim in connection with incident one because Plaintiff was allegedly detained on 2/5/13 but did not submit a claim until 9/16/13. (4thAC, ? 36; RJN, Ex. D.) In Opposition, Plaintiff argues the 9/16/13 claim was timely filed because Plaintiff was released from confinement on 3/29/13. Accordingly, the critical inquiry in this matter is whether Plaintiff?s claim for false imprisonment accrued on 2/5/13 (the date of the allegedly false arrest) or 3/29/13 (Plaintiff?s release from confinement).
The case law is far from clear on this point. The Court has found two published cases holding that a claim for false arrest arises on the date of arrest. (Mohlmann v. City of Burbank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1041, fn. 1 [?A cause of action for false arrest accrues on the arrest and is actionable immediately.?]; Milliken v. City of South Pasadena (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 834, 840 [?Although a cause of action arose at the time of arrest and initial imprisonment, the statute of limitations did not commence to run until appellant’s discharge from jail.?].) (While these cases discuss the statute of limitations as it pertains to the claim of false arrest, ?[u]nder California law, the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts, as false arrest is ?but one way of committing a false imprisonment.?? (Watts v. Cnty. of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2001) 256 F.3d 886, 891 [citation omitted].))
It seems reasonable to the Court that a cause of action for false imprisonment would accrue at the time the would-be plaintiff is falsely incarcerated. For example, if someone is falsely imprisoned by kidnappers for a period of five days, and then released, it seems reasonable that he or she would have a cause of action for false imprisonment on the first day as well as the sixth day. While there might be good policy reasons to toll the statute of limitations during the time of imprisonment, surely the victim has a right to bring suit even while incarcerated.
But, some cases and secondary authorities state that a cause of action for false imprisonment accrues upon release from physical confinement. (See Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 848; Scannell v. County of Riverside (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 596, 606; Collins v. Los Angeles County (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451, 455-456; see also Wiseman & Reese, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Trial Claims and Def. Ch. 2(III)-D (The Rutter Group), ? 2:271 [?The cause of action accrues upon release from confinement.]; Rylaarsdam & Turner, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Tr. Stat. of Limitations Ch. 4-B (The Rutter Group), ?? 4:400-4:401 [same]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 5th Actions ? 549 (2008) [same].)
These authorities don?t offer any real explanation for why the cause of action would not accrue upon imprisonment. And it may be because in Collins, which seems to be the first case in this line, the person seeking to assert a claim was arrested and released from confinement on the same day. The issue in Collins was whether the cause of action accrued not on that day, but when the criminal proceedings were concluded. The court determined that the cause of action accrued upon release from physical custody, not when the criminal proceedings concluded, but did not address whether the cause of action accrued upon arrest. In Scannell, the court relied on Collins for the proposition that the cause of action accrued upon release from physical custody. But, again, whether the cause of action accrued upon imprisonment was not directly addressed. The issue in Scannell again was whether the plaintiff?s cause of action accrued ?on his release from custody or at the time of dismissal of the criminal proceedings.? (Scannell, 152 Cal.App.3d at 606.) Torres, relying on Scannell, repeats that ?[i]t is settled that a cause of action for false imprisonment accrues on the person’s release from incarceration.? (Torres, 217 Cal.App.4th at 848.) But, just like the courts in Collins and Scannell, the court in Torres did not consider whether the cause of action accrued upon false arrest. Instead, the court in Torres considered and rejected the appellant?s argument ?that notwithstanding his release from physical custody,? his cause of action did not accrue because ?he was in ?constructive custody? until ? he was released from parole supervision and his GPS tracking bracelet was removed.? (Id.)
As noted above, this Court ordered additional briefing from the parties on this subject. Plaintiff?s supplemental brief concedes that a cause of action for false arrest/false imprisonment accrues when the false arrest/false imprisonment occurs. (Plaintiff?s Court-Ordered Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants County of Los Angeles, et al. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 4:7-8.) But, plaintiff argues, both the statute of limitations and claim-presentation period are tolled during the period of imprisonment, so that both only begin to run upon release. (Id. at 3:21 ? 4:11). Thus, a person who is falsely imprisoned could bring an action on the first day of imprisonment, but must bring the action no later than one year from the date of release. (Id. at 4:5 -11). That may be an appropriate rule, but it doesn?t fully reconcile Government Code ? 911.2 and all the existing case law.
Given the language used in the Collins/Scannell/Torres line of cases, the Court declines to find that Plaintiff?s false imprisonment tort claim with respect to the first incident was untimely when submitted within 6 months from his release from confinement, even though submitted more than six months from the date of his arrest. It may be that Plaintiff was entitled to rely on those cases. The issue can be revisited, if need be, with more thoughtful briefing, in a motion for summary adjudication or summary judgment.
2. Other Causes of Action ? Causes of Action 3 and 7
On the other hand, it is evident the tort claim is untimely as it pertains to Plaintiff?s causes of action for negligence and violation of Civil Code ? 52.1. The cause of action for negligence accrues when Plaintiff ?has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for … the cause of action.? (Fox v. Ethicon Endo?Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) Likewise, a cause of action for violation of Civil Code ? 52.1 accrues on the date of the event that allegedly caused a violation of the plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights. (Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 760.) Based on Plaintiff?s allegations in this matter, namely that certain police deputies offered allegedly false testimony in order to support a finding of probable cause, Plaintiff?s claims for negligence and violation of Civil Code ? 52.1 seemingly accrued on 2/5/13, the date of Plaintiff?s arrest. Plaintiff has not offered any arguments in Opposition to rebut Defendants? contention in this regard.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to timely file a government claim with respect to the third and seventh causes of action for violation of Civil Code ? 52.1 and negligence. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to causes of action 3 and 7 without leave to amend.
C. Penal Code ? 847(b) ? Causes of Action 1 and 4
Defendants? next contention is that Penal Code ? 847 immunizes the moving defendants against Plaintiff?s claims for false imprisonment. Penal Code ? 847(b) states, ?There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer or federal criminal investigator or law enforcement officer described in subdivision (a) or (d) of Section 830.8, acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest under any of the following circumstances: (1) The arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful. (2) The arrest was made pursuant to a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the person to be arrested. (3) The arrest was made pursuant to the requirements of Section 142, 837, 838, or 839.?
In California, ?an officer has probable cause for a warrantless arrest ?if the facts known to him would lead a [person] of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.?? (Blankenhorn v. City of Orange (9th Cir. 2007) 485 F.3d 463, 471.) The test for whether probable cause exists is whether at the moment of arrest the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officers and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense. (Id.)
Defendants rely on the case of Blankenhorn v. City of Orange (9th Cir. 2007) 485 F.3d 463, in support of their reliance on Penal Code ? 847(b). In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that police officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for trespassing in a mall, where they reasonably believed that he had previously been banned from the mall by the owner and had returned for the purpose of injuring property rights or interfering with the mall’s business, and mall security requested that he be arrested for trespassing. (Id. at 473.) The Ninth Circuit agreed that, given the finding of probable cause, the police officers were entitled to immunity from Blankenhorn?s state law false imprisonment claims under Penal Code ? 847(b). (Id. at 486-487.)
With respect to incident one, Plaintiff has alleges that Deputy Lopez and Deputy Del Castillo arrested him ?[w]ithout probable cause or reasonable suspicion.? (4thAC, ?36.) He concedes that the deputies relied ? at least in part ? on witness statements that Plaintiff shoplifted a bag of burritos. (Id. at ? ?27- 31). Plaintiff also seems to concede that, if there were no further allegations, the deputies would have had probable cause to make the arrest and Defendants would be immune from liability. But there is more. Plaintiff alleges the existence of a store security video that (allegedly) ?clearly? depicts ?Plaintiff, a young looking black man wearing a hoodie,? in ?the meat aisle at the Ralph?s Grocery, [open] the hinged freezer case door to view an item, then [close] the door without making a selection or removing any item ? .? (Id. at ? 19.) The complaint goes on to allege that Deputy Lopez ?claims to have viewed the security video and relying on it, chose to arrest and falsely imprisoned Plaintiff on the stated basis of the activity depicted therein and/or statements of store and/or Mall security which are unequivocally refuted by the video.? (Id. at ? 31.) Lopez, the complaint continues, ?either negligently failed to observe the lack of any criminal activity on the video he claims to have viewed or, instead, never viewed but claimed falsely ? to have viewed it,? or ?saw that the video did not support the arrest,? but arrested Plaintiff anyway. (Id. at ? ? 32-33.) The problem with this alternative pleading ? from Plaintiff?s perspective ? is that it does not rule out that the deputies acted with probable cause. They had statements from private security officers that Plaintiff had shoplifted. Viewing a segment of store security that shows nothing amiss does not necessarily prove that the witnesses had fabricated their accusations. The segment could simply have not included the crime. The Court finds that, as pled, Defendants are entitled to the immunity set forth in Penal Code ? 847 in connection with incident one. Accordingly, the County of Los Angeles is also entitled to immunity under Gov. Code ? 815(b).
With respect to incident two, Plaintiff has simply alleged that Deputies Clark and Leos wrongfully arrested Plaintiff upon the purported charge of terrorist threat after speaking with the Legion?s Protective Service employees Valencia, Porras, and Mathis. (4thAC, ?? 43-44.) Although Plaintiff claims the Deputies ?misleadingly? reported that Plaintiff had ?armed? himself with a common BIC pen and did not seek to hear Plaintiff?s side of the story, Plaintiff has not alleged any actionable wrongdoing by the deputies. In essence, Plaintiff merely contends Deputies Clark and Leos chose to accept Legion?s Protective Service employees? (Valencia, Porras, and Mathis?) version of events. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to undermine the conclusion that the Deputies had probable cause to detain Plaintiff after hearing from the Legion employees that Plaintiff allegedly threatened them with a BIC pen. The Court finds that Defendants are entitled to the immunity set forth in Penal Code ? 847 in connection with incident two. Accordingly, the County of Los Angeles is also entitled to immunity under Gov. Code ? 815(b).
The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the first cause of action for false imprisonment with 10 days? leave to amend, and the fourth cause of action for false imprisonment without leave to amend.
D. Civil Code ? 52.1 ? Causes of Action 3 and 6
Defendants lastly contend that Plaintiff has not alleged a claim for violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act (Civil Code ? 52.1), because the provisions of Civil Code ? 52.1 ?are limited to threats, intimidation, or coercion that interferes with a constitutional or statutory right?, and simply being improperly arrested does not amount to ?threats, intimidation, or coercion?. (Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 843; Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 [?[W]e conclude that where coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged, i.e., an overdetention in County jail, the statutory requirement of ?threats, intimidation, or coercion? is not met. The statute requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself.?].)
There are two distinct elements for a section 52.1 cause of action. A plaintiff must show (1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion. (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 67.) In Shoyoye, where the plaintiff was lawfully arrested but was held more than two weeks after the order for his release due to a county employee error, the Court of Appeal held that, because coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged (i.e., the unreasonably prolonged detention), section 52.1 requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention. (Id. at 67-68.) Consistent with Shoyoye, the Court of Appeal in Allen concluded ?a wrongful arrest or detention, without more, does not satisfy both elements of section 52.1.? (Id. at 69; see also Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 978 [holding that coercion is ?inherent in any arrest, lawful or not?, but claim for violation of Bane Act may be maintained where unlawful arrest is accompanied with excessive force].)
Here, in connection with incident one, Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Lopez falsely claimed to have relied on a security video and Deputy Del Castillo falsely claimed to have given a Miranda admonition to Plaintiff and falsely reported he obtained incriminating statements from Plaintiff in order to establish probable cause for their arrest of Plaintiff. (4thAC, ?? 31-36.) The Court need not determine that these allegations are sufficient to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, because ? as discussed above ? Plaintiff?s tort claim for violation of Civil Code ? 52.1.was not timely filed. Therefore, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the third cause of action without leave to amend.
In connection with incident two, Plaintiff claims Defendants falsely reported that Plaintiff ?armed? himself with a common BIC pen ?in an apparent attempt to add gravity to their report? and later ?rubber stamped? the arrest report without conducting a reasonable investigation. (4thAC, ?? 44-46.) For the same reasons noted earlier, these allegations fail to set forth facts to overcome the immunity set forth in Penal Code ? 847(b) and fail to state a claim for violation of Civil Code ? 52.1. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the sixth cause of action without leave to amend.
E. Sanctions
Plaintiff requests that the Court order Defendants to pay $18,105.00 to Plaintiff?s counsel pursuant to CCP ? 128.7(b), for attempting to mislead the Court as to when a cause of action for state law false imprisonment accrues, for failing to cite Government Code ? 815.2, for stating the wrong standard of review for motions for judgment on the pleading, and for bringing this challenge to the pleadings, on timely (but minimal) notice, over 2 years after this action was filed. The Court need not address these charges. Plaintiff?s request for sanctions is denied. Plaintiff has not cited to any statutory basis other than CCP ? 128.7 for the Court to award the attorney?s fees sought, and CCP ? 128.7 requires that Plaintiff follow certain procedures in making a motion for attorney?s fees, which he has not done. (CCP ? 128.7(c).)
F. Order
In view of the foregoing, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to causes of action 2-7 without leave to amend. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to cause of action 1, with 10 days? leave to amend. Defendants will have 20 days to respond to any amended pleading, or 25 days if served by mail.
This ruling is, of course, without out prejudice to revisiting the issue of probable cause with respect to cause of action 1 in a motion for summary adjudication of issues or summary judgment.
III. Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication
Defendants Alpha Beta Company dba Ralphs and Gloria Solic move for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, on the grounds that: Defendant Gloria Solic cannot be held liable for the statements she made to the Sheriff?s Department, which were absolutely privileged under Civil Code ? 47(b) and Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB (2004) 32 Cal.4th 39; there are no facts to support the contention that Defendant Solic is liable to Plaintiff for malicious prosecution; security guard Johnny Rincon was an independent contractor of Ralphs and Ralphs is not liable to Plaintiff for Rincon?s actions in connection with the first incident; and Ralphs was not involved in Plaintiff?s arrest in either the first or second incident of this case and, thus, cannot be held liable to Plaintiff for any of the alleged claims.
Defendants have attached a number of exhibits to their Separate Statement of Material Facts, including deposition transcripts from various individuals and discovery responses from Plaintiff and other defendants. However, critically missing from Defendants? motion is a declaration laying a foundation for and authenticating the exhibits attached to the Separate Statement. (See CCP ? 437c(d).) The declaration requirements serve to identify and authenticate the testimony being offered ? thus, the usual procedure to offer excerpts of a deposition or discovery responses is to set forth relevant excerpts in the moving party?s declarations, or to attach copies of relevant pages of the deposition transcripts as exhibits thereto. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 10-C (The Rutter Group), ? 10:164; Sacks v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 950, 962 [motion based on ?papers on file and lodged with court? did not make deposition transcripts part of record; ?Review is limited to those portions of the depositions which were abstracted and placed before the court in the affidavit and in the declaration filed in connection with the motion.?].)
As Defendants have not provided a declaration authenticating any of the exhibits attached to the Separate Statement, the Court finds that most of the evidence submitted by Defendants (other than the declaration from Brian Gray and the document attached thereto) cannot be considered by the Court at the present time.
However, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not objected to the motion for summary judgment on this ground. Accordingly, the Court will allow Defendants to file a declaration with the Court identifying and authenticating the exhibits being offered in the motion. This declaration must be filed before September 13, 2016. Any objections to the declaration must be filed within 10 days thereafter, or 15 days if served by mail. The hearing on the motion will be continued to allow Defendants an opportunity to cure the foregoing defect.
Next dates: to be set
Notice: Moving parties to give notice