Motion for Protective Order (Judge Howard L. Halm)


Case Number: BC607511??? Hearing Date: October 20, 2016??? Dept: 53

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ? CENTRAL DISTRICT
DEPARTMENT 53

KELLENE AMBER JOHNSON, et al.;

Plaintiffs,

vs.

GENERAL MOTORS LLC;

Defendant.
Case No.: BC607511

Hearing Date: October 20, 2016

Time: 8:30 a.m.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:

DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS LLC?S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER PROHIBITING DEPOSITIONS OF REYNOLD BUICK GMC?S SERVICE ADVISORS AND TECHNICIANS

Defendant GENERAL MOTORS LLC?s motion for PROTECTIVE ORDER is GRANTED in part..

BACKGROUND

This is a vehicle warranty action. Plaintiffs Kellene Amber Johnson and Jeffrey Alan Johnson brought this action against Defendant General Motors, LLC alleging causes of action for: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act and (2) Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act.

Plaintiffs purchased a 2008 Buick Enclave on October 29, 2008. Serious defects began to arise in the vehicle during the warranty period regarding the electrical components, steering, brakes, transmission and other parts of the vehicle. Plaintiffs brought the vehicle to the dealership for repairs on 8 occasions.
LEGAL STANDARD

?In accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, California courts have been broad-minded in determining whether discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 172; Pettie v. Superior Court, supra, 178 Cal.App.2d at p. 687.) As a practical matter, it is difficult to define at the discovery stage what evidence will be relevant at trial. Therefore, the party seeking discovery is entitled to substantial leeway. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 172.) Furthermore, California’s liberal approach to permissible discovery generally has led the courts to resolve any doubt in favor of permitting discovery. (Id. at p. 173.) In doing so, the courts have taken the view if an error is made in ruling on a discovery motion, it is better that it be made in favor of granting discovery of the non-discoverable rather than denying discovery of information vital to preparation or presentation of the party’s case or to efficacious settlement of the dispute.? Norton v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1761.

Where good cause is shown, courts may enter protective orders limiting depositions. ?The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.? CCP ? 2025.420(b). Courts have considerable discretion in granting and crafting protective orders. Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588. A court may quash a subpoena entirely or partially, and issue an order to protect parties, witnesses or consumers from unreasonable or oppressive demands including violations of privacy. CCP ?1987.1; Weil & Brown, Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2008) ?8:598. See also generally Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Trials & Ev. (The Rutter Group 2008) ?1:91.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs noticed depositions of 27 service advisors and technicians on July 11, 2016. Defendant?s counsel met and conferred with Plaintiffs? counsel on August 26, 2016. Plaintiffs? counsel indicated that Plaintiffs were willing to narrow down the number of deponents to 13 which excluded dealership personnel who no longer worked for the dealer or where involved only with maintenance.

Defendant contends that there is no justification to seek the depositions of the 13 service advisors and technicians particularly because Defendant has already offered to repurchase the vehicle and pay attorney?s fees. As Defendant has already acknowledged that the repair history warrants a repurchase of the vehicle, there is no need to depose the service advisors and technicians regarding the repair history.

However, as Plaintiffs have pointed out, Defendant has presented no binding offer to repurchase the vehicle. Other than statements in the motion and in the emails between Defendant?s counsel and Plaintiffs? counsel that such an offer has been made, there are no official offers to repurchase that Defendant has presented to this Court. Absent any indication that this offer to repurchase the vehicle exists outside the realm of conjecture, the Court cannot proceed as if the repair history of the vehicle is no longer relevant.

Additionally, the issue whether there should be a civil penalty for willfully refusing to repurchase the vehicle or refund the purchase price is at issue and some of these witnesses may have testimony relevant to this issue.

However, the depositions of 13 repair personnel is not justified on the present record. Defendant?s motion is GRANTED, in part, to the extent that Plaintiffs may depose Defendant?s PMK regarding the repair history of the vehicle. If Plaintiffs believe that Defendant?s PMK was not able to provide testimony regarding any of the 8 repair visits, Defendant will make the lead technician for the repair available for that day?s repairs. If the parties cannot agree, they should arrange for an Informal Discovery Conference (?IDC?) before proceeding with further discovery motions regarding repairs. The opposing party should provide the moving party with an extension, on any rule imposing a time limit for bringing the motion, until the IDC is completed.

Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this ruling.

DATED: October 20, 2016

_____________________________
Howard L. Halm
Judge of the Superior Court