Case Name: Kim v. Samsung SDS America, Inc.
Case No.: 2015-1-CV-283549
Defendant Samsung SDS America, Inc. (?SDSA? or ?Defendant?) moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication in its favor and against plaintiff Joohong Kim (?Plaintiff?).
After full review of the evidence, separate statements and authorities submitted by each party, the Court makes the following rulings:
SDSA?s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, is GRANTED.
With respect to the first cause of action for age discrimination, SDSA meets its initial burden by submitting evidence which establishes that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff?s termination- SDSA eliminated the Texas CM positon for business reasons and there was no work to provide Plaintiff after he was transferred to the Delivery Center in San Jose.? (See SDSA?s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Fact in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication (?UMF?) Nos. 31-40, 43-45.)?? It follows that SDSA has also met its initial burden with respect to the failure to prevent discrimination component of this claim.? (See Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 284 [?[T]here is no logic that says an employee who has not been discriminated against can sue an employer for not preventing discrimination that didn?t happen, for not having a policy to prevent discrimination when no discrimination occurred?].)
In opposition, Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the reasons proffered by SDSA for his termination are a pretext for intentional discrimination.? Plaintiff fails to submit competent evidence that younger, similarly qualified workers were treated more favorably then he was and evidence that SDSA?s stated reasons for terminating him may have shifted, without more, is insufficient to raise a triable issue.? (Guz v. Bechtel Nat?l, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 361-362 [?[a]n inference of intentional discrimination cannot be drawn solely from evidence, if any, that the company lied about its reasons?].)? Consequently, summary adjudication of this claim is proper.
With respect to the second cause of action for national origin discrimination, SDSA similarly meets its initial burden by establishing that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff?s termination- the same reason articulated above with respect to the first cause of action.? (UMF Nos. 31-40, 43-45.)? It follows that SDSA has also met its initial burden with respect to the failure to prevent discrimination component of this claim.? (See Trujillo, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at 284.)? In opposition, Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of material fact, offering nothing, outside of a question as to whether SDSA?s stated reasons for terminating him were truthful, that suggests discriminatory animus based on his national origin on the part of SDSA.? As mentioned above, an inference of intentional discrimination cannot be drawn solely from proof that the employer?s stated reasons for terminating the plaintiff are illogical, inconsistent, or otherwise not worthy of belief.? (Guz v. Bechtel Nat?l, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at 361 [?[t]he pertinent statutes do not prohibit lying, they prohibit discrimination?].)? If, however, there is other evidence which supports an inference of discriminatory motive, proof that the employer?s reasons are illogical or inconsistent may ?considerably assist? plaintiff?s case because it suggests the employer had cause to hide its true reasons.? (Id.)? Here, however, Plaintiff fails to proffer such ?other? evidence.? Thus, adjudication of this claim is appropriate.
Because Plaintiff?s first and second causes of action fail, it follows that summary adjudication of the third and fifth, which are derivative of those claims, is appropriate as well.? (See Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229.)
Finally, SDSA meets its initial burden on Plaintiff?s remaining claim for defamation by demonstrating that the statements at issue are opinions, rather than facts, and thus cannot form the basis for an actionable defamation claim.? (See Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 958.)? The Court may properly (and does so here) decide this issue as a matter of law.? (See Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 260.)