Defendant the City of Laguna Beach moves for summary judgment or adjudication as to the first cause of action for dangerous condition of public property in the First Amended Complaint filed on 3/13/17 by Plaintiff Lauren Esparza.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff?s first cause of action alleges only two dangerous conditions that were substantial factors in causing her injury.? (FAC at ?? 26, 28.)?? Those two conditions were an inoperative streetlight that allegedly made it more difficult for drivers to see Plaintiff as she crossed the street in the darkness, and a trailer with a mobile electronic message board that was placed where it allegedly obstructed drivers? view of Plaintiff while she was crossing the street.? (Facts 6, 12, 23.)
- Inoperative Street Light
The City argues that under California law it owes Plaintiff and the general public no tort duty of care to provide streetlights in the first place, and that the City also owes no tort duty of care to maintain those streetlights in an operable condition.? (Plattner v. City of Riverside?(1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1445;?White v. Southern California Edison Co.?(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 442, 446;?Antenor v. City of Los Angeles?(1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 477, 483).
Defendant argues as follows. ?An action in negligence requires a showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach was a legal cause of injury suffered by the plaintiff.? (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center?(1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673 (disapproved on other grounds).? The determination that a defendant owed plaintiff no duty of care is a complete defense to a cause of action for negligence. (Owens v. Kings Supermarket?(1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 379, 385, citing?Sprecher v. Adamson Companies?(1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, 362.)
Whether such a duty exists is a question of law for the Court to determine.? (Krawitz v. Rusch?(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 963.)? In determining the existence of duty, ?… the major [considerations] are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.? (White v. Southern California Edison Co.?(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 442, 447,?citing Rowland v. Christian?(1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.)
In?White v. Southern California Edison Co.?(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 442, 445-446, 454, plaintiff was driving a moped and was injured in a collision with a van.? Plaintiff alleged that Southern California Edison Co. was negligent for failing to maintain and repair a nearby streetlight, so that insufficient lighting at the intersection proximately caused his injuries.? Edison owned and maintained the streetlight, under a contract with Los Angeles County.? The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court?s summary judgment ruling in favor of Edison.? The Court of Appeal held that under the facts of that case, the public utility owed no tort duty of care to plaintiff to maintain the streetlight in an operable condition.
?We are of the opinion that a public utility generally owes no duty to the motoring public for inoperable streetlights. There is no contractual relation between the utility and the injured party, and the injured party is not a third party beneficiary of the utility’s contract with the public entity. The public utility owes no general duty to the public to provide streetlights. The burden on the public utility in terms of costs and disruption of existing rate schedules far exceeds the slight benefit to the motoring public from the imposition of liability. As noted, vehicles at night are driven with headlights, it is unlikely that a single inoperable streetlight will be a substantial factor in causing a collision, and automobile insurance is available to cover damages.?? (White, at p. 451.)
?In our view, liability may not be imposed on a public utility in these circumstances where (1) the installation of the streetlight is not necessary to obviate a dangerous condition, i.e., there is a duty to install the streetlight and a concomitant duty to maintain it; (2) the failure to maintain an installed streetlight does not create a risk greater than the risk created by the total absence of a streetlight; and (3) the injured party has not in some manner relied on the operation of the streetlight foregoing other protective actions, e.g., a pedestrian chooses a particular route home in reliance on the available streetlighting when the pedestrian would have chosen a different route or a different means of transportation in the absence of lighting.?? (Ibid.)
?In the absence of a statutory or charter provision to the contrary, it is generally held that a municipality is under no duty to light its streets even though it is given the power to do so, and hence, that its failure to light them is not actionable negligence, and will not render it liable in damages to a traveler who is injured solely by reason thereof. A duty to light, and the consequent liability for failure to do so, may, however, arise from some peculiar condition rendering lighting necessary in order to make the streets safe for travel.?? (White, at p. 451,?citing Antenor v. City of Los Angeles?(1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 477, 483).
In?Plattner v. City of Riverside?(1999) 69 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1445, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 2, applied the analysis in?Whiteand similarly held that a city did not owe a duty to an injured pedestrian to maintain a streetlight over a crosswalk in working condition.
The plaintiff in?Plattner?alleged that the installation of the subject streetlight was necessary to obviate the danger posed by a pedestrian having to cross the roadway after dark; the failure to maintain the subject streetlight created a risk greater than that posed by the failure to install a light in that the plaintiff had come to rely upon the light at the crosswalk in her travels; and the plaintiff would not have taken that particular route home if she had known that she would be forced to cross in the pitch blackness.?Id. at 1443.
The Court of Appeal rejected plaintiff?s arguments.? Darkness is a naturally occurring condition that the city is under no duty to eliminate, so the crosswalk was not dangerous in the abstract and therefore did not constitute a peculiar condition rendering lighting necessary. Plaintiff did not claim or show that there was anything dangerous about the crosswalk other than the absence of light.??Id. at 1445.
The Court of Appeal also rejected plaintiff?s argument that by providing a crosswalk and thereby encouraging pedestrians to cross the street at that location, the city invited the public to rely on the streetlight and thus created a duty to maintain the light.?Id.
In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that although the City initially owed no duty to provide street lights, nevertheless once the City undertook to place a streetlight near the crosswalk, it automatically assumed a duty to maintain it.? But this argument was squarely rejected in?White?and?Plattner.? A public entity or public utility owes no duty to install or maintain a streetlight, unless the light was necessary to obviate a dangerous condition, or unless the other requirements set forth in?Whitehave not been met.
Plaintiff also argues that?White?does not apply here because?Whiteinvolved an accident between a car and a moped, both of which had working lights.? However, this argument fails because?Plattner?did involve an accident between a car and a pedestrian.
Plaintiff asks the Court to ignore?Plattner?and instead rely on other California authority that is factually distinguishable.? Plaintiff further asks the Court to rely instead on non-California authority that found a duty of care.? However, the Court is bound by?Plattner?and?White?and determines that their holdings squarely apply to this factual circumstance.? Accordingly, the City?s argument as framed in their motion for summary adjudication as to issue No. 1 is meritorious.
As to the second issue that the City moves for summary adjudication, Plaintiff does not dispute that the message board did not create a line of sight obstruction.? (Undisputed Fact. No. 28).? Accordingly, the City?s argument as to the second issue is also well-taken.
Therefore, the City?s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
As to the City?s request for attorney?s fees, the request is DENIED.
Defendant to give notice.