Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission (Judge Robert S. Draper)


ERIC ESCORSIA;

Plaintiff,

vs.

KIA MOTORS AMERICA,
INC., et al.;

Defendants.

Case No.: BC 719448
Hearing
Date:
July 26, 2019
   
[TENTATIVE]RULING
RE:

PLAINTIFF ERIC ESCORSIA’S MOTION TO
COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION FROM DEFENDANT KIA MOTORS
AMERICA, INC..

Plaintiff Eric Escorsia’s
Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission from Defendant Kia
Motors America, Inc. is GRANTED.

FACTUAL
BACKGROUND

This is a Lemon Law case. The
Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges as follows. In September 2012,
Plaintiff Eric Escorsia (“Escorsia”) purchased a 2012 Kia Optima with an
express warranty. (SAC ¶¶ 6–7.) During the warranty period, the vehicle
developed various engine defects. (SAC ¶ 8.) Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc.
(“Kia”) knew before Escorsia purchased the vehicle that a certain engine defect
was common in this type of vehicle, yet failed to disclose it. (SAC ¶¶ 15–51.)
Kia has failed to re-purchase the vehicle or offer restitution. (SAC ¶ 66.)

PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

Escorsia filed the original
Complaint on August 27, 2018, and filed the FAC on October 5, 2018, alleging
seven causes of action:

  1. VIOLATION OF SUBDIVISION (D) OF CIVIL CODE SECTION
    1793.2
  2. VIOLATION OF SUBDIVISION (B) OF CIVIL CODE SECTION
    1793.2
  3. VIOLATION OF SUBDIVISION (A)(3) OF CIVIL CODE SECTION
    1793.2
  4. BREACH OF EXPRESS WRITTEN WARRANTY
  5. BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
  6. FRAUD BY OMISSION
  7. FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT

 

This Court on January 7, 2019,
sustained Kia’s Demurrer to the FAC without leave to amend as to the Fifth
Cause of Action, with leave to amend as to the Sixth and Seventh Causes of
Action, and overruled the demurrer as to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action.

 

Escorsia filed the SAC on
January 28, 2019, alleging the same causes of action.

 

This Court on May 29, 2019,
sustained Kia’s Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action without leave to amend,
and overruled the Demurrer as to the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes
of Action, and denied Kia’s Motion to Strike.

 

Escorsia filed the present
motion to compel further on April 11, 2019.

 

Kia filed an Opposition on July
15, 2019.

 

Escorsia filed a Reply on July
17, 2019.

 

DISCUSSION

 

  1. MOTION TO
    COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

 

“On
receipt of a response to requests for admissions, the party requesting
admissions may move for an order compelling a further response,” if they
contend the response is incomplete or that an objection is without merit. (Code
Civ. Proc. § 2033.290, subd. (a).)

 

Escorsia moves to
compel further responses to Requests for Admission, Set One, No. 1–24. Kia
responded to Requests No. 1–10 and 17–24 with statements that such requests
were premature considering Kia’s then-pending petition to coordinate actions,
which was denied on January 29, 2019. Kia’s answers to Requests No. 11–16
complained of the overbreadth and ambiguity of the term “engine defect,” which
was defined to mean defects resulting in such symptoms as restricted oil flow,
knocking sounds, and others. (Separate Statement at p. 2.)

 

 

 

In opposition, Kia
claims that it will produce supplemental responses before the hearing on this
motion. (Opposition at pp. 4–5.) Kia also argues that Escorsia has failed to
make a fact-specific showing of good cause for each request. (Opposition at pp.
5–6.) Kia also argues that Escorsia cannot seek discovery as relates to other
vehicles. (Opposition at pp. 6–8.) Finally, Kia argues that Escorsia took a
different position in arguing against the petition to coordinate. (Opposition
at pp. 8–9.)

 

 

 

Kia’s arguments
fail. First, no showing of good cause is required for a motion to compel
further responses to Requests for Admissions. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.290.) Kia confuses the standard
applicable to motions of this type with those applicable to motions to compel
further document production (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1)) and
discovery from non-parties. (See Calcor
Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court
 (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.)

 

 

 

Likewise, discovery
may be had as to vehicles other than Escorsia’s own. The scope of discovery is
defined by statute as follows:

 

 

 

Unless
otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any
party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the
determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself
admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.

 

 

 

(Code Civ. Proc. §
2017.010.)

 

 

 

To
succeed on a claim brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“the
Act”), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving several elements, including
nonconformity of a vehicle that substantially impaired its use, value, or
safety, presentation of a vehicle to a manufacturer or authorized
representative for repair, and failure to repair the defect after a reasonable
number of attempts. (Oregel v. Am. Isuzu
Motors, Inc. 
(“Oregel”) (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)

 

 

 

A buyer may be entitled to a civil penalty of up
to two times the actual damages upon a showing that the manufacturer willfully
failed to abide by any of its obligations under the Act. (Civ. Code § 1794,
subd. (c).) Evidence that a defendant “adopted internal policies that erected
hidden obstacles to the ability of an unwary consumer to obtain redress under
the Act,” is relevant to a determination of “willfulness” in relation to prayers
for the civil penalty. (Oregelsupra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)

 

 

 

The Court
finds that Escorsia may obtain discovery as to Kia’s knowledge of the relevant
defects, not limited to his car alone. The Song-Beverly Act itself allows for
the imposition of penalties for “willful” violations, which could encompass a
manufacturer’s knowledge of a given defect at the time the plaintiff’s car is
presented for repurchase. . (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (c).) Moreover, in Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 138, the trial court allowed an expert to testify that a particular
transmission was defective  because he
had heard from “others” that the same transmission in “other vehicle[s]” was
“problematic.” The Court of Appeal held that the “other vehicle” testimony was
properly “limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck
and other vehicles.”  (Id. at p. 154.)  The court held that “[s]uch evidence
certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”  (Ibid.)

 

 

 

Finally, the court disagrees with Kia’s argument
that Escorsia is estopped from seeking this discovery here because his counsel
represented that discovery would be limited in opposing Kia’s petition to
coordinate cases. (Opposition at pp. 12–13.) The court’s ruling in that matter
indicated that it felt discovery would not be burdensome in litigating
individual Song-Beverly cases even considering discovery with regard to “KIA’s
policies and internal investigations with regard to defects.” (Opposition Exh.
B at p. 3.) This is the scope of the discovery at issue.

 

 

 

This Ruling is limited to documents relating to
vehicles of the same make and model and year as plaintiff’s vehicle.

 

 

 

Accordingly, Escorsia’s Motion to Compel Further
is GRANTED.

 

 

 

Plaintiff to provide notice.

 

DATED:  July 26, 2019                                  ________________________________

 

Hon.
Robert S. Draper

 

Judge
of the Superior Court