Motion to Strike Punitive Damages (Judge Laura A. Seigle)


Case Number: BC712498    Hearing Date: February 11, 2020    Dept: 27

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES

On July 6, 2018, plaintiffs Margarita Manzanarez Rodriguez (“Margarita”) and Andres Rodriguez (“Andres”) filed this action against defendant Jennifer L. Issa for motor vehicle, general negligence, and intentional tort relating to a July 13, 2016 incident.  Plaintiff alleges that while attempting to park her car, Defendant pinned Margarita against a trash bin.  Andres attempted to stop Defendant from leaving the scene of the accident by holding onto the left-side back door of her vehicle.  Defendant drove away, dragging Andres until he eventually entered the moving vehicle through an open window.  With Andres in the car, Defendant drove away and initially refused to return.  Eventually, Defendant returned to the scene of the accident.  Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ punitive damages allegations and third cause of action for intentional tort.  Plaintiffs did not file an opposition.

Punitive Damages Allegations

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)  “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)  “As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests.  The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (Ibid.)  Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.  Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)  “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages.  (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.)  The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)

Defendant argues Plaintiffs did not allege facts showing she intended or reasonably could have expected to injure Margarita.  As for the injuries sustained by Andres, Defendant argues she was just concerned for her own safety when she drove off and refused to stop, and her refusal to stop does not show intent to injure.

The complaint does not allege that Defendant intended to injury Margarita.  To the contrary, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff was trying to park and did not initially realize she had pinned Margarita against a trash bin.  However, the allegations that Defendant drove away with Andres holding onto her vehicle’s backdoor and dragged him until he climbed in through an open window could demonstrate willful and conscious disregard for Andres’s safety and willful failure to avoid the probable dangerous consequences of driving away.

Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages allegations is DENIED.

Motion to Strike Third Cause of Action

            A motion to strike can be used to attack portions of a cause of action while a demurrer is used to attack entire causes of action.  “[I]t is improper for a court to strike a whole cause of action of a pleading under Code of Civil Procedure section 436. … Where a whole cause of action is the proper subject of a pleading challenge, the court should sustain a demurrer to the cause of action rather than grant a motion to strike. [Citation.]” (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281.)  Accordingly, the motion to strike the third cause of action is DENIED.

Moving party to give notice.