Case Number: 19STCV45276 Hearing Date: July 16, 2020 Dept: 31
DEMURRER IS SUSTAINED.
Background
On December 16, 2019, Plaintiff Matthew De Santis, Trustee of the Loma De Santis Trust dated February 5, 2019, filed the instant action against Defendants A & B Property Investments; Alvarado Auto Sales, Inc; and Does 1 through 10. The Complaint asserts causes of action for:
- Quiet Title (Prescriptive Easement);
- Injunctive Relief;
- Declaratory Relief; and
- Conversion.
Defendants A & B Property Investments and Alvarado Auto Sales, Inc. (hereinafter “Defendants”) demur to the entire complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Legal Standard on Demurrer
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747. When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-21.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not on the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such, the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Id.) However, it does not accept as true deductions, contentions, or conclusions of law or fact. (Stonehouse Homes LLC v. City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.) A demurrer may be sustained “only if the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory.” (Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998.)
Legal Standard on Motion to Strike
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)
Discussion
First Cause of Action for Quiet Title (Prescriptive Easement)
California Code of Civil Procedure § 761.020 requires a complaint for quiet title to be verified and to include the following elements: (1) a legal description of the property; (2) the basis of title as to which determination is sought; (3) the adverse claims to the title as to which determination is sought; (4) the date as of which the determination is sought; and (5) a prayer for the determination of title. (Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020; 5 Witkin, Cal. Pro. (4th ed. 1997) Pleading § 622.)
“A prescriptive easement requires use of land that is open and notorious, hostile to the true owner and continuous for five years. [Citation.] Unlike adverse possession, a prescriptive easement does not require the payment of taxes. [Citation.] It is not an ownership right, but a right to a specific use of another’s property. [Citation.] But Kapner’s use of the land was not in the nature of an easement. Instead, he enclosed and possessed the land in question.
To escape the tax requirement for adverse possession, some claimants who have exercised what amounts to possessory rights over parts of neighboring parcels, have claimed a prescriptive easement. Courts uniformly have rejected the claim. [Citations.] These cases rest on the traditional distinction between easements and possessory interests. [Citation.]” (Kapner v. Meadowlark Ranch Assn. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186–1187.)
Defendants demur to the first cause of action arguing that Plaintiff’s allegations of exclusive use bars the claim for a prescriptive easement. Defendants assert that here, Plaintiff’s claim of a prescriptive easement fails because Plaintiff has alleged that Plaintiff fenced in and possessed the land in question. This allegation is fatal to the claim of prescriptive easement.
Defendants also argue that the law does not permit an exclusive prescriptive easement. Defendants assert that the complaint alleged an exclusive prescriptive easement, as the allegations do not simply seek an easement; they seek to quiet title in the name of the Plaintiff akin to adverse possession. Defendants contend that as there is no claim that Plaintiff paid the property taxes on the position of the land they seek to seize, the cause of action fails.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the complaint does not seek an “exclusive” prescriptive easement. Plaintiff asserts that the word “exclusive” cannot be found in the complaint and the rights Plaintiff seeks are in the nature of an easement, i.e., ingress and egress over Defendants’ property.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for quiet title based on a prescriptive easement. As noted by the authorities above, when a plaintiff alleges that the subject land was enclosed and possessed, a plaintiff cannot succeed on a cause of action for prescriptive easement. (Kapner, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 1187 (“Because Kapner enclosed and possessed the land in question, his claim to a prescriptive easement is without merit.”).) Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the subject property was enclosed by a fence. (Complaint ¶ 7.) Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for prescriptive easement; instead, Plaintiff must attempt to quiet title through adverse possession. As to a cause of action for adverse possession, Plaintiff has failed to allege the payment of taxes.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demur to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
Second Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief
Seeking injunctive relief is an equitable remedy, not a cause of action. (Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1187.)
Defendants demur to the fourth cause of action for injunctive relief arguing that injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action.
The Court finds that Plaintiff improperly brings a cause of action for injunctive relief, as injunctive relief is not a cause of action, but rather, a remedy.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
Third Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief
Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 provides that a person may bring an action for declaratory relief if he or she “desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) A request for declaratory relief may be brought alone or with other relief. (See id.)
To state a declaratory relief claim, the plaintiff must allege a proper subject of declaratory relief and an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations. (See Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909.)
“The court . . . may sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if it determines that a judicial declaration is not ‘necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.”’ (DeLaura v. Beckett (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 542, 545; see also Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 648 (demurrer properly sustained where no allegations that declaratory relief would “have any practical consequences.”).)
Defendants demur to the third cause of action for declaratory relief arguing that it fails for the same reasons the cause of action for quiet title based on prescriptive easement fails.
The Court finds that given the Court’s sustaining of the demurrer to the first cause of action, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to allege an actual controversy.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demur to the third cause of action for declaratory relief is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
Fourth Cause of Action for Conversion
“[A]n action will not lie for the conversion of real estate.” (Graner v. Hogsett (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 657, 662.)
Defendants demur to the fourth cause of action for conversion arguing that real property is not subject to a conversion cause of action and the Complaint alleges that Defendants converted the easement at issue, causing damages of $550,000.00. (Complaint ¶ 23-28.)
Plaintiff withdraws/dismisses the conversion cause of action in his opposition.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action for conversion is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
Motion to Strike
Given the Court’s ruling, sustaining the demurrer to the entirety of the Complaint, Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED as moot.
Conclusion
Defendants’ demurrer to the first and third causes of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Defendants’ demurrer to the second and fourth causes of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED as moot.
The parties are strongly encouraged to attend all scheduled hearings by telephone or CourtCall. All social distancing protocols will be observed at the Courthouse and in the courtrooms.
Moving party to give notice.