Case Number: 18STCV01679 Hearing Date: August 31, 2020 Dept: 56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT
| JOHN HASLER, etc.,
Plaintiff, vs.
GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, etc., et al.,
Defendants. |
CASE NO.: 18STCV01679
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
Date: August 31, 2020 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 |
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff John Hasler
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant General Motors, LLC
The Court has considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint arising from an allegedly defective 2015 Chevrolet Sonic (the “Subject Vehicle”), alleging against Defendants causes of action for: (1) breach of implied warranty of merchantability under Song-Beverly Warranty Act; and (2) breach of express warranty under Song-Beverly Warranty Act.
On January 13, 2020, Defendant filed and served California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 998 Offer to Compromise (the “Offer”), which Plaintiff accepted. In part, the Offer stated that: (1) Moving Defendant would pay $24,068.20 to Plaintiff in exchange for the return of the Subject Vehicle; (2) Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs that have been reasonably incurred pursuant to California Civil Code, Section 1794(d) may be determined by the Court via noticed motion and, for the purposes of such motion, Moving Defendant would agree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party; and (3) Moving Defendant agreed to pay prejudgment interest pursuant to California Civil Code, Sections 3287(b) and 3289(b).
The Current Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and according to the terms of the accepted Offer. Plaintiff seeks: (1) attorneys’ fees in the lodestar amount of $37,133.50; (2) a lodestar multiplier of 1.5 which equals $18,566.75; and (3) costs in the amount of $4,977.14. Pursuant to the motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $60,677.39.
Plaintiff asserts that: (1) Defendant agreed to pay attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Offer; (2) other courts, including departments in this building have previously approved the hourly rate of David N. Barry, Esq. (“Barry”); (3) the hourly rates and time incurred are reasonable; (4) the nature and complexity of the litigation support the requested attorneys’ fees; (5) the firm’s skill justified the amount of attorneys’ fees sought; (6) the firm is entitled to a lodestar multiplier; and (7) Plaintiff is entitled to recover all costs and expenses reasonably incurred in connection with this action.
Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s motion on the grounds that: (1) the Court should deny Plaintiff’s entire demand and not award any attorneys’ fees because counsel submitting billing records for work not performed in this case; (2) the Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion because it seeks double recovery, as well as fees, for inefficient and unnecessary work; (3) counsel’s claimed fees are unreasonable and excessive; (4) the Court should not award a multiplier; and (5) counsel’s expenses should be reduced to $2,200.00.
Tertiary Arguments
Initially, Defendant argues that counsel billed for multiple events that never occurred in the amount of more than $5,700.00 which includes: (1) $3,307.50 for a motion for prejudgment interest that was never filed; (2) $625.00 for a cancelled Informal Discovery Conference (“IDC”); (3) $1,290.00 for a cancelled OSC; and (4) $1,150.00 for a PMK to which Defendant objected and informed counsel that Defendant would not attend.
Defendant’s argument is misplaced. On July 2, 2020, Plaintiff in fact did file and serve a motion for prejudgment interest. Also, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, an IDC was held on July 1, 2019 as reflected by the Court’s minute order thereto. Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, a hearing on the OSC re: Sanctions was held on September 30, 2019. Also, Defendant confirmed the depositions that Defendant claimed it would not attend. (Reply at Exhibit 3.)
Thus, the Court will not strike Plaintiff’s entire request for attorneys’ fees and costs, nor will it strike related items from Plaintiff’s costs. Defendant’s contentions are incorrect that Plaintiff submitted billing records for work not performed in this case. (Opposition at 2:1-16.)
DISCUSSION
A prevailing party in an action under the Song-Beverly Act may be entitled to attorneys’ fees. (Cal. Civ. Code § 1794; see also Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(a)(4).) Attorneys’ fees compensation “ordinarily include[s] compensation for all hours reasonably spent, including those necessary to establish and defend the . . . claim.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.) The party moving for attorneys’ fees has “the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) Where a case is premised on a contingent fee agreement “it is appropriate to award reasonable attorney’s fees for time reasonably expended by the attorney.” (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 755.) “If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)
A party seeking attorney’s fees has the burden of showing that such sought fees are reasonable. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 98.) “In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an attorney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceeding, the court may and should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, his learning, his age, and his experience in the particular type of work demanded.” (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 659.) “[A]n award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “[T]he verified time statements of . . . attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) Where a party is challenging the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees as excessive that party must “attack itemized billing with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate or obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable.” (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-564.) A “reduced [attorney fee] award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101.)
With respect to awarding attorneys’ fees “California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done.” (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698.) “Because time records are not required under California law . . . there is no required level of detail that counsel must achieve.” (Id. at 699.) A court awards attorneys’ fees based on the “lodestar” method which is “the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “[T]he trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.” (Id.) “The loadstar figure may . . . be adjusted, based on a consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Id.) “The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove that the fees it seeks are reasonable.” (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 615.)
Issue No. 1: Excessiveness and Unreasonableness of Fees
The prevailing party in a Song-Beverly Act action “has the burden of showing that the fees incurred were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The Court must “make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then . . . ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. These circumstances may include, but are not limited to, factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved.” (Id.) “Generally, the reasonable hourly rate used for the lodestar calculation is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616, emphasis added.) Where an attorney has been awarded attorneys’ fees for comparable work at comparable hourly rates in other actions, the hourly rate will be deemed reasonable. (Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 473-474.)
Where a defendant does not produce evidence contradicting the reasonableness of plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates, the Court will deem an attorney’s hourly rate reasonable. (Id. at 473.) Attorney billing records are given a presumption of credibility. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) “[I]t is inappropriate and an abuse of a trial court’s discretion to tie an attorney fee award to the amount of the prevailing buyer/plaintiff’s damages or recovery in a Song-Beverly Act action.” (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 37.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998.)
Plaintiff’s Evidence
Plaintiff provides numerous declarations in support of his motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.
Barry Declaration
Plaintiff presents the declaration of Barry who relevantly declares that: (1) his firm’s representation agreement with Plaintiff is based on an hourly rate, payment of which is contingent on prevailing in the case (Barry Decl. at ¶ 3); (2) Plaintiff experienced multiple defects with the Subject Vehicle and Plaintiff was forced to retain counsel and filed suit on October 18, 2018 (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6); (3) once litigation commenced, Defendant filed a general denial of all claims asserted in the complaint and refused to take any responsibility (Id. at ¶ 7 and Exhibit 3); (4) he propounded written discovery and noticed the deposition of Defendant’s PMK and his efforts to obtain basic discovery were thwarted (Id. at ¶ 8); (5) despite his efforts to resolve these issues informally with Defendant, Defendant refused to provide Code-compliant discovery and he was forced to pursue law and motion practice (Id.); (6) it was not until January 2020 that this matter was finally resolved and Defendant issued the Offer, wherein Plaintiff obtained a full buyback of the Subject Vehicle plus additional cash compensation (Id. at ¶ 9 and Exhibit 4); (7) he has attached his firm’s time entries which accurately reflect time and tasks performed (Id. at ¶ 10 and Exhibit 5); (8) all of the services for which fees have been listed as attributable to him were actually performed, save for the time reviewing Defendant’s opposition, preparing the reply brief, traveling to and from the fee hearing and attending the hearing (Id.); and (9) the time entries contain a detailed description of the legal services that have been rendered in connection with this matter by him. (Id.)
Barry also declares that: (1) he has personally reviewed the billing entries to ensure they accurately reflect the time expended (Id. at ¶ 11); (2) he has reduced or eliminated any time he felt was excessive, duplicative, de minimus, or otherwise not justified (Id.); (3) his firm does not bill clients for staff time including secretarial or paralegal time (Id.); (4) his firm provided effective and vigorous representation (Id. at ¶ 12); (5) his hourly rate is $525.00 and such rate is consistent with other attorneys who litigate consumer matters and who possess his level of experience (Id. at ¶ 13); (6) he is lead counsel for Plaintiff and he believes his rates are reasonable and customary (Id.); (7) breach of warranty/lemon law and sales fraud claims are a sub-specialty of contract law and there are only a handful of lawyers in California that handle these claims (Id.); (8) he has been practicing law for over 19 years and prior to this case, he has successfully handled hundreds of consumer rights claims against various manufacturers and dealers (Id. at ¶ 14); and (9) he graduated Pepperdine Law School in 2000. (Id. at ¶ 16.)
Barry further declares that: (1) he requests a multiplier of 1.5 (Id. at ¶ 19); (2) a multiplier is warranted because his fees are contingent (Id.); (3) there is a substantial delay in payment associated with a contingent fee scenario (Id.); (4) the skill in advancing the issues in this case, particularly in the face of stern opposition against one of the biggest automobile manufacturers in the world that has virtually limitless resources, warrants a multiplier (Id.); (5) Plaintiff obtained a full buyback of the Subject Vehicle plus additional compensation and such outcome on behalf of his client warrants a multiplier (Id.); (6) with the multiplier of 1.5, the total amount of fees is $55,700.25 and that amount plus costs of $4,977.14 totals $60,677.39. (Id. at ¶ 20.); (7) Lucy Kasparian, who specializes in his area of law, of The California Lemon Law Center in Glendale, California charges $550.00 per hour (Id. at ¶ 22); and (8) his hourly rate of $525.00 per hour has been approved in February 2020 with respect to two cases involving automobile manufacturers. (Id. at ¶¶ 66-67.) Barry also declares that: (1) the requested fees are reasonable given the time spent, the nature of the case, the results achieved, and the experience of counsel (Id. at ¶ 68); and (2) the verified memorandum of costs is attached to his declaration. (Id. at ¶ 21 and Exhibit 7.)
Declaration of Sarah Jane Norris
Sarah Jane Norris (“Norris”) relevantly declares that: (1) she has reviewed her time entries in this matter, which are attached as Exhibit 5 to Barry’s declaration, and the time entries correspond to the work she performed and are true and accurate (Norris Decl. at ¶ 2); (2) she has been practicing law in California for almost three years and obtained her license in December 2016 (Id. at ¶ 4); (3) she has been an associate at the Barry Law Firm since July 2018, and her hourly rate was originally $250.00 (Id. at ¶ 6); (4) since 2019, after practicing exclusively in the area of Song-Beverly protection for over one year, her current hourly rate was increased to $300.00 per hour, which is in line with, if not lower than, the majority of attorneys with her level of education and experience practicing in the same geographical area and subject area of law (Id.); (5) she is only seeking an hourly rate of $300.00 for services rendered since September 2019 and for services rendered prior to that date, her previous hourly rate of $250.00 applies (Id.) and (6) her hourly rate of $300.00 per hour has been approved in February 2020 with respect to two cases involving automobile manufacturers. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.)
Declaration of Logan Pascal
Logan Pascal (“Pascal”) relevantly declares that: (1) he has reviewed his time entries in this matter, which are attached as Exhibit 5 to Barry’s declaration, and the time entries correspond to the work he performed and are true and accurate (Pascal Decl. at ¶ 2); (2) he has been practicing law in California for over one year and obtained his license in January 2019 (Id. at ¶ 4); (3) he has been an associate at the Barry Law Firm since August 2019, and his hourly rate is $250.00 which is in line with, if not lower than, the majority of attorneys with his level of education and experience practicing in the same geographical area and subject area of law (Id. at ¶ 5); and (4) his hourly rate of $250.00 per hour has been approved in February 2020 with respect to a case involving and automobile manufacturer. (Id. at ¶ 6.)
Declaration of Andrew Matera
Andrew Matera (“Matera”) relevantly declares that: (1) he has reviewed his time entries in this matter, which are attached as Exhibit 5 to Barry’s declaration, and the time entries correspond to the work he performed and are true and accurate (Matera Decl. at ¶ 2); (2) he has been practicing law in California for over two years and obtained his license in December 2017 (Id. at ¶ 4); and (3) he has been an associate at the Barry Law Firm since October 2019, and his hourly rate is $290.00 which is in line with, if not lower than, the majority of attorneys with his level of education and experience practicing in the same geographical area and subject area of law. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
Declaration of Hallen D. Rosner
Hallen D. Rosner (“Rosner”) relevantly declares that: (1) her declaration is made to help establish prevailing auto attorney fees rates in consumer cases such as lemon law (Rosner Dec. at ¶ 2); (2) she is a partner at the law firm of Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, LLP (Id. at ¶ 1); and (3) her billing rate in 2019 was $660.00 per hour. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
Defendant’s Evidence
Defendant’s counsel, Kyle B. Roybal (“Roybal”), relevantly declares that: (1) the complaint in this case is a form of counsel’s used in countless other cases against Defendant, which requires at most inserting Plaintiffs’ information in the caption and a handful of paragraphs (Roybal Decl. ¶3 and Exhibits B-C); (2) counsel routinely bills grossly excessive amounts for template-base, low-level tasks (Id. at ¶ 4); (3) discovery was minimal in this case and the only motion filed in this case—other than the instant fee motion—was a motion to compel the deposition of Defendant’s PMK (Id. at ¶ 5); (4) Barry sent multiple, almost identical meet and confer letters in this case that are used in other cases (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7; Id. at Exhibits D-H); (5) Defendant did not aggressively litigate this case at any point (Id. at ¶ 10); and (6) all, if not nearly all, of the pleadings in this case were prepared by only slightly modifying templates counsel has used in hundreds of other Song-Beverly cases.
Analysis
Initially, the Court will address Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claimed fees are excessive. Defendant’s opposition refers to various billing entries which Defendant claims are excessive and should not be included in the award of attorneys’ fees.
Defendant asserts that Barry should not receive credit for the 0.3 hours he billed to prepare his firm’s retainer agreement with Plaintiff. (Opposition at 3:10-12.) Defendant’s citation to Hensley is not applicable to Defendant’s argument on that point. (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 429.)
Defendant’s assertion that Pascal should not be compensated for the 5.0 hours he billed to attend the return of the Subject Vehicle is not persuasive. (Barry Decl., Exhibit 5 at p.26.) Roybal, however, presents no evidence that such task was unnecessary. Additionally, “the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment” as to the tasks completed with respect to an action because “he won, and might not have, had he been more of a slacker.” (Moreno v. City of Sacramento (2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1111.)
The Court also rejects Defendant’s assertion that Barry and his firm should not get any credit for billing time for “drafting” the same template-based discovery requests and letters that counsel uses in every lemon law case. Had Defendant complied with discovery, then Plaintiff would not have been forced to utilize such templates. Defendant “cannot litigate tenaciously then be heard to complain about the time spent [or tasks performed] by the plaintiff in response.” (City of Riverside v. Rivera (1986) 477 U.S. 561, 580, fn.11.) Barry clearly and unequivocally stated in his declaration that Defendant was not compliant in this action and refused to take responsibility.
Defendant contends that Barry should not get credit for “billing” time for work he did not actually perform. Defendant refers to page 5 of Barry’s declaration and asserts that Barry billed for two meet and confer letters that was not drafted by Barry because “DB” with various initials are on the bottom of such letters. (Roybal Decl. at Exhibits G and H.) The Court finds that Defendant is arguing in pure speculative terms. The meet and confer letters at issue were signed by Barry.
Next, Defendant asserts that Barry engaged in associate-level tasks and that attorneys were required to re-review documents that Barry had already reviewed at least once. Staffing decisions of a law firm are not for the court to speculate and such arguments have been rejected. (Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 874.) Thus, under City of Redondo Beach and the persuasive language in Moreno, who was staffed on what tasks is not for this Court to second-guess. Counsel’s professional judgment is entitled to a degree of deference given that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.
Additionally, Defendant contends that Barry should not receive credit for the numerous, generalized communications with Plaintiff. Defendant contends that the billing entries fail to give insight about the general topic of such communications and, as such, Defendant cannot ascertain whether the tasks were reasonable or necessary. “[C]ounsel . . . is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended. But counsel should identify the general subject matter of his expenditures.” (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 437, fn.12.) The entries that Defendant takes issue with (Opposition at 3:14-19), identifies the general subject matter of the task. Such descriptions are thus sufficient.
Next, Defendant contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to time spent drafting and attending the attorneys’ fees motion hearing because the fee motion is identical to that counsel has filed in other cases and the Court, before awarding attorneys’ fees thereto, should confirm that Barry personally appears at the hearing. While the Court finds that the fee motion here is essentially identical to that filed by counsel in another fee action (Roybal Decl. at Exhibit J), Plaintiff is entitled to fees in connection with the motion for attorneys’ fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141, fn.6.)
Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, after review of the billing entries, the Court does not find that the bill is “padded.”
Besides conclusory assertions in Roybal’s declaration, the Court finds that Defendant has not: (1) presented sufficient evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate; or (2) provided the declaration of attorney with expertise in procedural or substantive law that the fees claimed are unreasonable. Thus, Defendant has not met its burden with respect to challenging unreasonableness under Premier.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claimed attorneys’ fees are reasonable and are not excessive.
The Court, however, does notice a discrepancy in the billing. Plaintiff claims fees with respect to a motion for postjudgment interest—drafting a reply brief, travel time to the hearing, and attending the hearing—however, such motion was taken off calendar by Plaintiff. (Barry Decl., Exhibit 5 a pp.27-28.) Additionally, an opposition to the motion for prejudgment interest was never filed. As such, the Court will deduct $2,625.00 for the 5 hours in connection with such motion from the claimed lodestar attorneys’ fees.
Issue No. 2: The Lodestar Multiplier
“The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered.” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In cases involving the Song-Beverly Act, the lodestar figure may be augmented or diminished. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 819.) In determining whether or not a lodestar figure will be multiplied for purposes of attorneys’ fees the court “take[s] various relevant factors into account, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.” (Id.)
The Court finds that a multiplier is not warranted in this case. While this case was taken on a contingent fee basis, the declarations of counsel are lacking facts to warrant a multiplier in this action. Only Barry sets forth reasons why a multiplier is warranted. Barry requests a multiplier based on his contingent fee, the risk and delay in payment associated with contingent fees, and the result achieved. No declaration presents evidence that the nature of this case precluded other employment by the attorneys. Additionally, there was no novel work performed by either counsel. Barry’s firm engaged in discovery-related tasks and other routine matters.
Therefore, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s request for a 1.5 multiplier.
Issue No.3: Costs
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s costs should be reduced to $2,200.00. Defendant, however, cites no legal authority in support of its contention.
A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence that the costs were reasonable and necessary. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)
Here, Plaintiff has submitted a verified memorandum of costs. (Barry Decl. at Exhibit 7.) Plaintiff is entitled to recover all of its costs in the amount of $4,977.14.
The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs and AWARDS Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $34,508.50 and costs in the amount of $4,977.14. Thus, Plaintiff’s total award of attorneys’ fees and costs is $39,485.64.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
In consideration of the current COVID-19 pandemic situation, the Court strongly encourages that appearances on all proceedings, including this one, be made by CourtCall if the parties do not submit on the tentative. If you instead intend to make an appearance in person at Court on this matter, you must send an email by 2 p.m. on the last Court day before the scheduled date of the hearing to SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org stating your intention to appear in person. The Court will then inform you by close of business that day of the time your hearing will be held. The time set for the hearing may be at any time during that scheduled hearing day, or it may be necessary to schedule the hearing for another date if the Court is unable to accommodate all personal appearances set on that date. This rule is necessary to ensure that adequate precautions can be taken for proper social distancing.
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.
Dated this 31st day of August 2020
| Hon. Holly J. Fujie
Judge of the Superior Court |