Case Number: 21SMCV00498 Hearing Date: July 17, 2025 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE RULING
| DEPARTMENT | 207 |
| HEARING DATE | July 17, 2025 |
| CASE NUMBER | 21SMCV00498 |
| MOTIONS | Motion for Reconsideration
Motion to Vacate |
| MOVING PARTIES | Defendants Jake Seal, Orwo Film Distribution LLC, and PVS Studios |
| OPPOSING PARTY | Plaintiff Myriad Pictures, Inc. |
BACKGROUND
This case arises from a dispute concerning the production and distribution of the fourth movie in the “Jeepers Creepers” movie franchise.
On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff Myriad Pictures, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed the operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) against Defendants Infinity Films Holdings, LLC (“Infinity”); Michael Ohoven (“Ohoven”); Brandon Farm, LLC (“Brandon Farm”); Jake Seal (“Seal”); Screen Media Ventures, LLC (“SMV”); Chicken Soup for the Soul Entertainment, Inc. (“CSS”)[1]; Independent Frame, LLC (“Independent”); Orwo Film Distribution, LLC (“Orwo”); PVS Studios, LLC (“PVS”); David Fannon (“Fannon”); Seth Needle (“Needle”); and the Estate Mark Damon (“Damon”), alleging five causes of action for (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) intentional interference with contractual relations; (4) fraudulent concealment; and (5) declaratory relief.
On August 27, 2024, the Court sustained Fannon and Needle’s demurrer to the TAC with leave to amend, but Plaintiff did not file a fourth amended complaint.
On November 21, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel Seal, Orwo, and PVS (together “Defendants”) to provide further code-compliant responses to Request for Production set 2 (“RPD”) Nos. 60, 61, and 62 within 20 days of notice of the Court’s order and awarded monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,910. (Minute Order, Nov. 21, 2024.) However, the Court denied the motion to compel a further production as premature. (Ibid.)[2]
On February 6, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for monetary sanctions against Seal, Orwo, and PVS, for failing to comply with the Court’s November 21 order to provide further code-compliant verified responses to the RPD within 20 days of notice of the Court’s order and awarded monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,860.
On February 4, 2025, Defendants had apparently filed an “Opposition Declaration” demonstrating that further responses were electronically served on February 4, 2025. The “Opposition Declaration” did not appear on the docket before the Court issued its February 6 order granting Plaintiff’s motion for monetary sanctions as unopposed.
On April 8, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for issue and monetary sanctions against Seal, Orwo, and PVS, for failing to produce documents in compliance with the Court’s February 6 order, because the Court’s February 6 order only required the defendants to provide further code-compliant verified responses acknowledging that the requested “financial records” were in their possession, custody, or control, as they had conceded in briefing.
On May 28, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for issue sanctions, prohibiting Defendants from opposing the third cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations or the fourth cause of action for fraudulent concealment. In so holding, the Court found the supplemental responses Defendants served (and belatedly filed with the Court on February 4) disingenuously denied that the financial records were in their possession or control, conspicuously omitting “custody” and despite the facts that Defendants had conceded otherwise in prior briefing and judicially noticeable documents demonstrate that Jake Seal manages Glamorous Life Enterprises LLC, the entity that manages JC4 IP LLC, which is the entity Defendants contend handled the financing.
At 6:30 p.m. on May 27, Defendants apparently filed an opposition and an opposing Declaration of Jake Seal, but these documents did not appear on the docket prior to the 8:30 a.m. hearing on May 28.
Defendants now move for reconsideration of and to vacate the Court’s May 28 order. Plaintiff opposes the motions and Defendants reply.
ANALYSIS
- RECONSIDERATION
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a), “[w]hen an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make an application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) Where the statutory requirements are met, reconsideration should be granted; upon reconsideration, however, the court may simply reaffirm its original order. (Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 202.)
The moving party on a motion for reconsideration “must provide not only new evidence but also a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time[.]” (Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342, internal quotations & citations omitted; see New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 221 [on a motion for reconsideration, a party must present new or different facts, circumstances, or law, which the moving party “could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced” in connection with the original hearing].)
In support, Defendants advance the attorney declaration of Paul Sigelman, which provides as follows:
- The Court indicated a hearing on May 28, 2025, the plaintiffs motion – filed on the April 23rd, 2025 – that defendant’s responses were not code compliant as they omit “custody” whereas set forth by Exhibit 1, page 12 L2-12; page 21 L2-12; page 29 L2- 12, that is not so; the amended and further response of all parties made this clear in the February 4th filings prior to plaintiffs motions (Exhibit 1).
- Moreover, Jake Seal is, by the Court’s ruling, implied to being able to obtain control of the non-party entity, JC4 IP LLC, that by Jake Seal’s verified responses, he does not have knowledge that JC4 IP LLC have such records, but that JC4 IP LLC is attempting to have such prepared for Louisiana tax authority. While the Court noted that Jake Seal could obtain the non-existent records, for by implication he controls an entity that controls JC4 IP LLC, there is no proof in that regard. The Court then inquired whether there was any declaration on file in this regard and inquired of the clerk whether there was anything on file with the Court and was told there was not. The new and different facts and circumstances are that such records were and are on file with the Court, Exhibit 2 pg 9 L 9-25, and demonstrates that the actual circumstances were otherwise.
(Sigelman Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.)
As for the first point, Defendants’ “Further and Amended Response to Request for Production of Documents” that were filed on February 4 include response to RPD No. 62, which indicates, “No such financing records are in possession or control of Responding party as no financing was ever provided by Responding party.” Further, the February 4, 2025 Declaration of Paul Sigelman that accompanied that filing indicates, “As this Court was informed by the Responding parties’ filing on November 8th, they do not have possession or control of the requested financial production records. Indeed they do not have possession as they never financed the subject motion pictures.” As such, the Court’s assessment that the responses were noncompliant because they omitted the word “custody” was not erroneous.
Regarding the second point, opposition papers to a motion for sanctions must be filed and served no later than nine court days prior to the hearing. Here, the hearing was on May 28, 2025 at 8:30 a.m., yet Defendants did not file their opposition papers until 6:30 p.m. on May 27, 2025. Because electronically filed documents typically take two to three court days before they even appear on the docket, these documents were not even visible to the Court prior to the hearing, much less were they filed sufficiently in advance of the hearing that the Court could properly analyze them and incorporate them into its analysis. Nor have Defendants provided any explanation, much less an adequate explanation, in connection with their motion for reconsideration for their failure to timely file an opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions that came for hearing on May 28.
As such, Defendants have not met their burden to provide a satisfactory explanation for their failure to produce such evidence at an earlier time. Therefore, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for reconsideration.
- VACATE
- DISCRETIONARY AND MANDATORY RELIEF
“Proceeding to judgment in the absence of a party is an extraordinary and disfavored practice in Anglo–American jurisprudence: The policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon its merits, and it looks with disfavor upon a party, who, regardless of the merits of the case, attempts to take advantage of the mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary.” (Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21 Cal.4th 958, 963 [cleaned up].)
Code of Civil procedure section 473 “includes a discretionary provision, which applies permissively, and a mandatory provision, which applies as of right.” (Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 25 (hereafter Minick).) “Section 473 is a remedial statute to be “applied liberally” in favor of relief if the opposing party will not suffer prejudice. Because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default. Unless inexcusable neglect is clear, the policy favoring trial on the merits prevails.” (Minick, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 24 [cleaned up].)
The party or the legal representative must seek such relief “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 [“because more than six months had elapsed from the entry of default, and hence relief under section 473 was unavailable”]; People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Ca.App.4th 712, 721 [motion for relief under section 473 must be brought “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months”]). “The six-month limit is mandatory; a court has no authority to grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b), unless an application is made within the six-month period.” (Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340, citations omitted.)
- DISCRETIONARY RELIEF
Per Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), a court may “relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
- MANDATORY RELIEF
Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) “In considering whether the trial court properly denied relief under section 473(b), the first question is the sufficiency of defendants’ showing of attorney fault, if believed, to trigger the mandatory relief provisions of that statute.” (Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond Electronics Corp. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 868, 896, disapproved on other grounds by Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830 (hereafter Standard).) “Under section 473(b), a party is entitled to relief from a default and resulting judgment whenever, on timely application for relief, his attorney ‘attest[s] to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect’ in connection with the default or the judgment.” (Ibid.)
Several cases have considered the applicability of section 473’s mandatory relief provisions to counsel’s failure to respond to a motion, as opposed to failing to respond to the operative complaint.
In Avila v. Chua (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 860 (hereafter Avila), a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff had filed an untimely opposition to the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. (Id. at p. 864.) The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request to continue the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, struck the untimely filed opposition, and ruled in favor of the hospital on the then-unopposed motion for summary judgment. (Ibid.)
The plaintiff moved to set aside the order, pursuant to Section 473, on the grounds that the failure to timely oppose the motion was due to counsel’s calendaring error. (Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 865.) The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that counsel had not demonstrated an excusable mistake. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed, however, holding that the mandatory provisions of Section 473 apply to a motion for summary judgment where there has been no “litigation and adjudication on the merits” which is “directly analogous to a default judgment.” (Id. at p. 867-868.) And because the mandatory provision applied, counsel need not show that the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect was excusable. (Id. at pp. 868-869.)
However, in English v. IKON Business Solutions, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130 (hereafter IKON), the appellate court criticized the Avila decision:
Based on our construction of the statute, the Avila court’s conclusion that a summary judgment is “directly analogous to a default judgment” when the opposing party fails to file a timely opposition to the motion misses the point. (Avila v. Chua, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 868.) It is not an appellate court’s task, nor, indeed, its prerogative, when interpreting a statute, to extend the scope of the statute to encompass situations “analogous” to those the statute explicitly addresses. Rather, an appellate court’s task is simply to determine what the Legislature meant by the words it used, relying first and foremost on the words themselves. For the reasons already given, the terms “default” and “default judgment,” as used in the mandatory provision of section 473(b), cannot reasonably be construed to encompass a summary judgment, regardless of whatever omissions or failures by counsel may have preceded the entry of that judgment.
(English v. IKON Business Solutions, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 144.) IKON court further explained that the same is true for the statutory construction of the word “dismissal”:
Applying this principle of construction to the mandatory provision of section 473(b), we construe the word “dismissal” as having a limited meaning similar to the term “default judgment.” This approach is supported by the history of the mandatory provision, set out above. As Justice Epstein explained in his dissenting opinion in Yeap: “The purpose of the [1992] amendment was to give plaintiffs the functional equivalent of the ‘default’ provision for defendants ….” (Yeap v. Leake, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 604 (dis. opn. of Epstein, J.).) Thus, where a defendant was entitled to mandatory relief from a “default” or “default judgment” resulting from attorney mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, a plaintiff would be entitled to mandatory relief from a “dismissal” resulting from similar circumstances.
(Id. at p. 145.) Further,
By taking our statement about the purpose of the mandatory provision out of context, the Avila court was able to use that statement to justify extending the reach of the provision beyond the language of the statute itself and beyond what the Legislature intended when it added the word “dismissal” to the statute. At the same time, the Avila court avoided directly addressing the issue we address here—whether the Legislature intended the word “dismissal” to encompass a summary judgment entered against a plaintiff.
(Id. at p. 147.) Consequently, IKON concluded that a summary judgment is not a “default” or a “dismissal” under the mandatory provisions of Section 473.
Similarly, in Prieto v. Loyola Marymount University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 290 (hereafter Prieto), the appellate court affirmed the holding in IKON that “a motion brought under the mandatory, ‘attorney-fault’ provision of section 473(b) cannot seek to set aside an order granting summary judgment. More accurately, the mandatory provision of section 473(b) does not empower a court to set aside a summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 295.) As Prieto explained:
the mandatory relief provision [of section 473(b) was enacted because trial courts were found to be reluctant to grant discretionary relief from default judgments because of increased case loads. The policy goal sought to be effectuated was to relieve innocent clients from losing their day in court because the attorneys they hired to defend them inexcusably failed to file responsive papers. To achieve this goal, the Legislature expressly limited the scope of the mandatory provision of section 473(b) to require relief from default judgments only. The only expansion of the mandatory provision since its enactment in 1988 has been to make the provision available to plaintiffs. Thus, the Legislature has shown no interest in expanding the type of case to which the mandatory relief provision applies to cases beyond the relatively narrow category of default judgments and dismissals.
(Prieto, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 295-296 [cleaned up].) Notably, in the case of summary judgment, allowing a party to wait six months and then file a mandatory motion to set aside/vacate, unreasonably delays resolution of the dispute through trial. (Id. at pp. 296-297.)
Notwithstanding, “In the appropriate circumstances, of course, relief from a summary judgment may be available to either a plaintiff or a defendant under the discretionary provision of section 473(b). This is so because discretionary relief under the statute is not limited to defaults, default judgments, and dismissals, but is available from any judgment.” (IKON, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 149, citation omitted.)
In arguing mandatory relief is available, Defendants advance the case Rodriguez v. Brill (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 715 (hereafter Rodriguez), which held that an order of dismissal pursuant to a terminating sanction for discovery abuse constituted a “dismissal” for purposes of the mandatory provisions of Section 473, subdivision (b) in light of the general directive to construe section 473 liberally because (1) a “dismissal entered” pursuant to a terminating sanction fell within the plain meaning of “any … dismissal” and even if “any … dismissal” was intended to apply only to default judgment dismissals, and (2) a terminating discovery sanction was “in essence, the result of a default on discovery obligations.” (Id. at p. 725.) In so holding, Rodriguez followed the reasoning in Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 725, 736, that an order of dismissal for failure to comply with an order compelling answers to interrogatories “is the practical equivalent of a default judgment.” (Ibid.)
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that there is no dismissal order here, like there was in Rodriguez. As such, pursuant to the plain terms of the statute, there is no “dismissal” to vacate. Further, to the extent Rodriguez and/or Aldrich stand for the proposition that a lesser discovery sanction is “in essence” a default or “the practical equivalent of a default,” such reasoning falls in line with the now-criticized Avila decision. As such, the Court does not find mandatory relief is available to vacate the Court’s May 28 order.
Thus, because an adverse ruling on a motion for issue sanctions does not constitute a default judgment, the mandatory relief provisions of Section 473, subdivision (b) do not apply. As such, to the extent Defendants seek relief under the mandatory relief provisions, such request is denied as procedurally defective.
But even if mandatory relief were available, the Court does not find the attorney affidavit of fault warrants relief. In support of the motion, Defendants advance the attorney declaration of Paul Sigelman, which provides:
- On April 23rd, plaintiff served its notice of motion on Court order pertaining to compliant answer to discovery. Such further and amended response to request for production of documents had been filed on February 4, 2025 stating that no records were in possession of custody or control of defendant (Exhibit A). The opposition to the current motion was to be filed by code on or before the 6th of May.
- Meanwhile, the deposition pertaining to the same matters had been set for May 14th, (Exhibit B). Objection by code to the notice of deposition was also to be served on or before 6th of May.
- My secretary, Maddie Caesar, was working remotely out of the state and I prepared with her opposition to the pending motion, be there any question that I had done so in this regard, my rough draft of notes for opposition and the rough draft declaration of Jake Seal, which were prepared on or before May 6th, are attached (Exhibit C). This included information provided by Mr. Seal that he did not know who formed Glamorous Life LLC, the entity plaintiff alleged had control of the non-party entity, JC4 IP LLC, which plaintiff says has such non-existent documents. As Mr. Seal states in his May 6th declaration, he had never acted as an officer of the entity and never operated or worked at the entity. My notes (Exhibit C), along with other information, were sent to my secretary for the formal opposition, along with Jake Seal’s signature which he had provided. At the same time, I prepared objection to Mr. Seal’s deposition with the same points as of the opposition to plaintiff’s motion (Exhibit D). Because it needed to be served that day, I personally drove and delivered it to plaintiff’s office al 11990 San Vicente Boulevard.
- Meanwhile, since I had left the office to make the delivery, I left dictation which was transmitted remotely to my secretary, Maddie Caesar, to put everything into ‘final format’ and instructed it was to be filed and served that afternoon. Ms. Caesar was experienced and accomplished in doing so and via phone conversation, I understood it was going to be clone that clay.
- For reason I do not know, the opposition to motion and supporting declaration of Jake Seal inadvertently or mistakenly went adrift. They were not filed or served at that time, though I believed it had been done.
- I did eventually receive a notice of non-opposition to motion on May 12th I believed it was mistaken, and before I could respond, on May 14th I received notice that the matter had been continued. I spoke again to my remote secretary to make sure our papers had been filed and served on May 28th. Unbeknownst to me, the papers were not served and filed by my secretary until May 27th, which I did not know, and would have well recognized to be late.
- On May 27th, I commenced a jury trial on behalf of plaintiff,Ladi Labidi v. Alisa Facchini Stewart(Case No. 23SA1CV02446), which I was able to attend on May 28th by remote appearance. At the hearing on May 28th, the Court inquired whether Jake Seal had filed a declaration as it appeared that would cure the Glamorous Life LLC allegation. I understood the papers to have been filed. I was not present in my office verify because I was awaiting the trial court. As previously stated, unbeknownst to me, my secretary had indeed filed the papers May 27th (Exhibit E). The Court did ask the clerk to review on screen but reported that no papers were found on screen. Neve1iheless, the declaration squarely answered the single question as to the involvement with Glamorous Life LLC. I believe I specifically informed the court that Mr. Seal had no involvement with the company, which I knew from the preparation of his declaration long before the hearing.
- I hereby state that by my office’s oversight, mistake and inadvertence alone that the declaration of response to motion was not served and that neither Mr. Seal nor the defendants have no knowledge of the mistake and did not contribute to or approximately cause the failure.
- I believe that Mr. Seal and the defendants have a valid defense, in that there are no documents in their possession, custody, or control, and to his knowledge the non-party, JC4 IP LLC, arranged preparation of an ‘as spent’ budget for Louisiana tax authority, who was then to issue tax credit and that he had been told would be voluntarily forwarded to us when finished, and thereby would be provided to plaintiff when received.
(Sigelman Decl. ¶¶ 1-9.)
Thus, according to Sigelman, although Sigelman timely dictated instructions to file the opposition, the failure to timely file the opposition was due either to the mistake of his secretary, Maddie Cesar, his “office’s oversight,” or “for reason I do not know.” (Sigelman Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 8.) Thus, Defendants have not advanced any declaration in which an attorney takes responsibility for the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect to warrant mandatory relief.
Notwithstanding, “In the appropriate circumstances, of course, relief from a summary judgment may be available to either a plaintiff or a defendant under the discretionary provision of Section 473. (See, e.g., Uriarte v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.) This is so because discretionary relief under the statute is not limited to defaults, default judgments, and dismissals, but is available from any judgment.” (IKON, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 149.)
However, the Court does not find the neglect excusable, warranting discretionary relief. As a threshold matter, this is far from the first time Defendants’ documents were filed late. In addition to not timely responding to discovery, Defendants filed late oppositions to the Motion to Compel Further Responses (see Nov. 21, 2024 Minute Order); to Plaintiff’s initial motion for sanctions heard on February 6 (see Feb. 6, 2025 Minute Order); and to Plaintiff’s subsequent motion for sanctions heard on May 28 (see May 28, 2025 Minute Order.) The last two filings were so late, they did not even appear on the Court’s docket before the respective hearings, and thus, the Court deemed those motions to be unopposed.
Further, as the Sigelman declaration illustrates, the Motion for Issue Sanctions was originally scheduled for hearing on May 19, 2025, making Defendants’ opposition due May 6, 2025. For reasons Mr. Sigelman “do[es] not know,” the opposition was not filed. (Sigelman Decl. ¶ 5.) Mr. Sigelman received a notice of non-opposition to the motion on May 12, and on May 14 received notice that the hearing had been continued to May 28, 2025, meaning Counsel had notice that no opposition was filed and still had time to timely file the opposition in advance of the continued hearing, yet Counsel did nothing. (Sigelman Decl. ¶ 6.) Indeed, for reasons that have still not been adequately explained to the Court, the opposition was not filed until 6:30 p.m. on May 27, the day before the continued hearing – far too late for the Court to receive, much less analyze in time.
As such, the Court finds that Defendants have not demonstrated excusable neglect warranting relief under the discretionary provisions of Section 473.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, because Defendants have not provided a satisfactory explanation for their failure to timely oppose Plaintiff’s Motion for Issue Sanctions, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for reconsideration.
Further, because (i) the mandatory relief provisions apply only to default judgments and not to counsel’s failure to timely oppose a motion for issue sanctions; (ii) Counsel has not demonstrated attorney fault warranting mandatory relief in any event; and (iii) Counsel has not demonstrated excusable neglect warranting discretionary relief, the Court similarly denies Defendants’ motion to vacate.
Defendants shall provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.
DATED: July 17, 2025 ___________________________
Michael E. Whitaker
Judge of the Superior Court
[1] Chicken Soup for the Soul Entertainment, Inc. and Screen Media Ventures, LLC filed a Notice of Stay (Bankruptcy) on July 8, 2024, but the Bankruptcy Court issued an order granting to Plaintiff relief from the Automatic Stay. (See Notice of Order filed February 19, 2025.) [2] At the hearing on April 1, 2025, Counsel for Plaintiff claimed otherwise. Counsel was incorrect. The Court’s ruling stated: “For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to RFP. Defendants are compelled to provide further, code-compliant verified responses to the three RFP at issue in accordance with this order within 20 days of notice of the Court’s order. The Court denies as premature Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further production.”