Motion to Tax Costs (Judge William A. Crowfoot)

Case Number: 23AHCV01903    Hearing Date: November 18, 2025    Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTHEAST DISTRICT

JAFARNIA SUEDABEH, Plaintiff(s), vs.   CITY OF PASADENA, et al.,   Defendant(s).	) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	CASE NO.:  23AHCV01903   [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS   Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. November 18, 2025
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1. INTRODUCTION

On October 14, 2023, plaintiff Jafarnia Suedabeh (“Plaintiff”) filed this motion to strike or tax costs claimed by defendant City of Pasadena (“Defendant”). The total amount claimed by Defendant is $12,919.53 and Plaintiff argues that the Court should strike four categories of costs: (1) deposition costs of Mollianne Dumadguindin ($919.75), (2) expert witness fees ($9,140), (3) service of process ($1,046.83), and (4) mediation fees ($1,800).

Defendant filed an opposition brief on October 7, 2025.

Plaintiff filed a reply brief on October 14, 2025.

On October 20, 2025, the Court continued the hearing on this motion so that the parties could file supplemental briefs. Plaintiff filed a supplemental brief on October 24, 2025. Defendant filed a supplemental brief on October 31, 2025.

1. LEGAL STANDARD

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 (all statutory references to follow are to the Code of Civil Procedure except when otherwise indicated) provides for recovery of costs by a prevailing party. “Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. (C.C.P. §1032(a)(4).)

California law recognizes three types of litigation costs: allowable, not allowable, and discretionary. (C.C.P. §1033.5(a), (b), (c)(4).) Any award of costs — whether categorically recoverable under section 1033.5, subdivision (a) or allowable in the court’s discretion under section 1033.5(c)(4) — must also be “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation” and “reasonable in amount.” (Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 667.)

¿If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.)¿On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.¿(Ibid.)

III.        DISCUSSION

1. Deposition Costs

Plaintiff moves to tax the cost of deposing Defendant’s employee, Officer Mollianne Dumadguindin on the grounds that it was unnecessary. Plaintiff argues that the deposition was not needed or used in Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Motion, p. 3.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that the deposition costs were necessary at the time it was incurred and whether it was used in its motion for summary judgment is irrelevant. (Opp., p. 7.) Defendant also argues that the testimony was “essential for evaluating liability and preparing the City’s defense.” (Id.)

It is unclear why Defendant needed to incur the cost of deposing Officer Dumadguindin when an informal interview of its employee and a declaration would have sufficed.

Accordingly, the motion to tax costs with respect to the deposition of Ms. Dumadguindin is GRANTED.

1. Expert Fees

Plaintiff moves to tax Defendant’s claimed cost of $9,140 for expert fees. Defendant claims expert fees after Plaintiff rejected its section 998 offer to settle for $15,000.

“A prevailing party who has made a valid pretrial offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 is eligible for specified costs, so long as the offer was reasonable and made in good faith.” (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 134, as modified on denial of reh’g (June 14, 1999).) Since Defendant prevailed on its motion for summary judgment, it constituted prima facie evidence that the $15,000 offer was reasonable. (Menges v. Department of Transportation (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 13, 26-27.)

Here, Plaintiff claims that the offer was unreasonable because she was unable to “properly assess the full amount of liability and exposure if the 998 was rejected.” (Motion, p. 4.) Plaintiff argues, without no authority, that she should have been given “a list of expenses incurred prior to the issuance of the 998 Offer” or told “what expenses would be incurred between the expiration of the [offer] and the [hearing on the motion for summary judgment.” (Motion, p. 4.) Plaintiff does not cite to any case law holding that a 998 offer’s validity is dependent on the anticipated postoffer costs, and the Court is unaware of any. Rather, Defendant points out, and the Court agrees, Plaintiff had sufficient information to determine whether or not the 998 Offer was objectively reasonable. First, it was served on the day Plaintiff filed her opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment; Plaintiff was therefore aware of Defendant’s arguments regarding the very existence of a dangerous condition and the application of the “trivial defect” doctrine. (Opp., pp. 4-5.) Second, the offer was extended two days after an unsuccessful mediation session. (Opp., p. 4.)

On reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s offer was not made in good faith because she made a demand of $300,000 based on $84,000 in medical bills while Defendant only offered $15,000. (Reply, p. 4.) However, Plaintiff’s cited cases are inapposite; Defendant’s offer was not disproportionately low considering it was 20% of Plaintiff’s special damages. In contrast, Plaintiff relies on Pineda v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 53, in which the settlement offer of $2,500 was found to be disproportionate to the plaintiff’s demand of $10 million. (Opp., pp. 3-4.)

Plaintiff also speculates in her reply brief that Defendant actually incurred its expert witness costs before it sent its 998 offer. (Reply, p. 2.) This contradicts defense counsel’s declaration that the work performed by its orthopedic and biomechanical experts were conducted post-offer. (Opp., De Mesa Decl., ¶ 7.) The argument is also unpersuasive because, as Plaintiff concedes in her moving papers, no expert witness declarations were used in support of Defendant’s summary judgment motion.

Last, the expert witness fees were not unnecessary because the hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was scheduled to be heard on August 19, 2025, while trial was set for September 22, 2025. It was reasonable for Defendant to retain experts and prepare expert opinions on Plaintiff’s claimed injuries and damages in the event that the matter proceeded to trial. (See, Opp., De Mesa Decl., ¶ 6.)

Accordingly, the motion to tax costs is DENIED with respect to Defendant’s expert witness fees.

1. Service of Process Fees

Plaintiff argues that Defendant needlessly incurred expenses to subpoena her medical and billing records when she already provided them. (Motion, p. 4.) However, Defendant is entitled to subpoena the providers themselves in order to ensure a complete record, and the records themselves are necessary to evaluate Plaintiff’s claimed damages. Therefore, the motion to tax the costs incurred for service of process is DENIED.

1. Mediation Fees

Plaintiff moves to tax Defendant’s request for the costs of mediation because the parties agreed to each pay $1,800. The invoice attached to Plaintiff’s motion states, “Fees to be split equally between the parties unless the mediator is advised otherwise.” When parties agree to share costs during litigation, “the courts will enforce those agreements as written under the principles that ‘[w]hen the language of a document is unambiguous, we are not free to restructure the agreement,’ and ‘[if the parties wanted to allow recovery of the apportioned fee [by] the prevailing party as an item of cost, they were free to spell this out in their agreement,’ but such a provision will not be read into the agreement.” (Anthony v. Li (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 816, 824, as modified (Apr. 14, 2020) [citing Carr Business Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Chowchilla (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 25, 30].)

In opposition, Defendant argues that the mediation fees are recoverable as reasonably necessary and cites to Gibson v. Bobroff (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209, in support of its contention that the parties’ prior agreement did not preclude recovery. Gibson, however, is inapposite as it did not concern parties who had any such agreement to share the costs of mediation.

Accordingly, the motion to tax the mediation fees is GRANTED.

1. Supplemental Briefing

Plaintiff argues in her supplemental brief that Defendant failed to attach receipts, bills, invoices, or other documentation to establish the reasonableness or necessity of the claimed costs. However, a verified memorandum of costs constitutes prima facie evidence that the claimed costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred. (Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 693; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.) Plaintiff did not challenge the reasonableness of any amounts claimed by Defendant in her moving papers and furthermore, in response to Plaintiff’s new argument raised at the last hearing, Defendant has since attached copies of its supporting invoices and receipts substantiating its claimed costs. (Def.’s Supp. Brief, De Mesa Decl., Exs. A-C.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s latest argument is unavailing.

1. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion to tax costs is GRANTED in part with respect to the $919.75 in deposition costs and $1,800 in mediation fees claimed by Defendant. Defendant’s total cost award is therefore $10,119.78.

          Defendant to give notice.

Dated this 18th day of November 2025

	William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court