Case Number: TC028154??? Hearing Date: April 26, 2016??? Dept: B
# 5. ADBUL MADYUN v. COMMUNITY GENTRIFICATION CORP., ET AL.
Case No. TC028154
Matter on calendar for: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Notes:
Background
This is an action to quiet title concerning real property located at 807 N. Thornton Avenue, Compton. Plaintiff Abdul Madyun (in pro per) alleges that he took possession of the property on 4/19/88, after it was abandoned following the death of the owner, Thomas Edwards. In 2014 and 2015, the property was transferred several times, ultimately resulting in title to Defendant Community Gentrification Corporation. (Complaint, ? 14.) Plaintiff alleges that the title owner of the property during this time, Cathie Butler, was aware of Plaintiff living in the property and paying taxes, and conspired with Defendants to find a quick way to obtain title to the property fraudulently by transferring the property to themselves and others.
Procedural History
On 5/18/15, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint, asserting causes of action for:
1.Quiet title based on adverse possession and fraud and conspiracy
2.Quiet title for the removal of invalid and expired liens based on fraud and conspiracy
3.Cancellation of deeds and deeds of trust
Apparently a Judgment has been entered against Plaintiff in unlawful detainer case #15UN1107.
On 6/9/15, the Court granted Plaintiff?s ex parte application for a TRO, only to the extent Plaintiff sought to restrain the Compton Sheriff from pursuing any move-out of the premises based on a Writ of Possession in case #15UN1107 because Plaintiff?s bankruptcy stay was in effect when the Writ was issued on 5/26/15. On 8/26/15, the Court declined to renew the injunctive relief, finding it had no jurisdiction to overturn the decision by the bankruptcy court or by the bench officer who heard the unlawful detainer action.
On 9/22/15, the Court overruled Defendant Community Gentrification?s unopposed motion to strike and demurrer to the Complaint.
On 10/29/15, the Court sustained Defendant Anchor Loan?s unopposed demurrer to the Complaint without leave to amend.
On 1/13/16, default was entered against Las Virgenes Investments, LLC.
On 2/16/16, Plaintiff dismissed Defendants Stephan M. Vener and Ellen M. Vener, individually and as trustees, from the action without prejudice.
Tentative ruling:
On 4/1/16, Defendant Community Gentrification Corporation filed the present motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion is denied for the reasons set forth below.
Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Court?s tentative ruling on Anchor Loans? demurrer and various filings in the unlawful detainer case 15UN1107, including a copy of the docket. Although requests for judicial notice are typically filed separately from the subject motion (CRC 3.1113(l)), absent an Opposition, Defendant?s RJN is granted pursuant to Evidence Code ? 452(d) and (h).
Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that: Plaintiff raised an affirmative defense in the UD matter as to Defendant?s purported lack of ownership interest in the property due to Plaintiff?s alleged possession for 26 years, Plaintiff had a fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the UD matter, and Judgment was entered against Plaintiff. (RJN, Exs. B-D; Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 256-257.) In other words, Defendant contends the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply in this matter. Defendant also points out that the Court previously noted ?[Plaintiff] has no claim to title? when it issued its tentative ruling on Anchor Loan?s demurrer. (RJN, Ex. A.)
In Opposition, Plaintiff argues the UD matter only resolved the claim for possession, and Plaintiff ended up defaulting in the UD matter because Plaintiff was filing for bankruptcy during that time. Plaintiff contends Exhibit A to the RJN is irrelevant to the present motion.
Collateral estoppel, which precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings, applies only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issues sought to be precluded from litigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)
In Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, the Supreme Court of California noted, ?a judgment in unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of title, to adjudicate other legal and equitable claims between the parties.? (Id. at 255 [citations omitted].) The Supreme Court, however, discussed an exception set forth in Wood v. Herson (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 737, where the Court of Appeal found that the essential issues of title were fully and fairly disposed of in a previous unlawful detainer action where an affirmative defense of fraud was raised. (Vella, at 256.) The Court of Appeal cited in support of its ruling such varied factors as the length of the ?summary? unlawful detainer hearing (seven days), the scope of discovery by the parties (?extensive? and ?complete?), the quality of the evidence (?detailed?), and the general character of the action (?(c)learly . . . not the customary unlawful detainer proceeding?). (Id.) Thus, the Supreme Court in Vella concluded that ?full and fair? litigation of an affirmative defense, even one not ordinarily cognizable in unlawful detainer, if it is raised without objection and if a fair opportunity to litigate is provided, will result in a judgment conclusive upon issues material to that defense. (Id. at 256-257.)
This is not the same situation here. There is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiff was afforded a ?full and fair? opportunity to litigate his claim for adverse possession in the previous UD action. Indeed, the documents submitted with Defendant?s request for judicial notice merely establish that (i) Plaintiff denied the allegations of the UD Complaint based on his 26 years of possession of the subject property, and (ii) Judgment was entered against Plaintiff. (RJN, Exs. C-D.) Moreover, Plaintiff correctly notes that the Court?s tentative ruling on a demurrer filed by another defendant has no controlling effect on the present motion. Defendant?s motion does not articulate how or why the Court?s tentative ruling on Anchor Loan?s demurrer precludes Plaintiff?s action against Community Gentrification.
Next dates: set as appropriate