Case Number: BC576759??? Hearing Date: February 21, 2017??? Dept: 92
LEONARD FERNANDEZ, successor-in-interest to Leonardo Fernandez-Avila (deceased); et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
GENERAL MOTORS LLC; et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: BC576759
(Consolidated with BC576954 and BC634587)
The Motion of Defendant General Motors LLC for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Background
This case consists of three consolidated cases. Defendant General Motors LLC (?GM?) moves for summary judgment in regards to the action pursued by Plaintiff Juan Sandoval (?Plaintiff?). Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Orange Superior Court on March 30, 2015 against Defendants Jean Soriano (?Soriano?), Charmain Scott (?Scott?), and Does 1-30 arising from a motor vehicle accident on Interstate-15 on March 30, 2013 that caused the death of his daughter Angela Sandoval after she was ejected from the 2002 Chevrolet Astro van (?the Astro van?) in which she was riding. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (?FAC?) in Orange County on the same day. The FAC alleges causes the wrongful death of Plaintiff?s daughter by the named and Doe defendants? in the collision between the Astro van and a Dodge Durango.
On October 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed three Doe Amendments to the FAC, replacing Defendant Doe 1 with Defendant Maria Cardenas (?Cardenas?), replacing Defendant Doe 2 with Defendant Alfred Gomez (?Gomez?), and replacing Defendant Doe 3 with Defendant GM. These amendments were subsequently reflected in the Second Amended Complaint (?SAC?) filed on May 16, 2016. The SAC alleges the wrongful death of Plaintiff?s daughter due to negligence and/or products liability against Soriano, Scott, Cardenas, Gomez, GM, and Doe Defendants. (SAC, p. 3?6.) As to GM, the SAC alleges that GM ?negligently and carelessly failed to warn about the [the Astro van?s] high rollover propensity and its substandard restraint system for the occupants? and that GM ?designed, produced, and manufactured the [the Astro van] involved in this accident in such a manner as to cause the death of Plaintiff?s daughter.? (SAC, p. 5.) The SAC alleges products liability under the theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. (SAC, p. 6.)
On July 21, 2016, this Court ordered Plaintiff?s case to be transferred to the Los Angeles Superior Court and consolidated with two other cases which pertained to claims of other persons involved with the same motor vehicle accident.
GM now moves for summary judgment on the SAC arguing that the claims related to the Astro van asserted in the SAC are barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, GM argues that the statute of limitations was not tolled and the relation-back doctrine is inapplicable because Plaintiff was not ignorant of GM?s identity at the time the FAC was filed and because the FAC did not contain an allegation of products liability. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
Request for Judicial Notice
GM requests the Court to take judicial notice of the Complaint filed in the related case of Cardenas v. General Motors LLC (LASC Case No. BC576954).
Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), which permits a court to take judicial notice of the records of any court of this state, GM?s request is GRANTED.
Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
In moving for summary judgment, the initial burden rests with moving party. (Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 742?744, fn. 6-7.) ?As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant must present facts to negate an essential element or to establish a defense. Only then will the burden shift to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable, material issue of fact.? (Archdale v. American Intern. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 449, 462. ?There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.? (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
Here, GM?s motion for summary judgment revolves around one issue: whether the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff?s claims.
The Applicable Statute of Limitations
Section 335.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a two-year statute of limitation for the wrongful death of a person. (Code of Civ. Proc. ? 335.1; see also, Eidson v. Medtronic, Inc. (N.D. Cal., 2013) 981 F.Supp.2d 868, 893 (?California Civil Procedure Code ? 335.1 sets a two-year statute of limitations on personal injury claims based upon defective products, regardless of the particular legal theory invoked.?).) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a cause of action accrues. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 385 Cal.4th 797, 806.) ?Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.? (Id. (internal quotation omitted).)
Here, GM argues that this statute of limitations bars Plaintiff?s claims against it based on the Astro van as these claims were not asserted until the filing of the SAC on May 16, 2016, more than three years after the March 30, 2013 accident giving rise to the claims. GM argues that the relation-back doctrine and delayed discovery rule are inapplicable, and as such, the statute of limitations bars the claims.
Section 474 and the Relation-Back Doctrine
Code of Civil Procedure section 474 provides, ?[w]hen the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.? (Code of Civ. Proc. ? 474.) Section 474 enables ?a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations when he or she is ignorant of the identity of the defendant.? (Davis v. Marin (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 380, 386 (quoting Olden v. Hatchell (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1037).) This ?relation-back doctrine? amends the general rule that an amended complaint adding a new defendant will not relate back to the filing of the original complaint for statute of limitations purposes only where the amended complaint ?does not add a ?new? defendant, but simply corrects a misnomer by which an ?old? defendant was sued.? (Hawkins v. Pacific Coast Bldg. Products, Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1503 (internal quotes and citations omitted).)
The relation-back doctrine of section 474 ?is available only when the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant. (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 371?372.) That is, ?[t]he question is whether the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that he had a cause of action against the defendant.? (Id. at 372 (quoting and citing Wallis v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 782, 786).) ?The phrase ?ignorant of the name of a defendant? is broadly interpreted to mean not only ignorant of the defendant’s identity, but also ignorant of the facts giving rise to a cause of action against that defendant.? (Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170.) Indeed, even where a plaintiff knows the actual name of a doe defendant, ?the plaintiff is ?ignorant? within the meaning of the statute if [plaintiff] lacks knowledge of that person’s connection with the case or with [plaintiff’s] injuries.? (General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 593?594.)
A ?plaintiff does not relinquish her rights under section 474 simply because she has a suspicion of wrongdoing arising from one or more facts she does know.? (General Motors Corp., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at 595.) As stated by the Court of Appeal in Dieckmann v. Superior Court, ?[s]ection 474 allows a plaintiff in good faith to delay suing particular persons as named defendants until he has knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to believe liability is probable. The distinction between a suspicion that some cause could exist and a factual basis to believe a cause exists is critical in the operation of section 474.? (Dieckmann v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 345, 363.)
In essence, GM raises two arguments. First, GM argues that Plaintiff was not ignorant of GM?s identity at the time the FAC was filed on March 30, 2015. Second, GM argues that the claims asserted against it in the SAC on the basis of the Astro van do not ?relate-back? to the claims in the FAC within the meaning of the doctrine.
(1) Plaintiff?s Ignorance or Knowledge of GM?s Identity
As a threshold matter, it is undisputed that Plaintiff?s daughter was killed on March 30, 2013 when she was ejected from the Astro van. (See, Plaintiff?s Sep. State. of Undisputed Facts, Facts 1 and 4.) It is also undisputed that within three days after the crash, Plaintiff learned that his daughter was riding in the Astro van at the time of the accident. (Plaintiff?s Sep. State. of Undisputed Facts, Fact 5.)
In regards to the issue of whether Plaintiff was ignorant of GM?s identity at the time of the filing of the FAC on March 30, 2015, GM submitted evidence that prior to the fatal crash, Plaintiff knew that the Astro van was a product of GM. (See, GM Evidence, Exh. B (Plaintiff?s Depo.).) Specifically, GM relies on Plaintiff?s deposition testimony to establish Plaintiff?s knowledge of GM?s identity as the producer of the Astro van through Chevrolet. The evidence is:
Q. Now, we were talking about an Astro van earlier, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said it was a Chevy Astro van?
A. I don?t get it.
Q. The Astro van, that?s a Chevrolet?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. At some point did you get some understanding that General Motors was Chevrolet?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you first get that understanding?
A. Actually, that?s been a long time that I know Chevy belongs to General Motors.
Q. You knew that way back when you had your Chevrolet ? your Astro van from Puente Hills?
A. Yeah
Q. And you knew that way back when you got your Astro van from ?
Plaintiff?s Counsel. West Covina.
Q. ? West Covina, yes?
A. Right.
(GM Evidence, Exh. B (Plaintiff?s Depo. 94:17?95:13).)
GM also submitted evidence suggesting that Plaintiff knew that the Astro van was ?not good,? ?unstable,? and/or ?unsafe? as early as only a few days after the motor vehicle accident. Specifically, GM relies on Plaintiff?s testimony that although he did not see the police report generated after the accident, he understood that the report indicated that ?[t]he vehicle was not good.? (See, GM Evidence, Exh. B (Plaintiff?s Depo. 68:4?70:4).) Finally, GM submitted evidence suggesting that Plaintiff had prior concerns about the seatbelts in an Astro van he previously owned and that immediately after the crash, Plaintiff inquired as to whether his daughter was wearing her seatbelt at the time of the crash. (GM Evidence, Exh. B (Plaintiff?s Depo. 82:6?83:24, 97:23?98:5, and 100:19?101:1).)
This evidence is insufficient for GM to carry its burden on a motion for summary judgment. While it may be that that Plaintiff knew of the name and identity of GM as the producer of the Astro van, the evidence submitted by GM does not indicate that Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts giving rise to a cause of action against GM. Plaintiff?s knowledge that a police report indicated that the Astro van was ?not good? is insufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff knew of the facts giving rise to a cause of action against GM. Indeed, this evidence does not establish when Plaintiff even learned of the alleged contents of the police report, which is of particular concern for this issue. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Plaintiff has sufficient knowledge of vehicles to know that the Astro van was potentially defective such that a cause of action could be asserted against GM. At best, GM?s evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff had a ?mere suspicion? that a cause of action may be asserted against GM, which is inadequate to show Plaintiff?s knowledge of sufficient facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that GM?s liability was probable. Indeed, that Plaintiff had concerns about the seatbelts in his previously owned Astro van indicates a suspicion, but does not demonstrate knowledge of the facts giving rise to a claim. Accordingly, GM?s motion for summary judgment cannot be granted on these grounds.
(2) Whether the Claims Relate-Back Within the Meaning of the Statute
GM also argues that the claims asserted against it in the SAC simply do not relate-back to the claims asserted in the FAC such that section 474?s relation-back doctrine would be applicable. GM argues that the FAC did not state a cause of action against a Doe for which GM could be ?substituted,? and that the FAC contained no claim related to the Astro van while the SAC purported to assert a claim based on the Astro van.
GM submitted evidence that Plaintiff?s FAC contains allegations against Does 1-30. (GM Evidence, Exh. E.) In Plaintiff?s FAC, Does 1-5 are ?defendants who operated a motor vehicle,? Does 6-10 are ?defendants who employed person who operated a motor vehicle in the course of their employment,? Does 11-15 are ?defendants who owned the motor vehicle which was operated with their permission,? Does 16-20 are ?defendants who entrusted the motor vehicle,? Does 21-25 are ?defendants who were the agents and employees of the other defendants and acted within the scope of the agency,? and Does 26-30 are ?defendants who are liable to plaintiffs for other reasons.? (GM Evidence, Exh. E.) GM also submitted evidence that Plaintiff purportedly admitted, in his responses to a request for admissions, that the FAC did not contain an express allegation against GM and did not contain an allegation of a defect related to the Astro van. (GM Evidence, Exh. C.)
GM also submitted evidence that Plaintiff filed a Doe Amendment on October 2, 2015, substituting GM for Doe 3. (GM Evidence, Exh. F.) Additionally, GM relies on evidence that in response to a request for admissions, Plaintiff admitted that there are no facts to support any claim that GM was Doe 3, or a defendant who operated a motor vehicle, and that there were no facts to support a claim that the motor vehicle negligence cause of action applied to GM. (GM Evidence Exh. C.) Further, GM submitted evidence that Plaintiff?s SAC sets forth claims of products liability against GM. (GM Evidence, Exh. G.) Finally, GM submitted evidence suggesting that in the FAC, the instrumentality of Plaintiff?s daughter?s death was the car with which the Astro van collided, while the SAC lists the instrumentality of her death as the defective Astro van. (GM Evidence, Exh. E and G.)
The Court finds that GM has not carried its burden on a motion for summary judgment. GM?s reliance on Plaintiff?s responses to the requests for admission is unavailing as Plaintiff?s admission as to legal conclusions concerning the substance and nature of the FAC?s allegations is improper lay opinion. (See, Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1445 (?The manner in which the law should apply to particular facts is a legal question and is not subject to expert, much less lay, opinion.?).) Furthermore, the evidence submitted by GM indicates that both the FAC and SAC state claims for the wrongful death of Plaintiff?s daughter arising from a motor vehicle collision. There is nothing to indicate that the FAC related only to the Dodge Durango. Indeed, the FAC clearly states that Does 26-30 are ?defendants who are liable to plaintiffs for other reasons.?
Likewise, GM?s reliance on Milam v. Dickman Const. Co. and Coronet Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court is unavailing. In Milam, the court held that a Doe Amendment was improper for the purposes of the relation-back doctrine where all of the allegations referred only to the named defendants. (Milam v. Dickman Const. Co. (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 208, 213.) The court concluded, ?[t]he complaint having failed to state a cause of action against the fictitious defendants, the statute of limitations is not tolled as to them by the filing of the complaint.? (Id. at 214.) Such is not the case here where the FAC clearly contains allegations against Doe defendants who may be liable to Plaintiff for other reasons.
In Coronet, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in overruling a demurrer to an amended complaint that changed the instrumentality of the decedent?s death from a faulty hair dryer to a faulty table lamp. (Coronet Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 342.) The Court of Appeal found error because the amendment alleged two different ?accidents? as the instrumentality of the decedent?s death. (Id. at 347.) This holding is not applicable here, where both the FAC and the SAC allege the instrumentality of death to be the collision between the Dodge Durango and the Astro van. That the SAC was amended to state a claim for products liability as a theory of liability does not change the allegation that the instrumentality of death was the collision itself.
Accordingly, GM?s motion for summary judgment cannot be granted on the basis that the claims asserted against it are barred by the statute of limitations because the relation-back doctrine of section 474 is inapplicable.
Delayed Discovery Doctrine
As noted above, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a cause of action accrues. (Fox, supra, 385 Cal.4th at 806.) ?Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.? (Id. (internal quotation omitted).) However, ?[u]nder the delayed discovery doctrine, accrual of a cause of action is postponed until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.? (K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1233.)
In arguing that Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the facts giving rise to a cause of action against GM prior to the filing of the FAC, GM relies upon the same evidence submitted and relied upon for its argument that Plaintiff knew of GM?s identity prior to the filing of the FAC. Specifically, GM relies on the evidence suggesting that prior to the filing of the FAC Plaintiff knew that his daughter was riding in the Astro van, Plaintiff knew GM was the producer of the Astro van, and Plaintiff knew Astro vans were unsafe.?
While the Court does not find GM has carried its burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff knew of all of the facts giving rise to a cause of action at GM prior to the filing of the Doe Amendment and the SAC, even assuming that GM has carried its burden, Plaintiff has introduced evidence that creates a triable issue of fact as to the matter. Specifically, Plaintiff?s counsel?s declaration states that in late August or early September 2015 he discovered the related Fernandez case (BC576759) and its claims asserted against GM and that it was only at this time that he determined that a products liability claim could be asserted against GM by Plaintiff. (Markarian Decl. ? 2?3.) Accordingly, Defendant?s motion for summary judgment cannot be granted on the grounds that the statute of limitations the claims as there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the Plaintiff?s delayed discovery of the facts giving rise to a cause of action was tolled by the delayed-discovery doctrine.
Conclusion
GM?s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. GM has not carried its burden of introducing evidence suggesting that the SAC improperly amended the FAC to add GM as a defendant such that section 474?s relation-back doctrine would be inapplicable. Further, even assuming GM introduced sufficient evidence suggesting that Plaintiff knew of the facts giving rise to a cause of action such that the statute of limitations was tolled under the delayed-discovery doctrine, Plaintiff submitted evidence that created a triable issue of fact on as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the delayed-discovery doctrine.
GM to give notice of this order.