Defendant Talor Marie Marion’s motion to quash Plaintiff Fernando Jacobs’ deposition subpoena for production of Defendant Marion’s business records from third-party Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) is denied.
The subject of the motion is the subpoena issued by Plaintiff, on June 12, 2020, to the DMV. (Craver Decl. at ¶ 9, Exh. H.) The subpoena includes two broadly worded requests for Defendant Marion’s driving records, suspensions, accident records, etc., from November 1, 2006 to the present. After Defendant objected to the subpoena, the DMV sent a letter dated June 19, 2020, stating that it would not produce the requested records “until further notice from the Objector or by court order.” (Robinson Decl. [ROA 121] at ¶ 20, Exh. 11.) The DMV further explained that, “once the production moves forward,” a number of “confidential information objections would apply.” Under “additional information,” the DMV explained other limitations to its ability to respond to the subpoena. (Robinson Decl., at Exh. 11.)
Defendant Marion moves to quash the subpoena under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, on the grounds that the subpoena violates her right to privacy and that it violates the Court’s February 21, 2020 Order granting a stay of all discovery as to Defendant Marion only. The Court finds neither argument to be persuasive.
As to her first argument, the Court recognizes that Defendant Marion has a constitutional right of privacy to her personal information. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) Nevertheless, it has long been recognized that “[p]rivacy concerns are not absolute; they must be balanced against other important interests.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 37, citations omitted.) The party asserting a privacy right “must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” The party seeking information “may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves.” Then, the party seeking protection may “identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy.” The court’s job is to balance these competing considerations. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552, citations omitted.)
In balancing the competing considerations, the Court emphasizes that, in its letter dated June 19, 2020, the DMV has already objected to producing certain confidential information (such as Defendant Marion’s address or social security number) that is expressly protected by various statutes. The DMV has also placed limitations on the production. (Robinson Decl., at Exh. 11.) Notably, Plaintiff does not challenge these objections. In fact, Plaintiff expressly confirms he is “not seeking those confidential records.” (Opp., at p. 7.)
On the other hand, there appears to be no dispute that the DMV can produce records related to Defendant Marion’s prior accidents; more specifically, a prior DUI involving Defendant Marion in November 2008. (Opp., at p. 8.) This information is directly relevant to Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 893 [complaint that alleged defendant was intoxicated when defendant collided with plaintiff’s car and that defendant had previously caused a serious automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol was sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages].)
Defendant Marion has asked the Court to modify the requests, if the subpoena is not quashed outright. But, she does not explain what further modifications she is requesting. She does not contend that the objections and limitations interposed by the DMV are insufficient to prevent any serious intrusion into her privacy.
With respect to Defendant Marion’s second argument, the Court finds that the subpoena does not violate the February 21, 2020 Order. The Order expressly states that Plaintiff may “proceed with conducting discovery on third-party witnesses.” The Order does not limit Plaintiff to proceeding with conducting discovery on percipient third party witnesses. Moreover, Defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege is not implicated by the subpoena to the DMV. To the extent the records contain “incriminating contents,” they are not shielded by the Fifth Amendment. Nor is there a testimonial aspect to responding to the subpoena, because the subpoena is not directed at Defendant Marion. (See United States v. Doe (1984) 465 U.S. 605, 611–612 [holding that the content of records that were not prepared by the party asserting Fifth Amendment were not privileged; however, the act of compelling that party to produce responsive documents was privileged in that it had “testimonial aspects” and an “incriminating effect”].)
The Court hereby orders the DMV to comply with the subpoena issued by Plaintiff on June 12, 2020, subject to the confidential information objections and limitations asserted in its letter dated June 19, 2020. The DMV need not produce the confidential information that are prohibited from disclosure by statute and/or case law, as objected to and or those that are outside of the DMV’s limitations as noted in its June 19, 2020 letter. The production shall be made within 30 days, or some later date if agreed to by Plaintiff.
The Court declines to award any sanctions.
Plaintiff shall give notice of the ruling.
STATUS CONFERENCE RE CASE NO. 19HF0640
Plaintiff noted that it appears that the Clerk’s Office has erroneously scheduled duplicate hearings on Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories and production of documents for September 18, 2020 and October 2, 2020. (Opp., at p. 1.) Here, it appears that Plaintiff’s vendor made errors during the filing process for the motion to compel Defendant Chaney to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s special interrogatories and motion to compel Defendant Chaney to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s request for production of documents, resulting in hearings being scheduled for the motions for both September 18, 2020 and October 2, 2020. The Court is inclined to hear both motions (ROA 80 and 87) on September 18, 2020 because Defendant Chaney has filed oppositions to the motions on September 4, 2020. Counsel should be prepared to address why the Court should not hear both motions on September 18, 2020, and vacate the hearings scheduled for October 2, 2020.