Case Number: 23SMCV03244 Hearing Date: July 17, 2025 Dept: 207
TENTATIVE RULING
| DEPARTMENT | 207 |
| HEARING DATE | July 17, 2025 |
| CASE NUMBER | 23SMCV03244 |
| MOTION | Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint |
| MOVING PARTY | Plaintiff Ashlee Nicole Saldana |
| OPPOSING PARTIES | Defendants Culver City Mall, LLC (erroneously sued as Westfield Corporation) & Allied Universal Security Services Universal Protection Service LPP |
BACKGROUND
This case arises from an incident where Plaintiff became trapped in the back of the Victoria’s Secret store where she worked during an active shooter situation at the mall where the store was located.
On July 18, 2023, Plaintiff Ashlee Nicole Saldana (“Plaintiff”) brought suit against Defendant Westfield Corporation (“Culver”) alleging two causes of action for (1) premises liability; and (2) negligence and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention.
On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff added Defendant Allied Universal Security Services Universal Protection Service LPP (“Allied”) via Doe amendment.
On September 25, 2024, Allied answered the Complaint and filed its own Cross-Complaint against Roes 1 through 20 for apportionment of fault, indemnity, declaratory relief, and negligence.
On January 16, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s prior motion for leave to amend the complaint without prejudice on procedural grounds because the Court could not discern exactly what allegations were proposed to be added, the effect of the proposed amendments, or when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered.
Plaintiff now moves again for leave to amend the complaint. Separate oppositions have been filed by (1) Allied and (2) Culver, and Plaintiff has replied to both.
LEGAL STANDARD
Amendments to Pleadings: General Provisions
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1), “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.”
To wit, without notice to the other party the Court has wide discretion to allow either party (i) to add or strike the name of a party or (ii) to correct a mistake in the name of a party or a mistake in any other respect “in furtherance of justice” and “on any terms as may be proper.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1); see also Marriage of Liss (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1429.) Alternatively, after notice to the other party, the Court has wide discretion to allow either party to amend pleadings “upon any terms as may be just.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1). Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 576 states “Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.”
Judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters between the parties and, therefore, leave to amend is liberally granted. (Berman vs. Bromberg (1986) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945; Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488-489 [this has been an established policy in California since 1901] (citing Frost v. Whitter (1901) 132 Cal. 421, 424; Thomas v. Bruza (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 150, 155).) The Court of Appeal in Morgan v. Superior Court held “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.” (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530, citations omitted.) Moreover, “it is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment.” (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [opposing party did not establish harm by the delay in moving to amend the complaint].)
“The court may grant leave to amend the pleadings at any stage of the action.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 6:636 (hereafter Weil & Brown).) Denial of a motion to amend is rarely justified if the motion is timely made and granting the motion will not prejudice the opposing party. (Id. at ¶ 6:639, citations omitted.) However, if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. (Id. at ¶ 6:655, citations omitted. Absent prejudice, any claimed delay alone is not grounds for denial. “If the delay in seeking the amendment has not misled or prejudiced the other side, the liberal policy of allowing amendments prevails. Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave in such a case even if sought as late as the time of trial. (Id. at ¶ 6:653 (citing Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565).) “Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc. . . . But the fact that the amendment involves a change in legal theory which would make admissible evidence damaging to the opposing party is not the kind of prejudice the court will consider.” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 6:656, citations omitted.)
“Even if some prejudice is shown, the judge may still permit the amendment but impose conditions, as the Court is authorized to grant leave ‘on such terms as may be proper.’” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 6:663, citation omitted.) For example, the court may cause the party seeking the amendment to pay the costs and fees incurred in preparing for trial. (Id. at ¶ 6:664 (citing Fuller v. Vista Del Arroyo Hotel, 42 Cal.App.2d 400, 404).)
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324: Procedural Requirements
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must:
“(1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleadings, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;
(2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and
(3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.”
In addition, under Rule 3.1324(b), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must be accompanied by a separate declaration that specifies the following:
“(1) the effect of the amendment;
(2) why the amendment is necessary and proper;
(3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and
(4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks to add allegations about Allied, as well as additional factual allegations, including that Plaintiff was instructed to communicate using a specific mall application, and of Plaintiff’s prior reporting of safety concerns, as well as to correct grammatical errors.
In support of the motion, Plaintiff advances the Declaration of Levon Kantzabedian, attached to which are both unedited and redlined versions of the proposed amended complaint. The attorney declaration further explains that the proposed amendments delete redundant language, add factual detail, adds Allied as a named party, and corrects the name “Westfield Corporation” to “Culver City Mall, LLC,” while maintaining the same two causes of action originally alleged. (Kantzabedian Decl. ¶¶ 3-13.) The attorney declaration further provides:
- The facts concerning the mall’s emergency application system and the conflicting instructions given to Plaintiff were first discovered on or about May 2024 during preparation when Plaintiff’s current counsel assumed the case as lead handling attorney. Immediately, Plaintiff’s counsel began efforts to obtain the workers’ compensation deposition transcript and records.
- The most significant factual discoveries occurred on October 18, 2024, when counsel finally received Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation deposition transcript.
- Most notably, the central factual basis for the proposed amendments stems from Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation deposition transcript, which counsel diligently pursued throughout 2024 but did not receive until October 18, 2024. […]
- The law firm also experienced significant administrative challenges during the relevant time period, including the departure of one attorney and one paralegal, which created temporary difficulties in case management and deadline tracking.
(Kantzabedian Decl ¶¶ 15-18.)
Thus, the Court finds the attorney declaration satisfies the procedural requirements of specifying the effect of the proposed amendments, why the proposed amendments are necessary and proper, when the facts giving rise to the proposed amendments were discovered, and the reasons why the request was not made sooner.
Allied argues it will be prejudiced by the delay, both from May-October 18, 2024 to December 4, 2024 when Plaintiff first moved for leave to amend, and the additional delay from January 16, 2025 when that motion was denied to June 25, 2025, when Plaintiff filed the instant motion, because on June 2, 2025, it filed a motion for summary judgment. Culver argues it will be prejudiced because the proposed amendments expand Plaintiff’s theory of liability from simply defective doors to now encompassing prior criminal activity and inadequate security staffing.
As for the purported prejudices, “the fact that the amendment involves a change in legal theory which would make admissible evidence damaging to the opposing party is not the kind of prejudice the court will consider.” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 6:656, citations omitted.)
Further, the Court finds that the staffing issues adequately explain Plaintiff’s delay in filing the proposed amendment even after the facts giving rise to the proposed amendments were discovered, especially in light of the strong public policy favoring amendment.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Therefore, in light of the strong public policy favoring amendment, the fact that Plaintiff’s motion is both procedurally and substantively proper, and because Defendants have not demonstrated prejudice warranting denial, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint.
Plaintiff shall file and serve the proposed Amended Complaint on or before July 31, 2025.
The Court further orders Plaintiff to provide notice of the Court’s ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith.
DATED: July 17, 2025 ___________________________
Michael E. Whitaker
Judge of the Superior Court