Category: 1991

State?Farm?Fire?&?Casualty?Co.?v.?Von?Der?Lieth?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?1123?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?183;?820?P.2d?285 [No.?S019059.?Dec?16,?1991.] STATE?FARM?FIRE?AND?CASUALTY?COMPANY,?Plaintiff,?Cross-defendant?and?Appellant,?v.?ERIC?VON?DER?LIETH?et?al.,?Defendants,?Cross-complainants?and?Appellants. (Superior?Court?of?Los?Angeles?County,?No.?WEC?097757,?William?E.?McGinley,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Knapp,?Petersen?&?Clarke,?Ryan?C.?Knapp,?Peter?J.?Senuty,?Horvitz?&?Levy,?Ellis?J.?Horvitz?and?Peter?Abrahams?for?Plaintiff,?Cross-?defendant?and?Appellant.?[54?Cal.3d?1126] Thornton,?Taylor,?Downs?&?Becker,?Clarke?B.?Holland,?Michael?F.?Scully,?Rogers,?Joseph,?O’Donnell?&?Quinn,?Susan?M.?Popik,?Robie?&?Matthai,?James?R.?Robie?and?Pamela?E.?Dunn?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Plaintiff,?Cross-defendant?and?Appellant. Lillick?&?McHose,?Pillsbury,?Madison?&?Sutro,?Kenneth?R.?Chiate,?John?R.?Cadarette,?Jr.,?Berger?&?Norton,?Michael?M.?Berger,?Richard?D.?Norton?and?Ann?E.?Kelly?for?Defendants,?Cross-complainants?and?Appellants. OPINION LUCAS,?C.?J. We?granted?review?in?this?case?to?resolve?a?conflict?in?the?Courts?of?Appeal?concerning?whether?courts?should?distinguish?between?types?of?negligence?when?analyzing?coverage?in?the?first?party?homeowners?property?insurance?context.?(See?Garvey?v.?State?Farm?Fire?&?Casualty?Co.?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?395,?408-409,?fn.?7?[257?Cal.Rptr.?292,?770?P.2d?704]?(Garvey).)?This?conflict?arises?from?different?interpretations?of?our?observation?in?Garvey?suggesting?a?property?insurer?may?deny?coverage?when?homeowners?construct?improvements?on?the?insured?premises?in?order?to?protect?the?property?from?the?operation?of?a?specifically?excluded?risk.?(Ibid.) As?we?explain,?we?conclude?the?Court?of?Appeal?erred?in?reversing?judgment?for?the?insureds.?In?our?view,?the?jury?correctly?determined?that?third?party?negligence?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?loss?and?that?State?Farm?Fire?and?Casualty?Company?therefore?was?liable?for?damages?suffered?by?the?insureds.?In?addition,?we?explain?that?our?observation?in?Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pages?408-409,?footnote?7,?has?no?application?in?cases?involving?landslide?or?earth?movement?precipitated?by?the?negligent?acts?of?third?parties.?Accordingly,?we?reverse?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?and?remand?the?cause?for?further?proceedings?consistent?with?this?opinion. Facts The?Von?Der?Lieths?(cross-complainants?and?insureds,?hereafter?insureds)?are?homeowners?in?the?Big?Rock?Mesa?area?of?Malibu,?California,?an?area?that?has?experienced?massive?landsliding?for?several?years.?Insureds?purchased?their?home?in?1976.?In?fall?1983,?the?County?of?Los?Angeles?(hereafter?the?County)?informed?them?that?an?incipient?landslide?might?be?developing?on?the?mesa.?They?subsequently?noticed?cracking?in?the?interior?and?exterior?walls,?patio,?and?front?steps?of?their?home.?[54?Cal.3d?1127] Since?1976,?plaintiff?State?Farm?Fire?and?Casualty?Company?(State?Farm)?provided?insureds?with?an?all-risk?homeowner’s?policy.?At?the?time?of?the?loss,?the?policy?provided?coverage?for?”all?risks?of?physical?loss?to?the?property?…?except?for?loss?caused?by?…?settling,?cracking,?shrinking,?bulging,?or?expansion?of?pavements,?patios,?foundations,?walls,?floors,?roofs?or?ceilings”?and?for?”loss?resulting?directly?or?indirectly?from:?…?Earth?Movement?…?Water?Damage,?meaning;?…?(c)?natural?water?below?the?surface?of?the?ground,?including?water?which?exerts?pressure?on,?or?seeps?or?leaks?through?a?building,?sidewalk?driveway,?foundation,?swimming?pool?or?other?structure.”?Because?the?policy?did?not?expressly?exclude?coverage?for?losses?caused?by?the?negligence?of?third?parties,?such?negligence?was?a?covered?risk.?(Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?408.) In?April?1984,?insureds?submitted?a?claim?to?State?Farm?for?damage?to?their?house.?On?December?15,?1985,?State?Farm?paid?insureds?$14,075.71,?to?cover?physical?damage?to?the?dwelling?only.?State?Farm?informed?insureds?that?this?initial?payment?did?not?include?payment?for?”soil?work?or?stabilization?of?site?upon?which?this?structure?is?situated.”?Insureds,?through?their?counsel,?demanded?the?policy?limits?of?$231,000?based?on?their?belief?that?in?order?to?stabilize?the?ground?underneath?their?home,?the?entire?mesa?required?stabilization. Thereafter,?State?Farm?filed?a?complaint?in?declaratory?relief,?asserting?that?insureds’?policy?did?not?cover?losses?caused?by?”earth?movement?or?natural?groundwater,”?because?those?types?of?risks?were?specifically?excluded?under?the?homeowner’s?policy.?State?Farm?also?asserted?its?policy?did?not?insure?the?cost?of?stabilizing?the?land?under?the?insured?premises.?Insureds?cross-complained?for?bad?faith,?breach?of?contract,?and?intentional?and?negligent?infliction?of?emotional?distress,?and?sought?declaratory?relief?in?their?favor?in?the?amount?of?the?policy?limits.?The?action?was?consolidated?with?three?related?suits?that?were?settled?prior?to?this?appeal. Insureds?contended?at?trial?that?third?party?negligence?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?their?loss.?They?assigned?negligence?to?a?number?of?individuals?and?entities,?including?the?State?of?California,?for?removing?a?portion?of?the?Big?Rock?Mesa?mountain?slope?to?construct?the?Pacific?Coast?Highway?in?the?1930’s,?and?the?developer?of?the?property?for?failing?to?provide?needed?protection?from?landslide?activation.?Insureds?also?blamed?a?local?homeowners’?organization?for?its?failure?to?maintain?its?drain?systems?and?county-required?pumping?systems?(specifically?designed?to?prevent?rising?groundwater),?and?other?homeowners?for?their?failure?to?properly?maintain?their?septic?tank?systems?so?that?the?systems?did?not?affect?the?groundwater?level.?Finally,?insureds?claimed?the?County?acted?negligently?in?approving?the?project?originally?and?in?failing?to?compel?dewatering?(a?[54?Cal.3d?1128]?comprehensive?system?of?drains?to?prevent?groundwater?from?rising)?before?1983?contrary?to?the?express?recommendation?of?the?county?engineer. Insureds?presented?expert?testimony?on?the?causes?of?the?loss?and?on?the?history?of?earth?movement?in?the?area.?Their?experts?testified?that?the?recent?earth?movement?was?caused?by?an?increase?in?the?groundwater?level?due?primarily?to?the?use?of?septic?waste?disposal?systems. The?evidence?established?that?Big?Rock?Mesa?had?been?the?site?of?six?ancient?landslides,?and?minor?recorded?slides?caused?by?rainfall.?The?testimony?also?showed?that?the?mesa?had?been?rendered?less?stable?by?the?soil?removal?in?1933?at?the?base?of?the?ocean?cliff. When?the?original?housing?tracts?on?the?mesa?were?approved?by?the?County?in?1962,?the?County?was?concerned?that?the?use?of?septic?tank?waste?disposal?systems?might?elevate?the?groundwater?level?and?reactivate?the?prehistoric?landslide?activity.?Nonetheless,?relying?on?a?report?prepared?by?the?developer’s?geologist,?the?County?allowed?the?development?to?proceed?with?a?septic?tank?system,?on?condition?that?the?developer?(i)?install?and?maintain?four?horizontal?drains,?or?hydraugers,?in?the?side?of?the?bluff?to?drain?surface?water,?and?(ii)?create?an?entity?responsible?for?maintaining?the?hydraugers. In?an?attempt?to?comply?with?the?above?conditions,?the?developer?formed?the?Malibu?Mutual?Drainage?Company?(hereafter?MMDC),?consisting?of?the?original?70?homeowners?at?the?time?the?first?tract?was?developed.?In?1973,?a?County?engineer?recommended?a?dewatering?program?that?was?not?pursued.?The?MMDC?dissolved?in?1975,?and?various?pumping?wells?on?the?mesa?operated?by?the?homeowners?were?abandoned.?These?actions?contributed?to?the?rise?in?groundwater?level?on?the?mesa. In?1983,?several?homeowners?formed?the?Concerned?Citizens?for?Water?Control?(CCWC),?and?insureds?contributed?$1,100?to?the?organization.?CCWC?hired?D.A.?Evans,?Inc.,?to?refurbish?the?existing?dewatering?wells?on?the?mesa,?install?new?dewatering?wells,?and?monitor?land?movement. In?December?1983,?the?County?formed?an?improvement?district?and?hired?D.A.?Evans,?Inc.,?to?provide?landslide?mitigation?efforts?in?the?area.?The?district?installed?additional?horizontal?drains,?reactivated?existing?hydraugers,?and?monitored?ground?movement.?At?the?time?of?trial,?the?district?was?designing?a?surface?drainage?system?and?continuing?to?pump?the?dewatering?wells?and?monitor?the?hydraugers.?The?district?incurred?expenses?of?$2.8?million?through?the?date?of?trial?and?estimated?spending?a?total?of?$4?million?to?complete?the?project.?The?district?had?authority?to?spend?up?to?$4.8?[54?Cal.3d?1129]?million,?which?would?result?in?an?individual?assessment?to?the?homeowners?of?not?less?than?$17,606. Insureds’?home?consisted?of?wood?construction?on?a?concrete?slab,?with?a?stucco?exterior?and?a?dry?wall?interior.?It?exhibited?cracks?in?the?walls,?patio,?and?front?steps,?and?a?tilt?of?three?to?four?inches?from?front?to?rear?in?the?slab.?Conflicting?opinions?were?offered?regarding?whether?the?damage?was?the?result?of?landslide?movement?or?settling?due?to?differences?in?the?depth?of?the?landfill?under?the?dwelling.?Insureds?conceded?that?they?had?been?compensated?by?State?Farm?for?the?physical?damage?to?their?house,?not?including?stabilization?costs. The?jury?returned?a?special?verdict?finding?State?Farm?had?breached?the?terms?of?the?policy?by?failing?to?pay?insureds?the?full?costs?of?repair?due?under?the?policy?and?had?acted?in?bad?faith?in?doing?so.?It?awarded?insureds?$1,100?for?reasonable?costs?incurred?to?repair?their?property?to?protect?it?from?further?damage,?and?compensatory?damages?of?$55,000?for?State?Farm’s?breach?of?contract,?breach?of?the?covenant?of?good?faith?and?fair?dealing,?and?unfair?claims?practices.?The?jury?also?determined?that?third?party?negligence?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?damage?and?that?State?Farm?had?not?failed?to?pay?for?covered?physical?damage.?It?further?decided?that?State?Farm?was?not?responsible?under?its?policy?for?the?cost?of?stabilizing?the?land?beneath?the?dwelling.?Both?parties?filed?motions?for?judgment?notwithstanding?the?verdict,?and?insureds?also?filed?a?motion?for?new?trial.?All?three?motions?were?denied.?State?Farm?appealed?the?$55,000?judgment?for?insureds,?and?insureds?cross-appealed,?claiming?they?were?entitled?to?the?policy?limits?($231,000),?in?order?to?stabilize?the?ground?underlying?and?supporting?their?property. The?Court?of?Appeal?Holding The?Court?of?Appeal?reversed?the?judgment?and?held?that?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?damage?to?insureds’?home?was?earth?movement,?an?excluded?risk.?The?court?believed?the?rising?groundwater?level?due?to?septic?systems?on?the?mesa?precipitated?the?earth?movement.?This?rising?groundwater,?the?court?reasoned,?was?also?an?excluded?risk?under?the?policy?provision?excluding?loss?caused?by?”natural?water?below?the?surface?of?the?ground,?including?water?which?exerts?pressure?on,?or?seeps?or?leaks?through?a?building,?sidewalk,?driveway,?foundation,?swimming?pool?or?other?structure.”?The?Court?of?Appeal?rejected?insureds’?contention?that?the?elevation?of?the?water?level?did?not?involve?”natural?water”?as?contemplated?by?the?exclusion,?because?the?groundwater?flowed?from?the?septic?system,?an?”artificial”?source?of?water.?[54?Cal.3d?1130] Although?noting?that?uncertainties?in?policy?language?must?be?resolved?in?favor?of?insured’s?reasonable?expectations,?the?Court?of?Appeal?concluded?this?general?rule?could?not?assist?the?coverage?claim?here.?The?court?held?that?an?ordinary?insured?could?not?reasonably?believe?the?exclusion?applied?to?pure,?natural?groundwater?only.?Rather,?the?court?concluded,?the?language?of?the?exclusion?was?meant?to?distinguish?between?groundwater,?an?excluded?risk,?and?”water?emitting?from?a?burst?pipe,”?a?covered?risk.?The?court?also?noted?the?policy?excluded?damage?caused?by?”leakage?or?seepage?of?water?…?from?any?…?plumbing?system.” Alternatively,?the?court?reasoned?that?even?if?it?were?to?assume?the?building?of?the?Pacific?Coast?Highway,?the?failure?to?timely?dewater?the?mesa,?and?poor?maintenance?of?the?mesa,?amounted?to?negligent?acts?under?insureds’?policy,?those?acts?were?excluded?from?coverage?by?Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pages?408-409,?footnote?7,?because?they?were?not?”distinct”?from?other?excluded?risks. In?so?holding,?the?court?observed?that?in?Garvey,?supra,?we?left?open?the?question?whether?courts?should?distinguish?between?different?types?of?third?party?negligence?when?determining?whether?such?negligence?could?ever?be?considered?a?covered?cause?under?an?all-risks?homeowner’s?policy.?We?stated,?”For?example,?if?construction?is?undertaken?on?the?insured?premises?for?the?sole?purpose?of?protecting?against?the?operation?of?a?specifically?excluded?risk?under?the?homeowner’s?policy,?and?that?improvement?subsequently?fails?to?serve?its?purpose?because?it?was?negligently?designed?or?constructed,?the?damage?to?the?structure?should?arguably?not?be?covered.?On?the?other?hand,?ordinary?negligence?that?contributes?to?property?loss,?but?does?not?involve?acts?undertaken?to?protect?against?an?excluded?risk,?may?give?rise?to?coverage?under?an?all-risk?policy.?…”?(48?Cal.3d?at?pp.?408-409,?fn.?7.) In?addition,?the?Court?of?Appeal?herein?found?that?the?state’s?conduct?in?removing?the?toe?of?the?Big?Rock?Mesa?in?order?to?construct?the?Pacific?Coast?Highway?in?1933?was?”simply?too?remote?to?be?regarded?as?an?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?damage.”?The?court?also?observed?that?it?failed?”to?see?how?the?County’s?failure?to?prevent?the?excluded?loss?could?transform?it?to?an?included?one.” The?court?determined?that?the?jury?erroneously?concluded?negligence?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?loss?because?it?was?improperly?instructed?under?Sabella?v.?Wisler?(1963)?59?Cal.2d?21,?31-32?[27?Cal.Rptr.?689,?377?P.2d?889]?(Sabella),?on?the?prerequisites?for?reaching?an?efficient?proximate?cause?determination.?As?the?Court?of?Appeal?observed,?Sabella,?supra,?held?that?when?dependent?concurrent?causes?interact?to?create?property?loss,?the?[54?Cal.3d?1131]?loss?must?be?attributed?to?the?”moving”?or?”triggering?cause.”?Here,?the?jury?was?instructed?pursuant?to?Sabella,?supra,?that?the?”efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?loss,?where?there?are?concurring?causes,?is?the?one?that?sets?the?others?in?motion.?The?efficient?proximate?cause?is?the?one?to?which?the?loss?is?to?be?attributed,?though?other?causes?may?follow?it?and?operate?more?immediately?in?producing?the?loss.”?(See?ibid.) In?Garvey,?supra,?we?approved?Sabella’s?dependent?concurrent?causation?analysis,?but?modified?its?test?for?determining?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?a?loss?by?noting?that?we?”use?the?term?’efficient?proximate?cause’?(meaning?predominating?cause)?when?referring?to?the?Sabella?analysis?because?we?believe?the?phrase?’moving?cause’?can?be?misconstrued?to?deny?coverage?erroneously,?particularly?when?it?is?understood?literally?to?mean?the?’triggering’?cause.?Indeed,?we?believe?misinterpretation?of?the?Sabella?definition?of?’efficient?proximate?cause’?has?added?to?the?confusion?in?the?courts?….”?(Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pp.?403-404.) As?we?explain,?we?conclude?the?decision?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?should?be?reversed.?The?court’s?determination,?that?earth?movement?caused?by?rising?groundwater?levels?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?loss,?was?erroneous?under?these?facts.?In?addition,?the?court’s?conclusion?that?there?was?no?coverage?under?the?homeowner’s?policy?even?if?third?party?negligence?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?loss,?because?the?asserted?acts?of?negligence?did?not?involve?risks?separate?from?excluded?perils,?conflicts?not?only?with?policy?provisions?and?principles?of?coverage?as?discussed?in?Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?395,?but?also?with?the?Court?of?Appeal’s?decision?in?Davis?v.?United?Services?Auto.?Assn.?(1990)?223?Cal.App.3d?1322?[273?Cal.Rptr.?224]?(Davis),?which?we?approve.?(See?also?Winans?v.?State?Farm?Fire?&?Cas.?Co.?(S.D.Cal.?1990)?743?F.Supp.?733,?736?(Winans)?[construction?negligence?resulting?in?earth?settlement?is?separate?act?not?subject?to?earth?movement?exclusion?in?all-risk?policy].) Discussion   The?Efficient?Proximate?Cause?of?the?Loss [1]?As?we?explained?in?Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pages?406-407,?the?scope?of?coverage?under?an?all-risk?homeowner’s?policy?includes?all?risks?except?those?specifically?excluded?by?the?policy.?When?a?loss?is?caused?by?a?combination?of?a?covered?and?specifically?excluded?risks,?the?loss?is?covered?if?the?covered?risk?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?loss.?(Id.?at?p.?402.)?As?we?further?explained,?the?question?of?what?caused?the?loss?is?generally?a?question?of?fact,?and?the?loss?is?not?covered?if?the?covered?risk?[54?Cal.3d?1132]?was?only?a?remote?cause?of?the?loss,?or?the?excluded?risk?was?the?efficient?proximate,?or?predominate?cause.?(See?id.?at?p.?412.) Here,?there?were?several?causes?of?the?loss:?(i)?earth?movement?caused?by?rising?groundwater?levels,?and?(ii)?negligence?of?certain?entities?and?parties?in?failing?to?take?proper?measures?to?preserve?the?mesa.?[2a]?Insureds?first?contend?the?Court?of?Appeal?erroneously?concluded?that?under?Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pages?403-404,?earth?movement,?an?excluded?cause,?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?loss. In?determining?that?earth?movement?resulting?from?the?rising?groundwater?level?on?the?mesa?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?loss,?the?Court?of?Appeal?relied?on?our?observation?in?Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?page?408,?that?remote?causes?of?a?loss?should?not?amount?to?covered?causes.?Garvey?reasoned?that?”if?the?insurer?is?expected?to?cover?claims?that?are?outside?the?scope?of?the?first?party?property?loss?policy,?an?’all?risk’?policy?would?become?an?’all?loss’?policy.?[Citation].?In?most?instances,?the?insured?can?point?to?some?arguably?covered?contributing?factor.?…” The?Court?of?Appeal?relied?on?the?above?language?to?conclude?that?third?party?negligence?was?too?remote?a?cause?to?give?rise?to?coverage?under?insureds’?homeowner’s?policy.?In?so?doing,?however,?the?court?overlooked?an?important?point?regarding?the?scope?of?an?all-risks?homeowner’s?policy.?[3]?We?emphasized?in?Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?page?408,?that?if?third?party?negligence?is?not?excluded?under?such?a?policy,?it?is?a?covered?peril.?As?we?stated,?third?party?negligence?under?a?homeowner’s?policy?is?a?”risk?of?physical?loss”?under?the?policy.?(Ibid.) [2b]?Moreover,?the?third?party?negligence?that?occurred?here?could?not?be?considered?a?remote?cause?of?the?loss?under?either?Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?395,?or?Sabella,?supra,?59?Cal.2d?at?pages?31-?32.?The?expert?testimony?overwhelmingly?supported?the?jury’s?determination?that?the?predominating?cause?of?the?loss?at?Big?Rock?Mesa?was?third?party?negligence.?By?developing?the?hillside?with?septic?tanks?instead?of?sewers?and?failing?to?properly?dewater?the?hillside,?it?was?inevitable?the?ancient?landslide?would?be?reactivated,?causing?damage?to?a?substantial?number?of?properties?on?the?mesa. In?addition,?the?fact?that?the?jury?was?instructed?under?Sabella’s?literal?”moving?cause”?language?rather?than?under?Garvey’s?broader?efficient?proximate?cause?language?(Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pp.?403-404)?is?of?no?consequence.?Based?on?the?testimony,?it?is?not?reasonably?probable?a?different?result?would?have?been?reached?under?Garvey’s?definition?of?efficient?[54?Cal.3d?1133]?proximate?cause.?(Ibid.)?Accordingly,?the?Sabella,?supra,?59?Cal.2d?at?page?31,?instruction?did?not?prejudice?State?Farm. The?Court?of?Appeal?and?State?Farm?also?rely?on?Finn?v.?Continental?Ins.?Co.?(1990)?218?Cal.App.3d?69,?71?[267?Cal.Rptr.?22],?to?support?the?argument?that?coverage?does?not?exist?in?this?case.?The?Finn?court?upheld?summary?judgment?for?the?insurer?after?determining?that?property?loss?attributed?to?leaking?water?caused?by?a?broken?sewer?pipe?was?an?excluded?risk?under?the?homeowner’s?policy?provision?excluding?losses?caused?by?”Continuous?or?Repeated?Seepage?or?Leakage.”?(Ibid.)?The?insured’s?claim,?that?the?break?in?the?pipe?(a?nonexcluded?cause)?rather?than?the?leakage?from?the?pipe?was?the?cause?of?the?loss,?was?rejected?by?the?court?on?the?ground?that?”Leakage?or?seepage?cannot?occur?without?a?rupture?or?incomplete?joining?of?the?pipes.”?(Id.?at?p.?72.) Thus,?whereas?the?Finn?court?made?a?coverage?determination?based?on?one?cause?of?a?loss,?the?present?case?involves?several?levels?of?causation-an?unstable?hillside,?third?party?negligence,?earth?movement,?and?a?rise?in?the?groundwater?level.?This?is?not,?as?the?insurer?claims,?a?case?in?which?the?”negligence?cannot?be?separated?from?the?earth?movement,”?thus?leaving?only?one?cause?of?the?loss.?Although?the?causes?may?be?distinct?in?origin,?they?were?dependent?causes?in?the?sense?that,?but?for?the?negligence?in?building?the?structures?on?an?ancient?landslide?site?without?the?proper?sewer?system?or?stabilization?of?the?mesa,?the?landslides?might?not?have?occurred?or?damaged?the?property?to?the?extent?it?was?damaged.?Unlike?Finn,?supra,?218?Cal.App.3d?69,?this?case?presents?the?classic?Garvey?situation,?in?which?the?efficient?proximate?cause?must?be?determined?from?a?combination?of?covered?and?specifically?excluded?risks.?(Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pp.?402-404.) [4]?In?addition,?the?fact?that?the?earth?movement?may?have?resulted?from?rising?groundwater?levels?caused?by?the?development?on?the?mesa?does?not?preclude?coverage?in?this?case.?As?insureds?observe,?the?policy’s?groundwater?exclusion?applies?to?water?damage?caused?by?”natural?water?below?the?surface?of?the?ground”?and?not?to?the?artificially?high?level?of?groundwater?that?followed?the?housing?development.?Accordingly,?we?find?the?natural?water?exclusion?does?not?preclude?coverage?here. [2c]?We?conclude?the?Court?of?Appeal?erred?in?determining,?as?a?matter?of?law,?the?damage?suffered?by?insureds?was?not?covered?by?their?homeowner’s?policy.?Instead,?we?hold?the?jury?properly?found?on?these?facts?that?third?party?negligence?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?insureds’?property?loss,?and?was?covered?under?their?policy?with?State?Farm.?[54?Cal.3d?1134]?B.?Third?Party?Negligence?Under?an?All-risks?Homeowner’s?Insurance?Policy Although?we?determined?in?Garvey?that?third?party?negligence?is?a?covered?risk?unless?specifically?excluded?by?the?standard?homeowner’s?policy,?we?suggested?there?might?be?a?narrow?category?of?third?party?negligence?cases?in?which?coverage?was?not?available.?As?an?example,?we?indicated?that?if?a?structure?was?constructed?on?an?insured’s?property?solely?to?protect?the?insured’s?home?against?the?operation?of?a?specifically?excluded?risk?and?because?of?negligent?construction?the?structure?subsequently?failed?to?serve?its?purpose?and?the?home?was?damaged?by?the?excluded?risk,?the?damage?to?the?house?arguably?should?not?be?covered.?(Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pp.?408-409,?fn.?7.) [5]?State?Farm?contends?the?Court?of?Appeal?correctly?found?that?even?if?the?”acts?and?failings”?of?the?state,?County,?and?developer?amounted?to?negligence,?such?acts?could?never?be?the?efficient?proximate?or?predominant?cause?of?the?landslide?because?they?did?not?involve?”perils?distinct?from?excluded?risks.”?In?other?words,?State?Farm?asserts?the?third?party?negligence?involved?here?is?the?type?of?negligence?that?Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pages?408-409,?footnote?7,?meant?to?exclude.?State?Farm?claims,?”Each?alleged?act?of?negligence?identified?by?[insureds]?…,?was?negligence?only?because?it?exposed?[insureds’]?property?to?earth?movement,?an?excluded?peril.?…?There?would?have?been?no?negligence?absent?the?risk?of?earth?movement.?Therefore,?the?negligence?cannot?be?separated?from?the?earth?movement.” The?negligence?that?occurred?in?this?case?was?the?undertaking?of?activity?that?exposed?the?insured?property?to?greater?danger?of?landslides?and?earth?movement?without?taking?counter?measures?to?eliminate?the?increased?risk?of?damage.?As?insureds?observe,?footnote?7?in?Garvey?does?not?apply?to?these?facts.?The?negligent?conduct?outlined?above,?causing?the?landslide?and?resulting?damage?to?insureds’?home,?was?not?designed?to?and?did?not?fail?to?prevent?the?landslide;?it?was,?in?fact,?the?predominating?factor?precipitating?the?slide.?It?is?clear?that?the?housing?tract?at?Big?Rock?Mesa?was?not?created?for?the?purpose?of?preventing?earth?movement;?it?was?created?as?a?profit-making?development.?Likewise,?there?is?no?indication?the?County?approved?the?development?in?order?to?prevent?earth?movement.?The?septic?systems?were?installed?to?dispose?of?household?wastewater,?not?to?prevent?future?landslides.?Although?the?jury?reasonably?found?that?these?acts?amounted?to?third?party?negligence,?none?was?completed?”for?the?sole?purpose?of?protecting?against?the?operation?of?a?specifically?excluded?risk?under?the?homeowner’s?policy?….”?(Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?408,?fn.?7.)?[54?Cal.3d?1135] Indeed,?State?Farm’s?argument?would?essentially?render?third?party?negligence?coverage?illusory.?Our?observation?in?Garvey,?supra,?at?pages?408-409,?footnote?7,?simply?indicated?that?an?insured?cannot?automatically?transform?an?uncovered?loss?into?a?covered?one?by?claiming?a?negligent?construction?job?existed?in?the?chain?of?causation. This?principle?is?illustrated?in?Davis,?supra,?223?Cal.App.3d?1322,?1329-1330,?in?which?the?Court?of?Appeal?found?that?coverage?existed?under?an?all-risk?homeowner’s?policy?for?property?loss?caused?by?the?excluded?risk?of?settlement?that,?in?turn,?was?caused?by?a?contractor’s?failure?to?properly?prepare?the?soil?on?which?the?home?was?constructed.?The?contractor?also?failed?adequately?to?reinforce?the?dwelling’s?foundation.?The?insurer?contended?the?contractor?negligence?was?the?type?of?negligence?Garvey?suggested?would?not?be?covered.?In?rejecting?the?insurer’s?argument,?the?Davis?court?noted,?”There?are?a?number?of?problems?with?this?argument.?…?The?improvements?here?were?not?merely?anti-earth?movement?devices;?they?were:?(1)?grading?and?(2)?a?foundation.?When?seen?in?this?light,?it?becomes?clear?neither?improvement?was?the?type?undertaken?solely?to?prevent?earth?movement;?grading?is?performed?for?a?variety?of?reasons?including?providing?an?area?on?which?it?is?cheaper?and?quicker?to?build?and?which?may?provide?a?lot?more?desirable?to?the?final?buyer[;]?a?foundation?also?provides?support?for?the?structure.”?(Id.?at?p.?1329;?see?also?Winans,?supra,?743?F.Supp.?733,?736.) As?the?Davis?court?observed,?footnote?7?in?Garvey,?supra,?was?never?intended?to?exclude?coverage?for?negligence?when?the?record?establishes?the?negligently?constructed?improvements?were?the?type?undertaken?for?reasons?other?than?prevention?of?an?excluded?occurrence.?(Davis,?supra,?223?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1329.)?Here,?there?was?ample?evidence?that?the?third?party?negligence?leading?to?the?landslide?was?negligence?in?planning,?approving,?and?building?the?Big?Rock?Mesa?subdivision?and?not?negligence?in?acting?to?prevent?landslides?resulting?from?natural?causes.?We?therefore?conclude?that?our?observation?regarding?types?of?third?party?negligence?in?Garvey,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?pages?408-409,?footnote?7,?did?not?preclude?liability?based?on?the?jury?finding?that?third?party?negligence?was?the?efficient?proximate?cause?of?the?insureds’?property?loss. […]

People?v.?Saille?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?1103?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?364;?820?P.2d?588 [No.?S016721.?Dec?12,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?MANUEL?DE?JESUS?SAILLE,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Merced?County,?No.?12650,?George?C.?Barrett,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Panelli,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Richard?L.?Phillips,?Mark?E.?Cutler?and?Bradley?A.?Bristow,?under?appointments?by?the?Supreme?Court,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. Fiedler,?Gardner?&?Derham,?Cliff?Gardner,?Elaine?A.?Alexander,?Martin?Buchanan?and?Madeline?McDowell?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart?and?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Arnold?O.?Overoye,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Jane?N.?Kirkland,?W.?Scott?Thorpe?and?Janet?Neeley?Kvarme,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. John?J.?Meehan,?District?Attorney?(Oakland),?Thomas?J.?Orloff,?Chief?Assistant?District?Attorney,?Kent?S.?Scheidegger?and?Charles?L.?Hobson?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION PANELLI,?J. We?granted?review?in?this?case?to?resolve?a?conflict?among?the?Courts?of?Appeal?regarding?the?impact?of?legislation?abolishing?diminished?capacity?on?the?crime?of?voluntary?manslaughter.?Specifically,?the?issue?is?whether?the?law?of?this?state?still?permits?a?reduction?of?what?would?otherwise?be?murder?to?nonstatutory?voluntary?manslaughter?due?to?voluntary?intoxication?and/or?mental?disorder.fn.?1?In?this?case,?the?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?it?does?not.?After?careful?examination?of?the?relevant?statutes?and?legislative?history,?we?agree. Following?a?retrial,?defendant?was?convicted?of?the?first?degree?murder?of?Guadalupe?Borba?(Pen.?Code,???187)fn.?2?and?the?attempted?murder?of?David?Ballagh?(???664/187).?His?earlier?conviction?for?these?crimes?was?reversed?[54?Cal.3d?1108]?on?appeal?for?Wheeler?error?(People?v.?Wheeler?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?258?[148?Cal.Rptr.?890,?583?P.2d?748]). Facts On?November?30,?1985,?defendant?started?drinking?at?a?friend’s?house?shortly?before?noon.?He?had?drunk?15?to?18?beers?by?about?6?o’clock?that?evening;?he?then?went?to?a?bar?and?drank?about?3?or?4?more?beers.?He?was?noticeably?drunk?when?he?went?to?Eva’s?Cafe?about?9?p.m.?The?bartender?signalled?the?security?guard,?David?Ballagh,?to?ask?defendant?to?leave.?Ballagh?told?defendant?he?could?not?drink?there?because?he?appeared?intoxicated?and?asked?defendant?to?leave;?defendant?did?so.?Defendant?returned?about?an?hour?later,?but?was?reminded?by?Ballagh?that?he?could?not?come?in.?Defendant?left?but?returned?again?around?11?p.m.?and?was?rebuffed?once?again?by?Ballagh.?As?he?left?he?said?to?Ballagh,?”I’m?going?to?get?a?gun?and?kill?you.” Defendant?went?home?around?1?a.m.,?got?his?rifle?(a?semiautomatic?assault?rifle),?and?returned?to?the?bar.?As?he?entered?the?bar,?defendant?said?to?Ballagh,?”I?told?you?I?would?be?back.”?Ballagh?tried?to?grab?the?rifle;?it?discharged?and?killed?a?patron.?Defendant?was?eventually?subdued?outside?the?bar;?both?he?and?Ballagh?were?shot?during?the?struggle. A?blood?sample?taken?from?defendant?about?two?hours?later?showed?a?blood-?alcohol?level?of?.14?percent.?Expert?testimony?at?trial?established?that?the?level?would?have?been?about?.19?percent?at?the?time?of?the?shooting. Contentions Defendant?contends?the?court’s?instructions?on?the?effect?of?voluntary?intoxication?were?inadequate.?The?court?gave?CALJIC?No.?4.21,?stating?that?voluntary?intoxication?could?be?considered?in?determining?whether?defendant?had?the?specific?intent?to?kill.?The?court?instructed?on?first?and?second?degree?murder?and?voluntary?and?involuntary?manslaughter.?[1a]?It?did?not,?however,?relate?voluntary?intoxication?to?anything?other?than?the?specific?intent?to?kill.?Defendant?contends?the?instructions?were?insufficient?because?they?did?not?tell?the?jury?that?voluntary?intoxication,?like?heat?of?passion?upon?adequate?provocation,?could?negate?express?malice?and?reduce?what?would?otherwise?be?murder?to?voluntary?manslaughter.?Defendant?also?contends?that?the?court?should?have?instructed?sua?sponte?that?the?jury?could?consider?his?voluntary?intoxication?in?determining?whether?he?had?premeditated?and?deliberated?the?murder.?Defendant?further?contends?that?the?instructions?on?involuntary?manslaughter?improperly?required?a?showing?of?unconsciousness.?[54?Cal.3d?1109] In?rejecting?these?contentions,?the?Court?of?Appeal?based?its?reasoning?on?the?legislative?enactments?that?(1)?abolished?diminished?capacity?and?(2)?clarified?the?definition?of?malice?aforethought.?Accordingly,?before?we?can?properly?assess?the?correctness?of?the?Court?of?Appeal’s?interpretation?of?the?legislation,?we?review?the?historical?development?of?the?doctrine?of?diminished?capacity. The?first?step?in?the?development?of?the?diminished?capacity?doctrine?was?taken?in?People?v.?Wells?(1949)?33?Cal.2d?330?[202?P.2d?53].?(See?People?v.?Wetmore?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?318,?323?[149?Cal.Rptr.?265,?583?P.2d?1308].)?In?Wells?the?defendant,?a?life-term?prisoner,?was?charged?with?assault?on?a?prison?guard,?which?was?a?capital?offense?if?done?with?malice?aforethought.?The?defendant?contended?he?did?not?act?with?malice?aforethought?because?he?was?reacting?to?an?honest?but?unreasonable?fear?of?bodily?harm.?He?sought?to?introduce?psychiatric?testimony?at?the?guilt?phase?to?show?that?he?was?suffering?from?an?abnormal?physical?and?mental?condition?that?caused?him?to?fear?for?his?personal?safety?in?response?to?even?slight?external?stimuli.?We?held?that?the?trial?court?erred?in?excluding?the?proffered?evidence.?We?explained:?”Evidence?which?tends?to?show?legal?insanity?…?is?not?admissible?at?the?first?stage?of?the?trial?because?it?is?not?pertinent?to?any?issue?then?being?litigated;?but?competent?evidence,?other?than?proof?of?sanity?or?insanity,?which?tends?to?show?that?a?(then?presumed)?legally?sane?defendant?either?did?or?did?not?in?fact?possess?the?required?specific?intent?or?motive?is?admissible.”?(Wells,?supra,?33?Cal.2d?at?p.?351,?italics?added.) The?next?step?was?taken?in?People?v.?Gorshen?(1959)?51?Cal.2d?716?[336?P.2d?492].?Gorshen,?a?longshoreman,?reported?to?work?intoxicated?and?was?told?by?his?foreman?to?go?home.?After?Gorshen?refused?to?leave,?the?two?men?fought?briefly.?The?fight?ended?when?the?foreman?knocked?Gorshen?to?the?ground.?Gorshen?announced?that?he?was?going?to?go?home,?get?his?gun,?return,?and?kill?the?foreman.?Gorshen?went?home,?cleaned?and?loaded?his?gun,?returned?to?the?docks,?and?killed?the?foreman.?In?addition?to?introducing?evidence?of?his?intoxication,?Gorshen?introduced?psychiatric?testimony?that?he?was?suffering?from?a?mental?disease?at?the?time?of?the?killing.?The?psychiatrist?described?the?effect?of?the?disease?and?concluded?that?Gorshen?did?”?’not?have?the?mental?state?which?is?required?for?malice?aforethought?or?premeditation?or?anything?which?implies?intention,?deliberation?or?premeditation.’?”?(Id.,?at?p.?723.)?The?trial?court?found?Gorshen?guilty?of?second?degree?murder.?The?court?relied?on?the?psychiatrist’s?testimony?to?reduce?the?murder?to?second?degree,?but?found?there?was?malice?aforethought. Citing?People?v.?Wells,?supra,?33?Cal.2d?330,?we?upheld?the?admission?of?the?psychiatric?evidence,?as?it?was?evidence?of?defendant’s?mental?infirmity?[54?Cal.3d?1110]?short?of?insanity?that?tended?to?prove?the?defendant?did?not?have?the?necessary?specific?mental?state?to?commit?first?degree?murder.?(Gorshen,?supra,?51?Cal.2d?at?p.?726.)?In?so?doing,?we?opened?the?door?for?diminished?capacity,?since?we?permitted?expert?evidence?”not?as?a?’complete?defense’?negating?capacity?to?commit?any?crime?but?as?a?’partial?defense’?negating?[a]?specific?mental?state?essential?to?a?particular?crime.”?(Id.,?at?p.?727.)?Moreover,?we?recognized?that?murder?could?be?reduced?to?manslaughter,?not?only?on?the?statutory?basis?of?the?reasonable?person?objective?standard?of?provocation?(??192),?but?also?on?the?subjective?standard?of?defendant’s?voluntary?intoxication?or?mental?impairment.?(51?Cal.2d?at?pp.?731-733.) In?People?v.?Conley?(1966)?64?Cal.2d?310?[49?Cal.Rptr.?815,?411?P.2d?911]?we?applied?the?Gorshen-Wells?principles?to?reverse?the?defendant’s?conviction?of?two?counts?of?first?degree?murder.?The?defendant?shot?and?killed?his?former?girlfriend?and?her?husband.?He?testified?that?he?did?not?intend?to?kill?the?victims?and?that?he?did?not?remember?anything?from?the?time?he?was?drinking?at?his?sister’s?house?until?the?time?of?his?arrest?shortly?after?the?shooting.?His?blood-alcohol?level?was?.21?percent?three?hours?after?the?shooting.?We?held?that?the?trial?court?erred?in?refusing?to?give?voluntary?manslaughter?instructions?based?on?the?defendant’s?diminished?capacity?as?a?result?of?voluntary?intoxication.?We?concluded?that?the?statutory?limitation?of?voluntary?manslaughter?to?homicides?caused?by?adequate?provocation?(??192)?was?not?exclusive:?”[S]ince?the?statute?[??192]?had?been?enacted?before?the?concept?of?diminished?capacity?had?been?developed,?its?enumeration?of?nonmalicious?criminal?homicides?did?not?include?those?in?which?the?lack?of?malice?results?from?diminished?capacity.”?(Conley,?supra,?at?p.?318.)?As?a?result,?malice?aforethought?could?be?negated?by?showing?that?a?person?who?intentionally?killed?was?incapable?of?harboring?malice?aforethought?because?of?a?mental?disease?or?defect?or?intoxication.?(Ibid.)?To?explain?how?diminished?capacity?negated?malice,?we?redefined?and?expanded?the?mental?component?of?malice?aforethought?beyond?that?stated?in?section?188fn.?3?to?include?a?requirement?that?the?defendant?was?able?to?comprehend?the?duty?society?places?on?all?persons?to?act?within?the?law,?i.e.,?that?he?had?an?”awareness?of?the?obligation?to?act?within?the?general?body?of?laws?regulating?society.”?(Id.,?at?p.?322.)?Pursuant?to?this?definition,?we?concluded?that?someone?who?is?unable,?because?of?intoxication?or?mental?illness,?to?comprehend?his?duty?to?govern?his?actions?in?accord?with?the?duty?imposed?by?law,?cannot?act?with?malice?aforethought.?[54?Cal.3d?1111] In?People?v.?Poddar?(1974)?10?Cal.3d?750?[111?Cal.Rptr.?910,?518?P.2d?342]?we?put?the?final?gloss?on?the?definition?of?malice?aforethought.?There,?in?the?context?of?implied?malice,?we?added?the?requirement?that?the?defendant,?even?if?aware?of?his?duty?to?act?in?accordance?with?the?law,?also?be?able?to?act?in?accordance?with?that?duty.?(Id.,?at?p.?758.) Finally,?in?People?v.?Wetmore,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?318,?we?addressed?the?kind?of?evidence?admissible?on?the?issue?of?defendant’s?mental?state.?We?held?that?evidence?which?tended?to?show?a?defendant?could?not?form?the?requisite?mental?state?is?admissible?in?the?guilt?phase?even?though?the?evidence?is?also?probative?of?insanity.?In?so?doing,?we?rejected?dictum?in?People?v.?Wells,?supra,?33?Cal.2d?330,?that?evidence?tending?to?show?lack?of?mental?capacity?to?commit?the?crime?because?of?insanity?was?inadmissible?at?the?guilt?phase?of?trial.?(People?v.?Wetmore,?supra,?22?Cal.2d?at?p.?323.)?We?observed?that?our?holding?would?result?in?the?duplication?of?evidence?presented?at?the?legislatively?mandated?bifurcated?trial?on?guilt?and?insanity.?We?therefore?urged?the?Legislature?to?reconsider?the?wisdom?of?the?statutes?providing?for?bifurcated?trial.?(Id.,?at?p.?331.) In?response?to?our?request,?the?Joint?Committee?for?Revision?of?the?Penal?Code?held?two?public?hearings?on?the?subject?of?psychiatric?evidence?and?the?defenses?of?diminished?capacity?and?insanity.?These?hearings?led?to?the?introduction?of?Senate?Bill?No.?54,?1981-1982?Regular?Session,?to?abolish?the?defense?of?diminished?capacity.?(Comment,?Admissibility?of?Psychiatric?Testimony?in?the?Guilt?Phase?of?Bifurcated?Trials:?What’s?Left?After?the?Reforms?of?the?Diminished?Capacity?Defense??(1984)?16?Pacific?L.J.?305,?316-318.)?After?substantial?amendment,?Senate?Bill?No.?54?was?enacted?into?law?in?September?1981.?(Stats.?1981,?ch.?404,?pp.?1591-1592.)fn.?4 Senate?Bill?No.?54?added?to?the?Penal?Code?sections?28?and?29,?which?abolished?diminished?capacity?and?limited?psychiatric?testimony.?It?amended?section?22?on?the?admissibility?of?evidence?of?voluntary?intoxication,?section?188?on?the?definition?of?malice?aforethought,?and?section?189?on?the?definition?of?premeditation?and?deliberation.fn.?5?Other?sections?not?relevant?here?were?also?amended. [2]?Section?28,?subdivision?(a)?provides?in?pertinent?part?that?evidence?of?mental?illness?”shall?not?be?admitted?to?show?or?negate?the?capacity?to?form?[54?Cal.3d?1112]?any?mental?state,”?but?is?”admissible?solely?on?the?issue?of?whether?or?not?the?accused?actually?formed?a?required?specific?intent,?premeditated,?deliberated,?or?harbored?malice?aforethought,?when?a?specific?intent?crime?is?charged.”?(Italics?added.)?Subdivision?(b)?of?section?28?abolishes?the?defenses?of?diminished?capacity,?diminished?responsibility,?and?irresistible?impulse?”as?a?matter?of?public?policy.” Section?29?provides?that?any?expert?testifying?in?the?guilt?phase?of?a?criminal?action?”shall?not?testify?as?to?whether?the?defendant?had?or?did?not?have?the?required?mental?states,?which?include,?but?are?not?limited?to,?purpose,?intent,?knowledge,?or?malice?aforethought,?for?the?crimes?charged.?The?question?as?to?whether?the?defendant?had?or?did?not?have?the?required?mental?states?shall?be?decided?by?the?trier?of?fact.” Section?22?was?amended?to?reflect?the?abolition?of?diminished?capacity.?It?provides?that?evidence?of?voluntary?intoxication?is?not?admissible?to?negate?the?capacity?to?form?any?mental?state,?but?it?is?admissible?”solely?on?the?issue?of?whether?or?not?the?defendant?actually?formed?a?required?specific?intent,?premeditated,?deliberated,?or?harbored?malice?aforethought,?when?a?specific?intent?crime?is?charged.” A?provision?abolishing?the?defense?of?diminished?capacity?was?also?included?in?the?initiative?measure?adopted?in?June?1982?and?known?as?Proposition?8.?Section?25?was?added?to?the?Penal?Code?as?part?of?Proposition?8.?Subdivision?(a)?of?section?25?provides:?”The?defense?of?diminished?capacity?is?hereby?abolished.?In?a?criminal?action,?as?well?as?any?juvenile?court?proceeding,?evidence?concerning?an?accused?person’s?intoxication,?trauma,?mental?illness,?disease,?or?defect?shall?not?be?admissible?to?show?or?negate?capacity?to?form?the?particular?purpose,?intent,?motive,?malice?aforethought,?knowledge,?or?other?mental?state?required?for?the?commission?of?the?crime?charged.” Although?there?was?initially?some?confusion?about?the?interaction?between?section?25,?subdivision?(a)?and?section?28?(People?v.?Spurlin?(1984)?156?Cal.App.3d?119,?128?[202?Cal.Rptr.?663]),?courts?and?commentators?now?appear?to?agree?that?the?two?sections?are?complementary?and?that?both?statutes?remain?operative.?(See?1?Witkin?&?Epstein,?Cal.?Criminal?Law?(2d?ed.?1988)?Defenses,???211,?pp.?241-243;?People?v.?McCowan?(1986)?182?Cal.App.3d?1,?11-13?[227?Cal.Rptr.?23];?People?v.?Young?(1987)?189?Cal.App.3d?891,?904-905?[234?Cal.Rptr.?819].) Scope?of?Voluntary?Manslaughter [1b]?Defendant?argues?that?the?new?legislation?did?not?limit?the?ability?of?an?accused?to?reduce?an?intentional?killing?to?voluntary?manslaughter?as?a?[54?Cal.3d?1113]?result?of?mental?illness?or?voluntary?intoxication.?He?relies?primarily?on?People?v.?Molina?(1988)?202?Cal.App.3d?1168?[249?Cal.Rptr.?273]. In?Molina,?a?psychotic?mother,?who?was?experiencing?auditory?hallucinations,?strangled?and?killed?her?18-month-old?son?and?set?fire?to?the?house.?The?trial?court?refused?requested?instructions?on?the?lesser?offenses?of?voluntary?and?involuntary?manslaughter.?The?defendant?was?convicted?of?second?degree?murder?and?found?not?guilty?by?reason?of?insanity.?The?Court?of?Appeal?reversed. The?Molina?court?reviewed?sections?25,?28,?and?29,?noting?that?the?statutory?language?provides?that?”evidence?of?mental?problems?is?inadmissible?to?show?that?a?defendant?lacked?the?capacity?to?form?the?requisite?mental?state,?but?is?admissible?to?show?that?the?defendant?actually?lacked?the?requisite?mental?state.”?(202?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1173.)?From?this?the?court?concluded:?”The?inclusion?of?the?language?in?subdivision?(a)?[of?section?28]?regarding?actual?formation?of?mental?states?shows?that?the?Legislature?did?not?foreclose?the?possibility?of?a?reduction?from?murder?to?voluntary?manslaughter?where?malice?is?lacking?due?to?mental?illness,?or?a?further?reduction?to?involuntary?manslaughter?where?intent?to?kill?is?not?present?for?the?same?reason.”?(Id.,?at?p.?1174.) We?are?unpersuaded?by?defendant’s?reliance?on?Molina,?supra,?202?Cal.App.3d?1168,?since?the?court’s?analysis?failed?to?consider?the?effect?on?the?definition?of?malice?of?the?amendment?to?section?188,?which?was?part?of?the?same?legislative?package?as?sections?25,?28,?and?29. [3]?Section?188,?as?amended?by?Senate?Bill?No.?54?(see?fn.?5,?ante),?now?provides:?”Such?malice?may?be?express?or?implied.?It?is?express?when?there?is?manifested?a?deliberate?intention?unlawfully?to?take?away?the?life?of?a?fellow?creature.?It?is?implied,?when?no?considerable?provocation?appears,?or?when?the?circumstances?attending?the?killing?show?an?abandoned?and?malignant?heart.?[?]?When?it?is?shown?that?the?killing?resulted?from?the?intentional?doing?of?an?act?with?express?or?implied?malice?as?defined?above,?no?other?mental?state?need?be?shown?to?establish?the?mental?state?of?malice?aforethought.?Neither?an?awareness?of?the?obligation?to?act?within?the?general?body?of?laws?regulating?society?nor?acting?despite?such?awareness?is?included?within?the?definition?of?malice.”?(Italics?added.) The?first?sentence?of?the?underscored?passage?limits?malice?to?the?definition?set?forth?in?section?188.?This?sentence?clearly?provides?that?once?the?trier?of?fact?finds?a?deliberate?intention?unlawfully?to?kill,?no?other?mental?state?need?be?shown?to?establish?malice?aforethought.?Whether?a?defendant?acted?with?a?wanton?disregard?for?human?life?or?with?some?antisocial?motivation?is?[54?Cal.3d?1114]?no?longer?relevant?to?the?issue?of?express?malice.?(People?v.?Stress?(1988)?205?Cal.App.3d?1259,?1267-1268?[252?Cal.Rptr.?913].)?No?doubt?about?this?conclusion?is?possible?when?the?last?sentence?of?section?188?is?analyzed.?That?sentence?directly?repudiates?the?expanded?definition?of?malice?aforethought?in?People?v.?Conley,?supra,?64?Cal.2d?310,?and?People?v.?Poddar,?supra,?10?Cal.3d?750,?that?express?and?implied?malice?include?an?awareness?of?the?obligation?to?act?within?the?general?body?of?laws?regulating?society?and?the?capability?of?acting?in?accordance?with?such?awareness.?After?this?amendment?of?section?188,?express?malice?and?an?intent?unlawfully?to?kill?are?one?and?the?same.fn.?6?(People?v.?Stress,?supra,?205?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1268.) Pursuant?to?the?language?of?section?188,?when?an?intentional?killing?is?shown,?malice?aforethought?is?established.?Accordingly,?the?concept?of?”diminished?capacity?voluntary?manslaughter”?(nonstatutory?manslaughter)?recognized?in?Conley,?supra,?64?Cal.2d?310,?is?no?longer?valid?as?a?defense. However,?while?retreating?from?the?Conley/Poddar?definition?of?malice?aforethought,?the?Legislature?left?unchanged?the?definition?of?voluntary?manslaughter?in?section?192.?Indeed,?that?definition?has?not?changed?since?section?192?was?first?enacted?in?1872.?Section?192?defines?voluntary?manslaughter?as?the?”unlawful?killing?of?a?human?being?without?malice?…?[?]?…?upon?a?sudden?quarrel?or?heat?of?passion.”?Thus,?pursuant?to?the?language?of?section?188,?when?an?intentional?killing?is?shown,?malice?aforethought?is?established.?Section?192,?however,?negates?malice?when?the?intentional?killing?results?from?a?sudden?quarrel?or?heat?of?passion?induced?by?adequate?provocation. Defendant?disagrees.?Relying?on?the?language?in?section?188?that?requires?for?express?malice?a?”deliberate?intention?unlawfully”?to?take?a?life,?he?argues?that?express?malice?requires?more?than?mere?intent?to?kill.?We?find?the?Court?of?Appeal’s?reasoning?to?the?contrary?in?People?v.?Bobofn.?*(1990)?229?Cal.App.3d?1417,?1440-1441?[271?Cal.Rptr.?277],?persuasive:?”From?the?time?it?was?enacted?in?1872,?section?188?has?stated?that?malice?is?express?’when?there?is?manifested?a?deliberate?intention?unlawfully’?to?kill.?One?might?argue?that?the?word?’deliberate’?has?a?significance?in?the?distinction?between?murder?and?manslaughter.?That?argument?would?be?mistaken.?[54?Cal.3d?1115]?As?noted?in?In?re?Thomas?C.?(1986)?183?Cal.App.3d?786,?796-797?[228?Cal.Rptr.?430]:?’In?People?v.?Valentine?(1946)?28?Cal.2d?121?[169?P.2d?1],?our?Supreme?Court?pointed?out?that?it?was?”incorrect?[to?differentiate]?manslaughter?from?murder?on?the?basis?of?deliberate?intent?….?Deliberate?intent?…?is?not?an?essential?element?of?murder,?as?such.?It?is?an?essential?element?of?one?class?only?of?first?degree?murder?and?is?not?at?all?an?element?of?second?degree?murder.”?(Id.,?at?pp.?131-132;?[citations].)?Indeed,?the?standard?CALJIC?instruction?(No.?8.11?(1983?rev.))?has?been?held?to?be?a?correct?definition?of?express?malice?aforethought,?despite?the?fact?that?it?does?not?use?the?word?”deliberate”?as?used?in?Penal?Code?section?188,?but?merely?states?that?”[m]alice?is?express?when?there?is?manifested?an?intention?unlawfully?to?kill?a?human?being.”?(CALJIC?No.?8.11.)?In?short,?”deliberate?intention,”?as?stated?in?Penal?Code?section?188,?merely?distinguishes?”express”?from?”implied”?malice,?whereas?premeditation?and?deliberation?is?one?class?of?first?degree?murder.’?(See?also?People?v.?Van?Ronk,?supra,?171?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?824.) “Moreover,?as?defined?in?cases?predating?Conley?and?Conley’s?foundational?pillars-People?v.?Wells?(1949)?33?Cal.2d?330,?and?People?v.?Gorshen?(1959)?51?Cal.2d?716-the?concept?of?malice?aforethought?was?manifested?by?the?doing?of?an?unlawful?and?felonious?act?intentionally?and?without?legal?cause?or?excuse.?(People?v.?Balkwell?(1904)?143?Cal.?259,?263?[76?P.?1017];?People?v.?Fallon?(1906)?149?Cal.?287,?289-290?[86?P.?689];?People?v.?Coleman?(1942)?50?Cal.App.2d?592,?596?[123?P.2d?557];?see?also?People?v.?Bender?(1945)?27?Cal.2d?164,?181?[163?P.2d?8].)?The?adjective?’deliberate’?in?section?188?consequently?implies?an?intentional?act?and?is?essentially?redundant?to?the?language?defining?express?malice. “The?adverb?’unlawfully’?in?the?express?malice?definition?means?simply?that?there?is?no?justification,?excuse,?or?mitigation?for?the?killing?recognized?by?the?law.?(People?v.?Stress,?supra,?205?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1268.)” [4]?We?still?must?reconcile?the?narrowed?definition?of?malice?aforethought?in?section?188?with?the?language?of?sections?22,?subdivision?(b)?and?28,?subdivision?(a).?These?latter?sections?make?evidence?of?voluntary?intoxication?and?mental?illness?admissible?solely?on?the?issue?of?whether?the?accused?”actually?formed?a?required?specific?intent,?premeditated,?deliberated,?or?harbored?malice?aforethought,?when?a?specific?intent?crime?is?charged.” Molina?had?relied?on?the?reference?to?malice?aforethought?in?section?28,?subdivision?(a)?to?conclude?that?the?Legislature?had?not?foreclosed?the?possibility?of?a?reduction?of?murder?to?voluntary?manslaughter?where?malice?is?lacking?due?to?mental?illness?or?intoxication.?(People?v.?Molina,?supra,?202?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1174.)?As?previously?stated,?however,?the?Molina?analysis?[54?Cal.3d?1116]?did?not?consider?the?effect?of?the?Legislature’s?amendment?of?the?definition?of?malice?in?section?188. As?the?Court?of?Appeal?noted?in?People?v.?Bobo,?supra,?229?Cal.App.3d?at?page?1442,?”section?28,?subdivision?(a),?is?a?general?statute?covering?all?specific?intent?crimes.?Leeway?in?the?language?is?needed?to?ensure?such?coverage.?Moreover,?malice?aforethought?can?be?either?express?or?implied.?Nothing?is?generalized?about?the?definition?of?express?malice?in?section?188?and?no?leeway?in?the?language?is?needed?for?that?precise?definition.?Furthermore,?evidence?of?mental?disease,?disorder,?or?defect?is?still?admissible?on?the?issue?of?whether?the?accused?actually?formed?an?intent?unlawfully?to?kill-i.e.,?whether?the?accused?actually?formed?express?malice.” Sections?22?and?28?state?that?voluntary?intoxication?or?mental?condition?may?be?considered?in?deciding?whether?the?defendant?actually?had?the?required?mental?state,?including?malice.?These?sections?relate?to?any?crime,?and?make?no?attempt?to?define?what?mental?state?is?required.?Section?188,?on?the?other?hand,?defines?malice?for?purposes?of?murder.?In?combination,?the?statutes?provide?that?voluntary?intoxication?or?mental?condition?may?be?considered?in?deciding?whether?there?was?malice?as?defined?in?section?188.?Contrary?to?defendant’s?contention,?we?see?no?conflict?in?these?provisions. [5]?Defendant?further?argues?that?the?Legislature’s?narrowing?of?the?definition?of?express?malice?and?the?resulting?restriction?of?the?scope?of?voluntary?manslaughter?presents?a?due?process?problem.?We?disagree.?The?Legislature?can?limit?the?mental?elements?included?in?the?statutory?definition?of?a?crime?and?thereby?curtail?use?of?mens?rea?defenses.?(See?Patterson?v.?New?York?(1977)?432?U.S.?197,?210-211?[53?L.Ed.2d?281,?292-293,?97?S.Ct.?2319].)?If,?however,?a?crime?requires?a?particular?mental?state?the?Legislature?may?not?deny?a?defendant?the?opportunity?to?prove?he?did?not?possess?that?state.?(Id.,?at?p.?215?[53?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?295].)?The?abolition?of?the?diminished?capacity?defense?and?limitation?of?admissible?evidence?to?actual?formation?of?various?mental?states?has?been?held?not?to?violate?the?due?process?right?to?present?a?defense.?(People?v.?Jackson?(1984)?152?Cal.App.3d?961,?967-970?[199?Cal.Rptr.?848];?People?v.?Lynn?(1984)?159?Cal.App.3d?715,?731-733?[206?Cal.Rptr.?181];?People?v.?Whitler?(1985)?171?Cal.App.3d?337,?340-341?[214?Cal.Rptr.?610].)?If?there?is?no?due?process?impediment?to?the?deletion?of?malice?as?an?element?of?the?crime?of?felony?murder?(People?v.?Dillon?(1983)?34?Cal.3d?441,?472-476?[194?Cal.Rptr.?390,?668?P.2d?697]),?there?is?likewise?no?problem?here.?[1c]?In?amending?section?188?in?1981,?the?Legislature?equated?express?malice?with?an?intent?unlawfully?to?kill.?Since?two?distinct?concepts?no?longer?exist,?there?has?been?some?narrowing?of?the?mental?element?included?in?the?statutory?definition?of?express?malice.?A?defendant,?[54?Cal.3d?1117]?however,?is?still?free?to?show?that?because?of?his?mental?illness?or?voluntary?intoxication,?he?did?not?in?fact?form?the?intent?unlawfully?to?kill?(i.e.,?did?not?have?malice?aforethought).?(People?v.?Jackson,?supra,?152?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?968.)?In?a?murder?case,?if?this?evidence?is?believed,?the?only?supportable?verdict?would?be?involuntary?manslaughter?or?an?acquittal.?If?such?a?showing?gives?rise?to?a?reasonable?doubt,?the?killing?(assuming?there?is?no?implied?malice)?can?be?no?greater?than?involuntary?manslaughter.?(See?People?v.?Bobo,fn.?*?supra,?229?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?1442-?1443.) It?follows?from?the?foregoing?analysis?that?the?trial?court?did?not?err?in?failing?to?instruct?that?voluntary?intoxication?could?negate?express?malice?so?as?to?reduce?a?murder?to?voluntary?manslaughter. Duty?to?Instruct?Sua?Sponte [6a]?Defendant?contends?that?the?trial?court?erred?in?failing?to?instruct?sua?sponte?that?the?jury?should?consider?his?voluntary?intoxication?in?determining?whether?he?had?premeditated?and?deliberated?the?murder.?As?previously?mentioned,?the?instructions?given?(CALJIC?No.?4.21)?related?voluntary?intoxication?only?to?the?question?of?whether?defendant?had?the?specific?intent?to?kill. The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?the?abolition?of?the?defense?of?diminished?capacity?had?eliminated?the?need?for?a?sua?sponte?instruction?relating?mental?illness?or?voluntary?intoxication?to?the?required?mental?states.?It?relied?on?the?analysis?set?forth?by?Justice?Sims?in?his?concurring?opinion?in?People?v.?Whitler,?supra,?171?Cal.App.3d?at?pages?342-343:?”These?cases?represent?variations?of?the?familiar?rule?that?a?trial?court?has?a?sua?sponte?duty?to?give?instructions?relating?a?recognized?defense?to?elements?of?a?charged?offense.?(People?v.?Sedeno?(1974)?10?Cal.3d?703,?716.)?…?[T]he?defense?of?diminished?capacity?has?been?abolished.?A?defendant?may?still?defend?against?a?charge?of?homicide?by?presenting?evidence?of?mental?disease?or?defect?sufficient?to?raise?a?reasonable?doubt?that?he?or?she?in?fact?had?the?requisite?mental?state?at?the?time?of?the?offense.?[Citation.]?However,?when?a?defendant?presents?evidence?to?attempt?to?negate?or?rebut?the?prosecution’s?proof?of?an?element?of?the?offense,?a?defendant?is?not?presenting?a?special?defense?invoking?sua?sponte?instructional?duties.?While?a?court?may?well?have?a?duty?to?give?a?’pinpoint’?instruction?relating?such?evidence?to?the?elements?of?the?offense?and?to?the?jury’s?duty?to?acquit?if?the?evidence?produces?a?reasonable?doubt,?such?’pinpoint’?instructions?are?not?required?to?be?given?sua?sponte?and?must?be?given?only?upon?request.?[Citations.]”?[54?Cal.3d?1118] […]

People?v.?Cookson?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?1091?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?176;?820?P.2d?278 [No.?S015205.?Dec?12,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?RANDALL?LEE?COOKSON,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Monterey?County,?No.?MCR5876,?William?M.?Wunderlich,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?with?Panelli,?Arabian,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?with?Kennard,?J.,?concurring.) COUNSEL Julia?Kai?Barreto?and?Mark?D.?Greenberg?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. Wilbur?F.?Littlefield,?Public?Defender?(Los?Angeles),?Laurence?M.?Sarnoff?and?John?Hamilton?Scott,?Deputy?Public?Defenders,?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Stan?Helfman,?John?T.?Murphy?and?Sharon?Birenbaum,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION LUCAS,?C.?J. Defendant?Randall?Lee?Cookson?pleaded?nolo?contendere?to?violating?Penal?Code?section?484b?(all?further?statutory?references,?unless?otherwise?noted,?are?to?this?code)?and?was?placed?on?three?years’?probation?on?condition,?inter?alia,?that?he?pay?restitution?as?determined?by?the?probation?department.?Thereafter,?the?department?ordered?that?defendant?pay?$12,000,?and?devised?a?monthly?payment?schedule.?Defendant?made?all?monthly?payments?as?required?by?the?department,?but?at?the?end?of?three?years?he?had?paid?only?a?part?of?the?total?amount?originally?ordered.?On?motion?by?the?department,?the?trial?court?ordered?defendant’s?probation?extended?for?two?years?to?assure?further?restitution?would?be?made.?Defendant?challenged?the?imposition?of?an?additional?probationary?period,?contending?the?extension?was?improper?absent?proof?he?had?the?ability?to?pay?and?willfully?failed?to?pay.?The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed.?For?the?reasons?given?below,?we?affirm?its?decision. Facts In?1985,?Dr.?Robert?Slaughter?paid?defendant?approximately?$18,000?to?build?an?addition?to?Slaughter’s?home.?The?addition?was?never?made.?Defendant?later?entered?a?plea?of?nolo?contendere?to?one?count?of?diverting?[54?Cal.3d?1094]?construction?funds?in?excess?of?$1,000?(??484b).?A?presentence?probation?report?valued?the?loss?to?Dr.?Slaughter?at?$12,000.?The?court?sentenced?defendant?to?three?years’?probation?on?condition,?inter?alia,?that?he?serve?a?ninety-day?jail?sentence,?pay?a?$120?restitution?fine?to?the?probation?department,?and?make?restitution?as?determined?by?the?probation?officer.?In?fashioning?its?decree,?the?court?contemplated?that?the?amount?of?restitution?would?equal?the?actual?loss?suffered?by?Dr.?Slaughter.fn.?1 One?week?after?defendant?was?sentenced,?the?probation?department?set?the?ultimate?amount?of?restitution?at?$12,000.?Although?the?record?is?not?entirely?clear,?the?department?at?the?same?time?apparently?fixed?defendant’s?monthly?payments?at?$100.?The?payment?amount?was?increased?in?September?1988?to?$135?per?month.?Defendant?made?each?monthly?payment?as?required?by?the?department,?but?pursuant?to?that?schedule?three?years?of?payments?amounted?to?only?$4,085. On?the?day?before?defendant’s?probation?was?to?expire,?the?department?filed?a?petition?to?extend?his?probation?for?two?yearsfn.?2?to?allow?continued?supervised?payments?to?Dr.?Slaughter.fn.?3The?trial?court?agreed?to?modify?the?terms?of?probation?and?stated:?”It?is?my?finding?that?…?[the?sentencing?court]?made?two?orders:?that?[defendant]?pay?restitution?in?an?amount?to?be?determined?by?the?probation?officer,?with?the?manner?of?payment?to?be?determined?by?the?probation?officer.?[?]?It?is?the?conclusion?of?this?court?that?[defendant]?has?not?paid?restitution?in?the?amount?determined?by?the?probation?officer,?and?in?fact?owes?[$7,912],?and?therefore?is?in?violation?of?probation.?…?[?]?I’m?just?going?to?advise?you?…?that?were?you?to?divide?the?amount?of?restitution?owed?into?23?equal?parts,?it?would?be?$344?a?month.?I?expect?restitution?to?be?paid?in?the?full?amount.”?[54?Cal.3d?1095] Defendant?appealed,?claiming?probation?was?improperly?extended?without?proof?he?willfully?failed?to?pay?restitution?as?ordered.?The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed.?It?first?concluded?that?the?trial?court?had?jurisdiction?to?modify?the?probation?because?defendant’s?inability?to?pay?amounted?to?a?change?of?circumstances.?Rejecting?contrary?language?in?People?v.?Ryan?(1988)?203?Cal.App.3d?189?[249?Cal.Rptr.?750],?the?court?then?interpreted?section?1203.2?as?enabling?courts?to?modify?a?term?of?probation?for?nonwillful?failure?to?pay?restitution,?even?though?such?a?failure?would?not?support?a?revocation. Discussion [1]?A?court?may?revoke?or?modify?a?term?of?probation?at?any?time?before?the?expiration?of?that?term.?(??1203.3.)?This?power?to?modify?includes?the?power?to?extend?the?probationary?term.?(Ex?Parte?Sizelove?(1910)?158?Cal.?493,?494?[111?P.?527].)?Pursuant?to?section?1203.2,?subdivision?(b)?(hereafter?section?1203.2(b)),?a?court,?on?sufficient?notice?to?the?probationer,?may?”modify,?revoke,?or?terminate?the?probation?of?the?probationer?upon?the?grounds?set?forth?in?[section?1203.2,]?subdivision?(a)?if?the?interests?of?justice?so?require.”?(Italics?added.)?Section?1203.2,?subdivision?(a)?(hereafter?section?1203.2(a)),?provides?that?a?court?”may?revoke?and?terminate?such?probation?if?the?interests?of?justice?so?require?and?the?court,?in?its?judgment,?has?reason?to?believe?from?the?report?of?the?probation?officer?or?otherwise?that?the?person?has?violated?any?of?the?conditions?of?his?or?her?probation,?has?become?abandoned?to?improper?associates?or?a?vicious?life,?or?has?subsequently?committed?other?offenses,?regardless?whether?he?or?she?has?been?prosecuted?for?such?offenses.?However,?probation?shall?not?be?revoked?for?failure?of?a?person?to?make?restitution?…?unless?the?court?determines?that?the?defendant?has?willfully?failed?to?pay?and?has?the?ability?to?pay.” A?change?in?circumstances?is?required?before?a?court?has?jurisdiction?to?extend?or?otherwise?modify?probation.?As?we?held?in?In?re?Clark?(1959)?51?Cal.2d?838?[337?P.2d?67],?”An?order?modifying?the?terms?of?probation?based?upon?the?same?facts?as?the?original?order?granting?probation?is?in?excess?of?the?jurisdiction?of?the?court,?for?the?reason?that?there?is?no?factual?basis?to?support?it.”?(Id.?at?p.?840,?italics?added.)?In?this?case,?the?Court?of?Appeal?correctly?determined?that?a?change?in?circumstance?could?be?found?in?a?fact?”not?available?at?the?time?of?the?original?order,”?namely,?”that?setting?the?pay?schedule?consistent?with?defendant’s?ability?to?pay?had?resulted?in?defendant’s?inability?to?pay?full?restitution?as?contemplated?within?the?original?period?of?probation.” Defendant?initially?argues?that?”modification?of?probation?as?authorized?in?[section?1203.2(b)]?is?perfectly?congruent?with?the?power?of?revocation?set?[54?Cal.3d?1096]?forth?in?[section?1203.2(a)].”?Thus,?he?suggests?that?because?section?1203.2(a)?prohibits?revoking?probation?for?nonwillful?failure?to?pay?restitution,?modification?under?section?1203.2(b)?for?such?failure?to?pay?restitution?is?also?prohibited.?He?also?contends?that?the?trial?court?may?modify?probation?only?if?there?is?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation.?For?the?reasons?discussed?below,?we?reject?both?assertions.?A.?Court’s?Power?to?Modify?Probation?for?Nonwillful?Failure?to?Pay?Restitution [2]?Defendant?relies?on?People?v.?Ryan,?supra,?203?Cal.App.3d?189,?to?support?his?argument?that?the?statutory?limitation?on?the?court’s?power?to?revoke?probation?for?failure?to?pay?restitution?likewise?limits?the?court’s?power?to?modify?probation.?In?Ryan?the?court?said,?”The?period?of?probation?may?not?be?extended?for?failure?to?make?full?restitution?to?the?victim?unless?said?failure?is?willful?and?the?defendant?has?the?ability?to?pay.”?(Id.?at?p.?199.) In?light?of?the?legislative?history?of?the?provision?in?section?1203.2(a),?which?bars?revocation?for?nonwillful?failure?to?pay?restitution,?we?reject?the?Ryan?court’s?conclusion.?On?June?30,?1983,?this?provision?was?added?to?the?Senate?version?of?the?bill?that?eventually?became?section?1203.2.?(3?Sen.?J.?(1983-1984?Reg.?Sess.)?p.?4288.)?One?month?earlier,?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?decided?Bearden?v.?Georgia?(1982)?461?U.S.?660?[76?L.Ed.2d?221,?103?S.Ct.?2064]?(hereafter?Bearden).?In?Bearden,?the?high?court?held?that?in?probation?revocation?proceedings?based?on?failure?to?pay?a?fine?or?restitution,?a?sentencing?court?must?”inquire?into?the?reasons?for?the?failure?to?pay.”?(Id.?at?p.?672?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?233].)?”If?the?probationer?has?willfully?refused?to?pay?the?fine?or?restitution?when?he?has?the?means?to?pay,?the?State?is?perfectly?justified?in?using?imprisonment?as?a?sanction?to?enforce?collection.”?(Id.?at?p.?668?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?230],?italics?added.)?This?language?closely?resembles?that?employed?by?the?Legislature?for?the?first?time?in?section?1203.2(a)?when?it?stated?that?probation?could?not?be?revoked?unless?”the?court?determines?that?the?defendant?has?willfully?failed?to?pay?and?has?the?ability?to?pay.”?(Italics?added.)?Because?of?the?temporal?and?linguistic?nexus?linking?the?decision?in?Bearden?with?the?Senate?amendment,?it?appears?the?Legislature?sought?to?codify?the?Bearden?holding. The?Bearden?court?also?stated,?”If?the?probationer?could?not?pay?despite?sufficient?bona?fide?efforts?…?the?court?must?consider?…?measures?of?punishment”?other?than?imprisonment.?(Bearden,?supra,?461?U.S.?at?p.?672?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?252].)?Only?if?such?alternative?measures?are?inadequate?to?meet?a?state’s?interests?in?punishment?may?the?court?imprison?a?probationer?who?has?made?bona?fide?efforts?to?pay.?The?court?reasoned?that?”To?do?[54?Cal.3d?1097]?otherwise?would?deprive?the?probationer?of?his?conditional?freedom?simply?because,?through?no?fault?of?his?own,?he?cannot?pay?the?fine.?Such?a?deprivation?would?be?contrary?to?the?fundamental?fairness?required?by?the?Fourteenth?Amendment.”?(Id.?at?pp.?672-673?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?233];?see?also?In?re?Antazo?(1970)?3?Cal.3d?100,?116?[89?Cal.Rptr.?255,?473?P.2d?999]?[absent?compelling?state?interest,?imprisoning?indigent?defendant?for?failing?to?pay?fine?violates?equal?protection?clause?of?Fourteenth?Amendment].) As?the?Supreme?Court?noted?in?Bearden,?a?state?”?’is?not?powerless?to?enforce?judgments?against?those?financially?unable?to?pay?a?fine.’?For?example,?the?sentencing?court?could?extend?the?time?for?making?payments,?or?reduce?the?fine,?or?direct?that?the?probationer?perform?some?form?of?labor?or?public?service?in?lieu?of?the?fine.”?(Bearden,?supra,?461?U.S.?at?p.?672?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?232],?quoting?Tate?v.?Short?(1971)?401?U.S.?395,?399?[28?L.Ed.2d?130,?134,?91?S.Ct.?668],?italics?added.)?The?court?thus?contemplated?that?an?indigent’s?probation?might?be?extended?if?he?failed?to?pay?as?required?because?he?was?financially?unable?to?do?so.?(United?States?v.?Ortiz?(10th?Cir.?1984)?733?F.2d?1416,?1418.)?The?Legislature,?in?codifying?Bearden,?indicated?no?disagreement?with?this?aspect?of?the?decision.?We?think?it?reasonable?to?conclude?that?the?Legislature?intended?trial?courts?to?have?the?option?to?do?as?Bearden?suggested?and,?in?appropriate?cases,?extend?or?otherwise?modify?probation. Additionally,?common?sense?and?the?policies?behind?our?system?of?probation?buttress?this?conclusion.?Conditions?are?imposed?on?probation?”to?the?end?that?justice?may?be?done,?that?amends?may?be?made?to?society?for?the?breach?of?the?law,?for?any?injury?done?to?any?person?resulting?from?that?breach,?and?generally?and?specifically?for?the?reformation?and?rehabilitation?of?the?probationer?….”?(??1203.1.)?Restitution?”may?serve?the?salutary?purpose?of?making?a?criminal?understand?that?he?has?harmed?not?merely?society?in?the?abstract?but?also?individual?human?beings,?and?that?he?has?a?responsibility?to?make?them?whole.”?(People?v.?Richards?(1976)17?Cal.3d?614,?620?[131?Cal.Rptr.?537,?552?P.2d?97].)?Thus,?aside?from?making?the?victim?whole,?restitution?serves?valid?punitive,?deterrent,?and?rehabilitative?objectives?by?requiring?the?defendant?to?return?his?ill-gotten?gains?and?helping?him?appreciate?the?harm?done?to?the?victim.?(See?Cohen?&?Gobert,?The?Law?of?Probation?and?Parole?(1983)???6.33,?p.?280.)?Allowing?modification?of?probation?to?facilitate?the?recovery?of?restitution?as?originally?contemplated?by?the?court?enables?the?court?to?fashion?a?remedy?that?best?serves?the?goals?of?probation. Accordingly,?section?1203.2(a)?does?not?prohibit?a?court?from?extending?a?term?of?probation?when?the?probationer?fails?to?pay?restitution?as?ordered?because?of?an?inability?to?pay.?[54?Cal.3d?1098]?B.?Court’s?Power?to?Modify?Probation?Without?a?Prior?Violation?Thereof [3]?Defendant?argues?that?section?1203.1?provides?for?modification?of?probation?only?if?there?has?been?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation,?that?he?did?not?violate?probation,?and?that?his?probation,?therefore,?could?not?be?modified.?Defendant?relies?on?In?re?Stallings?(1970)?5?Cal.App.3d?322?[85?Cal.Rptr.?96],?which?concluded?the?trial?court?in?that?case?”lacked?the?authority?to?extend?the?period?of?probation?without?a?finding?that?the?petitioner?had?violated?a?condition?of?probation.”?(Id.?at?p.?333.)?Defendant?rejects?the?notion?that?other?bases?for?modifying?probation?exist?and?urges?us?to?disapprove?cases?that?hold?to?the?contrary.?We?decline?to?do?so. Section?1203.1?provides,?”should?the?probationer?violate?any?of?the?terms?or?conditions?imposed?by?the?court?in?the?matter,?it?shall?have?authority?to?modify?and?change?any?and?all?such?terms?and?conditions?….”?The?statute?thus?vests?the?court?with?jurisdiction?to?modify?probation?if?there?is?a?violation?thereof.?Defendant?draws?from?this?the?conclusion?that?a?court?may?modify?probation?only?if?there?is?a?violation.?His?assertion?fails,?however,?because?it?does?not?take?into?consideration?other?statutes?governing?modification?and?the?statutory?scheme?governing?probation?in?general. Two?other?statutes?are?relevant.?The?first?is?section?1203.3,?which?states,?”The?court?shall?have?authority?at?any?time?during?the?term?of?probation?to?revoke,?modify,?or?change?its?order?of?suspension?of?imposition?or?execution?of?sentence.”?Next,?as?discussed?above,?section?1203.2(b)?provides?that?a?court?may?modify?probation?on?the?grounds?listed?in?section?1203.2(a),?which?in?turn?provides?for?revocation?in?certain?circumstances?including,?among?others,?a?violation?of?probation. In?our?view,?based?on?the?foregoing?statutes?and?in?light?of?the?purposes?of?probation?(??1203.1),?the?sentencing?court?need?not?await?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation?before?it?may?modify?the?conditions?of?probation.?As?one?commentator?has?explained,?permitting?modification?even?absent?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation?is?often?consistent?with?the?flexibility?necessary?to?achieve?the?rehabilitative?goals?of?probation:?”[R]equiring?a?court?or?parole?board?to?await?a?violation?of?a?condition?may?be?disadvantageous?to?the?probationer?or?parolee.?After?a?violation?has?occurred?the?respective?authorities?may?be?disinclined?to?do?anything?other?than?revoke,?although?they?might?have?been?receptive?to?modification?prior?to?the?actual?commission?of?the?violation.?Allowing?modification?even?absent?a?violation?of?a?release?condition?may?therefore?be?in?the?long-term?interest?of?the?parolee?or?probationer.”?(Cohen?&?Gobert,?The?Law?of?Probation?and?Parole,?[54?Cal.3d?1099]?supra,???7.05,?at?p.?360.)?Our?courts?have?taken?this?approach?in?a?variety?of?circumstances. For?example,?in?In?re?Peeler?(1968)?266?Cal.App.2d?483?[72?Cal.Rptr.?254],?the?Court?of?Appeal?denied?a?petition?for?a?writ?of?habeas?corpus?and?rejected?the?assertion,?also?made?here,?that?probation?may?be?modified?only?if?there?were?a?violation?of?a?condition?of?probation.?After?pleading?guilty?to?possessing?marijuana,?the?petitioner?in?Peeler?was?placed?on?probation,?conditioned?on?serving?30?days?in?jail?and?thereafter?not?associating?with?known?users?of?marijuana?or?dangerous?drugs.?After?serving?the?jail?term,?the?petitioner?moved?to?eliminate?certain?conditions?of?probation.?At?the?hearing?on?the?motion,?the?court?learned?for?the?first?time?that?the?petitioner’s?husband?was?charged?with?narcotics?violations.?The?court?considered?revoking?probation,?but?instead?modified?it?to?include?an?additional?60?days?in?jail?and?a?bar?against?associating?with?”reputed”?drug?users. The?petitioner?unsuccessfully?challenged?the?latter?modification.?The?Court?of?Appeal?stated,?”Read?as?a?whole?we?do?not?construe?either?the?Penal?Code?sections?covering?probation?or?the?cases?…?construing?those?sections?to?limit?the?power?of?the?court?to?modify?conditions?of?probation?to?cases?in?which?there?has?been?…?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation?by?the?probationer?thereafter.?…?[?]?…?We?have?no?doubt?whatever?that?the?facts?before?the?court?justified?the?imposition?of?the?new?conditions?of?probation?….”?(In?re?Peeler,?supra,?266?Cal.App.2d?at?pp.?490-491.) In?People?v.?Miller?(1967)?256?Cal.App.2d?348?[64?Cal.Rptr.?20],?the?defendant?was?placed?on?three?years’?probation?on?condition?that?he?make?restitution?as?directed?by?his?probation?officer.?Before?probation?ended,?the?probation?officer?concluded?that?the?victim’s?monetary?loss?was?greater?than?originally?thought?and?that?other?creditors?existed?because?the?defendant?had?breached?other?contracts?arising?out?of?the?same?business?used?to?commit?the?charged?offense.?The?sentencing?court?informally?ordered?that?the?restitution?payments?be?allocated?among?the?victim?and?the?other?creditors.?The?defendant?continued?to?make?the?monthly?payments.?Subsequently,?the?probation?department?applied?for?and?the?trial?court?granted?an?extension?of?probation?to?facilitate?full?payment?to?the?victim?and?the?other?creditors.?The?Court?of?Appeal?concluded?the?increased?amount?of?restitution?to?the?victim?was?not?a?modification?because?the?probation?department?was?operating?within?the?scope?of?the?original?order?in?determining?the?amount?due.?Requiring?restitution?to?the?other?creditors?was?a?modification,?but?the?court?concluded?it?was?appropriate?because?the?claims?arose?out?of?the?same?business?as?the?victim’s?claim.?The?court?thus?approved?a?modification?absent?a?violation?of?probation.?[54?Cal.3d?1100] In?1970,?the?Legislature?amended?section?1203.2?by?adding?subdivision?(b),?which?provides?that?a?court?may?modify?probation?on?the?grounds?listed?in?section?1203.2(a).?(Stats.?1970,?ch.?333,???1,?p.?729.)?Although?it?could?be?argued?that?the?Legislature,?by?amending?the?statute,?intended?to?overturn?the?interpretations?detailed?above?and?to?limit?the?court’s?power?to?modify?to?the?grounds?listed?in?section?1203.2(a),?we?find?no?direct?evidence?of?such?an?intent?in?the?available?legislative?history.?Instead?it?appears?the?Legislature?added?section?1203.2(b)?in?an?effort?to?improve?supervision?of?probationers?by?enabling?law?enforcement?officials?to?petition?for?revocation?or?modification.?Moreover,?the?language?used?in?section?1203.2(b)?does?not?indicate?an?intent?to?limit?the?court’s?power?to?modify.?We?also?note?that?the?Legislature?did?not?alter?section?1203.3,?which?broadly?states?the?court’s?power?to?modify. In?light?of?the?foregoing?analysis,?we?conclude?that?the?Legislature,?by?adding?subdivision?(b)?to?section?1203.2,?did?not?intend?to?alter?the?power?of?courts?to?modify?probation?absent?a?violation?of?the?conditions?of?probation.?To?the?extent?that?In?re?Stallings,?supra,?5?Cal.App.3d?322,?is?inconsistent?with?this?opinion,?it?is?disapproved. Defendant’s?Other?Arguments Defendant?argues?that?equal?protection?requires?that?his?restitution?be?fixed?by?a?county?financial?evaluation?officer?and?that?due?process?has?been?violated?because?of?the?vagueness?of?the?restitution?order?and?because?of?the?timing?of?the?modification.?He?also?argues?that?when?the?court?modified?his?probation?its?order?was?void?for?failing?to?set?the?amount?of?restitution?to?fit?his?ability?to?pay.?These?arguments?were?raised?for?the?first?time?in?defendant’s?opening?brief?on?the?merits?in?this?court.?[4]?As?a?matter?of?policy,?we?normally?will?not?consider?”any?issue?that?could?have?been?but?was?not?timely?raised?in?the?briefs?filed?in?the?Court?of?Appeal.”?(Cal.?Rules?of?Court,?rule?29(b).)?In?his?briefs?in?the?Court?of?Appeal,?defendant?did?not?raise?the?issues?of?the?constitutionality?of?the?modification?and?the?validity?of?the?order?modifying?probation?to?require?higher?restitution.?We?therefore?do?not?address?them?now. III.?Disposition The?decision?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?affirming?the?modification?of?defendant’s?probation?is?affirmed. Panelli,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?Baxter,?J.,?and?George,?J.,?concurred.?[54?Cal.3d?1101] MOSK,?J. I?dissent. The?majority?acknowledge?that?”[a]?change?in?circumstances?is?required?before?a?court?has?jurisdiction?to?extend?or?otherwise?modify?probation.”?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?at?p.?1095.)?I?agree.?They?go?on?to?assert,?quoting?the?Court?of?Appeal,?that?such?a?change?in?circumstances?”could?be?found?in?a?fact?’not?available?at?the?time?of?the?original?order,’?namely,?’that?setting?the?pay?schedule?consistent?with?defendant’s?ability?to?pay?had?resulted?in?defendant’s?inability?to?pay?full?restitution?as?contemplated?within?the?original?period?of?probation.’?”?(Ibid.)?Here?I?disagree. Information?on?defendant’s?economic?status?was?available?at?sentencing?and?cannot?be?considered?a?new?fact?merely?because?the?court?overlooked?it.?The?failure?of?full?restitution?cannot?be?attributed?to?any?default?on?defendant’s?part;?he?made?each?and?every?payment?required?by?the?pay?schedule.?The?court?should?have?considered?whether?setting?the?pay?schedule?consistent?with?defendant’s?income?would?allow?full?restitution?to?be?paid?in?the?probation?period. The?extension?of?a?probation?period?must?be?based?on?a?change?in?circumstances?relevant?to?the?defendant’s?ability?to?fulfill?the?terms?of?probation.?For?example,?in?People?v.?Miller?(1967)?256?Cal.App.2d?348,?354?[64?Cal.Rptr.?20],?the?court?extended?the?probation?period?to?allow?the?defendant?to?make?further?restitution?payments?after?it?learned?that?he?had?defrauded?additional?creditors.fn.?1?In?In?re?Peeler?(1968)?266?Cal.App.2d?483,?491?[72?Cal.Rptr.?254],?the?court?imposed?additional?conditions?on?the?defendant’s?probation?after?it?became?aware?that?she?was?married?to,?and?planned?to?live?with,?a?man?charged?with?narcotics?violations.?Finally,?in?In?re?Medina?(1983)?143?Cal.App.3d?562,?564?[191?Cal.Rptr.?783],?the?court?imposed?additional?conditions?of?probation?after?it?learned?that?the?defendant?committed?another?crime?while?free?on?bail,?pending?an?appeal?of?the?original?judgment?granting?him?probation. In?the?present?case,?there?is?no?change?in?circumstances?affecting?defendant’s?ability?to?make?restitution.?As?noted,?the?trial?court?did?not?consider?the?available?facts.?It?cannot?use?its?own?default?to?burden?a?defendant?who?has?faithfully?fulfilled?the?precise?terms?of?his?probation.?Accordingly,?its?extension?[54?Cal.3d?1102]?of?defendant’s?term?of?probation?is?improper.?Although?a?change?in?circumstances?can?be?found?in?many?situations,?I?cannot?find?it?here. For?these?reasons,?I?would?reverse?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal. Kennard,?J.,?concurred. FN?1.?During?the?sentencing?hearing,?the?deputy?district?attorney?commented?on?defendant’s?conduct?in?the?charged?offense?and?in?an?uncharged?offense.?The?court?then?said,?”$12,000?,”?to?which?the?probation?officer?responded,?”Dr.?Slaughter.”?When?the?court?sentenced?defendant,?it?ordered?him?to?pay?restitution?and?noted,?”it?looks?like?we?do?have?a?figure?concerning?Dr.?Slaughter.?We?don’t?have?one?as?to?the?other?individual.?But?it?would?be?the?total?actual?loss?to?the?other?individual.” FN?2.?Because?the?maximum?term?of?incarceration?that?defendant?could?have?suffered?was?less?than?five?years?(??484b),?probation?could?not?extend?past?five?years?(??1203.1). FN?3.?One?month?earlier,?the?probation?department?had?filed?a?section?1203.3?petition?(revocation?or?modification?of?probation),?reporting?that?defendant?had?failed?to?pay?the?full?amount?of?restitution.?At?that?hearing?the?probation?officer?admitted?that?defendant?had?not?violated?the?conditions?of?probation.?”He’s?paid?every?cent?that?we’ve?asked?from?him.?In?the?probation?department?we?assumed,?maybe?falsely,?that?if?we?ordered?somebody?to?pay?a?certain?amount?and?they?paid?that?but?couldn’t?pay?off?full?restitution,?that?probation?would?be?extended.?But?now?we?find?that?we?couldn’t?have-we?wouldn’t?recommend?a?violation?at?probation?hearing?[sic]?in?this?case,?because?he?has?paid?everything?that?we’ve?asked,?according?to?his?ability?to?pay.”?The?court?allowed?the?probation?department?to?withdraw?the?petition?without?prejudice?to?filing?a?new?petition?if?the?department?concluded?defendant?was?in?violation?of?probation. FN?1.?In?People?v.?Richards?(1976)?17?Cal.3d?614,?622-623,?footnote?6?[131?Cal.Rptr.?537,?552?P.2d?97],?footnote?6,?we?questioned?the?Miller?court’s?order?of?modification?because?it?was?made?without?proof?that?the?defendant?breached?his?contracts?with?the?other?creditors?with?the?same?fraudulent?intent?that?formed?the?basis?of?his?original?theft?conviction.?The?issue?in?Richards?was?whether?a?restitution?order?served?a?rehabilitative?purpose.?The?opinion?did?not?call?into?question?the?requirement?that?a?modification?order?must?be?based?on?new?facts.    

Mitchell?v.?Gonzales?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?1041?,?1?Cal.Rptr.2d?913;?819?P.2d?872 [No.?S018678.?Dec?9,?1991.] JAMES?MITCHELL?et?al.,?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants,?v.?JOSE?L.?GONZALES?et?al.,?Defendants?and?Respondents. (Superior?Court?of?San?Bernardino?County,?No.?SCV?237329,?Don?A.?Turner,?Judge.fn.?*?) (Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?with?Mosk,?Panelli,?Arabian,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.) COUNSEL Edward?J.?Horowitz,?Greenberg?&?Panish?and?David?Greenberg?for?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants. Bodkin,?McCarthy,?Sargent?&?Smith?and?Richard?P.?Kinnan?for?Defendants?and?Respondents. Rogers,?Joseph,?O’Donnell?&?Quinn,?Joseph?W.?Rogers,?Susan?M.?Popik,?Richard?D.?Shively,?Thelen,?Marrin,?Johnson?&?Bridges,?Lee?A.?McCoy?and?Curtis?A.?Cole?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendants?and?Respondents. OPINION LUCAS,?C.?J. In?this?case?we?decide?whether?BAJI?No.?3.75,fn.?1?the?so-called?proximate?cause?instruction,?which?contains?a?”but?for”?test?of?cause?in?fact,?should?continue?to?be?given?in?this?state,?or?whether?it?should?be?disapproved?in?favor?of?BAJI?No.?3.76,?the?so-called?legal?cause?instruction,?which?employs?the?”substantial?factor”?test?of?cause?in?fact.fn.?2 Plaintiffs?James?and?Joyce?Mitchell,?the?parents?of?12-year-old?Damechie?Mitchell,?who?drowned?in?Lake?Gregory?on?July?4,?1985,?sued?defendants?Jose?L.?Gonzales,?Matilde?Gonzales,?and?Mrs.?Gonzales’s?son?Luis?(hereafter?defendants)?for?damages,?claiming?defendants’?negligence?caused?Damechie’s?death.?By?special?verdict,?the?jury?found?that?defendants?were?negligent,?i.e.,?they?had?breached?a?duty,?but?that?the?negligence?was?not?a?proximate?cause?of?the?death. The?Court?of?Appeal?concluded?that,?under?the?facts,?the?trial?court?erred?when?it?denied?plaintiffs’?request?to?instruct?the?jury?pursuant?to?BAJI?No.?[54?Cal.3d?1045]?3.76?and?instead?instructed?under?BAJI?No.?3.75.?After?reviewing?both?instructions,?the?Court?of?Appeal?concluded?that?BAJI?No.?3.75?is?potentially?misleading?and?should?not?have?been?given,?and?that?the?trial?court?committed?prejudicial?error?when?it?refused?to?give?BAJI?No.?3.76. We?granted?review?in?this?case?to?determine?whether?courts?should?continue?to?instruct?juries?on?cause?in?fact?using?BAJI?No.?3.75?in?light?of?the?frequent?criticism?of?that?instruction.?We?conclude?that?the?Court?of?Appeal?was?correct?and?that?BAJI?No.?3.75?should?be?disapproved. Facts Damechie,?12?years?old,?standing?4?feet?11?inches?tall,?and?weighing?90?pounds,?had?a?tag-along?little-brother?relationship?with?his?friend?Luis,?who?was?14?years?old,?5?feet?4?inches?tall,?and?weighed?190?pounds.?The?Gonzales?invited?Damechie?to?accompany?them?to?Lake?Gregory?for?the?Fourth?of?July.?According?to?Mrs.?Mitchell’s?testimony,?when?Mrs.?Gonzales?called?her?to?ask?whether?Damechie?could?accompany?them,?she?informed?Mrs.?Gonzales?that?Damechie?could?not?swim.?After?Mrs.?Gonzales?suggested?that?the?boys?would?play?in?the?shallow?edge?of?the?lake,?the?Mitchells?agreed?that?Damechie?could?go,?as?long?as?he?was?restricted?to?the?edge?of?the?lake. Mrs.?Gonzales?denied?that?she?had?told?Mrs.?Mitchell?the?children?would?be?swimming?or?that?Mrs.?Mitchell?had?told?her?Damechie?could?not?swim. According?to?Mrs.?Mitchell,?while?Damechie?was?packing,?he,?Luis,?and?Luis’s?sister,?Yoshi,?talked?about?swimming.?Mrs.?Mitchell?told?the?children?Damechie?could?not?swim?and?should?not?go?swimming.?Luis?and?Yoshi?said?they?would?watch?Damechie. Luis?testified?that?Mrs.?Mitchell?did?not?tell?him?that?Damechie?could?not?swim.?He?did?remember?telling?her?they?were?going?swimming,?but?he?did?not?remember?what?she?said?about?it.?He?also?remembered?that?Mrs.?Mitchell?told?him?to?watch?out?for?Damechie?because?Luis?was?bigger?and?older?than?Damechie. At?the?lake,?the?Gonzales?family?was?joined?by?Mr.?and?Mrs.?Reyes?and?their?young?children.?Luis?asked?his?parents?for?money?to?rent?a?paddleboard.?Mrs.?Gonzales?told?him,?as?she?always?did,?not?to?go?into?water?over?his?head.?Both?Luis?and?Yoshi?knew?how?to?swim. The?three?children?rented?two?paddleboards,?replying?affirmatively?when?asked?by?the?employee?in?charge?of?rentals?whether?they?knew?how?to?swim.?[54?Cal.3d?1046]?During?the?morning,?the?children?stayed?within?30?feet?of?shore,?in?water?that?was?not?over?their?heads.?Mr.?and?Mrs.?Gonzales?admittedly?did?not?watch?the?children?during?some?of?the?time?the?children?were?in?the?water. Mrs.?Gonzales?testified?that?had?she?known?the?children?were?going?into?deep?water,?she?probably?would?not?have?allowed?it?because?she?believed?it?would?be?dangerous.?Apparently,?because?of?her?vantage?point,?it?was?difficult?for?her?to?watch?the?children?in?the?water,?and?there?was?a?long?period?when?she?did?not?have?them?in?sight.?She?assumed?Luis?would?obey?her,?although?she?acknowledged?that?he?had?disobeyed?her?on?other?occasions. Mr.?Gonzales?testified?that?he?relied?on?the?lifeguards?to?watch?the?children?and?that?he?neither?knew?nor?asked?whether?Damechie?could?swim. After?lunch,?Mrs.?Gonzales?told?the?children?not?to?leave?the?picnic?area?and?went?to?the?restroom.?Nevertheless,?the?children?left?and?rented?another?paddleboard.?When?she?returned?to?the?picnic?site?15?minutes?later,?the?children?were?gone?and?Mr.?Gonzales?was?asleep.?She?did?not?know?where?they?had?gone,?nor?did?she?ask?Mr.?Reyes,?who?was?awake?and?at?the?site,?of?their?whereabouts. The?children?had?entered?the?water?and,?on?their?paddleboard,?crossed?the?lake.?When?Luis?started?to?push?Damechie?and?Yoshi,?who?were?on?the?paddleboard,?back?across?the?lake,?Damechie?told?Luis?he?could?not?swim. Luis,?nevertheless,?pushed?them?100?feet?out?onto?the?lake,?into?water?over?their?heads.?He?then?told?Damechie?to?let?him?get?on?the?paddleboard?because?he?was?tired.?Damechie?again?told?Luis?he?was?unable?to?swim?and?asked?him?to?be?careful.?Luis?promised?to?be?careful.?After?Luis?got?on?board,?Damechie?asked?Luis?whether?Luis?would?save?him?if?he?fell?off.?Luis?said?he?would?do?so. Shortly?before?the?accident,?the?children?were?five?to?ten?feet?from?three?women,?apparently?on?a?nearby?paddleboard,?who?testified?that?the?children?made?a?lot?of?noise?and?engaged?in?horseplay.?They?each?testified?that?Luis?was?the?rowdiest. One?of?the?women?testified?that?the?paddleboard?tipped?over?and?that?the?noise?and?roughhousing?stopped?for?five?to?ten?minutes.?Immediately?before?the?board?tipped?over,?Luis?was?on?the?center?of?the?board?and?Damechie?and?Yoshi?were?draped?over?it.?During?the?quiet?period,?neither?Luis?nor?Yoshi?called?or?gestured?for?help,?but?they?appeared?to?be?whispering.?[54?Cal.3d?1047] The?second?woman?testified?that?the?quiet?period?lasted?from?one?to?five?minutes,?during?which?time?she?glanced?over?and?saw?only?Luis?and?Yoshi.?She?did?not?hear?any?cries?for?help. The?third?woman?thought?three?minutes?of?quiet?elapsed?before?she?notice?only?two?children?where?there?had?previously?been?three.?She?never?heard?any?call?for?help. After?the?women?noticed?one?of?the?children?was?missing,?Luis?said,?”Lady,?my?friend’s?down?there,”?indicating?the?lake.?One?of?the?women?yelled?for?a?lifeguard?and?asked?Luis?why?he?had?not?signalled?for?help?sooner.?He?replied?that?neither?he?nor?his?sister?could?swim.?He?also?said?that?Damechie?had?grabbed?Luis?in?an?effort?to?save?himself?and?that?he,?Luis,?had?kicked?Damechie?to?get?him?off?and?to?avoid?being?pulled?under. Luis?testified?that?the?board?tipped?over?when?Damechie?put?his?hands?on?Luis’s?shoulder.?He?admitted?he?rocked?the?board?before?it?tipped?over?and?that?Damechie’s?movement?had?not?caused?the?board?to?tip.?The?employee?in?charge?of?the?paddleboard?rentals?testified?that?”You?have?to?work?at?it”?to?get?a?board?to?tip.?Yoshi?testified?that?the?board?tipped?when?Luis?attempted?to?climb?on. Luis?testified?that?Damechie?was?very?scared?while?the?board?was?rocking?and?that?he?asked?Luis?not?to?rock?the?board?because?he?did?not?want?to?fall?off.?Additionally,?Luis?admitted?that?at?the?time,?he?was?being?very?rowdy?and?that?when?he?tipped?the?board,?he?and?Damechie?fell?off.?Damechie?panicked?and?grabbed?Luis’s?shorts,?pulling?them?down.?Luis?pulled?them?up,?and?Damechie?grabbed?Luis’s?ankles.?Luis?shook?free?of?Damechie,?got?to?the?surface,?and?climbed?onto?the?board.?He?looked?into?the?water?and?could?see?Damechie’s?fingers,?which?he?tried?to?grab.?Yoshi?remained?on?the?board.?Luis?testified?inconsistently,?one?time?stating?that?he?waited?two?or?three?minutes?before?calling?a?lifeguard?and?another?time?stating?that?he?immediately?called?for?a?lifeguard. Later?that?day,?Luis?told?the?lifeguards?that?Damechie?had?rocked?the?board,?causing?it?to?flip.?He?asked?them?whether?he?and?his?family?would?be?sued.?Mrs.?Gonzales?asked?him,?”Why?didn’t?you?stay?where?I?told?you?to?stay?” Damechie’s?body?was?not?recovered?for?several?days?because?of?the?opacity?of?the?water?and?bottom?vegetation.?The?body?was?about?120?feet?from?shore?in?8?feet?of?water. The?Mitchells?sued?the?Gonzaleses,?including?Luis,?and?others?not?party?to?this?appeal.?The?complaint?alleged?causes?of?action?for?negligence?and?[54?Cal.3d?1048]?wrongful?death.?Defendants?asserted?comparative?negligence?on?the?part?of?Damechie?and?his?parents. As?noted?above,?the?court?refused?plaintiffs’?proffered?instruction?on?causation?in?fact?(i.e.,?BAJI?No.?3.76)?and?instead?gave?the?causation?in?fact?instruction?requested?by?defendants,?BAJI?No.?3.75. The?jury,?by?special?verdict,?concluded?that?defendants?were?negligent?but?that?the?negligence?was?not?a?cause?of?the?death.?The?jury?therefore?did?not?reach?a?special?verdict?on?comparative?negligence. The?trial?court?denied?plaintiffs’?motions?for?a?new?trial?or?a?judgment?notwithstanding?the?verdict.?The?Court?of?Appeal?reversed. Discussion As?explained?below,?we?conclude?the?Court?of?Appeal?correctly?determined?that?the?trial?court?prejudicially?erred?when?it?refused?BAJI?No.?3.76?and?instead?gave?BAJI?No.?3.75.?Our?discussion?proceeds?in?two?steps.?[1a]?We?begin?by?determining?whether?instructional?error?occurred.?Our?analysis?focuses?on?whether?conceptual?and?grammatical?flaws?in?BAJI?No.?3.75?may?confuse?jurors?and?lead?them?to?improperly?limit?their?findings?on?causation,?and?whether?BAJI?No.?3.76?is?a?superior?alternative?instruction.?[2a]?Because?we?find?error,?we?next?analyze?prejudice?and?conclude?that?there?is?a?reasonable?probability?that?BAJI?No.?3.75?misled?the?jurors?into?finding?that?defendants’?negligence?was?not?a?”proximate?cause”?of?Damechie’s?death?and?that?a?result?more?favorable?to?plaintiffs?would?have?occurred?if?the?jury?had?been?instructed?under?BAJI?No.?3.76.?Accordingly,?we?affirm?the?Court?of?Appeal’s?decision?reversing?the?judgment?of?the?trial?court. Alleged?Instructional?Error As?Dean?Prosser?observed?over?40?years?ago,?”Proximate?cause?remains?a?tangle?and?a?jungle,?a?palace?of?mirrors?and?a?maze?….”?Cases?”indicate?that?’proximate?cause’?covers?a?multitude?of?sins,?that?it?is?a?complex?term?of?highly?uncertain?meaning?under?which?other?rules,?doctrines?and?reasons?lie?buried?….”?(Prosser,?Proximate?Cause?in?California?(1950)?38?Cal.L.Rev.?369,?375.)?[54?Cal.3d?1049] [3]?One?of?the?concepts?included?in?the?term?proximate?cause?is?cause?in?fact,?also?referred?to?as?actual?cause.fn.?3?Indeed,?for?purposes?of?BAJI?No.?3.75,?”so?far?as?a?jury?is?concerned?’proximate?cause’?only?relates?to?causation?in?fact.”?(Com.?to?BAJI?No.?3.75,?italics?added.)fn.?4?”There?are?two?widely?recognized?tests?for?establishing?cause?in?fact.?The?’but?for’?or?’sine?qua?non’?rule,?unfortunately?labeled?’proximate?cause’?in?BAJI?No.?3.75,?asks?whether?the?injury?would?not?have?occurred?but?for?the?defendant’s?conduct.?The?other?test,?labeled?’legal?cause’?in?BAJI?No.?3.76,?asks?whether?the?defendant’s?conduct?was?a?substantial?factor?in?bringing?about?the?injury.”?(Maupin?v.?Widling?(1987)?192?Cal.App.3d?568,?574?[237?Cal.Rptr.?521].) BAJI?Nos.?3.75?and?3.76?are?alternative?instructions?that?should?not?jointly?be?given?in?a?single?lawsuit.?(See?Maupin?v.?Widling,?supra,?192?Cal.App.3d?568,?575-579?[error?to?give?both?BAJI?No.?3.79,?which?instructs?on?supervening?causes?in?substantial?factor?terms,?and?BAJI?No.?3.75].)?Several?Court?of?Appeal?opinions?have?discussed?the?propriety?of?giving?one?or?the?other?instruction?in?particular?circumstances.?It?has?generally?been?recognized?that?the?”but?for”?test?contained?in?BAJI?No.?3.75?should?not?be?used?when?two?”causes?concur?to?bring?about?an?event?and?either?one?of?them?operating?alone?could?have?been?sufficient?to?cause?the?result?(Thomsen?v.?Rexall?Drug?&?Chemical?Co.?[(1965)]?235?Cal.App.2d?775?[45?Cal.Rptr.?642]).?In?those?few?situations,?where?there?are?concurrent?[independent]?causes,?our?law?provides?one?cannot?escape?responsibility?for?his?negligence?on?the?ground?that?identical?harm?would?have?occurred?without?it.?The?proper?rule?for?such?situations?is?that?the?defendant’s?conduct?is?a?cause?of?the?event?because?it?is?a?material?element?and?a?substantial?factor?in?bringing?it?about.”?(Vecchione?v.?Carlin?(1980)?111?Cal.App.3d?351,?359?[168?Cal.Rptr.?571];?see?also?Hart?v.?Browne?(1980)?103?Cal.App.3d?947,?960-962?[163?Cal.Rptr.?356];?Fraijo?v.?Hartland?Hospital?(1979)?99?Cal.App.3d?331,?346-347?[160?Cal.Rptr.?246];?Prosser?&?Keeton?on?Torts?(5th?ed.?1984)???41,?pp.?266-267;?BAJI?Nos.?3.75,?3.76?and?respective?comments.)?The?foregoing?authorities?conclude?that?in?such?a?situation?BAJI?No.?3.76?should?be?given. [1b]?This?case?presents?the?issue?of?whether?BAJI?No.?3.75?should?be?given?in?any?negligence?action.?[54?Cal.3d?1050] Criticism?of?the?term?”proximate?cause”?has?been?extensive.?Justice?Traynor?once?observed,?”In?all?probability?the?general?expectation?is?the?reasonable?one?that?in?time?courts?will?dispel?the?mists?that?have?settled?on?the?doctrine?of?proximate?cause?in?the?field?of?negligence.”?(Mosley?v.?Arden?Farms?Co.?(1945)?26?Cal.2d?213,?222?[157?P.2d?372,?158?A.L.R.?872]?(conc.?opn.?of?Traynor,?J.).)?Similarly,?while?serving?on?the?Court?of?Appeal,?Justice?Tobriner?commented,?”The?concept?of?proximate?causation?has?given?courts?and?commentators?consummate?difficulty?and?has?in?truth?defied?precise?definition.”?(State?Comp.?Ins.?Fund?v.?Ind.?Acc.?Com.?(1959)?176?Cal.App.2d?10,?20.) Nor?did?Prosser?and?Keeton?hide?their?dislike?for?the?term:?”The?word?’proximate’?is?a?legacy?of?Lord?Chancellor?Bacon,?who?in?his?time?committed?other?sins.?The?word?means?nothing?more?than?near?or?immediate;?and?when?it?was?first?taken?up?by?the?courts?it?had?connotations?of?proximity?in?time?and?space?which?have?long?since?disappeared.?It?is?an?unfortunate?word,?which?places?an?entirely?wrong?emphasis?upon?the?factor?of?physical?or?mechanical?closeness.”?(Prosser?&?Keeton?on?Torts,?supra,???42,?at?p.?273,?fn.?omitted.) It?is?reasonably?likely?that?when?jurors?hear?the?term?”proximate?cause”?they?may?misunderstand?its?meaning?or?improperly?limit?their?discussion?of?what?constitutes?a?cause?in?fact.?Prosser?and?Keeton’s?concern?that?the?word?”proximate”?improperly?imputes?a?spatial?or?temporal?connotation?is?well?founded.?Webster’s?Third?New?International?Dictionary?(1981)?page?1828,?defines?proximate?as?”very?near,”?”next,”?”immediately?preceding?or?following.”?Yet,?”[p]roximity?in?point?of?time?or?space?is?no?part?of?the?definition?[of?proximate?cause]?…?except?as?it?may?afford?evidence?for?or?against?proximity?of?causation.?[Citation.]”?(Osborn?v.?City?of?Whittier?(1951)?103?Cal.App.2d?609,?616?[230?P.2d?132].) Given?the?foregoing?criticism,?it?is?not?surprising?that?a?jury?instruction?incorporating?the?term?”proximate?cause”?would?come?under?attack?from?courts,?litigants,?and?commentators.?In?considering?a?predecessor?to?BAJI?No.?3.75?that?included?language?almost?identical?to?the?current?instruction,fn.?5?Prosser?observed,?”There?are?probably?few?judges?who?would?undertake?to?say?just?what?this?means,?and?fewer?still?who?would?expect?it?to?mean?anything?whatever?to?a?jury.?The?first?sentence?was?lifted?by?a?California?[54?Cal.3d?1051]?opinion?long?since?from?Shearman?and?Redfield?on?Negligence,?a?text?written?for?lawyers?and?not?expected?to?be?comprehensible?to?laymen,?and?none?too?good?a?text?at?that.”?(Prosser,?Proximate?Cause?in?California,?supra,?38?Cal.L.Rev.?369,?424,?fn.?omitted.) The?misunderstanding?engendered?by?the?term?”proximate?cause”?has?been?documented.fn.?6?In?a?scholarly?study?of?14?jury?instructions,?BAJI?No.?3.75?produced?proportionally?the?most?misunderstanding?among?laypersons.?(Charrow,?Making?Legal?Language?Understandable:?A?Psycholinguistic?Study?of?Jury?Instructions?(1979)?79?Colum.L.Rev.?1306,?1353?(hereafter?Psycholinguistic?Study).)?The?study?noted?two?significant?problems?with?BAJI?No.?3.75.?First,?because?the?phrase?”natural?and?continuous?sequence”?precedes?”the?verb?it?is?intended?to?modify,?the?construction?leaves?the?listener?with?the?impression?that?the?cause?itself?is?in?a?natural?and?continuous?sequence.?Inasmuch?as?a?single?’cause’?cannot?be?in?a?continuous?sequence,?the?listener?is?befuddled.”?(Psycholinguistic?Study,?supra,?79?Colum.L.Rev.?at?p.?1323.)?Second,?in?one?experiment,?”the?term?’proximate?cause’?was?misunderstood?by?23%?of?the?subjects?….?They?interpreted?it?as?’approximate?cause,’?’estimated?cause,’?or?some?fabrication.”?(Id.,?at?p.?1353.) Our?Courts?of?Appeal?have?recognized?the?serious?problems?with?the?language?of?BAJI?No.?3.75.?In?Fraijo?v.?Hartland?Hospital,?supra,?99?Cal.App.3d?331,?the?court?criticized?the?instruction?because?it?appeared?to?place?an?undue?emphasis?on?”nearness.”?Nonetheless,?”despite?the?criticism?of?the?’but?for’?language?in?BAJI?No.?3.75,?the?most?recent?edition?of?California?Jury?Instructions?(Civil)?[citation]?…?allow[s]?the?trial?judge?to?exercise?a?discretion?in?selecting?his?preference?between?…?the?’proximate?cause’?instruction?found?in?BAJI?No.?3.75,?or?the?’legal?cause’?instruction?found?in?BAJI?No.?3.76.”?(Id.,?at?p.?346.) The?Fraijo?court?said,?”We?agree?that?BAJI?No.?3.75-the?proximate?cause?instruction-is?far?from?constituting?a?model?of?clarity?in?informing?a?jury?as?to?what?is?meant?by?proximate?causation.?…?Nevertheless,?in?view?of?its?long?history?of?being?considered?a?correct?statement?of?the?law?by?the?courts?of?this?state,?we?are?not?inclined?to?hold?that?BAJI?No.?3.75?is?an?erroneous?instruction.?Although?we?believe?such?a?determination?should?be?made,?we?[54?Cal.3d?1052]?consider?that?the?determination?ought?to?be?made?by?our?Supreme?Court?and?not?by?an?intermediate?reviewing?court.”?(Fraijo?v.?Hartland?Hospital,?supra,?99?Cal.App.3d?331,?347;?see?also?Maupin?v.?Widling,?supra,?192?Cal.App.3d?568,?574?[“BAJI?No.?3.75?is?famous?for?causing?juror?confusion.?It?has?been?criticized?for?its?inexact?terminology?and?incorrect?sentence?structure.”];?John?B.?Gunn?Law?Corp.?v.?Maynard?(1987)?189?Cal.App.3d?1565,?1571?[235?Cal.Rptr.?180]?[instruction?misleading,?but?”it?has?never?been?held?error?in?California?to?instruct?in?terms?of?BAJI?No.?3.75?due?to?lack?of?intelligibility.”].) We?believe?the?foregoing?authorities?properly?criticize?BAJI?No.?3.75?for?being?conceptually?and?grammatically?deficient.?The?deficiencies?may?mislead?jurors,?causing?them,?if?they?can?glean?the?instruction’s?meaning?despite?the?grammatical?flaws,?to?focus?improperly?on?the?cause?that?is?spatially?or?temporally?closest?to?the?harm. […]

Whitman?v.?Superior?Court?(People)?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?1063?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?160;?820?P.2d?262 [No.?S018847.?Dec?9,?1991.] THOMAS?PAUL?WHITMAN,?Petitioner,?v.?THE?SUPERIOR?COURT?OF?SANTA?CLARA?COUNTY,?Respondent;?THE?PEOPLE,?Real?Party?in?Interest. (Superior?Court?of?Santa?Clara?County,?No.?141525,?Nathan?D.?Mihara,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?with?Panelli,?Arabian,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.?concurring?in?the?judgment.?Separate?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.) COUNSEL Stuart?Rappaport,?Public?Defender,?Susan?R.?Bernardini?and?Barbara?B.?Fargo,?Deputy?Public?Defenders,?for?Petitioner. Wilbur?F.?Littlefield,?Public?Defender?(Los?Angeles),?Laurence?M.?Sarnoff?and?Albert?J.?Menaster,?Deputy?Public?Defenders,?Gary?M.?Madinach?and?Madeline?McDowell?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Petitioner. No?Appearance?for?Respondent. Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorney?General,?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Clifford?K.?Thompson,?Jr.,?Laurence?K.?Sullivan?and?Joan?Killeen?Haller,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Real?Party?In?Interest. Dennis?Kottmeier,?District?Attorney?(San?Bernadino),?Joseph?A.?Burns,?Deputy?District?Attorney,?Kent?S.?Scheidegger?and?Charles?L.?Hobson?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Real?Party?in?Interest. OPINION LUCAS,?C.?J. In?this?case,?we?resolve?some?issues?presented?by?the?adoption?in?June?1990?of?an?initiative?measure?designated?on?the?ballot?as?Proposition?115?and?entitled?the?”Crime?Victims?Justice?Reform?Act.”?Petitioner?[54?Cal.3d?1068]?herein?raises?various?challenges?under?the?federal?and?state?Constitutions?to?the?provisions?of?the?measure?that?authorize?the?admission?of?hearsay?evidence?at?preliminary?hearings?in?criminal?cases.?(See?also?Izazaga?v.?Superior?Court,?ante,?p.?356?[285?Cal.Rptr.?231,?815?P.2d?304]?[challenge?to?reciprocal?discovery?provisions?of?Prop.?115];?Tapia?v.?Superior?Court?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?282?[279?Cal.Rptr.?592,?807?P.2d?434]?[challenge?to?retroactive?application?of?Prop.?115];?Raven?v.?Deukmejian?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?336?[276?Cal.Rptr.?326,?801?P.2d?1077]?[single-subject?and?revision?challenges?to?Prop.?115].)?He?also?contests?the?sufficiency?and?competency?of?the?evidence?presented?at?his?preliminary?hearing. As?will?appear,?we?conclude?that,?properly?construed?and?applied,?the?hearsay?provisions?of?Proposition?115?are?constitutionally?valid.?We?also?conclude,?however,?that?the?evidence?admitted?at?petitioner’s?preliminary?hearing,?consisting?entirely?of?hearsay?testimony?by?a?noninvestigating?officer?lacking?any?personal?knowledge?of?the?case,?was?insufficient?and?incompetent?to?constitute?probable?cause?to?bind?petitioner?over?for?trial,?and?that?his?motion?to?dismiss?the?charges?should?have?been?granted. Facts Petitioner?was?charged?with?one?felony?count?of?driving?under?the?influence?of?alcohol?and/or?drugs?with?three?or?more?prior?similar?convictions?(Veh.?Code,????23152,?subd.?(a),?23175),?one?felony?count?of?driving?with?a?blood-alcohol?level?of?0.08?percent?or?more?(id.,????23152,?subd.?(b),?23175),?as?well?as?misdemeanor?counts?of?driving?with?a?suspended?or?revoked?license?(id.,???14601.2,?subd.?(a)),?and?being?under?the?influence?of?methamphetamine?(Health?&?Saf.?Code,???11550).?These?offenses?were?alleged?to?have?occurred?on?August?8,?1990.?A?preliminary?hearing?was?held?on?September?19,?1990,?leading?to?the?filing?of?an?information?containing?these?charges. At?the?hearing,?the?People?called?only?a?single?witness,?Officer?Bruce?Alexander,?who?was?not?one?of?the?arresting?or?investigating?officers?and?who?had?no?direct,?personal?knowledge?of?petitioner’s?alleged?offenses.?Over?petitioner’s?continuing?objection?to?the?use?of?hearsay?evidence,?Alexander?attested?to?his?eight?years?of?employment?as?a?police?officer,?and?thereupon?recounted?to?the?magistrate?various?entries?made?in?the?report?of?the?investigating?officer,?Officer?Navin.?Alexander?confirmed?that?he?had?never?discussed?Navin’s?report?with?that?officer,?was?not?personally?acquainted?with?Navin,?and?first?became?aware?of?Navin’s?report,?and?of?the?case?against?petitioner,?on?the?morning?of?the?preliminary?hearing?after?the?district?attorney?handed?him?a?copy?of?Navin’s?report.?[54?Cal.3d?1069] In?response?to?the?prosecutor’s?questioning,?Alexander?indicated?that,?according?to?Navin’s?report,?on?August?8,?while?in?a?marked?patrol?car,?Navin?saw?a?1969?Chevrolet?traveling?eastbound?on?Cherry?Avenue.?Navin?heard?someone?shout?and?saw?the?driver?of?the?Chevrolet?lean?out?the?window?to?raise?his?right?fist.?Navin?watched?as?a?white?Ford?quickly?passed?the?Chevrolet.?Navin?paced?the?Chevrolet,?which?was?traveling?50?miles?per?hour?in?a?40?miles?per?hour?zone.?Navin?thereupon?made?a?traffic?stop. Alexander?further?testified?that,?according?to?Navin’s?report,?the?driver?of?the?car?identified?himself?as?Thomas?Paul?Whitman.?Among?other?things,?Navin?noticed?the?strong?odor?of?alcohol,?bloodshot?eyes,?and?dilated?pupils.?The?driver’s?mood?changed?from?passive?to?belligerent,?leading?Navin?to?believe?that?the?driver?might?be?under?the?influence?of?drugs.?Alexander?continued?his?”testimony,”?relating,?according?to?Navin,?that?the?driver?successfully?completed?the?finger-dexterity?test?and?balanced?on?one?foot,?but?swayed?when?asked?to?walk?a?straight?line.?Believing?the?driver?was?under?the?influence,?Navin?transported?him?to?the?station?where?a?blood?test?was?administered.?Counsel?stipulated?that?a?blood?test?revealed?a?blood-?alcohol?level?of?0.08?percent?and?was?positive?for?the?presence?of?methamphetamine. Thereupon,?Alexander?was?permitted?to?state?his?opinion,?based?solely?on?the?information?revealed?in?Navin’s?report,?that?petitioner?had?been?under?the?influence?of?alcohol?and?”perhaps?some?type?of?stimulant.” Defense?counsel?moved?to?strike?all?of?Alexander’s?direct?testimony?for?lack?of?proper?foundation?regarding?Navin’s?qualifications?as?a?police?officer.?The?magistrate?denied?the?motion,?after?permitting?Alexander?to?opine?that?because?Navin’s?badge?number?was?considerably?lower?than?his,?Navin?probably?had?12?years’?experience?as?a?police?officer. On?cross-examination,?Alexander?admitted?he?did?not?know?the?time?or?circumstances?of?the?preparation?of?Navin’s?report,?or?the?various?tests?conducted?to?determine?petitioner’s?sobriety.?Additionally,?Alexander?was?unable?to?explain?certain?discrepancies?and?omissions?in?the?report.?Counsel?elicited?the?fact?that?although?Navin’s?report?indicated?petitioner’s?eyes?were?brown,?in?fact?they?are?green. Despite?petitioner’s?objections?and?his?argument?that?Alexander?could?not?personally?identify?him?as?the?suspect?stopped?by?Navin,?the?magistrate?held?petitioner?to?answer?on?the?counts?charged.?The?magistrate?noted?that?the?description?of?petitioner?contained?in?Navin’s?report?closely?matched?the?description?in?the?records?of?the?Department?of?Motor?Vehicles,?which?was?also?placed?in?evidence.?[54?Cal.3d?1070] Thereafter,?petitioner?moved?the?superior?court?to?dismiss?the?information?(Pen.?Code,???995),?on?the?ground?that?the?evidence?elicited?at?the?preliminary?hearing?was?incompetent?and?insufficient?to?establish?probable?cause.?The?motion?was?denied,?and?the?Court?of?Appeal?summarily?denied?petitioner’s?application?for?mandate.?We?issued?an?alternative?writ?of?mandate?to?consider?the?important?constitutional?and?interpretive?questions?presented. Petitioner?raises?a?variety?of?arguments?regarding?the?admissibility,?and?constitutional?propriety,?of?Officer?Alexander’s?hearsay?testimony.?Before?we?consider?these?contentions,?we?first?review?the?new?constitutional?and?statutory?hearsay?provisions?added?by?Proposition?115. Constitutional?and?Statutory?Provisions Proposition?115?added?both?constitutional?and?statutory?language?pertinent?to?our?present?inquiry.?Section?30,?subdivision?(b),?is?added?to?article?I?of?the?state?Constitution,?declaring?hearsay?evidence?admissible?at?preliminary?hearings?in?criminal?cases,?as?may?be?provided?by?law.?(“In?order?to?protect?victims?and?witnesses?in?criminal?cases,?hearsay?evidence?shall?be?admissible?at?preliminary?hearings,?as?prescribed?by?the?Legislature?or?by?the?people?through?the?initiative?process.”) In?addition,?the?measure?amends?section?872,?subdivision?(b),?of?the?Penal?Code?to?provide?that?a?probable?cause?determination?at?a?preliminary?hearing?may?be?based?on?hearsay?statements?related?by?a?police?officer?with?certain?qualifications?and?experience.?(“Notwithstanding?Section?1200?of?the?Evidence?Code?[(the?hearsay?rule)],?the?finding?of?probable?cause?may?be?based?in?whole?or?in?part?upon?the?sworn?testimony?of?a?law?enforcement?officer?relating?the?statements?of?declarants?made?out?of?court?offered?for?the?truth?of?the?matter?asserted.?Any?law?enforcement?officer?testifying?as?to?hearsay?statements?shall?either?have?five?years?of?law?enforcement?experience?or?have?completed?a?training?course?certified?by?the?Commission?on?Peace?Officer?Standards?and?Training?which?includes?training?in?the?investigation?and?reporting?of?cases?and?testifying?at?preliminary?hearings.”) Additionally,?section?1203.1?is?added?to?the?Evidence?Code?to?provide?a?preliminary?hearing?exception?to?the?general?requirement?that?all?hearsay?declarants?be?made?available?for?cross-examination.?(“Section?1203?is?not?applicable?if?the?hearsay?statement?is?offered?at?a?preliminary?examination,?as?provided?in?Section?872?of?the?Penal?Code.”) Further,?Penal?Code?section?866,?subdivision?(a),?is?amended?to?give?the?magistrate?discretion?to?limit?the?defendant’s?right?to?call?witnesses?on?the?[54?Cal.3d?1071]?defendant’s?behalf.?(“The?magistrate?shall?not?permit?the?testimony?of?any?defense?witness?unless?the?offer?of?proof?discloses?to?the?satisfaction?of?the?magistrate,?in?his?or?her?discretion,?that?the?testimony?of?that?witness,?if?believed,?would?be?reasonably?likely?to?establish?an?affirmative?defense,?negate?an?element?of?a?crime?charged,?or?impeach?the?testimony?of?a?prosecution?witness?or?the?statement?of?a?declarant?testified?to?by?a?prosecution?witness.”) Finally,?Penal?code?section?866,?subdivision?(b),?explains?that?”It?is?the?purpose?of?a?preliminary?examination?to?establish?whether?there?exists?probable?cause?to?believe?that?the?defendant?has?committed?a?felony.?The?examination?shall?not?be?used?for?purposes?of?discovery.” We?note?that?our?discussion?herein?relates?solely?to?proceedings?initiated?by?complaint?and?information?rather?than?by?indictment,?because?under?Proposition?115,?”If?a?felony?is?prosecuted?by?indictment,?there?shall?be?no?postindictment?preliminary?hearing.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?I,???14.1.)?The?validity?of?this?provision?of?the?measure?is?presently?before?this?court?in?Bowens?v.?Superior?Court,?SO19774.fn.?* Discussion As?previously?indicated,?in?addition?to?contesting?the?sufficiency?of?the?evidence?elicited?at?the?preliminary?hearing,?petitioner?raises?various?constitutional?challenges?to?the?foregoing?provisions?of?Proposition?115.?He?argues?that?the?use?of?hearsay?testimony?without?confrontation?or?cross-?examination?of?the?declarants?violates?his?federal?Sixth?Amendment?right?to?confrontation,?his?Fourteenth?Amendment?right?to?due?process?of?law,?and?the?separation?of?powers?doctrine?of?article?III?of?the?state?Constitution.?In?addition,?he?asserts?Proposition?115?violates?the?single-subject?and?revision?provisions?(art.?II,???8,?subd.?(d),?&?art.?XVIII)?of?the?California?Constitution. In?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?336,?we?rejected?an?identical?single-subject?rule?challenge?to?Proposition?115.?We?also?rejected?a?revision?challenge?to?the?entire?measure,?invalidating?only?a?severable?provision?that?would?have?required?state?courts?to?interpret?certain?enumerated?state?constitutional?rights?consistently?with?the?federal?Constitution.?The?principles?expressed?in?Raven?adequately?dispose?of?petitioner’s?single-subject?rule?and?revision?challenges.?(See?52?Cal.3d?at?pp.?349-350.) [1a]?Before?discussing?the?merits?of?petitioner’s?various?remaining?constitutional?challenges,?we?first?turn?to?his?alternative?argument?to?the?effect?[54?Cal.3d?1072]?that,?as?an?interpretive?matter,?the?hearsay?provisions?of?Proposition?115?did?not?contemplate,?and?do?not?permit,?reliance?on?hearsay?of?the?kind?involved?in?this?case.?Thereafter,?we?address?petitioner’s?constitutional?arguments. Testimony?of?Noninvestigating?Officers?or?”Readers” [2]?As?an?initial?matter,?we?observe?that?”[t]he?fundamental?purpose?of?statutory?construction?is?to?ascertain?the?intent?of?the?lawmakers?so?as?to?effectuate?the?purpose?of?the?law.?[Citations.]?In?order?to?determine?this?intent,?we?begin?by?examining?the?language?of?the?statute.?[Citations.]?But?'[i]t?is?a?settled?principle?of?statutory?interpretation?that?language?of?a?statute?should?not?be?given?a?literal?meaning?if?doing?so?would?result?in?absurd?consequences?which?the?Legislature?did?not?intend.’?[Citations.]?Thus?'[t]he?intent?prevails?over?the?letter,?and?the?letter?will,?if?possible,?be?so?read?as?to?conform?to?the?spirit?of?the?act.’?[Citation.]”?(People?v.?Pieters?(1991)?52?Cal.3d?894,?898-899?[276?Cal.Rptr.?918,?802?P.2d?420].)?Similar?rules?would?govern?interpretation?of?measures?adopted?by?initiative.?(See?Amador?Valley?Joint?Union?High?Sch.?Dist.?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?208,?245?[149?Cal.Rptr.?239,?583?P.2d?1281].) [1b]?As?previously?noted,?Proposition?115?added?new?constitutional?and?statutory?language?relating?to?the?use?of?hearsay?evidence?at?preliminary?hearings.?The?constitutional?provision?(art.?I,???30,?subd.?(b))?states?that?”hearsay?evidence”?is?admissible?at?such?hearings,?as?provided?by?law.?An?amendment?to?Penal?Code?section?872,?subdivision?(b),?provides?that?a?probable?cause?finding?may?be?based?on?the?testimony?of?certain?qualified?law?enforcement?officers?relating?the?out-of-court?statements?of?”declarants.” Petitioner’s?primary?argument?is?that,?as?a?matter?of?sound?statutory?interpretation,?Officer?Alexander?should?not?have?been?permitted?to?relate?the?contents?of?Officer?Navin’s?investigative?report?because?Alexander?was?not?involved?in?the?investigation?of?the?case?and?had?no?personal?knowledge?of?the?circumstances?under?which?Navin’s?report?was?prepared.?We?agree.?Properly?construed,?Proposition?115?does?not?authorize?a?finding?of?probable?cause?based?on?the?testimony?of?a?noninvestigating?officer?or?”reader”?merely?reciting?the?police?report?of?an?investigating?officer.?We?believe?the?probable?intent?of?the?framers?of?the?measure?was?to?allow?a?properly?qualified?investigating?officer?to?relate?out-of-court?statements?by?crime?victims?or?witnesses,?including?other?law?enforcement?personnel,?without?requiring?the?victims’?or?witnesses’?presence?in?court.?The?testifying?officer,?however,?must?not?be?a?mere?reader?but?must?have?sufficient?knowledge?of?the?crime?or?the?circumstances?under?which?the?out-of-court?statement?was?[54?Cal.3d?1073]?made?so?as?to?meaningfully?assist?the?magistrate?in?assessing?the?reliability?of?the?statement. New?Penal?Code?section?872,?subdivision?(b),?by?its?terms?refers?to?”testimony?of?a?law?enforcement?officer?relating?the?statements?of?declarants?made?out?of?court?….”?(Italics?added.)?A?”declarant”?is?defined?by?Evidence?Code?section?135?as?”a?person?who?makes?a?statement.”?As?the?Legislative?Analyst?described?it?to?the?voters,?the?intent?underlying?this?provision?was?to?allow?introduction?of?”out-of-court?statements”?at?preliminary?hearings?if?those?statements?are?”introduced?through?the?testimony?of?certain?trained?and?experienced?law?enforcement?officers.”?(Ballot?Pamp.,?Proposed?Stats.?and?Amends.?to?Cal.?Const.?with?arguments?to?voters,?Primary?Elec.?(June?5,?1990)?p.?33.)?As?the?People?observe,?the?section?and?its?use?of?the?term?”declarants”?is?not?limited?to?the?statements?of?civilian?or?citizen?witnesses?but?would?include?the?statements?or?reports?of?any?persons,?including?other?law?enforcement?officers?such?as?Officer?Navin?herein. But?other?provisions?of?the?measure?convince?us?that?the?use?of?mere?”readers”?such?as?Officer?Alexander?was?not?contemplated?by?the?measure.?To?permit?testimony?by?noninvestigating?officers?that?merely?recites?the?contents?of?the?reports?of?the?investigating?officers?would?render?largely?meaningless?or?nugatory?the?new?statutory?provision,?also?added?by?Proposition?115,?that?requires?that?the?testifying?officer?have?at?least?five?years?of?law?enforcement?experience?or?have?completed?a?training?course?covering?the?”investigating?and?reporting”?of?criminal?cases.?(Pen.?Code,???872,?subd.?(b).)?This?provision?undoubtedly?was?intended?to?enhance?the?reliability?of?hearsay?testimony?at?preliminary?hearings.?Yet?such?reliability?is?not?furthered?if?the?only?testimonial?function?of?the?”qualified”?noninvestigating?officer?such?as?Officer?Alexander?is?to?parrot?information?contained?in?a?report?prepared?by?another?officer?who?may?lack?such?extensive?experience?or?training. As?petitioner?observes,?the?experience?and?training?requirements?of?Penal?Code?section?872,?subdivision?(b),?could?be?readily?circumvented?if?prosecutors?were?permitted?routinely?to?designate?the?same?”qualified”?officer?as?a?”reader”?of?the?reports?of?other?officers,?regardless?of?their?own?qualifications,?or?lack?thereof.?The?alternate?requirement?of?training?in?”investigating?and?reporting”?crimes?strongly?supports?petitioner’s?position?that?Proposition?115’s?hearsay?provisions?were?intended?to?foreclose?the?testimony?of?a?noninvestigating?officer?lacking?personal?knowledge?of?either?the?crime?or?the?circumstances?under?which?the?out-of-court?statements?were?made.?(See?generally,?Cowell,?When?Prelims?Turn?Pro?Forma?(Mar.?1991)?11?Cal.?Law.,?at?p.?104.)?[54?Cal.3d?1074] Thus,?in?permitting?only?officers?with?lengthy?experience?or?special?training?to?testify?regarding?out-of-court?statements,?Penal?Code?section?872,?subdivision?(b),?plainly?contemplates?that?the?testifying?officer?will?be?capable?of?using?his?or?her?experience?and?expertise?to?assess?the?circumstances?under?which?the?statement?is?made?and?to?accurately?describe?those?circumstances?to?the?magistrate?so?as?to?increase?the?reliability?of?the?underlying?evidence. Moreover,?to?allow?testimony?by?noninvestigating?officers?or?readers?would?seemingly?sanction?a?form?of?double?or?multiple?hearsay?beyond?the?contemplation?of?the?framers?of,?and?voters?for,?Proposition?115.?(See?Evid.?Code,???1201?[multiple?hearsay?admissible?only?if?each?hearsay?statement?admissible?under?hearsay?rule?exception].)?Although?such?multiple?hearsay?was?not?present?in?this?case,?we?doubt?that?Proposition?115?was?intended?to?sanction?a?procedure?whereby?a?noninvestigating?officer,?lacking?any?personal?knowledge?of?the?matter,?nonetheless?would?be?permitted?to?relate?not?only?what?the?investigating?officer?told?him?or?her,?but?also?what?the?other?witnesses?told?the?investigating?officer.?It?is?noteworthy?that?although?Proposition?115?created?an?exception?to?the?basic?hearsay?rule?contained?in?Evidence?Code?section?1200?(see?new?Pen.?Code,???872,?subd.?(b)),?the?measure?did?not?purport?to?create?a?similar?exception?for?the?multiple?hearsay?rule?of?Evidence?Code?section?1201. In?addition,?an?interpretation?of?Proposition?115?that?would?allow?”reader”?or?multiple?hearsay?testimony?would?raise?constitutional?questions?that?we?can?and?should?avoid?by?limiting?admissible?hearsay?testimony?to?testimony?by?qualified?investigative?officers.?(See,?e.g.,?People?v.?Smith?(1983)?34?Cal.3d?251,?259?[193?Cal.Rptr.?692,?667?P.2d?149]?[construing?Prop.?8,?”The?Victims’?Bill?of?Rights”?initiative?measure,?to?avoid?constitutional?doubts].)?As?discussed?below,?we?believe?that?the?latter,?more?limited,?form?of?hearsay?evidence?satisfies?federal?requirements?of?reliability?(see?Ohio?v.?Roberts?(1980)?448?U.S.?56,?63-65?[65?L.Ed.2d?597,?605-607,?100?S.Ct.?2531]),?and?thus?properly?may?be?admitted?at?preliminary?hearings?despite?the?defendant’s?inability?to?confront?and?cross-examine?the?declarant?witness?or?victim.?But?substantial?additional?objections?to?the?reliability?of?the?evidence?might?arise?if?multiple?hearsay?were?involved,?and?the?defendant?were?also?deprived?of?the?opportunity?to?meaningfully?cross-examine?the?testifying?officer?regarding?the?circumstances?under?which?the?out-of-court?statement?was?made. In?the?present?case,?for?example,?on?cross-examination,?Officer?Alexander?was?unable?to?answer?potentially?significant?questions?regarding?the?methods?and?circumstances?of?Officer?Navin’s?investigation,?including?the?time?the?report?was?written,?the?details?of?the?sobriety?test?given?petitioner,?and?[54?Cal.3d?1075]?petitioner’s?pupil?reaction?and?degree?of?dilation.?Indeed,?Alexander?was?even?uncertain?how?long?Navin?had?been?employed?on?the?force?or?even?whether?Navin?was?a?male?or?female?officer.?Similar?uncertainties?are?inherent?in?any?procedure?in?which?the?testifying?officer?acts?as?no?more?than?a?”reader”?of?another?officer’s?investigative?report. [3]?In?her?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion,?Justice?Kennard?suggests?that?the?term?”declarant”?in?section?872,?subdivision?(b)?should?be?interpreted?to?refer?only?to?”citizen”?declarants?and?not?to?police?officer?declarants.?The?statutory?language?contains?no?such?limitation,?however,?and?one?of?the?principal?purposes?of?Proposition?115-to?increase?the?efficient?administration?of?the?criminal?justice?system,?and,?in?particular,?to?streamline?the?preliminary?hearing?procedure?(see,?e.g.,?Prop.?115,????1,?subd.?(c),?16,?17,?18,?Primary?Elec.?(June?5,?1990)?[Deering’s?Ann.?Cal.?Const.?(1991?pocket?supp.)?note?foll.?art.?I,???14.1,?pp.?44-45;?Pen.?Code,????866,?871.6,?872])-strongly?supports?an?interpretation?of?the?provision?in?accordance?with?its?”plain?meaning,”?permitting?a?qualified?officer?to?testify?to?out-of-court?statements?by?fellow?officers?and?thereby?eliminating?the?need?for?the?separate?appearance?and?testimony?of?a?substantial?number?of?police?officers?at?preliminary?hearings.?Although?the?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion?suggests?that?its?proposed?interpretation?has?the?advantage?of?establishing?a?”bright?line”?test?that?the?court’s?opinion?lacks,?in?reality?the?suggested?interpretation?would?simply?narrow?the?class?of?persons?whose?out-of-court?statements?could?be?introduced,?but?would?still?require?a?further?standard?for?determining?the?required?relationship?between?the?testifying?officer?and?the?out-of-court?statement. [1c]?Thus,?we?conclude?that?the?magistrate?erred?in?allowing?Officer?Alexander?to?read?or?relate?portions?of?Officer?Navin’s?report,?and?that?such?error?requires?dismissal?of?the?information.?It?appears,?however,?that?the?People?will?be?entitled?to?refile?the?information?(see?Pen.?Code,???1387),?and?a?new?preliminary?hearing?may?be?held.?Accordingly,?for?purposes?of?guiding?the?lower?courts?during?any?such?further?proceedings,?we?will?consider?petitioner’s?alternative?contentions. Constitutional?Right?to?Confrontation In?the?foregoing?discussion,?we?construe?Proposition?115?to?allow?an?investigating?officer?to?relate?at?the?preliminary?hearing?any?relevant?statements?of?victims?or?witnesses,?if?the?testifying?officer?has?sufficient?knowledge?of?the?crime?or?the?circumstances?under?which?the?out-of-court?statement?was?made?so?as?to?meaningfully?assist?the?magistrate?in?assessing?the?reliability?of?the?statement.?The?new?measure?would?permit?the?magistrate?to?base?a?finding?of?probable?cause?entirely?on?that?testimony.?(Pen.?Code,?[54?Cal.3d?1076]???872,?subd.?(b).)?Petitioner?asserts?that?such?a?procedure?would?violate?his?state?and?federal?constitutional?rights?to?confront?his?accusers.?We?disagree. State?Confrontation?Clause Section?15?of?article?I?of?the?state?Constitution?guarantees?to?the?defendant?in?a?criminal?case?various?procedural?rights,?including?the?right?”to?be?confronted?with?the?witnesses?against?the?defendant.”?We?relied?on?that?provision?in?Mills?v.?Superior?Court?(1986)?42?Cal.3d?951,?956-960?[232?Cal.Rptr.?141,?728?P.2d?211],?to?invalidate?a?former?version?of?Penal?Code?section?872?that?deprived?defendants?of?certain?confrontation?and?cross-examination?rights?at?preliminary?hearings. Under?the?former?statute?at?issue?in?Mills?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?a?finding?of?probable?cause?could?be?based?on?the?hearsay?statements?of?a?witness?who?was?neither?an?eyewitness?nor?a?victim,?but?only?if?the?defendant?failed?to?make?reasonable?efforts?to?secure?the?presence?of?the?witness?at?the?preliminary?hearing.?We?grounded?our?decision?invalidating?the?statute?on?prior?California?cases?acknowledging?the?”critical?importance”?of?the?preliminary?hearing?as?a?mechanism?to?weed?out?groundless?claims.?As?we?stated,?”Only?by?preserving?the?adversarial?character?of?the?preliminary?hearing?can?we?enable?the?magistrate?responsibly?to?’weigh?the?evidence,?resolve?conflicts?and?give?or?withhold?credence?to?particular?witnesses.’?[Citations.]”?(42?Cal.3d?at?p.?957.)?We?concluded?that?the?challenged?statute,?by?requiring?a?defendant?to?expend?”reasonable?efforts”?to?secure?a?witness’s?presence?at?the?hearing,?”unduly?strains?defendant’s?rights?under?article?I,?section?15,?of?the?California?Constitution.”?(Id.?at?p.?958.) […]

People?v.?Ashmus?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?932?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?112;?820?P.2d?214 [No.?S004723. Dec?5,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?TROY?ADAM?ASHMUS,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?San?Mateo?County,?No.?C-?15661,?Alan?W.?Haverty,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Linda?F.?Robertson,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?and?Charles?Bush?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart?and?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Dane?R.?Gillette,?Herbert?F.?Wilkinson?and?Ronald?S.?Matthias,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION MOSK,?J. This?is?an?automatic?appeal?(Pen.?Code,???1239,?subd.?(b))?from?a?judgment?of?death?under?the?1978?death?penalty?law?(id.,???190?et?seq.). On?August?17,?1984,?the?District?Attorney?of?Sacramento?County?filed?an?information?against?defendant?Troy?Adam?Ashmus?in?the?superior?court?of?that?county. Count?I?charged?that?on?May?19,?1984,?defendant?murdered?Marcella?D.?in?violation?of?Penal?Code?section?187.?It?was?alleged?that?he?committed?the?[54?Cal.3d?952]?offense?under?the?following?special?circumstances:?(1)?felony?murder?in?the?course?of?rape?under?Penal?Code?section?261,?within?the?meaning?of?Penal?Code?section?190.2,?subdivision?(a)(17)(iii);?(2)?felony?murder?in?the?course?of?sodomy?under?Penal?Code?section?286,?within?the?meaning?of?Penal?Code?section?190.2,?subdivision?(a)(17)(iv);?and?(3)?felony?murder?in?the?course?of?a?lewd?or?lascivious?act?on?the?person?of?a?child?under?14?years?of?age?under?Penal?Code?section?288,?within?the?meaning?of?Penal?Code?section?190.2,?subdivision?(a)(17)(v).?Counts?II,?III,?and?IV?charged,?respectively,?that?on?that?same?date?defendant?engaged?in?rape,?sodomy,?and?lewd?or?lascivious?conduct?against?the?same?victim,?in?violation?of?the?statutory?provisions?cited?above-specifically,?as?to?rape,?former?subdivision?(2)?(current?subd.?(a)(2))?of?Penal?Code?section?261?(Stats.?1983,?ch.?949,???1,?p.?3416);?as?to?sodomy,?subdivision?(c)?of?Penal?Code?section?286;?and?as?to?lewd?or?lascivious?conduct,?subdivision?(b)?of?Penal?Code?section?288. Defendant?pleaded?not?guilty?to?the?charges?and?denied?the?special?circumstance?allegations.?On?his?motion,?the?court?subsequently?changed?venue?from?Sacramento?to?San?Mateo?County. Trial?was?by?jury.?The?jury?returned?verdicts?finding?defendant?guilty?as?charged,?determined?the?murder?to?be?of?the?first?degree,?and?found?all?the?special?circumstance?allegations?true.?It?subsequently?returned?a?verdict?of?death.?The?court?entered?judgment?accordingly,?sentencing?defendant?to?death?for?the?murder?and?to?full,?separate,?and?consecutive?middle?terms?of?six?years?in?prison?for?each?of?the?three?noncapital?offenses. As?we?shall?explain,?we?conclude?that?the?judgment?must?be?affirmed. Facts Guilt?Phase Most?of?the?basic?facts?relevant?here?were?essentially?undisputed?at?trial. About?4?o’clock?on?the?afternoon?of?Saturday,?May?19,?1984,?Marcella?(Marcie)?D.,?who?was?seven?years?of?age,?rode?to?Howe?Park?in?Sacramento?on?her?bicycle.?There?she?met?her?brother?Arby,?age?10,?who?was?responsible?for?her,?and?Arby’s?friend?Ernesto?(P.J.)?G.,?age?9.?Arby?and?P.J.?walked?to?a?pond?to?fish?from?a?dock,?and?Marcie?went?to?play?with?some?children?within?a?few?feet?of?the?boys. Defendant,?who?was?22?years?old,?approached?Arby?and?P.J.?as?they?were?fishing.?For?the?past?few?days?he?had?been?camping?in?an?area?in?adjacent?Santa?Anita?Park?called?Stoner’s?Pit,?a?site?that?was?filled?with?litter?but?also?[54?Cal.3d?953]?secluded?and?covered?with?vegetation.?He?gave?the?boys?advice?and?help?in?their?fishing,?and?stayed?nearby. About?5?or?5:30?p.m.,?Arby?and?P.J.?walked?to?the?park?clubhouse.?Marcie?soon?rode?up.?She?said?that?she?was?going?off?to?Santa?Anita?Park?with?defendant:?he?had?told?her?that?he?knew?of?a?duck’s?nest?there,?and?that?he?would?give?her?a?duckling?if?any?had?hatched.?The?boys?said?that?she?should?return?in?about?an?hour. Defendant?and?Marcie?proceeded?to?Stoner’s?Pit.?Once?there,?he?subjected?her?to?a?fatal?attack.?He?raped?her?and?perhaps?also?penetrated?her?with?some?foreign?object,?making?a?very?large?tear?through?the?length?of?her?vagina?to?within?a?quarter?of?an?inch?of?her?rectum.?He?sodomized?her,?inflicting?two?small?wounds?in?the?anal?or?rectal?tissue.?He?possibly?committed?oral?copulation?by?inserting?his?penis?into?her?mouth.?He?evidently?ejaculated?over?her?body.?He?stuffed?into?her?mouth?and?throat?material?including?two?plastic?bags,?a?piece?of?cellophane?about?six?inches?long?and?two?to?three?inches?wide,?and?a?pair?of?red?shorts?she?had?been?wearing;?the?bags?were?wedged?side-by-side?in?separate?tight?wads?deep?in?her?throat?with?the?cellophane?in?between;?the?shorts?were?tightly?compressed?within?her?mouth;?the?bags?obstructed?her?throat?and?caused?her?to?die?by?asphyxiation.?Covering?her?naked?body?with?a?carpet?remnant?he?had?used?for?a?sleeping?mat?during?his?stay?at?Stoner’s?Pit,?he?fled?the?scene. When?Marcie?did?not?return?as?she?had?been?told,?Arby?and?P.J.?became?concerned.?They?searched?without?success.?Arby?telephoned?his?father.?He?too?searched?without?success.?The?police?were?called?in.?About?8:30?p.m.,?a?neighborhood?man?who?was?assisting?the?officers?found?Marcie’s?body.?Within?a?few?hours,?defendant?was?arrested.?He?had?fresh?abrasions?on?at?least?one?of?his?hands.?It?does?not?appear?that?the?duck’s?nest?of?which?defendant?spoke?had?ever?existed. Although?most?of?the?basic?facts?were?essentially?undisputed,?one?was?strongly?contested:?intent?to?kill.?The?People?sought?to?prove?intent?by?evidence?including?the?manner?and?means?defendant?used?to?kill?Marcie.?By?contrast,?defendant,?who?took?the?stand?himself,?expressly?denied?intent.?In?his?testimony,?he?generally?confessed?his?culpability,?admitting?that?he?had?lied?in?extrajudicial?statements?to?the?police?and?others?in?which?he?attempted?to?avoid?responsibility?and?even?tried?to?shift?blame?to?his?brother?Tracy,?who?was?three?years?younger.?All?the?same,?he?asserted?that?Marcie’s?death?was?accidental. Beyond?the?basic?facts?set?out?above,?the?People?and?defendant?disputed?the?proper?characterization?of?the?events.?[54?Cal.3d?954] The?People?attempted?to?prove?that?defendant?was?especially?cruel?and?his?attack?singularly?brutal.?They?relied?largely?on?the?established?circumstances?of?the?offenses. For?his?part,?defendant?tried?to?show?the?opposite.?For?example,?he?testified?to?the?following?effect:?he?had?consumed?marijuana?on?the?day?in?question;?not?long?after?reaching?Stoner’s?Pit?with?Marcie,?”something?right?then?and?there?hit?me”;?he?asked?her?to?take?her?clothes?off,?and?she?complied;?he?then?took?off?his?own;?his?intention?was?”[j]ust?to?make?her?happy”;?at?first,?she?did?not?resist?”because?all?I?was?doing?was?I?was?like?a?man?would?regularly?treat?a?woman”;?during?what?he?called?”the?process?of?making?love?to?her,”?he?did?”nothing?that?would?be?harmful”;?”Let’s?put?it?this?way,”?he?continued,?”when?I?make?love?to?a?woman-one?of?my?girlfriends-she?don’t?have?no?complaints?at?all”;?soon,?however,?Marcie’s?eyes?began?to?flow?with?tears?and?she?cried?for?help;?”[a]bout?two?seconds?later?someone?walked?by?and?yelled?out,?’Did?someone?holler?for?help?’?”;?he?then?pushed?the?plastic?bags?into?her?mouth,?but?only?”to?keep?her?quiet”;?after?the?act,?he?cleaned?himself?off?and?dressed;?”I?believe?she?was?still?moving?when?I?finally?left”;?he?did?not?remove?the?bags?from?her?mouth?because?”I?forgot?they?were?there”;?he?covered?her?with?the?carpet?remnant?”out?of?courtesy”;?he?felt?remorse?and?shame,?apparently?from?the?very?moment?he?did?the?deed;?and?he?stated?that?he?preferred?to?refer?to?Marcie?as?a?”person”?because?”I’m?tired?of?people?using?the?word?’child.’?” Penalty?Phase In?their?case?in?aggravation,?the?People?introduced?evidence?to?prove?that?defendant?suffered?two?felony?convictions:?the?first,?in?1981,?for?burglary?in?the?second?degree?in?violation?of?Penal?Code?sections?459?and?460,?in?Kern?County;?and?the?second,?in?1985,?for?assault?with?intent?to?commit?rape?in?violation?of?Penal?Code?section?220,?in?Sacramento?County.?They?also?presented?evidence?to?establish?the?facts?underlying?the?latter?conviction.?Lisa?Cronin,?the?victim,?testified?that?in?the?early?hours?of?May?19,?1984-the?date?of?the?crimes?against?Marcie-defendant?attacked?her,?and?in?fact?bruised?and?sprained?one?of?her?arms;?he?announced?his?intent?to?commit?rape;?but?he?fled?without?accomplishing?his?purpose?when?bystanders?came?to?her?aid. In?his?case?in?mitigation,?defendant?introduced?evidence?to?generally?describe?his?background?and?character,?from?before?birth?up?until?the?time?of?trial.?The?testimony,?given?by?lay?witnesses?as?well?as?psychiatric?and?psychological?experts,?painted?the?following?picture:?defendant?suffered?abuse?and?neglect?from?his?earliest?years?at?the?hands?of?his?father?and?mother;?his?parents?had?a?troubled?and?unhappy?marriage,?which?was?dissolved?[54?Cal.3d?955]?when?he?was?about?17?or?18?years?old;?he?was?an?emotionally?and?behaviorally?disturbed?child,?youth,?and?adult;?over?the?years,?he?had?been?cruel?to?animals?and?hurtful?to?his?peers;?he?had?experimented?with?drugs;?he?was?friendless,?angry,?and?refractory;?and?he?may?have?experienced?organic?brain?damage?or?impairment.?Further,?the?evidence?supported?an?inference?that?he?may?have?been?under?the?influence?of?some?mental?or?emotional?disturbance?at?the?time?of?the?crimes.?It?also?showed?that?his?burglary?conviction?arose?from?petty,?nonviolent?criminal?conduct.?In?addition,?it?suggested?that?he?would?not?be?dangerous?in?prison?if?his?life?were?spared. In?rebuttal,?the?People?introduced?evidence?through?the?testimony?of?a?psychologist,?who?opined?that?defendant?had?not,?in?fact,?experienced?organic?brain?damage?or?impairment. Jury-selection?Issues Defendant?raises?a?number?of?claims?bearing?on?the?process?of?jury?selection?in?order?to?demonstrate?that?the?judgment?should?be?reversed?as?to?guilt?or?at?least?as?to?penalty.?As?will?be?shown,?none?is?meritorious. Introduction [1]?(See?fn.?1.)?At?defendant’s?request,?the?trial?court?employed?a?modified?version?of?the?”struck?jury”?system?to?select?the?jurors?who?would?try?the?case,?instead?of?the?”jury?box”?system?defined?by?statute?(see?generally?former?Pen.?Code,???1055?et?seq.;?current?Code?Civ.?Proc.,???225?et?seq.).fn.?1 The?prospective?jurors?were?first?examined?for?hardship,?and?some?were?excused?on?that?basis.?Those?who?remained?were?questioned?individually?and?in?sequestration?(following?limited?group?preinstruction?and?voir?dire),?and?some?were?excluded?for?cause.?Those?who?remained?after?that?stage?had?their?names?drawn?randomly?and?listed?in?the?order?drawn;?each?side?was?allotted?26?peremptory?challenges?against?prospective?jurors?and?5?against?prospective?alternates;?prospective?jurors?”1″?through?”12″?were?drawn?into?the?jury?box;?the?People?and?defendant?alternately?struck?(or?passed)?the?prospective?[54?Cal.3d?956]?jurors?in?the?box,?with?prospective?juror?”13″?taking?the?place?of?the?first?person?struck,?prospective?juror?”14″?taking?the?place?of?the?second,?and?so?on;?in?all,?the?People?struck?22?prospective?jurors?and?4?prospective?alternates,?and?defendant?struck?19?of?the?former?and?3?of?the?latter;?neither?side?expressed?any?dissatisfaction?with?any?of?the?persons?selected?as?jurors?or?alternates;?finally,?12?jurors?and?5?alternates?were?sworn. Denial?of?Motion?as?to?”Guilt?Phase?Includables” [2]?(See?fn.?2.)?Prior?to?the?commencement?of?jury?selection,?defendant?moved?the?trial?court?for?an?order?to?govern?the?process?of?”California?death?qualification,”?to?the?following?effect:?(1)?not?to?exclude?”guilt?phase?includables”?at?that?phase?for?cause?for?actual?bias;?and?(2)?to?prohibit?the?People?from?attempting?to?exclude?such?persons?on?that?basis.fn.?2?He?claimed?that?such?exclusion?violates,?among?other?provisions,?the?Sixth?Amendment?to?the?United?States?Constitution?and?article?I,?section?16,?of?the?California?Constitution-including,?as?relevant?here,?the?guaranties?of?trial?by?an?impartial?jury?and?trial?by?a?jury?drawn?from?a?fair?cross-section?of?the?community. The?trial?court?denied?the?motion.?It?rested?its?decision,?in?pertinent?part,?on?a?conclusion?that?the?law?did?not?support?the?position?that?defendant?had?taken. [3]?Defendant?contends?that?the?trial?court’s?ruling?was?erroneous.?We?disagree. The?exclusion?through?”California?death?qualification”?of?”guilt?phase?includables”?does?not?offend?the?Sixth?Amendment?or?article?I,?section?16,?as?to?the?guaranty?of?trial?by?a?jury?drawn?from?a?fair?cross-section?of?the?community.?(E.g.,?People?v.?Fields?(1983)?35?Cal.3d?329,?342-353?[197?Cal.Rptr.?803,?673?P.2d?680]?(plur.?opn.);?id.?at?pp.?374-375?(conc.?opn.?of?Kaus,?J.);?People?v.?Guzman?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?915,?948-949?[248?Cal.Rptr.?467,?755?P.2d?917];?see,?e.g.,?People?v.?Warren?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?471,?479?[247?Cal.Rptr.?172,?754?P.2d]?[adhering?to?Fields];?see?also?Lockhart?v.?McCree?(1986)?476?U.S.?162,?173-177?[90?L.Ed.2d?137,?147-150,?106?S.Ct.?1758]?[dealing?solely?with?the?federal?constitutional?right].)?[54?Cal.3d?957] Neither?does?such?exclusion?offend?the?Sixth?Amendment?or?article?I,?section?16,?as?to?the?guaranty?of?trial?by?an?impartial?jury.?(E.g.,?People?v.?Melton?(1988)?44?Cal.3d?713,?732?[244?Cal.Rptr.?867,?750?P.2d?741]?[impliedly?dealing?with?both?federal?and?state?constitutional?rights];?People?v.?Hamilton?(1988)?46?Cal.3d?123,?136?[249?Cal.Rptr.?320,?756?P.2d?1348]?[same];?see?also?Lockhart?v.?McCree,?supra,?476?U.S.?at?pp.?177-184?[dealing?solely?with?the?federal?constitutional?right].) Defendant?asks?us?to?revisit?these?questions.?We?decline?to?do?so.?To?the?extent?that?he?urges?departure?from?precedent?laid?down?by?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?or?by?this?court,?his?request?is?refused:?we?must?follow?the?former?and?will?follow?the?latter.fn.?3 Limitation?of?Examination?on?Voir?Dire [4a]?Defendant?contends?that?the?trial?court?erred?when?it?limited?his?examination?of?prospective?jurors?on?individual?sequestered?voir?dire,?assertedly?in?violation?of?California?law?as?construed?in?People?v.?Williams?(1981)?29?Cal.3d?392?[174?Cal.Rptr.?317,?628?P.2d?869]. From?the?very?beginning?of?individual?sequestered?voir?dire,?as?they?extensively?questioned?the?prospective?jurors?on?their?understanding?of?the?two?possible?sentences?at?the?penalty?phase,?defense?counsel?declared?that?life?imprisonment?without?possibility?of?parole?meant?life?imprisonment?without?possibility?of?parole.?In?so?doing,?they?stated?or?implied?that?the?penalty?would?inexorably?be?carried?out.?They?contrasted?life?imprisonment?without?possibility?of?parole,?which?might?be?imposed?on?defendant,?with?life?imprisonment?simpliciter,?which?had?been?imposed?on?such?notorious?criminals?as?Charles?Manson?and?Sirhan?Sirhan. After?16?prospective?jurors?had?been?examined,?the?prosecutor?objected?to?defense?counsel’s?examination?on?the?ground?that?the?questioning?”unduly?emphasize[d]”?life?imprisonment?without?possibility?of?parole?and?was?”in?the?form?of?argument?and?comment?on?the?law.”?He?said,?”One?or?two?questions?on?the?subject?I?think?would?be?sufficient.” The?trial?court?expressed?a?concern?to?avoid?the?topic?of?possible?postverdict?governmental?actions?bearing?on?execution?of?penalty,?specifically,?commutation?by?the?Governor?of?the?sentence?of?death.?[54?Cal.3d?958] Defense?counsel?responded?that?the?prospective?jurors?did?not?understand?life?imprisonment?without?possibility?of?parole,?and?needed?instruction?thereon. The?trial?court?stated?that?both?the?prosecutor?and?defense?counsel?were?”entitled?to?ask”?the?prospective?jurors?”how?they?feel?about?the?two?subject?matters.?Namely,?death?or?life?without?the?possibility?of?parole.”?But?it?also?said:?”We?are?not?here?to?instruct?them?on?the?law?at?this?point.?What?we?are?here?to?talk?about?is?their?qualifications.”?Later,?it?reiterated:?”This?is?not?the?time?to?preinstruct?the?jury?or?precondition?them.” The?trial?court?proceeded?to?rule?as?follows:?”I?will?allow?the?question,?’Do?you?understand?that?life?without?possibility?of?parole?really?means?that?in?California;?no?eligibility?for?parole?’?If?they?say?yes?to?that,?that’s?it.?If?they?want?to?know?more,?you?can?ask?them.?I?don’t?want?any?references?to?Manson?or?Sirhan?or?that?stuff.?It?has?nothing?to?do?with?their?qualifications?to?sit?on?this?case.”?(Paragraphing?omitted.) Thereafter,?eight?more?prospective?jurors?were?examined.?Defense?counsel?continued?to?declare?that?life?imprisonment?without?possibility?of?parole?meant?life?imprisonment?without?possibility?of?parole.?And?they?continued?to?state?or?imply?that?the?penalty?would?inexorably?be?carried?out. When?the?last?of?these?eight?prospective?jurors,?Kenneth?N.?Judnick,?was?passed?for?cause?by?both?sides,?defense?counsel?stated?that?defendant?had?wished?to?examine?Judnick?more?extensively?as?to?life?imprisonment?without?possibility?of?parole?because?of?what?he?believed?to?be?Judnick’s?possible?lack?of?understanding.?Counsel?added?that?in?his?view,?the?meaning?of?the?penalty?was?generally?a?”very?crucial?point”?and?called?for?more?extensive?questioning.?The?trial?court?responded?that?Judnick?”understood”?the?matter?”very?clearly.”fn.?4 […]

People?v.?Walker?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?1013?,?1?Cal.Rptr.2d?902;?819?P.2d?861 [No.?S017854.?Dec?5,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?DEXTER?M.?WALKER,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?San?Bernardino?County,?No.?SCR46930,?Michael?A.?Smith,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Arabian,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Harvey?E.?Goldfine,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart?and?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Harley?D.?Mayfield,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?and?Robert?M.?Foster,?Deputy?Attorney?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION ARABIAN,?J. We?granted?review?in?this?case?to?resolve?a?conflict?in?the?Court?of?Appeal?over?the?proper?means?of?remedying?the?erroneous?imposition?of?a?restitution?fine.?As?explained?below,?we?order?the?restitution?fine?of?this?case?reduced?to?the?statutory?minimum?of?$100. Facts Defendant?was?charged?by?information?with?two?felony?counts,?including,?in?count?2,?the?attempted?use?of?a?destructive?device?with?the?intent?to?injure?or?intimidate.?(Pen.?Code,???12303.3.)fn.?1?According?to?the?probation?report,?defendant?placed?in?his?ex-wife’s?car?a?bomb?which?was?designed?to?detonate?when?the?brake?lights?or?headlights?were?activated.?Fortunately,?the?bomb?was?discovered?and?defused?before?it?exploded. On?April?21,?1988,?pursuant?to?a?plea?bargain,?defendant?pleaded?guilty?to?count?2.?The?district?attorney?and?defendant?agreed?that?in?return?for?the?[54?Cal.3d?1019]?guilty?plea,?count?1?would?be?dismissed,?and?defendant?would?be?sentenced?to?state?prison?for?the?midterm?of?five?years?with?credit?for?time?served.?Defendant?signed?a?change?of?plea?form,?and?initialed?his?understanding?of?the?agreement.?He?waived?his?constitutional?rights.?The?court?orally?explained?to?defendant?that?”the?maximum?penalties?provided?by?law?for?this?offense?are?either?3?years,?5?years,?or?7?years?in?state?prison?and?a?fine?of?up?to?$10,000,”?followed?by?a?period?of?parole. The?court?sentenced?defendant?immediately?after?the?guilty?plea.?In?accordance?with?the?plea?bargain,?it?imposed?a?five-year?prison?sentence?and?awarded?credit?for?time?served.?It?also?imposed?a?restitution?fine?of?$5,000,?although?the?plea?agreement?did?not?mention?such?a?fine.?The?probation?report?prepared?before?the?plea,?and?supplied?to?the?defense,?recommended?a?$7,000?restitution?fine;?the?record?discloses?no?other?mention?of?the?possibility?of?such?a?fine?prior?to?sentencing.?Defendant?did?not?object?to?the?fine?at?sentencing. Defendant?appealed?on?the?sole?ground?that?the?restitution?fine?was?not?part?of?the?plea?bargain,?and?should?be?stricken.?The?Court?of?Appeal?found?error,?but?held?that?the?only?remedy?was?to?allow?defendant?to?withdraw?his?guilty?plea?and,?if?he?chose?to?do?so,?to?reinstate?the?dismissed?count.?Accordingly,?it?reversed?the?judgment?and?remanded?the?matter?to?the?trial?court.?We?granted?review?to?consider?the?propriety?of?that?disposition. Discussion   Background A?person?convicted?of?a?felony?faces?the?possible?imposition?of?two?different?kinds?of?fine.?First?is?a?penal?fine,?up?to?$10,000?in?this?case.?(???672,?12303.3.)?The?court?”may”?impose?this?fine.?(??672.)?Second?is?a?restitution?fine.?As?relevant?to?this?case,?the?court?”shall”?impose?a?restitution?fine?of?at?least?$100?and?not?more?than?$10,000?(Gov.?Code,???13967,?subd.?(a))?”regardless?of?the?defendant’s?present?ability?to?pay.?However,?if?the?court?finds?that?there?are?compelling?and?extraordinary?reasons,?the?court?may?waive?imposition?of?the?fine.?When?such?a?waiver?is?granted,?the?court?shall?state?on?the?record?all?reasons?supporting?the?waiver.”?(??1202.4,?subd.?(a).)?”This?statutory?requirement?is?the?result?of?a?constitutional?amendment?adopted?by?the?voters?as?part?of?Proposition?8.?(See?Cal.?Const.,?art.?I,???28,?subd.?(b).)”?(People?v.?Davis?(1988)?205?Cal.App.3d?1305,?1309?[252?Cal.Rptr.?924].) [1a]?Determining?whether?the?restitution?fine?in?this?case?was?properly?imposed?and,?if?not,?the?appropriate?remedy?to?correct?the?error,?requires?[54?Cal.3d?1020]?consideration?of?two?related?but?distinct?legal?principles.?(See?People?v.?Glennon?(1990)?225?Cal.App.3d?101,?104?[276?Cal.Rptr.?1].) The?first?principle?concerns?the?necessary?advisements?whenever?a?defendant?pleads?guilty,?whether?or?not?the?guilty?plea?is?part?of?a?plea?bargain.?The?defendant?must?be?admonished?of?and?waive?his?constitutional?rights.?(Boykin?v.?Alabama?(1969)?395?U.S.?238?[23?L.Ed.2d?274,?89?S.Ct.?1709];?In?re?Tahl?(1969)?1?Cal.3d?122?[81?Cal.Rptr.?577,?460?P.2d?449].)?In?addition,?and?pertinent?to?this?case,?the?defendant?must?be?advised?of?the?direct?consequences?of?the?plea.?(Bunnell?v.?Superior?Court?(1975)?13?Cal.3d?592,?605?[119?Cal.Rptr.?302,?531?P.2d?1086].) The?second?principle?is?that?the?parties?must?adhere?to?the?terms?of?a?plea?bargain.?(People?v.?Mancheno?(1982)?32?Cal.3d?855,?860?[187?Cal.Rptr.?441,?654?P.2d?211].) In?any?given?case,?there?may?be?a?violation?of?the?advisement?requirement,?of?the?plea?bargain,?or?of?both.?Although?these?possible?violations?are?related,?they?must?be?analyzed?separately,?for?the?nature?of?the?rights?involved?and?the?consequences?of?a?violation?differ?substantially.?Indeed,?much?of?the?confusion?engendered?by?the?appellate?decisions?on?this?issue?results?from?a?blurring?of?the?distinction?between?these?principles. The?Prior?Cases The?first?case?to?consider?this?question?was?People?v.?Oberreuter?(1988)?204?Cal.App.3d?884?[251?Cal.Rptr.?522].?In?Oberreuter,?the?defendant?argued?that?the?restitution?fine?”must?be?stricken,?because?it?was?not?part?of?the?plea?bargain?and?[defendant]?was?not?advised?a?fine?could?be?imposed?as?possible?punishment?before?he?entered?his?plea.”?(Id.?at?p.?888.)?The?court?found?that?”a?restitution?fine,?like?any?other?penal?consequence,?may?not?be?imposed?on?a?plea-bargain?participant?where?it?was?not?included?in?the?negotiated?agreement.”?(Ibid.)?It?held?that?the?proper?remedy?for?the?violation?was?to?strike?the?fine.?(Id.?at?pp.?889-890.)?Justice?Benke?dissented,?finding?no?error?and?arguing?that?if?there?was?error,?the?proper?remedy?was?not?to?strike?the?fine?but?to?allow?the?defendant?to?withdraw?the?guilty?plea.?(Id.?at?pp.?890-893?(dis.?opn.?of?Benke,?J.).) A?similar?contention?was?raised?in?People?v.?Robinson?(1988)?205?Cal.App.3d?280?[252?Cal.Rptr.?202].?The?Court?of?Appeal?dismissed?the?appeal?because?the?defendant?had?not?obtained?a?certificate?of?probable?cause,?but?stated?in?dicta?that?the?trial?court?must?advise?the?defendant?about?the?restitution?fine?prior?to?the?guilty?plea.?[54?Cal.3d?1021] People?v.?Davis,?supra,?205?Cal.App.3d?1305,?was?the?first?decision?to?disagree?with?Oberreuter.?Davis?discussed?both?the?plea?bargain?and?advisement?issues,?and?concluded?the?defendant?was?not?entitled?to?relief?from?the?imposition?of?a?$100?restitution?fine.?Concerning?the?plea?bargain,?the?court?found?that?defendant?”has?not?demonstrated?that?the?plea?bargain?involved?any?limitation?on?the?court’s?mandatory?duty?to?impose?a?restitution?fine”?(id.?at?p.?1308),?and?that?”The?public?policy?represented?by?the?mandatory?fine?’is?too?substantial?to?permit?erosion’?by?reliance?on?mere?silence?in?the?course?of?a?plea?bargain.”?(Id.?at?p.?1309,?quoting?In?re?Chambliss?(1981)?119?Cal.App.3d?199,?203?[173?Cal.Rptr.?712].)?It?found?a?violation?of?the?advisement?requirement,?but?held?there?was?no?prejudice?because?of?the?small?amount?of?the?fine.?(Id.?at?pp.?1310-1311.) In?People?v.?Ross?(1990)?217?Cal.App.3d?879?[265?Cal.Rptr.?921],?the?defendant?claimed?that?”the?imposition?of?restitution?fines?was?improper?and?they?must?be?stricken?because?[defendant]?was?not?advised?of?the?possibility?of?such?fines?when?she?entered?her?plea.”?(Id.?at?p.?885.)?Agreeing?with?Oberreuter?and?disagreeing?with?Davis,?the?court?held?that?the?fine?must?be?stricken.?It?pointed?out?that?imposition?of?the?restitution?fine?may?be?waived?for?”?’compelling?and?extraordinary’?”?reasons?(??1202.4,?subd.(a)),?and?reasoned?that?a?failure?of?advisement?was?a?valid?basis?for?not?imposing?the?fine.?(Ross,?supra,?at?p.?887.) The?court?in?People?v.?Melton?(1990)?218?Cal.App.3d?1406?[267?Cal.Rptr.?640]?took?a?different?approach.?Although?a?plea?bargain?was?negotiated?and?a?guilty?plea?taken?without?mention?of?a?possible?restitution?fine,?the?probation?report?recommended?such?a?fine.?In?light?of?this,?the?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?the?defendant’s?failure?to?object?to?the?imposition?of?the?fine?waived?his?right?to?challenge?the?fine?on?appeal. In?People?v.?Williams?(1990)?224?Cal.App.3d?179?[273?Cal.Rptr.?526],?the?court?reviewed?the?prior?cases?and?agreed?with?Ross?and?Oberreuter.?It?ordered?the?restitution?fine?stricken?both?because?of?the?failure?of?advisement?and?because?it?was?not?a?part?of?the?negotiated?plea.?(Id.?at?pp.?185-186.) Most?recently,?in?People?v.?Glennon,?supra,?225?Cal.App.3d?101,?the?court?noted?that?the?guilty?plea?was?not?the?result?of?a?negotiated?disposition.?Hence?the?court?concluded?that?”it?is?appropriate,?in?such?cases?where?there?is?no?evidence?of?breach?of?the?plea?agreement,?to?deny?relief?unless?the?error?is?shown?to?be?prejudicial.”?(Id.?at?p.?105.)?The?court?found?no?prejudice?and?would?have?denied?relief,?except?that?the?trial?court?(unnecessarily)?advised?the?defendant?at?the?time?of?the?plea?”that?he?could?withdraw?it?if?the?indicated?disposition?was?not?the?sentence?imposed.”?(Id.?at?pp.?105-106.)?In?[54?Cal.3d?1022]?light?of?this?advice,?the?court?allowed?the?defendant?to?withdraw?his?guilty?plea.?(Id.?at?p.?106.) The?Court?of?Appeal?here?found?that?the?trial?court?had?erroneously?failed?to?advise?defendant?under?section?1192.5?that?if?it?imposed?a?sentence?other?than?in?conformity?with?the?plea?bargain,?he?could?withdraw?the?guilty?plea.?It?held?that?since?restitution?fines?are?”statutorily?mandated,”?the?only?remedy?is?to?allow?the?defendant?to?withdraw?the?guilty?plea. Thus,?confronted?with?error?in?the?imposition?of?a?restitution?fine,?some?courts?have?granted?no?relief?(Davis,?supra,?205?Cal.App.3d?1305;?and?Melton,?supra,?218?Cal.App.3d?1406),?others?have?ordered?the?fine?stricken?(Oberreuter,?supra,?204?Cal.App.3d?884;?Ross,?supra,?217?Cal.App.3d?879;?and?Williams,?supra,?224?Cal.App.3d?179),?and?still?others?have?allowed?the?defendant?to?withdraw?his?guilty?plea?(Glennon,?supra,?225?Cal.App.3d?101,?and?the?court?in?this?matter).?As?we?explain,?however,?the?proper?remedy?depends?on?the?nature?of?the?error,?and?the?time?and?manner?in?which?it?is?brought?to?the?attention?of?the?court.?Language?in?the?foregoing?decisions?inconsistent?with?the?following?analysis?is?disapproved. Advisement?of?the?Consequences?of?the?Plea [2]?As?noted?earlier,?before?taking?a?guilty?plea?the?trial?court?must?admonish?the?defendant?of?both?the?constitutional?rights?that?are?being?waived?and?the?direct?consequences?of?the?plea.?(Boykin?v.?Alabama,?supra,?395?U.S.?238;?In?re?Tahl,?supra,?1?Cal.3d?122;?Bunnell?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?13?Cal.3d?592,?605;?see?generally?People?v.?Wright?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?487,?491-493?[233?Cal.Rptr.?69,?729?P.2d?260].)?A?possible?$10,000?restitution?fine?constitutes?such?a?direct?consequence.?Thus,?before?taking?any?guilty?plea?a?trial?court?should?advise?the?defendant?of?the?minimum?$100?and?maximum?$10,000?restitution?fine. [3]?Unlike?the?admonition?of?constitutional?rights,?however,?advisement?as?to?the?consequences?of?a?plea?is?not?constitutionally?mandated.?Rather,?the?rule?compelling?such?advisement?is?”a?judicially?declared?rule?of?criminal?procedure.”?(People?v.?Wright,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?495,?citing?In?re?Yurko?(1974)?10?Cal.3d?857,?864?[112?Cal.Rptr.?513,?519?P.2d?561].)?The?nonconstitutional?basis?of?the?rule?has?two?consequences?pertinent?to?this?case. First,?”Unlike?an?uninformed?waiver?of?the?specified?constitutional?rights?which?renders?a?plea?or?admission?involuntary?and?requires?that?it?be?set?aside,?an?uninformed?waiver?based?on?the?failure?of?the?court?to?advise?an?accused?of?the?consequences?of?an?admission?constitutes?error?which?requires?[54?Cal.3d?1023]?that?the?admission?be?set?aside?only?if?the?error?is?prejudicial?to?the?accused.”?(In?re?Ronald?E.?(1977)?19?Cal.3d?315,?321?[137?Cal.Rptr.?781,?562?P.2d?684].)?”A?showing?of?prejudice?requires?the?appellant?to?demonstrate?that?it?is?reasonably?probable?he?would?not?have?entered?his?plea?if?he?had?been?told?about?the?fine.”?(People?v.?Glennon,?supra,?225?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?105;?see?also?People?v.?Wright,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?495.) Second,?the?error?is?waived?absent?a?timely?objection.?In?People?v.?Melton,?supra,?218?Cal.App.3d?at?page?1408,?as?in?this?case,?the?imposition?of?a?fine?was?recommended?in?the?probation?report.?The?Melton?court?held?that?the?defendants’?failure?to?object?to?the?fine?at?the?sentencing?hearing?waived?the?failure?to?advise?of?the?possibility?of?the?fine.?We?agree.?”The?purpose?of?the?general?doctrine?of?waiver?is?to?encourage?a?defendant?to?bring?errors?to?the?attention?of?the?trial?court,?so?that?they?may?be?corrected?or?avoided?and?a?fair?trial?had.?…?[?]?In?this?case,?the?record?reflects?that?defense?counsel?was?familiar?with?the?probation?report.?Had?the?recommendation?that?defendants?be?ordered?to?pay?a?restitution?fine?come?as?a?genuine?surprise,?it?would?have?been?a?simple?matter?to?bring?the?issue?to?the?attention?of?the?trial?court.”?(Id.?at?p.?1409.) [4]?Thus,?when?the?only?error?is?a?failure?to?advise?of?the?consequences?of?the?plea,?the?error?is?waived?if?not?raised?at?or?before?sentencing.?Upon?a?timely?objection,?the?sentencing?court?must?determine?whether?the?error?prejudiced?the?defendant,?i.e.,?whether?it?is?”reasonably?probable”?the?defendant?would?not?have?pleaded?guilty?if?properly?advised.?(People?v.?Glennon,?supra,?225?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?105.) As?the?defendant?is?already?before?the?court?at?sentencing,?this?determination?of?prejudice?should?not?be?difficult?or?time?consuming.?The?court?should?consider?the?defendant’s?financial?condition,?the?seriousness?of?the?consequences?of?which?the?defendant?was?advised,?the?nature?of?the?crimes?charged,?the?punishment?actually?imposed,?and?the?size?of?the?restitution?fine.?(See?People?v.?Wright,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?499;?People?v.?Melton,?supra,?218?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1408,?fn.?1.)?The?last?of?these?factors?is?particularly?important.?As?noted?in?People?v.?Davis,?supra,?205?Cal.App.3d?at?page?1311,?”in?the?case?of?a?minimal?fine?[of?$100]?no?showing?of?prejudice?normally?will?be?possible.” If?the?sentencing?court?finds?no?prejudice,?the?defendant?is?not?entitled?to?relief.?When?there?is?prejudice,?and?a?timely?objection,?the?defendant?is?entitled?to?a?remedy.?The?situation?then?is?analogous?to?a?violation?of?a?plea?bargain?that?is?brought?to?the?attention?of?the?sentencing?court.?As?explained?below,?the?court?must,?under?such?circumstances,?adopt?either?of?two?remedies:?[54?Cal.3d?1024]?impose?only?the?statutory?minimum?of?$100,?or?give?the?defendant?the?option?to?withdraw?the?plea. Violation?of?the?Plea?Bargain [5]?When?a?guilty?plea?is?entered?in?exchange?for?specified?benefits?such?as?the?dismissal?of?other?counts?or?an?agreed?maximum?punishment,?both?parties,?including?the?state,?must?abide?by?the?terms?of?the?agreement.?The?punishment?may?not?significantly?exceed?that?which?the?parties?agreed?upon. “?'[W]hen?a?plea?rests?in?any?significant?degree?on?a?promise?or?agreement?of?the?prosecutor,?so?that?it?can?be?said?to?be?part?of?the?inducement?or?consideration,?such?promise?must?be?fulfilled.’?(Santobello?v.?New?York?[(1971)]?404?U.S.?[257,]?262?[30?L.Ed.2d?427,?433,?92?S.Ct.?495].)?[?]?The?Supreme?Court?has?thus?recognized?that?due?process?applies?not?only?to?the?procedure?of?accepting?the?plea?(see?Boykin?v.?Alabama?(1969)?395?U.S.?238?[23?L.Ed.2d?274,?89?S.Ct.?1709]),?but?that?the?requirements?of?due?process?attach?also?to?implementation?of?the?bargain?itself.?It?necessarily?follows?that?violation?of?the?bargain?by?an?officer?of?the?state?raises?a?constitutional?right?to?some?remedy.”?(People?v.?Mancheno,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?855,?860;?see?also?People?v.?Glennon,?supra,?225?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?104.)?Although?the?purpose?of?a?restitution?fine?is?not?punitive,?we?believe?its?consequences?to?the?defendant?are?severe?enough?that?it?qualifies?as?punishment?for?this?purpose.?Accordingly,?the?restitution?fine?should?generally?be?considered?in?plea?negotiations. This?does?not?mean?that?any?deviation?from?the?terms?of?the?agreement?is?constitutionally?impermissible.?As?Santobello?v.?New?York?(1971)?404?U.S.?257,?262?[30?L.Ed.2d?427,?433,?92?S.Ct.?495],?suggests,?the?variance?must?be?”significant”?in?the?context?of?the?plea?bargain?as?a?whole?to?violate?the?defendant’s?rights.?A?punishment?or?related?condition?that?is?insignificant?relative?to?the?whole,?such?as?a?standard?condition?of?probation,?may?be?imposed?whether?or?not?it?was?part?of?the?express?negotiations. [6]?Whether?or?not?a?defendant?waives?an?objection?to?punishment?exceeding?the?terms?of?the?bargain?by?the?failure?to?raise?the?point?in?some?fashion?at?sentencing?depends?upon?whether?the?trial?court?followed?the?requirements?of?section?1192.5.?That?section?provides?in?pertinent?part?that?when?a?plea?bargain?is?accepted?by?the?parties?and?approved?by?the?court,?the?defendant?generally?”cannot?be?sentenced?on?such?plea?to?a?punishment?more?severe?than?that?specified?in?the?plea?and?the?court?may?not?proceed?as?to?such?plea?other?than?as?specified?in?the?plea.”?The?court?”shall?inform?the?defendant?prior?to?the?making?of?the?plea?that?(1)?its?approval?is?not?binding,?[54?Cal.3d?1025]?(2)?it?may,?at?the?time?set?for?the?hearing?on?the?application?for?probation?or?pronouncement?of?judgment,?withdraw?its?approval?in?the?light?of?further?consideration?of?the?matter,?and?(3)?in?such?case,?the?defendant?shall?be?permitted?to?withdraw?his?plea?if?he?desires?to?do?so.”?(??1192.5.) Absent?compliance?with?the?section?1192.5?procedure,?the?defendant’s?constitutional?right?to?the?benefit?of?his?bargain?is?not?waived?by?a?mere?failure?to?object?at?sentencing.?”Of?course,?there?can?be?no?waiver?of?a?constitutional?right?absent?’an?intentional?relinquishment?or?abandonment?of?a?known?right?or?privilege.’?[Citation.]?No?less?should?a?court?presume?from?mere?silence?that?defendant?is?waiving?implementation?of?the?consideration?that?induced?him?to?waive?his?constitutional?rights.”?(People?v.?Mancheno,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?p.?864.) When,?however,?the?section?1192.5?admonition?is?given,?and?it?is?generally?required,?the?situation?is?quite?different.?The?issue?then?becomes?whether?the?defendant?has?relinquished?his?statutory?right?to?withdraw?the?plea.?People?v.?Mancheno,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?855,?does?not?state?whether?the?admonition?was?given?in?that?case,?and?thus?it?does?not?address?the?point. We?have?held?that?absent?a?section?1192.5?admonition,?a?defendant’s?”failure?affirmatively?to?request?a?change?of?plea?should?not?be?deemed?a?waiver?of?his?right?to?do?so.?Since?he?was?never?advised?of?his?rights?under?section?1192.5,?he?should?not?be?held?to?have?waived?them.”?(People?v.?Johnson?(1974)?10?Cal.3d?868,?872?[112?Cal.Rptr.?556,?519?P.2d?604],?fn.?omitted.)?Implicit?in?this?reasoning?is?that?when?the?admonition?is?given,?the?failure?affirmatively?to?request?a?change?of?plea?does?waive?the?right?to?do?so.?(See?id.?at?p.?872,?fn.?3?[distinguishing?prior?cases?which?supported?a?finding?of?waiver?on?the?basis?of?the?absence?of?the?admonition].)?A?line?of?cases?in?an?analogous?situation?supports?this?conclusion. In?People?v.?Arbuckle?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?749?[150?Cal.Rptr.?778,?587?P.2d?220,?3?A.L.R.4th?1171],?we?held?that?when?a?judge?accepts?a?plea?bargain?and?retains?sentencing?discretion,?it?is?generally?an?implied?term?of?the?bargain?that?sentence?will?be?imposed?by?that?judge.?The?question?naturally?arose?whether?a?defendant?waives?this?implied?term?by?silence?when?a?different?judge?imposes?sentence.?The?exact?answer?to?this?question?is?currently?unsettled,?as?the?several?appellate?decisions?conflict.?(See?fn.?2,?post.)?But?as?analogous?to?this?case,?the?decisions?all?suggest?a?finding?of?waiver?upon?the?giving?of?a?section?1192.5?admonition. In?People?v.?Rosaia?(1984)?157?Cal.App.3d?832,?840?[203?Cal.Rptr.?856],?the?court?found?that?the?Arbuckle?right?”may?be?waived?by?conduct,”?i.e.,?by?[54?Cal.3d?1026]?not?seeking?to?withdraw?the?guilty?plea?or?otherwise?objecting?at?sentencing.?It?went?on?to?hold?that?”fairness?dictates?that?before?accepting?silence?or?acquiesence?in?sentencing?by?a?different?judge?as?a?waiver,?the?court?must?satisfy?itself?from?the?record?that?defendant?knew?he?had?the?right?to?be?sentenced?by?the?same?judge?who?took?his?plea.?The?court?cannot?reasonably?assume?or?speculate?that?the?defendant?had?the?requisite?knowledge?of?his?Arbuckle?rights?even?if?represented?by?an?attorney.”?(Ibid.) In?part,?the?analysis?of?Rosaia?has?come?under?substantial?attack,?but?for?reasons?not?pertinent?to?this?case.?(Cf.?People?v.?Adams?(1990)?224?Cal.App.3d?1540?[274?Cal.Rptr.?629]?and?People?v.?Serrato?(1988)?201?Cal.App.3d?761?[247?Cal.Rptr.?322]?with?People?v.?Horn?(1989)?213?Cal.App.3d?701?[261?Cal.Rptr.?814].)fn.?2?All?of?these?cases?agree?with?Rosaia?to?the?extent?it?finds?waiver?at?least?when?the?court?has?advised?the?defendant?of?the?existence?of?the?Arbuckle?right.?The?Rosaia?rationale?applies?here?(even?if?not?under?its?own?facts-see?fn.?2,?ante).?Absent?a?section?1192.5?admonition,?we?cannot?assume?defendant?knew?he?had?a?right?to?withdraw?his?plea.?But?when?the?admonition?is?given,?and?the?defendant?does?not?ask?to?withdraw?the?plea?or?otherwise?object?to?the?sentence,?he?has?waived?the?right?to?complain?of?the?sentence?later. [7]?A?violation?of?a?plea?bargain?is?not?subject?to?harmless?error?analysis.?A?court?may?not?impose?punishment?significantly?greater?than?that?bargained?for?by?finding?the?defendant?would?have?agreed?to?the?greater?punishment?had?it?been?made?a?part?of?the?plea?offer.?”Because?a?court?can?only?speculate?why?a?defendant?would?negotiate?for?a?particular?term?of?a?bargain,?implementation?should?not?be?contingent?on?others’?assessment?of?the?value?of?the?term?to?defendant.?[?]?…?[?]?Moreover,?the?concept?of?harmless?error?only?addresses?whether?the?defendant?is?prejudiced?by?the?error.?However,?in?the?context?of?a?broken?plea?agreement,?there?is?more?at?stake?than?the?liberty?of?the?defendant?or?the?length?of?his?term.?’At?stake?is?the?honor?of?the?government[,]?public?confidence?in?the?fair?administration?of?justice,?and?the?efficient?administration?of?justice?….’?”?(People?v.?Mancheno,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?pp.?865-866,?quoting?United?States?v.?Carter?(4th?Cir.?1972)?454?F.2d?426,?428?(in?bank).) The?Appropriate?Remedy […]

People?v.?Bennett?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?1032?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?8;?819?P.2d?849 [No.?S018584.?Dec?5,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?JOHN?BENNETT,?JR.,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Sonoma?County,?No.?16288-C,?Arnold?D.?Rosenfield,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Fern?M.?Laethem,?State?Public?Defender,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?and?Jeanne?Wolfe,?Deputy?State?Public?Defender,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart?and?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Herbert?F.?Wilkinson,?Morris?Beatus?and?David?D.?Salmon,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION MOSK,?J. Defendant?appeals?from?a?conviction?of?gross?vehicular?manslaughter?while?intoxicated.?(Pen.?Code,???191.5,?subd.?(a).)fn.?1?The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed?the?conviction.?Defendant?contends?the?trial?court?erroneously?instructed?the?jury?that?it?could?find?gross?negligence?from?”the?overall?circumstances?of?[his]?intoxication.”?(CALJIC?No.?8.94?(5th?ed.?1988?bound?vol.).)?For?the?reasons?stated?below?we?conclude?that?the?instruction?is?correct,?and?we?therefore?affirm?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal. I. Late?in?the?afternoon?of?December?11,?1988,?defendant,?a?30-year-old?male,?and?2?friends?who?were?each?less?than?21?years?of?age?(see?Bus.?&?Prof.?Code,???25658),?began?drinking?from?a?”party?ball”?of?beer-a?keg?approximately?18?inches?in?diameter?and?a?foot?long.?After?an?hour?or?so,?defendant?drove?the?two?teenagers?to?the?beach?in?his?pickup?truck.?There?they?met?another?friend?and?continued?drinking?from?the?”party?ball.”?The?four?”pretty?well?killed?the?entire?thing”?before?they?left?after?sunset.?The?victim?and?one?friend?rode?with?defendant?while?the?third?friend?followed?in?his?own?car. Described?by?one?witness?as?”pretty?drunk,”?defendant?was?weaving?in?and?out?of?his?traffic?lane?as?he?drove?inland?from?the?beach.?The?third?friend?tried?to?signal?defendant?that?his?truck?was?drifting?off?the?road?by?honking?his?horn?and?flashing?his?lights.?As?defendant?approached?a?blind?curve?on?a?downgrade,?he?crossed?the?double?yellow?line?and?passed?three?cars.?He?was?[54?Cal.3d?1035]?driving?approximately?10?miles?over?the?speed?limit?when?he?lost?control?of?his?vehicle?at?the?bottom?of?the?hill. Defendant’s?truck?went?off?the?road,?came?back?and?rolled?over?five?or?six?times.?All?three?occupants?were?ejected.?Defendant?and?one?passenger?survived?with?minor?injuries;?the?other?passenger?died.?Defendant’s?blood-?alcohol?level?two?hours?later?was?0.20?percent. Defendant?was?convicted?of?gross?vehicular?manslaughter?while?intoxicated.?(??191.5,?subd.?(a).)?Section?191.5?as?charged?defines?the?offense?as?the?unlawful?killing?of?a?human?being?without?malice,?while?driving?under?the?influence,?in?the?commission?of?an?unlawful?act?not?amounting?to?a?felony,?and?with?gross?negligence. The?only?contested?issue?at?trial?was?whether?defendant?was?grossly?negligent.?In?accordance?with?CALJIC?No.?8.94,?the?jury?was?instructed?to?determine?gross?negligence?from?”the?overall?circumstances?of?the?defendant’s?intoxication?or?the?manner?in?which?he?drove,?or?both?….”?(Italics?added.) [1a]?On?appeal,?defendant?challenged?this?instruction.?He?argued?that?it?erroneously?allowed?the?jury?to?find?gross?negligence?from?the?circumstances?of?his?intoxication?alone,?without?regard?to?his?manner?of?driving.?In?affirming?the?judgment,?the?Court?of?Appeal?held?the?instruction?was?correct. II. To?determine?the?propriety?of?the?challenged?instruction,?we?must?examine?the?Penal?Code’s?definition?of?gross?vehicular?manslaughter?while?intoxicated.?The?history?of?the?legislation?is?instructive. Manslaughter?is?the?unlawful?killing?of?a?human?being?without?malice.?Originally,?two?kinds?of?manslaughter?were?defined:?voluntary?and?involuntary.?(Former???192,?subds.?1?&?2.)?In?1945,?the?Legislature?created?the?offense?of?vehicular?manslaughter,?the?unlawful?killing?of?a?human?being?while?driving?a?vehicle.?(Former???192,?subd.?3,?added?by?Stats.?1945,?ch.?1006,???1,?p.?1942.)?In?1983,?it?further?defined?vehicular?manslaughter?as?being?with?or?without?gross?negligence?and?with?or?without?some?form?of?intoxication.?(Former???192,?subd.?3,?as?amended?by?Stats.?1983,?ch.?937,???1,?pp.?3387-3388.) Three?years?later,?the?Legislature?enacted?the?statute?here?in?issue,?defining?the?crime?of?vehicular?manslaughter?with?gross?negligence?while?driving?[54?Cal.3d?1036]?under?the?influence.?(??191.5,?added?by?Stats.?1986,?ch.?1106,???2,?p.?3881.)?Section?191.5,?subdivision?(a),?provides:?”Gross?vehicular?manslaughter?while?intoxicated?is?the?unlawful?killing?of?a?human?being?without?malice?aforethought,?in?the?driving?of?a?vehicle,?where?the?driving?was?in?violation?of?Section?23152?[driving?under?the?influence]?or?23153?[driving?under?the?influence?with?bodily?injury]?of?the?Vehicle?Code,?and?the?killing?was?either?the?proximate?result?of?the?commission?of?an?unlawful?act,?not?amounting?to?a?felony,?and?with?gross?negligence,?or?the?proximate?result?of?the?commission?of?a?lawful?act?which?might?produce?death,?in?an?unlawful?manner,?and?with?gross?negligence.”fn.?2 The?requirement?of?section?191.5?that?the?defendant?act?with?gross?negligence?is?the?focus?of?this?appeal.?The?gross?negligence?element?was?addressed?in?People?v.?McNiece?(1986)?181?Cal.App.3d?1048?[226?Cal.Rptr.?733]?(hereafter?McNiece),?in?which?the?court?reversed?a?conviction?for?gross?vehicular?manslaughter?with?intoxication?because?the?trial?court?failed?to?instruct?the?jury?that?”gross?negligence?could?not?be?supported?solely?by?facts?which?satisfied?other?essential?elements?…,?namely?(1)?drunk?driving?and?(2)?a?traffic?offense.”?(Id.?at?p.?1057.)?The?court?held?that?”something?in?addition”?was?necessary,?but?did?not?define?what?this?”something”?was.?(Id.?at?p.?1058.) [2]?Gross?negligence?is?the?exercise?of?so?slight?a?degree?of?care?as?to?raise?a?presumption?of?conscious?indifference?to?the?consequences.?(People?v.?Watson?(1981)?30?Cal.3d?290,?296?[179?Cal.Rptr.?43,?637?P.2d?279].)?”The?state?of?mind?of?a?person?who?acts?with?conscious?indifferences?to?the?consequences?is?simply,?’I?don’t?care?what?happens.’?”?(People?v.?Olivas?(1985)?172?Cal.App.3d?984,?988?[218?Cal.Rptr.?567])?The?test?is?objective:?whether?a?reasonable?person?in?the?defendant’s?position?would?have?been?aware?of?the?risk?involved.?(People?v.?Watson,?supra,?30?Cal.3d?at?p.?296.) [1b]?Defendant?challenges?the?gross?negligence?instruction?given?in?this?case:?”The?mere?fact?that?a?defendant?drives?a?motor?vehicle?while?under?the?influence?of?alcohol?and?violates?a?traffic?law?is?insufficient?in?itself?to?constitute?gross?negligence.?You?must?determine?from?the?overall?circumstances?of?the?defendant’s?intoxication?or?the?manner?in?which?he?drove,?or?both,?whether?his?conduct?constituted?gross?negligence.”?(CALJIC?No.?8.94,?italics?added.)fn.?3?[54?Cal.3d?1037] The?issue?is?whether?allowing?the?jury?to?find?gross?negligence?from?the?”overall?circumstances?of?the?defendant’s?intoxication,”?without?more,?is?consistent?with?the?Legislature’s?definition?of?gross?vehicular?manslaughter?while?intoxicated.?The?cases?reach?different?conclusions. Defendant?relies?on?People?v.?Stanley?(1986)?187?Cal.App.3d?248?[232?Cal.Rptr.?22]?(hereafter?Stanley),?which?narrowly?defined?gross?negligence.?There?the?court?held?that?the?degree?of?intoxication?could?not?alone?be?used?to?establish?gross?negligence:?”As?written,?the?statute?requires?evidence?of?intoxication?as?one?of?two?predicates?for?liability.?It?cannot,?however,?be?used?again?to?satisfy?the?second?predicate?as?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?negligence?or?gross?negligence.?…?[T]he?jury?must?find?that?in?addition?to?being?intoxicated?the?defendant?was?negligent?or?grossly?negligent?in?the?manner?of?his?operation?of?the?vehicle.”?(Id.?at?p.?253,?italics?in?original.)fn.?4 A?different?approach?was?taken?in?People?v.?Von?Staden?(1987)?195?Cal.App.3d?1423?[241?Cal.Rptr.?523]?(Von?Staden),?from?which?the?challenged?instruction?is?derived.?The?Von?Staden?court?agreed?with?McNiece?that?”gross?negligence?cannot?be?shown?by?the?mere?fact?of?driving?under?the?influence?and?violating?the?traffic?laws.”?(Id.?at?p.?1427,?italics?in?original.)?It?also?agreed?with?Stanley?that?”gross?negligence?can?be?shown?by?the?manner?in?which?the?defendant?operated?the?vehicle,?that?is,?the?overall?circumstances?(rather?than?the?mere?fact)?of?the?traffic?law?violation.”?(Ibid.,?italics?in?original.) The?court,?however,?disagreed?with?the?holding?of?Stanley?that?gross?negligence?cannot?be?shown?by?the?level?of?defendant’s?intoxication:?”nothing?in?the?history?of?sections?191.5?and?192?suggests?the?Legislature?intended?such?a?restriction.?…?[O]ne?who?drives?with?a?very?high?level?of?intoxication?is?indeed?more?negligent,?more?dangerous,?and?thus?more?culpable?than?one?who?drives?near?the?legal?limit?of?intoxication,?just?as?one?who?exceeds?the?speed?limit?by?50?miles?per?hour?exhibits?greater?negligence?than?one?who?exceeds?the?speed?limit?by?5?miles?per?hour.”?(Von?Staden,?supra,?195?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1428.)?The?court?concluded?that?”The?trier?of?fact?must?determine,?considering?the?overall?circumstances?of?the?defendant’s?intoxication?or?the?manner?in?which?he?drove,?or?both,?whether?there?was?gross?negligence?….”?(Id.?at?p.?1425.)?[54?Cal.3d?1038] Defendant?contends?that?Von?Staden,?supra,?195?Cal.App.3d?1423,?and?the?decision?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?the?present?case?are?incorrect:?the?jury?should?not?be?allowed?to?base?its?finding?of?gross?negligence?on?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?overall?circumstances?of?intoxication.?He?argues?that?under?the?plain?language?of?section?191.5,?the?People?must?show?that?the?unlawful?act,?here?the?traffic?violation,?was?performed?with?gross?negligence.?Thus,?he?argues,?only?his?”driving?conduct?at?the?time?of?the?traffic?accident,”?not?his?level?of?intoxication,?is?relevant?to?determining?gross?negligence. Defendant?fails?to?grasp,?however,?that?a?driver’s?level?of?intoxication?is?an?integral?aspect?of?the?”driving?conduct.”?A?high?level?of?intoxication?sets?the?stage?for?tragedy?long?before?the?driver?turns?the?ignition?key.?”There?is?a?very?commonly?understood?risk?which?attends?every?motor?vehicle?driver?who?is?intoxicated.?[Citation.]?One?who?wilfully?consumes?alcoholic?beverages?to?the?point?of?intoxication,?knowing?that?he?thereafter?must?operate?a?motor?vehicle,?thereby?combining?sharply?impaired?physical?and?mental?faculties?with?a?vehicle?capable?of?great?force?and?speed,?reasonably?may?be?held?to?exhibit?a?conscious?disregard?of?the?safety?of?others.?The?effect?may?be?lethal?….”?(Taylor?v.?Superior?Court?(1979)?24?Cal.3d?890,?896-897?[157?Cal.Rptr.?693,?598?P.2d?854].) The?jury?should?therefore?consider?all?relevant?circumstances,?including?level?of?intoxication,?to?determine?if?the?defendant?acted?with?a?conscious?disregard?of?the?consequences?rather?than?with?mere?inadvertence.?(See,?e.g.,?People?v.?Costa?(1953)?40?Cal.2d?160,?166?[252?P.2d?1]?[evidence?that?defendant?was?specifically?warned?not?to?speed?a?half-hour?prior?to?fatal?accident];?People?v.?Leffel?(1988)?203?Cal.App.3d?575,?584?[249?Cal.Rptr.?906]?[evidence?that?defendant?had?not?slept?for?three?nights];?Von?Staden,?supra,?195?Cal.App.3d?1423,?1428?[evidence?that?defendant?was?specifically?warned?not?to?drive?while?intoxicated];?People?v.?Roerman?(1961)?189?Cal.App.2d?150,?159?[10?Cal.Rptr.?870]?[evidence?that?defendant?drove?to?heavily?trafficked?area?with?cast?on?her?right?foot].)?To?the?extent?that?Stanley,?supra,?187?Cal.App.3d?248,?suggests?otherwise,?it?is?disapproved. Such?an?interpretation?is?consistent?with?legislative?intent.?When?the?Legislature?enacted?section?191.5,?it?stated:?”The?Legislature?finds?and?declares?that?traffic?accidents?are?the?greatest?cause?of?violent?death?in?the?United?States?and?that?over?one-half?of?the?ensuing?fatalities?are?alcohol?related.?…?In?view?of?the?severe?threat?to?public?safety?which?is?posed?by?the?intoxicated?driver,?there?is?a?compelling?need?for?more?effective?methods?to?identify?and?penalize?those?who?voluntarily?consume?alcoholic?beverages?to?the?point?of?legal?intoxication?and?thereafter?operate?a?motor?vehicle,?thereby?combining?sharply?impaired?physical?and?mental?faculties?with?a?[54?Cal.3d?1039]?vehicle?capable?of?exerting?great?force?and?speed?and?causing?severe?damage?and?death.”?(Stats.?1986,?ch.?1106,???1,?pp.?3880-3881.) Thus?the?Legislature?sought?to?punish?severely?those?who?operate?a?vehicle?when?their?physical?and?mental?faculties?are?impaired?by?voluntary?alcohol?consumption.?To?separate?the?gross?negligence?inquiry?from?the?question?of?the?defendant’s?intoxication?would?undercut?the?Legislature’s?goal?of?preventing?drunk?driving. The?challenged?instruction?correctly?allowed?the?jury?to?find?gross?negligence?from?the?overall?circumstances?of?defendant’s?intoxication.?[3]?Nevertheless,?to?forestall?objections?to?its?wording?in?future?gross?vehicular?manslaughter?cases?the?instruction?should?more?precisely?advise?the?jury?that?”The?mere?fact?that?a?defendant?drives?a?motor?vehicle?while?under?the?influence?of?alcohol?and?violates?a?traffic?law?is?insufficient?in?itself?to?constitute?gross?negligence.?You?must?determine?gross?negligence?from?the?level?of?the?defendant’s?intoxication,?the?manner?of?driving,?or?other?relevant?aspects?of?the?defendant’s?conduct?resulting?in?the?fatal?accident.”fn.?5 The?case?law?on?which?defendant?relies?does?not?require?a?contrary?result.?The?courts?in?People?v.?Leitgeb?(1947)?77?Cal.App.2d?764,?769-770?[176?P.2d?384],?and?People?v.?Markham?(1957)?153?Cal.App.2d?260,?275?[314?P.2d?217],?found?gross?negligence?from?the?circumstances?of?the?defendant’s?driving?conduct?at?the?time?of?the?accident?but?did?not?consider?whether?other?factors?could?support?a?finding?of?gross?negligence.?People?v.?Hoe?(1958)?164?Cal.App.2d?502,?508?[330?P.2d?907],?held?that?the?defendant’s?manner?of?driving?at?the?time?of?the?accident?must?be?the?proximate?cause?of?the?death,?but?also?stated?in?regard?to?gross?negligence:?”The?jury?could?find?that?her?conduct?in?driving?while?intoxicated?and?in?failing?to?see?either?decedent?or?his?car?as?she?approached?was?grossly?negligent?conduct.”?(Id.?at?p.?509.) Nor?is?there,?as?defendant?contends,?a?”direct?conflict”?between?CALJIC?No.?8.94?and?CALJIC?No.?8.93,?which?defines?gross?vehicular?manslaughter?while?intoxicated.?CALJIC?No.?8.93,?as?given?in?this?case,?provides?that?one?element?of?the?crime?is?that?”the?driver?of?the?vehicle?committed?with?gross?negligence?an?unlawful?act,?namely?a?violation?of?the?maximum?speed?law?or?basic?speed?law?of?this?state?….”?This?language?merely?clarifies?that?the?element?of?gross?negligence?is?related?to?driving?conduct.?As?discussed?above,?this?is?consistent?with?CALJIC?No.?8.94.?[54?Cal.3d?1040] [1c]?We?conclude?that?the?finding?of?gross?negligence?required?to?convict?a?defendant?of?gross?vehicular?manslaughter?while?intoxicated?may?be?based?on?the?overall?circumstances?surrounding?the?fatality.?Intoxication?is?one?of?those?circumstances?and?its?effect?on?the?defendant’s?driving?may?show?gross?negligence.?In?the?present?case,?the?jury?could?reasonably?have?found?that?defendant’s?high?level?of?intoxication?led?to?his?reckless?manner?of?driving.?It?was?therefore?not?error?to?give?the?challenged?instruction. The?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?affirmed. Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?J.,?Kennard,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?Baxter,?J.,?and?George,?J.,?concurred. FN?1.?All?further?references?are?to?the?Penal?Code?unless?otherwise?indicated. FN?2.?The?provision?replaced?former?section?192,?subdivision?(c)(3). FN?3.?The?jury?was?also?instructed?on?gross?negligence?as?follows:?”[‘Gross?negligence’]?means?conduct?which?is?more?than?ordinary?negligence.?Ordinary?negligence?is?the?failure?to?exercise?ordinary?or?reasonable?care. “[‘Gross?negligence’]?refers?to?[a]?negligent?act?which?[is]?aggravated,?reckless?and?gross?and?which?[is]?such?a?departure?from?what?would?be?the?conduct?of?an?ordinarily?prudent,?careful?person?under?the?same?circumstances?as?to?be?contrary?to?a?proper?regard?for?[human?life]?or?to?constitute?indifference?to?the?consequences?of?such?act[s].?The?facts?must?be?such?that?the?consequences?of?the?negligent?act[s]?could?reasonably?have?been?foreseen?and?it?must?appear?that?the?[death]?was?not?the?result?of?inattention,?mistaken?judgment?or?misadventure?but?the?natural?and?probable?result?of?an?aggravated,?reckless?or?grossly?negligent?act.”?(Brackets?in?original,?CALJIC?No.?3.36.) FN?4.?Both?McNiece?and?Stanley?interpreted?former?section?192,?subdivision?(c)(3). FN?5.?The?causal?connection?required?is?a?broad?one.?(See,?e.g.,?cases?cited?ante,?p.?1038.)  

City?of?Moorpark?v.?Moorpark?Unified?School?Dist.?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?921?,?1?Cal.Rptr.2d?896;?819?P.2d?854 [No.?S019591.?Dec?5,?1991.] CITY?OF?MOORPARK,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?MOORPARK?UNIFIED?SCHOOL?DISTRICT?et?al.,?Defendants?and?Appellants. (Superior?Court?of?Ventura?County,?No.?106606,?Bruce?A.?Thompson,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Bergman?&?Wedner,?Gregory?M.?Bergman,?Richard?V.?Godino?and?Robert?M.?Mason?III?for?Defendants?and?Appellants.?[54?Cal.3d?923] Bowie,?Arneson,?Kadi?&?Dixon,?Carol?J.?Graham,?Wendy?H.?Wiles,?Ronald?D.?Wenkart,?Claire?Y.?Morey,?Geraldine?Jaffe?and?Val?R.?Fadely?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendants?and?Appellants. Cheryl?J.?Kane,?City?Attorney,?Burke,?Williams?&?Sorenson,?Lisa?E.?Kranitz?and?Peter?D.?Tremblay?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. Stephanie?Scher,?City?Attorney?(La?Canada-Flintridge),?Brown,?Winfield?&?Canzoneri?and?Virginia?R.?Pesola?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION LUCAS,?C.?J. In?this?case?we?construe?for?the?first?time?the?Naylor?Act?(Ed.?Code,????39390-39404;fn.?1hereafter?the?Act),?which?governs?the?disposal?of?certain?kinds?of?surplus?school?property.?The?City?of?Moorpark?(hereafter?City)?petitioned?the?superior?court?for?a?writ?of?mandate?to?compel?the?Moorpark?Unified?School?District?(hereafter?District)?to?transfer?school?property,?pursuant?to?the?Act.?After?the?court?granted?the?petition,?District?appealed.?The?Court?of?Appeal,?affirming?the?superior?court,?concluded?that?the?Act’s?provisions?regarding?surplus?school?property?displaced?the?common?law?of?contracts,?that?a?binding?contract?for?sale?had?been?made?under?the?Act,?and?that?District?acted?capriciously?when?it?purported?to?exempt?the?school?site?from?the?Act.?We?reverse?the?Court?of?Appeal’s?decision. The?Act In?the?preamble?to?the?Act,?the?Legislature?expressed?its?concern?”that?school?playgrounds,?playing?fields?and?recreational?real?property?will?be?lost?for?such?uses?by?the?surrounding?communities?even?where?those?communities?in?their?planning?process?have?assumed?that?such?properties?would?be?permanently?available?for?recreational?purposes.”?(??39390.)?The?Legislature?explicitly?stated?its?intention?”to?allow?school?districts?to?recover?their?investment?in?such?surplus?property?while?making?it?possible?for?other?agencies?of?government?to?acquire?the?property?and?keep?it?available?for?playground,?playing?field?or?other?outdoor?recreational?and?open-space?purposes.”?(Ibid.)?The?net?effect?of?the?Act?is?to?make?surplus?school?property?available?to?local?communities?at?less?than?present?market?value,?[54?Cal.3d?924]?while?assuring?that?participating?school?districts?recover?at?least?the?cost?of?acquiring?the?property. The?Act?applies?when?a?school?district?determines?to?sell?or?lease?a?school?site,?if?three?conditions?are?met:?(1)?All?or?part?of?the?school?site?consists?of?land?used?for?school?playground,?playing?field,?or?other?outdoor?recreational?purposes,?and?open-space?land?particularly?suited?for?recreational?purposes;?(2)?the?land?has?been?used?for?at?least?one?of?the?foregoing?purposes?for?at?least?eight?years?immediately?preceding?the?decision?to?sell?or?lease?the?site;?and?(3)?the?public?entity?proposing?to?purchase?or?lease?the?land?determines?that?no?other?public?land?in?the?vicinity?of?the?site?is?adequate?to?meet?community?needs?for?playground,?playing?field?or?other?outdoor?recreational?and?open-space?purposes.?(??39391.) Before?a?public?agency?may?purchase?property?pursuant?to?the?Act,?it?must?adopt?a?plan?that?designates?the?areas?of?the?school?site?the?agency?does?and?does?not?desire.?(??39397.5.) Once?a?school?district?decides?to?sell?or?lease?a?school?site?containing?land?described?in?section?39391,?the?sale?or?lease?of?such?land?must?be?in?accordance?with?the?Act.?(??39393.)?A?district?may?retain?any?part?of?a?school?site?containing?buildings?along?with?adjacent?land?sufficient?to?avoid?reducing?the?value?of?the?part?of?the?school?site?containing?the?building?to?less?than?50?percent?of?fair?market?value.?(??39395.)?Before?a?district?sells?or?leases?a?school?site?containing?section?39391?land,?the?district?must?first?offer?to?sell?or?lease?the?portion?of?the?school?site?containing?section?39391?land,?excluding?retained?land,?to?a?variety?of?public?agencies?according?to?the?priority?established?by?the?Act.?(??39394.)?The?district?has?”discretion?to?determine?whether?the?offer?shall?be?an?offer?to?sell?or?an?offer?to?lease.”?(Ibid.) The?Act?provides?that?the?sales?price?for?section?39391?land?shall?not?exceed?the?district’s?cost?of?acquisition?with?certain?adjustments?for?inflation?and?improvements.?In?addition?to?this?maximum?price,?the?Act?establishes?a?price?floor?of?either?25?percent?of?fair?market?value?or?an?amount?related?to?bonded?indebtedness.?(??39396,?subd.?(a).)?Likewise,?the?Act?sets?a?maximum?annual?lease?rate.?(??39396,?subd.?(c).)?A?district?that?offers?a?portion?of?a?school?site?for?sale?may?do?so?at?fair?market?value,?provided?the?district?”offers?an?equivalent?size?alternative?portion?of?that?school?site?for?school?playground,?playing?field,?or?other?recreational?and?open-space?purposes.”?(??39396,?subd.?(b).) Section?39402?provides?that?a?school?district?may,?as?an?alternative?to?a?sale?or?a?lease?pursuant?to?other?provisions?of?the?Act,?enter?into?other?[54?Cal.3d?925]?agreements?to?dispose?of?the?land,?such?as?a?lease?purchase.?If?the?lessee?or?grantee?has?zoning?powers,?the?alternative?agreement?may?require?the?entity?to?rezone?any?portion?of?the?school?site?retained?by?the?district.?(??39402.) Land?purchased?or?leased?under?the?Act?must?be?maintained?for?playground,?playing?field,?or?other?outdoor?recreational?and?open-space?uses.?(??39398.)?A?district?that?has?transferred?land?may?reacquire?it?at?any?time?at?a?price?set?by?the?same?mechanism?used?to?establish?the?original?sales?price.?(Ibid.) Notwithstanding?other?provisions?of?the?Act,?a?school?district?may?exempt?not?more?than?two?surplus?sites?from?the?Act?if?the?district?has?an?immediate?need?for?an?additional?school?site?and?is?actively?seeking?to?acquire?such?a?site?and?may?exempt?not?more?than?one?surplus?site?if?the?district?is?seeking?immediate?expansion?of?the?classroom?capacity?of?an?existing?school?by?at?least?50?percent.?(??39401.) Facts District?owns?a?school?site?on?Casey?Road?in?Moorpark?(hereafter?the?site).?Part?of?the?site?is?improved?with?a?variety?of?school?buildings.?In?November?1987,?District?adopted?a?resolution?finding?disposition?of?the?site?was?in?the?best?interests?of?District?and?its?students?and?noting?that?the?site?was?not?a?surplus?school?site.?In?February?1988,?City?adopted?a?resolution?stating?that?public?lands?in?the?vicinity?of?the?site?were?inadequate?to?meet?community?needs?for?playgrounds,?playing?fields,?or?other?open-space?purposes.?Three?months?later,?District?adopted?a?resolution,?which?resolved?that?sale,?lease,?or?exchange?of?all?or?a?portion?of?the?site?was?in?the?best?interest?of?the?students.?Unlike?District’s?previous?resolution,?this?resolution?failed?to?state?the?site?was?not?a?surplus?school?site.fn.?2 Later?in?May,?District?sent?to?13?public?agencies,?including?City,?a?notice?of?its?second?resolution.?The?notice?stated?that?District?”proposes?to?offer?for?sale,?lease,?or?exchange?all?or?a?portion?of?the?[site]?at?fair?market?value?….”?In?July,?City?notified?District?of?its?intent?to?purchase?a?portion?of?the?site?pursuant?to?the?Act?and?generally?described?the?location?of?the?property?City?desired,?which?was?referred?to?as?the?lower?field?area.?District?responded?by?informing?City?that?District?would?not?consider?disposing?of?the?lower?field?area?unless?City?held?hearings?to?allow?for?development?of?an?area?referred?to?as?the?upper?parcel,?and?by?asking?for?City’s?input?on?a?total?development?package?for?the?site.?[54?Cal.3d?926] After?a?period?of?negotiations,?District?sent?a?proposal?to?City?offering?either?a?lease-purchase?or?an?outright?purchase?of?the?lower?field?area?for?a?price?based?in?part?on?fair?market?value?and?in?part?as?set?by?the?Act.?City?rejected?the?proposal.?Thereafter,?District?twice?asked?City?whether?it?was?still?interested?in?the?lower?field?area?and?suggested?meeting?to?develop?an?agreeable?proposal. A?City?appraisal?set?the?fair?market?value?of?the?lower?field?area?at?$1,279,000.?City?then?advised?District,?in?early?May?1989,?that?it?was?prepared?to?take?title?to?the?lower?field?area?for?$319,750,?which?was?25?percent?of?the?property’s?alleged?fair?market?value,?as?provided?by?the?Act.?City?and?District?met?on?May?30,?at?which?time?District?made?a?counterproposal. City?apparently?did?not?respond?but?instead?filed?a?petition?for?a?writ?of?mandate?and?a?complaint?for?declaratory?relief,?seeking?a?ruling?that?District?was?obligated?under?the?Act?to?sell?the?lower?field?area?for?$319,750.?Thereafter,?District?passed?a?resolution?to?exempt?the?entire?Casey?Road?site?from?the?provisions?of?the?Act. The?trial?court?issued?the?requested?writ?and?ordered?District?to?set?aside?its?resolution?exempting?the?site?from?the?Act.?It?also?ordered?District?to?sell?the?lower?field?area?at?the?price?established?by?the?Act,?25?percent?of?fair?market?value. The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed.?It?concluded?that?sales?of?surplus?school?property?are?governed?by?the?Act?and?that?District’s?notice?of?its?intent?to?sell,?lease,?or?exchange?some?or?all?of?the?site?constituted?an?offer?rather?than?a?mere?invitation?to?deal.?The?court?rejected?District’s?argument?that?its?notice?could?not?be?an?offer?because?of?its?lack?of?specificity?of?material?terms,?such?as?price.?Instead,?the?court?determined?that,?unless?a?school?district?properly?exempts?a?site?from?the?Act?or?retains?a?portion?of?the?site?pursuant?to?the?Act,?the?district?cannot?sell?surplus?property?for?more?than?the?price?established?by?the?Act.?The?court?reasoned?that?the?notice?was?not?deficient?for?lack?of?specificity;?rather,?the?notice?substantially?complied?with?the?Act,?creating?an?offer?that?City?accepted?by?written?notice?in?July?1988. The?Court?of?Appeal?concluded?District?acted?capriciously?because?it?thereafter?purported?to?exempt?the?site?from?the?Act?”solely?as?an?effort?to?halt?…?City’s?lawsuit?and?to?thwart?…?City’s?acceptance?of?its?offer?to?sell?the?property?at?a?surplus?price.”?It?held?that?District?could?not?exempt?the?site?from?the?act?”as?a?means?to?extricate?itself?from?a?binding?contract?to?sell?[54?Cal.3d?927]?a?surplus?site?at?less?than?fair?market?value”?and?that?District?had?a?ministerial?duty?to?sell?the?site?to?City. III.?Discussion   Applicability?of?Common?Law [1a]?In?its?analysis,?the?Court?of?Appeal?concluded?that?sales?of?surplus?property?are?governed?by?the?Act?and?not?by?the?law?of?contracts.?The?court?considered?the?notice?sent?out?by?District?to?be?an?offer,?stating,?”The?use?of?the?word?’proposes’?in?the?notice?does?not?mean?that?it?is?a?mere?invitation?to?treat,?as?it?might?under?common?law.?The?notice?substantially?complies?with?section?39394.”?According?to?the?court,?City?accepted?this?offer?by?its?written?notice?in?July?of?1988.?We?disagree. [2]?Statutes?generally?do?not?supplant?the?common?law?unless?it?appears?the?Legislature?intended?to?occupy?the?field.?(I.?E.?Associates?v.?Safeco?Title?Ins.?Co.?(1985)?39?Cal.3d?281,?285?[216?Cal.Rptr.?438,?702?P.2d?596].)?[1b]?The?Act?does?not?reveal?such?an?intent. The?Court?of?Appeal?focused?on?the?statement?of?legislative?intent?in?section?39390?and?the?Act’s?price-setting?mechanism?in?section?39396?to?conclude?that?the?Act?permits?District?to?recover?only?its?investment?in?the?surplus?property?the?District?determines?to?sell,?thus?making?negotiations?over?price?unnecessary.?Likewise,?the?court?focused?on?section?39394fn.?3?to?conclude?that?the?common?law?does?not?apply?and?that?District’s?notice?substantially?complied?with?the?Act’s?requirements?for?an?offer.?We?note?that?this?last?conclusion?seems?facially?incorrect.?District?notified?City?that?it?proposed?to?”offer?for?sale,?lease,?or?exchange?all?or?a?portion?of?the?[site]?at?fair?market?value.”?Section?39394?provides?that?District?”shall?have?discretion?to?determine?whether?the?offer?shall?be?an?offer?to?sell?or?an?offer?to?lease.”?The?section?thus?contemplates?that?District’s?offer?will?either?be?an?[54?Cal.3d?928]?offer?to?sell?or?an?offer?to?lease.?District’s?notice?spoke?of?an?offer?to?sell,?lease?or?exchange.?Such?an?offer?is?not?an?offer?to?sell,?nor?is?it?an?offer?to?lease. The?Court?of?Appeal?improperly?focused?on?the?foregoing?statutes?rather?than?construing?those?statutes?with?reference?to?the?Act?as?a?whole?so?that?all?sections?of?the?Act?may?be?harmonized?and?given?effect.?(See,?e.g.,?Moore?v.?Panish?(1982)?32?Cal.3d?535,?541?[186?Cal.Rptr.?475,?652?P.2d?32].)?The?Act?contemplates?that?school?districts,?after?deciding?to?sell?or?lease?all?or?part?of?a?site?containing?section?39391?land,?will?make?an?offer?to?public?agencies?to?sell?or?lease?some?of?the?property?at?the?price?established?by?the?Act.?(???39390,?39394,?39396.)?The?Act?is?not,?however,?as?mechanistic?and?all?encompassing?as?the?Court?of?Appeal?believed.?It?does?not?contemplate,?as?the?Court?of?Appeal?seemed?to?hold,?that?once?a?district?makes?a?broad?proposal?to?offer?to?sell,?lease,?or?exchange?all?or?a?portion?of?a?site?for?fair?market?value,?a?responding?public?agency?unilaterally?may?then?decide?that?there?shall?be?a?transaction?in?the?form?of?a?sale?of?a?certain?portion?of?the?property?for?less?than?fair?market?value. Section?39394,?relied?on?by?the?Court?of?Appeal,?addresses?leases?and?sales.?It?is?clear,?however,?that?school?districts?may?attempt?to?tailor?transfers?to?fit?their?needs?by?engaging?in?other?types?of?transactions.?Section?39402?authorizes?districts?to?”enter?into?other?forms?of?agreement?concerning?the?disposition?of?[section?39391]?property?with?any?entity?enumerated?in?Section?39394,?in?accordance?with?the?priorities?therein?specified?….”?The?variety?and?the?nature?of?the?options?available?to?school?districts?implicitly?require?that?districts?have?the?ability,?recognized?under?the?common?law?of?contracts,?to?make?initial,?nonbinding?overtures?to?various?public?agencies?and?to?engage?in?a?period?of?negotiations. For?example,?a?district?may?wish?to?dispose?of?part?of?a?site?and?to?have?another?part?rezoned.?Section?39402?expressly?contemplates?an?exchange?that?requires?rezoning.?It?is?therefore?reasonable?for?a?district?to?notify?public?agencies?of?its?desire?to?”sell,?lease,?or?exchange?all?or?part?of?the?site”?while?entertaining?the?hope?that?an?entity?with?zoning?power,?such?as?a?city,?will?respond.?If?such?an?entity?does?respond,?a?period?of?negotiation?will?likely?be?necessary?to?determine?what?form?of?exchange?will?be?employed?and?to?what?extent?the?property?will?be?rezoned.?Indeed,?this?apparently?is?such?a?case.?District?informed?City?that?it?could?not?consider?disposing?of?the?lower?field?area?unless?City?held?hearings?to?allow?for?development?of?the?entire?upper?parcel;?District?asked?for?City’s?input?on?a?total?development?package?for?the?site. The?Court?of?Appeal’s?conclusion,?however,?ignores?the?need?to?solicit?agencies?and?to?engage?in?negotiations?as?a?prelude?to?making?an?offer?[54?Cal.3d?929]?pursuant?to?the?Act?and?hampers?the?discretion?of?school?districts?attempting?to?shape?transactions?to?fit?their?individual?needs.?Properly?construed,?the?Act?does?not?mandate?a?particular?type?of?transaction?and?therefore?does?not?by?itself?render?District’s?statement?that?it?”proposes?to?sell,?lease?or?exchange?all?or?a?portion”?of?the?site?sufficiently?definite?to?constitute?an?offer.?Indeed,?because?the?Act?does?not?supply?the?material?term?of?the?form?of?the?transaction,?if?City?had?indicated?that?it?wished?to?lease?the?site,?the?trial?court?would?have?been?faced?with?the?impossible?task?of?divining?the?length?of?the?lease. The?Court?of?Appeal,?to?support?its?determination?that?the?Act?supplants?common?law?and?that?District?made?an?effective?legal?offer,?implicitly?relied?on?its?conclusion?that?school?districts?are?entitled?to?recover?only?the?acquisition?costs?of?the?surplus?property?that?they?sell?and?that?District’s?statement?in?its?notice?that?the?site?was?to?be?offered?at?fair?market?value?was?not?authorized?by?the?Act.?The?court’s?conclusion,?however,?is?based?on?an?unreasonably?narrow?reading?of?the?Act. In?its?analysis,?the?court?relied?on?section?39390,?which?sets?forth?the?statement?of?legislative?intent,?and?on?section?39396,?subdivision?(a),?which?provides?the?mechanism?for?establishing?the?maximum?sales?price?based?primarily?on?the?cost?of?acquisition?and?sets?a?floor?of?25?percent?of?fair?market?value.?To?be?sure,?these?provisions?reveal?an?intent?to?allow?public?agencies?to?obtain?playgrounds?and?similar?property?at?advantageous?prices?while?ensuring?that?school?districts?recover?their?acquisition?costs.?To?that?extent,?the?Act?in?some?instances?does?supply?the?parameters?for?the?price?term?of?a?contract. Pursuant?to?subdivision?(b)?of?section?39396,?however,?a?district?may?offer?a?portion?of?a?site?at?fair?market?value?as?long?as?the?district?offers?an?alternative?portion?for?playground-type?use.?The?Act?therefore?does?not?eliminate?the?possibility?of?recovering?fair?market?value?for?part?of?the?surplus?property.?The?Court?of?Appeal?failed?to?consider?the?possibility?that?District?was?attempting?to?determine?whether?any?public?agency?was?interested?in?the?property?at?fair?market?value?as?a?prelude?to?making?an?offer?that?would?conform?to?this?subdivision. The?Court?of?Appeal?also?relied?on?section?39399,?which?subjects?transactions?under?the?Act?to?the?requirements?of?other?articles?in?the?code?that?do?not?conflict?with?the?requirements?of?the?Act.?The?Legislature?may?require?school?districts?to?perform?certain?acts?as?part?of?the?process?of?making?a?contract.?Doing?so,?however,?does?not?remove?the?contract-making?process?from?the?purview?of?the?common?law?unless?the?Legislature?intends?to?occupy?the?field.?In?this?case,?the?nature?of?the?statutory?regulation?of?the?[54?Cal.3d?930]?contract-making?process?is?such?that?legislative?intent?appears?not?to?be?to?supplant?the?common?law?but?to?supplement?it?by?adding?requirements?not?found?in?the?common?law.?For?example,?the?common?law?does?not?list?entities?to?which?offers?must?be?made?nor?does?it?provide?price?parameters;?the?Act?does?so.?But?in?doing?so,?it?does?not?purport?to?remove?the?entire?contract?process?from?application?of?common?law?principles?consistent?with?the?specific?requirements?of?the?Act. The?question?of?what?constitutes?an?offer?is?beyond?the?scope?of?the?Act.?The?Act?does?not?explicitly?define?an?offer?nor?does?it?implicitly,?by?the?breadth?of?its?regulation,?support?the?conclusion?that?the?common?law?of?contracts?has?been?supplanted?for?purposes?of?determining?whether?an?offer?has?been?made.?Indeed,?the?flexibility?accorded?to?school?districts?in?the?Act,?as?described?in?the?foregoing?discussion,?is?incompatible?with?a?mechanistic?approach?to?determining?whether?an?offer?is?present?and?is?best?served?by,?and?most?reasonably?requires?the?application?of,?common?law?principles.?We?therefore?conclude?that?the?Act?was?not?intended?to?supplant?the?common?law?of?contracts?as?it?pertains?to?offers. Existence?of?an?Offer?Under?Common?Law Our?conclusion,?that?the?Court?of?Appeal?erroneously?held?that?courts?need?not?apply?common?law?contract?principles?to?determine?whether?school?districts?have?made?legal?offers?when?selling?surplus?property,?does?not?end?our?inquiry.?We?must?decide?whether?District?made?an?effective?legal?offer?under?the?common?law. [3]?”?’An?offer?is?the?manifestation?of?willingness?to?enter?into?a?bargain,?so?made?as?to?justify?another?person?in?understanding?that?his?assent?to?that?bargain?is?invited?and?will?conclude?it.’?”?(1?Witkin,?Summary?of?Cal.?Law?(9th?ed.?1987)?Contracts,???128,?pp.?153-154?[hereafter?Witkin],?quoting?Rest.2d?Contracts,???24;?accord?Winnaman?v.?Cambria?Community?Services?Dist.?(1989)?208?Cal.App.3d?49,?57?[256?Cal.Rptr.?40].)?[1c]?District’s?notice?informing?other?public?agencies?that?it?”proposes?to?offer?for?sale,?lease?or?exchange?all?or?a?portion?of?the?[site]?at?fair?market?value”?manifests?a?willingness?to?enter?into?a?bargain,?but?it?does?not?do?so?in?a?way?that?would?justify?an?understanding?that?assent?by?the?recipient?of?the?notice?is?invited?and?will?conclude?the?bargain. Rather,?the?notice?”suggests?the?terms?of?a?possible?contract”-(1)?sale,?lease,?or?exchange?of?(2)?all?or?a?part?of?a?particular?school?site-“without?making?a?definite?proposal.?The?result?is?a?mere?invitation?to?others?to?make?offers.”?(Witkin,?supra,???133,?at?p.?157.)?District’s?notice?thus?was?a?mere?invitation,?sent?to?13?public?agencies?with?the?hope?that?one?or?more?of?them?[54?Cal.3d?931]?would?express?interest?in?the?property.?Because?it?was?not?an?offer,?it?could?not?be?accepted?by?City’s?notice?in?July?1988,?contrary?to?the?conclusion?of?the?Court?of?Appeal.?Moreover,?the?history?of?negotiations?set?out?above?indicates?that?although?proposals?that?would?qualify?as?offers?were?made,?none?was?ever?accepted. Conclusion We?conclude?that?the?common?law?of?contracts?applies?to?transactions?pursuant?to?the?Act?and?that?under?common?law?principles,?City?and?District?did?not?enter?into?a?contract?for?sale.?Accordingly,?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?affirming?the?judgment?in?favor?of?respondents?is?reversed. Mosk,?J.,?Panelli,?J.,?Kennard,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?Baxter,?J.,?and?George,?J.,?concurred. FN?1.?All?statutory?references?are?to?this?code?unless?otherwise?noted. FN?2.?Application?of?the?Act?does?not?hinge?on?a?school?district’s?determination?that?a?site?is?or?is?not?surplus?property.?If?the?criteria?of?section?39391?are?met,?the?Act?applies. […]

In?re?Richard?S.?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?857?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?2;?819?P.2d?843 [No.?S016631.?Dec?2,?1991.] In?re?RICHARD?S.,?a?Person?Coming?Under?the?Juvenile?Court?Law. PEDRO?R.?SILVA,?as?Chief?Probation?Officer,?etc.,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?LORI?S.,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Santa?Clara?County,?No.?97327,?Kristine?Mackin?McCarthy,?Temporary?Judge.fn.?*?) (Opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Dallas?Sacher,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?and?Margaritay?Lopez?Orozco,?under?appointment?by?the?Court?of?Appeal,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. Steven?M.?Woodside,?County?Counsel,?Vanessa?Zecher?Cain?and?Diane?L.?Bennett,?Deputy?County?Counsel,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent.?[54?Cal.3d?860] Leo?Himmelsbach,?District?Attorney,?Daniel?A.?Palmer?and?Penelope?M.?Blake,?Deputy?District?Attorneys,?for?Minor. OPINION MOSK,?J. The?question?before?us?is?whether?a?referee?lacks?jurisdiction?to?enter?a?final?order?in?a?juvenile?matter?if?the?superior?court?fails?to?strictly?follow?the?provisions?of?rule?244?of?the?California?Rules?of?Court?in?appointing?the?referee?as?a?temporary?judge.?We?determine?that?error?in?failing?to?follow?rule?244?is?not?jurisdictional?when?the?parties?have?stipulated?to?trial?by?temporary?judge?and?the?requirements?of?article?VI,?section?21?of?the?California?Constitution?are?otherwise?met. I During?a?custody?dispute?in?the?family?court,?when?it?appeared?that?the?family?court?services?custody?evaluation?would?recommend?that?father?should?receive?custody?of?the?child,?the?child?made?an?accusation?of?sexual?abuse?against?father.?The?county?filed?a?petition?under?Welfare?and?Institutions?Code?section?300?to?declare?the?child?a?dependent?ward?of?the?juvenile?court. On?April?22,?1988,?Kristine?Mackin?McCarthy,?referee?of?the?Juvenile?Court?of?Santa?Clara?County,?ordered?that?the?child?be?placed?in?protective?custody?in?juvenile?hall.?The?form?order,?clearly?referring?to?McCarthy?as?a?referee,?set?a?hearing?in?the?matter?in?department?IV?of?the?juvenile?court?for?May?13,?1988. On?May?13,?1988,?the?matter?was?continued?by?Referee?McCarthy.?The?clerk’s?transcript?notation?of?this?hearing?referred?to?her?as?a?judge.?The?clerk’s?transcript?also?contains?a?form?stipulation?dated?May?20,?1988,?in?which?the?attorney?representing?the?child,?and?the?two?attorneys?representing?mother?and?father,?signed?the?written?stipulation?that?McCarthy?”be?appointed?Judge?Pro?Tempore?of?the?Superior?Court?to?try?this?action.”?The?form?calls?for?the?signature?of?a?judge?of?the?superior?court?approving?the?referee’s?appointment?as?a?temporary?judge,?but?no?such?signature?appears.?McCarthy?entered?her?signature?indicating?that?she?had?subscribed?to?the?oath?of?office. The?jurisdictional?hearing?commenced?on?November?4,?1988,?the?court?reporter?noting?that?the?judge?presiding?was?the?Honorable?Kristine?[54?Cal.3d?861]?McCarthy,?”Judge?Pro?Tempore.”fn.?1At?the?conclusion?of?the?hearing?on?Monday,?November?21,?1988,?at?which?the?court?found?the?child?a?dependent?ward?of?the?court?and?ordered?him?placed?in?his?father’s?custody,?the?court?advised?the?parties?of?their?right?of?appeal?to?the?Court?of?Appeal.fn.?2 The?clerk’s?transcript?also?contains?another?form?stipulation,?dated?November?10,?1988,?and?stamped?as?filed?on?November?22,?1988,?in?which?counsel?for?mother?and?father?signed?a?stipulation?to?McCarthy?presiding?as?”Judge?Pro?Tempore.”?The?portion?of?the?form?noting?that?the?superior?court?ordered?McCarthy?appointed?as?a?temporary?judge?is?signed?by?a?judge?of?the?superior?court,?and?McCarthy?again?entered?her?signature?indicating?that?she?had?taken?the?oath?of?office. Mother?appealed,?arguing,?among?other?things,?that?the?court’s?order?was?void?because?of?defects?in?the?stipulation?and?order?authorizing?the?referee?to?sit?as?a?temporary?judge.?The?Court?of?Appeal?rejected?these?arguments?and?affirmed?the?judgment. II Article?VI,?section?21?of?the?California?Constitution?provides:?”On?stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant?the?court?may?order?a?cause?to?be?tried?by?a?temporary?judge?who?is?a?member?of?the?State?Bar,?sworn?and?empowered?to?act?until?final?determination?of?the?cause.” Rule?244?of?the?California?Rules?of?Court?(hereafter?rule?244)?amplifies?these?requirements,?particularly?by?providing?for?written?stipulations.?It?provides?in?pertinent?part:?”The?stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant?that?a?case?may?be?tried?by?a?temporary?judge?shall?be?in?writing?….?It?shall?be?submitted?for?approval?to?the?presiding?judge?or?to?the?supervising?judge?of?a?branch?court.?The?order?designating?the?temporary?judge?shall?be?endorsed?upon?the?stipulation,?which?shall?then?be?filed.?The?temporary?judge?shall?take?and?subscribe?the?oath?of?office,?which?shall?be?attached?to?the?stipulation?and?order?of?designation,?and?the?case?shall?then?be?assigned?to?the?temporary?judge?for?trial.?After?the?oath?is?filed,?the?temporary?judge?may?proceed?with?the?hearing,?trial?and?determination?of?the?case.”?[54?Cal.3d?862] [1a]?Mother?argues?that?because?the?order?signed?by?a?superior?court?judge?authorizing?the?referee?to?act?as?a?temporary?judge?was?not?filed?until?the?conclusion?of?the?dispositional?hearing,?the?referee?lacked?jurisdiction?to?enter?a?final?order.fn.?3?She?argues?that?under?article?VI,?section?21?of?the?California?Constitution?(hereafter?article?VI,?section?21),?a?juvenile?court?referee?may?not?act?as?a?temporary?judge?absent?a?written?order?of?the?superior?court.?The?requirements?of?rule?244,?she?maintains,?are?of?constitutional?stature,?so?that?failure?to?meet?those?requirements?is?jurisdictional?error.?She?relies?on?the?familiar?rule?that?the?parties?cannot?confer?jurisdiction?by?consent.fn.?4 [2]?At?the?outset?we?dispose?of?the?claim?that?the?failure?of?the?clerk?to?file?the?written?order?authorizing?the?referee?to?sit?as?a?temporary?judge?before?the?entry?of?the?jurisdictional?order?was?constitutional?error?within?the?terms?of?article?VI,?section?21.?That?section?simply?provides?that?a?court?may?order?a?cause?to?be?tried?by?a?temporary?judge.?It?appears?to?us?that?the?court?fulfilled?this?function?by?assigning?the?matter?for?trial?before?a?referee?the?parties?had?stipulated?would?sit?as?a?temporary?judge?and?who?had?subscribed?to?the?oath?of?office. Mother?objects?that?the?history?of?the?provision?indicates?a?written?order?must?precede?any?judicial?act?by?the?temporary?judge.?She?points?out?that?article?VI,?section?21?is?based?on?the?now?repealed?article?VI,?section?5,?which?provided?that?the?selection?of?a?temporary?judge?”shall?be?subject?to?the?approval?and?order?of?the?court.”?As?the?1966?revision?of?the?provision?was?not?intended?to?achieve?a?substantive?change,?but?simply?to?restate?the?provision?in?modern?terms?(People?v.?Tijerina?(1969)?1?Cal.3d?41,?48?[81?Cal.Rptr.?264,?459?P.2d?680]),?she?reasons?that?a?requirement?of?a?prior?written?order?survives?in?the?current?constitutional?language.?We?do?not?accept?her?premise,?however,?that?the?original?language?required?a?prior?written?order,?or?any?act?beyond?the?assignment?of?a?cause?for?trial?before?an?[54?Cal.3d?863]?eligible?person?who?sits?by?stipulation?as?a?temporary?judge.?In?any?event,?here?the?court?did?sign?a?written?order?before?the?referee?entered?her?order. Mother?makes?a?similar?argument?to?indicate?that?the?requirements?of?rule?244?are?jurisdictional.?She?notes?that?the?former?article?VI,?section?5?of?the?Constitution?provided?the?appointment?of?a?temporary?judge?”shall?also?be?subject?to?such?regulations?and?orders?as?may?be?prescribed?by?the?Judicial?Council.”?Though?this?language?was?omitted?from?the?current?provision,?she?argues?there?was?no?intent?to?diminish?the?authority?of?the?Judicial?Council,?but?rather?the?language?was?omitted?because?”the?Judicial?Council’s?general?rulemaking?authority?[was]?continued?in?Section?6?of?Article?VI?and?a?separate?statement?in?[section?21?was]?unnecessary.”?(Judicial?Council?of?Cal.,?Ann.?Rep.?(1967)?p.?89.) [1b]?Even?interpreting?the?constitutional?language?in?light?of?the?earlier?provision,?we?do?not?accept?the?premise?that?because?the?Constitution?provided?the?Judicial?Council?was?to?establish?rules?with?respect?to?the?appointment?of?temporary?judges,?the?Constitution?intended?to?provide?that?failure?to?follow?those?rules?precisely?is?error?depriving?the?tribunal?of?jurisdiction.?Neither?the?former?nor?the?current?constitutional?language?suggests?this,?and?no?other?authority?has?been?called?to?our?attention?to?indicate?that?the?Constitution?was?intended?to?make?Judicial?Council?rules?on?this?point?jurisdictional.?The?Judicial?Council?is?simply?empowered?to?”adopt?rules?for?court?administration,?practice?and?procedure,?not?inconsistent?with?statute?….”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???6.) Therefore,?although?there?is?doubt?that?Judicial?Council?rules?may?affect?jurisdiction?in?this?instance,?for?purposes?of?discussion?we?shall?assume?that?they?may.?[3]?The?rules?have?the?force?of?statute?to?the?extent?that?they?are?not?inconsistent?with?legislative?enactments?and?constitutional?provisions.?(Albermont?Petroleum?Ltd.?v.?Cunningham?(1960)?186?Cal.App.2d?84,?89?[9?Cal.Rptr.?405],?questioned?on?other?grounds?in?Mann?v.?Cracchiolo?(1985)?38?Cal.3d?18,?28-29?[210?Cal.Rptr.?762,?694?P.2d?1134];?see?also?People?v.?Wright?(1982)?30?Cal.3d?705,?712?[180?Cal.Rptr.?196,?639?P.2d?267].)?As?with?any?other?statute,?the?question?whether?failure?to?comply?with?the?rule?deprives?the?tribunal?of?jurisdiction?is?one?of?legislative?intent.?(Averill?v.?Lincoln?(1944)?24?Cal.2d?761,?764?[151?P.2d?119]?[rule?requiring?that?party?”shall”?serve?certain?notice?on?appeal?is?not?jurisdictional];?see?also?Jacobs?v.?State?Bar?(1977)?20?Cal.3d?191,?198?[141?Cal.Rptr.?812,?570?P.2d?1230];?Morris?v.?County?of?Marin?(1977)?18?Cal.3d?901,?910?[136?Cal.Rptr.?251,?559?P.2d?606].) The?contention?that?the?requirements?of?rule?244?are?jurisdictional?is?one?that?has?divided?the?Courts?of?Appeal.?In?two?cases,?the?Fifth?District?has?[54?Cal.3d?864]?held?that?failure?to?follow?the?procedure?set?out?in?rule?244?is?jurisdictional?error?requiring?reversal.?The?first?case,?In?re?Damian?V.?(1988)?197?Cal.App.3d?933?[243?Cal.Rptr.?185],?involved?a?proceeding?to?terminate?parental?rights.?Although?the?father?and?the?county?counsel?stipulated?to?trial?by?temporary?judge,?and?the?superior?court?ordered?the?appointment?of?the?temporary?judge,?neither?the?mother?(who?failed?to?appear)?nor?the?minors?joined?in?the?stipulation?and?the?temporary?judge?never?took?the?oath?of?office.?The?reviewing?court?observed?that?rule?244?”is?couched?in?mandatory?language?and?suggests?failure?to?comply?with?the?specific?conditions?precedent?would?nullify?or?void?any?subsequent?rulings?or?orders?by?the?temporary?judge.”?(Id.?at?p.?938.)?The?second?case,?In?re?Heather?P.?(1988)?203?Cal.App.3d?1214?[250?Cal.Rptr.?468],?reached?the?same?conclusion?in?the?context?of?a?dependency?proceeding?brought?under?section?300?of?the?Welfare?and?Institutions?Code.?There,?although?there?was?an?oral?stipulation?on?behalf?of?the?mother?and?minor?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge,?there?was?no?written?stipulation?or?approval?of?the?stipulation?by?the?superior?court,?and?it?appeared?that?the?temporary?judge?had?not?taken?the?oath?of?office.?Simply?noting?that?Damian?V.?had?held?that?the?rule?244?was?mandatory,?the?court?concluded?”any?orders?or?rulings?by?the?temporary?judge?would?necessarily?be?void?as?the?temporary?judge?would?have?been?without?constitutional?or?statutory?authority?to?act.”?(203?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1225.) The?better?view,?however,?is?represented?by?those?cases?that?have?reached?a?contrary?conclusion?with?respect?to?rule?244,?as?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?the?present?case?determined.?In?In?re?Robert?S.?(1988)?197?Cal.App.3d?1260?[243?Cal.Rptr.?459],?a?termination?of?parental?rights?case,?the?First?District?held?that?because?article?VI,?section?21?contemplates?trial?by?temporary?judge?”upon?stipulation?of?the?parties,”?a?retired?juvenile?court?referee?had?power?to?preside?under?an?oral?stipulation?of?the?parties,?regardless?of?rule?244?and?its?requirement?of?a?written?stipulation.?It?pointed?out?that?far?from?requiring?a?written?stipulation,?the?Constitution?permits?stipulation?by?conduct?of?the?parties.?(See?maj.?opn.?in?In?re?Horton?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?82?[284?Cal.Rptr.?305,?813?P.2d?1335].)?It?agreed?with?language?in?People?v.?Oaxaca?(1974)?39?Cal.App.3d?153,?164?[114?Cal.Rptr.?178],?objecting?that?it?would?be?”?’?”intolerable?to?permit?a?party?to?play?fast?and?loose?with?the?administration?of?justice?by?deliberately?standing?by?without?making?an?objection?of?which?he?is?aware?and?thereby?permitting?the?proceeding?to?go?to?a?conclusion?which?he?may?acquiesce?in,?if?favorable,?and?which?he?may?avoid,?if?not.”?’?” Further,?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?Robert?S.?rejected?the?notion?that?rule?244?imposes?jurisdictional?requirements,?declaring?that?the?1966?amendment?to?article?VI,?section?21?eliminated?language?that?formerly?had?expressly?referred?to?Judicial?Council?rules.?”[T]he?language?of?former?article?VI,?[54?Cal.3d?865]?section?5,?expressly?providing?that?the?selection?of?a?judge?pro?tempore?is?’subject?to?such?regulations?and?orders?as?may?be?prescribed?by?the?Judicial?Council,’?was?eliminated.?Based?on?the?omission?of?the?requirement?that?the?selection?of?a?temporary?judge?be?subject?to?the?rules?of?the?Judicial?Council,?we?conclude?that?compliance?with?rule?244(a)?is?not?a?constitutional?prerequisite?to?empowering?a?temporary?judge?to?act.”?(In?re?Robert?S.,?supra,?197?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1265;?see?also?In?re?P.?I.?(1989)?207?Cal.App.3d?316,?322?[254?Cal.Rptr.?774]?[accord,?applying?Robert?S.?in?Welf.?&?Inst.?Code,???602?proceeding].) The?Fourth?District?in?In?re?Lamonica?H.?(1990)?220?Cal.App.3d?634?[270?Cal.Rptr.?60]?(see?also?In?re?Samkirtana?S.?(1990)?222?Cal.App.3d?1475,?1481?[272?Cal.Rptr.?489],?accord)?also?noted?the?deletion?from?the?Constitution?of?language?referring?to?the?Judicial?Council?rules,?but?focused?more?on?an?analysis?of?whether?the?rule?itself?was?intended?to?be?mandatory?or?directory.?It?is?this?analysis?that?we?find?dispositive.?[1c]?We?conclude?that?the?court?in?In?re?Damian?V.,?supra,?197?Cal.App.3d?933,?erred?in?assuming?that?because?rule?244?uses?the?term?”shall,”?failure?to?follow?the?rule?precisely?deprives?the?court?of?jurisdiction. [4a]?A?statutory?requirement?may?impose?on?the?state?a?duty?to?act?in?a?particular?way,?and?yet?failure?to?do?so?may?not?void?the?governmental?action?taken?in?violation?of?the?duty.?(Morris?v.?County?of?Marin,?supra,?18?Cal.3d?901,?908;?Pulcifer?v.?County?of?Alameda?(1946)?29?Cal.2d?258,?262-263?[175?P.2d?1];?Mitchell?v.?City?of?Indio?(1987)?196?Cal.App.3d?881,?888-889?[242?Cal.Rptr.?235];?In?re?Charles?B.?(1986)?189?Cal.App.3d?1204,?1209?[235?Cal.Rptr.?1].)?This?distinction?is?generally?expressed?in?terms?of?calling?the?duty?”mandatory”?or?”directory.”?”[T]he?’directory’?or?’mandatory’?designation?does?not?refer?to?whether?a?particular?statutory?requirement?is?’permissive’?or?’obligatory,’?but?instead?simply?denotes?whether?the?failure?to?comply?with?a?particular?procedural?step?will?or?will?not?have?the?effect?of?invalidating?the?governmental?action?to?which?the?procedural?requirement?relates.”?(Morris?v.?County?of?Marin,?supra,?18?Cal.3d?at?p.?908.) [1d]?We?are?persuaded?by?the?decision?in?In?re?Lamonica?H.,?supra,?220?Cal.App.3d?634,?that?rule?244?is?directory?rather?than?mandatory?to?the?extent?that?it?imposes?requirements?beyond?those?expressed?in?article?VI,?section?21,?and?that?no?purpose?would?be?served?by?interpreting?it?as?intended?to?void?any?action?taken?when?the?requirements?of?the?rule?were?not?precisely?fulfilled.?We?must?go?beyond?the?use?of?the?term?”shall”?in?the?rules?and?determine?legislative?intent.?[4b]?In?determining?whether?statutory?language?is?mandatory?or?directory,?”?'[i]n?the?absence?of?express?language,?the?intent?must?be?gathered?from?the?terms?of?the?statute?construed?as?a?whole,?from?the?nature?and?character?of?the?act?to?be?done,?and?from?the?[54?Cal.3d?866]?consequences?which?would?follow?the?doing?or?failure?to?do?the?particular?act?at?the?required?time.?[Citation.]?When?the?object?is?to?subserve?some?public?purpose,?the?provision?may?be?held?directory?or?mandatory?as?will?best?accomplish?that?purpose?[citation].?…’?”?(Morris?v.?County?of?Marin,?supra,?18?Cal.3d?at?p.?910,?quoting?Pulcifer?v.?County?of?Alameda,?supra,?29?Cal.2d?at?p.?262;?see?also?People?v.?McGee?(1977)?19?Cal.3d?948,?958-959?[140?Cal.Rptr.?657,?568?P.2d?382].) The?court?in?Lamonica?H.?found?that?rule?244?was?intended?to?serve?administrative?purposes:?”Where?a?party?to?a?proceeding?heard?by?a?referee?has?in?fact?expressly?or?impliedly?agreed?that?the?referee?may?sit?as?temporary?judge?pursuant?to?article?VI,?section?21?of?the?Constitution,?it?is?difficult?for?us?to?fathom?what?legitimate?interest?the?party?has?in?the?method?by?which?his?agreement?is?memorialized.?Whether?consent?is?oral,?written,?express?or?implied,?if?in?fact?a?party?agrees?to?proceed?before?a?referee?and?thereafter?receives?a?ruling?on?the?merits?from?the?referee,?his?reasonable?expectations?have?been?fulfilled.?Thus?the?detailed?procedure?set?forth?in?rule?244?appears?to?us?designed?to?serve?collateral?interests?of?the?judicial?system.?By?requiring?a?written?instrument,?the?rule?prevents?disputes?as?to?whether?parties?have?in?fact?consented?and?the?scope?of?their?consent.?[Citation.]?By?further?requiring?the?written?approval?of?a?supervising?judge?and?an?oath,?the?rule?insures?that?the?activities?of?temporary?judges?are?monitored?and?do?not?impair?the?administration?of?the?trial?courts.?These?interests?are?entirely?unrelated?to?[the?litigant’s]?interest?in?having?his?dispute?heard?in?a?competent?and?unbiased?tribunal.”?(In?re?Lamonica?H.,?supra,?220?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?644.) [1e]?In?sum,?we?agree?with?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?this?case,?and?with?the?decisions?in?In?re?Robert?S.,?supra,?197?Cal.App.3d?1260,?In?re?P.?I.,?supra,?207?Cal.App.3d?316,?and?In?re?Lamonica?H.,?supra,?220?Cal.App.3d?634,?that?when?the?requirements?of?article?VI,?section?21?are?otherwise?met,?the?parties?by?their?stipulation?to?trial?by?a?referee?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge,?waive?any?claim?of?error?on?the?basis?of?failure?to?strictly?comply?with?that?rule.fn.?5 Mother?objects?that?such?a?conclusion?violates?the?general?rule?that?parties?cannot?confer?jurisdiction?by?consent.?She?overlooks?the?fact?that?the?superior?court?has?subject?matter?jurisdiction?over?the?cause?and?ordered?it?tried?before?the?referee?as?a?temporary?judge.?The?stipulation?of?the?parties?simply?confers?judicial?power?on?the?referee?to?act?as?a?temporary?judge?within?the?superior?court.?(See?In?re?Perrone?C.?(1979)?26?Cal.3d?49,?57?[160?Cal.Rptr.?[54?Cal.3d?867]?704,?603?P.2d?1300].)?This?is?not?a?situation?in?which?the?parties?attempt?to?confer?jurisdiction?that?is?constitutionally?lacking. III The?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?affirmed. Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?J.,?Kennard,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?Baxter,?J.,?and?George,?J.,?concurred. FN?*.?Pursuant?to?California?Constitution,?article?VI,?section?21. FN?1.?The?evidence?at?the?hearing?was?directed?to?the?question?whether?mother?or?father?should?receive?custody;?it?was?undisputed?that?the?child?had?serious?emotional?problems?but?little?effort?was?made?to?prove?an?episode?of?sexual?abuse. FN?2.?The?hearings?on?November?4,?10,?14?and?21?were?technically?jurisdictional?hearings,?though?father?offered?to?stipulate?to?the?court’s?jurisdiction?under?Welfare?and?Institutions?Code?section?300,?and?although?the?evidence?was?directed?to?the?issue?of?disposition.?At?the?conclusion?of?closing?argument?on?November?21,?the?court?noted?its?understanding?that?there?was?no?dispute?over?jurisdiction,?and?that?it?would?enter?a?dispositional?order?based?on?the?evidence?it?had?heard?at?the?jurisdictional?phase. FN?3.?A?referee,?of?course,?has?jurisdiction?to?enter?a?dispositional?order?as?a?referee,?subject?to?review?by?the?superior?court.?(Welf.?&?Inst.?Code,????248,?252.) FN?4.?In?the?Court?of?Appeal,?and?in?the?petition?for?review,?mother?argued?that?the?stipulation?to?trial?of?this?juvenile?dependency?matter?before?a?referee?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge?was?defective?in?other?respects:?1)?it?was?not?prepared?until?after?the?referee?had?already?made?an?order?detaining?the?child?in?juvenile?hall?and?made?an?order?continuing?the?jurisdictional?hearing;?2)?it?lacked?the?signature?of?counsel?who?was?present?and?representing?the?child;?and?3)?the?referee’s?office?address?did?not?appear?on?the?form.?Our?order?granting?review?specified?the?issue?as?whether?orders?made?by?a?juvenile?court?referee?are?valid?where?the?record?does?not?show?strict?compliance?with?the?court?rule?regarding?stipulations?for?temporary?judges.?Counsel?for?mother?chose?to?limit?briefing?on?the?merits?to?the?issue?of?the?failure?of?the?superior?court?to?timely?file?an?order?authorizing?the?referee?to?sit?as?a?temporary?judge.?Accordingly,?we?respond?only?to?that?question. FN?5.?To?the?extent?they?are?inconsistent?with?this?opinion,?the?decisions?in?In?re?Heather?P.,?supra,?203?Cal.App.3d?1214,?and?In?re?Damian?V.,?supra,?197?Cal.App.3d?933,?are?disapproved.  

Christensen?v.?Superior?Court?(Pasadena?Crematorium?of?Altadena)?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?868?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?79;?820?P.2d?181 [No.?S016890. Dec?2,?1991.] DONALD?PAUL?CHRISTENSEN?et?al.,?Petitioners,?v.?THE?SUPERIOR?COURT?OF?LOS?ANGELES?COUNTY,?Respondent;?PASADENA?CREMATORIUM?OF?ALTADENA?et?al.,?Real?Parties?in?Interest. (Superior?Court?of?Los?Angeles?County,?No.?C634121,?Barnet?M.?Cooperman,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Baxter,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?George,?JJ.,?and?Turner?(Paul?A.),?J.,fn.?*?concurring.?Separate?concurring?and?dissenting?opinions?by?Mosk?and?Kennard,?JJ.) COUNSEL Robie?&?Matthai,?Edith?R.?Matthai,?Pamela?E.?Dunn,?Lieff,?Cabraser?&?Heimann,?Elizabeth?Joan?Cabraser,?William?Bernstein,?William?M.?Audet,?Kronick,?Moskovitz,?Tiedemann?&?Girard,?William?A.?Kershaw,?Robin?Leslie?Stewart,?Michael?McShane,?Belli,?Belli,?Brown,?Monzione,?Fabbro?&?Zakaria,?Melvin?E.?Belli,?Sr.,?Richard?Brown,?Wilner,?Narwitz,?Lewin?&?Klein,?Wilner,?Klein,?Siegel?&?Kehr,?Walter?Klein,?Sayre,?Moreno,?Purcell?&?Boucher?and?Gilbert?S.?Purcell?for?Petitioners. No?appearance?for?Respondent.?[54?Cal.3d?875] Marlin?&?Saltzman,?Marlin,?Saltzman?&?White,?Louis?M.?Marlin,?Stanley?D.?Saltzman,?Morris,?Polich?&?Purdy,?Jeffrey?S.?Barron,?Robert?S.?Wolfe,?Anthony?G.?Brazil,?Douglas?J.?Collodel,?Michael?S.?Wildermuth,?Donald?L.?Ridge,?Adams,?Duque?&?Hazeltine,?Richard?T.?Davis,?Jr.,?Jeffrey?P.?Smith,?Berna?Warner-Fredman,?F.?Christopher?Chrisbens,?Pillsbury,?Madison?&?Sutro,?C.?Douglas?Floyd,?F.?John?Nyhan,?Anthony?R.?Delling,?Susan?A.?Kerans,?Gerber?&?Donaldes,?Harvey?R.?Gerber,?Berchin?&?Berchin,?Eugene?C.?Berchin?and?Jerome?J.?Berchin?for?Real?Parties?in?Interest. Horvitz?&?Levy,?Barry?R.?Levy,?Christina?J.?Imre,?Fred?Main,?Catherine?I.?Hansen,?Fred?J.?Hiestand?and?Richard?Denhalter,?City?Attorney?(Santa?Clara),?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Real?Parties?in?Interest. OPINION BAXTER,?J. We?are?asked?to?decide?whether?persons?other?than?those?who?contract?for?the?services?of?mortuaries?and?crematoria?or?have?the?statutory?right?to?direct?the?disposition?of?the?body?of?a?decedent?may?recover?damages?for?emotional?distress?engendered?by?knowledge?of?the?negligent?or?intentional?mishandling?of?the?decedent’s?remains?when?they?did?not?observe?the?misconduct?or?its?consequences.?The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?those?family?members?may?recover?damages?for?the?emotional?distress?they?suffer?if?remains?are?negligently?or?intentionally?mishandled,?and?that?if?the?mishandling?is?intentional?all?family?members?and?close?friends?of?the?deceased?may?do?so. We?agree?that?the?class?of?persons?who?may?recover?for?emotional?distress?negligently?caused?by?the?defendants?is?not?limited?to?those?who?have?the?statutory?right?to?control?disposition?of?the?remains?and?those?who?contract?for?disposition.?The?class?is?not,?however,?as?expansive?as?that?identified?by?the?Court?of?Appeal.?As?in?all?recovery?for?negligence,?the?potential?plaintiff?must?be?a?person?to?whom?the?defendant?owes?a?duty?recognized?by?the?law.?In?this?context,?the?duty?is?owed?only?to?those?close?family?members?who?were?aware?that?funeral?and/or?crematory?services?were?being?performed,?and?on?whose?behalf?or?for?whose?benefit?the?services?were?rendered. Therefore,?and?because?we?also?conclude?that?the?individual?plaintiffs?and?the?class?they?seek?to?represent?lack?standing?to?recover?on?an?intentional?infliction?of?emotional?distress?theory,?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?must?be?modified.?[54?Cal.3d?876] I This?matter?arises?on?review?of?a?ruling?on?standing?to?sue?made?by?the?trial?court?in?a?coordination?proceeding.fn.?1?At?the?trial?court’s?request?the?parties?briefed?the?question?of?standing?based?on?the?allegations?of?a?designated?”model”?complaint,?selected?for?the?purpose?of?preliminary?rulings?from?those?filed?in?the?coordinated?actions.?The?Court?of?Appeal?treated?the?ruling?as?one?in?the?nature?of?a?ruling?on?a?demurrer,fn.?2?accepting?the?allegations?of?the?model?complaint?as?true?for?purposes?of?this?proceeding,?and?considering?whether?those?allegations?stated?a?cause?of?action?on?behalf?of?all?of?the?individual?plaintiffs,?and?the?class?the?individual?plaintiffs?sought?to?represent.fn.?3 In?response?to?plaintiffs’?petition?for?writ?of?mandate,?after?issuance?of?an?alternative?writ?the?Court?of?Appeal?directed?that?a?peremptory?writ?issue?to?compel?the?trial?court?to?modify?its?order?to?recognize?the?standing?of?additional?plaintiffs. We?agree?with?the?Court?of?Appeal?that?the?ruling,?although?described?as?one?on?standing,?was?in?the?nature?of?a?ruling?on?a?demurrer?inasmuch?as?the?effect?was?to?determine?whether?all?of?the?plaintiffs?and?the?plaintiff?class?had?stated?a?cause?or?causes?of?action?for?which?each?could?recover?emotional?distress?damages.?We?address?the?issues?as?having?been?raised?in?that?context. The?model?complaint?defined?the?plaintiff?class?as?one?consisting?of?surviving?spouses,?relatives,?and?designated?representatives?of?decedents?whose?remains?had?been?mishandled?by?defendants.?The?individual?plaintiffs?who?seek?to?represent?the?class?are?persons?within?the?class?who?have?the?right?and?responsibility?for?handling,?and?the?right?to?custody?and?possession?of?their?decedents’?remains,?and?possess?or?may?acquire?the?right?under?section?7100?of?the?Health?and?Safety?Codefn.?4?to?control?disposition?of?the?[54?Cal.3d?877]?remains,?and/or?contracted?for?defendants’?services,?paid?for?the?services,?or?represent?the?estates?of?persons?who?did?so.fn.?5 All?of?the?individual?plaintiffs?and?members?of?the?plaintiff?class?as?described?in?the?model?complaint?are,?therefore,?contracting?parties?and/or?relatives?of?decedents?whose?remains?were?allegedly?mishandled.fn.?6 The?defendants?fall?into?two?principal?classes?designated?by?plaintiffs?as?the?”mortuary”?defendants?and?the?”crematory”?defendants.?The?mortuary?defendants?allegedly?undertook?to,?contracted?to,?and?agreed?to?provide?funeral-related?services?for?the?benefit?of?plaintiffs,?and?to?accomplish?the?cremation?of?the?remains?of?plaintiffs’?decedents?”with?the?dignity?and?respect?due?them?in?accordance?with?Plaintiffs’?and?decedents’?wishes,?in?keeping?with?public?sensibilities,?and?in?accordance?with?the?law.”?The?mortuary?defendants?contracted?with?the?crematory?defendants?for?cremation?of?the?remains. The?crematory?defendants,?which?represented?that?they?would?perform?cremations?in?a?dignified?and?respectful?manner,?provided?forms?authorizing?[54?Cal.3d?878]?cremation?to?the?mortuary?defendants?to?enable?the?latter?to?obtain?consent?from?the?next?of?kin?whose?business?the?mortuary?defendants?solicited?on?behalf?of?both?themselves?and?the?crematory?defendants. The?mortuary?defendants?knew,?or?should?have?known,?of?the?illegal?and?improper?practices?of?the?crematory?defendants. The?remaining?defendants,?Carolina?Biological?Supply?Company?and?its?agent?William?G.?Gabriel,?residents?of?North?Carolina?(collectively,?the?Carolina?defendants),?allegedly?requested?and?purchased?human?organs?and?body?parts?from?the?crematory?defendants.?The?Carolina?defendants?failed?to?seek?review?of?an?earlier?order?of?the?trial?court?overruling?their?demurrer,?and?did?not?seek?review?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?ruling?on?the?standing?of?a?subclass?of?plaintiffs?who?seek?recovery?from?the?Carolina?defendants.?In?that?ruling,?the?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?only?the?statutory?right?holders?may?recover?from?the?Carolina?defendants?that,?allegedly,?purchased?bodily?organs?and?parts?taken?from?plaintiffs’?decedents?by?the?crematory?defendants,?and?did?so?under?circumstances?in?which?the?Carolina?defendants?knew?or?should?have?known?that?desecration?of?human?remains?would?necessarily?occur.fn.?7 The?PFAC?seeks?relief?against?members?of?each?class?directly?and?for?the?acts?of?others?on?theories?of?agency?and?conspiracy.?The?events?about?which?plaintiffs?complain?occurred?in?the?period?1980-1987,?but?were?not?discovered?by?plaintiffs?until?February?1987,?when?plaintiffs?first?learned?”from?public?media?reports”?that?their?decedents’?remains?had?been?mishandled?in?the?manner?alleged?in?the?complaint. The?model?complaint?alleged?that?the?crematory?defendants?mishandled?and?mutilated?remains,?commingled?human?remains,?and?violated?sections?7051,?7052,?7054.7,?and?7055,?as?well?as?Business?and?Professions?Code?section?7735,?and?Penal?Code?section?487.1.?[54?Cal.3d?879] More?specifically,?in?support?of?this?allegation?and?one?charging?that?those?defendants?had?”removed?and?’harvested,’?without?authorization?or?permission,?numerous?human?organs?and?body?parts?from?plaintiffs’?decedents’?remains,”?the?complaint?alleged?that?defendants?cremated?remains?in?the?pottery?kiln?of?defendant?Oscar?Ceramics;?cremated?remains?in?a?disrespectful?manner;?cremated?as?many?as?10?to?15?bodies?together?at?the?pottery?kiln?and?multiple?bodies?at?other?locations;?took?and?sold?gold?and?other?metals?from?the?remains;?placed?cremated?remains?in?urns?or?other?containers?without?preserving?their?integrity?or?identity;?and?mutilated?decedents’?remains?”including,?but?not?limited?to?the?unauthorized?taking?of?Plaintiffs’?decedents’?corneas,?eyes,?hearts,?lungs?and?other?organs,?and?bones?and?body?parts,?which?were?sold?for?Defendants’?profit?….” The?mortuary?defendants,?who?had?agreed?to?provide?funeral-related?services?and?accomplish?cremation?of?the?remains?for?the?benefit?of?plaintiffs,?had?contracted?with?the?crematory?defendants?for?services?in?circumstances?in?which?they?knew?or?should?have?known?that?this?conduct?was?occurring?or?would?occur. On?discovering?defendants’?misconduct?plaintiffs?suffered?and?will?continue?to?suffer?”physical?injury,?shock,?outrage,?extreme?anxiety,?worry,?mortification,?embarrassment,?humiliation,?distress,?grief,?and?sorrow.” The?ninth?cause?of?action,?identified?as?one?for?”Intentional?Interference?with?Remains?and?Infliction?of?Emotional?Distress,”?alleged?that?the?crematory?and?mortuary?defendants?had?wilfully?and?deliberately?interfered?with?the?rights?and?duties?of?the?plaintiffs?to?effect?the?proper?cremation?of?the?remains?”by?mutilating?the?remains?by?’harvesting’?of?organs?and?body?parts,?by?performing?multiple?cremations,?by?commingling?decedents’?cremated?remains?with?other?cremated?remains,?and?with?nonhuman?residue,?and?by?unceremoniously?and?disrespectfully?handling?Plaintiff’s?decedents’?remains,?rather?than?by?separately,?respectfully,?and?with?dignity,?mishandling?the?cremated?remains?….”?As?a?result?plaintiffs?allegedly?suffered?injury?like?that?described?above. The?10th?cause?of?action,?identified?as?one?for?”Negligent?Interference?with?Remains?and?Infliction?of?Emotional?Distress,”?alleged?the?same?improper?conduct?and?injury?caused?by?defendants’?negligent,?reckless?and?careless?interference?with?the?plaintiffs’?statutory?rights?and?responsibilities?to?dispose?of?the?remains?of?their?decedents.?This?count?also?alleged?that?defendants?had?cremated,?handled,?and?treated?their?decedents’?remains?in?[54?Cal.3d?880]?ways?unauthorized?by?plaintiffs?and?their?decedents,?which?were?contrary?to?their?wishes,?requests,?and?beliefs.?Such?negligent?interference?was?accomplished?through?the?common?course?and?practice?of?unauthorized?mutilation,?improper?cremation?and?commingling?of?remains.?Negligent?entrustment?of?the?remains?to?persons?unqualified?to?handle?them?was?also?alleged.fn.?8 Citing?Cohen?v.?Groman?Mortuary,?Inc.?(1964)?231?Cal.App.2d?1?[41?Cal.Rptr.?481],?and?Sinai?Temple?v.?Kaplan?(1976)?54?Cal.App.3d?1103?[127?Cal.Rptr.?80],?as?controlling,?the?trial?court?ruled?that?only?those?plaintiffs?who?were?entitled?by?section?7100?to?control?the?disposition?of?their?decedents’?remains?as?of?the?date?of?the?decedents’?death,?or?who?actually?contracted?for?disposition,?had?standing?to?assert?the?claims?set?forth?in?the?model?complaint. II Section?7100?establishes?rights?and?duties?in?the?disposition?of?human?remains,?providing: “The?right?to?control?the?disposition?of?the?remains?of?a?deceased?person,?unless?other?directions?have?been?given?by?the?decedent,?vests?in,?and?the?duty?of?interment?and?the?liability?for?the?reasonable?cost?of?interment?of?such?remains?devolves?upon?the?following?in?the?order?named: “(a)?The?surviving?spouse. “(b)?The?surviving?child?or?children?of?the?decedent. “(c)?The?surviving?parent?or?parents?of?the?decedent. “(d)?The?person?or?persons?respectively?in?the?next?degrees?of?kindred?in?the?order?named?by?the?laws?of?California?as?entitled?to?succeed?to?the?estate?of?the?decedent.?[54?Cal.3d?881] “(e)?The?public?administrator?when?the?deceased?has?sufficient?assets. “?*?*?*?” Other?statutory?provisions?relied?on?by?plaintiffs?and/or?relevant?to?the?claims?made?by?plaintiffs?include?the?following: The?person?who?has?the?section?7100?duty?of?interment?is?entitled?to?custody?of?the?remains?for?that?purpose,?or?if?the?remains?are?cremated?for?burial?at?sea.?(??7102.)fn.?9 Pursuant?to?the?version?of?the?Uniform?Anatomical?Gift?Act?(??7150?et?seq.)?in?effect?when?this?case?arose,?an?individual?had?the?primary?right?to?make,?permit,?or?refuse?to?permit?the?making?of?an?anatomical?gift.?(Former???7151.?See?now???7150.5.)?It?was?and?is?a?felony?to?remove?any?part?of?any?human?remains?from?the?place?deposited?while?awaiting?interment?with?the?intent?to?sell?it,?unless?written?permission?is?given?by?the?person?who?holds?the?section?7100?right.?(??7051.?See?also?Pen.?Code,???367f.)fn.?10 Section?7054.7?prohibits?multiple?cremation?of?remains?and?commingling?of?remains?without?the?written?permission?of?the?section?7100?right?holder,?making?violation?of?its?provisions?a?misdemeanor.?Section?7055?makes?it?a?misdemeanor?to?remove?remains?from?one?primary?registration?district?to?another,?except?in?a?funeral?director’s?conveyance,?without?a?permit?by?the?local?registrar. III Before?considering?the?causes?of?action?for?negligent?and?intentional?interference?with?remains,?the?Court?of?Appeal?addressed?the?plaintiffs’?[54?Cal.3d?882]?standing?to?seek?recovery?on?a?theory?that?plaintiffs,?or?some?of?them,?were?third?party?beneficiaries?of?a?contract?for?mortuary?services.?It?concluded?that?a?section?7100?right?holder?is?the?only?express?beneficiary?of?a?contract?for?mortuary?services,?and?that?if?the?contracting?party?was?not?the?section?7100?right?holder,?only?the?holder?of?that?right?may?be?seen?as?an?intended?beneficiary?of?the?contract.fn.?11The?section?7100?right?did?devolve?according?to?the?statutory?scheme,?however,?if?the?holder?at?the?date?of?the?death?of?the?decedent?himself?or?herself?died. After?considering?this?court’s?recent?decisions?in?Thing?v.?La?Chusa?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?644?[257?Cal.Rptr.?865,?771?P.2d?814],?and?Marlene?F.?v.?Affiliated?Psychiatric?Medical?Clinic,?Inc.?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?583?[257?Cal.Rptr.?98,?770?P.2d?278],?the?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?none?of?the?plaintiffs?could?recover?on?either?a?negligent?infliction?of?emotional?distress?or?an?intentional?infliction?of?emotional?distress?theory.?The?court?also?held,?however,?that?the?allegations?of?the?complaint?stated?a?cause?of?action?for?negligent?mishandling?of?a?corpse,?as?recognized?in?Quesada?v.?Oak?Hill?Improvement?Co.?(1989)?213?Cal.App.3d?596?[261?Cal.Rptr.?769],?for?which?the?close?family?members?described?in?Thing?and?grandchildren?may?recover?damages?for?emotional?distress.fn.?12?A?broader?class,?all?family?members?and?close?friends,?could?recover?for?emotional?distress?suffered?as?a?result?of?the?intentional?mishandling?of?remains. In?reaching?these?conclusions,?the?Court?of?Appeal?applied?well-settled?principles?governing?the?tort?of?negligence.?The?court?recognized,?as?had?this?court?in?Marlene?F.?v.?Affiliated?Psychiatric?Medical?Clinic,?Inc.,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?583,?588,?that?when?damages?are?sought?for?negligently?inflicted?emotional?distress,?the?tort?is?negligence?regardless?of?the?specific?name?that?may?be?used?to?describe?the?tort,?and?that?the?elements?of?duty,?breach?of?duty,?causation?and?damages?must?be?pleaded?and?proven. The?court?reasoned?that?when?a?mortuary?agrees?to?care?for?the?remains?of?a?decedent,?a?special?relationship?is?created?between?the?mortuary?and?the?close?family?members?of?the?decedent?by?virtue?of?the?nature?of?the?services?the?mortuary?undertakes?to?perform.?The?mortuary’s?duty?to?properly?discharge?[54?Cal.3d?883]?its?responsibility?of?caring?for?the?decedent?runs?to?all?persons?with?whom?it?has?that?special?relationship,?not?just?to?the?person?who?actually?contracts?for?the?services.?It?is?foreseeable?that?a?breach?of?that?duty?may?cause?severe?emotional?distress?to?members?of?the?bereaved?family.fn.?13 In?recognizing?a?broader?class?of?persons?entitled?to?recover?for?intentional?mishandling?of?a?corpse,?the?Court?of?Appeal?relied?on?language?in?Amaya?v.?Home?Ice,?Fuel?&?Supply?Co.?(1963)59?Cal.2d?295,?315?[29?Cal.Rptr.?33,?379?P.2d?513],?quoted?with?approval?in?Thing?v.?La?Chusa,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?644,?652-653,?which?distinguished?the?culpability?and?liability?of?intentional?tortfeasors?from?that?of?those?who?are?merely?negligent: “[T]he?increased?liability?imposed?on?an?intentional?wrongdoer?appears?to?reflect?the?psychological?fact?that?solicitude?for?the?interests?of?the?actor?weighs?less?in?the?balance?as?his?[or?her]?moral?guilt?increases?and?the?social?utility?of?his?[or?her]?conduct?diminishes.” The?Court?of?Appeal?also?reasoned,?based?on?statements?in?Thing?v.?La?Chusa,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?644,?that?when?an?intentional?tort?is?alleged,?and?society?seeks?to?both?punish?the?wrongdoer?and?deter?such?conduct?by?others,?the?imposition?of?liability?out?of?all?proportion?to?a?defendant’s?negligence?is?not?a?concern.?Therefore?it?is?not?necessary?to?limit?liability?to?as?narrow?a?class?as?is?the?case?when?negligence?is?the?cause?of?the?injury.?For?that?reason,?no?arbitrary?limitation?of?recovery?to?persons?in?a?close?family?relationship?with?the?decedent?was?required?when?the?defendant?had?intentionally?mishandled?a?corpse.?Close?friends?of?the?decedent?need?not?be?denied?the?right?to?recover. […]

People?v.?Edwards?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?787?,?1?Cal.Rptr.2d?696;?819?P.2d?436 [No.?S004755. Nov?25,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?THOMAS?FRANCIS?EDWARDS,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Orange?County,?No.?C-48764,?James?S.?Judge,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Arabian,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.?Separate?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.) COUNSEL Lisa?Short,?Timothy?J.?Foley?and?Joseph?Schlesinger,?under?appointments?by?the?Supreme?Court,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Harley?D.?Mayfield,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Jay?M.?Bloom?and?Louis?R.?Hanoian,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION ARABIAN,?J. In?this?case,?arising?out?of?the?1978?death?penalty?law,?defendant?was?convicted?of?the?first?degree?murder?of?Vanessa?Iberri?(Vanessa)?and?the?attempted?first?degree?murder?of?Kelly?Cartier?(Kelly).?(Pen.?Code????187,?664.)fn.?1?The?jury?found?that?defendant?personally?used?a?firearm?during?the?commission?of?both?offenses?(??12022.5),?and?intentionally?inflicted?great?bodily?injury?on?Kelly.?(??12022.7.)?As?to?the?murder?count,?the?[54?Cal.3d?804]?jury?found?true?the?special?circumstance?that?defendant?intentionally?killed?the?victim?while?lying?in?wait.?(??190.2,?subd.?(a)(15).)?The?first?penalty?trial?ended?in?a?mistrial,?as?the?jury?was?unable?to?reach?a?verdict. After?the?second?penalty?trial,?the?jury?imposed?the?death?penalty.?The?trial?court?then?granted?a?new?penalty?trial?because?of?error?under?People?v.?Boyd?(1985)?38?Cal.3d?762?[215?Cal.Rptr.?1,?700?P.2d?782],?a?case?decided?the?same?day?as?the?penalty?verdict.?A?third?penalty?trial?ended?with?the?jury?again?imposing?the?death?penalty.?This?time,?the?court?denied?defendant’s?motion?for?a?new?trial.?It?also?denied?the?automatic?motion?to?modify?the?verdict?(??190.4,?subd.?(e)),?and?entered?a?judgment?of?death.?This?appeal?is?automatic.?(??1239.)?We?affirm. Facts Guilt?Phase On?Saturday,?September?19,?1981,?defendant,?an?excellent?marksman,?tragically?shot?12-year-old?Vanessa?between?the?eyes?and?her?12-year-old?friend,?Kelly,?in?the?head?with?a?.22-caliber?pistol?while?the?girls?were?walking?to?a?picnic?lunch?from?a?campsite?in?the?Blue?Jay?campground?in?Orange?County.?Vanessa?died?of?her?wound;?Kelly?survived. Prosecution?Evidence Defendant?was?an?employee?of?the?South?Coast?Gun?Club?in?Santa?Ana.?He?visited?the?Blue?Jay?campground?”quite?often,?usually?every?weekend.”?He?was?seen?at?the?gun?club?the?morning?of?September?19.?Around?11?a.m.?that?same?morning,?a?truck?that?looked?like?defendant’s?red?Datsun?pickup?entered?the?campground,?which?was?about?half?full. Kelly?and?Vanessa?were?spending?the?weekend?camping?at?the?same?campground?with?Vanessa’s?mother?and?stepfather.?Around?2?p.m.,?the?girls?left?their?campsite?to?have?a?picnic?lunch?at?a?site?they?had?selected?earlier?that?morning.?As?they?were?walking?by?a?restroom?near?the?entrance,?Kelly?saw?defendant’s?truck?drive?slowly?towards?them.?Defendant?looked?in?their?direction,?and?then?drove?past.?The?girls?then?walked?out?of?the?campground?towards?the?picnic?site. Two?other?campers?observed?the?girls?leave?the?area.?Two?to?three?minutes?later,?one?of?the?campers?saw?defendant?drive?his?truck?out?of?the?campground.?Shortly?thereafter,?while?Kelly?and?Vanessa?were?walking?down?the?road,?with?Vanessa?in?front,?Kelly?heard?a?car?coming,?and?told?Vanessa?to?[54?Cal.3d?805]?”get?on?the?side?of?the?road.”?They?both?moved?over.?Defendant?drove?alongside?the?girls,?stopped,?and?said,?”Girls.”?He?then?fired?two?shots?from?a?pistol,?the?first?at?Vanessa,?the?second?at?Kelly. Defendant?hit?Vanessa?in?the?forehead,?a?quarter?of?an?inch?to?the?right?of?center,?just?above?the?eyebrows.?He?hit?Kelly?in?the?right?side?of?the?head.?Kelly?fell?to?the?ground,?but?saw?defendant?get?out?of?the?truck?and?run?to?the?back.?She?heard?something?slam?in?the?back?of?the?truck,?then?saw?defendant?return?to?the?truck?cab?and?drive?away. In?the?meantime,?other?campers,?including?the?two?who?had?seen?the?girls?walk?out?of?the?campground,?were?driving?in?two?trucks?to?get?some?firewood.?As?the?front?truck,?driven?by?Larry?Ellis,?was?going?over?a?speed?bump?just?outside?their?campsite,?one?of?the?passengers,?Charles?Vaughn,?looked?to?his?left?across?a?meadow.?Vaughn?saw?the?top?portion?of?defendant’s?parked?truck.?He?saw?defendant?run?from?the?front?of?the?van?to?the?back,?and?then?back?towards?the?front.?Vaughn?then?lost?sight?of?defendant,?as?some?trees?blocked?his?view.?None?of?the?group?heard?any?gunshots. Thinking?defendant?might?have?been?a?poacher,?Vaughn?told?Ellis?to?drive?in?that?direction.?The?second?truck?followed.?When?they?came?around?a?bend?in?the?road,?Vaughn?and?Ellis?saw?defendant?standing?near?the?front?of?his?truck.?Defendant?looked?towards?the?girls?on?the?side?of?the?road,?then?over?his?shoulder?towards?the?Ellis?truck.?Defendant?then?jumped?into?his?truck?and?drove?away?at?high?speed.?Ellis?gave?chase?while?the?driver?of?the?second?truck?stopped?to?aid?the?stricken?girls.?Defendant?got?away?after?a?high-speed?chase,?but?not?before?Ellis?and?Vaughn?got?the?license?number?of?the?truck.?It?was?registered?to?defendant. An?extensive?manhunt?over?the?next?few?days?failed?to?find?defendant.?He?was?eventually?arrested?in?the?State?of?Maryland?on?September?28,?1981.?Bus?tickets?dated?from?September?24?to?27?with?destinations?from?Los?Angeles?to?Washington,?D.C.,?were?found?in?his?motel?room.?Defendant’s?truck?was?later?found?near?a?bus?station?in?Los?Angeles.?The?camper?portion?of?the?truck?contained?several?firearms?and?quantities?of?ammunition.?Additional?firearms?belonging?to?defendant?were?found?in?a?storage?area?of?the?South?Coast?Gun?Club. Vanessa?died?of?a?single?gunshot?wound?to?the?forehead.?Kelly?received?a?grazing?wound?in?the?scalp.?She?required?surgery?to?remove?an?accumulation?of?blood?underneath?the?skull?(an?”epidural?hematoma”),?but?eventually?recovered. Two?.22-caliber?casings?were?found?at?the?scene?of?the?shooting.?Ballistics?analysis?established?that?none?of?the?firearms?found?in?defendant’s?truck?or?among?his?property?at?the?gun?club?fired?the?fatal?bullet.?[54?Cal.3d?806] A?week?or?two?before?the?shooting,?Bobby?Pamplin?sold?a?.22-caliber?Ruger?handgun?to?defendant.?It?could?have?been?the?murder?weapon,?but?was?not?found?after?the?shooting.?Pamplin?testified?that?defendant?was?an?”excellent?shot.”?He?observed?defendant?fire?the?Ruger?at?the?firing?range.?Defendant?”repeatedly”?hit?a?target?the?size?and?shape?of?a?chicken?at?a?distance?of?50?yards. In?January?1983,?shortly?before?the?guilt?phase?trial?began,?defendant?told?a?deputy?sheriff?in?the?county?jail?that?he?was?”guilty?as?sin.” During?the?guilt?phase?trial,?the?jury?viewed?the?crime?scene.?The?scene?of?the?shooting?was?relatively?isolated.?It?was?approximately?halfway?between?the?Blue?Jay?campground?and?a?neighboring?campground.?More?than?a?quarter?of?a?mile?separated?the?spot?where?defendant?passed?the?girls?the?first?time?and?the?spot?where?he?shot?them. Defense?Evidence The?defense?did?not?dispute?that?defendant?shot?the?two?girls.?It?presented?evidence?suggesting?that?the?shooting?was?not?premeditated,?but?was?a?sudden?act?of?violence?caused?by?depression?over?defendant’s?recent?divorce.?Defendant?did?not?testify. Penalty?Phase At?the?third?penalty?trial,?the?one?currently?under?review,?the?prosecution?presented?essentially?the?same?evidence?concerning?the?crimes?as?at?the?guilt?phase.?It?introduced?no?additional?evidence. The?defense?presented?evidence?concerning?defendant’s?marital?problems?and?their?effects?on?him,?his?good?character?traits,?his?good?behavior?in?jail,?and?his?apparent?remorse?for?the?crimes.?Defendant?did?not?testify. Discussion Guilt?Phase?Issues Denial?of?Change?of?Venue [1a]?Defendant?contends?the?trial?court?erred?in?denying?his?motion?to?change?venue?from?Orange?County. [2]?The?applicable?law?is?settled.?A?change?of?venue?must?be?granted?when?the?defendant?shows?a?reasonable?likelihood?that,?in?the?absence?of?[54?Cal.3d?807]?such?relief,?a?fair?trial?cannot?be?had.?The?court?considers?such?factors?as?the?nature?and?gravity?of?the?offense,?the?size?of?the?community,?the?status?of?the?defendant,?the?popularity?and?prominence?of?the?victim,?and?the?nature?and?extent?of?the?publicity.?[3]?On?appeal?after?a?judgment?following?the?denial?of?a?change?of?venue,?the?defendant?must?show?both?that?the?court?erred?in?denying?the?change?of?venue?motion,?i.e.,?that?at?the?time?of?the?motion?it?was?reasonably?likely?that?a?fair?trial?could?not?be?had,?and?that?the?error?was?prejudicial,?i.e.,?that?it?was?reasonably?likely?that?a?fair?trial?was?not?in?fact?had.?The?trial?court’s?essentially?factual?determinations?as?to?these?factors?will?be?sustained?if?supported?by?substantial?evidence.?We?independently?review?the?trial?court’s?ultimate?determination?of?the?reasonable?likelihood?of?an?unfair?trial.?(People?v.?Cooper?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?771,?805-806?[281?Cal.Rptr.?90,?809?P.2d?865];?People?v.?Bonin?(1988)?46?Cal.3d?659,?672-673,?676-677?[250?Cal.Rptr.?687,?758?P.2d?1217].)fn.?2 [1b]?As?the?trial?court?recognized,?the?gravity?of?the?offense?is?most?serious?and,?if?considered?alone,?would?support?a?change?of?venue.?Review?of?the?other?factors,?however,?compels?the?conclusion?that?a?change?of?venue?was?properly?denied. At?the?time?of?the?guilt?trial?in?early?1983,?Orange?County?was?California’s?second?largest?county?in?population.?(People?v.?Cooper,?supra,?53?Cal.3d?at?p.?806,?fn.?4.)?Defendant?claims?Orange?County?is?too?”White,”?too?”Republican,”?and?too?prosperous?to?afford?a?fair?trial,?but?presents?no?credible?supporting?evidence.?The?size?of?the?county?weighed?heavily?against?a?change?of?venue.?(People?v.?Bonin,?supra,?46?Cal.3d?at?p.?677;?People?v.?Harris?(1981)?28?Cal.3d?935,?949?[171?Cal.Rptr.?679,?623?P.2d?240].) Defendant?was?a?resident?of?Orange?County?at?the?time?of?the?crime.?The?media?generally?identified?him?as?a?resident?of?Costa?Mesa?employed?at?a?gun?club?in?Irvine.?In?contrast?to?People?v.?Williams?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?1112,?1131?[259?Cal.Rptr.?473,?774?P.2d?146],?where?a?change?of?venue?was?found?necessary,?defendant?was?not?an?outsider?in?either?a?”geographic?or?racial?sense.” Although?there?was?an?understandable?outpouring?of?sympathy?for?the?victims?immediately?after?the?crime,?they?had?no?particular?celebrity?status?in?[54?Cal.3d?808]?the?community.?Indeed,?they?were?not?residents?of?Orange?County?at?all,?but?residents?of?neighboring?Riverside?County?who?happened?to?be?camping?in?Orange?County.?In?contending?that?the?victims’?prominence?supported?a?change?of?venue,?defendant?stresses?”their?particular?status?as?children.”?This?status,?however,?will?not?change?with?a?change?of?venue.?Prospective?jurors?would?sympathize?with?the?girls’?fate?whether?trial?were?held?in?Santo?Domingo?in?the?Dominican?Republic,?Orange?County,?or?any?other?county?in?California.?The?horrendous?crime,?not?the?locale?of?trial,?evokes?the?sympathy. Defendant?stresses?the?substantial?publicity?of?the?crime.?After?reviewing?the?voluminous?defense?exhibits,?the?trial?court?found?”that?the?news?coverage?was?extensive,?that?there?was?some?aspects?of?sensationalism,?but?that?it?was?not?overly?sensational?in?the?coverage?and?that?the?coverage?appeared?to?be?reasonably?fair.”?Substantial?evidence?supports?this?finding.?Media?coverage?of?the?crime?was?intense,?especially?soon?after?its?commission?and?defendant’s?arrest.?But?such?coverage?was?generally?fair,?and?not?inflammatory.?It?pales?in?comparison?with?the?publicity?we?found?insufficient?to?compel?a?change?of?venue?in?a?serial?murder?case?tried?in?Orange?County.?(People?v.?Bonin,?supra,?46?Cal.3d?at?p.?677?[reports?that?the?defendant?was?the?”Freeway?Killer,”?had?a?history?of?mental?illness,?had?prior?convictions,?had?been?linked?to?as?many?as?44?killings,?had?admitted?21?killings,?and?had?already?been?convicted?of?10?murders?in?Los?Angeles?and?sentenced?to?death].) In?addition,?the?court?found?that?”time?has?diminished?greatly?the?events?that?were?before?the?public.”?The?record?also?supports?this?finding.?The?motion?to?change?venue?was?denied?about?10?months?after?the?crime.?Trial?began?another?six?months?later.?Passage?of?time?weighs?heavily?against?a?change?of?venue.?(People?v.?Bonin,?supra,?46?Cal.3d?at?pp.?677-678.)?As?Marcus?Aurelius?said?some?two?millennia?ago,?”All?is?ephemeral-fame?and?the?famous?as?well.”?(Meditations,?IV,?35.) Citing?Maine?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?68?Cal.2d?at?pages?386-387,?defendant?also?contends?that?political?factors?supported?a?change?of?venue.?There?is?some?evidence?in?the?record?that?the?sheriff?criticized?the?initial?appearance?of?the?public?defender’s?office?in?this?case.?The?sheriff?later?ran?for?reelection.?But?defendant’s?showing,?consisting?mainly?of?media?reports,?does?not?compel?a?change?of?venue.?Indeed,?defendant’s?own?poll?showed?that?most?of?the?populace?remembered?nothing?about?any?political?controversy. After?completion?of?the?individual?jury?voir?dire,?defendant?renewed?his?motion?for?a?change?of?venue.?The?court?denied?the?motion,?finding?”that?we?[54?Cal.3d?809]?we?will?be?able?to?find?twelve?[jurors]?that?will?have?no?influence?whatsoever?from?anything?they?ever?read?about?or?heard?about?this?case.?It?just?wasn’t?a?major?problem?in?talking?with?them.”?Defendant?does?not?specifically?challenge?this?ruling.?Our?review?of?the?record?convinces?us?it?was?correct.?Trial?was?properly?held?in?Orange?County. Jury?Selection?Issues Waiver?of?Defendant’s?Presence At?the?outset?of?the?guilt?trial,?defendant?expressed?the?desire?to?be?absent?during?jury?selection.?After?being?fully?admonished?of?his?right?to?be?present,?and?with?his?attorney’s?approval,?defendant?personally?waived?the?right?both?in?writing?and?orally.?The?court?accepted?the?waiver?after?finding?defendant?”knowingly?and?willingly”?waived?his?rights.?It?informed?defendant?that?if?he?changed?his?mind,?he?could?come?back?into?court?at?any?time.?Defendant?then?absented?himself?during?jury?selection.?A?week?after?the?waiver,?another?hearing?was?held?to?determine?whether?defendant?still?wanted?to?be?absent.?He?did.?Defendant?was?present?during?the?evidence?portion?of?trial. [4a]?Defendant?contends?the?right?to?be?present?during?jury?selection?cannot?be?waived.?In?essence,?he?argues?that?a?defendant?who?does?not?want?to?be?present?during?jury?selection?can?achieve?his?wish?only?if?he?engages?in?”disruptive?behavior.”?A?defendant?who?behaves?himself?but?”merely?desires?to?be?absent”?cannot,?he?claims,?be?accommodated.?We?disagree.?This?right,?like?other?more?fundamental?rights?(e.g.,?against?self-incrimination,?to?testify,?to?have?an?attorney,?to?confront?witnesses,?and?to?have?a?jury?trial?at?all),?may?be?waived.?A?defendant?need?not?be?disruptive?before?a?court?may?grant?his?request?and?excuse?him?from?attending?jury?selection. People?v.?Robertson?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?18?[255?Cal.Rptr.?631,?767?P.2d?1109]?is?closely?on?point.?In?Robertson,?the?defendant?filed?a?written?waiver?adapted?from?the?form?set?out?in?section?977,?subdivision?(b)fn.?3?waiving?his?right?to?be?present?at?the?sentence-modification?hearing?and?imposition?of?sentence.?As?in?this?case,?defendant?argued?that?his?presence?at?any?”critical?[54?Cal.3d?810]?phase”?of?a?capital?trial?may?not?be?waived.?Based?in?part?on?the?”solicitude?shown?by?modern?jurisprudence?to?the?defendant’s?prerogative?to?waive?the?most?crucial?of?rights”?(48?Cal.3d?at?p.?61),?we?disagreed,?and?held?that?a?capital?defendant?may?waive?his?right?to?be?present?even?at?critical?stages?of?the?proceeding.?(Id.?at?pp.?59-62.)?This?holding?applies?equally?to?jury?selection.?It?would?be?anomalous?to?force?a?defendant?to?misbehave?before?he?could?fulfill?his?wish?to?be?absent?from?the?proceedings. Defendant?argues?that?such?a?waiver?should?not?be?allowed?in?capital?cases.?However,?as?noted?in?Robertson,?”Our?statutes?governing?waiver?make?no?distinction?between?capital?and?other?felony?defendants?….”?(48?Cal.3d?at?pp.?61-62.)?In?Robertson,?we?cited?sections?977?and?1193.?The?applicable?statutes?here?are?sections?977?and?1043.?The?latter?generally?provides?that?”the?defendant?in?a?felony?case?shall?be?personally?present?at?the?trial.”?(??1043,?subd.?(a).)?Exceptions?include?when?the?defendant?is?disruptive?(??1043,?subd.?(b)(1))?and?”Any?prosecution?for?an?offense?which?is?not?punishable?by?death?in?which?the?defendant?is?voluntarily?absent.”?(??1043,?subd.?(b)(2).)?Section?1043,?subdivision?(d),?also?states,?”Subdivisions?(a)?and?(b)?shall?not?limit?the?right?of?a?defendant?to?waive?his?right?to?be?present?in?accordance?with?Section?977.” In?combination,?sections?977?and?1043?provide?that?although?mere?voluntary?absence?is?not?sufficient?in?a?capital?case?to?hold?the?trial?without?the?defendant’s?personal?presence,?such?presence?may?be?waived?(at?least?as?to?those?proceedings?not?specifically?listed?in?section?977,?subdivision?(b)).?Defendant?argues?that?the?legislative?history?of?these?sections?discloses?no?intent?to?allow?such?waiver?in?capital?cases.?Nothing?in?that?history,?however,?suffices?to?overcome?the?plain?language?of?the?statutes.?[5]?When?statutory?language?is?clear?and?unambiguous,?there?is?no?need?for?construction,?and?courts?should?not?indulge?in?it.?(People?v.?Belleci?(1979)?24?Cal.3d?879,?884?[157?Cal.Rptr.?503,?598?P.2d?473].)?We?thus?adhere?to?Robertson,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?18.?[4b]?A?capital?defendant?may?waive?his?right?to?be?present?even?at?critical?stages?of?trial.?(We?do?not?here?decide?whether?a?defendant?may?waive?his?presence?as?to?those?proceedings?specifically?listed?in?section?977,?subdivision?(b);?see?People?v.?Sully?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?1195,?1237-1240?[283?Cal.Rptr.?144,?812?P.2d?163].) Defendant?also?argues?the?”public?and?state”?have?an?independent?interest?in?compelling?him?to?be?present?during?jury?selection.?The?Legislature,?however,?has?deemed?otherwise.?(Cf.?People?v.?Chadd?(1981)?28?Cal.3d?739,?745-755?[170?Cal.Rptr.?798,?621?P.2d?837]?[upholding???1018,?which?prohibits?a?capital?defendant?from?pleading?guilty?without?the?consent?of?counsel];?and?People?v.?Stanworth?(1969)?71?Cal.2d?820,?833-834?[54?Cal.3d?811]?[80?Cal.Rptr.?49,?457?P.2d?889]?[applying?the?automatic?appeal?provisions?of???1239,?subd.?(b)].) […]

Calvert?v.?State?Bar?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?765?,?1?Cal.Rptr.2d?684;?819?P.2d?424 [No.?S015184.?Nov?25,?1991.] CYNTHIA?S.?CALVERT,?Petitioner,?v.?THE?STATE?BAR?OF?CALIFORNIA,?Respondent. (Opinion?by?The?Court). COUNSEL Cynthia?S.?Calvert,?in?pro.?per.,?and?L.?W.?Holt?for?Petitioner. Diane?C.?Yu,?Richard?J.?Zanassi,?Colin?P.?Wong?and?E.?Lisa?Vorgias?for?Respondent.?[54?Cal.3d?770] OPINION THE?COURT.fn.?* The?Review?Department?of?the?State?Bar?Court?(review?department)?has?recommended?that?petitioner?Cynthia?S.?Calvert?be?suspended?from?the?practice?of?law?in?California?for?three?years,?that?execution?of?the?suspension?order?be?stayed,?and?that?she?be?placed?on?probation?for?one?year?upon?conditions?that?include?actual?suspension?from?the?practice?of?law?for?six?months.?The?recommendation?is?based?on?the?review?department’s?findings?that?in?one?matter?petitioner?failed?to?perform?competently,?continued?representation?of?her?client?though?she?knew?she?could?not?perform?competently,?and?withdrew?from?employment?without?taking?reasonable?steps?to?avoid?prejudice?to?the?client. Petitioner?contends?that?a?new?hearing?should?be?held?before?a?new?hearing?panel?because?the?hearing?referee?failed?to?disqualify?himself?when?required?by?law?to?do?so,?that?prejudicial?errors?in?the?exclusion?of?evidence?require?a?new?hearing,?that?certain?aggravating?circumstances?were?improperly?found,?and?that?the?recommended?discipline?is?excessive. We?conclude?the?following:?petitioner?waived?the?claim?that?the?hearing?referee?improperly?failed?to?disqualify?himself;?even?though?evidentiary?errors?occurred,?they?do?not?require?a?new?hearing;?the?evidence?is?insufficient?to?support?one?of?the?three?disciplinary?violations?found;?two?aggravating?circumstances?are?unsupported?by?the?record;?and?the?recommended?discipline?is?excessive.?We?further?conclude?that?the?period?of?actual?suspension?imposed?should?be?60?days,?not?6?months?as?recommended?by?the?review?department. Background Petitioner?was?admitted?to?the?practice?of?law?in?California?in?January?1978.?Petitioner?has?a?prior?record?of?discipline;?she?was?suspended?for?90?days?in?1990.?The?review?department’s?decision?states?that?petitioner?has?no?prior?record?of?discipline;?the?decision,?however,?was?issued?before?the?July?1990?order?suspending?petitioner.fn.?1?[54?Cal.3d?771] The?McKnight?Matter This?disciplinary?proceeding?arises?from?petitioner’s?representation?of?Doris?McKnight?(McKnight).?This?matter?involves?two?critical?issues:?whether?petitioner?adequately?communicated?with?McKnight,?and?whether?petitioner’s?posttrial?legal?strategy?was?one?that?a?competent?attorney?could?reasonably?have?adopted.?The?parties?presented?sharply?conflicting?evidence?on?both?critical?issues.?Because?the?evidentiary?errors?that?are?discussed?below?require?an?analysis?of?the?effect?of?the?errors?on?the?hearing?as?a?whole,?a?somewhat?detailed?review?of?the?evidence?is?necessary.?Although?there?were?other?witnesses,?the?key?witnesses?were?McKnight?and?petitioner. The?State?Bar’s?Evidence In?November?1982,?McKnight?substituted?petitioner?in?place?of?Mary?Louise?Frampton?as?her?attorney?in?an?employment?discrimination?suit?against?her?employer,?Commercial?Union?Insurance?Co.?(Commercial?Union).?In?May?1984,?the?case?was?tried.?The?trial?court?filed?a?statement?of?decision?in?McKnight’s?favor?in?September?1984?and?awarded?McKnight?$23,895?in?damages. Five?days?later,?petitioner?wrote?to?McKnight?that?she?had?received?the?final?decision?of?the?court?and?would?”see?that?judgment?is?entered?and?the?cost?bill?and?attorneys?fee?bill?filed?with?the?court?and?opposing?counsel.”?But?judgment?was?not?entered.?Commercial?Union?made?a?motion?for?a?new?trial,?which?was?denied?in?November?1984. In?December?1984,?petitioner?wrote?to?McKnight,?asking?her?to?”get?together?all?the?bills?and?expenses?[she]?had?incurred”?so?that?petitioner?could?”file?the?judgment?and?cost?bill?ASAP.”?In?early?January?1985,?McKnight?delivered?the?requested?documents?to?petitioner. In?January?1985,?Commercial?Union?filed?a?notice?of?appeal,?which?was?eventually?withdrawn?pending?the?entry?of?judgment.?McKnight?stated?that?petitioner?called?her?to?notify?her?that?Commercial?Union?had?filed?the?notice?of?appeal. In?February?1985,?the?Commercial?Union?office?in?Fresno?closed.?McKnight?called?petitioner?and?left?word?of?the?closure?and?her?layoff?with?petitioner’s?secretary.?[54?Cal.3d?772] McKnight?testified?that,?apart?from?receiving?monthly?billing?statements?and?a?letter?concerning?witness?fees?from?petitioner,?she?had?no?further?communication?with?petitioner?until?December?1985.?But?McKnight?had?attempted?to?speak?with?petitioner?over?the?telephone?at?least?once?a?month?and?more?frequently?toward?the?end?of?the?year.?McKnight?stated?that?petitioner?was?not?available?and?did?not?return?her?calls. In?late?1985,?McKnight?called?the?courthouse?to?check?on?the?status?of?the?case.?She?was?informed?that?Commercial?Union?had?abandoned?its?appeal?in?February?1985.?In?early?December?1985,?she?called?petitioner?at?home?and?spoke?with?her;?petitioner?told?McKnight?that?she?had?not?filed?the?judgment,?apologized?for?not?doing?so,?and?said?she?would?take?care?of?the?matter?when?she?returned?from?Christmas?vacation. McKnight?testified?that?she?called?petitioner’s?office?nine?or?ten?times?in?the?first?three?months?of?1986?and?that?she?kept?notes?of?the?conversations?with?petitioner,?her?secretary,?or?her?law?partner.?These?notes?were?admitted?into?evidence.?In?February?1986,?McKnight?was?told?that?petitioner?had?insufficient?time?to?attend?to?her?case?and?that?her?case?was?not?”emergency?work.”?In?early?March?1986,?petitioner’s?secretary?called?McKnight?and?told?her?petitioner?was?working?on?her?case.?In?late?March,?McKnight?called?petitioner’s?office?for?the?last?time.?Petitioner?would?not?speak?to?McKnight,?but?her?secretary?told?McKnight?that?petitioner?was?working?on?her?case. In?early?April?1986,?McKnight?filed?a?complaint?with?the?Client?Relations?Committee?of?the?Fresno?County?Bar?Association.?In?mid-May,?Jan?Biggs,?an?attorney?handling?the?matter?for?the?association,?sent?a?letter?to?petitioner?requesting?that?she?contact?him?regarding?the?complaint.?Biggs?called?petitioner?three?or?four?times?in?the?weeks?after?he?sent?the?letter,?but?petitioner?did?not?reply?to?the?letter?or?return?his?phone?calls.?In?mid-?June?1986,?Biggs?sent?petitioner?another?letter?about?McKnight’s?complaint;?petitioner?did?not?respond. In?July?1986,?McKnight?filed?a?complaint?against?petitioner?with?the?State?Bar.?In?November?1986,?she?substituted?her?former?attorney,?Mary?Louise?Frampton,?as?her?attorney?to?replace?petitioner.?Frampton?subsequently?caused?the?judgment?to?be?filed,?and?made?a?motion?for?attorney?fees.?The?trial?court?awarded?attorney?fees?of?$21,199.95.?Commercial?Union?then?filed?a?notice?of?appeal.?Approximately?six?months?after?Frampton?became?McKnight’s?attorney,?the?court?reporter’s?notes?for?the?trial?were?destroyed.?Thereafter,?the?parties?settled?the?lawsuit?for?$21,500.?[54?Cal.3d?773] Petitioner’s?Evidence Petitioner’s?evidence?consisted?of?her?own?testimony?and?the?testimony?of?Attorney?Mary?Louise?Frampton.fn.?2?Frampton’s?testimony,?which?was?stricken?by?the?hearing?panel,?is?discussed?below?in?connection?with?the?argument?that?it?was?error?to?strike?it.fn.?3 Petitioner?testified?that?in?early?1985,?after?Commercial?Union?filed?its?notice?of?appeal,?she?decided?to?use?a?strategy?of?waiting?before?having?the?judgment?entered.?This?strategy?was?based?on?the?”hard-line?position”?of?Commercial?Union?and?its?attorneys,?who?were?adamantly?opposed?to?settlement?and?intent?on?vindication.?Petitioner?concluded?that?with?the?passage?of?time?certain?events?might?occur?that?would?facilitate?settlement?of?the?case?on?favorable?terms?without?an?appeal. Specifically,?these?anticipated?events?involved:?(1)?the?planned?retirement?of?McKnight’s?former?supervisor,?Mr.?Rubke,?who?had?appeared?to?be?influential?in?Commercial?Union’s?handling?of?the?case?and?who?had?exhibited?personal?animosity?toward?McKnight;?(2)?an?impending?consolidation?and?reorganization?of?Commercial?Union’s?management;?(3)?the?impending?closure?of?Commercial?Union’s?Fresno?office,?at?which?McKnight?continued?to?work;?(4)?the?lessening?of?the?”ego?involvement”?of?Commercial?Union’s?trial?attorney?with?the?passage?of?time;?and?(5)?the?possibility?of?a?new?attorney?taking?responsibility?for?the?litigation.?Petitioner?concluded?that?if?some?of?these?events?occurred,?Commercial?Union?and?its?counsel?would?begin?to?evaluate?the?case?”in?a?more?realistic?[fashion]?…?not?only?legally?but?economically.” Petitioner?stated?that?the?judgment?would?include?a?provision?that?McKnight?would?receive?10?percent?interest?on?the?damages?from?the?date?the?complaint?was?filed,?and?petitioner?believed?that?this?added?to?the?attractiveness?of?the?waiting?strategy.?Petitioner?also?explained?that?McKnight?owed?her?approximately?$6,000?in?fees,?that?further?expenses?would?be?incurred?on?any?appeal,?and?that?the?strategy?would?give?McKnight?”time?to?regroup.” Petitioner?explained?this?choice?of?strategy?to?McKnight?several?times?in?1985,?and?McKnight?acquiesced?in?the?strategy.?Also,?from?February?1985?through?May?1986,?petitioner?spoke?with?McKnight?about?her?case?several?[54?Cal.3d?774]?times,?and?was?known?by?McKnight?to?be?available?to?discuss?the?case?at?times?convenient?to?McKnight. When?petitioner?received?the?letter?from?the?Fresno?County?Bar?Association?in?May?1986,?she?telephoned?McKnight.?McKnight?was?very?hostile?to?her.?Petitioner?asked?McKnight?to?contact?her?later,?but?did?not?remember?further?details?of?the?conversation.?Petitioner?explained?that?she?did?not?respond?to?the?letter?from?Attorney?Biggs?on?behalf?of?the?Fresno?County?Bar?Association?because?Biggs?had?previously?represented?her?in?another?matter?and?she?had?had?a?”very?bad?experience”?with?him,?and?because?Biggs’s?firm?had?”gone?on?record?saying?they?would?never?have?a?woman?lawyer?because?they?don’t?think?women?can?be?lawyers?….”?Petitioner?also?believed?that?it?would?hurt?her?relationship?with?McKnight?to?deal?with?Biggs. Petitioner?considered?filing?a?motion?to?withdraw?from?the?case,?but?because?there?were?no?other?attorneys?in?Fresno?who?had?expertise?in?employment?discrimination?cases?brought?by?employees,?she?rejected?this?alternative?as?amounting?to?”abandonment.”?Petitioner?made?a?considered?decision?that?it?would?be?in?the?best?interests?of?her?client?to?continue?with?her?strategy. Petitioner?discussed?with?Mary?Louise?Frampton?the?possibility?that?Frampton?would?take?over?McKnight’s?case,?and?McKnight?and?Frampton?made?arrangements?for?Frampton?to?do?so.?Petitioner?cooperated?by?preparing?the?substitution?of?attorney?form,?delivering?her?files?to?Frampton,?and?assisting?in?preparation?of?the?attorney?fee?motion?filed?by?Frampton. Proceedings?Before?Hearing?Panel?and?Review?Department The?hearing?panel,?consisting?of?a?single?referee,?found?that?petitioner?had?violated?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct,?rules?2-111(A)(2)?(withdrawing?from?employment?without?taking?reasonable?steps?to?avoid?foreseeable?prejudice?to?client),?6-101(A)(2)?(intentionally?or?with?reckless?disregard?failing?to?perform?legal?services?competently),?and?6-101(B)(1)?(continuing?legal?representation?with?knowledge?of?insufficient?time,?resources?or?ability?to?perform?competently). The?hearing?panel?generally?accepted?McKnight’s?version?of?events,?but?did?not?explain?how?petitioner’s?conduct?violated?each?of?the?rules?at?issue.?The?hearing?panel?found?that?petitioner’s?posttrial?legal?strategy?was?motivated?by?a?desire?to?discourage?Commercial?Union?from?pursuing?an?appeal;?that?petitioner?did?not?”clearly?explain?the?matter”?to?McKnight;?that?although?Commercial?Union’s?Fresno?office?did?close?down,?petitioner?did?not?[54?Cal.3d?775]?pursue?settlement?negotiations;?and?that?petitioner?intentionally?failed?to?return?McKnight’s?telephone?calls. In?mitigation,?the?hearing?panel?found?that?petitioner?had?no?record?of?prior?discipline,?and?that?she?was?”known?to?be?among?the?few?attorneys?in?her?community?who?regularly?are?available?to?represent?minorities,?women?and?less?favored?members?of?society.” In?aggravation,?the?hearing?panel?concluded?that?petitioner’s?violations?of?former?rules?2-111(A)(2),?6-101(A)(2)?and?6-101(B)(1)?of?the?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct?of?the?State?Bar?were?wilful,?and?that?although?petitioner?had?attended?the?first?four?hearing?sessions?in?the?matter,?she?had?failed?to?attend?the?remaining?four?hearing?sessions.?The?hearing?panel?deemed?this?failure?to?attend?to?be?a?lack?of?cooperation,?and?found?that?petitioner?had?deprived?the?State?Bar’s?counsel?of?the?opportunity?to?examine?her?regarding?issues?that?arose?during?cross-examination?by?petitioner’s?counsel.?The?hearing?panel?further?found?that?petitioner’s?delay?was?the?”primary?cause”?of?the?destruction?of?the?reporter’s?notes. The?hearing?panel?recommended?that?petitioner?be?suspended?from?the?practice?of?law?for?three?years,?that?execution?of?the?suspension?be?stayed,?and?that?she?be?placed?on?probation?for?one?year?and?actually?suspended?for?six?months. The?review?department,?by?a?vote?of?nine?to?two,?adopted?the?decision?and?recommendation?of?the?hearing?panel. Discussion   Disqualification?of?Referee Petitioner?contends?a?new?hearing?is?necessary?because?the?hearing?referee?improperly?failed?to?disqualify?himself. After?the?fourth?day?of?hearings?in?this?matter,?on?September?12,?1988,?petitioner?filed?a?”declaration?of?disqualification,”?seeking?to?disqualify?the?referee?for?cause?under?rule?230?of?the?Rules?of?Procedure?of?the?State?Bar?(rule?230)?and?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?170.3,?based?on?certain?comments?the?referee?made?off?the?record. On?September?22,?1988,?the?referee?issued?a?written?ruling?declining?to?disqualify?himself,?but?drawing?petitioner’s?attention?to?her?right?to?seek?review?of?his?decision?under?the?Rules?of?Procedure?of?the?State?Bar.?[54?Cal.3d?776] The?disciplinary?hearing?proceeded?on?several?hearing?dates?and,?on?March?30,?1989,?the?referee?issued?a?written?decision?on?the?merits.?Petitioner?did?not?raise?the?issue?of?disqualification?again?until?April?1989,?after?the?referee’s?decision. [1]?The?State?Bar?contends?that?by?failing?to?timely?seek?review?of?the?referee’s?decision?not?to?disqualify?himself,?petitioner?waived?the?issue.?We?agree. Under?rule?230?petitioner?had?10?days?from?the?referee’s?denial?of?her?challenge?to?file?a?motion?with?the?presiding?referee?seeking?the?recusal?of?the?referee?she?had?challenged.fn.?4?Petitioner?did?not?do?so.?We?conclude?she?waived?the?claim?of?prejudice?by?failing?to?seek?timely?review.?(See?Tarver?v.?State?Bar?(1984)?37?Cal.3d?122,?130,?fn.?2?[207?Cal.Rptr.?302,?688?P.2d?911];?Hamilton?v.?State?Bar?(1979)?23?Cal.3d?868,?878?[153?Cal.Rptr.?602,?591?P.2d?1254].) Petitioner’s?argument?that?the?final?paragraph?of?rule?230?compels?a?different?result?has?no?merit.?That?paragraph?provides:?”Situations?in?which?the?grounds?for?disqualification?are?discovered?or?arise?after?the?referee?has?made?one?or?more?rulings?shall?be?governed?by?the?provisions?of?section?170.3,?subdivision?(b)(3),?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure.”?That?subdivision,?which?has?since?been?renumbered?as?subdivision?(b)(4),?states:?”In?the?event?that?grounds?for?disqualification?are?first?learned?…?after?the?judge?has?made?one?or?more?rulings?…?the?judge?shall,?unless?the?disqualification?be?waived,?disqualify?himself?or?herself,?but?in?the?absence?of?good?cause?the?rulings?he?or?she?has?made?up?to?that?time?shall?not?be?set?aside?by?the?judge?who?replaces?the?disqualified?judge.” Contrary?to?petitioner’s?contention,?rule?230’s?incorporation?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?170.3,?subdivision?(b)(4)?does?not?abrogate?the?10-day?period?within?which?to?seek?review?of?a?referee’s?refusal?to?disqualify?himself?or?herself.?The?rule?merely?addresses?the?continuing?effect?of?rulings?made?by?a?referee?before?the?referee?was?disqualified. Evidentiary?Errors […]

Stangvik?v.?Shiley?Inc.?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?744?,?1?Cal.Rptr.2d?556;?819?P.2d?14 [No.?S018015.?Nov?21,?1991.] MELLET?STANGVIK?et?al.,?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants,?v.?SHILEY?INCORPORATED?et?al.,?Defendants?and?Respondents. JENNY?MIKAELA?MARIE?THERESE?BIRGITTA?KARLSSON?et?al.,?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants,?v.?SHILEY?INCORPORATED?et?al.,?Defendents?and?Respondents. (Superior?Court?of?Orange?County,?Nos.?530881?and?530887,?Gary?L.?Taylor,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Robins,?Kaplan,?Miller?&?Ciresi,?Bruce?A.?Finzen,?Joseph?L.?Dunn?and?Gary?L.?Wilson?for?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants.?[54?Cal.3d?749] Kaye,?Scholer,?Fierman,?Hays?&?Handler,?Pierce?O’Donnell,?Palmieri,?Tyler,?Wiener,?Wilhem?&?Waldron,?Frank?C.?Rothrock,?Gary?C.?Weisberg,?Michele?D.?Murphy,?Skadden,?Arps,?Slate,?Meagher?&?Flom?and?Malcolm?E.?Wheeler?for?Defendants?and?Respondents. Harvey?M.?Grossman,?Nielsen,?Merksamer,?Hodgson,?Parrinello?&?Mueller,?Steve?Merksamer,?John?E.?Mueller,?James?C.?Gross,?Thomas?W.?Hiltachk,?Arthur?R.?Miller,?Mayer,?Brown?&?Platt,?Kenneth?S.?Geller,?Evan?M.?Tager,?James?G.?Duncan,?Stephen?M.?Shapiro,?Pillsbury,?Madison?&?Sutro,?Walter?R.?Allan,?Alson?R.?Kemp,?Jr.,?Mark?H.?Penskar?and?Dale?C.?Lysak?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendants?and?Respondents. Crosby,?Heafy?Roach?&?May,?Raoul?D.?Kennedy,?Peter?W.?Davis,?James?C.?Martin?and?Paul?D.?Fogel?as?Amici?Curiae. OPINION MOSK,?J. In?this?case?we?address?the?question?of?the?appropriate?standards?to?be?applied?in?deciding?whether?a?trial?court?should?grant?a?motion?based?on?the?doctrine?of?forum?non?conveniens?when?the?plaintiff,?a?resident?of?a?foreign?country,?seeks?to?bring?suit?against?a?California?corporation?in?the?courts?of?this?state.?We?granted?review?to?resolve?a?conflict?between?the?opinion?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?the?present?case?on?the?one?hand,?and?Corrigan?v.?Bjork?Shiley?Corp.?(1986)?182?Cal.App.3d?166?[227?Cal.Rptr.?247],?and?Holmes?v.?Syntex?Laboratories,?Inc.?(1984)?156?Cal.App.3d?372?[202?Cal.Rptr.?773],?on?the?other. Plaintiffs,?members?of?two?families,?one?residing?in?Norway?and?the?other?in?Sweden,?are?the?wives?and?children?of?two?men?who?received?heart?valve?implants?in?the?countries?of?their?residence.?The?valves?were?designed?and?manufactured?in?California?by?defendant?Shiley?Incorporated?(Shiley),?a?California?corporation.?In?both?cases,?the?valves?allegedly?failed,?and?the?patients?died.?Thereafter,?plaintiffs?filed?suit?in?California?against?Shiley?and?its?parent?company,?a?Delaware?corporation?(hereinafter?defendants),?alleging?that?the?valves?were?defective.?They?sought?damages?based?on?theories?of?negligence,?strict?liability,?breach?of?warranty,?fraud,?and?loss?of?consortium.?One?of?the?complaints?also?sought?recovery?for?negligent?infliction?of?emotional?distress. Defendants?moved?to?dismiss?or?stay?the?actions?on?the?ground?of?forum?non?conveniens,?as?authorized?by?section?410.30?of?the?Code?of?Civil?[54?Cal.3d?750]?Procedure.fn.?1?They?asserted?that?the?cases?should?be?tried?in?Sweden?and?Norway?because?it?was?in?those?countries?that?the?plaintiffs?resided,?the?valves?were?sold,?decedents?received?medical?care,?the?alleged?fraudulent?representations?were?made,?and?evidence?regarding?the?provision?of?health?care?and?other?matters?existed.?Plaintiffs?countered?that?California?was?the?more?convenient?place?of?trial?because?the?valves?were?designed,?manufactured,?tested?and?packaged?in?California.?The?parties?introduced?conflicting?evidence?regarding?plaintiffs’?legal?rights?and?remedies?in?Scandinavia,?and?each?claimed?that?the?most?important?and?numerous?documents?and?witnesses?were?located?in?the?country?which?they?asserted?was?the?most?appropriate?place?for?trial.?The?trial?court?found?in?favor?of?defendants,?concluding?that?California?was?an?inconvenient?forum?and?that?Sweden?and?Norway?provided?adequate?alternative?forums?for?resolution?of?the?actions.?It?stayed?the?actions,?and?retained?jurisdiction?to?make?such?further?orders?as?might?become?appropriate.?The?order?was?subject?to?seven?conditions,?with?which?defendants?agreed?to?comply.fn.?2 The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed,?after?discussing?the?various?private?and?public?interest?factors?relevant?to?a?determination?of?the?appropriate?forum?for?the?trial?of?an?action?under?the?doctrine?of?forum?non?conveniens.?It?declined?to?follow?Corrigan?v.?Bjork?Shiley?Corp.,?supra,?182?Cal.App.3d?166?(hereafter?Corrigan),?and?Holmes?v.?Syntex?Laboratories,?Inc.,?supra,?156?Cal.App.3d?372?(hereafter?Holmes),?a?case?which?preceded?Corrigan?by?two?years. [1a]?Plaintiffs?claim?that?the?convenience?of?the?parties?and?public?policy?would?be?best?served?if?the?actions?were?tried?in?California,?and?that?the?Court?of?Appeal?distorted?the?analysis?of?these?factors?in?upholding?the?trial?court’s?decision.?They?assert?also?that?the?appellate?court?failed?to?analyze?or?give?weight?to?certain?matters?which?prior?California?decisions?have?held?are?relevant?to?a?determination?of?a?forum?non?conveniens?motion.?We?conclude?that?the?Court?of?Appeal?correctly?decided?the?case?and?affirm?its?judgment.?[54?Cal.3d?751] [2]?Forum?non?conveniens?is?an?equitable?doctrine?invoking?the?discretionary?power?of?a?court?to?decline?to?exercise?the?jurisdiction?it?has?over?a?transitory?cause?of?action?when?it?believes?that?the?action?may?be?more?appropriately?and?justly?tried?elsewhere.?(Leet?v.?Union?Pac.?R.?R.?Co.?(1944)?25?Cal.2d?605,?609?[155?P.2d?42,?158?A.L.R.?1008].)?The?doctrine?was?first?applied?in?California?in?Price?v.?Atchison,?T.?&?S.?F.?Ry.?Co.?(1954)?42?Cal.2d?577?[268?P.2d?457,?43?A.L.R.2d?756]?(hereafter?Price).?We?described?the?basis?of?the?doctrine?as?follows:?”?’There?are?manifest?reasons?for?preferring?residents?in?access?to?often?overcrowded?Courts,?both?in?convenience?and?in?the?fact?that?broadly?speaking?it?is?they?who?pay?for?maintaining?the?Courts?concerned.’?…?[T]he?injustices?and?the?burdens?on?local?courts?and?taxpayers,?as?well?as?on?those?leaving?their?work?and?business?to?serve?as?jurors,?which?can?follow?from?an?unchecked?and?unregulated?importation?of?transitory?causes?of?action?for?trial?in?this?state?…?require?that?our?courts,?acting?upon?the?equitable?principles?…,?exercise?their?discretionary?power?to?decline?to?proceed?in?those?causes?of?action?which?they?conclude,?on?satisfactory?evidence,?may?be?more?appropriately?and?justly?tried?elsewhere.”?(Id.?at?pp.?582-584.) [3]?In?determining?whether?to?grant?a?motion?based?on?forum?non?conveniens,?a?court?must?first?determine?whether?the?alternate?forum?is?a?”suitable”?place?for?trial.?If?it?is,?the?next?step?is?to?consider?the?private?interests?of?the?litigants?and?the?interests?of?the?public?in?retaining?the?action?for?trial?in?California.?The?private?interest?factors?are?those?that?make?trial?and?the?enforceability?of?the?ensuing?judgment?expeditious?and?relatively?inexpensive,?such?as?the?ease?of?access?to?sources?of?proof,?the?cost?of?obtaining?attendance?of?witnesses,?and?the?availability?of?compulsory?process?for?attendance?of?unwilling?witnesses.?The?public?interest?factors?include?avoidance?of?overburdening?local?courts?with?congested?calendars,?protecting?the?interests?of?potential?jurors?so?that?they?are?not?called?upon?to?decide?cases?in?which?the?local?community?has?little?concern,?and?weighing?the?competing?interests?of?California?and?the?alternate?jurisdiction?in?the?litigation.?(Piper?Aircraft?Co.?v.?Reyno?(1981)?454?U.S.?235,?259-261?[70?L.Ed.2d?419,?437-439,?102?S.Ct.?252]?(hereafter?Piper);?Gulf?Oil?Corp.?v.?Gilbert?(1947)?330?U.S.?501,?507-509?[91?L.Ed.?1055,?1061-1063,?67?S.Ct.?839].) [4]?On?a?motion?for?forum?non?conveniens,?the?defendant,?as?the?moving?party,?bears?the?burden?of?proof.?The?granting?or?denial?of?such?a?motion?is?within?the?trial?court’s?discretion,?and?substantial?deference?is?accorded?its?determination?in?this?regard.?(Piper,?supra,?454?U.S.?at?p.?257?[70?L.Ed.2d?at?[54?Cal.3d?752]?pp.?436-437];?Lacey?v.?Cessna?Aircraft?Co.?(3d?Cir.?1991)?932?F.2d?170,?178-179;?Credit?Lyonnais?Bank?Nederland,?N.V.?v.?Manatt,?Phelps,?Rothenberg?&?Tunney?(1988)?202?Cal.App.3d?1424,?1436?[249?Cal.Rptr.?559].) [5]?On?the?first?of?these?issues,?whether?the?case?may?be?”suitably”?tried?in?Norway?and?Sweden,?the?answer?is?clear.?The?Judicial?Council?comment?to?section?410.30?declares?in?part,?”[T]he?action?will?not?be?dismissed?unless?a?suitable?alternative?forum?is?available?to?the?plaintiff?[citations].?Because?of?…?[this]?factor,?the?suit?will?be?entertained,?no?matter?how?inappropriate?the?forum?may?be,?if?the?defendant?cannot?be?subjected?to?jurisdiction?in?other?states.?The?same?will?be?true?if?the?plaintiff’s?cause?of?action?would?elsewhere?be?barred?by?the?statute?of?limitations,?unless?the?court?is?willing?to?accept?the?defendant’s?stipulation?that?he?will?not?raise?this?defense?in?the?second?state?[citations].”?(Judicial?Council?com.,?14?West’s?Ann.?Code?Civ.?Proc.?(1973?ed.)???410.30,?pp.?492-493,?hereinafter?referred?to?as?Judicial?Council?Comment.)?Defendants?stipulated?that?they?would?submit?to?jurisdiction?in?Sweden?or?Norway,?respectively,?as?well?as?to?the?tolling?of?the?statute?of?limitations?during?the?pendency?of?the?actions?in?California.?Thus,?the?courts?of?Sweden?and?Norway?present?suitable?forums?for?trial?of?the?actions.fn.?3 [1b]?We?proceed,?then,?to?the?second?and?more?difficult?question,?whether?the?Court?of?Appeal?erred?in?concluding?that?the?balance?of?the?private?and?public?interests?justified?a?stay?of?the?actions.?The?court?relied?heavily?on?Piper,?supra,?454?U.S.?235,?in?reaching?its?decision.?Piper,?like?the?present?case,?involved?foreign?plaintiffs?who?sought?to?hold?an?American?manufacturer?liable?for?deaths?which?occurred?in?a?foreign?country.?There,?an?airplane?built?by?the?defendant?in?Pennsylvania,?crashed?in?Scotland,?killing?several?residents?of?that?country.?The?representative?of?the?decedents’?estates?filed?a?wrongful?death?action?in?federal?district?court,?alleging?negligence?and?strict?liability.?The?district?court?in?Pennsylvania?granted?a?motion?by?defendants?on?the?ground?of?forum?non?conveniens,?concluding?that?Scotland?was?the?appropriate?forum?for?trial?of?the?action.?The?circuit?court?reversed?the?judgment?because?Scottish?law?was?less?favorable?to?the?plaintiffs?than?the?law?of?Pennsylvania. This?decision?was?in?turn?reversed?by?the?Supreme?Court,?in?an?opinion?which?discussed?the?factors?to?be?considered?in?determining?a?forum?non?[54?Cal.3d?753]?conveniens?motion.?The?high?court,?in?its?analysis?of?the?doctrine,?reiterated?long-standing?principles,?first?clearly?enunciated?by?it?in?Gulf?Oil?Corp.?v.?Gilbert,?supra,?330?U.S.?501,?and?later?applied?in?California?in?Price,?supra,?42?Cal.2d?577.?The?court?warned?that?the?private?and?public?interest?factors?must?be?applied?flexibly,?without?giving?undue?emphasis?to?any?one?element.?A?court?should?not?decide?that?there?are?circumstances?in?which?the?doctrine?will?always?apply?or?never?apply.?Otherwise,?the?flexibility?of?the?doctrine?would?be?threatened,?and?its?application?would?be?based?on?identification?of?a?single?factor?rather?than?the?balancing?of?several.?(Piper,?supra,?454?U.S.?at?pp.?249-250?[70?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?431-432].)fn.?4?The?high?court?recognized?that?there?is?”ordinarily?a?strong?presumption?in?favor?of?the?plaintiff’s?choice?of?forum”?(id.?at?p.?255?[70?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?435]),?but?held?that?a?foreign?plaintiff’s?choice?deserves?less?deference?than?the?choice?of?a?resident. The?high?court?discussed?in?some?detail?the?significance?to?be?accorded?to?the?fact?that?the?law?of?the?forum?state?is?more?favorable?to?the?plaintiff?than?that?of?the?alternate?jurisdiction.?In?this?connection,?it?observed?that?the?laws?of?the?United?States?in?product?liability?actions?favor?plaintiffs?in?several?respects:?the?law?of?strict?liability,?which?exists?in?almost?all?50?states?but?only?a?handful?of?foreign?countries;?the?existence?of?jury?trials?in?such?actions,?resulting?in?sometimes?generous?awards,?contingent?attorney?fee?arrangements,?and?more?liberal?rules?of?discovery.?It?held?that?if?substantial?weight?is?given?to?the?circumstance?that?the?law?in?the?forum?state?is?more?favorable?to?the?plaintiff?than?the?one?in?the?alternate?jurisdiction,?”The?American?courts,?which?are?already?extremely?attractive?to?foreign?plaintiffs,?would?become?even?more?attractive.?The?flow?of?litigation?into?the?United?States?would?increase?and?further?congest?already?crowded?courts.?[Fn.?omitted.]”?(Piper,?supra,?454?U.S.?at?p.?252?[70?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?433].)?[6a]?Thus,?the?possibility?of?an?unfavorable?change?in?the?law?is?a?”relevant?consideration”?only?if?the?remedy?in?the?alternative?forum?”is?so?clearly?inadequate?or?unsatisfactory?that?it?is?no?remedy?at?all?….”?(Id.?at?p.?254?[70?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?435].)fn.?5?[54?Cal.3d?754] After?analyzing?the?interests?of?the?parties?and?of?Scotland?in?the?litigation,?the?court?concluded?that?”the?incremental?deterrence?that?would?be?gained?if?this?trial?were?held?in?an?American?court?is?likely?to?be?insignificant.?The?American?interest?in?this?accident?is?simply?not?sufficient?to?justify?the?enormous?commitment?of?judicial?time?and?resources?that?would?inevitably?be?required?if?the?case?were?to?be?tried?here.”?(Piper,?supra,?454?U.S.?at?pp.?260-261?[70?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?438-?439].)fn.?6 [1c]?In?the?present?case,?the?trial?court?found?that?Sweden?and?Norway?were?adequate?alternative?forums.?Defendants?produced?evidence?that?Norway?and?Sweden?might?permit?recovery?under?a?strict?liability?theory,?that?Norway?might?allow?special?damages?(but?not?punitive?damages)?in?some?circumstances,?and?that?the?actions?could?be?pursued?in?those?countries?without?undue?delay.?Although?some?of?this?evidence?was?contradicted?by?plaintiffs,?the?trial?court’s?determination?of?these?issues?is?supported?by?substantial?evidence,?and?we?defer?to?its?conclusion.?Thus,?the?fact?that?California?law?would?likely?provide?plaintiffs?with?certain?advantages?of?procedural?or?substantive?law?cannot?be?considered?as?a?factor?in?plaintiffs’?favor?in?the?forum?non?conveniens?balance. Next?we?consider?the?effect?of?the?residence?of?the?parties?in?deciding?a?motion?based?on?forum?non?conveniens.?Many?cases?hold?that?the?plaintiff’s?choice?of?a?forum?should?rarely?be?disturbed?unless?the?balance?is?strongly?in?favor?of?the?defendant.?(E.g.,?Goodwine?v.?Superior?Court?(1965)63?Cal.2d?481,?485?[47?Cal.Rptr.?201,?407?P.2d?1];?Price,?supra,?42?Cal.2d?577,?585;?Brown?v.?Clorox?Co.?(1976)?56?Cal.App.3d?306,?311?[128?Cal.Rptr.?385].)?[7]?But?the?reasons?advanced?for?this?frequently?reiterated?rule?apply?only?to?residents?of?the?forum?state:?(1)?if?the?plaintiff?is?a?resident?of?the?jurisdiction?in?which?the?suit?is?filed,?the?plaintiff’s?choice?of?forum?is?presumed?to?be?convenient?(Piper,?supra,?454?U.S.?at?pp.?255-256?[70?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?435-436];?Thomson?v.?Continental?Ins.?Co.?(1967)?66?Cal.2d?738,?744-745?[59?Cal.Rptr.?101,?427?P.2d?765]);?and?(2)?a?state?has?a?strong?[54?Cal.3d?755]?interest?in?assuring?its?own?residents?an?adequate?forum?for?the?redress?of?grievances?(Archibald?v.?Cinerama?Hotels?(1976)?15?Cal.3d?853,?859?[126?Cal.Rptr.?811,?544?P.2d?947]).?Indeed,?until?the?recent?amendment?of?section?410.30,?dismissal?of?an?action?(as?opposed?to?a?stay)?was?ordinarily?not?permitted?on?the?basis?of?inconvenient?forum?if?the?plaintiff?was?a?California?resident.?(15?Cal.3d?at?p.?859;?Thomson?v.?Continental?Ins.?Co.,?supra,?66?Cal.2d?at?p.?742;?Goodwine?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?63?Cal.2d?at?p.?485.)?Where,?however,?the?plaintiff?resides?in?a?foreign?country,?Piper?holds?that?the?plaintiff’s?choice?of?forum?is?much?less?reasonable?and?is?not?entitled?to?the?same?preference?as?a?resident?of?the?state?where?the?action?is?filed.?(Piper,?supra,?454?U.S.?at?p.?256?[70?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?436].)?[1d]?At?best,?therefore,?under?the?rule?laid?down?in?Piper,?the?fact?that?plaintiffs?chose?to?file?their?complaint?in?California?is?not?a?substantial?factor?in?favor?of?retaining?jurisdiction?here.fn.?7 [8]?Defendant’s?residence?is?also?a?factor?to?be?considered?in?the?balance?of?convenience.?If?a?corporation?is?the?defendant,?the?state?of?its?incorporation?and?the?place?where?its?principal?place?of?business?is?located?is?presumptively?a?convenient?forum.?(Judicial?Council?Com.,?supra,?p.?493.)?As?noted?above,?Shiley?is?a?California?corporation?with?its?principal?place?of?business?in?this?state. The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?in?view?of?a?1986?amendment?to?section?410.30,?a?defendant’s?choice?to?incorporate?or?do?business?in?California?is?no?longer?a?significant?factor?in?the?balancing?process.?The?amendment,?[54?Cal.3d?756]?effective?until?January?1,?1992,?unless?extended?by?the?Legislature,?provides?that?the?”domicile?or?residence?in?this?state?of?any?party?to?the?action?shall?not?preclude?the?court?from?staying?or?dismissing?the?action.” We?doubt?the?correctness?of?the?Court?of?Appeal’s?analysis.?[9]?We?agree?with?the?statements?in?a?number?of?cases?which?have?examined?the?issue?(see,?e.g.,?Northrop?Corp.?v.?American?Motorists?Ins.?Co.?(1990)?220?Cal.App.3d?1553,?1562?[270?Cal.Rptr.?233];?Credit?Lyonnais?Bank?Nederland,?N.V.?v.?Manatt,?Phelps,?Rothenberg?&?Tunney,?supra,?202?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1434;?Klein?v.?Superior?Court?(1988)?198?Cal.App.3d?894,?901?[244?Cal.Rptr.?226]),fn.?8?that?the?purpose?of?the?amendment?was?to?overcome?the?holding?of?Archibald?v.?Cinerama?Hotels,?supra,?15?Cal.3d?853,?and?other?cases?cited?above?that?a?trial?court?was?powerless?to?dismiss?an?action?on?the?ground?of?forum?non?conveniens?if?the?plaintiff?was?a?California?resident.?Thus,?the?presumption?of?convenience?to?a?defendant?which?follows?from?its?residence?in?California?remains?in?effect?despite?the?amendment?of?section?410.30. But,?as?Piper,?supra,?454?U.S.?235,?and?other?authorities?make?clear,?this?presumption?is?not?conclusive.fn.?9?Even?though?evidence?relating?to?the?design,?manufacture,?and?testing?of?the?airplane?involved?in?Piper?was?located?in?the?United?States,?the?plaintiffs?were?relegated?to?the?Scottish?courts?to?vindicate?their?claims.?A?resident?defendant?may?overcome?the?presumption?of?convenience?by?evidence?that?the?alternate?jurisdiction?is?a?more?convenient?place?for?trial?of?the?action.fn.?10 On?this?issue,?the?parties?disagree?sharply.?The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?because?virtually?all?witnesses?and?documents?relating?to?the?decedents’?medical?care?and?treatment,?medical?histories,?loss?of?earnings,?and?all?the?[54?Cal.3d?757]?witnesses?to?the?familial?impacts?of?their?deaths?are?located?in?Scandinavia,?it?is?more?convenient?to?try?the?actions?there.?Defendants?point?out?in?addition?that,?although?the?alleged?fraudulent?representations?emanated?from?California,?they?were?received?and?relied?on?in?Scandinavia,?and?the?Scandinavian?doctors?have?knowledge?of?decedents’?preexisting?medical?conditions,?the?factors?relevant?to?a?risk-benefit?analysis,?and?the?handling?of?the?heart?valves?prior?to?implantation. Plaintiffs?counter?that?evidence?relating?to?defendants’?allegedly?culpable?conduct,?such?as?the?design,?manufacture,?testing?and?packing?of?the?valves,?is?in?California;?that?warnings?and?advice?to?doctors?using?the?valve?were?issued?from?this?state;?and?that?investigations?of?the?reasons?for?the?valve?failure?were?conducted?here.?Plaintiffs?represented?that?the?Scandinavian?witnesses?to?damages?and?decedents’?medical?care?have?agreed?that?they?will?be?available?to?testify?in?California.?In?addition,?they?assert,?there?are?more?than?one?million?pages?of?documents?in?California?that?are?relevant?to?the?issue?of?the?valve?failures,?and?it?would?be?extremely?time?consuming?and?costly?to?translate?even?a?fraction?of?these?into?Swedish?and?Norwegian.?Hundreds?of?witnesses?from?California?and?perhaps?other?states?will?be?called,?some?of?whom?would?not?be?available?for?trial?in?Scandinavia. Defendants?produced?evidence?that?Swedish?and?Norwegian?courts?routinely?receive?documents?into?evidence?that?are?written?in?English,?without?requiring?translation.?Among?the?conditions?imposed?by?the?trial?court?with?which?defendants?agreed?to?comply?were?to?make?available?in?Norway?and?Sweden?past?and?present?employees?of?defendants?and?documents?in?their?possession,?as?required?by?the?Scandinavian?courts.fn.?11?They?also?agreed?to?defray?the?expenses?for?the?production?of?these?witnesses?and?documents. [1e]?Before?deciding?whether?the?private?convenience?of?the?parties?weighs?in?favor?of?plaintiffs?or?defendants,?we?consider?the?interests?of?the?California?public?in?retaining?the?trial?of?the?actions?in?this?state.?Piper?held?that?the?jurisdiction?with?the?greater?interest?should?bear?the?burden?of?entertaining?the?litigation.?(Piper,?supra,?454?U.S.?at?pp.?260-261?[70?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?438-439].) The?Court?of?Appeal?considered?four?factors?in?holding?that?the?public?interest?favored?the?granting?of?the?motions:?(1)?California’s?interest?in?[54?Cal.3d?758]?avoiding?undue?congestion?of?its?courts?due?to?the?trial?of?foreign?causes?of?action;?(2)?this?state’s?deterrent?and?regulatory?interests?in?products?manufactured?here;?(3)?appropriate?deference?to?the?laws?and?policy?decisions?of?foreign?governments;?and?(4)?the?competitive?disadvantage?to?California?business?if?resident?corporations?were?required?to?defend?lawsuits?here?based?on?injuries?incurred?in?other?jurisdictions. As?to?the?first?of?these?matters,?the?court?concluded?trial?in?California?would?unduly?burden?the?court.?It?noted?that?foreign?plaintiffs?have?filed?108?actions?in?California?against?Shiley?relating?to?the?heart?valves,?and?that,?according?to?plaintiffs,?about?one?million?pages?of?documents?are?relevant?to?their?actions,?and?that?the?testimony?of?hundreds?of?witnesses?might?be?required.?Defendants?state?that?the?number?of?cases?filed?against?Shiley?involving?the?heart?valves?had?increased?to?235?by?the?time?the?briefs?were?filed.?[10]?The?court?observed?correctly?that?preventing?court?congestion?resulting?from?the?trial?of?foreign?causes?of?action?is?an?important?factor?in?the?forum?non?conveniens?analysis.?(Citing?Gulf?Oil?Corp.?v.?Gilbert,?supra,?330?U.S.?at?pp.?508-509?[91?L.Ed.?at?pp.?1062-1063];?Price,?supra,?42?Cal.2d?at?pp.?583-?584.) Plaintiffs?rely?on?authorities?stating?generally?that?if?a?case?is?”properly”?before?the?court?(Hemmelgarn?v.?Boeing?Co.?(1980)?106?Cal.App.3d?576,?586?[165?Cal.Rptr.?190])?or?if?the?action?is?”legitimately?and?correctly?brought?before?it”?(Lake?v.?Richardson-Merrell,?Inc.?(N.D.Ohio?1982)?538?F.Supp.?262,?275),?a?court?will?retain?the?case?even?in?the?face?of?a?congested?calendar.?We?have?no?argument?with?these?propositions,?and?we?agree?with?plaintiffs?that?dismissals?or?stays?for?forum?non?conveniens?should?not?be?used?primarily?to?control?a?court’s?docket.?Nevertheless,?there?can?be?no?question?that?the?already?congested?courts?of?this?state?would?be?burdened?by?the?trial?of?the?numerous?and?complex?actions?relating?to?the?heart?valve?brought?by?plaintiffs?who?reside?in?foreign?countries.?Whether?this?would?constitute?an?”undue?burden,”?however,?is?another?question.?In?order?to?determine?that?issue,?we?must?consider?other?factors?as?well. The?appellate?court?next?considered?whether?California’s?interest?in?deterring?wrongful?conduct?justified?retention?of?the?actions.?As?we?have?already?noted,?in?Piper,?the?high?court,?after?observing?that?Scotland?had?the?stronger?interest?in?the?litigation?because?the?decedents?who?died?in?the?airplane?crash?were?Scottish,?and?all?potential?defendants?except?those?before?the?American?court?were?Scottish?or?English,?held?that?the?”incremental?deterrence?that?would?be?gained?if?this?trial?were?held?in?an?American?court?is?likely?to?be?insignificant.?The?American?interest?in?this?accident?is?simply?not?sufficient?to?justify?the?enormous?commitment?of?judicial?time?and?resources?that?would?inevitably?be?required?if?the?case?were?to?be?tried?here.”?(Piper,?supra,?[54?Cal.3d?759]?454?U.S.?at?pp.?260-261?[70?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?438-439].)?The?Court?of?Appeal?adopted?this?”incremental?deterrence”?reasoning?and?concluded?that?California’s?interest?in?deterring?wrongful?conduct?did?not?outweigh?the?other?factors?pointing?to?trial?in?Scandinavia. Plaintiffs?argue?vigorously?against?this?conclusion.?They?cite?cases?stating?that?California?has?a?strong?interest?in?regulating?the?conduct?of?manufacturers?who?produce?products?in?this?state?which?cause?injury?to?persons?in?other?jurisdictions.?(Hurtado?v.?Superior?Court?(1974)?11?Cal.3d?574,?583-584?[114?Cal.Rptr.?106,?522?P.2d?666];?Clothesrigger,?Inc.?v.?GTE?Corp.?(1987)?191?Cal.App.3d?605,?615?[236?Cal.Rptr.?605];?Hemmelgarn?v.?Boeing?Co.,?supra,?106?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?586;?see?Van?Cauwenberghe?v.?Biard?(1988)?486?U.S.?517,?528?[100?L.Ed.2d?517,?528-529,?108?S.Ct.?1945].)fn.?12?This?interest,?as?the?cited?cases?make?clear,?is?to?deter?negligent?conduct;?the?likelihood?of?a?substantial?recovery?against?such?a?manufacturer?strengthens?the?deterrent?effect. [1f]?We?are?persuaded?that?under?the?facts?in?the?present?case,?the?additional?deterrence?that?would?result?if?defendants?were?called?to?account?for?their?allegedly?wrongful?conduct?in?a?California?court?rather?than?in?the?courts?of?Scandinavia?would?be?negligible.?As?we?observe?above,?there?are?235?lawsuits?pending?in?California?relating?to?the?heart?valve.?According?to?defendants,?some?of?these?have?been?filed?on?behalf?of?persons?with?functioning?valves?who?seek?damages?for?the?anxiety?engendered?by?the?apprehension?that?the?valves?may?fail.?At?least?108?of?these?suits?were?filed?by?foreign?residents,?according?to?the?Court?of?Appeal.?Many?valves?were?implanted?in?California,?and?it?is?safe?to?assume?that?the?plaintiffs?in?some?of?the?235?actions?are?California?residents.fn.?13?The?burden?imposed?on?defendants?in?trying?these?cases?by?California?residents?in?the?California?courts,?and?the?damages?that?defendants?might?be?required?to?pay?if?they?are?found?liable,?would?provide?sufficient?deterrence?to?prevent?wrongful?conduct?in?the?future?even?if?the?suits?filed?by?nonresident?plaintiffs?were?tried?elsewhere.?[54?Cal.3d?760] The?Court?of?Appeal?found?that?there?were?two?additional?factors?that?weighed?in?favor?of?granting?the?motions.?One?is?the?competitive?disadvantage?to?California?business?that?would?result?if?California?manufacturers?were?called?on?to?defend?lawsuits?involving?extraterritorial?injuries.?A?few?decisions?have?relied?on?similar?reasoning?in?granting?motions?for?forum?non?conveniens.?(Fraizer?v.?St.?Jude?Medical,?Inc.?(D.Minn.?1985)?609?F.Supp.?1129,?1131-1132;?Kaiser?Foundation?Health?Plan?v.?Rose?(D.C.?1990)?583?A.2d?156,?159;?see?Howe?v.?Diversified?Builders,?Inc.?(1968)?262?Cal.App.2d?741,?746?[69?Cal.Rptr.?56].) The?other?factor?relates?to?the?interests?and?policy?concerns?of?Sweden?and?Norway?in?the?litigation,?such?as?their?interest?in?assuring?that?new?medical?devices?be?made?available?promptly?and?inexpensively,?policies?that?might?be?threatened?by?applying?American?regulation?of?medical?products?and?liability?laws?to?actions?brought?by?foreign?citizens.?A?number?of?cases?consider?these?matters?in?determining?whether?the?forum?where?the?action?is?brought?or?the?alternative?forum?has?a?greater?interest?in?the?action.?(E.g.,?Jennings?v.?Boeing?Co.?(E.D.Pa.?1987)?660?F.Supp.?796,?808;?In?re?Union?Carbide?Corp.?Gas?Plant?Disaster?(S.D.N.Y.?1986)?634?F.Supp.?842,?864-865,?affd.?(2d?Cir.?1987)?809?F.2d?195;?Fraizer?v.?St.?Jude?Medical,?Inc.,?supra,?609?F.Supp.?at?pp.?1131-1132;?Abiaad?v.?General?Motors?Corp.?(E.D.Pa.?1982)?538?F.Supp.?537,?543,?affd.?per?curiam?(2d?Cir.?1982)?696?F.2d?980;?Harrison?v.?Wyeth?Laboratories,?etc.,?supra,?510?F.Supp.?at?p.?4;?Jones?v.?Searle?Laboratories,?supra,?444?N.E.2d?at?p.?161.) The?Court?of?Appeal?mentions?the?foregoing?two?factors?only?in?passing,?and?we?may?assume?that?they?do?not?represent?a?significant?basis?for?the?court’s?decision.?A?detailed?discussion?of?their?effect?on?the?balance?of?conveniences?is?unnecessary?since,?as?we?shall?conclude,?the?court?was?justified?in?upholding?the?judgment?on?the?basis?of?the?other?public?and?private?interest?factors?which?it?considered. Plaintiffs?place?great?reliance?on?an?additional?factor,?which?they?complain?the?Court?of?Appeal?failed?to?consider,?i.e.,?the?relationship?of?defendants?to?California.?We?hold?above?that?a?presumption?of?convenience?to?defendants?arises?from?the?fact?that?Shiley?is?incorporated?in?California?and?has?its?principal?place?of?business?here.?Another?aspect?of?defendants’?connection?with?this?state?is?that?alleged?wrongful?conduct?was?committed?here,?and?there?is?a?close?connection?between?such?conduct?and?plaintiffs’?causes?of?action.?[11]?We?agree?with?plaintiffs?that?defendants’?cumulative?connection?with?California?is?an?appropriate?matter?for?consideration?in?deciding?a?forum?non?conveniens?motion. The?significance?of?such?a?connection?is?that,?as?Corrigan?implies,?it?is?not?unfair?to?a?defendant?to?hold?the?trial?in?a?state?where?a?substantial?part?of?the?[54?Cal.3d?761]?wrongful?conduct?was?committed.?(182?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?180-181.)?However,?Corrigan?and?other?authorities?cited?by?defendants?also?appear?to?hold?that?a?court?is?not?unfairly?burdened?by?the?trial?of?an?action?in?California?if?a?corporate?defendant?has?its?principal?place?of?business?here?and?the?tort?was?allegedly?committed?in?this?state.?(Id.?at?pp.?181-182;?Holmes,?supra,?156?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?388-389;?Brown?v.?Clorox?Co.,?supra,?56?Cal.App.3d?306,?313-314;?see?Hemmelgarn?v.?Boeing?Co.,?supra,?106?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?580.)?We?reject?this?analysis,?for?it?would?require?that?the?court?congestion?factor?always?be?decided?in?favor?of?the?plaintiff?and?against?a?California?corporation?which?caused?injury?to?consumers?anywhere?in?the?world,?if?the?product?was?manufactured?here.fn.?14?While?the?cumulative?connection?of?the?defendant?and?its?conduct?within?the?state?is?relevant?in?deciding?whether?retention?of?an?action?would?place?an?undue?burden?on?the?courts,?we?cannot?look?only?to?such?circumstances;?matters?like?the?complexity?of?the?case,?whether?it?would?consume?considerable?court?time,?and?the?condition?of?the?court’s?docket?are?also?relevant?to?the?issue. [1g]?We?come,?then,?to?an?assessment?of?the?factors?discussed?above.?We?are?confronted?with?the?somewhat?anomalous?situation?that?the?parties?seek?to?try?the?action?in?a?jurisdiction?which?would?appear?to?violate?their?interest?in?a?convenient?place?for?trial.?Both?plaintiffs?and?defendants?are?willing-indeed,?eager-to?litigate?the?matter?in?a?jurisdiction?separated?by?an?ocean?and?a?continent?from?their?places?of?residence.?Although?both?claim?that?they?are?motivated?by?the?convenience?of?the?place?of?trial,?this?court,?like?others?before?it,?recognizes?that?an?additional?motivating?factor-and?perhaps?the?major?one-relates?to?the?circumstance?that?trial?in?California?will?enhance?the?possibility?of?substantial?recovery.?Plaintiffs?seek?and?defendants?resist?trial?in?the?California?courts?substantially?for?this?reason.?In?the?service?of?this?goal,?they?are?willing?to?transport?numerous?witnesses?and?documents?many?thousand?miles. Amici?curiae,?the?California?Chamber?of?Commerce?and?the?California?Manufacturers?Association,?suggest?that?the?private?convenience?of?the?parties?should?be?afforded?less?weight?than?the?public?interest?in?deciding?issues?of?forum?non?conveniens?when?the?plaintiff?is?the?resident?of?a?foreign?country.?They?point?out?that?with?modern?transportation?and?transmission?methods,?witnesses?can?attend?trials?relatively?easily?in?distant?places?and?documents?may?be?transferred?almost?instantaneously,?and?that?conditions?imposed?by?courts?can?mitigate?inconvenience?to?the?parties?to?a?substantial?degree.?(See?Stein,?Forum?Non?Conveniens?(1985)?133?U.?Pa.?L.?Rev.?781,?[54?Cal.3d?762]?784,?fn.?12;?Note,?Forum?Non?Conveniens?(1985)?64?Tex.?L.?Rev.?193,?216.)?Here,?for?example,?the?trial?court?conditioned?the?granting?of?a?stay?on?defendants’?agreement?to?make?documents?in?their?possession?and?witnesses?available?in?Scandinavia,?at?their?expense. The?suggestion?of?amici?curiae?has?a?certain?appeal.?Perhaps?in?the?light?of?vastly?improved?transportation?and?transmission?methods?(Fitzgerald?v.?Texaco,?Inc.?(2d?Cir.?1975)?521?F.2d?448,?455,?456?(dis.?opn.?by?Oakes,?J.)?and?the?conditions?the?trial?court?may?impose?to?mitigate?inconvenience,?we?should?be?less?concerned?with?the?convenience?of?the?parties?or?with?harassment?of?defendants?by?the?filing?of?lawsuits?in?a?forum?inconvenient?for?them?(e.g.,?Price,?supra,?42?Cal.2d?at?p.?585;?Bechtel?Corp.?v.?Industrial?Indem.?Co.?(1978)?86?Cal.App.3d?45,?50?[150?Cal.Rptr.?29])?than?with?forum?shopping?by?plaintiffs?and?reverse?forum?shopping?by?defendants,?seeking?to?take?advantage?of,?or?to?resist?the?advantage?of,?laws?favorable?to?the?plaintiff?in?the?jurisdiction?the?suit?is?filed.?(Note,?Forum?Non?Conveniens,?supra,?64?Tex.?L.?Rev.?at?pp.?215-216.) In?any?event,?even?without?adopting?the?suggestion?of?amici?curiae,?there?was?clearly?substantial?evidence?to?sustain?the?trial?court’s?determination?that?the?balance?of?private?and?public?interests?favors?defendants?under?traditional?rules?laid?down?in?prior?cases.?It?is?true?that?much,?but?not?all,?of?the?evidence?concerning?liability?exists?in?California;fn.?15?but?virtually?all?the?evidence?relating?to?damages?is?in?Scandinavia.?Since?defendants?have?promised?to?supply?documents?in?their?possession?if?required?by?the?Scandinavian?courts,?the?fact?that?a?large?number?of?documents?will?be?involved?appears?not?to?pose?a?significant?inconvenience?to?plaintiffs.?The?Court?of?Appeal?concluded?that?these?documents?could?be?admitted?into?evidence?without?translation,?and?although?there?was?conflicting?evidence?on?this?score,?its?conclusion?was?supported?by?the?record. It?is?probable?that?both?parties?will?suffer?some?disadvantage?from?trial?in?their?home?forums.?For?example,?former?employees?of?defendants?may?be?beyond?the?jurisdiction?of?the?Scandinavian?courts?and?defendants?may?be?unable?to?make?good?their?promise?to?produce?them?for?trial?in?Scandinavia.?Conversely,?defendants?have?no?means?by?which?to?ensure?that?Scandinavian?[54?Cal.3d?763]?medical?witnesses?and?others?whose?testimony?might?be?important?will?attend?the?trial?in?California.?But?these?problems?are?implicit?in?many?cases?in?which?forum?non?conveniens?motions?are?made,?and?it?is?for?the?trial?court?to?decide?which?party?will?be?more?inconvenienced. The?public?interest?factors?clearly?favor?defendants’?position.?If?we?hold?that?the?present?cases?may?be?tried?in?California,?it?will?likely?mean?that?the?remaining?108?cases?involving?the?Shiley?valve?will?also?be?tried?here.?The?burden?on?the?California?courts?of?trying?these?numerous?complex?actions?is?considerable.?Moreover,?California’s?interest?in?deterring?future?improper?conduct?by?defendants?would?be?amply?vindicated?if?the?actions?filed?by?California?resident?plaintiffs?resulted?in?judgments?in?their?favor.?Under?all?the?circumstances,?we?hold?that?the?Court?of?Appeal?was?correct?in?concluding?that?there?was?substantial?evidence?to?support?the?trial?court’s?determination?that?the?private?and?public?interest?factors,?on?balance,?justified?the?stays?granted?in?these?actions. Finally,?we?consider?Corrigan,?supra,?182?Cal.App.3d?166,?and?Holmes,?supra,?156?Cal.App.3d?372,?the?two?decisions?the?Court?of?Appeal?declined?to?follow.?Holmes?involved?a?suit?filed?in?California?by?British?plaintiffs?who?alleged?that?they?were?injured?as?a?result?of?ingesting?an?oral?contraceptive?produced?by?an?American?manufacturer?whose?principal?place?of?business?was?California.?The?court?first?held?that?California?law,?unlike?federal?law,?affords?substantial?deference?to?a?foreign?plaintiff’s?choice?of?forum.?We?have?concluded?above?to?the?contrary,?and,?indeed,?plaintiffs?in?these?actions?do?not?claim?that?the?same?amount?of?deference?is?due?to?foreign?and?resident?plaintiffs.fn.?16 [6b]?A?second?ground?of?the?Holmes?decision?was?that?”California?attaches?far?greater?significance?to?the?possibility?of?an?unfavorable?change?in?applicable?law”?in?the?alternative?forum?than?the?federal?courts.?(156?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?381.)?The?decision?concluded?that?a?factor?of?”fundamental?importance”?in?favor?of?denial?of?the?motion?for?forum?non?conveniens?was?[54?Cal.3d?764]?that?the?plaintiffs?would?be?substantially?disadvantaged?if?the?case?were?tried?in?Britain?because?that?country?did?not?afford?recovery?on?the?basis?of?strict?liability.?We?disapprove?of?this?holding.?As?Piper,?supra,?454?U.S.?235,?points?out,?if?substantial?weight?is?given?to?the?fact?that?the?law?in?the?forum?state?is?more?favorable?to?a?plaintiff?than?in?the?foreign?jurisdiction,?the?balance?will?ordinarily?favor?denial?of?the?motion,?and?substantial?weight?should?be?given?to?this?factor?only?if?the?alternative?forum?provides?no?remedy?at?all. […]

Hendy?v.?Losse?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?723?,?1?Cal.Rptr.2d?543;?819?P.2d?1 [No.?S018325.?Nov?18,?1991.] JOHN?HENDY?et?al.,?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants,?v.?GARY?LOSSE?et?al.,?Defendants?and?Respondents. (Superior?Court?of?San?Diego?County,?No.?603318,?William?C.?Pate,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Baxter,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Howarth?&?Smith,?Don?Howarth?and?Barbara?Gregg?Glenn?for?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants. Ault,?Deuprey,?Jones,?Danielson?&?Gorman,?Michael?J.?Grace,?Martin?E.?Costello,?Thelin,?Marrin,?Johnson?&?Bridges,?Curtis?A.?Cole,?William?F.?Holbrook,?Steven?J.?Bernheim,?Luce,?Forward,?Hamilton?&?Scripps,?Richard?R.?Spirra,?Lawrence?J.?Kouns?and?Nathan?S.?Arrington?for?Defendants?and?Respondents. Fred?J.?Heistand?as?Amicus?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendants?and?Respondents. OPINION BAXTER,?J. Review?was?granted?in?this?matter?to?determine?the?effect,?if?any,?of?a?1982?amendment?of?Labor?Code?section?3602,fn.?1?on?the?right?of?a?person?who?suffers?an?industrial?injury?to?sue?a?coemployee?physician?whose?treatment?allegedly?aggravated?the?injury.?The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?while?section?3602,?as?amended,?no?longer?permits?actions?against?a?physician?employer?under?the?”dual?capacity”?doctrine,?a?coemployee?action?may?be?maintained?under?section?3601. We?disagree.?While?the?Court?of?Appeal?was?correct?in?its?conclusion?that?section?3601?alone?governs?the?right?of?an?employee?to?seek?damages?for?industrial?injuries?caused?by?a?coemployee,?the?immunity?granted?coemployees?by?section?3601?bars?this?medical?malpractice?action?against?Gary?Loose,?M.D.,?because?he?was?acting?within?the?scope?of?his?employment?when?the?conduct?complained?of?occurred. I?Background Insofar?as?they?are?relevant?to?plaintiff’s?cause?of?action?against?defendant?Losse?for?medical?malpractice?and?thus?to?the?issue?before?the?court,?the?allegations?of?the?complaint?reflect?the?following:fn.?2 Plaintiff?John?Hendy?suffered?injury?to?his?right?knee?on?August?11,?1986,?while?playing?in?a?regular?season?football?game?as?an?employee?of?the?San?[54?Cal.3d?728]?Diego?Chargers?Football?Company?(Club).?He?was?treated?for?that?injury?by?defendant?Losse,?who?was?employed?as?a?Club?physician.?As?a?condition?of?his?continued?receipt?of?salary?and?medical?care?at?the?expense?of?his?employer,?plaintiff?was?required?to?consult?the?Club?physician. Defendant?Losse?examined?plaintiff?pursuant?to?his?employment?by?the?Club,?and?advised?plaintiff?to?continue?playing?football.?From?May?11,?1987,?and?continuing?to?September?1987,?defendant?Losse?negligently?diagnosed?and/or?treated?plaintiff?and?advised?plaintiff?to?continue?playing?football.?On?or?about?May?28,?1987,?plaintiff?suffered?another?injury?to?his?right?knee?during?a?training?session.?He?again?consulted?Dr.?Losse,?and?defendant?Losse?again?advised?plaintiff?to?continue?playing?football.?Dr.?Losse?lacked?the?knowledge?and?skill?necessary?to?properly?diagnose?and?treat?plaintiff’s?condition?or,?although?aware?of?the?condition,?advised?plaintiff?to?continue?to?play?football,?with?the?result?that?plaintiff?suffered?irreparable?and?permanent?injury?to?his?right?knee.fn.?3?On?or?about?September?8,?1987,?when?he?consulted?a?physician?who?was?not?employed?by?the?Club,?plaintiff?discovered?that?the?cause?of?his?injuries?was?defendant’s?failure?to?properly?diagnose?and?treat?his?condition. Defendant?demurred?to?the?cause?of?action?for?medical?malpractice?on?the?ground?that?plaintiff’s?exclusive?remedy?for?his?employment-related?injury?was?within?the?workers’?compensation?system.?In?support?of?the?demurrer?defendant?asked?that?the?court?take?judicial?notice,?pursuant?to?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?430.30?and?Evidence?Code?section?452,?of?both?the?National?Football?League?employment?contract?and?the?collective?bargaining?agreement?between?the?league’s?management?council?and?the?National?Football?League?Players?Association,?both?of?which?governed?plaintiff’s?employment. The?collective?bargaining?agreement?included?a?provision?outlining?the?players’?right?to?medical?care?and?treatment,?and?made?the?cost?of?medical?[54?Cal.3d?729]?services?to?be?rendered?by?Club?physicians?the?responsibility?of?the?Club.?The?contract?between?plaintiff?and?the?Club?provided?that?plaintiff?would?receive?”such?medical?and?hospital?care?during?the?term?of?this?contract?as?the?Club?physician?may?deem?necessary?….”?The?contract?between?defendant?and?the?Club?is?not?part?of?the?record. Plaintiff?opposed?the?demurrer?on?two?grounds-(1)?defendant?was?acting?in?a?dual?capacity?when?he?diagnosed?and?treated?plaintiff,?and?(2)?the?action?was?permitted?under?subdivision?(b)(2)?of?section?3602,?which?permits?an?action?at?law?against?an?employer?for?damages?proximately?caused?by?aggravation?of?a?work-related?injury?if?the?”injury?is?aggravated?by?the?employer’s?fraudulent?concealment?of?the?existence?of?the?injury?and?its?connection?with?the?employment?….” The?trial?court?sustained?the?demurrer?without?leave?to?amend,?ruling?that?a?1982?amendment?of?section?3602?made?workers’?compensation?plaintiff’s?exclusive?remedy?even?if?a?dual?capacity?situation?existed,?and?that?the?complaint?failed?to?state?facts?to?establish?concealment?of?either?the?injury?or?its?relation?to?plaintiff’s?employment.?The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?because?section?3602?applies?only?to?lawsuits?against?employers,?its?limitation?on?use?of?the?dual?capacity?doctrine?applied?only?to?actions?against?employers?and?had?no?impact?on?an?injured?employee’s?right?to?sue?a?coemployee.fn.?4 II?Development?of?the?Dual?Capacity?Doctrine Section?3600?establishes?the?conditions?under?which?an?employer’s?liability?for?compensation?established?by?the?Workers’?Compensation?Act?is?in?lieu?of?any?other?liability?of?the?employer?to?the?employee?for?an?injury?suffered?on?the?job.fn.?5?Section?3602?provides?in?turn,?with?exceptions?not?relevant?here,?that?when?compensation?is?payable?under?section?3600,?the?right?to?recover?[54?Cal.3d?730]?compensation?is?”the?sole?and?exclusive?remedy?of?the?employee?or?his?or?her?dependents?against?the?employer.?…”?A?parallel,?but?not?identical,?exclusive?remedy?provision,?section?3601,?prohibits?actions?against?coemployees?for?injuries?they?cause?when?acting?within?the?scope?of?their?employment. A?judicially?recognized?exception?to?the?exclusive?remedy?restriction?on?actions?against?employers-the?”dual?capacity?doctrine”-has?been?understood?to?also?permit?an?action?for?damages?against?a?coemployee?physician?if?the?injury?to?the?plaintiff?employee?was?caused?or?aggravated?by?the?defendant.?This?case?arises?because?the?Legislature?has?imposed?limits?on?the?dual?capacity?doctrine?by?amendment?of?section?3602. Dual?Capacity?of?Employers [1]?The?dual?capacity?doctrine?posits?that?an?employer?may?have?or?assume?a?relationship?with?an?employee?other?than?that?of?employer-employee,?and?that?when?an?employee?seeks?damages?for?injuries?arising?out?of?the?secondary?relationship?the?employee’s?claim?is?not?subject?to?the?exclusive?remedy?provisions?of?the?Workers’?Compensation?Act.?The?doctrine?was?first?enunciated?in?Duprey?v.?Shane?(1952)?39?Cal.2d?781?[249?P.2d?8],?which,?like?this?case,?involved?a?medical?malpractice?claim. At?the?time?Duprey?was?decided,?section?3601?governed?actions?against?employers?by?injured?employees.?It?then?provided:?”Where?the?conditions?of?compensation?exist,?the?right?to?recover?such?compensation?pursuant?to?the?provisions?of?this?division?is,?except?as?provided?in?section?3706,?the?exclusive?remedy?against?the?employer?for?the?injury?or?death.” Plaintiff?Duprey?was?employed?as?a?practical?nurse?by?defendants?who?were?partners?engaged?in?the?practice?of?chiropractic.?The?plaintiff?was?[54?Cal.3d?731]?injured?on?the?job.?She?was?treated?by?one?of?her?employers?and?by?a?fellow?employee,?also?a?chiropractor,?who?was?another?defendant.?The?treatment?aggravated?her?injuries.?She?applied?for?and?received?compensation?from?the?Industrial?Accident?Commission?(IAC)?for?the?original?injury?and?resulting?disability,?and?then?sued?Dr.?Shane,?her?employer,?and?Dr.?Harrison,?her?coemployee,?for?malpractice?in?causing?the?subsequent?injury.?After?jury?trial,?the?plaintiff?was?awarded?damages?for?that?injury. On?appeal?from?the?judgment,?the?defendants?claimed,?inter?alia,?that?the?IAC?had?exclusive?jurisdiction?over?the?plaintiff’s?claim,?relying?on?section?3601?for?that?proposition.?The?Court?of?Appeal,?whose?opinion?this?court?adopted,?disagreed?and?affirmed?the?judgment?for?the?plaintiff. The?court?reasoned:?”?'[W]hen?the?employing?doctor?elected?to?treat?the?industrial?injury,?the?doctor?assumed?the?same?responsibilities?that?any?doctor?would?have?assumed?had?he?been?called?in?on?the?case?….?[S]uch?third?party?doctor?can?be?sued?for?malpractice?resulting?in?an?aggravation?of?an?industrial?injury,?or?a?new?injury.?It?follows?that?the?employer-doctor?may?be?sued?for?malpractice?when?he?elects?to?treat?the?industrial?injury.’?”?(Duprey?v.?Shane,?supra,?39?Cal.2d?781,?789,?bracketed?deletions?from?Court?of?Appeal?opinion?omitted.)?In?further?explanation,?the?court?noted?the?right?of?an?injured?employee?to?sue?a?doctor?provided?by?the?employer’s?insurer?for?malpractice,?and?concluded?that?the?employee?did?not?lose?that?right?if?an?employer?who?was?a?doctor?treated?the?injury.?”?’In?such?event,?the?employer-doctor?is?a?”person?other?than?the?employer”?within?the?meaning?of?section?3852?of?the?Labor?Code?….?In?treating?the?injury?Dr.?Shane?did?not?do?so?because?of?the?employer-employee?relationship,?but?did?so?as?an?attending?doctor,?and?his?relationship?to?[plaintiff]?was?that?of?doctor?and?patient.’?”?(39?Cal.2d?at?p.?793,?bracketed?deletions?from?Court?of?Appeal?opinion?omitted.) Use?of?the?phrase?”dual?capacity”?to?describe?this?secondary?relationship?between?the?chiropractor/employer?and?patient/employee?in?Duprey?v.?Shane,?supra,?39?Cal.2d?781,?and?analogous?relationships?in?later?cases?apparently?stems?from?the?defendants’?argument?in?Duprey?that?the?result?would?recognize?a?”dual?legal?personality,”?a?disfavored?concept.?Rejecting?that?argument,?this?court?held: “?’It?is?true?that?the?law?is?opposed?to?the?creation?of?a?dual?personality,?where?to?do?so?is?unrealistic?and?purely?legalistic.?But?where,?as?here,?it?is?perfectly?apparent?that?the?person?involved?…?bore?towards?his?employee?two?relationships-that?of?employer?and?that?of?a?doctor-there?should?be?no?hesitancy?in?recognizing?this?fact?as?a?fact.?Such?a?conclusion,?in?this?case,?is?[54?Cal.3d?732]?in?precise?accord?with?the?facts?and?is?realistic?and?not?legalistic.?We?conclude,?therefore,?that?an?employee?injured?in?an?industrial?accident?may?sue?the?attending?physician?for?malpractice?if?the?original?injury?is?aggravated?as?a?result?of?the?doctor’s?negligence,?and?that?such?right?exists?whether?the?attending?doctor?is?the?insurance?doctor?or?the?employer.’?”?(Duprey?v.?Shane,?supra,?39?Cal.2d?at?p.?793.) The?reasoning?of?Duprey?was?applied?to?several?variants?of?employer/physician?relationship?prior?to?legislative?restriction?of?the?dual?capacity?doctrine?by?amendment?of?section?3602.fn.?6?We?again?explained?the?theory?underlying?the?doctrine?in?Bell?v.?Industrial?Vangas,?Inc.,?supra,?30?Cal.3d?268,?273,?footnote?4:?”This?concept?assumes?a?logical,?rational?and?legally?self-evident?premise.?An?individual?can?act?in?two?or?more?different,?distinct?capacities,?either?simultaneously?or?sequentially,?giving?rise?in?law?to?separate?and?distinct?sets?of?obligations.?There?is?no?fictional?character,?no?need?to?create?any?’Doppleganger’?to?support?the?rule?as?long?applied?in?California;?only?a?recognition?of?a?simple?fact-one?person?can?have?separate?and?distinct?legal?personalities.” Finally,?in?Jones?v.?Kaiser?Industries?Corp.?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?552,?560?[237?Cal.Rptr.?568,?737?P.2d?771],?a?case?arising?prior?to?the?1982?amendment?of?section?3602,?we?again?described?the?concept: “The?dual?capacity?doctrine,?first?enunciated?in?this?state?in?Duprey?v.?Shane?(1952)?39?Cal.2d?781,?793,?holds?that?if?the?employer?occupies?toward?his?employee?a?second?relationship?that?imposes?obligations?different?from?those?he?has?undertaken?in?his?capacity?as?employer,?he?may?be?liable?in?tort?in?the?event?the?employee?is?injured?as?a?result?of?the?violation?of?those?distinct?obligations.?The?rule?has?generally?been?applied?to?cases?in?which?the?employee?was?injured?at?work?by?the?use?of?a?product?which?the?employer?manufactured?for?public?distribution?[citations],?or?where?the?employer?steps?out?of?his?role?as?employer?by?providing?medical?care?to?the?employee?[citations].”?(See?also,?Cole?v.?Fair?Oaks?Fire?Protection?Dist.?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?148,?162?[233?Cal.Rptr.?308,?729?P.2d?743]?[“In?all?of?these?cases,?the?conduct?which?gave?rise?to?the?dual?capacity?doctrine?was?an?act?not?ordinarily?part?of?the?employment.”].)?[54?Cal.3d?733] Dual?Capacity?and?Coemployees The?Duprey?decision?also?permitted?the?plaintiff?to?pursue?her?action?against?her?coemployee,?Dr.?Harrison.?The?court?did?not?identify?any?existing?bar?to?that?suit?or?explain?the?necessity?for?its?analogy?of?that?action?to?the?action?against?the?employer.?We?said?only?that?Harrison?was?also?subject?to?suit?because?”?’it?is?hard?to?see?how?Dr.?Harrison?is?in?any?different?position?than?the?insurance?company?doctor?would?have?been?had?he?been?called?in?to?treat?[plaintiff].’?”?(Duprey?v.?Shane,?supra,?39?Cal.2d?at?pp.?794-795,?bracketed?deletions?from?Court?of?Appeal?opinion?omitted.) There?was?no?statutory?limitation?on?actions?against?coemployees?at?the?time?Duprey?was?decided.?Section?3852?had?provided?since?its?enactment?in?1937?(Stats.?1937,?ch.?90,?p.?273)?that?an?employee’s?claim?for?workers’?compensation?did?not?affect?his?or?her?right?of?action?”against?any?person?other?than?the?employer.”fn.?7?Suits?against?coemployees?were?permitted. In?1959,?following?Duprey,?section?3601?was?amended?to?include?coemployees.?Prior?to?that?year,?workers’?compensation?had?been?the?exclusive?remedy?only?as?against?an?employer?for?the?injury?or?death?of?an?employee. “Prior?to?1959?when?section?3601?was?amended,?there?was?no?doubt?that?the?common?law?right?of?an?employee?to?sue?a?coemployee?for?injuries?negligently?inflicted?while?on?the?job?[citation],?was?preserved?in?this?jurisdiction?by?section?3852.?Baugh?v.?Rogers?(1944)?24?Cal.2d?200,?214?[148?P.2d?633,?152?A.L.R.?1043],?held?that?’Our?workmen’s?compensation?laws?were?not?designed?to?relieve?one?other?than?the?employer?from?any?liability?imposed?by?statute?or?common?law.’?[Citation.]?At?that?time?and?until?1959,?section?3601?merely?stated:?’Where?the?conditions?of?compensation?exist,?the?right?to?recover?such?compensation?…?is?…?the?exclusive?remedy?against?the?employer?for?the?injury?or?death.’?(Stats.?1937,?ch.?90,?p.?269.)”?(Saala?v.?McFarland?(1965)?63?Cal.2d?124,?127?[45?Cal.Rptr.?144,?403?P.2d?400].) As?amended?in?1959,?section?3601?made?workers’?compensation?the?”exclusive?remedy?for?injury?or?death?of?an?employee?against?the?employer?or?against?any?other?employee?of?the?employer?acting?within?the?scope?of?his?or?her?employment?….”?(Stats.?1959,?ch.?1189,???1,?p.?3275.)?[2]?The?immunity?granted?coemployees?was?more?limited?than?that?extended?to?employers,?however.?Workers’?compensation?was?the?exclusive?remedy?only?[54?Cal.3d?734]?if?the?employee?was?”acting?within?the?scope?of?his?or?her?employment.?…”fn.?8?(Ibid.,?italics?added.) This?court?considered?the?impact?of?the?1959?amendment?in?Saala?v.?McFarland,?supra,?63?Cal.2d?124.?There,?the?plaintiff?employee?suffered?a?compensable?injury?when?she?was?struck?by?an?automobile?driven?by?a?coemployee?on?a?parking?lot?maintained?by?the?employer.?She?sued?the?coemployee,?who?claimed?that?the?immunity?from?suit?granted?coemployees?by?the?1959?amendment?of?section?3601?was?coextensive?with?that?granted?employers?by?sections?3600?and?3601.?This?court?rejected?the?argument: “[W]e?cannot?agree?with?defendant’s?contention?that?the?Legislature?intended?to?exempt?from?the?common?law?liability?retained?in?section?3852?all?employee?actions?causing?harm?to?coemployees?to?the?identical?extent?that?the?common?employer?is?exempted?from?civil?liability?because?of?its?provision?for?workmen’s?compensation.?…?The?presumption?that?an?overall?change?is?intended?where?a?statute?is?amended?following?a?judicial?decision?[citation]?is?given?its?full?effect?if?section?3601?as?amended?is?construed?to?change?the?law?stated?in?those?cases?and?exempt?from?civil?liability?only?a?coemployee’s?actions?within?the?scope?of?employment,?rather?than?those?’arising?out?of?and?in?the?course?of?the?employment.’?”?(Saala?v.?McFarland,?supra,?63?Cal.2d?124,?128.) The?limitation?of?coemployee?immunity?to?acts?within?the?scope?of?employment?reflects?apparent?legislative?recognition?that,?because?coemployees?do?not?have?financial?obligations?imposed?on?them?under?the?workers’?compensation?law?comparable?to?those?imposed?on?an?employer,?granting?the?same?broad?immunity?was?not?justified.?Employers?are?granted?immunity?from?suit?in?most?cases?because,?regardless?of?fault,?they?are?obligated?to?provide?benefits?to?an?injured?employee.?(S.?G.?Borello?&?Sons,?Inc.?v.?Department?of?Industrial?Relations?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?341,?354?[256?Cal.Rptr.?543,?769?P.2d?399];?Pacific?Gas?&?Elec.?Co.?v.?Ind.?Acc.?Com.?(1961)?56?Cal.2d?219,?233?[14?Cal.Rptr.?548,?363?P.2d?596].)?An?employee?is?liable?only?for?tortious?conduct.?There?is?no?reason?to?grant?employees?the?same?broad?immunity?from?suit?that?employers?enjoy. The?1959?amendment?therefore?granted?a?limited?immunity?to?employees.?That?immunity?protects?employees?from?damage?actions?by?coemployees,?but?only?if?the?defendant?was?acting?within?the?scope?of?employment?when?that?defendant’s?conduct?injured?the?plaintiff.?[54?Cal.3d?735] This?court’s?earlier?recognition?of?coemployee?liability?in?Duprey?v.?Shane,?supra,?39?Cal.2d?781,?was?consistent?with?the?limitation?created?by?the?1959?amendment?of?section?3601.?However,?courts?which?relied?on?that?decision?and?the?”dual?capacity”?doctrine?thereafter?as?a?basis?for?permitting?actions?against?coemployees?did?not?recognize,?as?this?court?did?in?Saala?v.?McFarland,?supra,?63?Cal.2d?124,?that?coemployees?were?not?exempted?from?suit?when?the?workers’?compensation?system?was?created,?and?that?section?3601?establishes?an?immunity?from?suit?for?coemployees?which?is?distinct?from?that?granted?employers?by?section?3602. Thus,?in?Hoffman?v.?Rogers?(1972)?22?Cal.App.3d?655?[99?Cal.Rptr.?455],?a?malpractice?action?was?permitted?against?a?coemployee?physician?who?allegedly?aggravated?an?industrial?injury.?In?Hoffman,?as?in?the?present?case,?the?services?for?which?the?physician?was?employed?included?treatment?of?industrial?injuries.?Relying?on?the?statement?in?Duprey?v.?Shane,?supra,?39?Cal.2d?781,?794,?that?the?principles?underlying?our?conclusion?that?the?employer?could?be?held?liable?were?equally?applicable?to?the?coemployee?physician,?the?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?the?1959?amendment?of?section?3601?did?not?affect?the?”dual?legal?personality”?rule?enunciated?in?Duprey.?(22?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?662.) III?Legislative?Restriction?of?Dual?Capacity Prior?to?the?1982?amendment,?section?3602?stated?only:?”In?all?cases?where?the?conditions?of?compensation?do?not?concur,?the?liability?of?the?employer?is?the?same?as?if?this?division?had?not?been?enacted.”?(Stats.?1937,?ch.?90,?p.?269.) In?1982,?the?Legislature?amended?sections?3601?and?3602.?Since?that?amendment,?section?3601?has?applied?only?to?coemployees.?Section?3602?has?governed?civil?liability?of?employers.?As?amended,?section?3602?provides?in?pertinent?part: “(a)?Where?the?conditions?of?compensation?set?forth?in?Section?3600?concur,?the?right?to?recover?such?compensation?is,?except?as?specifically?provided?in?this?section?and?Sections?3706?and?4558,?the?sole?and?exclusive?remedy?of?the?employee?or?his?or?her?dependents?against?the?employer,?and?the?fact?that?either?the?employee?or?the?employer?also?occupied?another?or?dual?capacity?prior?to,?or?at?the?time?of,?the?employee’s?industrial?injury?shall?[54?Cal.3d?736]?not?permit?the?employee?or?his?or?her?dependents?to?bring?an?action?at?law?for?damages?against?the?employer.”?(Italics?added.)fn.?9 [3a]?Defendant?argues?that?this?amendment?reflects?a?legislative?intent?to?abrogate?the?dual?capacity?doctrine?as?to?coemployees?as?well?as?employers.?As?a?result,?he?claims,?coemployees?are?entitled?to?the?same?protection?against?suit?that?employers?now?enjoy,?and?may?not?be?held?liable?on?a?dual?capacity?theory. Failing?to?recognize?the?significance?of?section?3601,?defendant?argues?that?the?language?of?section?3602,?as?amended,?and?the?legislative?history?of?the?1982?amendment,?reflect?an?intent?to?abolish?the?dual?capacity?doctrine?altogether-as?to?both?employers?and?coemployees-except?as?expressly?provided?in?section?3602.fn.?10 Plaintiff?argues?in?response?that?the?1982?amendment?does?not?affect?application?of?the?doctrine?in?malpractice?actions?against?employer-?physicians?in?medical?malpractice?cases?involving?aggravation?of?industrial?injury,?and?has?no?effect?whatsoever?on?actions?against?coemployees.?He?also?argues?that,?regardless?of?the?impact?of?the?1982?amendment?on?actions?against?employers,?the?legislative?history?of?the?1982?amendments?reflects?no?consideration?of?the?dual?capacity?rule?as?applied?to?coemployees.?Therefore,?he?reasons,?the?Legislature?cannot?be?deemed?to?have?intended?that?the?restrictions?imposed?in?section?3602?be?extended?to?actions?governed?by?section?3601. Plaintiff’s?view?has?been?accepted?by?one?commentator.?Professor?Larson?states?in?his?treatise:?”The?dual?capacity?doctrine?was?legislatively?abolished?[54?Cal.3d?737]?in?1982?as?to?the?employer?as?a?third-party?defendant,?but?apparently?not?as?to?the?co-employee?doctor.”?(2A?Larson,?The?Law?of?Workmen’s?Compensation?(4th?ed.?1990)???72.61(b),?p.?228.47,?fn.?65.1.) […]