Category: 1991

People?v.?Fuentes?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?707?,?286?Cal.Rptr.?792;?818?P.2d?75 [No.?S004785.?Oct?31,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?JOSE?LEON?FUENTES,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Los?Angeles?County,?No.?A?197745,?William?R.?Hollingsworth,?Jr.,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Panelli,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Kennard,?Arabian,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.) COUNSEL Chris?G.?Gasparich,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?Miller,?Starr?&?Regalia?and?Michael?J.?Hassen?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Edward?T.?Fogel,?Jr.,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Donald?E.?de?Nicola,?Susan?Lee?Frierson?and?Carol?Frederick?Jorstad,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION PANELLI,?J. Defendant?Jose?Leon?Fuentes?appeals?from?the?sentence?of?death?imposed?on?retrial?after?this?court?reversed?the?judgment?of?death?in?[54?Cal.3d?711]?People?v.?Fuentes?(1985)?40?Cal.3d?629[221?Cal.Rptr.?440,?710?P.2d?240]?(Fuentes?I).?In?Fuentes?I?a?jury?had?convicted?defendant?of?first?degree?murder?(Pen.?Code,????187,?189),fn.?1?attempted?robbery?(???664,?211),?and?automobile?theft?(Veh.?Code,???10851)?and?had?found?true?a?special?circumstance?allegation?of?attempted?robbery?(??190.2,?subd.?(a)(17)(i)).?The?special?circumstance?allegation?has?been?retried?and?found?true,?and?the?jury?has?reimposed?the?death?penalty.?This?appeal?is?automatic?(??1239,?subd.?(b)). We?conclude?that?defendant’s?constitutional?right?to?trial?by?a?jury?drawn?from?a?representative?cross-section?of?the?community?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?I,???16)?was?violated?by?the?trial?court’s?failure?to?carefully?evaluate?the?prosecutor’s?explanations?for?peremptory?challenges?to?Black?prospective?jurors,?which?it?must?do?in?order?to?determine?whether?the?challenges?reflected?a?constitutionally?impermissible?group?bias.?(See?People?v.?Wheeler?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?258?[148?Cal.Rptr.?890,?583?P.2d?748]?(hereafter?Wheeler);?People?v.?Hall?(1983)?35?Cal.3d?161?[197?Cal.Rptr.?71,?672?P.2d?854].) The?evidence?presented?on?retrial?of?the?special?circumstance?and?penalty?phases?paralleled?that?introduced?in?the?first?trial:?On?December?1,?1980,?defendant?and?an?accomplice,?both?of?whom?were?armed,?attempted?to?rob?a?Brinks?guard?as?he?was?leaving?the?cashier’s?office?of?a?department?store.?Defendant?and?the?guard?fell,?wounded,?when?gunshots?were?fired.?The?guard?died.?The?accomplice?escaped?and?was?never?apprehended.?A?gun?found?near?defendant?proved?to?be?the?weapon?which?had?fired?the?fatal?bullets.?At?the?penalty?phase,?defendant?stipulated?that?he?had?suffered?prior?robbery?convictions.?In?mitigation,?he?presented?the?testimony?of?his?family?members?and?prison?counselor,?who?noted?his?exemplary?academic?and?work?record?while?incarcerated.?(See?Fuentes?I,?supra,?40?Cal.3d?at?pp.?633-637.) The?Voir?Dire. Following?Witherspoon?voir?dire?(Witherspoon?v.?Illinois?(1968)?391?U.S.?510?[20?L.Ed.2d?776,?88?S.Ct.?1770])?and?voir?dire?on?challenges?for?cause,?several?jurors?were?excused?for?cause;?thereafter,?prospective?jurors?returned?to?court?for?peremptory?challenge.fn.?2?The?prosecutor?exercised?19?peremptory?challenges.?Of?the?13?prospective?trial?jurors?challenged,?10?were?Black.?Of?[54?Cal.3d?712]?the?6?prospective?alternates?challenged,?4?were?Black.?As?finally?constituted,?the?trial?jury?included?3?Black?jurors?and?3?Black?alternates. Defense?counsel?made?the?first?of?several?objections?on?Wheeler?grounds?after?the?prosecutor?exercised?each?of?his?initial?four?challenges?against?Black?prospective?jurors.?The?trial?court?asked?the?prosecutor?for?an?explanation,?but?the?prosecutor?was?not?prepared?to?give?one.?He?said:?”I?have?only?’yes/no’?on?my?sheet,?Your?Honor.?To?be?able?to?answer?any?challenge,?I?will?need?to?get?the?transcripts?and?the?questionnaires?and?to?go?over?it?[sic]?in?some?detail?with?the?court.?I?would?not?begin?to?try?and?remember?at?this?point?all?of?the?reasons?which?is?[sic]?necessary?for?the?People?to?put?on?the?record?in?order?to?satisfy?the?court?that?the?purpose?and?reason?for?challenging?these?jurors?has?[sic]?nothing?to?do?with?race?but?strictly?with?their?answers?to?the?questions?and?the?voir?dire?itself.”?The?trial?court?indicated?that?it?would?note?which?prospective?jurors?were?Black?and?that?it?would?”have?the?reasons?set?forth?by?the?People”?before?trial?commenced. The?prosecutor?thereafter?excused,?in?this?order,?two?more?Black?jurors,?one?juror?who?was?not?Black,?and?then?yet?another?Black?juror.?When?defense?counsel?again?objected?on?Wheeler?grounds,?the?court?stated?that?it?would?”consider?[counsel’s?objection]?a?continuing?motion”?but?did?not?inquire?further?into?the?matter.?The?prosecutor’s?next?three?challenges?were?also?to?Black?jurors.?Finally,?the?prosecutor?excused?two?jurors?who?were?not?Black.?In?total,?the?prosecutor?exercised?13?peremptory?challenges?to?the?trial?jury.?Ten?of?his?first?11?challenges?were?to?Black?jurors.?During?the?ensuing?selection?of?alternates,?the?prosecutor?peremptorily?challenged?4?more?Black?jurors. At?the?conclusion?of?voir?dire,?the?court?finally?addressed?the?Wheeler?motion.?The?prosecutor?began?by?arguing?that?his?challenges?did?not?establish?a?prima?facie?case?of?group?bias.?When?defense?counsel?pointed?out?that?the?prosecutor?had?exercised?almost?every?challenge?against?Blacks,?the?prosecutor?irrelevantly?responded:?”And?I?think?that?the?defense?has?excused?almost?all?White?jurors,?your?Honor.”?At?this?point,?the?court?instructed?the?prosecutor:?”[G]o?down?and?get?your?records?so?we?can?put?[your?reasons?for?excusing?Blacks]?in?the?record.” More?than?three?hours?later,?the?prosecutor?returned?with?his?records.?During?the?ensuing?two?hours?he?perused?the?daily?transcripts?and?the?questionnaires,?offering?a?multitude?of?purported?reasons-as?many?as?a?dozen?or?more?in?most?cases-to?justify?his?challenge?of?each?juror.?The?prosecutor?apparently?did?not?have?notes?on?the?reasons?for?his?challenges;?he?sometimes?quoted?and?sometimes?paraphrased?a?juror’s?response,?but?without?page?citation?to?the?transcript?or?to?the?questionnaire.?Defense?[54?Cal.3d?713]?counsel?complained?that?the?prosecutor?was?merely?reading?from?the?transcripts?and?was?not?giving?the?”reasons”?why?the?juror?was?excluded,?i.e.,?was?not?explaining?how?the?juror?in?question?was?revealing?a?possible?bias?that?was?relevant?to?the?case.?Counsel?also?expressed?concern?that?the?prosecutor?was?not?presenting?the?context?of?his?quotations?and?paraphrases. Following?the?prosecutor’s?rambling?attempt?to?explain?his?challenges,?the?court?took?defendant’s?Wheeler?motion?under?submission.?On?the?following?morning,?the?court?ruled?that?no?prima?facie?showing?had?been?made.?Despite?this?ruling,?however,?the?court?examined?the?prosecutor’s?purported?reasons?for?excusing?the?14?Black?jurors.?Addressing?the?challenged?jurors?as?a?group,?the?court?found?that?some?of?the?prosecutor’s?excuses?were?”totally?unreasonable”?and?others?”very?spurious.”?The?court?also?stated,?however,?that?there?were?”some?good?reasons”?for?the?prosecutor’s?challenges,?namely,?that?certain?unidentified?prospective?jurors?or?their?relatives?had?been?arrested,?had?leanings?against?the?death?penalty,?or,?in?one?case,?had?given?responses?that?”should?not?be?trusted.”?Except?for?that?one?juror,?however,?identified?only?as?”a?gentleman?from?the?navy,”?the?court?did?not?identify?any?particular?juror?or?indicate?which?of?the?purportedly?”good?reasons”?applied?to?which?jurors.?In?conclusion,?the?trial?court?found?that?the?People?had?not?excluded?Blacks?improperly?and?denied?defendant’s?motion.?Later,?after?the?trial?court?had?gone?on?to?other?pretrial?matters,?the?prosecutor?interrupted?to?add?that?his?challenges?had?not?been?based?solely?on?”particular?questions”?but?also?on?”body?language.”?The?trial?court?ignored?the?interruption. Defendant?assigns?as?error?the?trial?court’s?denial?of?his?motion?pursuant?to?Wheeler,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?258.?The?principles?first?articulated?in?that?case?are?now?well?settled.?(See?People?v.?Johnson?(1989)?47?Cal.3d?1194,?1215-1216?[255?Cal.Rptr.?569,?767?P.2d?1047];?People?v.?Turner?(1986)?42?Cal.3d?711,?715-?717?[230?Cal.Rptr.?656,?726?P.2d?102];?People?v.?Hall,?supra,35?Cal.3d?161,?166-167.)?[1]?A?party?may?not?use?peremptory?challenges?to?remove?prospective?jurors?solely?on?the?basis?of?group?bias.?Group?bias?is?a?presumption?that?jurors?are?biased?merely?because?they?are?members?of?an?identifiable?group?distinguished?on?racial,?religious,?ethnic,?or?similar?grounds.?(Wheeler,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?p.?276.)?In?Batson?v.?Kentucky?(1986)476?U.S.?79?[90?L.Ed.2d?69,?106?S.Ct.?1712],?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?held?that?peremptory?challenges?based?solely?on?race?also?violated?the?federal?equal?protection?clause?when?the?defendant?is?a?member?of?the?race?being?challenged.?Although?Batson?has?no?application?in?this?case,fn.?3?the?high?[54?Cal.3d?714]?court?has?recently?extended?the?Batson?holding?and?given?a?defendant,?regardless?of?race,?standing?to?object?to?the?racially?discriminatory?use?of?peremptory?challenges.?(Powers?v.?Ohio?(1991)?___?U.S.?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?411,?111?S.Ct.?1364].)?Under?Wheeler,?of?course,?which?is?based?on?the?right?to?trial?by?a?representative?jury,?a?defendant?need?not?be?a?member?of?the?group?to?challenge?its?exclusion.?(Wheeler,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?p.?281.) [2]?If?a?party?believes?an?opponent?is?improperly?using?peremptory?challenges?for?a?discriminatory?purpose,?that?party?must?make?a?timely?objection?and?a?prima?facie?showing?that?the?jurors?are?being?excluded?on?the?basis?of?group?bias.?(Wheeler,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?p.?280.)?To?establish?a?prima?facie?case,?the?moving?party?should?first?make?as?complete?a?record?as?possible;?second,?the?moving?party?must?establish?that?the?persons?excluded?are?members?of?a?cognizable?group;?and?third,?the?moving?party?must?show?a?strong?likelihood?that?the?persons?are?being?excluded?because?of?group?association.?(Ibid.;?see?also?People?v.?Sanders?(1990)?51?Cal.3d?471,?497-498?[273?Cal.Rptr.?537,?797?P.2d?561];?People?v.?Snow?(1987)?44?Cal.3d?216[242?Cal.Rptr.?477,?746?P.2d?452];?People?v.?Motton?(1985)?39?Cal.3d?596?[217?Cal.Rptr.?416,?704?P.2d?176];?People?v.?Allen?(1979)?23?Cal.3d?286?[152?Cal.Rptr.?454,?590?P.2d?30].)?Once?the?moving?party?has?established?a?prima?facie?case,?the?burden?shifts?to?the?other?party?to?come?forward?with?a?race-neutral?explanation?related?to?the?particular?case?to?be?tried.?(Wheeler,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?pp.?281-282;?Batson?v.?Kentucky,?supra,?476?U.S.?at?pp.?96-98?[90?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?87-?89];?People?v.?Johnson,?supra,?47?Cal.3d?at?p.?1216.) [3]?This?court?and?the?high?court?have?professed?confidence?in?trial?judges’?ability?to?determine?the?sufficiency?of?the?prosecutor’s?explanations.?In?Wheeler,?we?said?that?we?will?”rely?on?the?good?judgment?of?the?trial?courts?to?distinguish?bona?fide?reasons?for?such?peremptories?from?sham?excuses?belatedly?contrived?to?avoid?admitting?acts?of?group?discrimination.”?(Wheeler,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?p.?282.)?Similarly,?the?high?court?stated?in?Batson?v.?Kentucky,?supra,?that?”the?trial?judge’s?findings?in?the?context?under?consideration?here?largely?will?turn?on?evaluation?of?credibility,”?and?for?that?reason?”a?reviewing?court?ordinarily?should?give?those?findings?great?deference.”?(476?U.S.?at?p.?98,?fn.?21?[90?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?89].) In?People?v.?Johnson,?supra,?we?reemphasized?the?need?for?”a?standard?of?truly?giving?great?deference?to?the?trial?court?in?distinguishing?bona?fide?reasons?from?sham?excuses.”?(47?Cal.3d?at?p.?1221.)?We?disapproved?the?[54?Cal.3d?715]?approach?taken?earlier?in?People?v.?Trevino?(1985)39?Cal.3d?667?[217?Cal.Rptr.?652,?704?P.2d?719],?in?which?we?had?disallowed?subjective?reasons?for?peremptory?challenges?and?had?engaged?in?a?comparative?analysis?of?various?jurors’?responses?to?evaluate?the?bona?fides?of?the?prosecutor’s?stated?reasons.?We?disapproved?the?Trevino?approach?because?nothing?in?Wheeler?disallows?reliance?on?the?prospective?jurors’?body?language?or?manner?of?answering?questions?as?a?basis?for?rebutting?a?prima?facie?case,?and?because?comparative?analysis?of?jurors?unrealistically?ignores?”the?variety?of?factors?and?considerations?that?go?into?a?lawyer’s?decision?to?select?certain?jurors?while?challenging?others?that?appear?to?be?similar.”?(47?Cal.3d?at?pp.?1219,?1220.) We?reaffirmed?in?People?v.?Johnson,?supra,?47?Cal.3d?1194,?however,?that?the?trial?court?must?make?”?’a?sincere?and?reasoned’?”?attempt?to?evaluate?the?prosecutor’s?justifications.?(Id.?at?p.?1216,?citing?People?v.?Hall,?supra,?35?Cal.3d?161,?167-168.)?Furthermore,?every?questioned?peremptory?challenge?must?be?justified:?”If?the?court?finds?that?the?burden?of?justification?is?not?sustained?as?to?any?of?the?questioned?peremptory?challenges,?the?presumption?of?their?validity?is?rebutted”?and?the?court?must?dismiss?the?venire?and?begin?jury?selection?anew.?(Wheeler,?supra,?22?Cal.3d?at?p.?282.)?Batson?has?been?interpreted?to?afford?the?same?relief.?”[U]nder?Batson,?the?striking?of?a?single?black?juror?for?racial?reasons?violates?the?equal?protection?clause,?even?though?other?black?jurors?are?seated,?and?even?when?there?are?valid?reasons?for?the?striking?of?some?black?jurors.”?(People?v.?Battle?(8th?Cir.?1987)?836?F.2d?1084,?1086;?see?also?United?States?v.?Gordon?(11th?Cir.?1987)?817?F.2d?1538,?1541;?United?States?v.?David?(11th?Cir.?1986)?803?F.2d?1567,?1571;?People?v.?Gonzalez?(1989)?211?Cal.App.3d?1186,?1193?[259?Cal.Rptr.?870].) Prima?Facie?Case?Finding. As?noted,?the?procedure?for?challenging?a?party’s?use?of?peremptory?challenges?requires?the?moving?party?to?make?a?timely?objection?and?to?establish?a?prima?facie?case?to?the?court’s?satisfaction. [4a]?Defendant?contends?that?he?made?a?timely?objection?after?the?prosecutor?challenged?the?first?four?jurors,?all?of?whom?were?Black.?Defendant?further?contends?that,?when?the?trial?court?asked?the?prosecutor?to?respond,?the?court?in?effect?found?that?a?prima?facie?case?had?been?made.?Although?the?trial?court?deferred?hearing?the?prosecutor’s?justifications,?it?noted:?”Before?we?commence?the?trial,?I?will?have?the?reasons?set?forth?by?the?People.”?Moreover,?when?voir?dire?concluded,?the?court?instructed?the?[54?Cal.3d?716]?prosecutor?to?obtain?his?records?and?justify?his?challenges?despite?the?prosecutor’s?claim?that?there?was?no?prima?facie?case. These?statements?by?the?trial?court?clearly?indicate?that?the?court?had?implicitly?found?a?prima?facie?case?of?improper?exclusion?on?the?basis?of?race.?That?the?trial?court?had?moved?beyond?the?required?prima?facie?finding?is?further?indicated?by?the?court’s?comment?to?defense?counsel?that,?”if?I?rule?in?your?favor,?I’d?start?over?with?a?whole?new?panel.”?Only?a?ruling?on?the?ultimate?question?of?the?adequacy?of?the?prosecutor’s?justifications?to?rebut?a?prima?facie?showing?would?present?the?issue?of?remedy. After?finding?a?prima?facie?case?of?group?bias,?a?trial?court?ordinarily?proceeds?by?considering?the?prosecutor’s?justifications?and?then?by?ruling?on?their?adequacy.?In?this?case,?however,?the?court?appears?to?have?confused?these?steps.?After?hearing?the?prosecutor’s?justifications,?the?court?commented:?”Well,?in?reviewing?the?cases,?I?find?that?I?probably?should?have?ruled?on?whether?there?was?a?prima?facie?showing?that?established?a?systematic?exclusion.?And?I?failed?to?do?so.?However,?in?reviewing?the?matter,?I?would?indicate?that?I?find?that?there?was?no?prima?facie?showing?that?there?was?a?systematic?exclusion.”fn.?4?The?court?mentioned?three?factors?to?support?its?finding:?(1)?Defendant?was?not?of?the?same?race?as?the?excluded?jurors;?(2)?the?trial?jury,?as?finally?constituted,?included?three?Black?jurors;?and?(3)?no?discrimination?was?evident?in?the?manner?and?thoroughness?of?the?voir?dire. The?People?contend?that?the?trial?court’s?express?finding?of?no?prima?facie?showing?effectively?disposes?of?the?Wheeler?issue.?We?disagree. [5a]?First,?we?have?consistently?held?that?when?the?trial?court?inquires?about?the?prosecutor’s?justifications,?as?in?this?case,?the?court?has?made?”at?least?an?implied?finding”?of?a?prima?facie?showing.?[6]?(See?fn.?5.)?(People?v.?Johnson,?supra,?47?Cal.3d?at?p.?1217;?People?v.?Turner,?supra,?42?Cal.3d?at?pp.?718-719;?People?v.?Hall,?supra,?35?Cal.3d?at?p.?165.?See?also?People?v.?Mason?(1991)?52?Cal.3d?909,?937?[277?Cal.Rptr.?166,?802?P.2d?950].)fn.?5?[54?Cal.3d?717] The?prosecutor?in?this?case?evidently?understood?the?court’s?inquiry?as?an?implied?finding,?for?he?stated?he?was?unprepared?to?give?his?”reasons”?when?the?Wheeler?objection?was?first?made. [5b]?Second,?there?is?authority?for?the?proposition?that?once?the?trial?court?has?ruled,?expressly?or?by?implication,?that?a?prima?facie?case?has?been?made?and?that?the?burden?has?shifted?to?the?prosecution,?the?court?may?not?then?”return?to?the?screening?process.?The?sole?issue?then?pending?is?the?adequacy?of?the?justifications.”?(People?v.?Granillo?(1987)?197?Cal.App.3d?110,?122?[242?Cal.Rptr.?639];?see?also?People?v.?Gonzalez,?supra,?211?Cal.App.3d?1186,?1198.) The?United?States?Supreme?Court?reached?the?same?conclusion?in?the?context?of?motions?under?Batson?v.?Kentucky,?supra,?476?U.S.?79.?In?Hernandez?v.?New?York?(1991)?500?U.S.?___?[114?L.Ed.2d?395,?111?S.Ct.?1859],?the?court?found?the?lack?of?a?ruling?on?the?threshold?issue?irrelevant?when?a?prosecutor?had?explained?his?use?of?peremptory?challenges?without?prompting?or?inquiry?by?the?trial?court,?and?when?the?court?had?actually?considered?the?explanations.?Under?those?circumstances,?the?trial?court?had?no?occasion?to?decide?whether?the?defendant?had?met?the?prima?facie?showing?requirement.?Thus,?the?absence?of?a?finding?on?the?threshold?showing?did?not?affect?review.?”Once?a?prosecutor?has?offered?a?race-neutral?explanation?for?the?peremptory?challenges?and?the?trial?court?has?ruled?on?the?ultimate?question?of?intentional?discrimination,?the?preliminary?issue?of?whether?the?defendant?had?made?a?prima?facie?showing?becomes?moot.”?(Id.?at?p.?___?[114?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?405].) Accordingly,?we?proceed?to?the?court’s?evaluation?of?the?prosecutor’s?justifications?for?his?peremptory?challenges.?[54?Cal.3d?718] The?Trial?Court’s?Evaluation?of?the?Prosecutor’s?Reasons. [7]?The?trial?court’s?responsibilities?in?this?phase?of?a?Wheeler?motion?are?set?out?in?People?v.?Hall,?supra,?35?Cal.3d?161,?167-168:?”[I]t?is?imperative,?if?the?constitutional?guarantee?is?to?have?real?meaning,?that?once?a?prima?facie?case?of?group?bias?appears?the?allegedly?offending?party?be?required?to?come?forward?with?[an]?explanation?to?the?court?that?demonstrates?other?bases?for?the?challenges,?and?that?the?court?satisfy?itself?that?the?explanation?is?genuine.?This?demands?of?the?trial?judge?a?sincere?and?reasoned?attempt?to?evaluate?the?prosecutor’s?explanation?in?light?of?the?circumstances?of?the?case?as?then?known,?his?knowledge?of?trial?techniques,?and?his?observations?of?the?manner?in?which?the?prosecutor?has?examined?members?of?the?venire?and?has?exercised?challenges?for?cause?or?peremptorily?….” In?People?v.?Hall,?supra,?35?Cal.3d?161,?we?concluded?that?the?trial?court?had?made?no?serious?attempt?to?evaluate?the?bona?fides?of?the?prosecutor’s?explanations.?(35?Cal.3d?at?p.?168.)?[4b]?In?this?case,?as?we?shall?explain,?the?trial?court?did?make?some?effort?to?evaluate?the?prosecutor’s?explanations,?but?the?court?evaluated?them?only?in?the?abstract.?The?court?did?not?determine?whether?the?”bona?fide”?or?the?”sham”?reasons?actually?applied?to?particular?challenged?jurors.?For?this?reason,?the?trial?court?did?not?satisfy?its?Wheeler?obligation?of?inquiry?and?evaluation,?and?the?judgment?must?therefore?be?reversed. The?prosecutor?stated?his?reasons?for?challenging?each?of?the?14?prospective?Black?jurors?at?length,?referring?to?answers?in?the?questionnaires?and?reading?from?the?transcript?of?the?voir?dire.?Unlike?the?trial?court?in?Hall,?there?is?no?indication?that?the?court?in?this?case?considered?itself?bound?to?accept?the?prosecutor’s?explanations?at?face?value.?The?court?found?some?of?the?stated?reasons?genuine?(“good”)?and?some?false?(“spurious”)?and?indicated?which?were?which,?but?the?court?failed?to?consider?which?of?the?valid?reasons?applied?to?which?jurors. Moreover,?review?of?defendant’s?Wheeler?claim?has?been?made?difficult?by?the?court’s?failure?to?ask?for?justifications?until?the?conclusion?of?voir?dire.?The?large?number?of?challenges?exercised,?combined?with?the?large?number?of?reasons?given?for?challenging?each?prospective?juror,?compounded?the?trial?court’s?task.?The?trial?court?itself?perceived?this?problem,?noting?that?the?time?lapse?between?the?examinations?and?the?prosecutor’s?justifications?(“three?or?four?weeks”)?presented?problems?of?recall.fn.?6?As?will?appear,?the?[54?Cal.3d?719]?end?result?was?that?the?trial?court?did?not,?and?perhaps?could?not,?evaluate?the?prosecutor’s?explanations?as?to?individual?jurors.?Instead,?the?court?made?a?global?ruling?as?to?which?of?the?prosecutor’s?reasons?were?neutral,?and?therefore?proper.?However,?the?court?erroneously?failed?to?relate?its?findings?to?particular?challenged?jurors?except?in?the?case?of?a?single?alternate?juror?whose?responses?raised?a?question?as?to?his?honesty. To?illustrate,?the?trial?court?found?”totally?unreasonable”?one?of?the?prosecutor’s?reasons?for?excusing?many?of?the?Black?jurors,?namely?their?having?answered?”no”?to?a?series?of?questions?(Nos.?94?through?97)?regarding?their?attitudes?towards?the?death?penalty.fn.?7?The?court?found?this?reason?invalid?”not?only?from?the?fact?that?the?answer?’no’?probably?is?the?proper?answer?to?each?of?those?questions?for?any?juror,?but?secondly?because?[the?prosecutor]?left,?as?I?count,?more?than?half?of?the?remaining?jurors?there?in?the?box?who?also?answered?’no’?to?all?those?questions.?So?that?can’t?be?a?basic?reason?for?his?exclusion.” Regarding?the?myriad?other?reasons?that?the?prosecutor?offered?to?explain?his?exclusions,?the?court?said:?”I?also?recognize?that?the?People?were?using?kind?of?a?shotgun?approach?to?the?reasoning?[justification]?process,?hoping?that?something?would?fly?…?would?shoot?down?a?good?excuse?somewhere?down?the?line.”?(Italics?added.)?Indeed,?on?numerous?occasions?the?prosecutor?cited?as?a?justification?for?excusing?a?particular?juror?the?nature?of?the?juror’s?employment,?recreational?choices,?or?choice?of?reading?material.?The?prosecutor?also?pointed?out?that?the?excluded?jurors?were?unfamiliar?with?the?[54?Cal.3d?720]?meaning?of?words,?including?legal?terms?with?which?the?juror?had?no?experience;?he?noted?that?some?of?the?jurors?left?certain?questions?in?the?questionnaire?blank,?that?they?gave?ungrammatical?answers,?or?that?they?misspelled?words?in?their?response?to?the?questionnaire.fn.?8?The?prosecutor?did?not?articulate?how?these?failings?related?to?jury?service?in?this?case.?The?trial?court?understandably?found?such?reasons?”very?spurious.” The?trial?court?nevertheless?found?three?”good?reasons”?for?the?prosecutor’s?excusals.?The?court?stated:?”I?feel?that?there?were?good?reasons?for?excusing?the?jurors?that?were?excused.?Those?that?had?been?arrested?or?relatives?been?arrested,?I?think?in?reading?the?cases?the?courts?have?indicated?that’s?a?proper?reason.?…?And?I?thought?that?some?of?the?jurors?with?their?leanings?against?the?death?penalty,?in?this?type?of?a?case,?that?is?a?proper?excuse.”?Except?for?the?single?juror?whose?answers?seemed?to?suggest?dishonesty,?the?trial?court?accepted?no?other?reasons?for?challenge?as?valid. In?summary,?the?trial?court?took?the?first?step?in?the?evaluation?process.?It?determined?which?of?the?myriad?justifications?cited?by?the?prosecutor?were?sham?and?which?were?bona?fide.?However,?a?truly?”reasoned?attempt”?to?evaluate?the?prosecutor’s?explanations?(People?v.?Hall,?supra,?35?Cal.3d?at?pp.?167-168)?requires?the?court?to?address?the?challenged?jurors?individually?to?determine?whether?any?one?of?them?has?been?improperly?excluded.?In?that?process,?the?trial?court?must?determine?not?only?that?a?valid?reason?existed?but?also?that?the?reason?actually?prompted?the?prosecutor’s?exercise?of?the?particular?peremptory?challenge. We?reiterate?that?the?trial?court?is?in?the?best?position?to?determine?whether?a?given?explanation?is?genuine?or?sham.?For?that?reason,?we?continue?to?accord?great?deference?to?the?trial?court’s?ruling?that?a?particular?reason?is?[54?Cal.3d?721]?genuine.?(People?v.?Johnson,?supra,?47?Cal.3d?at?p.?1221.)?In?this?case,?however,?the?trial?court?failed?to?take?the?next,?necessary?step?of?asking?whether?the?asserted?reasons?actually?applied?to?the?particular?jurors?whom?the?prosecutor?challenged.?For?this?reason,?we?are?compelled?to?reverse?the?judgment?of?death.?Our?conclusion?makes?it?unnecessary?to?reach?defendant’s?remaining?contentions.?Accordingly,?the?special?circumstance?finding?is?set?aside,?and?the?judgment?imposing?a?penalty?of?death?is?reversed. Lucas,?C.?J.,?Kennard,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?Baxter,?J.,?and?George,?J.,?concurred. MOSK,?J., Concurring. I?concur?in?the?judgment.?In?my?view,?the?majority?soundly?conclude?that?the?judgment?of?death?must?be?reversed. I?write?separately?to?clarify?what?I?believe?to?be?the?fundamental?basis?of?our?decision. In?People?v.?Wheeler?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?258,?276-?277?[148?Cal.Rptr.?890,?583?P.2d?748],?we?held?that?the?use?of?peremptory?challenges?by?a?prosecutor?to?strike?prospective?jurors?on?the?basis?of?group?membership?or?bias?violates?the?right?of?a?criminal?defendant?to?trial?by?a?jury?drawn?from?a?representative?cross-section?of?the?community?under?article?I,?section?16,?of?the?California?Constitution.?Subsequently,?in?Batson?v.?Kentucky?(1986)?476?U.S.?79,?84-89?[90?L.Ed.2d?69,?79-83,?106?S.Ct.?1712],?and?its?progeny,?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?held?that?such?a?practice?also?violates?the?defendant’s?right?to?equal?protection?of?the?laws?under?the?Fourteenth?Amendment?to?the?United?States?Constitution. Blacks,?of?course,?are?a?cognizable?group?for?purposes?of?both?Wheeler?(22?Cal.3d?at?p.?280,?fn.?26)?and?Batson?(476?U.S.?at?pp.?84-89?[90?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?79-83]). Under?Wheeler,?there?is?a?presumption?that?a?prosecutor?uses?peremptory?challenges?in?a?constitutional?manner.?(22?Cal.3d?at?p.?278.)?The?defendant?bears?the?burden?to?show,?prima?facie,?the?presence?of?invidious?discrimination.?(Id.?at?p.?280.)?If?he?succeeds,?the?burden?shifts?to?the?prosecutor?to?show?its?absence.?(Id.?at?p.?281.)?If?he?fails,?the?defendant’s?prima?facie?showing?becomes?conclusive.?(See?id.?at?p.?282.)?In?such?a?situation,?the?presumption?of?constitutionality?is?rebutted.?(Ibid.)?Substantially?the?same?principles?apply?under?Batson.?(See?476?U.S.?at?pp.?89-98?[90?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?82-?89].)?[54?Cal.3d?722] In?this?case,?we?are?required?to?conclude?that?the?prosecutor?peremptorily?challenged?Black?prospective?jurors?on?the?basis?of?group?membership?or?bias?in?violation?of?the?United?States?and?California?Constitutions.?Defendant?carried?his?burden.?The?prosecutor?did?not. […]

People?v.?Mickey?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?612?,?286?Cal.Rptr.?801;?818?P.2d?84 [No.?S004567. Oct?31,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?aand?Respondent,?v.?DOUGLAS?SCOTT?MICKEY,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?San?Mateo?County,?No.?C-11727,?John?F.?Cruikshank,?Jr.,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL John?B.?Oakley,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Steve?White,?Richard?B.?Iglehart?and?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Ronald?S.?Matthias,?Martin?S.?Kane,?Morris?Beatus?and?Dane?R.?Gillette,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION MOSK,?J. This?is?an?automatic?appeal?(Pen.?Code,???1239,?subd.?(b))?from?a?judgment?of?death?under?the?1978?death?penalty?law?(id.,???190?et?seq.). On?May?29,?1981,?the?District?Attorney?of?Placer?County?filed?an?information?against?defendant?Douglas?Scott?Mickey.?Count?I?charged?that?on?or?about?September?29,?1980,?defendant?murdered?Eric?Lee?Hanson.?(Pen.?Code,???187.)?Count?II?charged?that?on?or?about?the?same?date?he?also?murdered?Catherine?Blount.?(Ibid.)?As?to?each?count,?five?special?circumstances?were?alleged:?multiple?murder?(id.,???190.2,?subd.?(a)(3));?intentional?murder?for?financial?gain?(id.,???190.2,?subd.?(a)(1));?heinous,?atrocious,?or?cruel?murder?(id.,???190.2,?subd.?(a)(14));?felony-murder-robbery?(id.,???190.2,?subd.?(a)(17)(i));?and?felony-murder-burglary?(id.,???190.2,?subd.?(a)(17)(vii)). Defendant?pleaded?not?guilty?to?the?murder?charges?and?denied?the?special?circumstance?allegations.?On?his?motion,?the?court?subsequently?changed?[54?Cal.3d?637]?venue?from?Placer?County?to?San?Mateo?County.?Also?on?his?motion,?it?set?aside?both?of?the?heinous-atrocious-cruel?special-circumstance?allegations. Trial?was?by?jury.?The?panel?returned?verdicts?finding?defendant?guilty?as?charged?on?both?counts?of?murder,?determined?each?offense?to?be?in?the?first?degree,?and?found?all?the?remaining?special-circumstance?allegations?true.?It?subsequently?returned?a?verdict?of?death.?The?court?entered?judgment?accordingly. As?we?shall?explain,?we?conclude?that?except?as?to?one?of?the?multiple-?murder?special-circumstance?findings?and?both?of?the?intentional-murder-for-?financial-gain?special-circumstance?findings,?the?judgment?must?be?affirmed. Facts Guilt?Phase At?the?guilt?phase,?the?People?introduced?substantial?evidence,?both?testimonial?and?physical,?to?prove?the?murder?charges?and?special?circumstance?allegations.?The?evidence?featured?certain?extrajudicial?statements?by?defendant?to?persons?including?family?members,?friends,?and?acquaintances,?the?police,?and?a?fellow?inmate?in?jail.?It?also?included?testimony?by?Edward?Rogers,?who?was?an?accomplice?and?took?the?stand?under?a?grant?of?immunity.?The?tale?told?is?long?and?detailed.?Its?substance?is?as?follows. In?September?1980?defendant?was?married?to?Lieutenant?Allison?W.?Mickey,?an?Air?Force?nurse,?and?resided?with?her?and?her?two?children?in?housing?at?Yokota?Air?Force?Base?in?Japan.?The?couple?was?experiencing?difficulties?in?their?financial?situation?and?consequent?distress?in?their?personal?relationship.?By?the?time?of?trial,?their?marriage?had?been?dissolved. About?September?17,?1980,?defendant?returned?to?California,?flying?into?Travis?Air?Force?Base?in?Solano?County.?During?much?of?his?time?in?the?state,?he?stayed?with?Rogers,?a?longtime?friend,?in?Concord;?both?were?about?31?years?of?age. Defendant?disclosed?several?reasons?for?his?visit-including,?primarily,?an?intent?to?execute?a?plan?to?rob?and?murder?a?man?in?Placer?County?and?then?possibly?to?travel?to?Alaska?to?kill?his?wife’s?former?husband?for?the?proceeds?of?a?life?insurance?policy?of?which?she?and/or?her?children?were?beneficiaries.?[54?Cal.3d?638] The?man?in?Placer?County?was?Eric?Lee?Hanson.?He?dealt?in?marijuana?and?hashish,?and?also?cultivated?the?former.?He?had?a?business?partner?by?the?name?of?Randy?Hoehne.?Hanson?lived?with?his?lover,?Catherine?Blount,?in?a?house?in?the?rural?community?of?Ophir;?Hoehne?lived?there?as?well,?but?at?the?time?relevant?here?slept?in?a?tent?some?distance?away?in?order?to?guard?the?marijuana?crop;?Hanson?was?about?29?years?old,?Blount?18,?and?Hoehne?24. Defendant?had?been?a?friend?of?Hanson?for?several?years,?but?bore?secret?grievances?against?him?and?desired?revenge.?Years?earlier,?defendant?believed,?Hanson?had?stolen?certain?items?belonging?to?him?and?his?family.?In?1979?defendant?raided?Hanson’s?marijuana?crop?in?retaliation.?After?his?arrival?in?California,?he?retrieved?the?drug?from?the?place?at?which?he?had?hidden?it,?and?began?to?consume?it?continually-apparently?together?with?alcohol.?He?discussed?his?scheme?against?Hanson?with?Rogers?and?took?steps?to?accomplish?his?objective. On?September?22,?1980,?defendant?traveled?to?Hanson’s?home?in?a?car?he?had?borrowed?from?Rogers?in?order?to?carry?out?his?plan.?He?arrived?about?11?p.m.?He?was?armed?with?a?rifle?belonging?to?Rogers,?which?he?had?fitted?with?a?homemade?silencer.?Blount?was?alone?in?the?house;?Hanson?and?Hoehne?were?out?on?the?property.?Blount?invited?defendant?in.?Hanson?soon?returned.?Defendant?did?not?do?the?deed-apparently?because?Hoehne?learned?of?his?presence?and?could?therefore?link?him?to?whatever?might?happen.?He?visited?with?Hanson?and?Blount,?stayed?overnight,?and?left?the?next?day.?During?his?time?at?the?property,?defendant?observed?Hanson?counting?”a?good?size?stack?of?money”;?he?attempted?to?sell?him?some?of?the?marijuana?he?had?stolen?the?year?before,?but?was?unsuccessful. On?September?28,?1980,?defendant?again?traveled?to?Hanson’s?home?in?order?to?carry?out?his?plan,?this?time?accompanied?by?Rogers?in?a?pickup?truck?belonging?to?the?latter.?The?pair?established?a?rendezvous?point?at?a?public?telephone?booth?near?a?restaurant?a?few?miles?from?the?house;?defendant?took?down?the?number?of?that?telephone?and?gave?Rogers?the?number?of?Hanson’s.?They?drove?to?the?property.?Rogers?left?defendant?off.?The?time?was?near?midnight.?Defendant?was?armed?with,?at?least,?a?knife?belonging?to?himself?and?a?pistol?belonging?to?Rogers.?Hanson?and?Blount?were?alone?in?the?house;?Hoehne?was?in?his?tent.?Hanson?and?Blount?greeted?defendant?at?the?door?and?invited?him?in. During?the?earliest?hours?of?September?29,?1980,?evidently?after?Hanson?and?Blount?went?to?sleep,?defendant?killed?the?couple:?he?bludgeoned?Hanson?with?a?baseball?bat?and?slit?his?throat?from?ear?to?ear?down?to?the?spinal?cord;?he?stabbed?Blount?seven?times?in?the?chest?in?a?close?pattern,?[54?Cal.3d?639]?piercing?her?heart?with?three?of?the?blows.?Immediately?thereafter,?he?removed?a?substantial?quantity?of?property?from?the?house,?loaded?it?into?a?black?Volkswagen?Karmann?Ghia?that?belonged?to?Hanson,?and?departed;?he?left?no?fingerprints?behind.?He?arrived?at?the?rendezvous?point.?Rogers?followed?in?the?pickup?truck.?Some?distance?away,?with?Rogers’s?help?he?transferred?the?goods?to?the?truck?and?then?wiped?the?Volkswagen?clean?of?fingerprints?and?abandoned?it?there.?Defendant?said?he?wanted?to?go?back?and?burn?the?house;?Rogers?dissuaded?him,?declaring?one?should?never?return?to?the?scene?of?the?crime.?The?pair?drove?back?to?Concord.?Once?there,?defendant?sutured?with?needle?and?thread?a?gaping?injury?he?had?sustained?to?his?left?leg?during?the?events?at?Hanson’s?home.?The?pair?proceeded?to?stash?the?stolen?goods. On?September?30,?1980,?defendant?fled?this?country?from?Travis?Air?Force?Base,?stopped?over?in?Hawaii,?and?arrived?at?Yokota?Air?Force?Base?in?Japan?on?October?3.?On?October?2?Rogers?made?a?statement?to?officers?at?the?Placer?County?Sheriff’s?Department?implicating?himself?and?defendant?in?the?deeds?described?above.?Defendant?was?subsequently?arrested?in?Japan?and?was?eventually?returned?to?this?state. In?his?defense,?defendant?introduced?little?evidence,?and?did?not?himself?take?the?stand.?It?was?his?basic?position?that?the?People?failed?to?sustain?their?burden?to?prove?him?guilty?beyond?a?reasonable?doubt?as?to?any?applicable?mental?state?required?for?criminal?liability.?More?positively,?he?claimed?that?in?committing?the?acts?in?question?he?acted?in?self-defense?or?under?voluntary?intoxication?and/or?diminished?capacity?as?a?result?of?voluntary?intoxication.fn.?1?For?his?defense,?he?relied?on?certain?of?his?extrajudicial?statements?introduced?by?the?People,?which?if?believed?could?support?his?position. Penalty?Phase At?the?penalty?phase,?the?People?introduced?evidence?in?aggravation?that?they?themselves?characterized?as?”very?limited.”?Specifically,?they?attempted?to?prove?that?on?four?occasions,?in?the?course?of?domestic?disputes?involving?his?first?and?second?wives,?defendant?engaged?in?other?violent?criminal?activity,?viz.,?assault?and/or?battery. By?contrast,?defendant?introduced?substantial?evidence?in?mitigation.?[54?Cal.3d?640] Family?members,?friends,?and?acquaintances?narrated?a?story?of?defendant’s?background?and?character.?Its?main?points?are?these. Defendant’s?parents,?Robert?and?Dorothy?Mickey,?were?married?in?1946;?defendant’s?brother?Ronald?was?born?in?1947,?defendant?himself?in?1948;?the?family?lived?in?the?environs?of?Placer?and?Nevada?Counties.?Defendant?was?a?good,?loving,?and?hardworking?child?and?youth. Tragedy,?however,?touched?defendant’s?life.?When?he?was?about?five?years?of?age,?a?half?brother?named?Randall?was?killed?in?an?automobile?accident.?When?defendant?was?about?17,?his?mother?died?in?an?automobile?crash-possibly?by?accident?and?possibly?by?suicide.?He?had?been?very?close?to?her,?and?felt?her?loss?deeply.?He?turned?to?alcohol?to?deaden?the?pain.?Not?long?afterward,?his?maternal?grandfather?died.?A?little?later,?his?brother?Ronald?killed?himself. Defendant?began?to?drift?through?life,?moving?from?job?to?job,?place?to?place,?marriage?to?marriage.?He?developed?a?taste?for?various?illicit?substances,?including?marijuana,?hashish,?mescaline,?psilocybin,?hallucinogenic?mushrooms,?phencyclidine?(PCP),?and?lysergic?acid?diethylamide?(LSD).?He?also?developed?an?interest?in?eastern?religions.?He?soon?met?Hanson,?who?shared?his?taste?and?interest.?The?two?men?quickly?became?close?friends.?They?engaged?in?unusual?behavior?under?the?influence?of?the?illicit?substances?they?ingested.?For?example,?they?”would?get?naked?and?admire?…?the?strength?in?their?bodies?….?And?they?would?talk?about?philosophies?and?run?through?the?hills?like?deer?….” With?the?exception?of?the?crimes?of?which?he?had?been?convicted?and?the?other?unadjudicated?violent?criminal?activity,?defendant?was?nonviolent,?and?would?likely?adapt?well?to?life?in?prison. Two?experts?gave?opinions?bearing?on?defendant’s?mental?state?at?the?time?of?the?crimes.?Each?testified?in?substance?that?at?the?critical?time,?defendant?did?not?have?the?capacity?to?appreciate?the?criminality?of?his?conduct?or?to?conform?his?conduct?to?the?requirements?of?law-or?at?best,?any?capacity?he?may?have?had?was?”severely”?or?”significantly”?impaired.?Each?identified?two?causes?of?defendant’s?condition:?long-term?and?heavy?”polysubstance”?abuse?and?psychopathology.?Each?discovered?a?delusional?system?that?was?apparently?based?on?writings?of?an?author?named?Carlos?Castaneda,?who?was?then?popular?in?the?drug?culture.?In?that?system,?as?one?of?the?experts?stated?in?pertinent?part,?Hanson?was?the?master?and?defendant?the?apprentice;?defendant?wished?to?become?a?”spiritual?warrior”;?at?one?point,?Hanson?began?to?”rob[?]”?defendant?of?the?”power”?he?needed?to?achieve?his?goal;?defendant?had?to?kill?Hanson?to?get?his?”power”?back-and?did?so.?Each?[54?Cal.3d?641]?expert’s?opinion?was?based?in?large?part?on?information?provided?by?defendant?himself. In?rebuttal,?the?People?introduced?evidence?in?the?form?of?opinion?by?an?expert?to?counter?the?opinions?of?defendant’s?experts.?The?opinion?of?the?People’s?expert?was?based?on?information?coming?from?sources?including?defendant?as?well?as?his?family,?friends,?acquaintances,?and?others.?The?People’s?expert?contradicted?defendant’s. Guilt?Issues Defendant?raises?a?number?of?claims?challenging?the?judgment?as?to?guilt.?As?will?appear,?none?is?meritorious. Denial?of?Motion?to?Suppress?Statements Prior?to?trial,?defendant?moved?to?suppress?evidence?of?certain?statements?he?had?made.?On?October?14,?1980,?he?was?arrested?in?Japan?for?the?murder?of?Hanson?and?Blount.?On?January?16,?1981,?he?departed?Japan?for?the?United?States?in?the?custody?of?Robert?P.?LaRoche,?a?deputy?United?States?Marshal?for?the?Eastern?District?of?California;?Donald?J.?Nunes,?the?Sheriff?of?Placer?County;?and?Curtis?A.?Landry,?a?deputy?sheriff?and?detective?under?Nunes’s?command.?The?party?flew?from?Tokyo?to?Honolulu,?stayed?overnight,?and?then?flew?from?Honolulu?to?San?Francisco.?During?the?Tokyo-Honolulu?flight?and?later?in?Honolulu,?defendant?made?self-inculpatory?statements?to?Detective?Landry.?[1]?(See?fn.?2.)?As?relevant?here,?the?suppression?motion?was?based?on?the?broad?ground?that?the?statements?in?question?were?involuntary?and?hence?inadmissible:?they?were?involuntary?as?a?matter?of?fact?under?the?due?process?clauses?of?the?Fourteenth?Amendment?to?the?United?States?Constitution?and?article?I,?sections?7?and?15,?of?the?California?Constitution;?and?they?were?involuntary?as?a?matter?of?law?under?the?rule?of?Miranda?v.?Arizona?(1966)?384?U.S.?436?[16?L.Ed.2d?694,?86?S.Ct.?1602,?10?A.L.R.3d?974]?(hereafter?sometimes?Miranda).fn.?2?[54?Cal.3d?642] The?trial?court?conducted?a?hearing.?Defendant?and?the?People?introduced?evidence,?both?testimonial?and?documentary.?The?witnesses?included?Marshal?LaRoche,?Sheriff?Nunes,?and?Detective?Landry,?but?not?defendant.?The?court?found?facts?expressly?and?impliedly.?Those?facts?tell?the?following?tale.fn.?3 During?the?earliest?hours?of?September?29,?1980,?defendant?killed?Hanson?and?Blount.?On?September?30?he?fled?this?country?from?Travis?Air?Force?Base,?stopped?over?in?Hawaii,?and?arrived?at?Yokota?Air?Force?Base?in?Japan?on?October?3.?At?that?time,?he?was?still?married?to?Lieutenant?Allison?W.?Mickey,?an?Air?Force?nurse,?and?resided?with?her?and?her?two?children?in?base?housing. On?October?7,?1980,?the?People?filed?a?complaint?in?the?Justice?Court?for?the?Auburn-Colfax?Judicial?District?of?the?County?of?Placer?accusing?defendant?of?murdering?Hanson?and?Blount?under?special?circumstances.?That?same?day,?an?arrest?warrant?was?issued?by?the?court,?indicating?Yokota?Air?Force?Base?as?defendant’s?residence. On?October?11,?1980,?Sheriff?Nunes?left?for?Japan,?taking?with?him?the?arrest?warrant?and?supporting?papers.?A?provisional?warrant?for?detention?was?subsequently?issued?by?Japanese?authorities. On?October?14,?1980,?defendant?was?arrested?by?United?States?Air?Force?security?police?officers?at?his?residence?on?the?Yokota?Air?Force?Base.?Shortly?thereafter,?Sheriff?Nunes?met?defendant.?He?advised?him?of?his?rights?under?Miranda.?Defendant?told?Nunes?that?”he?did?not?want?to?decide?[54?Cal.3d?643]?whether?to?talk?to?[him]?or?not?at?that?time.?That?he?wished?to?counsel?with?a?friend”-who?was?apparently?a?”military?attorney”-“before?making?a?decision.”?Thereupon,?conversation?essentially?ceased.?Nunes,?however,?did?inform?defendant?that?he?would?be?held?at?the?Tokyo?Detention?House?pending?extradition.?Defendant?was?surrendered?to?Japanese?authorities.?From?that?day?forward,?defendant’s?wife?Allison?cooperated?with?Nunes?and?other?officials. On?October?15,?1980,?it?appears,?defendant?expressed?a?desire?to?waive?extradition?proceedings?and?return?to?the?United?States?voluntarily.?Sheriff?Nunes?learned?of?this?fact?from?the?United?States?Embassy.?Through?the?embassy?he?attempted?to?arrange?a?meeting?with?defendant?to?seek?confirmation,?but?was?informed?he?had?requested?to?speak?only?with?his?wife. On?October?16,?1980,?at?Sheriff?Nunes’s?request,?Allison?visited?defendant?and?asked?whether?he?did?in?fact?desire?to?waive?extradition;?defendant?apparently?answered?in?the?affirmative.?The?Japanese?government,?however,?would?not?permit?a?waiver. On?October?18,?1980,?Sheriff?Nunes?departed?Japan.?He?left?behind?certain?evidence?he?had?gathered?relating?to?the?murder?of?Hanson?and?Blount?for?use?in?the?extradition?proceedings.?Those?proceedings?were?subsequently?conducted.?Defendant?was?represented?by?counsel. On?January?12,?1981,?Marshal?LaRoche?arrived?in?Japan?with?a?warrant?for?defendant’s?extradition.?With?him?were?Sheriff?Nunes?and?Detective?Landry.?The?presence?of?nonfederal?officers?such?as?Nunes?and?Landry?was?not?customary.?It?was?permitted,?however,?when?authorized.?Such?was?the?case?here.?Nunes?and?Landry?went?to?Japan?to?collect?evidence?and?interview?witnesses?and?also?to?accompany?defendant?on?his?return.?They?did?not?intend?to?seek?a?statement?from?defendant,?nor?did?they?actually?try?to?do?so.?In?Nunes’s?words,?”We?were?in?transit.?…?[T]he?conditions?weren’t?conducive?to?that.”?During?their?stay?in?Japan,?Nunes?and?Landry?did?in?fact?collect?evidence?and?interview?witnesses. About?3:30?p.m.?on?January?16,?1981,?Marshal?LaRoche,?Sheriff?Nunes,?and?Detective?Landry?met?defendant?at?the?Tokyo?Detention?House?in?order?to?take?him?into?their?custody.?Defendant?was?alert?and?in?good?health;?he?was?also?jovial?and?extremely?talkative,?evidently?glad?to?be?in?the?company?of?Americans?and?to?be?able?to?speak?English.?He?recognized?Nunes?and?appeared?happy?to?see?him?again.?Nunes?engaged?in?”small?talk”?with?defendant?and?helped?him?with?his?tie.?Landry?explained?to?defendant?the?[54?Cal.3d?644]?operation?of?a?knee?brace?that?would?be?used?as?a?restraint.?Landry?knew?defendant?had?previously?been?Mirandized?by?Nunes. About?3:50?p.m.?Marshal?LaRoche,?Sheriff?Nunes,?Detective?Landry,?and?defendant?boarded?a?van?for?Tokyo?International?Airport?at?Narita.?The?trip?took?approximately?three?hours.?During?the?ride,?defendant?spoke?with?Nunes,?who?was?seated?next?to?him,?and?to?a?lesser?extent?with?Landry.?Although?their?conversation?touched?on?such?topics?as?the?countryside?and?Tokyo’s?congested?traffic,?in?LaRoche’s?view?”Almost?all?of?it?concerned?home?town?talk,?[defendant’s]?father,?friends,?relations,?people?that?they?knew?mutually.”?LaRoche?”thought?he?talked?an?awful?lot,”?and?was?”glad?when?he?kept?quiet.”?It?was?defendant?who?generally?opened?the?conversation?and?directed?its?course.?Throughout?this?period?of?time,?there?was?no?mention?of?the?murder?of?Hanson?and?Blount. About?7?p.m.?Marshal?LaRoche,?Sheriff?Nunes,?Detective?Landry,?and?defendant?arrived?at?Tokyo?International?Airport.?The?group?waited?in?a?security?area?for?more?than?an?hour.?Again?there?was?”small?talk,”?but?no?mention?of?the?crimes.?Landry?was?regularly?afflicted?with?bad?breath?and?constantly?carried?mints?to?deal?with?the?problem.?The?day?before,?he?had?visited?defendant’s?wife?Allison?at?her?residence.?She?kept?a?bowl?of?mints?near?the?door,?and?gave?him?some.?As?a?result?of?their?close?proximity,?Landry?noticed?that?defendant?too?had?bad?breath.?He?offered?him?a?mint.?Defendant?took?it?and?expressed?recognition.?Landry?asked,?”[D]o?you?know?where?I?got?this?”?Defendant?replied,?”Yes,”?and?”his?chin?quivered?and?he?kind?of?bowed?his?head?and?put?his?head?in?his?hands”?and?”covered?his?eyes?….”?Some?time?later,?the?group?boarded?their?plane. […]

People?v.?Camarella?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?592?,?286?Cal.Rptr.?780;?818?P.2d?63 [No.?S017787.?Oct?28,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?ROBERT?ANTHONY?CAMARELLA,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Placer?County,?No.?0412,?James?D.?Garbolino,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?with?Panelli,?Kennard,?Arabian,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.) COUNSEL Newsom,?Giffen?&?Bacon,?Newsom?&?Giffen?and?Brennan?J.?Newsom?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Steve?White,?Richard?B.?Iglehart?and?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Arnold?O.?Overoye?and?Robert?R.?Anderson,?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Thomas?Y.?Shigemoto,?Michael?Weinberger?and?Carlos?A.?Martinez,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. Kent?S.?Scheidegger,?Hunton?&?Williams?and?R.?Hewitt?Pate?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION LUCAS,?C.?J. Introduction We?granted?review?to?resolve?a?split?of?authority?in?the?Courts?of?Appeal?regarding?interpretation?of?the?so-called?”good?faith”?exception?to?the?[54?Cal.3d?596]?exclusionary?rule,?as?set?out?in?United?States?v.?Leon?(1984)?468?U.S.?897?[82?L.Ed.2d?677,?104?S.Ct.?3405]?(Leon).?By?virtue?of?California?Constitution,?article?I,?section?28,?subdivision?(d),?the?issue?is?purely?one?of?federal?constitutional?law.?(See?In?re?Lance?W.?(1985)?37?Cal.3d?873,?886-887?[210?Cal.Rptr.?631,?694?P.2d?744].) [1]?In?Leon,?the?high?court?held?”the?Fourth?Amendment?exclusionary?rule?should?be?modified?so?as?not?to?bar?the?use?in?the?prosecution’s?case?in?chief?of?evidence?obtained?by?officers?acting?in?reasonable?reliance?on?a?search?warrant?issued?by?a?detached?and?neutral?magistrate?but?ultimately?found?to?be?unsupported?by?probable?cause.”?(468?U.S.?at?p.?900?[82?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?684].)?The?court?made?clear?that?the?government?has?the?burden?of?establishing?”objectively?reasonable”?reliance?(id.,?at?p.?924?[82?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?699]),?and?it?described?four?limited?situations?in?which?such?reliance?would?not?be?established,?and?in?which?suppression?under?the?exclusionary?rule?would?remain?an?appropriate?remedy:?(i)?the?issuing?magistrate?was?misled?by?information?that?the?officer?knew?or?should?have?known?was?false;?(ii)?the?magistrate?”wholly?abandoned?his?judicial?role”;?(iii)?the?affidavit?was?”?’so?lacking?in?indicia?of?probable?cause’?”?that?it?would?be?”?’entirely?unreasonable’?”?for?an?officer?to?believe?such?cause?existed;?and?(iv)?the?warrant?was?so?facially?deficient?that?the?executing?officer?could?not?reasonably?presume?it?to?be?valid.?(Id.,?at?p.?923?[82?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?699],?italics?added.)?This?case?concerns?application?of?the?third?of?these?situations. The?issues?are:?In?deciding?whether?a?given?case?falls?within?the?third?situation?described?above,?what?test?of?”objective?reasonableness”?should?apply,?and?what?effect,?if?any,?should?a?court?give?to?the?fact?that?a?magistrate?signed?a?search?warrant?later?used?to?effect?the?search? We?distill?from?Leon,?supra,?468?U.S.?897,?and?its?progeny?the?following:?If?a?well-trained?officer?should?reasonably?have?known?that?the?affidavit?failed?to?establish?probable?cause?(and?hence?that?he?should?not?have?sought?a?warrant),?exclusion?is?required?under?the?third?situation?described?in?Leon,?and?a?court?may?not?rely?on?the?fact?that?a?warrant?was?issued?in?assessing?objective?reasonableness?of?the?officer’s?conduct?in?seeking?the?warrant.?But?in?all?other?cases,?unless?one?of?the?other?limited?Leon?situations?is?triggered,?Leon’s?”general”?rule?of?nonexclusion?will?apply. On?the?facts?of?this?case,?we?find?the?Court?of?Appeal?erred?in?concluding?that?a?well-trained?officer?should?reasonably?have?known?that?the?affidavit?at?issue?here?failed?to?establish?probable?cause?for?the?search?of?defendant’s?home.?Pursuant?to?Leon,?we?conclude?the?police?reasonably?relied?on?the?magistrate’s?issuance?of?the?warrant,?and?thus?it?would?be?improper?to?[54?Cal.3d?597]?suppress?the?evidence?on?the?ground?urged?by?defendant.?Accordingly,?we?will?reverse?the?decision?of?the?Court?of?Appeal. Facts?and?Procedure Placer?County?Sheriff’s?Detective?John?Addoms?received?a?telephone?call?from?an?anonymous?informant?who?claimed?defendant?was?selling?cocaine.?Addoms?conducted?additional?investigation?(described?below)?and?prepared?a?draft?affidavit?that?he?showed?to?a?deputy?district?attorney,?who?approved?the?document.?Addoms?then?submitted?the?affidavit?to?a?local?magistrate,?who?found?probable?cause?and?issued?a?search?warrant.?The?affidavit’s?recitation?of?facts?supporting?probable?cause?read?as?follows: “Your?affiant?has?been?a?Deputy?Sheriff?for?the?past?five?years,?employed?in?[that]?capacity?by?the?Placer?County?Sheriff’s?Office?and?has?acted?and?received?the?information?set?forth?in?this?affidavit?in?that?capacity. “Your?affiant?is?now?and?has?been?for?the?past?two?years?assigned?to?the?investigation?detail?thereof. “On?May?6,?1986,?your?affiant?received?a?telephone?call?from?an?anonymous?female.?The?caller?told?your?affiant?that?she?wanted?to?give?your?affiant?information?regarding?a?cocaine?dealer,?but?feared?for?her?life?if?her?identity?was?disclosed?as?an?informant?and,?therefore,?refused?to?identify?herself?to?your?affiant. “The?caller?told?your?affiant?she?used?to?be?a?heavy?user?of?cocaine?and?that?she?purchased?her?cocaine?from?’Bobby’?Camarella.?The?caller?stated?that?she?no?longer?uses?cocaine,?but?a?relative?of?hers?does?and?he?purchases?his?cocaine?from?Camarella.?The?caller?told?your?affiant?that?she?has?personally?known?Camarella?to?be?selling?cocaine?for?at?least?three?years?on?a?continual?and?ongoing?basis?and?has?heard?that?he?had?been?selling?cocaine?for?at?least?five?years.?The?caller?stated?that?Camarella?works?as?a?bartender?at?’Pete?and?Peter’s’?and?sells?cocaine?at?the?bar?as?well?as?at?his?residence.?Most?recently,?within?the?past?72?hours,?the?caller?stated?that?her?relative?told?her?that?he?had?just?purchased?one?gram?of?cocaine?from?Camarella?and?showed?her?a?paper?bindle?and?indicated?that?it?contained?the?cocaine?just?purchased. “The?caller?told?your?affiant?that?Camarella?had?recently?moved?and?was?living?’near?the?Tahoe?City?Golf?Course,’?but?was?unable?to?provide?a?more?detailed?location. “Your?affiant?checked?Sheriff’s?office?records?and?intelligence?files?and?discovered?the?following?corroborating?information:?[54?Cal.3d?598] “In?February,?1985,?your?affiant?spoke?to?a?confidential?untested?informant?hereafter?referred?to?as?the?CI.?The?CI?told?your?affiant?that?a?person?he?knew?as?’Bobby?C’?was?an?active?dealer?in?cocaine.?The?CI?stated?that?’Bobby?C’?worked?as?a?bartender?at?’Pete?and?Peter’s’?bar?and?that?on?two?occasions?within?the?past?month?[the?CI]?had?purchased?cocaine?from?’Bobby?C’?at?’Pete?and?Peter’s,’?one?time?purchasing?one?gram?and?the?other?time?purchasing?one-half?gram. “Your?affiant?discovered?Placer?County?Crime?report?#6272-82,?attached?and?incorporated?herein?as?exhibit?A.?The?report?indicates?that?on?November?5,?1982,?Camarella?was?arrested?by?Deputy?Shannon?of?the?Placer?County?Sheriff’s?Department?for?possession?of?cocaine.?At?the?time?of?booking,?Officer?Anderson?of?the?Placer?County?Sheriff’s?Department?found?on?Camarella’s?person?three?sheets?of?paper?with?numerous?names?or?initials?written?on?them?and?numbers?written?next?to?them,?some?[of]?the?numbers?being?crossed?out. “Your?affiant?believes?the?sheets?of?paper?to?be?typical?of?what?is?commonly?known?as?’score?sheets,’?records?of?controlled?substance?sales.?The?names?or?initials?indicat[e]?individuals?and?the?numbers?indicat[e]?the?money?owed?for?a?controlled?substance?sale.?The?number?is?then?crossed?out?or?changed?when?payment?is?made?or?the?amount?owed?is?changed?because?of?additional?sales. “The?Placer?County?Jail?booking?sheet?indicates?that?Camarella’s?nickname?is?’Bobby’?and?that?he?worked?as?a?bartender?at?’Pete?and?Peter’s.’ “Your?affiant?showed?Camarella’s?booking?photograph?to?Detective?Jones?of?the?Placer?County?Sheriff’s?Department?and?he?identified?Camarella?as?’Bobby’?that?works?as?a?bartender?at?’Pete?and?Peter’s’?bar?and?indicated?that?he?had?seen?’Bobby’?at?’Pete?and?Peter’s’?on?numerous?occasions. “1982?Sheriff’s?Department?local?records?on?Camarella?indicate?that?Camarella?lived?at?1273?Alpine?Way;?however?the?caller?had?told?your?affiant?that?Camarella?had?recently?moved?’near?the?Tahoe?City?Golf?Course.’?Your?affiant?checked?Placer?County?Assessor?records?and?they?indicated?that?Camarella?was?the?owner?of?1273?Alpine?Way?and?605?Fairway?Drive,?605?Fairway?Drive?being?’near?the?Tahoe?City?Golf?Course.’?Your?affiant?checked?with?the?Sierra?Pacific?Power?Company?and?was?told?that?1273?Alpine?Way’s?power?was?still?in?the?name?of?Camarella;?however,?the?address?had?been?changed?to?in?care?of?Carol?Campbell,?indicating?to?your?affiant?that?Camarella?no?longer?lived?at?the?residence.?Believing?Camarella?now?lived?at?605?Fairway?Drive,?your?affiant?drove?by?the?described?residence?and?observed?a?yellow?Jeep?Wagoneer?Ca.?Lic.?#2AEN009?to?be?parked?in?the?driveway.?[54?Cal.3d?599]?Your?affiant?checked?DMV?records?and?discovered?the?vehicle?to?be?registered?to?Robert?A.?Camarella.” The?affidavit?went?on?to?describe?Addoms’s?experience?and?training.?Addoms?claimed?to?have?participated?in?about?300?cases?involving?controlled?substances,?and?to?have?been?trained?by?various?law?enforcement?groups?in?that?subject.?Addoms?recounted?that?he?had?recently?attended?a?seminar?given?by?the?California?District?Attorney’s?Association?concerning,?inter?alia,?search?warrants?in?narcotics?cases.?Addoms?concluded?that?based?on?his?”education,?training,?and?experience,”?he?had?”reasonable?and?probable?cause?to?believe?that?grounds?for?the?issuance?of?a?search?warrant?exist,?as?set?forth?in?section?1524?of?the?Penal?Code,?based?upon?the?aforementioned?information,?facts?and?circumstances.” The?magistrate?issued?the?warrant,?and?shortly?thereafter?Detective?Addoms?conducted?a?search?at?605?Fairway?Drive?in?Tahoe?City.?The?officers?discovered?various?items?including?310?grams?of?cocaine,?several?”score?sheets,”?and?$1,250?in?cash.?Defendant?was?arrested?and?charged?with,?inter?alia,?possessing?cocaine?for?sale?(Health?&?Saf.?Code,???11351)?and?possession?of?marijuana?(id.,???11357,?subd.?(b)). At?the?preliminary?hearing,?Detective?Addoms?testified?that?because?the?Tahoe?City?community?is?small?and?he?and?the?two?other?detectives?at?the?local?station?were?well?known?in?the?community?it?would?have?been?difficult?to?conduct?surveillance?at?the?bar.?He?explained?his?reluctance?even?to?stop?near?defendant’s?home?because?he?feared?the?occupants?would?be?alerted?to?the?surveillance.?As?noted?above,?Addoms?stated?that?he?submitted?the?affidavit?to?a?deputy?district?attorney?for?approval?before?presenting?it?to?the?magistrate.?Finally,?Addoms?added?that?after?obtaining?the?warrant?but?before?serving?it?he?drove?past?defendant’s?home?at?least?four?times,?and?saw?the?yellow?jeep?each?time.?Although?the?magistrate?found?the?warrant?overbroad?in?certain?respects?and?indicated?he?would?exclude?evidence?relating?to?the?overbroad?parts?of?the?warrant?(see?post,?p.?607,?fn.?7),?he?nevertheless?held?defendant?to?answer?on?the?basis?of?the?nonexcluded?evidence?listed?above. Thereafter?the?superior?court?denied?defendant’s?motion?to?set?aside?the?information?based?on?illegally?seized?evidence?(Pen.?Code,???995).?The?court?initially?found?that?”substantial?evidence”?supported?issuance?of?the?warrant.?On?reconsideration?of?the?probable?cause?issue,?however,?the?court?held?that?probable?cause?was?absent,?but?declined?to?exclude?the?remaining?evidence?because?it?concluded?that?pursuant?to?Leon,?supra,?468?U.S.?897,?Addoms?reasonably?relied?on?the?warrant.?[54?Cal.3d?600] Defendant?pleaded?guilty?to?possessing?cocaine?for?sale?and?admitted?a?related?quantity?enhancement?(Pen.?Code,???1203.073,?subd.?(b)(1)).?The?court?sentenced?him?to?two?years?in?state?prison,?dismissed?the?marijuana?charge,?and?granted?bail?pending?appeal. The?Court?of?Appeal?agreed?with?the?superior?court?that?the?affidavit?was?insufficient?to?establish?probable?cause,?and?hence?acknowledged?that?this?is?”a?pure?Leon?case.”?Neither?party?below?asserted?otherwise. Addressing?the?Leon?issue,?the?Court?of?Appeal?majority?reversed.?The?majority?concluded?it?was?objectively?unreasonable?for?Addoms?to?believe?his?affidavit?supplied?probable?cause?for?issuance?of?the?warrant.?In?support?of?this?conclusion?the?court?emphasized?(i)?the?absence?of?”effort?to?ascertain?the?truth?of?the?suspicions?raised?about?defendant?by?the?anonymous?tipster”?through?surveillance,?and?(ii)?the?staleness?of?the?corroborating?information?(i.e.,?the?four-year-old?prior?arrest?and?the?fifteen-month-old?prior?tip). By?contrast,?the?dissenting?justice?maintained?that?the?corroboration,?though?stale,?nevertheless?provided?some?basis?for?Addoms?to?reasonably?believe?probable?cause?existed.?This,?in?conjunction?with?the?background?investigation,?Addoms’s?presentation?of?the?affidavit?for?approval?by?a?deputy?district?attorney,?and?the?impracticality?of?a?more?extensive?surveillance?program?in?the?close?community?involved?here,?led?the?dissenting?justice?to?conclude?that?Addoms?”should?not?be?faulted?for?the?magistrate’s?error?in?issuing?the?warrant.?It?is?not?enough?that?a?reasonably?well-?trained?officer?might?have?suspected?the?facts?did?not?rise?to?the?level?of?probable?cause.?Only?where?no?reasonable?officer?of?reasonable?competence?would?have?believed?probable?cause?existed?is?good?faith?lacking.?This?is?not?such?a?case.”?(Italics?in?original.)?As?will?appear,?we?believe?the?dissenting?justice’s?view?is?in?conformity?with?Leon,?supra,?468?U.S.?897. III.?Analysis   Illinois?v.?Gates [2]?Initially,?we?review?the?standards?for?determining?probable?cause?to?support?a?search?warrant.?In?Illinois?v.?Gates?(1983)?462?U.S.?213?[76?L.Ed.2d?527,?103?S.Ct.?2317]?(Gates),?the?high?court?rejected?rigid?adherence?to?the?”two?pronged”?probable?cause?test?described?in?Aguilar?v.?Texas?(1964)?378?U.S.?108?[12?L.Ed.2d?723,?84?S.Ct.?1509],?and?Spinelli?v.?United?States?(1969)?393?U.S.?410?[21?L.Ed.2d?637,?89?S.Ct.?584].?Instead,?the?court?embraced?a?”totality?of?the?circumstances”?approach?under?which?”[t]he?task?of?the?issuing?magistrate?is?simply?to?make?a?practical,?commonsense?[54?Cal.3d?601]?decision?whether,?given?all?the?circumstances?set?forth?in?the?affidavit?before?him,?including?the?’veracity’?and?’basis?of?knowledge’?of?persons?supplying?hearsay?information,?there?is?a?fair?probability?that?contraband?or?evidence?of?a?crime?will?be?found?in?a?particular?place.”?(Gates,?supra,?462?U.S.?at?p.?238?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?548].) The?court?observed?that?”probable?cause?is?a?fluid?concept-turning?on?the?assessment?of?probabilities?in?particular?factual?contexts-not?readily,?or?even?usefully,?reduced?to?a?neat?set?of?legal?rules.”?(Gates,?supra,?462?U.S.?at?p.?232?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?544].)?[3]?And?yet,?the?court?noted,?there?are?established?guidelines?for?determining?the?existence?of?probable?cause:?”Our?decisions?applying?the?totality-of-the-circumstances?analysis?…?have?consistently?recognized?the?value?of?corroboration?of?details?of?an?informant’s?tip?by?independent?police?work?….?[A]n?affidavit?relying?on?hearsay?’is?not?to?be?deemed?insufficient?on?that?score,?so?long?as?a?substantial?basis?for?crediting?the?hearsay?is?presented.”?(Id.,?at?pp.?241-242?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?550].)?The?court?explained?that?the?factors?set?out?in?its?prior?cases-i.e.,?”an?informant’s?’veracity,’?’reliability,’?and?’basis?of?knowledge’?”-are?”all?highly?relevant”?factors?that,?together?or?separately,?”usefully?illuminate?the?commonsense,?practical?question?whether?there?is?’probable?cause’?to?believe?that?contraband?or?evidence?is?located?in?a?particular?place.”?(Id.,?at?p.?230?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?543].)?The?court?further?explained?that?”a?deficiency?in?one?[of?these?factors]?may?be?compensated?for,?in?determining?the?overall?reliability?of?a?tip,?by?a?strong?showing?as?to?the?other,?or?by?some?other?indicia?of?reliability.”?(Id.,?at?p.?233?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?545].) Addressing?anonymously?obtained?information,?the?Gates?court?observed,?”such?tips,?particularly?when?supplemented?by?independent?police?investigation,?frequently?contribute?to?the?solution?of?otherwise?’perfect?crimes.’?While?a?conscientious?assessment?of?the?basis?for?crediting?such?tips?is?required?by?the?Fourth?Amendment,?a?standard?that?leaves?virtually?no?place?for?anonymous?citizen?informants?is?not.”?(462?U.S.?at?pp.?237-238?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?548].)?In?this?regard?the?court?noted?that?when?an?informant?is?anonymous?and?untested,?”[i]t?is?enough,?for?purposes?of?assessing?probable?cause,?that?'[c]orroboration?through?other?sources?of?information?reduce[s]?the?chances?of?a?reckless?or?prevaricating?tale,’?thus?providing?a?’substantial?basis?for?crediting?the?hearsay.’?”?(Id.,?at?pp.?244-245?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?552].) As?noted?above,?the?parties?do?not?contest?the?determination?of?the?superior?court?and?the?Court?of?Appeal,?that?the?magistrate?had?no?”substantial?basis”?for?concluding?there?was?probable?cause?supporting?the?search.?Although?this?conclusion?is?debatable,?and?although?the?question?is?one?of?law?subject?to?our?independent?review?(People?v.?Lawler?(1973)?9?Cal.3d?[54?Cal.3d?602]?156,?160?[107?Cal.Rptr.?13,?507?P.2d?621]),?we?decline?to?disturb?the?unchallenged?legal?determination?of?the?lower?courts.?Even?under?the?”commonsense”?and?nontechnical?approach?to?probable?cause?articulated?in?Gates,?supra,?462?U.S.?213,?it?is?arguable?that?additional?and?independent?corroboration?by?the?police?was?called?for?in?order?to?establish?a?”fair?probability”?that?contraband?would?be?found?in?defendant’s?house?at?the?time?the?warrant?was?to?be?executed.?We?thus?proceed?on?the?assumption?that?the?affidavit?failed?to?establish?probable?cause?that?contraband?would?be?found?in?defendant’s?home,?and?that?on?the?facts?presented?the?magistrate?had?no?”substantial?basis”?for?concluding?otherwise.?(Gates,?supra,?462?U.S.?at?pp.?238,?239?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?548,?549].) United?States?v.?Leon We?turn?to?the?question?of?whether?evidence?must?be?excluded?if?it?is?seized?pursuant?to?a?warrant?unsupported?by?probable?cause.?[4]?Under?high?court?cases?dating?from?Weeks?v.?United?States?(1914)?232?U.S.?383?[58?L?Ed?652,?34?S.Ct.?341],?evidence?seized?in?violation?of?a?defendant’s?Fourth?Amendment?rights?has?been?subject?to?exclusion?from?the?prosecution’s?case-in-chief.?Justice?White’s?opinion?for?the?court?in?Leon?concluded,?however,?that?the?”benefits”?of?this?rule?were?”marginal?or?nonexistent”?in?a?case?in?which?the?challenged?evidence?was?”obtained?in?objectively?reasonable?reliance?on?a?subsequently?invalidated?search?warrant,”?and?that?exclusion?in?such?situations?is?inappropriate.?(Leon,?supra,?468?U.S.?at?p.?922?[76?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?698].)?The?court?observed,?”?’If?the?purpose?of?the?exclusionary?rule?is?to?deter?unlawful?police?conduct,?then?evidence?obtained?from?a?search?should?be?suppressed?only?if?it?can?be?said?that?the?law?enforcement?officer?had?knowledge,?or?may?properly?be?charged?with?knowledge,?that?the?search?was?unconstitutional?under?the?Fourth?Amendment.’?”?(Id.,?at?p.?919?[82?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?696],?quoting?United?States?v.?Peltier?(1975)?422?U.S.?531,?542?[45?L.Ed.2d?374,?384,?95?S.Ct.?2313],?italics?added.) The?court?cautioned,?however,?that?although?”?’a?warrant?issued?by?a?magistrate?normally?suffices?to?establish’?that?a?law?enforcement?officer?has?’acted?in?good?faith?in?conducting?the?search’?”?(Leon,?supra,?468?U.S.?at?p.?922?[82?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?698],?italics?added),?there?are?limited?situations?in?which?this?presumption?does?not?apply.?An?”officer’s?reliance?on?the?magistrate’s?probable-cause?determination?…?must?be?objectively?reasonable,?cf.?Harlow?v.?Fitzgerald?[(1982)]?457?U.S.?800,?815-819?[73?L.Ed.2d?396,?102?S.Ct.?2727],?and?it?is?clear?that?in?some?circumstances?the?officer?will?have?no?reasonable?grounds?for?believing?that?the?warrant?was?properly?issued.”?(Id.,?at?pp.?922-923?[82?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?698],?fns.?omitted.)?In?a?footnote?after?the?citation?to?Harlow?v.?Fitzgerald?(1982)?457?U.S.?800?[73?L.Ed.2d?396,?102?S.Ct.?2727],?the?court?explained?that?its?inquiry?in?this?regard?will?be?[54?Cal.3d?603]?”confined?to?the?objectively?ascertainable?question?whether?a?reasonably?well?trained?officer?would?have?known?that?the?search?was?illegal?despite?the?magistrate’s?authorization.”?(Leon,?supra,?468?U.S.?at?p.?922,?fn.?23?[82?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?698],?italics?added.)?The?court?then?described?four?situations?in?which?suppression?would?remain?an?appropriate?remedy.?The?third?situation-urged?by?defendant?in?this?case-provides?as?follows: “Nor?would?an?officer?manifest?objective?good?faith?in?relying?on?a?warrant?based?on?an?affidavit?’so?lacking?in?indicia?of?probable?cause?as?to?render?official?belief?in?its?existence?entirely?unreasonable.’?Brown?v.?Illinois?[(1975)],?422?U.S.?[590],?610-611?[45?L.Ed.2d?416,?95?S.Ct.?2254]?(Powell,?J.,?concurring?in?part);?see?Illinois?v.?Gates,?supra,?462?U.S.?at?[pages]?263-264?(White,?J.,?concurring?in?judgment).”?(Leon,?supra,?468?U.S.?at?p.?923?[82?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?699].)fn.?1 The?Leon?court?concluded?by?observing?that?none?of?the?four?situations?in?which?exclusion?remains?the?appropriate?remedy?pertained?on?the?facts?before?it.?Although?the?defendant?asserted?that?no?reasonable?and?well-trained?officer?”could?have?believed?that?there?existed?probable?cause”?for?the?search?(468?U.S.?at?p.?926?[82?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?701]),?the?high?court?rejected?that?claim,?observing?that?the?searching?officer?had?submitted?to?the?magistrate?”much?more?than?a?’bare?bones’?affidavit.?The?affidavit?related?the?results?of?an?extensive?investigation?and?…?provided?evidence?sufficient?to?create?disagreement?…?as?to?the?existence?of?probable?cause.?Under?these?circumstances,?the?officers’?reliance?on?the?magistrate’s?determination?of?probable?cause?was?objectively?reasonable,?and?application?of?the?extreme?sanction?of?exclusion?is?inappropriate.”?(Ibid.) Subsequent?developments?in?Malley?v.?Briggs?(1986)?475?U.S.?335?[89?L.Ed.2d?271,?106?S.Ct.?1092]?(Malley),?a?civil?rights?action?(42?U.S.C.???1983)?also?authored?by?Justice?White,?illuminate?Leon.?In?Malley?the?plaintiff?sued?a?state?trooper?for?violating?his?civil?rights?by?improperly?[54?Cal.3d?604]?applying?for?an?arrest?warrant?that?was?subsequently?erroneously?issued,?and?thereafter?executed.?The?trooper,?asserting?”qualified?immunity,”?claimed?he?was?”shielded?from?damages?liability?because?the?act?of?applying?for?a?warrant?is?per?se?objectively?reasonable,?provided?that?the?officer?believes?that?the?facts?alleged?in?his?affidavit?are?true.”?(Malley,?supra,?475?U.S.?at?p.?345?[89?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?281],?italics?added.)?The?trooper?insisted?he?was?”entitled?to?rely?on?the?judgment?of?a?judicial?officer?in?finding?that?probable?cause?exists?and?hence?issuing?the?warrant.”?(Ibid.)?The?court,?however,?rejected?this?argument.?It?held,?”the?same?standard?of?objective?reasonableness?that?we?applied?in?the?context?of?a?suppression?hearing?in?Leon,?supra,?defines?the?qualified?immunity?accorded?an?officer?whose?request?for?a?warrant?allegedly?caused?an?unconstitutional?arrest”?(id.,?at?p.?344?[89?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?280],?italics?added),?and?concluded?the?trooper’s?view?”is?at?odds?with?…?Leon.”?(Id.,?at?p.?345?[89?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?281],?italics?added.) The?court?explained?that?pursuant?to?Leon,?the?question?to?be?addressed?”is?whether?a?reasonably?well-trained?officer?in?[the?trooper’s]?position?would?have?known?that?his?affidavit?failed?to?establish?probable?cause?and?that?he?should?not?have?applied?for?the?warrant.?If?such?was?the?case,?the?officer’s?application?for?a?warrant?was?not?objectively?reasonable,?because?it?created?the?unnecessary?danger?of?an?unlawful?arrest.?It?is?true?that?in?an?ideal?system?an?unreasonable?request?for?a?warrant?would?be?harmless,?because?no?judge?would?approve?it.?But?ours?is?not?an?ideal?system,?and?it?is?possible?that?a?magistrate,?working?under?docket?pressures,?will?fail?to?perform?as?a?magistrate?should.?We?find?it?reasonable?to?require?the?officer?applying?for?the?warrant?to?minimize?this?danger?by?exercising?reasonable?professional?judgment.”?(Malley,?supra,?475?U.S.?at?pp.?345-346?[89?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?281],?italics?added,?fns.?omitted;?see?also?id.,?p.?346,?fn.?9?[89?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?281]?[if?magistrate?issues?warrant?when?no?officer?of?reasonable?competence?would?have?sought?warrant,?”The?officer?then?cannot?excuse?his?own?default?by?pointing?to?the?greater?incompetence?of?the?magistrate.”].) Interpreting?Leon Our?Courts?of?Appeal,?like?the?appellate?courts?of?other?states?and?the?federal?appellate?courts,?have?expressed?confusion?in?attempting?to?apply?Leon,?supra,?468?U.S.?897.?For?example,?some?courts?appear?to?conclude?that?in?determining?whether?an?officer?was?objectively?reasonable?in?submitting?an?affidavit?to?a?magistrate,?it?is?proper?to?consider?the?fact?that?the?magistrate?signed?(albeit?erroneously)?the?warrant.?(People?v.?Brown?(1990)?231?Cal.App.3d?1201?[274?Cal.Rptr.?432],?review?granted?Jan.?4,?1991?(S018256)?[magistrate’s?issuance?of?warrant?is?a?factor?in?determining?[54?Cal.3d?605]?whether?objectively?reasonable?officer?would?have?submitted?affidavit?to?magistrate].)fn.?2 […]

People?v.?Nicolaus?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?551?,?286?Cal.Rptr.?628;?817?P.2d?893 [No.?S004766.?Oct?24,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?ROBERT?HENRY?NICOLAUS,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Santa?Clara?County,?No.?109681,?Taketsugu?Takei,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Baxter,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Fern?M.?Laethem,?State?Public?Defender,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?Dee?Hayashi?and?Nancy?Gayno,?Deputy?State?Public?Defenders,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Dane?R.?Gillette,?Ronald?S.?Matthias?and?Sharon?G.?Birenbaum,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent.?[54?Cal.3d?561] OPINION BAXTER,?J. Defendant?Robert?Henry?Nicolaus?appeals?from?a?judgment?of?death?imposed?under?the?1978?death?penalty?law.?(Pen.?Code,???190.1?et?seq.)fn.?1?He?was?convicted?of?the?first?degree?murder?of?his?ex-wife,?Charlyce?Robinson.?(??187.)?A?firearm-use?enhancement?was?found?true.?(??12022.5.)?The?murder?was?committed?in?Sacramento?County;?defendant?successfully?moved?for?a?change?of?venue?and?the?case?was?ordered?transferred?to?Santa?Clara?County?for?trial. Upon?his?conviction,?defendant?admitted?the?truth?of?the?three?alleged?prior-murder?special?circumstances,?having?been?previously?convicted?of?the?murders?of?his?three?children?in?1964.?(??190.2,?subd.?(a)(2).)?The?jury?fixed?the?penalty?at?death;?this?appeal?is?automatic.?(??1239,?subd.?(b).) For?the?reasons?set?forth?hereafter,?we?conclude?that?the?judgment?should?be?affirmed?in?its?entirety. Facts   Guilt?Phase   The?Murder At?4?p.m.?on?February?22,?1985,?Ron?Landrith?and?his?father?Leon?were?in?a?lot?adjacent?to?their?residence?on?Eleanor?Street?in?Sacramento.?A?turquoise?Rambler?parked?in?the?alleyway?next?to?their?property?suddenly?pulled?into?an?adjoining?lot?and?came?to?a?stop?in?front?of,?and?blocking,?a?red?Volkswagen.?Defendant?got?out,?walked?over?to?the?Volkswagen,?and?began?screaming?at?a?woman?seated?therein,?stating?words?to?the?effect?of,?”How?could?you?do?this?to?me?”?He?reached?into?the?Volkswagen?and?started?beating?the?woman,?then?retrieved?a?handgun?from?the?Rambler?and?shot?her?in?the?chest.?Ron?ran?inside?to?call?the?police.?Leon?observed?defendant?walk?back?to?his?car,?stand?there?several?seconds,?then?return?to?the?Volkswagen?and?shoot?the?victim,?who?had?exited?or?fallen?from?the?car?to?the?ground,?a?second?time?at?point-blank?range. As?defendant?drove?off,?the?Volkswagen?rolled?across?the?alley?and?came?to?a?stop?against?a?pole.?A?young?child?was?in?the?backseat.?Moments?later?defendant?drove?back?into?the?alley,?pulled?up?alongside?the?victim?who?was?lying?on?the?ground,?looked?at?her?for?several?seconds,?then?drove?off?again.?[54?Cal.3d?562] The?Landriths?furnished?defendant’s?license?plate?number?to?police?who?arrived?on?the?scene?within?minutes.?Officer?Scott?testified?that?the?victim?was?found?lying?on?her?back?in?the?parking?lot,?her?face?covered?with?blood?and?a?gunshot?wound?to?her?chest,?crying,?”Oh?my?God,?my?baby,?where’s?my?baby?”?The?victim?was?later?identified?as?defendant’s?ex-wife?Charlyce?(Lisa)?Robinson.?When?asked?who?shot?her,?Lisa?replied,?”Robert?Nicolaus.”?She?repeated?defendant’s?name,?spelled?it,?and?stated?he?lived?on?Erickson?Street,?apartment?1.?The?officers?took?custody?of?Lisa’s?three-year-old?son?who?was?in?a?hysterical?state.?Defendant’s?address?was?obtained?through?a?Department?of?Motor?Vehicles?(DMV)?check;?officers?arrived?at?his?apartment?less?than?20?minutes?after?the?shooting?but?did?not?find?him?there. The?victim?died?en?route?to?the?hospital.?An?autopsy?performed?the?following?day?revealed?extensive?facial?injuries?consistent?with?her?having?been?beaten?with?fists.?She?had?been?shot?twice;?once?through?the?lower?chest,?and?once?through?the?buttock.?Both?bullets?were?retrieved.?The?cause?of?death?was?hemorrhage?from?a?severed?aorta?caused?by?the?gunshot?wound?to?her?lower?chest.?Ballistics?tests?established?that?the?fatal?gunshot?had?been?fired?from?a?distance?of?four?to?eight?inches. The?next?day,?police?located?defendant’s?Rambler?in?a?public?parking?lot.?A?.25-caliber?semiautomatic?handgun?was?observed?in?plain?view?on?the?front?floorboard?and?seized,?and?the?car?was?impounded.?A?second?handgun?in?a?bag?was?later?recovered?from?the?vehicle?during?the?execution?of?a?search?warrant.?Ballistics?tests?established?that?the?.25-caliber?handgun?was?the?murder?weapon. Events?Leading?up?to?the?Murder The?subsequent?investigation?revealed?defendant’s?bitter?and?long-standing?grudge?against?his?ex-wife. Wilber?”Deke”?Bennett?had?known?defendant?since?1955.?Defendant?had?repeatedly?told?Bennett?that?Lisa?had?stolen?money?from?him.?Defendant?was?angry?and?bitter?about?this,?and?would?get?upset?when?he?talked?about?Lisa.?Prior?to?the?murder?he?sought?Bennett’s?assistance?in?locating?Lisa.?Bennett?denied?defendant?told?him?he?wanted?to?kidnap,?torture,?or?kill?Lisa,?or?that?he?(Bennett)?had?told?his?girlfriend,?Jillette?Kruhalski,?that?defendant?wanted?to?kidnap?Lisa. Kruhalski?testified?that,?one?year?prior?to?the?murder,?defendant?had?asked?her?to?befriend?Lisa.?At?defendant’s?request,?Kruhalski?went?to?speak?with?Lisa?at?a?store?where?Lisa?worked;?on?another?occasion?she?and?defendant?[54?Cal.3d?563]?waited?for?Lisa?to?leave?work?and?then?followed?her.?Sometime?thereafter,?Bennett?told?Kruhalski?that?Lisa?had?stolen?money?from?defendant,?and?that?defendant?was?going?to?get?even?with?her.?Contrary?to?Bennett’s?testimony,?Kruhalski?recalled?that?six?months?before?Lisa?was?killed,?Bennett?informed?her?that?defendant?was?going?to?kidnap?Lisa. Bennett’s?sister,?Orra?Thompson,?testified?that?sometime?in?1984?defendant?told?her?Lisa?and?her?mother?had?taken?$5,000?from?his?savings?account,?which?money?was?supposedly?earmarked?for?funeral?arrangements?for?defendant’s?children,?and?had?spent?it?on?themselves?instead.?Defendant?also?asked?Thompson?if?she?would?like?to?”work”?for?him,?offering?her?$1,000?plus?expenses?to?”get?to?know”?Lisa.?Thompson?was?to?obtain?information?for?him?on?Lisa’s?daily?activities?and?also?find?out?what?she?could?about?the?validity?of?defendant?and?Lisa’s?Mexican?divorce.?Defendant?told?Thompson?he?stood?to?inherit?some?money?when?his?mother?died?and?did?not?want?Lisa?to?get?any?of?it.?Thompson?never?actually?met?Lisa.?On?two?occasions?defendant?paid?her?$7?and?$25?respectively?for?her?attempts?to?contact?Lisa.?Although?defendant?never?expressed?a?desire?to?harm?his?ex-wife,?Thompson?perceived?that?he?harbored?bad?feelings?about?her,?and?that?she?would?not?cooperate?with?him. “Deke”?Bennett’s?brother?Harry?knew?defendant?and?had?introduced?him?to?one?Dick?Winn?in?the?spring?of?1984.?Winn?testified?that?Harry?Bennett?and?defendant?asked?him?to?obtain?a?couple?of?pistols?for?them.?Winn?was?told?”throwaways”?would?be?fine.?Defendant?agreed?to?pay?for?the?guns,?and?$150?was?discussed?as?the?purchase?price.?Winn?understood?that?the?guns?were?to?be?used?in?retaliation?for?a?long-standing?grudge?which?defendant?bore?against?his?former?wife.?Defendant?claimed?she?had?run?off?with?his?”defense?money.”?When?Winn?suggested?defendant?consider?whether?he?could?get?away?with?the?plan,?defendant?replied?that?there?would?be?no?doubt?about?who?did?it,?and?that?he?did?not?care.?Defendant?and?Bennett?also?wanted?Winn?to?”grab”?Lisa?and?take?her?someplace?”where?noise?wouldn’t?make?no?difference”?so?that?defendant?could?”spend?some?time?with?her.”?They?offered?Winn?$2,000?to?do?the?”grabbing,”?and?he?agreed.?Winn?specifically?asked?defendant?whether?he?planned?to?kill?Lisa,?which?defendant?denied.?When?asked?why?he?wanted?to?”grab”?his?ex-wife,?defendant?replied?that?”it?wasn’t?for?any?picnic.”?Winn?was?unsuccessful?in?locating?any?handguns?and?ultimately?lost?interest?in?the?plan. Lisa?had?a?15-year-old?daughter,?Donna?Johnson,?who?was?residing?with?her?in?1985.?Donna?testified?that?before?her?death?her?mother?was?involved?in?a?religious?organization?called?”The?Saints.”?She?recalled?frequently?seeing?defendant?at?the?grocery?store,?and?in?front?of?the?apartment?where?they?lived,?during?the?months?prior?to?her?mother’s?death.?Two?weeks?before?the?[54?Cal.3d?564]?murder,?defendant?confronted?Donna?and?Lisa?in?a?laundromat?and?”stared”?at?them?for?a?prolonged?period.?About?that?same?time?defendant?appeared?at?a?Saints’?meeting,?pounded?on?the?door,?and?demanded?to?speak?with?Lisa,?who?refused?to?see?him. Donna?testified?she?was?acquainted?with?Pasquale?D’Antonoli,?who?was?an?alcoholic.?Shortly?before?the?murder?he?had?come?to?their?apartment?and?told?Lisa?he?needed?to?move?from?his?apartment?within?a?week.?He?returned?on?the?afternoon?of?her?mother’s?murder;?Lisa?was?not?home?at?that?time. D’Antonoli?testified?he?had?known?defendant?since?1954?and?had?met?defendant’s?ex-wife?Lisa?while?they?were?married.?Three?or?four?days?prior?to?the?murder,?defendant?sought?his?assistance?in?”contacting”?Lisa.?D’Antonoli?agreed?to?offer?Lisa?some?money?to?help?him?”move?from?his?apartment.”?Defendant?told?D’Antonoli?he?could?not?contact?Lisa?himself?because?they?were?not?too?friendly,?and?that?he?wanted?to?discuss?the?legality?of?their?Mexican?divorce.?D’Antonoli?testified?that?defendant’s?desire?and?intent?to?harm?his?ex-wife?”showed.”?Defendant?promised?D’Antonoli?vodka?and?money?in?exchange?for?his?assistance. During?the?days?prior?to?the?murder?defendant?drove?D’Antonoli?to?Lisa’s?apartment?three?times.?On?the?first?occasion?she?was?not?home;?defendant?gave?D’Antonoli?a?bottle?of?whiskey?for?his?efforts.?On?the?second?occasion?D’Antonoli?contacted?Lisa?and?she?agreed?to?help?him?move;?defendant?gave?D’Antonoli?some?liquor?and?”a?few?bucks”?for?these?accomplishments.?According?to?plan,?D’Antonoli?was?to?meet?Lisa?at?a?Lucky’s?market?and?have?her?drive?him?to?the?alley?off?Eleanor?Street.?Defendant?and?D’Antonoli?visited?the?location.?The?night?before?the?murder?D’Antonoli?stayed?at?defendant’s?apartment,?got?drunk,?and?went?over?the?plan. On?the?afternoon?of?the?murder?D’Antonoli?and?defendant?drove?to?the?vicinity?of?Lucky’s?and?parked.?Defendant?began?jogging.?D’Antonoli?met?Lisa?according?to?plan?and?got?in?her?car.?While?they?were?driving,?Lisa?saw?defendant?jogging?and?pointed?him?out?to?D’Antonoli,?who?revealed?nothing?of?the?plan.?When?they?reached?the?alley,?D’Antonoli?noticed?defendant’s?car?parked?nearby.?Once?in?the?alley,?D’Antonoli?told?Lisa?he?would?be?right?back?and?walked?off.?He?passed?defendant,?who?was?alone?in?his?car?with?the?motor?running.?Defendant?asked,?”Is?she?in?the?car?over?there?”?D’Antonoli?replied,?”Yes,?I’ll?see?you?later.”?D’Antonoli?testified?that?Lisa’s?little?boy?was?in?her?car?at?the?time.?D’Antonoli?left?the?scene?to?buy?liquor?with?the?$30?defendant?had?given?him.?[54?Cal.3d?565] Events?Subsequent?to?the?Murder On?the?day?following?the?murder,?Sacramento?police?officers?executed?a?search?warrant?at?defendant’s?apartment.?Defendant?had?not?returned?to?the?apartment.?During?the?search?a?manila?folder?was?seized?from?atop?a?desk?in?the?living?room.?Numerous?handwritten?documents?were?inside?the?folder;?expert?testimony?established?they?had?been?written?by?defendant.?The?bulk?of?the?documents?contained?notations?of?defendant’s?feelings?about?Lisa?and?various?schemes?for?revenge.?They?outlined?plans?to?get?the?victim?to?various?locations,?and?items?that?defendant?would?have?to?procure?in?order?to?carry?out?his?intentions?of?kidnapping?or?harming?her.?Several?of?the?plans?tracked?the?testimony?of?D’Antonoli,?Bennett,?Winn,?Thompson,?and?Kruhalski?concerning?the?events?leading?up?to?Lisa’s?murder.?One?writing?described?plans?for?D’Antonoli?to?direct?Lisa?to?a?chosen?spot,?ostensibly?to?help?him?move,?with?references?to?an?alternate?plan?if?she?balked.?There?was?a?reference?to?D’Antonoli?removing?her?blindfold?and?gag.?Other?documents?contained?notations?about?how?Lisa’s?confidence?might?be?gained.?Another,?entitled?”Contract,”?made?reference?to?a?$1,000?contract?with?”Orra”?for?the?befriending?of?Lisa.?Yet?another?appeared?to?be?a?packing?list,?and?included?items?such?as?acid,?an?ax,?a?sleeping?bag,?rope,?tape,?and?things?to?”get?from?car.”?Another?document,?entitled?”Disposal,”?made?reference?to?various?Sacramento?bars?and?contained?the?notations?”dumpster,”?”hospital,”?and?”church.” Several?documents?evidenced?defendant’s?scorn?and?hatred?of?religion,?in?particular?the?sect?of?Christianity?to?which?his?ex-wife?belonged.?Others?revealed?his?apparent?intense?hatred?of?Lisa,?her?mother?Ione,?a?couple?surnamed?the?”Nieces,”?and?the?wrongs?he?believed?they?had?all?committed?against?him.?He?referred?to?Lisa?and?her?mother?as?the?”Satanic?Sisterhood,”?”evil?incarnate,”?and?the?”two?main?ultimate?causes?of?my?children’s?demise.”?Lisa?was?characterized?in?one?document?as?the?”accursed?whore?…?who?destroyed?all?possible?chances?for?a?good?life?for?my?children?and?myself,”?and?as?”the?archdemon?of?destruction”?in?a?document?dated?January?1,?1985?(less?than?two?months?prior?to?the?murder),?which?read: “It?is?my?single?resolve?to?avenge?my?children’s?destruction?before?I?enter?my?52nd?year,?so?that?I?may?slip?away?from?this?world?at?peace?with?myself.?Woe?to?the?archdemon?who?destroyed?us?almost?21?years?ago.?[?]?Before?I?entered?my?32nd?year,?my?children?were?destroyed.?Before?I?enter?my?52nd?year,?the?archdemon?who?destroyed?my?children?will?be?brought?to?book,?so?I?swear.?The?archdemon?of?destruction?will?itself?suffer?destruction.?I?swear?this.?Some?people,?the?fortunate,?die?quickly.?Other?people,?the?unfortunate,?[54?Cal.3d?566]?die?slowly.?I?am?one?of?the?unfortunates.”?(Defendant?turned?52?years?old?exactly?6?days?before?killing?his?ex-wife.) “Deke”?Bennett?testified?he?learned?about?Lisa’s?death?from?news?reports.?He?received?a?collect?call?from?defendant?on?the?day?following?her?murder.?Defendant?asked?Bennett?whom?he?had?hurt;?Bennett?replied?that?as?far?as?he?knew,?only?Lisa,?who?had?died.?Defendant?said?nothing?to?indicate?any?surprise?at?hearing?this?news.?When?Bennett?asked?defendant?where?he?was,?defendant?replied,?”I’m?buried.”?Although?contacted?by?a?Sacramento?detective?the?following?day,?Bennett?did?not?reveal?that?he?had?spoken?with?defendant?at?that?time. Bennett?received?another?collect?call?from?defendant?10?days?after?the?murder.?Defendant?wanted?to?know?who?had?been?questioned?or?arrested?for?the?crime.?This?time?Bennett?informed?police?defendant?had?called.?Bennett’s?telephone?bill?reflected?that?the?call?had?been?placed?from?New?York?City. Defendant?was?arrested?by?FBI?agents?in?York,?Pennsylvania?on?July?20,?1985.?At?first?he?claimed?his?name?was?Pasco?D’Antonoli.?After?admitting?his?true?name?and?waiving?his?Miranda?rights,?defendant?asserted?he?had?no?knowledge?of?the?murder?of?his?ex-wife.?He?claimed?he?left?Sacramento?a?day?or?two?before?the?date?of?the?murder?and?traveled?to?New?York?City,?Washington,?D.C.,?and?Virginia.?He?admitted?feeling?the?victim?owed?him?$5,000,?but?claimed?he?did?not?know?where?she?lived?and?had?not?spoken?to?her?since?sometime?in?1984.?He?denied?knowing?he?was?wanted?for?murder?and?maintained?he?had?not?touched?a?handgun?since?1964.?When?confronted?with?the?fact?that?Lisa?had?named?him?as?her?murderer?in?her?dying?declaration,?he?suggested?she?was?confused?or?lying?and?that?he?was?being?”framed.” Defense At?the?close?of?the?People’s?case-in-chief,?the?defense?rested?without?presenting?any?evidence.?The?thrust?of?defense?counsel’s?argument?to?the?jury?was?that?defendant?was?guilty,?at?most,?of?second?degree?murder.?Counsel?emphasized?passages?from?the?documents?seized?from?defendant’s?apartment?which,?it?was?argued,?indicated?his?desire?to?harm,?but?not?kill,?his?ex-wife.?Counsel?argued?it?was?a?mere?fortuity?that?the?first?bullet?had?severed?the?victim’s?aorta?and?proved?fatal,?urging?that?if?defendant?had?intended?to?kill?Lisa,?he?would?have?finished?her?off?with?the?second?shot?instead?of?shooting?her?in?the?buttock.?[54?Cal.3d?567] Special?Circumstances Defendant?was?convicted?of?the?first?degree?murders?of?his?three?children?in?1964,?and?was?sentenced?to?death.?In?1967,?this?court?modified?the?judgment?by?reducing?the?crimes?to?murder?of?the?second?degree?and,?as?so?modified,?affirmed?the?judgment.?(People?v.?Nicolaus?(1967)?65?Cal.2d?866,?883-884?[56?Cal.Rptr.?635,?423?P.2d?787]?[maj.?opn.?by?Burke,?J.;?dis.?opn.?by?Mosk,?J.].)?Defendant?served?a?prison?term?until?his?release?on?parole?in?1977. These?three?convictions?formed?the?basis?of?the?prior-murder?special?circumstances?alleged?herein.?(??190.2,?subd.?(a)(2).)?According?to?a?pretrial?agreement,?the?jury?was?never?informed?at?the?guilt?phase?of?the?fact?that?defendant?had?been?convicted?of?the?murders?of?his?three?children.?After?the?jury?returned?its?verdict?finding?defendant?guilty?of?first?degree?murder,?defendant?elected,?for?tactical?reasons,?to?admit?the?truth?of?the?prior-murder?special-circumstance?allegations?(so?that?the?jury?would?not?learn?he?had?initially?been?sentenced?to?death?for?those?murders),?and?the?trial?proceeded?to?the?penalty?phase. Penalty?Phase   Prosecution?Case The?prosecution’s?penalty?phase?case?consisted?of?the?brief?testimony?of?two?witnesses?to?establish?the?essential?facts?underlying?defendant’s?convictions?of?the?murders?of?his?children.?Roberta,?age?seven,?and?Donald,?age?five,?were?the?children?of?defendant?and?his?former?common?law?wife,?Jeannie?Lara.?Heidi,?age?two,?was?the?child?of?defendant?and?Lisa. Alejo?Lara,?Jeannie?Lara’s?husband?at?the?time,?testified?that?defendant?would?regularly?pick?up?Donald?and?Roberta?to?visit?with?them.?On?May?23,?1964,?he?picked?them?up?to?have?their?portraits?done.?On?the?following?day?Lara?received?a?phone?call?from?Lisa,?defendant’s?wife?at?the?time.?She?indicated?defendant?had?locked?his?three?children?in?the?trunk?of?his?car,?which?was?parked?in?Sacramento.?Lara?went?out?in?search?of?his?two?stepchildren?and?found?defendant’s?car?about?the?same?time?police?located?it.?The?three?children?were?found?shot?to?death?in?the?trunk.?Two-year-old?Heidi?had?four?bullet?wounds?to?her?head;?seven-year-old?Roberta?and?five-year-old?Donald?each?had?three?gunshot?wounds?to?their?heads.?All?the?shots?had?been?fired?at?point-blank?range. Defense?Case Defendant?presented?evidence?regarding?the?circumstances?leading?up?to?his?murder?of?his?three?children?and,?twenty?years?later,?his?ex-wife.?Various?[54?Cal.3d?568]?witnesses?testified?about?his?upbringing?and?psychological?profile;?defendant?himself?took?the?stand?but?limited?his?testimony?to?facts?surrounding?Lisa’s?murder. Defendant’s?mother?was?a?strict?Catholic.?He?attempted?to?conform?to?her?standards;?until?age?20?he?did?not?smoke,?drink,?or?date?women.?In?his?teenage?years?he?began?to?harbor?doubts?about?religion,?which?created?a?conflict?at?home.?Defendant?was?characterized?throughout?his?college?years?as?quiet,?shy,?somewhat?naive?and?studious.?One?friend?characterized?him?as?”brilliant,”?and?a?defense?psychiatrist?testified?he?had?a?relatively?high?IQ. In?1953,?at?age?20,?defendant?joined?the?Air?Force.?While?in?the?service?he?began?to?smoke,?drink?heavily,?and?visit?prostitutes.?He?studied?Marxism?and?became?an?atheist.?On?one?occasion?he?got?drunk?and?”passive?oral?copulation”?was?performed?on?him?by?another?man.?As?a?result?of?this?incident,?defendant?was?discharged?from?the?armed?services. […]

Legislature?v.?Eu?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?492?,?286?Cal.Rptr.?283;?816?P.2d?1309 [No.?S019660. Oct?10,?1991.] LEGISLATURE?OF?THE?STATE?OF?CALIFORNIA?et?al.,?Petitioners,?v.?MARCH?FONG?EU,?as?Secretary?of?State,?etc.,?et?al.,?Respondents;?CALIFORNIANS?FOR?A?CITIZEN?GOVERNMENT,?Intervener. (Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?with?Panelli,?Kennard,?Arabian,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.) COUNSEL Denise?Hulett,?Antonia?Hernandez,?Remcho,?Johansen?&?Purcell,?Joseph?Remcho,?Robin?B.?Johansen,?Lowell?Finley,?Barbara?A.?Brenner?and?Charles?C.?Marson?for?Petitioners. Brad?Sherman,?Ralph?Santiago?Abascal,?Jenner?&?Block,?Brent?N.?Rushforth,?Bruce?J.?Ennis,?Jonathan?B.?Sallett,?Donald?B.?Verrilli?and?Scott?A.?Sinder?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Petitioners. Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorney?General,?Robert?L.?Mukai,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?N.?Eugene?Hill,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Cathy?A.?Neff,?Manuel?M.?Medeiros,?Linda?A.?Cabatic,?Ramon?M.?de?la?Guardia,?Daniel?G.?Stone?and?Richard?Thomson,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?Lloyd?M.?Harmon,?Jr.,?County?Counsel?(San?Diego),?Diane?Bardsley,?Chief?Deputy?County?Counsel,?Pamela?T.?Jones,?Deputy?County?Counsel,?Lawrence?E.?Gercovich,?D.?Robert?Shuman,?Richard?J.?Chivaro,?Hufstedler,?Kaus?&?Ettinger,?Otto?M.?Kaus,?Joseph?L.?Wyatt,?Jr.,?Michael?V.?Toumanoff?and?Judith?R.?Starr?for?Respondents. Stephen?R.?Barnett?as?Amicus?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Respondents. Ronald?A.?Zumbrun,?John?H.?Findley,?Jonathan?M.?Coupal,?Meredith?M.?Chang?and?Deborah?J.?Martin?for?Intervener. Martin?A.?Schainbaum,?Daniel?J.?Popeo?and?John?C.?Scully?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Respondents?and?Intervener. OPINION LUCAS,?C.?J. In?this?proceeding,?we?consider?constitutional?challenges?to?an?initiative?measure?adopted?at?the?November?6,?1990,?General?Election.?This?measure,?entitled?by?its?framers?as?”The?Political?Reform?Act?of?1990,”?was?designated?on?the?ballot?as?Proposition?140.?Its?stated?purpose?is?to?”restore?a?free?and?democratic?system?of?fair?elections,?and?to?encourage?qualified?candidates?to?seek?public?office”?by?limiting?”the?powers?of?[54?Cal.3d?500]?incumbency.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.5,?added?by?Prop.?140.)?The?measure?seeks?to?accomplish?these?goals?by?these?three?separate?reforms:?”Retirement?benefits?[of?legislators]?must?be?restricted,?state-financed?incumbent?staff?and?support?services?limited,?and?limitations?placed?upon?the?number?of?terms?which?may?be?served.”?(Ibid.) Petitioners?herein?include?the?California?Legislature?(both?Senate?and?Assembly),?certain?individual?legislators?from?both?houses,?and?various?citizens,?voters?and?taxpayers.?Petitioners?jointly?assert?a?variety?of?challenges?to?the?constitutionality?of?Proposition?140. Respondents?are?various?public?officials?(including?the?Secretary?of?State,?the?state?Controller,?and?the?Board?of?Administration?of?the?Public?Employees?Retirement?System?[PERS])?responsible?for?implementing,?enforcing?or?applying?the?new?measure.?Intervener,?Californians?for?a?Citizen?Government,?is?the?organization?that?sponsored?Proposition?140.?Several?amici?curiae?have?filed?briefs?supporting?the?various?parties. Only?intervener?(represented?by?the?Pacific?Legal?Foundation)?and?respondent?Secretary?of?State?(represented?by?the?Attorney?General)?have?filed?briefs?adverse?to?petitioners.?Respondent?state?Controller?remains?neutral,?while?respondent?PERS?supports?petitioners’?challenge?to?the?pension?limitations?of?Proposition?140,?but?takes?no?position?on?the?remaining?issues.?Nonetheless,?for?convenience,?we?sometimes?refer?to?intervener?and?respondent?Secretary?of?State?jointly?as?”respondents.” [1]?The?petition?for?mandate?sought?original?relief?in?this?court.?Although?we?customarily?decline?to?exercise?such?jurisdiction,?preferring?initial?disposition?by?the?lower?courts,?the?present?case?involves?issues?of?sufficient?public?importance?to?justify?departing?from?our?usual?course.?As?we?recently?observed?in?Raven?v.?Deukmejian?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?336,?340?[276?Cal.Rptr.?326,?801?P.2d?1077]?(assessing?the?constitutionality?of?Proposition?115,?an?initiative?measure?adopted?at?the?June?1990?Primary?Election),?quoting?from?an?earlier?case,?”?’It?is?uniformly?agreed?that?the?issues?are?of?great?public?importance?and?should?be?resolved?promptly.?Accordingly,?under?well?settled?principles,?it?is?appropriate?that?we?exercise?our?original?jurisdiction.?[Citations.]’?…”?(See?also?Planned?Parenthood?Affiliates?v.?Van?de?Kamp?(1986)?181?Cal.App.3d?245,?262-265?[226?Cal.Rptr.?361].) Pending?our?review?of?the?issues,?on?June?14,?1991,?we?temporarily?stayed?operation?of?section?5?of?Proposition?115,?which?imposes?budgetary?restrictions?on?the?Legislature,?as?hereafter?discussed. The?principles?that?guide?us?in?evaluating?the?validity?of?initiative?measures?such?as?Proposition?140?are?likewise?well?settled.?[2]?Although?the?[54?Cal.3d?501]?legislative?power?under?our?state?Constitution?is?vested?in?the?Legislature,?”the?people?reserve?to?themselves?the?powers?of?initiative?and?referendum.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.)?Accordingly,?the?initiative?power?must?be?liberally?construed?to?promote?the?democratic?process.?(Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?p.?341.)?Indeed,?it?is?our?solemn?duty?to?jealously?guard?the?precious?initiative?power,?and?to?resolve?any?reasonable?doubts?in?favor?of?its?exercise.?(Ibid.,?and?cases?cited.)?As?with?statutes?adopted?by?the?Legislature,?all?presumptions?favor?the?validity?of?initiative?measures?and?mere?doubts?as?to?validity?are?insufficient;?such?measures?must?be?upheld?unless?their?unconstitutionality?clearly,?positively,?and?unmistakably?appears.?(Calfarm?Ins.?Co.?v.?Deukmejian?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?805,?814?[258?Cal.Rptr.?161,?771?P.2d?1247]?[evaluating?the?constitutionality?of?Prop.?103,?an?insurance?rate?initiative?measure?adopted?at?the?Nov.?1988?Gen.?Elec.].) As?will?appear,?we?conclude?that?although?the?pension?restrictions?of?Proposition?140?are?invalid?as?to?incumbent?legislators,?the?measure?is?constitutionally?valid?in?all?other?respects.?Before?addressing?petitioners’?challenges,?we?briefly?outline?the?basic?provisions?of?the?new?measure,?which?consists?entirely?of?various?amendments?to?the?state?Constitution. Summary?of?Proposition?140 Statement?of?Purpose?and?Findings Section?1.5?is?added?to?article?IV?of?the?Constitution?(the?”Legislative”?article),?to?set?forth?various?findings?and?statements?of?the?framers’?intent.?In?pertinent?part,?this?introductory?provision?recites?that?although?”the?Founding?Fathers?established?a?system?of?representative?government?based?upon?free,?fair,?and?competitive?elections,”?nonetheless?an?”extremely?high?number?of?incumbents”?are?reelected?by?reason?of?”[t]he?ability?of?legislators?to?serve?unlimited?number?of?terms,?to?establish?their?own?retirement?system,?and?to?pay?for?staff?and?support?services?at?state?expense?….” The?introductory?statement?continues?by?noting?that?”These?unfair?incumbent?advantages?discourage?qualified?candidates?from?seeking?public?office?and?create?a?class?of?career?politicians,?instead?of?the?citizen?representatives?envisioned?by?the?Founding?Fathers.”?The?statement?concludes?by?stating?that,?”To?restore?a?free?and?democratic?system?of?fair?elections,?and?to?encourage?qualified?candidates?to?seek?public?office,?the?people?find?and?declare?that?the?powers?of?incumbency?must?be?limited,”?as?provided?by?the?substantive?amendments?we?now?discuss. Term?Limitations The?measure?imposes?specific?term?limitations?for?state?legislators?and?various?state?constitutional?officers.?Persons?elected?or?appointed?on?or?after?[54?Cal.3d?502]?November?6,?1990,?to?the?office?of?Governor?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?V,???2),?Lieutenant?Governor?(id.,???11),?Attorney?General?(ibid.),?Controller?(ibid.),?Secretary?of?State?(ibid.),?Treasurer?(ibid.),?Superintendent?of?Public?Instruction?(id.,?art.?IX,???2),?or?to?the?State?Board?of?Equalization?(id.,?art.?XIII,???17),?or?the?state?Senate?(id.,?art.?IV,???2,?subd.?(a)),?are?limited?to?two?terms.?Members?of?the?Assembly?are?limited?to?three?terms?(ibid.). Section?7?is?added?to?article?XX?of?the?Constitution?(the?”Miscellaneous?Subjects”?article),?to?explain?that?the?foregoing?term?limitations?”apply?only?to?terms?to?which?persons?are?elected?or?appointed?on?or?after?November?6,?1990,?except?that?an?incumbent?Senator?whose?office?is?not?on?the?ballot?for?the?general?election?on?that?date?may?serve?only?one?additional?term,”?and?that?the?foregoing?term?limits?”shall?not?apply?to?any?unexpired?term?to?which?a?person?is?elected?or?appointed?if?the?remainder?of?the?term?is?less?than?half?of?the?full?term.” Budgetary?Limitations The?measure?imposes?a?budgetary?limitation?for?the?Legislature.?Section?7.5?is?added?to?article?IV?of?the?Constitution?to?provide?that,?for?the?forthcoming?fiscal?year,?”the?total?aggregate?expenditures?of?the?Legislature?for?the?compensation?of?members?and?employees?of,?and?the?operating?expenses?and?equipment?for,?the?Legislature?may?not?exceed”?$950,000?”per?member”?for?that?fiscal?year,?or?80?percent?of?the?amount?of?money?expended?for?such?purposes?in?the?preceding?year,?whichever?is?less. Additionally,?new?section?7.5?of?article?IV?of?the?Constitution?provides?that,?for?each?fiscal?year?thereafter,?the?total?aggregate?expenditures?may?not?exceed?the?amount?expended?during?the?previous?year,?”adjusted?and?compounded?by?an?amount?equal?to?the?percentage?increase?in?the?appropriations?limit?for?the?state?established?pursuant?to?Article?XIII?B”?of?the?Constitution. Pension?Limitations Finally,?the?measure?imposes?limitations?on?legislators’?pension?rights.?New?section?4.5?is?added?to?article?IV?of?the?Constitution?to?provide?that?the?state?will?contribute?the?employer’s?share?to?the?federal?Social?Security?system?on?behalf?of?participating?legislators?”elected?to?or?serving?in?the?Legislature?on?or?after?November?1,?1990,”?but?”[n]o?other?pension?or?retirement?benefit?shall?accrue?as?a?result?of?service?in?the?Legislature,?such?service?not?being?intended?as?a?career?occupation.” This?same?provision?further?provides?that?”This?Section?shall?not?be?construed?to?abrogate?or?diminish?any?vested?pension?or?retirement?benefit?[54?Cal.3d?503]?which?may?have?accrued?under?an?existing?law?…,?but?upon?adoption?of?this?Act?no?further?entitlement?to?nor?vesting?in?any?existing?program?shall?accrue?to?any?such?person,?other?than?[federal]?Social?Security?….” Respondent?state?Controller?confirms?that,?as?of?the?effective?date?of?Proposition?140,?he?ceased?making?deductions?from?the?salaries?of?incumbent?legislators?for?the?Legislators’?Retirement?Fund?in?connection?with?services?rendered?after?that?date,?and?has?also?terminated?paying?employer?or?state?contributions?to?that?fund?for?those?services. Severance?Clause In?addition?to?the?foregoing?provisions,?subdivision?(d)?is?added?to?section?11?of?article?VII?of?the?Constitution?(the?”Public?Officers?and?Employees”?article).?Section?11?of?article?VII?previously?had?limited?the?obligations?of?the?Legislators’?Retirement?System?to?persons?first?entering?state?office?after?January?1,?1987.?Subdivision?(d)?now?sets?forth?a?severance?clause?reciting?that?”If?any?part?of?this?measure?or?the?application?to?any?person?or?circumstance?is?held?invalid,?the?invalidity?shall?not?affect?other?provisions?or?applications?which?reasonably?can?be?given?effect?without?the?invalid?provision?or?application.”?We?discuss?the?matter?of?severance?below?in?connection?with?our?discussion?of?the?invalid?pension?restrictions. Discussion Lifetime?Ban?or?Limit?on?Consecutive?Terms [3a]?As?a?preliminary?matter,?we?must?address?the?interpretive?question?whether?Proposition?140?imposes?a?”lifetime?ban”?on?officers?who?have?served?the?specified?number?of?terms,?or?merely?limits?the?number?of?consecutive?terms?they?may?serve.?With?respect?to?state?legislators,?petitioners?and?intervener?assume?that?once?a?legislator?has?served?the?prescribed?maximum?number?of?terms,?the?measure?would?forever?bar?him?or?her?from?running?for?a?seat?in?the?legislative?house?previously?served.?Respondent?Secretary?of?State,?contends,?however,?that?the?term?limitation?”is?directed?only?at?the?incumbent?office?holder.”?(Italics?in?original.)?In?her?view,?the?measure?simply?limits?the?number?of?consecutive?terms?served,?and?she?suggests?that?a?former?legislator?might?run?for?a?new?term?of?office?if?he?or?she?is?not?currently?holding?that?office. We?focus?first?on?the?language?of?the?new?measure.?The?introduction?to?Proposition?140?refers?to?curtailing?”[t]he?ability?of?legislators?to?serve?unlimited?…?terms,”?by?limiting?”the?number?of?terms?which?may?be?served.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???1.5.)?Thus,?the?limitation?on?the?term?of?state?[54?Cal.3d?504]?Senators?adds?the?language,?”No?Senator?may?serve?more?than?2?terms,”?to?the?existing?language?of?the?Constitution?that?”The?Senate?has?a?membership?of?40?Senators?elected?for?4-?year?terms,?20?to?begin?every?2?years.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,???2,?subd.?(a).)?The?limitation?on?Assembly?members?is?similarly?phrased,?stating?that?”No?member?of?the?Assembly?may?serve?more?than?3?terms.”?(Ibid.)?As?petitioners?observe,?the?foregoing?provisions?do?not?expressly?refer?to?the?number?of?consecutive?terms?served.?Moreover,?the?measure?repeatedly?announces?its?intent?to?eliminate?”career?politicians”?(see?Cal.?Const.,?art.?IV,????1.5,?4.5),?language?which?would?support?the?view?that?a?lifetime?ban?was?intended. Respondent?Secretary?of?State?points?out,?however,?that?these?limitations?are?directed?to?a?”Senator”?or?”member?of?the?Assembly,”?rather?than?a?”person,”?and?she?argues?that?a?literal?interpretation?of?the?measure?thus?discloses?an?intent?to?limit?the?right?of?an?incumbent?legislator?to?continue?unabated?terms?in?office.?In?respondent?Eu’s?view,?once?the?incumbent?legislator?has?left?office,?he?or?she?can?no?longer?be?described?as?a?”Senator”?or?”member?of?the?Assembly”?to?which?the?term?limitation?provision?would?apply. Petitioners?argue?that?even?a?purely?literal?reading?of?Proposition?140?would?support?their?interpretation:?A?person?who,?having?already?served?two?prior?terms?as?Senator,?surrenders?his?or?her?seat?for?one?term?and?thereafter?enters?on?a?third?Senate?term,?could?be?accurately?described?as?a?”Senator”?who?is?”serv[ing]?more?than?2?terms”?contrary?to?the?language?of?Proposition?140.?Intervener?suggests?that?respondent?Eu’s?interpretation,?with?its?emphasis?on?limiting?only?incumbents,?could?lead?to?absurd?results,?permitting?a?legislator?to?avoid?the?term?limitations?by?resigning?shortly?before?his?or?her?final?term?had?expired,?and?thereupon?announcing?an?intent?to?run?for?reelection?unencumbered?by?any?term?limitations?applicable?to?”incumbents.” Nonetheless,?we?agree?with?respondent?Eu?that?the?language?of?Proposition?140?is?ambiguous?as?to?its?intent?to?impose?a?lifetime?ban.?[4]?As?we?have?previously?recognized,?to?help?resolve?such?ambiguities?”it?is?appropriate?to?consider?indicia?of?the?voters’?intent?other?than?the?language?of?the?provision?itself.?[Citation.]”?(Kennedy?Wholesale,?Inc.?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?245,?250?[279?Cal.Rptr.?325,?806?P.2d?1360].)?Such?indicia?include?the?analysis?and?arguments?contained?in?the?official?ballot?pamphlet.?(See?ibid.;?Amador?Valley?Joint?Union?High?Sch.?Dist.?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?208,?245-246?[149?Cal.Rptr.?239,?583?P.2d?1281]?[hereafter?Amador].)?[3b]?These?materials?strongly?support?the?position?of?petitioners?and?intervener?that?a?lifetime?ban?from?office?was?contemplated?by?the?framers?of,?and?voters?for,?Proposition?140.?[54?Cal.3d?505] First,?the?analysis?by?the?Legislative?Analyst?described?the?term?limitations?as?limiting?”the?number?of?terms?that?an?elected?state?official?can?serve?in?the?same?office?….”?(Ballot?Pamp.,?Proposed?Stats.?and?Amends.?to?Cal.?Const.?with?argument?to?voters,?Gen.?Elec.?(Nov.?6,?1990)?p.?69,?italics?in?original?[hereafter?Ballot?Pamphlet].)?No?suggestion?is?made?that?only?a?consecutive?term?limitation?was?contemplated. Second,?and?more?significantly,?the?opponents’?ballot?arguments?against?Proposition?140?forcefully?and?repeatedly?stressed?the?measure’s?”lifetime?ban,”?and?criticized?the?proponents’?failure?to?disclose?that?particular?aspect?of?the?measure?in?their?arguments?to?the?voters.?Indeed,?the?primary?thrust?of?the?opponents’?ballot?arguments?was?directed?to?this?aspect?of?the?measure.?(See?Ballot?Pamp.,?supra,?at?pp.?70-71.)?The?argument?against?Proposition?140?used?the?phrases?”lifetime?ban,”?”banned?for?life,”?or?similar?terminology?11?times.?(Ibid.) We?are?mindful?of?the?fact?that?ballot?measure?opponents?frequently?overstate?the?adverse?effects?of?the?challenged?measure,?and?that?their?”fears?and?doubts”?are?not?highly?authoritative?in?construing?the?measure.?(DeBartolo?Corp.?v.?Fla.?Gulf?Coast?Trades?Council?(1988)?485?U.S.?568,?585?[99?L.Ed.2d?645,?661,?108?S.Ct.?1392].)?Nonetheless,?we?find?it?significant?that?the?proponents?failed?to?contradict?the?opponents’?”lifetime?ban”?argument.?(See?D’Amico?v.?Board?of?Medical?Examiners?(1970)?6?Cal.App.3d?716,?725?[86?Cal.Rptr.?245].)?Moreover,?the?proponents?stressed?that?Proposition?140?was?directed?at?eliminating?”career?politicians”?or?”career?legislators,”?and?suggested?that?”good?legislators?will?always?have?the?opportunity?to?move?up?the?ladder.”?(Italics?added.)?These?arguments?seem?to?reinforce?the?idea?that?a?lifetime?ban?was?intended. We?think?it?likely?the?average?voter,?reading?the?proposed?constitutional?language?as?supplemented?by?the?foregoing?analysis?and?arguments,?would?conclude?the?measure?contemplated?a?lifetime?ban?against?candidacy?for?the?office?once?the?prescribed?maximum?number?of?terms?had?been?served.?[5]?As?we?stated?in?In?re?Lance?W.?(1985)?37?Cal.3d?873,?889?[210?Cal.Rptr.?631,?694?P.2d?744],?”In?construing?constitutional?and?statutory?provisions,?whether?enacted?by?the?Legislature?or?by?initiative,?the?intent?of?the?enacting?body?is?the?paramount?consideration.”?(Italics?added.) Respondent?Eu?suggests?that?the?applicable?principle?of?interpretation?requires?us?to?avoid?any?constitutional?”doubts”?or?”difficulties”?by?adopting?a?construction?which?will?render?the?measure?constitutional.?(E.g.,?Kortum?v.?Alkire?(1977)?69?Cal.App.3d?325,?333-?334?[138?Cal.Rptr.?26].)?We?find?no?cases?suggesting,?however,?that?this?interpretive?principle?precludes?resort?to?extrinsic?evidence?to?resolve?possible?ambiguities?in?a?measure.?Moreover,?as?[54?Cal.3d?506]?we?explain?in?this?opinion,?the?measure’s?lifetime?ban?is?constitutional?in?all?respects. [3c]?We?conclude?that?Proposition?140’s?term?limitations?extend?over?the?lifetime?of?each?affected?officeholder. Constitutional?Revision?or?Amendment [6a]?Turning?to?petitioners’?constitutional?challenges?to?Proposition?140,?they?first?contend?that?the?measure,?and?particularly?its?term?and?budgetary?limitations?on?the?Legislature,?effected?a?constitutional?revision?rather?than?a?mere?amendment.?Although?”[t]he?electors?may?amend?the?Constitution?by?initiative”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?XVIII,???3),?a?”revision”?of?the?Constitution?may?be?accomplished?only?by?convening?a?constitutional?convention?and?obtaining?popular?ratification?(id.,????2,?4),?or?by?legislative?submission?of?the?measure?to?the?voters?(id.,????1,?4).?(See?also?Raven?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?p.?349.) Raven?suggested?that?the?revision?provision?is?based?on?the?principle?that?”comprehensive?changes”?to?the?Constitution?require?more?formality,?discussion?and?deliberation?than?is?available?through?the?initiative?process.?(52?Cal.3d?at?pp.?349-350.)?We?should?bear?in?mind,?however,?that?the?initiative?process?may?represent?the?only?practical?means?of?achieving?the?kind?of?”reforms”?of?the?Legislature?involved?here,?because?the?revision?process?can?be?initiated?only?with?the?consent?of?two-thirds?membership?of?each?house?of?the?Legislature.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?XVIII,????1,?2.) In?Raven,?citing?earlier?cases,?we?observed,?”Although?the?Constitution?does?not?define?the?terms?’amendment’?or?’revision,’?the?courts?have?developed?some?guidelines?helpful?in?resolving?the?present?issue.?[7a]?As?explained?[in?prior?cases],?our?revision/amendment?analysis?has?a?dual?aspect,?requiring?us?to?examine?both?the?quantitative?and?qualitative?effects?of?the?measure?on?our?constitutional?scheme.?Substantial?changes?in?either?respect?could?amount?to?a?revision.”?(52?Cal.3d?at?p.?350.) […]

Weiner?v.?Fleischman?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?476?,?286?Cal.Rptr.?40;?816?P.2d?892 [No.?S017856.?Oct?7,?1991.] BERYL?WEINER,?Plaintiff?and?Appellant,?v.?WILLIAM?O.?FLEISCHMAN?et?al.,?Defendants?and?Respondents. (Superior?Court?of?Los?Angeles?County,?No.?C460038,?Arthur?Baldonado,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Panelli,?J.,?expressing?the?unanimous?view?of?the?court.) COUNSEL Kirsch?&?Mitchell,?Jonathan?L.?Kirsch,?Dennis?Mitchell,?Selvin,?Weiner?&?Ruben,?W.?Ruel?Walker?and?Arthur?E.?Schwimmer?for?Plaintiff?and?Appellant. Garfield,?Tepper,?Ashworth?&?Epstein,?Scott?J.?Tepper,?Christopher?Ashworth,?Franklin?R.?Garfield,?Hufstedler,?Kaus?&?Ettinger?and?Otto?M.?Kaus?for?Defendants?and?Respondents. Crosby,?Heafey,?Roach?&?May,?Peter?W.?Davis,?James?C.?Martin,?Kathy?M.?Banke,?White?&?Case,?Paul?J.?Bschorr,?Thomas?McGanney,?Richard?B.?Sypher?and?Terry?L.?Croghan?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendants?and?Respondents. OPINION PANELLI,?J. The?issue?presented?is?whether?the?existence?of?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement?must?be?established?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence?or?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence.?We?conclude?that?the?correct?standard?of?proof?is?preponderance?of?the?evidence. Facts The?underlying?dispute?in?this?case?centers?on?the?sale?of?stock?in?Pioneer?Theatres.?Beryl?Weiner?(Weiner),?an?attorney,?represented?a?group?of?Pioneer?[54?Cal.3d?480]?Theatres?(Pioneer)?shareholders?who?wished?to?sell?their?stock.?Weiner?also?owned?100?shares?of?Pioneer?stock.?In?December?1979,?Weiner?informed?William?O.?Fleischman?(Fleischman),?also?an?attorney,?of?the?group?of?Pioneer?shareholders’?interest?in?selling?their?stock.?Weiner?and?Fleischman?entered?into?an?oral?agreement?whereby?they?would?find?a?third?party?buyer?of?the?stock?and?equally?share?the?finder’s?fee.?The?parties?gave?conflicting?testimony,?however,?concerning?the?extent?of?that?oral?agreement.?Contrary?to?Fleischman,?Weiner?claimed?that?they?had?further?agreed?to?purchase?the?stock?together?if?they?were?unable?to?find?a?third?party?buyer. In?January?1980,?Fleischman?told?Weiner?that?Thorne?Donnelley,?Jr.?(Donnelley)?was?interested?in?being?the?sole?purchaser?of?the?Pioneer?stock.?Weiner’s?clients?accepted?Donnelley’s?written?offer?to?purchase?their?Pioneer?stock.?Fleischman?proceeded?to?form?T.D.J.?Pioneer?Corporation?(T.D.J.?Pioneer),?the?initials?symbolic?of?the?prospective?purchaser. In?late?January?1980,?a?dissenting?Pioneer?shareholder?tried?to?block?the?sale?to?T.D.J.?Pioneer.?The?attempt?was?unsuccessful.?As?a?result,?however,?Donnelley,?who?had?not?anticipated?becoming?involved?in?any?litigation,?withdrew?from?the?purchase.?The?exact?date?of?Donnelley’s?withdrawal?is?not?contained?in?the?record.?Although?Fleischman?did?not?mention?Donnelley’s?withdrawal?at?a?June?2,?1980,?Pioneer?shareholders’?meeting,?he?claims?to?have?sent?a?letter?in?late?May?informing?the?shareholders,?and?Weiner,?of?Donnelley’s?withdrawal. The?Pioneer?stock?sale?closed?on?July?14,?1980.?Again,?there?was?conflicting?testimony?surrounding?what?occurred?moments?before?the?closing?of?the?stock?sale.?Weiner?testified?that?Fleischman?introduced?William?Warnick?(Warnick)?as?an?employee?of?Donnelley?who?would?operate?Pioneer?after?acquisition.?In?contrast,?Fleischman?claims?to?have?introduced?Warnick?as?his?business?partner. Soon?after?the?sale,?T.D.J.?Pioneer?changed?its?name?to?Pioneer?Theatres,?Inc.?(Pioneer?Theatres),?and?the?shares?were?reissued?in?the?names?of?Fleischman?and?Warnick.?Pursuant?to?their?oral?agreement,?Weiner?and?Fleischman?each?received?their?share?of?the?finder’s?fee. In?October?1982,?Weiner?read?a?newspaper?article?that?named?Fleischman?as?one?of?the?owners?of?Pioneer?Theatres.?Weiner?then?filed?this?action?in?July?1983,?alleging?that?Fleischman?fraudulently?concealed?his?participation?in?the?Pioneer?stock?sale?as?a?buyer?and?hence?violated?their?alleged?oral?agreement.?[54?Cal.3d?481] The?trial?court?ordered?bifurcation?of?the?alleged?fraud?from?other?issues.?Upon?conclusion?of?the?trial?testimony,?the?court?instructed?the?jury?to?return?a?special?verdict.?The?first?question?on?the?special?verdict?form?read:?”Did?Plaintiff?Beryl?Weiner?and?Defendant?William?O.?Fleischman?have?a?relationship,?contractual,?fiduciary?or?other,?to?participate?equally?in?the?acquisition?of?shares?of?stock?of?Pioneer?Theaters,?Inc.,?if?the?opportunity?of?such?acquisition?arose,?aside?and?apart?from?any?agreement?only?to?share?or?split?the?attorney’s?or?finder’s?fee?relative?to?the?stock?sale?”?The?jurors?were?instructed?that?if?they?answered?this?first?question?in?the?negative,?they?were?to?discontinue?their?deliberations?and?were?not?to?consider?the?question?of?the?alleged?fraud. At?Fleischman’s?request,?and?over?Weiner’s?objections,?the?jury?was?given?”jury?instruction?No.?2.60″?(Burden?of?Proof?and?Preponderance?of?Evidence)?and?a?modified?version?of?BAJI?No.?12.35?(Fraud?and?Deceit-Concealment).?The?modified?version?of?BAJI?No.?12.35?presented?the?five?elements?necessary?for?a?fraudulent?concealment?cause?of?action.?Instruction?No.?2.60?stated?in?part:?”In?this?case,?the?plaintiff?claims?that?he?had?an?oral?joint?venture?with?the?defendant?to?accomplish?certain?purposes.?As?a?threshold?matter,?you?must?find?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence,?first,?that?the?plaintiff?and?the?defendant?did?enter?into?an?oral?joint?venture?and,?second,?the?essential?terms?of?that?joint?venture.”?(Italics?added.)?Instruction?No.?2.60?also?repeated?the?second?element?of?BAJI?No.?12.35,?that?”[t]he?defendant?must?have?been?under?a?duty?to?disclose?the?[allegedly?concealed]?fact?to?the?plaintiff,”?with?the?following?addition,?”[a]s?noted?previously,?the?existence?of?the?oral?joint?venture?and?its?scope?must?be?proved?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence.”?(Italics?added.)fn.?1?[54?Cal.3d?482] On?a?vote?of?nine?to?three,?the?jury?returned?a?special?verdict?finding,?inter?alia,?no?oral?joint?venture?or?other?relationship?between?Weiner?and?Fleischman.?A?motion?for?new?trial?was?denied.?Weiner?appealed.?The?Court?of?Appeal?reversed?and?remanded?for?a?new?trial,?holding?that?the?trial?court?erred?in?instructing?the?jury?that?the?existence?of?the?oral?joint?venture?agreement?had?to?be?proved?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence.?We?granted?Fleischman’s?petition?for?review?to?determine?the?correct?standard?of?proof?for?establishing?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership.fn.?2 Discussion [1]?A?joint?venture?is?”an?undertaking?by?two?or?more?persons?jointly?to?carry?out?a?single?business?enterprise?for?profit.?[Citations.]”?(Nelson?v.?Abraham?(1947)?29?Cal.2d?745,?749?[177?P.2d?931].)?”Like?partners,?joint?venturers?are?fiduciaries?with?a?duty?of?disclosure?and?liability?to?account?for?profits.”?(9?Witkin,?Summary?of?Cal.?Law?(9th?ed.?1989)?Partnership,???19,?p.?418.) The?distinction?between?joint?ventures?and?partnerships?is?not?sharply?drawn.?A?joint?venture?usually?involves?a?single?business?transaction,?whereas?a?partnership?may?involve?”a?continuing?business?for?an?indefinite?or?fixed?period?of?time.”?(9?Witkin,?Summary?of?Cal.?Law,?Partnership,?supra,???17,?at?p.?416,?italics?deleted.)?Yet?a?joint?venture?may?be?of?longer?duration?and?greater?complexity?than?a?partnership.?From?a?legal?standpoint,?both?relationships?are?virtually?the?same.?Accordingly,?the?courts?freely?apply?partnership?law?to?joint?ventures?when?appropriate.?(Orlopp?v.?Willardson?Co.?(1965)?232?Cal.App.2d?750,?754?[43?Cal.Rptr.?125].)?A?joint?venture?or?partnership?may?be?formed?orally?(Nelson?v.?Abraham,?supra,?29?Cal.2d?at?p.?749;?Sly?v.?Abbott?(1928)?89?Cal.App.?209,?216?[264?P.?507]),?or?”assumed?[54?Cal.3d?483]?to?have?been?organized?from?a?reasonable?deduction?from?the?acts?and?declarations?of?the?parties.”?(Swanson?v.?Siem?(1932)?124?Cal.App.?519,?524?[12?P.2d?1053].) Both?the?trial?court?and?the?Court?of?Appeal?determined?that?before?the?issue?of?fraud?by?concealment?could?be?raised,?Weiner?had?to?establish?the?existence?of?some?type?of?legal?relationship?giving?rise?to?a?duty?to?disclose.?[2]?”Although?material?facts?are?known?to?one?party?and?not?the?other,?failure?to?disclose?them?is?ordinarily?not?actionable?fraud?unless?there?is?some?fiduciary?relationship?giving?rise?to?a?duty?to?disclose.”?(5?Witkin,?Summary?of?Cal.?Law?(9th?ed.?1988)?Torts,???697,?p.?799;?Swanson?v.?Siem,?supra,?124?Cal.App.?at?p.?523?[Before?a?partner?may?be?charged,?a?prima?facie?showing?of?the?copartnership?should?first?be?established.].) The?trial?court,?in?considering?what?would?be?proper?jury?instructions,?did?not?determine?the?existence?or?nature?of?any?relationship?between?Weiner?and?Fleischman.?The?court?determined,?however,?that?Weiner?had?proceeded?to?trial?solely?on?an?oral?agreement?or?oral?joint?venture?theory.?Accordingly,?the?trial?court?left?to?the?jury,?by?way?of?a?response?to?the?request?for?a?special?verdict,?the?determination?of?whether?such?an?oral?joint?venture?agreement?existed.?The?court?instructed?the?jury?to?first?determine?by?”clear?and?convincing”?evidence?whether?in?fact?a?relationship?existed?between?Weiner?and?Fleischman. [3a]?The?general?rule?in?this?state?is?that?”[i]ssues?of?fact?in?civil?cases?are?determined?by?a?preponderance?of?testimony.”?(Liodas?v.?Sahadi?(1977)?19?Cal.3d?278,?288?[137?Cal.Rptr.?635,?562?P.2d?316],?citing?Ford?v.?Chambers?(1861)?19?Cal.?143,?144.)?Evidence?Code?section?115?(section?115)?provides?in?pertinent?part:?”The?burden?of?proof?may?require?a?party?to?raise?a?reasonable?doubt?concerning?the?existence?or?nonexistence?of?a?fact?or?that?he?establish?the?existence?or?nonexistence?of?a?fact?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence,?by?clear?and?convincing?proof,?or?by?proof?beyond?a?reasonable?doubt.?[?]?Except?as?otherwise?provided?by?law,?the?burden?of?proof?requires?proof?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence.”?(Italics?added.)?”Law,”?as?referenced?in?section?115,?includes?”constitutional,?statutory,?and?decisional?law.”?(Evid.?Code,???160.)?[4a]?In?light?of?section?115,?we?must?determine?whether?constitutional,?statutory?or?decisional?law?(i.e.,?case?law)?requires?a?burden?of?proof?higher?than?preponderance?of?the?evidence?to?establish?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership. None?of?the?parties?asserts,?and?we?find?no?evidence,?that?constitutional?law?dictates?a?higher?standard?of?proof?on?the?issue?of?the?existence?of?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement.?Hence,?we?turn?our?attention?first?to?statutory?law.?As?Fleischman?correctly?notes,?sections?of?many?of?our?[54?Cal.3d?484]?codes?require?that?proof?of?an?issue?of?fact?must?be?by?a?higher?degree?of?proof?than?preponderance?of?the?evidence.?For?example,?in?1987?the?Legislature?amended?Civil?Code?section?3294?to?provide?that?punitive?damages?could?be?assessed?only?”where?it?is?proven?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence?that?the?defendant?has?been?guilty?of?oppression,?fraud?or?malice.?…”?(Stats.?1987,?ch.?1498,???5,?p.?5780.)?Similarly,?the?Probate?Code?requires?that?agreements?to?make?a?trust?must?be?established?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence.?(Prob.?Code,???15207.) Significantly,?however,?no?California?statute?requires?that?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement?must?be?established?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence.?Since?statutory?law?does?not?provide?the?answer,?we?must?look?to?case?law?to?determine?whether?a?higher?degree?of?proof?is?required. [3b]?While?it?is?clear?that?case?law?may,?in?some?instances,?suggest?a?higher?burden?of?proof?than?preponderance?of?the?evidence?is?required,?we?have?stated?as?a?general?principle?that?”judicial?expressions?purporting?to?require?clear?and?convincing?[or?clear?and?satisfactory]?evidence?must?be?read?in?light?of?the?statutory?provision?for?proof?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence?….?[Citations.]”?(Liodas?v.?Sahadi,?supra,?19?Cal.3d?at?p.?289,?fn.?6.)?[4b]?In?light?of?this?principle,?the?Court?of?Appeal?concluded?that?our?case?law?does?not?require?clear?and?convincing?evidence?to?prove?the?existence?of?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement.?We?agree. As?the?Court?of?Appeal?correctly?recognized,?we?have?never?held?that?the?existence?of?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement?must?be?established?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence.?Welch?v.?Alcott?(1921)?185?Cal.?731?[198?P.?626],?on?which?Fleischman?relies,?merely?noted?that?the?defendant?had?cited?authorities?to?support?the?proposition?that?proof?of?an?oral?partnership?agreement?had?to?be?”clear,”?a?principle?with?which?Welch?expressed?agreement.?(Id.?at?p.?742,?italics?added.)?In?light?of?section?115,?we?do?not?believe?that?this?language?in?Welch?should?be?interpreted?as?holding?that?a?”clear?and?convincing”?burden?of?proof?is?required. Fleischman?contends?that?Cameron?v.?Crocker-Citizens?Nat.?Bank?(1971)?19?Cal.App.3d?940?[97?Cal.Rptr.?269],?and?Liodas?v.?Sahadi,?supra,?19?Cal.3d?278,?state?that?”clear?proof”?is?merely?a?variant?of?the?”clear?and?convincing”?standard?of?proof.?However,?Cameron,?which?involved?an?oral?contract?to?make?a?will,?did?not?hold?that?”clear?proof”?and?”clear?and?convincing?proof”?were?equivalent?standards.?Rather,?the?court?simply?noted?that?English?precedents?permitted?the?enforcement?of?oral?contracts?to?make?a?will?”upon?clear?proof”?of?their?execution.?(Cameron?v.?Crocker-?Citizens?Nat.?Bank,?supra,?19?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?943.)?Similarly,?Liodas?noted?that?some?Court?of?Appeal?cases?in?civil?fraud?actions?had?required?proof?of?fraud?[54?Cal.3d?485]?by?”?’clear?and?convincing?evidence,’?or?a?variant?of?that?standard.”?(Liodas?v.?Sahadi,?supra,?19?Cal.3d?at?p.?287?&?fn.?4.)?Liodas?itself?held?that?the?proper?standard?of?proof?in?civil?fraud?actions?is?preponderance?of?the?evidence.?(Id.?at?p.?286.)?Neither?Cameron?nor?Liodas,?therefore,?supports?the?proposition?that?”clear?proof”?is?necessarily?equivalent?to?”clear?and?convincing?evidence.” Concededly,?certain?appellate?decisions?have?stated?that?proof?of?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement?must?be?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence.?(See?Sullivan?v.?Schellinger?(1959)?170?Cal.App.2d?111,?113?[338?P.2d?462]?[“where,?as?here,?there?is?no?written?agreement,?proof?of?the?partnership?must?be?clear?and?convincing”];?accord,?Smalley?v.?Baker?(1968)?262?Cal.App.2d?824,?839?[69?Cal.Rptr.?521];?Lyon?v.?MacQuarrie?(1941)?46?Cal.App.2d?119,?124?[115?P.2d?594].)?The?Smalley?court?cited?Sullivan,?supra,?as?authority?regarding?the?requisite?burden?of?proof,?and?the?Sullivan?court?cited?to?Lyon,?supra.?Lyon,?in?turn,?cited?to?Welch?v.?Alcott,?supra,?185?Cal.?731,?Swanson?v.?Siem,?supra,?124?Cal.App.?519,?and?Blinn?v.?Ritchie?(1929)?101?Cal.App.?691?[282?P.?390]. When?this?trail?of?citations?is?traced?and?the?cases?analyzed,?the?proposition?that?clear?and?convincing?evidence?is?required?loses?much?of?its?persuasiveness.?Largely?for?this?reason,?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?this?case?was?not?inclined?to?follow?the?cases?calling?for?clear?and?convincing?evidence?as?the?standard?of?proof.?For?example,?Swanson?v.?Siem,?supra,?stated?only?that?the?existence?of?oral?partnerships?need?be?proved?by?”competent?evidence.”?(Swanson?v.?Siem,?supra,?124?Cal.App.?at?p.?523.)?In?Blinn?v.?Ritchie,?supra,?the?court?stated?that?there?was?no?finding?that?a?copartnership?existed?between?the?parties,?nor?was?there?”competent?evidence?in?the?record?to?sustain?such?a?finding.?…”?(Blinn?v.?Ritchie,?supra,?101?Cal.App.?at?p.?692.)?The?Blinn?court?reasoned?that?”a?contract?of?copartnership?must?be?proved?in?the?same?manner?that?any?other?contract?must?be?established.”?(Id.?at?p.?693.)?Significantly,?Fleischman?does?not?contend?that?an?oral?contract?must?be?established?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence.?Welch,?as?seen?above,?merely?stated?that?there?must?be?”clear?proof.”?(Welch?v.?Alcott,?supra,?185?Cal.?at?p.?742.) We?recognize?that?other?Court?of?Appeal?cases?have?also?indicated?that?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?should?be?established?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence.?But?these?cases?either?cite?to?the?cases?discussed?above?(i.e.,?Sullivan,?Smalley?and?Lyon)?(see?ABC?Egg?Ranch?v.?Abdelnour?(1963)?223?Cal.App.2d?12,?15-16?[35?Cal.Rptr.?487]?[citing?Lyon?v.?MacQuarrie,?supra,?46?Cal.App.2d?119]),?or?are?based,?like?Sullivan,?Smalley?and?Lyon,?on?cases?that?do?not?stand?for?the?proposition?for?which?they?are?cited.?(See?Coronet?Constr.?Co.,?Inc.?v.?Palmer?(1961)?194?Cal.App.2d?603,?611?[15?Cal.Rptr.?[54?Cal.3d?486]?601]?[citing?to?Milstein?v.?Sartain?(1943)?56?Cal.App.2d?924,?932?[133?P.2d?836],?which?states?that?the?burden?is?upon?the?one?asserting?the?existence?of?a?copartnership?to?prove?it?by?”competent?evidence”].) Fleischman?also?relies?on?Tannehill?v.?Finch?(1986)?188?Cal.App.3d?224?[232?Cal.Rptr.?749]?and?Toney?v.?Nolder?(1985)?173?Cal.App.3d?791?[219?Cal.Rptr.?497]?to?support?a?higher?burden?of?proof.?These?cases,?however,?are?inapposite?because?they?involved?attempts?to?rebut?the?legal?and?beneficial?title?to?real?property?and?were?expressly?decided?under?the?authority?of?Evidence?Code?section?662.?Evidence?Code?section?662?provides:?”The?owner?of?the?legal?title?to?property?is?presumed?to?be?the?owner?of?the?full?beneficial?title.?This?presumption?may?be?rebutted?only?by?clear?and?convincing?proof.”?Although?Weiner’s?original?complaint?stated?other?causes?of?action,?the?case?proceeded?to?trial?solely?as?an?action?for?damages?for?fraudulent?concealment.?Consequently,?the?trial?did?not?involve?an?effort?to?rebut?the?legal?or?beneficial?title?to?property. In?summary,?we?believe?that?the?decisional?law?does?not?justify?or?require?a?departure?from?the?ordinary?civil?standard?of?”preponderance?of?the?evidence”?when?a?party?seeks?to?establish?the?existence?and?scope?of?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement. We?note?that?our?determination?that?preponderance?of?the?evidence?is?the?correct?standard?for?establishing?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement?appears?to?be?consistent?with?the?decisions?of?a?majority?of?other?states?that?have?considered?this?question.fn.?3?Several?other?large?jurisdictions?have?[54?Cal.3d?487]?come?to?the?same?ultimate?conclusion,?including?New?York?(Kahn?v.?Kahn,?supra,?3?A.D.2d?820?[160?N.Y.S.2d?972,?973]?[“The?burden?of?establishing?the?existence?of?this?oral?partnership?by?a?fair?preponderance?of?the?credible?evidence?rests?upon?the?[party?asserting?its?existence].”]);?Pennsylvania?(Huron?v.?Schomaker,?supra,?123?Pa.Super.?82?[185?A.?859]?[“The?burden?of?proving,?by?a?fair?preponderance?of?the?evidence,?a?partnership?and?the?liability?of?the?defendant?rested?upon?the?[party?asserting?this?oral?agreement].”]);?and?Florida?(Trickey?v.?Stone,?supra,?152?So.2d?748,?750?[“We,?therefore,?hold?that?the?chancellor?should,?in?determining?the?quantum?of?proof?necessary?for?the?plaintiff?to?sustain?his?complaint?[based?on?an?oral?partnership?agreement]?adhere?to?the?preponderance?of?the?evidence?rule.”]). Fleischman?contends?that?the?gravity?of?the?consequences?flowing?from?a?finding?that?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement?exists?compels?a?conclusion?that?such?an?agreement?must?be?established?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence.?We?disagree.?[5]?In?Addington?v.?Texas?(1979)441?U.S.?418,?423?[60?L.Ed.2d?323,?329,?99?S.Ct.?1804],?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?stated:?”The?function?of?a?standard?of?proof?…?is?to?’instruct?the?factfinder?concerning?the?degree?of?confidence?our?society?thinks?[the?fact-finder]?should?have?in?the?correctness?of?factual?conclusions?for?a?particular?type?of?adjudication.’?[Citation.]?The?standard?serves?to?allocate?the?risk?of?error?between?the?litigants?and?to?indicate?the?relative?importance?attached?to?the?ultimate?decision.”?We?have?noted?that?the?standard?of?proof?may?depend?upon?the?”gravity?of?the?consequences?that?would?result?from?an?erroneous?determination?of?the?issue?involved.”?(People?v.?Jimenez?(1978)?21?Cal.3d?595,?604?[147?Cal.Rptr.?172,?580?P.2d?672].) [6]?Proof?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence?is?required?”where?particularly?important?individual?interests?or?rights?are?at?stake,”?such?as?the?termination?of?parental?rights,?involuntary?commitment,?and?deportation.?(Herman?&?MacLean?v.?Huddleston?(1983)?459?U.S.?375,?389?[74?L.Ed.2d?548,?560,?103?S.Ct.?683].)?However,?”imposition?of?even?severe?civil?sanctions?that?do?not?implicate?such?interests?has?been?permitted?after?proof?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence.”?(Id.?at?pp.?389-?390?[74?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?560],?citing?cases?involving?proof?in?civil?suits?of?acts?that?expose?a?party?to?[54?Cal.3d?488]?criminal?prosecution?or?disbarment.)?As?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?stated:?”A?preponderance-?of-the-evidence?standard?allows?both?parties?to?’share?the?risk?of?error?in?roughly?equal?fashion.’?[Citation.]?Any?other?standard?expresses?a?preference?for?one?side’s?interests.”?(Id.?at?p.?390?[74?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?561].) [4c]?Fleischman?lists?a?series?of?grave?consequences?that?a?defendant?might?suffer?from?an?erroneous?determination?that?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement?exists.?However,?for?each?of?the?serious?consequences?Fleischman?lists,?an?equally?serious?loss?of?rights?would?result?to?a?plaintiff?from?an?erroneous?determination?that?the?partnership?did?not?exist.?This?balance?of?interests?supports?the?use?of?the?preponderance?of?the?evidence?standard. Furthermore,?all?of?the?grave?consequences?listed?by?Fleischman?can?result?as?well?from?a?finding?of?an?oral?contract?or?an?oral?authorization?of?agency,?both?of?which?can?be?proved?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence.?For?instance,?an?agency?can?be?established?based?on?oral?communications?(Magnecomp?Corp.?v.?Athene?Co.?(1989)?209?Cal.App.3d?526,?536?[257?Cal.Rptr.?278]),?and?the?agent?can?subject?the?principal?to?individual?liability?and?indemnity?claims?based?upon?the?agent’s?conduct?or?omissions?(Warshauer?v.?Bauer?Construction?Co.?(1960)?179?Cal.App.2d?44,?48?[3?Cal.Rptr.?570];?Civ.?Code,???2338).?Indeed,?even?where?a?contract?has?been?solemnized?by?a?writing,?an?oral?modification?of?that?written?contract?may?be?proved?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence.?(Barrett?v.?Bank?of?America?(1986)?183?Cal.App.3d?1362,?1370-1371?[229?Cal.Rptr.?16].) We?recognize?that?the?consequences?of?finding?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement?may?be?serious.?However,?the?serious?consequences?flowing?from?a?finding?that?a?contract?of?any?kind?exists,?be?it?oral?or?written,?are?not?a?sound?basis?for?requiring?a?higher?or?lower?burden?of?persuasion.?While?an?oral?contract?may?be?easier?to?create?than?a?written?contract,?and?the?precise?terms?of?an?oral?contract?may?suffer?from?the?faulty?memories?of?the?parties,?all?oral?contracts?suffer?from?these?disabilities.?We?find?no?compelling?reason?to?assign?a?higher?burden?of?proof?to?partnerships?or?joint?venture?agreements?than?any?other?oral?contract.?(Accord?Bernard?v.?Vatheuer,?supra,?303?Ore.?410?[737?P.2d?128,?130].) Fleischman?seeks?to?draw?an?analogy?between?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreements?and?other?areas?of?the?law?where?courts?have?traditionally?required?clear?and?convincing?evidence.?As?examples,?Fleischman?cites?oral?agreements?to?make?wills,?allegations?that?deeds?absolute?are?actually?mortgages,?that?conveyances?are?subject?to?a?trust,?or?that?property?whose?title?was?held?by?one?person?was?owned?in?full?or?in?part?by?another,?[54?Cal.3d?489]?and?oral?agreements?to?create?a?trust?of?personalty.?We?believe?that?each?of?these?areas?of?the?law?is?distinguishable?from?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreements. Oral?agreements?to?make?wills?are?disfavored?because?such?claims?arise?after?the?testator,?one?of?the?parties?to?the?oral?agreement,?is?deceased?or?incapacitated.?(Crail?v.?Blakely?(1973)?8?Cal.3d?744,?750?[106?Cal.Rptr.?187,?505?P.2d?1027].)?Such?concerns?generally?do?not?apply?to?oral?partnership?agreements,?since?the?person?to?be?bound?by?the?alleged?agreement?will?generally?be?present?to?rebut?the?plaintiff’s?testimony. Allegations?that?deeds?absolute?are?actually?mortgages,?that?conveyances?are?subject?to?a?trust,?and?that?legal?title?does?not?represent?beneficial?ownership?have?also?been?historically?disfavored?because?society?and?the?courts?have?a?reluctance?to?tamper?with?duly?executed?instruments?and?documents?of?legal?title.?(See?Herman?&?MacLean?v.?Huddleston,?supra,?459?U.S.?at?p.?388,?fn.?27?[74?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?559];?Liodas?v.?Sahadi,?supra,?19?Cal.3d?at?p.?287;?Evid.?Code,???662.)?We?are?aware?of?no?comparable?body?of?evidence?showing?historical?legal?disfavor?directed?to?damage?suits?based?on?oral?partnership?agreements,?suits?that?do?not?necessarily?rebut?legal?or?beneficial?title?to?property. Finally,?the?higher?burden?of?proof?required?to?prove?oral?trusts?of?personal?property?is?derived?from?the?special?care?that?courts?have?historically?shown?in?recognizing?the?creation?of?trusts.?The?law?has?shown?such?care?because?of?special?concerns?that?the?terms?of?the?trust?specify?the?information?needed?for?courts?to?deal?with?the?trust,?such?as?the?identification?of?the?trust?property?and?purpose,?the?beneficiaries?and?trustees,?and?any?special?administrative?provisions.?(Recommendation?Proposing?Trust?Law?(Dec.?1985)?18?Cal.?Law?Revision?Com.?Rep.?(1986)?p.?525.)?In?addition,?the?creation?of?trusts,?unlike?the?creation?of?oral?partnerships,?has?long?been?governed?by?highly?specific?case?law?and?statutes,?reflecting?trusts’?closely?regulated?character.?(See,?e.g.,?Prob.?Code,????15200-15210.)?Thus,?oral?partnership?agreements?are?distinguishable?from?other?areas?of?the?law?in?which?courts,?because?of?historical?and?pervasive?legal?protection?or?skepticism,?have?traditionally?required?the?”clear?and?convincing?evidence”?burden?of?proof.fn.?4?[54?Cal.3d?490] In?conclusion,?we?find?that?nothing?in?our?constitutional,?statutory?or?case?law?requires?a?departure?from?the?ordinary?civil?standard?of?preponderance?of?the?evidence?when?a?party?seeks?to?establish?the?existence?and?scope?of?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement.?We?similarly?find?no?reason?why?proof?of?a?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement?should?be?subject?to?any?higher?standard?of?proof?than?any?other?ordinary?oral?contract?in?a?civil?dispute.?Accordingly,?the?trial?court?erred?by?instructing?the?jury?that?Weiner?had?to?establish?the?existence?and?scope?of?any?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership?agreement?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence. [7]?Article?VI,?section?13?of?the?California?Constitution?provides?that?error?in?instructing?the?jury?shall?be?grounds?for?reversal?only?when?the?reviewing?court,?”after?an?examination?of?the?entire?cause,?including?the?evidence,”?concludes?that?the?error?”has?resulted?in?a?miscarriage?of?justice.”?The?test?of?reversible?error?has?been?stated?in?terms?of?the?likelihood?that?the?improper?instruction?misled?the?jury.?(See?Henderson?v.?Harnischfeger?Corp.?(1974)?12?Cal.3d?663,?670?[117?Cal.Rptr.?1,?527?P.2d?353].)?Hence,?we?must?determine?whether?it?is?reasonably?probable?that?a?result?more?favorable?to?the?appealing?party?would?have?been?reached?in?the?absence?of?error.?(People?v.?Watson?(1956)?46?Cal.2d?818,?836?[299?P.2d?243].)?While?there?is?no?precise?formula?for?determining?the?prejudicial?effect?of?instructional?error,?we?are?guided?by?the?five?factors?enumerated?in?LeMons?v.?Regents?of?University?of?California?(1978)?21?Cal.3d?869,?876?[148?Cal.Rptr.?355,?582?P.2d?946]. [8]?The?first?factor?we?consider?is?the?degree?of?conflict?in?the?evidence?on?the?critical?issue,?here?the?existence?of?an?oral?joint?venture?or?partnership.?As?the?trial?court?itself?acknowledged,?the?evidence?was?sharply?conflicting?on?this?issue.?In?fact,?it?was?precisely?this?sharp?conflict?that?led?the?trial?court?to?instruct?the?jury?that?they?must?first?determine?whether?such?an?agreement?existed?before?they?could?consider?the?issue?of?fraudulent?concealment.?The?clear?and?convincing?standard?of?proof?is?an?exacting?standard.?When?there?is?sharply?conflicting?evidence,?as?in?this?case,?it?is?very?difficult?for?a?party?to?meet?this?high?standard.?If?the?jury?had?been?instructed?that?they?need?only?find?the?existence?of?this?agreement?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence,?they?may?well?have?reached?a?different?result. Second,?we?consider?whether?the?jury?asked?for?a?rereading?of?the?erroneous?instruction?or?of?related?evidence.?During?the?deliberations,?the?[54?Cal.3d?491]?jury?requested?three?readbacks?regarding?Fleischman’s?testimony?of?Weiner’s?possible?participation?in?Donnelley’s?Pioneer?offer,?Weiner?and?Fleischman’s?testimony?of?the?alleged?Pioneer?oral?agreement,?and?Weiner?and?Fleischman’s?testimony?on?a?prior?oral?agreement?between?the?parties?on?a?separate?business?venture.?The?court?denied?the?requests?because?the?portions?of?testimony?might?have?fostered?a?different?meaning?when?taken?out?of?context.?A?fourth?readback?request?concerning?Fleischman’s?testimony?as?to?his?desire?or?intention?to?buy?Pioneer?stock?was?granted. Third,?we?analyze?the?closeness?of?the?jury’s?verdict.?The?jury?returned?a?nine-to-three?special?verdict?against?Weiner?finding,?inter?alia,?no?oral?joint?venture?or?other?relationship?between?Weiner?and?Fleischman.?This?verdict?indicates?that?instructions?including?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence?standard,?rather?than?a?clear?and?convincing?evidence?standard,?could?have?been?critical. Fourth,?we?consider?the?emphasis?on?the?erroneous?instruction?in?argument?to?the?jury.?The?record?indicates?that?Fleischman?did?emphasize?the?erroneous?instruction?in?his?argument?to?the?jury. Finally,?we?consider?the?effect?of?other?instructions?in?remedying?the?error.?Clearly,?no?other?instructions?of?the?trial?court?cured?this?error.?Both?instructions?on?this?issue?explicitly?stated?that?the?jury?was?to?use?the?clear?and?convincing?evidence?standard. […]

Wilson?v.?Eu?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?471?,?286?Cal.Rptr.?280;?816?P.2d?1306 [No.?S022835.?Sep?25,?1991.] PETE?WILSON,?Individually?and?as?Governor,?etc.,?Petitioner,?v.?MARCH?FONG?EU,?as?Secretary?of?State,?etc.,?et?al.,?Respondents;?ASSEMBLY?OF?THE?STATE?OF?CALIFORNIA?et?al.,?Real?Parties?in?Interest. (Opinion?by?The?Court.) COUNSEL Gibson,?Dunn?&?Crutcher,?Robert?E.?Cooper,?Theodore?B.?Olson?and?Daniel?M.?Kolkey?for?Petitioner. No?appearance?for?Respondents. Browne?&?Woods,?Allan?Browne,?Benjamin?D.?Scheibe,?Robert?B.?Broadbelt,?Michael?J.?Olecki,?Bion?Gregory,?Remcho,?Johansen?&?Purcell,?Joseph?Remcho,?Robin?B.?Johansen?and?Charles?C.?Marson?for?Real?Parties?in?Interest. OPINION THE?COURT. In?these?mandate?proceedings,?we?are?called?on?to?resolve?the?impasse?created?by?the?failure?of?the?Legislature?to?pass?legislative?and?congressional?reapportionment?bills?acceptable?to?the?Governor?in?time?for?the?forthcoming?1992?Primary?and?General?Elections.?(See?Cal.?Const.,?art.?XXI,???1.) On?September?23,?1991,?Governor?Wilson?exercised?his?authority?to?veto?the?legislative?plans?submitted?to?him.?On?that?same?day,?an?attempted?override?of?the?veto?failed,?and?the?Legislature?adjourned?for?the?remainder?of?the?year.?Because?we?lack?assurance?that?reapportionment?plans?will?be?validly?enacted?in?time?for?the?1992?elections,?it?is?now?incumbent?on?this?[54?Cal.3d?473]?court?to?exercise?its?original?jurisdiction?and?arrange?for?the?drafting?and?adoption?of?appropriate?reapportionment?plans. [1]?As?we?have?repeatedly?emphasized?in?past?cases,?”reapportionment?is?primarily?a?matter?for?the?legislative?branch?of?the?government?to?resolve.?[Citations.]”?(Legislature?v.?Reinecke?(1972)?6?Cal.3d?595,?598?[99?Cal.Rptr.?481,?492?P.2d?385]?[hereafter?Reinecke?I].)?Accordingly,?we?urge?the?Legislature?and?the?Governor,?in?the?exercise?of?their?”shared?legislative?power”?(ibid.)?to?enact?reapportionment?plans?in?time?for?the?1992?elections,?and?thus?to?render?unnecessary?the?use?of?any?plans?this?court?may?adopt.?(See?ibid.;?see?also?Legislature?v.?Reinecke?(1972)?7?Cal.3d?92,?93?[101?Cal.Rptr.?552,?496?P.2d?464]?[Reinecke?II].)?[2]?But?because?the?impasse?may?continue?indefinitely,?because?”?’it?is?our?duty?to?insure?the?electorate?equal?protection?of?the?laws’?[citation]”?(Reinecke?I,?supra,?6?Cal.3d?595,?598),?and?because?California?is?entitled?to?seven?additional?congressional?seats?based?on?the?1990?census,?we?must?proceed?forthwith?to?draft?such?plans.?(See?also?Legislature?v.?Reinecke?(1973)?10?Cal.3d?396,?399,?fn.?1?[110?Cal.Rptr.?718,?516?P.2d?6]?[Reinecke?IV]?[necessity?to?act?to?fulfill?equal?protection?guarantees?and?assure?the?right?to?equal?participation?in?the?congressional?elections].) In?light?of?the?acknowledged?necessity?of?affording?all?interested?parties?an?opportunity?to?be?heard?in?such?matters,?it?is?appropriate?that?we?appoint?three?Special?Masters?to?hold?public?hearings?to?permit?the?presentation?of?evidence?and?argument?with?respect?to?proposed?plans?of?reapportionment.?(See?Legislature?v.?Reinecke?(1973)?9?Cal.3d?166,?167?[107?Cal.Rptr.?18,?507?P.2d?626]?[Reinecke?III].)?We?will?expeditiously?select?and?appoint?these?Masters,?and?they?will?be?guided?by?the?procedures?and?criteria?developed?by?an?earlier?panel?of?Masters?for?the?reapportionment?plans?adopted?by?this?court?in?1973?(see?Reinecke?IV,?supra,?10?Cal.3d?at?pp.?402,?410-414),?as?well?as?by?the?provisions?of?article?XXI,?section?1,?of?the?state?Constitution.?In?addition,?the?Masters?will?consider?the?application?of?federal?law,?including?the?Voting?Rights?Act?(42?U.S.C.???1971?et?seq.). Following?the?hearings,?the?Masters?will?file?their?report?and?recommendations?for?possible?adoption?of?reapportionment?plans?which?will?provide?for?52?single-member?congressional?districts,?40?single-member?Senate?districts,?80?single-member?Assembly?districts,?and?4?State?Board?of?Equalization?districts.?The?Masters?shall?set?forth?the?criteria?underlying?the?plans?they?recommend?for?adoption?and?the?reasons?for?their?recommendations. Subject?to?this?court’s?approval,?the?Masters?will?be?authorized?to?employ?counsel,?independent?experts?in?the?field?of?reapportionment?and?computer?technology,?and?other?necessary?personnel?to?assist?them?in?their?work.?They?[54?Cal.3d?474]?will?be?further?authorized?to?seek?the?full?cooperation?of?the?Legislature?and?Governor?in?producing?and?using?whatever?data,?computer?models?and?programs,?and?technical?assistance?that?may?be?made?available?to?them?by?the?Legislature?or?Governor?and?other?state?personnel?who?are?knowledgeable?in?the?mechanics?of?drafting?reapportionment?legislation.?(See?Reinecke?III,?supra,?9?Cal.3d?at?p.?168.) The?Administrative?Office?of?the?Courts?(AOC)?shall?assist?the?Masters?in?securing?the?necessary?personnel?and?the?physical?facilities?required?for?their?work.?The?AOC?shall?also?prepare?for?prompt?submission?to?the?Governor?and?Legislature?a?request?for?a?special?appropriation?to?augment?the?appropriations?made?for?the?support?of?the?judicial?branch?by?the?Budget?Acts?of?1991?and?1992?in?order?to?reimburse?those?appropriations?for?the?expenditures?that?must?be?made?for?the?necessary?expenses?of?the?Masters?and?their?staff.?(See?Reinecke?III,?supra,?9?Cal.3d?at?p.?168.) Public?hearings?shall?commence?no?later?than?30?days?from?the?date?of?the?Masters’?appointment,?and?the?Masters?shall?present?their?recommendations?to?the?court?no?later?than?November?29,?1991.?We?recognize?that?the?Masters?are?thus?given?considerably?less?time?to?formulate?their?report?and?recommendations?than?the?five-month?period?provided?in?Reinecke?III.?The?shorter?period?is?necessitated?by?the?close?proximity?of?the?June?2,?1992,?Primary?Election,?and?the?need?to?transmit?to?the?county?clerks?information?regarding?the?new?districts?no?later?than?104?days?prior?to?that?election?(Elec.?Code,???6462).?We?are?of?the?view?that?the?November?29?deadline?is?realistic?in?light?of?considerable?advances?in?computer?technology?since?1972. Permission?for?additional?parties?to?intervene?in?these?proceedings?will?not?be?granted,?but?any?present?parties?may?file?briefs?with?the?court?within?30?days?of?the?filing?of?the?Masters’?recommendations.?Other?interested?parties?may?file?briefs?as?amici?curiae?within?the?same?period.?The?matter?will?be?set?for?oral?argument?shortly?after?the?period?for?filing?briefs?has?expired. We?reiterate:?If?at?any?time?during?these?proceedings?congressional?and?legislative?reapportionment?plans?are?validly?enacted,?this?court?will?entertain?an?application?to?dismiss?these?proceedings. Let?an?alternative?writ?of?mandate?issue,?to?be?heard?before?this?court?at?its?courtroom?when?the?proceeding?is?ordered?on?calendar.?[54?Cal.3d?475] The?alternative?writ?is?to?be?issued,?served?and?filed?on?or?before?October?2,?1991. The?written?return?is?to?be?served?and?filed?on?or?before?October?16,?1991.    

Mary?M.?v.?City?of?Los?Angeles?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?202?,?285?Cal.Rptr.?99;?814?P.2d?1341 [No.?S005910. Sep?5,?1991.] MARY?M.,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?CITY?OF?LOS?ANGELES,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Los?Angeles?County,?No.?C427209,?Carlos?E.?Velarde,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Kennard,?J.,?with?Mosk,?Broussard?and?Panelli,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?opinion?by?Arabian,?J.?Separate?opinion?by?Baxter,?J.,?concurring?in?the?judgment,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?concurring.) COUNSEL James?K.?Hahn,?City?Attorney,?John?T.?Neville?and?Richard?M.?Helgeson,?Assistant?City?Attorneys,?Katherine?J.?Hamilton?and?Greg?Wolff,?Deputy?City?Attorneys,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. Slatter?&?Slatter,?Slatter?&?Kiesel,?Vann?H.?Slater?and?Roni?Keller?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION KENNARD,?J. Police?officers?occupy?a?unique?position?of?trust?in?our?society.?They?are?responsible?for?enforcing?the?law?and?protecting?society?from?criminal?acts.?They?are?given?the?authority?to?detain?and?to?arrest?and,?when?necessary,?to?use?deadly?force.?As?visible?symbols?of?that?formidable?power,?an?officer?is?furnished?a?distinctively?marked?car,?a?uniform,?a?badge,?and?a?gun.?Those?who?challenge?an?officer’s?actions?do?so?at?their?peril;?anyone?who?resists?an?officer’s?proper?exercise?of?authority?or?who?obstructs?the?performance?of?an?officer’s?duties?is?subject?to?criminal?prosecution.?(Pen.?Code,????69,?148.)?[54?Cal.3d?207] When?law?enforcement?officers?abuse?their?authority?by?committing?crimes?against?members?of?the?community,?they?violate?the?public?trust.?This?may?seriously?damage?the?relationship?between?the?community?and?its?sworn?protectors,?by?eroding?the?community’s?confidence?in?the?integrity?of?its?police?force. The?issue?in?this?case?is:?When?a?police?officer?on?duty,?by?misusing?his?official?authority,?rapes?a?woman?whom?he?has?detained,?can?the?public?entity?that?employs?him?be?held?vicariously?liable?for?his?misconduct??We?conclude?that?the?employer?can?be?held?liable?under?the?doctrine?of?respondeat?superior. Facts About?2:30?a.m.?on?October?3,?1981,?plaintiff?Mary?M.?was?driving?home?alone?when?Sergeant?Leigh?Schroyer?of?the?Los?Angeles?Police?Department?stopped?her?for?erratic?driving.?Sergeant?Schroyer?was?on?duty?as?a?field?supervisor;?he?was?assigned?to?supervise?and?train?police?officers?patrolling?the?streets.?He?was?in?uniform,?wore?a?badge?and?a?gun,?and?was?driving?a?marked?black-and-white?police?car.?When?he?detained?plaintiff,?he?sent?in?a?radio?message?that?he?was?out?of?his?vehicle?conducting?an?investigation. Sergeant?Schroyer?asked?plaintiff?for?her?driver’s?license;?plaintiff?gave?it?to?him.?He?then?asked?her?to?perform?a?field?sobriety?test?to?determine?whether?she?was?under?the?influence?of?alcohol.?Plaintiff,?who?had?been?drinking,?did?not?do?well?on?the?test.?She?began?to?cry,?and?pleaded?with?Schroyer?not?to?take?her?to?jail.?Schroyer?ordered?her?to?get?in?the?front?seat?of?the?police?car,?but?he?did?not?handcuff?her.?He?then?drove?to?plaintiff’s?home. After?entering?the?house?with?plaintiff,?Sergeant?Schroyer?told?her?that?he?expected?”payment”?for?taking?her?home?instead?of?to?jail.?Plaintiff?tried?to?run?away,?but?Schroyer?grabbed?her?hair?and?threw?her?on?the?couch.?When?plaintiff?screamed,?Schroyer?put?his?hand?over?her?mouth?and?threatened?to?take?her?to?jail.?Plaintiff?stopped?struggling,?and?Schroyer?raped?her.?He?then?left?the?house. From?his?police?car,?Sergeant?Schroyer?sent?a?radio?message?that?he?was?returning?from?a?”lunch”?break.?The?radio?operator?questioned?this,?because?Schroyer?had?previously?reported?that?he?was?conducting?an?investigation.?Schroyer?did?not?respond?to?the?question,?and?returned?to?the?police?station. As?a?result?of?this?incident,?criminal?charges?were?filed?against?Sergeant?Schroyer,?and?a?jury?convicted?him?of?rape?(Pen.?Code,???261,?subd.?(2)).?The?trial?court?sentenced?him?to?state?prison.?[54?Cal.3d?208] Plaintiff?then?brought?a?civil?lawsuit?against?both?Sergeant?Schroyer?and?his?employer,?the?City?of?Los?Angeles?(hereafter?the?City),?for?damages?arising?out?of?the?rape.?Plaintiff’s?complaint?originally?asserted?that?the?City?was?liable?for?negligence?in?employing?Schroyer?and?that,?as?Schroyer’s?employer,?the?City?was?also?vicariously?liable?under?the?doctrine?of?respondeat?superior.?At?trial,?however,?plaintiff?relied?solely?on?the?theory?of?respondeat?superior.?The?jury?returned?a?verdict?for?plaintiff,?finding?that?”at?the?time?of?the?events?out?of?which?this?case?arose”?Sergeant?Schroyer?was?”acting?within?the?scope?of?his?employment?with?the?Los?Angeles?Police?Department.”?The?jury?assessed?general?damages?of?$150,000?against?the?City.fn.?1 A?divided?Court?of?Appeal?reversed?the?judgment?against?the?City.?The?majority?held,?as?a?matter?of?law,?that?Sergeant?Schroyer?was?not?acting?within?the?scope?of?his?employment?when?he?raped?plaintiff.?We?granted?plaintiff’s?petition?for?review. Discussion General?Principles?Underlying?Employer’s?Vicarious?Liability [1]?Under?the?doctrine?of?respondeat?superior,?an?employer?may?be?held?vicariously?liable?for?torts?committed?by?an?employee?within?the?scope?of?employment.?(Perez?v.?Van?Groningen?&?Sons,?Inc.?(1986)?41?Cal.3d?962,?967?[227?Cal.Rptr.?106,?719?P.2d?676].)?The?origins?of?respondeat?superior?have?been?traced?to?ancient?Roman?law.?(5?Harper?et?al.,?The?Law?of?Torts?(2d?ed.?1986)???26.2,?pp.?8-10;?Holmes,?Agency?(1891)?4?Harv.L.Rev.?345;?but?see?Wigmore,?Responsibility?for?Tortious?Acts:?Its?History?(1894)?7?Harv.L.Rev.?315,?383?[stating?the?doctrine?has?Germanic,?not?Latin,?origins].)?The?doctrine?is?a?departure?from?the?general?tort?principle?that?liability?is?based?on?fault.?(Rodgers?v.?Kemper?Constr.?Co.?(1975)?50?Cal.App.3d?608,?618?[124?Cal.Rptr.?143].)?It?is?”?’a?rule?of?policy,?a?deliberate?allocation?of?a?risk.’?”?(Hinman?v.?Westinghouse?Elec.?Co.?(1970)?2?Cal.3d?956,?959?[88?Cal.Rptr.?188,?471?P.2d?988];?Perez?v.?Van?Groningen?&?Sons,?Inc.,?supra,?41?Cal.3d?at?p.?967.)?Respondeat?superior?is?based?on?”?’a?deeply?rooted?sentiment’?”?that?it?would?be?unjust?for?an?enterprise?to?disclaim?responsibility?for?injuries?occurring?in?the?course?of?its?characteristic?activities.?(Rodgers,?supra,?50?Cal.App.3d?608?at?p.?618,?quoting?Ira?S.?Bushey?&?Sons,?Inc.?v.?United?States?(2d?Cir.?1968)?398?F.2d?167,?171?[per?[54?Cal.3d?209]?Friendly,?J.];?see?also?Pacific?Mut.?Life?Ins.?Co.?v.?Haslip?(1991)?499?U.S.?___,?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?1,?17,?111?S.Ct.?1032,?1041]?[rejecting?due?process?challenge?to?respondeat?superior?liability].) Recently,?we?articulated?three?reasons?for?applying?the?doctrine?of?respondeat?superior:?(1)?to?prevent?recurrence?of?the?tortious?conduct;?(2)?to?give?greater?assurance?of?compensation?for?the?victim;?and?(3)?to?ensure?that?the?victim’s?losses?will?be?equitably?borne?by?those?who?benefit?from?the?enterprise?that?gave?rise?to?the?injury.?(Perez?v.?Van?Groningen?&?Sons,?Inc.,?supra,?41?Cal.3d?at?p.?967;?5?Harper?et?al.,?op.?cit.?supra,???26.5,?at?p.?21.) [2]?For?the?doctrine?of?respondeat?superior?to?apply,?the?plaintiff?must?prove?that?the?employee’s?tortious?conduct?was?committed?within?the?scope?of?employment.?(Ducey?v.?Argo?Sales?Co.?(1979)25?Cal.3d?707,?721?[159?Cal.Rptr.?835,?602?P.2d?755].)?”A?risk?arises?out?of?the?employment?when?’in?the?context?of?the?particular?enterprise?an?employee’s?conduct?is?not?so?unusual?or?startling?that?it?would?seem?unfair?to?include?the?loss?resulting?from?it?among?other?costs?of?the?employer’s?business.?[Citations.]?In?other?words,?where?the?question?is?one?of?vicarious?liability,?the?inquiry?should?be?whether?the?risk?was?one?”that?may?fairly?be?regarded?as?typical?of?or?broadly?incidental”?to?the?enterprise?undertaken?by?the?employer.?[Citation.]’?”?(Perez?v.?Van?Groningen?&?Sons,?Inc.,?supra,?41?Cal.3d?at?p.?968,?citing?Rodgers?v.?Kemper?Constr.?Co.,?supra,?50?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?619,?brackets?in?original.) Tortious?conduct?that?violates?an?employee’s?official?duties?or?disregards?the?employer’s?express?orders?may?nonetheless?be?within?the?scope?of?employment.?(Perez?v.?Van?Groningen?&?Sons,?Inc.,?supra,?41?Cal.3d?at?p.?969;?Meyer?v.?Blackman?(1963)?59?Cal.2d?668,?679?[31?Cal.Rptr.?36,?381?P.2d?916];?Van?Alstyne,?Cal.?Government?Tort?Liability?Practice?(Cont.Ed.Bar?1980)???2.22,?p.?62.)?So?may?acts?that?do?not?benefit?the?employer?(Perez,?supra,?41?Cal.3d?at?p.?969),?or?are?willful?or?malicious?in?nature?(John?R.?v.?Oakland?Unified?School?Dist.?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?438,?447?[256?Cal.Rptr.?766,?769?P.2d?948];?Martinez?v.?Hagopian?(1986)?182?Cal.App.3d?1223,?1227?[227?Cal.Rptr.?763]). [3]?The?doctrine?of?respondeat?superior?applies?to?public?and?private?employers?alike.?As?stated?in?subdivision?(a)?of?Government?Code?section?815.2?(all?further?statutory?references?are?to?the?Government?Code):?”A?public?entity?is?liable?for?injury?proximately?caused?by?an?act?or?omission?of?an?employee?of?the?public?entity?within?the?scope?of?his?employment?if?the?act?or?omission?would,?apart?from?this?section,?have?given?rise?to?a?cause?of?action?against?that?employee?or?his?personal?representative.”?By?this?language,?the?Legislature?incorporated?”general?standards?of?tort?liability?as?the?[54?Cal.3d?210]?primary?basis?for?respondeat?superior?liability?of?public?entities.?…”?(Van?Alstyne,?op.?cit.?supra,???2.32,?at?p.?77.)?Courts?have?construed?the?term?”scope?of?employment”?in?section?815.2?as?broadly?as?in?private?tort?litigation.?(Van?Alstyne,?op.?cit.?supra,???2.32,?at?p.?79;?see?generally,?John?R.?v.?Oakland?Unified?School?Dist.,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?447.)?B.?California?Decisions?Discussing?Public?Employer?Liability?for?Sexually?Assaultive?Conduct?by?Police When?the?Court?of?Appeal?decided?this?case,?only?one?published?decision?in?this?state?had?addressed?the?issue?of?whether?a?law?enforcement?officer?who?commits?a?sexual?assault?while?on?duty?can?be?deemed?to?have?acted?within?the?scope?of?employment.?In?White?v.?County?of?Orange?(1985)?166?Cal.App.3d?566?[212?Cal.Rptr.?493],?a?deputy?sheriff?detained?a?female?motorist?late?at?night,?placed?her?in?the?back?of?his?patrol?car,?drove?her?around?for?hours?in?an?isolated?area,?and?repeatedly?threatened?to?rape?and?kill?her.?When?she?promised?to?go?out?with?him?that?weekend,?he?returned?her?to?her?car.?After?she?drove?away,?he?again?stopped?her,?this?time?to?obtain?a?”goodnight?kiss.”?Based?on?this?entire?incident,?the?officer?was?convicted?of?kidnapping?and?false?imprisonment. Thereafter,?the?motorist?brought?a?civil?suit?against?the?officer’s?employer,?the?County?of?Orange,?on?a?theory?of?vicarious?liability.?The?trial?court?granted?the?county’s?motion?for?summary?judgment;?the?Court?of?Appeal?reversed.?The?appellate?court?observed?that?an?officer?is?entrusted?with?a?substantial?degree?of?authority,?and?that?the?motorist?submitted?to?that?authority,?stopping?her?car?solely?because?the?officer?had?ordered?her?to?do?so.?Accordingly,?the?court?held,?the?officer’s?wrongful?acts?”flowed?from?the?very?exercise?of?this?authority,”?and?the?county?could?be?held?liable?for?the?officer’s?conduct.?(White?v.?County?of?Orange,?supra,?166?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?571-572.) Recently,?this?court?had?occasion?to?examine?White?in?John?R.?v.?Oakland?Unified?School?Dist.,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?438?(hereafter?John?R.),?which?involved?the?application?of?respondeat?superior?in?a?different?context.?In?John?R.,?a?junior?high?school?student?sued?the?school?district,?alleging?he?had?been?sexually?molested?by?his?teacher?while?at?the?teacher’s?apartment?as?part?of?an?officially?sanctioned,?extracurricular?program.?The?trial?court?ruled?that?the?school?district?could?not?be?held?vicariously?liable?for?the?molestation,?and?granted?the?district’s?motion?for?nonsuit.?We?upheld?the?trial?court’s?ruling.?[54?Cal.3d?211] The?lead?opinionfn.?2?in?John?R.?did?not?consider?whether?the?case?was?factually?similar?to?other?cases?in?which?employers?had?been?held?liable?for?the?tortious?acts?of?their?employees.?Instead,?it?focused?on?the?rationale?underlying?the?imposition?of?such?liability:?to?prevent?recurrence?of?the?tortious?conduct,?to?give?greater?assurance?of?compensation?for?the?victim,?and?to?ensure?that?the?victim’s?losses?will?be?equitably?borne?by?those?who?benefit?from?the?enterprise?that?gave?rise?to?the?injury.?(Perez?v.?Van?Groningen?&?Sons,?Inc.,?supra,?41?Cal.3d?at?p.?967.)?After?evaluating?these?three?factors,?the?lead?opinion?in?John?R.?concluded?that?imposition?of?liability?against?the?teacher’s?employer?was?not?warranted.?(John?R.,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?452.)?Although?the?opinion?declined?to?determine?whether?White?v.?County?of?Orange,?supra,?166?Cal.App.3d?566,?was?correctly?decided,?it?suggested?that?the?policy?reasons?underlying?the?doctrine?of?respondeat?superior?would?justify?its?application?when?a?police?officer?uses?his?authority?to?enable?him?to?commit?a?sexual?assault.?(John?R.,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?452.) The?City?contends?that?White?v.?County?of?Orange,?supra,?166?Cal.App.3d?566,?was?wrongly?decided,?and?that?a?police?officer’s?act?of?rape,?even?when?preceded?by?an?assertion?of?authority,?is?outside?the?scope?of?his?employment?as?a?matter?of?law.?Before?addressing?the?merits?of?this?contention,?we?first?consider?whether?the?doctrine?of?invited?error?precludes?the?City?from?asserting?it. Application?of?Invited?Error?Doctrine In?this?case,?the?trial?court?instructed?the?jury,?based?on?White?v.?County?of?Orange,?supra,?166?Cal.App.3d?566,?that?when?”a?police?officer?who,?as?a?result?of?the?exercise?of?his?authority,?legally?causes?injury,”?the?employer?may?be?held?liable?regardless?of?the?employer’s?rules?or?knowledge?of?the?wrongful?conduct,?and?regardless?of?whether?the?employer?or?the?employee?benefited?from?the?act?itself.fn.?3?Because?the?record?indicated?that?the?City?had?requested?the?instruction,?we?solicited?briefing?from?the?parties?to?determine?whether?the?doctrine?of?invited?error?should?bar?the?City?from?contending?[54?Cal.3d?212]?that,?as?a?matter?of?law,?Sergeant?Schroyer?was?acting?outside?the?scope?of?his?employment?when?he?raped?plaintiff. The?record?shows?that?the?instruction?was?proposed?under?the?following?circumstances.?Throughout?the?proceedings?in?this?matter,?the?City?challenged?the?decision?in?White?v.?County?of?Orange,?supra,?166?Cal.App.3d?566.?The?trial?court?correctly?considered?itself?to?be?bound?by?the?appellate?court’s?decision?in?White.?(See?Auto?Equity?Sales,?Inc.?v.?Superior?Court?(1962)?57?Cal.2d?450,?455?[20?Cal.Rptr.?321,?369?P.2d?937].)?At?the?instruction?conference,?the?court?told?the?parties?that?notwithstanding?the?City’s?objections,?it?would?instruct?the?jury?in?accordance?with?White,?and?that?unless?the?City?proffered?an?alternative?instruction?it?would?give?plaintiff’s?proposed?instruction,?which?was?based?on?White.?The?City?then?submitted,?and?the?court?gave,?the?instruction?quoted?above. Immediately?after?the?case?was?submitted?to?the?jury,?the?trial?court?gave?the?parties?an?opportunity?to?”tie?up?any?loose?ends”?relating?to?any?matter?that?had?not?yet?been?”put?on?the?record.”?Counsel?for?the?City?then?explained?the?circumstances?which?led?it?to?submit?the?instruction?at?issue:?”[D]uring?our?many,?many?hours?of?discussions?concerning?jury?instructions,?I?did?indicate?to?the?court?that?we?did?not?believe?that?White?was?an?appropriate?case?with?which?the?jury?should?be?instructed?as?it?was?…?not?an?appropriate?statement?of?the?law.?[?]?The?court?indicated?that?it?would?follow?White?and?unless?I?wanted?Plaintiff’s?instructions?to?be?the?ones?to?go?to?the?jury,?I?would?be?requested?to?draft?an?instruction?based?upon?the?language?in?White.?[?]?In?response?to?that,?the?defense?submitted?an?instruction?based?upon?White?which?the?court?…?read?to?the?jury.?[?]?For?the?record,?I?would?like?it?to?be?clear?that?we?do?not?believe?that?White?is?the?authority?that?should?be?followed?and?that?we?objected?to?giving?any?instructions?in?accordance?with?the?White?case,?albeit,?we?did?submit?an?instruction?based?upon?the?court’s?request.”?The?trial?court?agreed?with?counsel’s?account,?but?pointed?out?that?the?precise?wording?of?the?instruction?was?the?City’s. [4]?Under?the?doctrine?of?invited?error,?when?a?party?by?its?own?conduct?induces?the?commission?of?error,?it?may?not?claim?on?appeal?that?the?judgment?should?be?reversed?because?of?that?error.?(People?v.?Perez?(1979)?23?Cal.3d?545,?549-550,?fn.?3?[153?Cal.Rptr.?40,?591?P.2d?63];?Jentick?v.?Pacific?Gas?&?Elec.?Co.?(1941)?18?Cal.2d?117?[114?P.2d?343];?9?Witkin,?Cal.?Procedure?(3d?ed.?1985)?Appeal,???301,?p.?313.)?But?the?doctrine?does?not?apply?when?a?party,?while?making?the?appropriate?objections,?acquiesces?in?a?judicial?determination.?(People?v.?Perez,?supra,?23?Cal.3d?at?p.?550,?fn.?3.)?As?this?court?has?explained:?”?’An?attorney?who?submits?to?the?authority?of?an?erroneous,?adverse?ruling?after?making?appropriate?objections?or?motions,?[54?Cal.3d?213]?does?not?waive?the?error?in?the?ruling?by?proceeding?in?accordance?therewith?and?endeavoring?to?make?the?best?of?a?bad?situation?for?which?he?was?not?responsible.’?”?(People?v.?Calio?(1986)?42?Cal.3d?639,?643?[230?Cal.Rptr.?137,?724?P.2d?1162],?quoting?Leibman?v.?Curtis?(1955)?138?Cal.App.2d?222,?225?[291?P.2d?542].) Here,?the?City?did?not?invite?the?trial?court?to?instruct?the?jury?that?liability?for?a?sexual?assault?can?arise?from?a?police?officer’s?exercise?of?official?authority.?To?the?contrary,?it?took?the?opposite?position?throughout?the?case,?including?the?instruction?conference.?The?City?never?induced?the?trial?court?to?follow?White?v.?County?of?Orange,?supra,?166?Cal.App.3d?566;?it?merely?acquiesced-after?objecting-to?the?court’s?decision?to?instruct?in?accordance?with?White,?and?submitted?an?instruction?in?accordance?with?that?decision.fn.?4?Although?the?City?would?be?barred?from?attacking?the?specific?language?of?the?jury?instruction?it?submitted,?it?is,?under?the?circumstances?of?this?case,?not?precluded?from?asserting?that?White?v.?County?of?Orange,?supra,?166?Cal.App.3d?566,?was?erroneously?decided?and?that,?as?a?matter?of?law,?the?evidence?presented?here?established?that?Sergeant?Schroyer?acted?outside?the?scope?of?his?employment?when?he?raped?plaintiff.fn.?5 Imposition?of?Liability?in?This?Case [5]?Ordinarily,?the?determination?whether?an?employee?has?acted?within?the?scope?of?employment?presents?a?question?of?fact;?it?becomes?a?question?of?law,?however,?when?”the?facts?are?undisputed?and?no?conflicting?inferences?are?possible.”?(Perez?v.?Van?Groningen?&?Sons,?Inc.,?supra,?41?Cal.3d?at?p.?968.)?In?some?cases,?the?relationship?between?an?employee’s?work?and?wrongful?conduct?is?so?attenuated?that?a?jury?could?not?reasonably?conclude?that?the?act?was?within?the?scope?of?employment.?(See,?e.g.,?John?R.,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?1452;?Rita?M.?v.?Roman?Catholic?Archbishop?(1986)?187?Cal.App.3d?1453,?1461?[232?Cal.Rptr.?685];?Alma?W.?v.?Oakland?Unified?School?Dist.?(1981)?123?Cal.App.3d?133,?139-?140?[176?Cal.Rptr.?287].)?[6a]?The?City?contends?that?such?is?the?case?here,?asserting?that?even?if?all?conflicts?in?the?facts?and?the?inferences?to?be?drawn?from?those?facts?are?[54?Cal.3d?214]?resolved?in?plaintiff’s?favor,?Sergeant?Schroyer?was?acting?outside?the?scope?of?employment?when?he?raped?plaintiff.fn.?6 We?do?not?agree.?As?we?shall?explain,?Sergeant?Schroyer’s?conduct?was?not?so?divorced?from?his?work?that,?as?a?matter?of?law,?it?was?outside?the?scope?of?employment.?Rather,?the?question?of?whether?Sergeant?Schroyer?acted?within?the?scope?of?his?employment?was?one?properly?left?for?the?jury?to?decide. As?we?mentioned?earlier,?the?test?for?determining?whether?an?employee?is?acting?outside?the?scope?of?employment?is?whether?”?’in?the?context?of?the?particular?enterprise?an?employee’s?conduct?is?not?so?unusual?or?startling?that?it?would?seem?unfair?to?include?the?loss?resulting?from?it?among?other?costs?of?the?employer’s?business.’?”?(Perez?v.?Van?Groningen?&?Sons,?Inc.,?supra,?41?Cal.3d?at?p.?968.)?To?assist?us?in?that?determination,?we?first?consider?whether?the?three?policy?objectives?underlying?respondeat?superior?would?be?achieved?by?applying?the?doctrine?when?a?police?officer?on?duty?misuses?his?official?authority?and?commits?an?act?of?rape.?The?lead?opinion?in?John?R.,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?438,?concluded?that?because?under?the?facts?of?that?case?application?of?respondeat?superior?would?not?further?the?doctrine’s?underlying?rationale,?it?should?not?be?invoked.?That?is?not?the?case?here. [7]?The?first?of?the?three?policy?objectives?supporting?the?application?of?respondeat?superior?is?that?imposing?liability?on?the?employer?may?prevent?recurrence?of?the?tortious?conduct,?because?it?”creates?a?strong?incentive?for?vigilance?by?those?in?a?position?’to?guard?substantially?against?the?evil?to?be?prevented.’?”?(Pacific?Mut.?Life?Ins.?Co.?v.?Haslip,?supra,?499?U.S.?at?p.?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?17,?111?S.Ct.?at?p.?1041],?quoting?an?earlier?case.)?In?John?R.,?the?lead?opinion?concluded?that?this?policy?did?not?support?the?imposition?of?liability?on?the?school?district?whose?teacher?committed?sexual?misconduct?because?the?preventive?measures?that?the?employer?could?be?forced?to?take?would?do?more?harm?than?good.?To?impose?vicarious?liability?in?that?situation,?the?opinion?explained,?”would?be?far?too?likely?to?deter?districts?from?encouraging,?or?even?authorizing,?extracurricular?and/or?one-on-one?contacts?between?teachers?and?students?or?to?induce?districts?to?impose?such?rigorous?controls?on?activities?of?this?nature?that?the?educational?process?would?be?negatively?affected.”?(John?R.,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?451.) By?contrast,?imposition?of?liability?here?would?not?be?likely?to?cause?public?entities?to?take?preventive?measures?that?would?impair?the?effectiveness?of?law?enforcement?activities.?As?the?lead?opinion?in?John?R.?said:?”We?[54?Cal.3d?215]?doubt?that?police?departments?would?deprive?their?officers?of?weapons?or?preclude?them?from?enforcing?the?laws?….”?(John?R.,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?452.) The?imposition?of?liability?on?public?entities?whose?law?enforcement?officers?commit?sexual?assaults?while?on?duty?would?encourage?the?employers?to?take?preventive?measures.fn.?7?There?is?little?or?no?risk?that?preventive?measures?would?significantly?interfere?with?the?ability?of?police?departments?to?enforce?the?law?and?to?protect?society?from?criminal?acts.?We?therefore?conclude?that?the?first?policy?basis?for?respondeat?superior-encouraging?the?employer?to?take?measures?to?prevent?recurrence?of?the?tortious?conduct-supports?the?jury’s?verdict?against?the?City?in?this?case.fn.?8 We?now?consider?the?second?reason?underlying?the?application?of?respondeat?superior:?to?give?greater?assurance?of?compensation?to?the?victim.?[8]?The?Legislature?has?recognized?that?the?imposition?of?vicarious?liability?on?a?public?employer?is?an?appropriate?method?to?ensure?that?victims?of?police?misconduct?are?compensated.?It?has?done?so?by?declining?to?grant?immunity?to?public?entities?when?their?police?officers?engage?in?violent?conduct.?Since?the?enactment?of?the?California?Tort?Claims?Act?in?1963?(??810?et?seq.),?a?governmental?entity?can?be?held?vicariously?liable?when?a?police?officer?acting?in?the?course?and?scope?of?employment?uses?excessive?force?or?engages?in?assaultive?conduct.?(City?of?Los?Angeles?v.?Superior?Court?(1973)?33?Cal.App.3d?778,?782?[109?Cal.Rptr.?365];?Larson?v.?City?of?[54?Cal.3d?216]?Oakland?(1971)?17?Cal.App.3d?91,?98?[94?Cal.Rptr.?466];?Scruggs?v.?Haynes?(1967)?252?Cal.App.2d?256,?268?[60?Cal.Rptr.?355];?Griffith?v.?City?of?Monrovia?(1982)?134?Cal.App.3d?Supp.?6?[184?Cal.Rptr.?709];?see?also?Jones?v.?City?of?Los?Angeles?(1963)?215?Cal.App.2d?155?[30?Cal.Rptr.?124].)?The?decisions?cited?have?recognized,?at?least?implicitly,?that?vicarious?liability?is?an?appropriate?method?to?ensure?that?victims?of?police?misconduct?are?compensated.fn.?9 The?only?difference?between?those?cases?and?the?one?now?before?us?is?that?here?the?assault?victim?was?raped?rather?than?beaten.?Surely?the?victim’s?need?for?compensation?in?this?instance?is?as?great?as?in?other?cases?of?violent?tortious?conduct?by?a?police?officer?while?on?duty.?Accordingly,?the?second?policy?objective?of?the?doctrine?of?respondeat?superior?supports?the?jury’s?verdict?imposing?liability?on?the?City. [9]?Finally,?the?third?policy?consideration-the?appropriateness?of?spreading?the?risk?of?loss?among?the?beneficiaries?of?the?enterprise-also?favors?the?imposition?of?vicarious?liability?against?the?City.?Here,?too,?John?R.?is?instructive.?The?lead?opinion?recognized?that?school?districts?and?the?community?at?large?benefit?from?the?authority?that?teachers?are?given?over?students,?but?it?concluded?that?the?connection?between?that?authority?and?a?teacher’s?sexual?abuse?of?a?student?was?”simply?too?attenuated?to?deem?a?sexual?assault?as?falling?within?the?range?of?risks?allocable?to?a?teacher’s?employer,”?and?thus?did?not?support?vicarious?liability?in?that?context.?(John?R.,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?452.)?The?opinion?contrasted?the?difference?in?authority,?”in?both?degree?and?kind,”?between?a?teacher?and?a?police?officer:?”[T]he?authority?of?a?police?officer?over?a?motorist-bolstered?most?immediately?by?his?uniform,?badge?and?firearm,?and?only?slightly?less?so?by?the?prospect?of?criminal?sanctions?for?disobedience-plainly?surpasses?that?of?a?teacher?over?a?student.”?(Ibid.) At?the?outset,?we?observed?that?society?has?granted?police?officers?extraordinary?power?and?authority?over?its?citizenry.?An?officer?who?detains?an?individual?is?acting?as?the?official?representative?of?the?state,?with?all?of?its?coercive?power.?As?visible?symbols?of?that?power,?an?officer?is?given?a?distinctively?marked?car,?a?uniform,?a?badge,?and?a?gun.?As?one?court?commented,?”police?officers?[exercise]?the?most?awesome?and?dangerous?power?that?a?democratic?state?possesses?with?respect?to?its?residents-the?power?to?use?lawful?force?to?arrest?and?detain?them.”?(Policeman’s?Benev.?Ass’n?of?N.J.?v.?Washington?Tp.?(3d?Cir.?1988)?850?F.2d?133,?141.)?Inherent?in?[54?Cal.3d?217]?this?formidable?power?is?the?potential?for?abuse.?The?cost?resulting?from?misuse?of?that?power?should?be?borne?by?the?community,?because?of?the?substantial?benefits?that?the?community?derives?from?the?lawful?exercise?of?police?power. As?demonstrated,?each?of?the?three?policy?reasons?supports?the?imposition?of?vicarious?liability?on?the?employer?of?a?police?officer?who,?while?on?duty,?commits?a?sexual?assault?by?misusing?his?official?authority.?[6b]?The?City?nevertheless?maintains?that?a?police?officer?who?commits?rape?while?on?duty?can?never?be?acting?within?the?scope?of?his?employment?because?the?conduct?is?so?unusual?that?to?impose?liability?on?the?officer’s?employer?in?that?instance?would?be?unfair. The?City?relies?on?our?decision?in?Perez?v.?Van?Groningen?&?Sons,?Inc.,?supra,?41?Cal.3d?962.?In?that?case,?the?defendant?employer?assigned?an?employee?to?drive?a?tractor?through?an?orchard?while?pulling?a?disking?attachment.?The?employee?invited?his?nephew?to?ride?with?him.?A?branch?knocked?the?nephew?off?the?tractor?and?into?the?disking?attachment.?We?held?that?the?employee?was?acting?within?the?scope?of?his?employment,?and?therefore?the?employer?could?be?held?liable?for?the?employee’s?negligent?acts.?We?explained:?”A?risk?arises?out?of?the?employment?when?’in?the?context?of?the?particular?enterprise?an?employee’s?conduct?is?not?so?unusual?or?startling?that?it?would?seem?unfair?to?include?the?loss?resulting?from?it?among?other?costs?of?the?employer’s?business.?…?[T]he?inquiry?should?be?whether?the?risk?was?one?”that?may?fairly?be?regarded?as?typical?of?or?broadly?incidental”?to?the?enterprise?undertaken?by?the?employer.?[Citation.]’?”?(Perez?v.?Van?Groningen?&?Sons,?Inc.,?supra,?41?Cal.3d?at?p.?968,?italics?added.)?Seizing?on?the?italicized?language,?the?City?contends?that?the?tortious?act-rape-committed?by?Sergeant?Schroyer?is?so?”unusual?or?startling”?that?it?cannot?”fairly?be?regarded?as?typical?of?or?broadly?incidental”?to?the?task?of?law?enforcement.?We?disagree. As?noted?previously,?society?has?granted?police?officers?great?power?and?control?over?criminal?suspects.?Officers?may?detain?such?persons?at?gunpoint,?place?them?in?handcuffs,?remove?them?from?their?residences,?order?them?into?police?cars?and,?in?some?circumstances,?may?even?use?deadly?force.?The?law?permits?police?officers?to?ensure?their?own?safety?by?frisking?persons?they?have?detained,?thereby?subjecting?detainees?to?a?form?of?nonconsensual?touching?ordinarily?deemed?highly?offensive?in?our?society.?(Terry?v.?Ohio?(1968)?392?U.S.?1?[20?L.Ed.2d?889,?88?S.Ct.?1868].)?In?view?of?the?considerable?power?and?authority?that?police?officers?possess,?it?is?neither?startling?nor?unexpected?that?on?occasion?an?officer?will?misuse?that?authority?by?engaging?in?assaultive?conduct.?The?precise?circumstances?of?the?assault?need?not?be?anticipated,?so?long?as?the?risk?is?one?that?is?reasonably?[54?Cal.3d?218]?foreseeable.?Sexual?assaults?by?police?officers?are?fortunately?uncommon;?nevertheless,?the?risk?of?such?tortious?conduct?is?broadly?incidental?to?the?enterprise?of?law?enforcement,?and?thus?liability?for?such?acts?may?appropriately?be?imposed?on?the?employing?public?entity.fn.?10 In?arguing?against?such?liability,?the?City?relies?on?Alma?W.?v.?Oakland?Unified?School?Dist.,?supra,?123?Cal.App.3d?133.?There,?the?Court?of?Appeal?upheld?a?trial?court’s?ruling?that?a?school?district?could?not?be?held?vicariously?liable?for?the?sexual?molestation?of?an?11-year-old?child?by?a?school?custodian?on?school?grounds.?As?the?court?observed,?”There?is?no?aspect?of?a?janitor’s?duties?that?would?make?sexual?assault?anything?other?than?highly?unusual?and?very?startling.”?(Id.?at?p.?143.)?By?contrast,?the?very?nature?of?law?enforcement?employment?requires?exertion?of?physical?control?over?persons?whom?an?officer?has?detained?or?arrested.?The?authority?to?use?force?when?necessary?in?securing?compliance?with?the?law?is?fundamental?to?a?police?officer’s?duties?in?maintaining?the?public?order.?(Nat.?Advisory?Com.?on?Crim.?Justice?Stds.?and?Goals,?Police?(1973)?p.?18.)?That?authority?carries?with?it?the?risk?of?abuse.?The?danger?that?an?officer?will?commit?a?sexual?assault?while?on?duty?arises?from?the?considerable?authority?and?control?inherent?in?the?responsibilities?of?an?officer?in?enforcing?the?law.?Those?responsibilities?do?not?at?all?resemble?the?duties?of?a?school?custodian,?as?involved?in?Alma?W.,?supra.fn.?11 […]

Lubetzky?v.?State?Bar?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?308?,?285?Cal.Rptr.?268;?815?P.2d?341 [No.?S013552.?Aug?30,?1991.] RICHARD?H.?LUBETZKY,?Petitioner,?v.?THE?STATE?BAR?OF?CALIFORNIA,?Respondent. (Opinion?by?The?Court.) COUNSEL Greines,?Martin,?Stein?&?Richland?and?Kent?L.?Richland?for?Petitioner. Diane?C.?Yu,?Starr?Babcock,?Marie?M.?Moffat?and?Robert?P.?Heyman?for?Respondent. OPINION THE?COURT. Petitioner?was?denied?admission?to?practice?law?after?a?hearing?panel?of?the?State?Bar?determined?that?he?had?”not?proven?that?he?is?possessed?of?good?moral?character”?within?the?meaning?of?rule?X?of?the?Rules?Regulating?Admission?to?Practice?Law?in?California.?The?review?department?affirmed?that?ruling?without?dissent,?two?members?abstaining.?[54?Cal.3d?312]?Our?review?of?the?entire?record?persuades?us?that?the?evidence?does?not?support?the?findings?of?the?hearing?panel?as?to?petitioner’s?moral?character.?We?therefore?decline?to?accord?those?findings?any?weight.?Instead,?we?conclude?in?light?of?our?own?independent?evaluation?of?the?evidence?that?petitioner?presented?a?strong?prima?facie?case?that?he?is?of?sufficiently?good?moral?character?to?be?admitted?to?practice?law.?Because?we?are?persuaded?that?the?State?Bar’s?evidence?failed?to?rebut?that?prima?facie?case,?we?find?that?petitioner?has?sustained?his?burden?of?proof?on?the?issue?of?moral?character?and?direct?that?he?be?certified?as?qualified?for?admission?to?practice?law. Introduction [1]?By?State?Bar?rule,?an?applicant?for?admission?to?practice?”shall?have?the?burden?of?proving?that?he?or?she?is?possessed?of?good?moral?character.”fn.?1?”Pursuant?to?this?rule?the?applicant?must?initially?furnish?enough?evidence?of?good?moral?character?to?establish?a?prima?facie?case,?and?the?[State?Bar]?then?has?the?opportunity?to?rebut?that?showing?with?evidence?of?bad?character.?[Citation.]”?(Hallinan?v.?Committee?of?Bar?Examiners?(1966)?65?Cal.2d?447,?449-551,?fn.?1?[55?Cal.Rptr.?228,?421?P.2d?76]?(Hallinan);?accord,?Hightower?v.?State?Bar?(1983)?34?Cal.3d?150,?155?[193?Cal.Rptr.?153,?666?P.2d?10];?Hall?v.?Committee?of?Bar?Examiners?(1979)?25?Cal.3d?730,?734?[159?Cal.Rptr.?848,?602?P.2d?768];?Bernstein?v.?Committee?of?Bar?Examiners?(1968)?69?Cal.2d?90,?95?[70?Cal.Rptr.?106,?443?P.2d?570].)?If?the?State?Bar?is?unable?to?rebut?the?applicant’s?prima?facie?case,?then?the?applicant?has?carried?his?or?her?burden?of?proof.?If?the?State?Bar?presents?sufficient?evidence?to?rebut?the?prima?facie?case,?then?the?applicant?must?introduce?further?evidence?of?good?moral?character?or?discredit?the?State?Bar’s?evidence.?Although?we?give?”great?weight”?to?the?findings?of?the?hearing?panel?on?review,?they?are?not?binding?on?us.?”We?examine?the?evidence?and?make?our?own?determinations?as?to?its?sufficiency?….”?(Hightower?v.?State?Bar,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?at?pp.?155-156;?see?also?Kwasnik?v.?State?Bar?(1990)?50?Cal.3d?1061,?1068-1069?[269?Cal.Rptr.?749,?791?P.2d?319].) The?charges?levelled?against?petitioner?by?the?State?Bar?centered?on?two?related?matters:?(1)?an?alleged?misuse?of?the?judicial?process?by?filing?civil?suits?against?former?friends?for?the?purpose?of?harassing?them,?and?(2)?the?accusation?that?petitioner?was?responsible?for?the?mystifying?appearance?of?over?one?hundred?sexually?obscene?postcards?and?letters?anonymously?mailed?to?Robert?Friedman,?a?former?friend?of?petitioner?and?his?chief?accuser?at?the?hearing,?and?to?Friedman’s?mother,?the?Friedmans’?family?[54?Cal.3d?313]?physicians,?and?an?art?gallery?where?Robert?Friedman?falsely?claimed?to?be?employed. Except?for?a?lawsuit?filed?by?petitioner?in?1975?against?one?Arguimbau,?a?college?classmate?and?friend?with?whom?he?had?a?falling?out,?the?bulk?of?the?litigation?filed?by?petitioner?arose?out?of?his?short-lived?friendship?with?Friedman,?a?relationship?that?began?in?1982?when?Friedman?began?sharing?an?apartment?with?Robin?Spivack,?a?friend?and?former?law?school?classmate?of?petitioner.?The?rise?and?fall?of?the?friendship?was?punctuated?by?the?appearance?of?the?anonymous?mail-beginning?with?a?mildly?obscene?note?to?Robin?Spivack?following?her?eviction?of?Friedman?from?the?apartment?in?the?wake?of?a?series?of?bizarre?acts-and?gradually?became?a?torrent?of?sexually?explicit?postcards,?often?cobbled?together?from?fragments?of?newspaper?and?typescript?or?handwriting.?As?a?kind?of?counterpoint?to?the?obscene?mail,?some?of?the?participants?in?the?affair?began?to?receive?annoying?hang-up?telephone?calls-sometimes?as?many?as?20?a?day-originating?roughly?coincidently?with?the?obscene?mail.?Robin?Spivack,?petitioner,?and?Robert?Friedman?all?reported?being?telephonically?harassed. Apart?from?one?item,?little?if?any?of?the?evidence?offered?by?the?State?Bar?inculpated?petitioner?as?the?source?of?the?obscene?mail.?But?that?one?item?was?troubling-the?tip?of?a?fingerprint?discovered?on?the?obverse?side?of?a?piece?of?”scotch”?tape?used?to?bind?a?fragment?of?newspaper?to?the?face?of?one?of?the?obscene?postcards,?a?print?identified?as?and?conceded?to?be?petitioner’s.?Other?than?this?item,?much?of?the?evidence?presented?at?the?hearing?pointed?to?someone?else?as?the?figure?behind?the?obscene?mail-pointed,?in?fact,?to?the?principal?recipient,?Robert?Friedman?himself.?Moreover,?the?implications?of?the?fingerprint?were?undercut?by?a?wealth?of?evidence?of?bizarre?conduct?by?Friedman,?conduct?similar?to?that?with?which?petitioner?was?charged;?by?the?admission?in?a?secretly?recorded?telephone?conversation?that?Friedman?was?responsible?for?the?hang-up?calls;?and?by?petitioner’s?innocent?explanation?of?the?fingerprint,?supported?by?expert?testimony?and?demonstrative?evidence.?Finally,?petitioner’s?authorship?of?the?postcards?was?not?easily?reconciled?with?the?considerable?evidence?of?his?good?character-evidence?that?he?is?conscientious,?moderate?in?expression,?and?seemingly?devoted?to?the?welfare?of?others. Our?independent?review?of?this?record?convinces?us?that?the?State?Bar’s?rebuttal?evidence?to?petitioner’s?prima?facie?case?is?insufficient?to?sustain?the?conclusion?of?the?hearing?panel?that?he?lacks?good?moral?character. The?Evidence Petitioner’s?evidence?at?the?moral?character?hearing?established?that?he?graduated?cum?laude?from?the?University?of?California?at?Los?Angeles?[54?Cal.3d?314]?(UCLA)?in?1974.?While?an?undergraduate,?petitioner?was?active?in?consumer?affairs;?he?founded?and?served?as?the?first?director?of?the?university’s?Consumer?Protection?Project,?co-authored?a?consumer?rights?handbook?published?by?the?university,?and?taught?a?consumer?rights?course.?He?received?several?awards?and?citations?for?his?work?in?this?area.?Following?graduation,?petitioner?worked?full?time?in?a?law?firm?as?a?paralegal?and?researcher?while?attending?night?law?school?classes?from?1975?to?1978.?[2]?(See?fn.?2.)?In?1979,?he?began?attending?law?school?full?time,?graduating?in?1980.fn.?2In?1985,?petitioner?joined?a?Southern-California-based?consumer?group?known?as?CALJUSTICE?(an?acronym?for?Consumer?Advocates?for?Legal?Justice),?an?organization?seeking?reform?of?the?attorney?disciplinary?process,?including?its?removal?from?the?hands?of?the?State?Bar.?According?to?evidence?in?the?record,?petitioner?has?been?a?visible?advocate?for?change?in?the?attorney?disciplinary?system,?having?served?as?board?chair?and?president?of?CALJUSTICE?since?1986?and?having?appeared?on?behalf?of?that?organization?before?several?state?legislative?committees,?the?State?Bar?Board?of?Governors,?and?other?forums?in?support?of?attorney?disciplinary?reform.?Petitioner?has?contributed?these?efforts?on?behalf?of?the?organization?on?an?uncompensated,?volunteer?basis. In?support?of?his?good?character,?petitioner?presented?testimony,?declarations,?and?letters?of?support?from?several?persons-three?attorneys,?a?state?senator,?colleagues?in?the?consumer?protection?movement,?former?teachers?and?college?administrators,?schoolmates?and?neighbors-attesting?to?his?good?moral?character.?All?offered?unqualified?praise?of?petitioner,?including?his?honesty,?integrity,?reliability?and?altruistic?nature.?These?included?the?former?president?and?cofounder?of?CALJUSTICE?(who?described?petitioner?as?”the?finest?human?being?I?ever?met”?and?”beyond?reproach”);?an?attorney?active?in?discipline?reform?who?formerly?served?on?the?State?Bar’s?Public?Protection?Committee?(who?stated,?”If?I?wanted?to?see?somebody?be?an?attorney,?it?would?be?[petitioner]?because?of?his?integrity”);?an?attorney?who?had?represented?petitioner?in?past?litigation?(who?described?petitioner?as?”honest?to?the?spirit,?not?only?the?letter,?of?what?he?says”?and?who?”wish[ed]?there?were?more?attorneys?out?there?with?[petitioner’s]?moral?character”);?another?attorney?for?whom?petitioner?had?worked?as?a?paralegal?and?researcher?(who?thought?petitioner?”would?make?an?excellent?attorney”);?and?[54?Cal.3d?315]?other?law?graduates?and?friends?of?petitioner?who?testified?along?similar?lines.?[3]?(See?fn.?3.)?In?short,?petitioner?met?his?threshold?burden?of?demonstrating?prima?facie?his?good?moral?character.fn.?3 The?State?Bar’s?case-in-rebuttal?proceeded?along?three?lines,?all?of?which-together?with?a?fourth-were?adopted?and?relied?upon?by?the?hearing?panel.?Before?taking?up?the?chief?issue-the?central?puzzle?of?the?obscene?mail-we?consider?the?three?other?grounds?relied?on?by?the?hearing?panel.fn.?4?The?panel?determined?that:?(1)?litigation?commenced?by?petitioner?in?the?past?indicated,?in?its?words,?”a?pattern?of?harassment?on?the?part?of?petitioner?in?using?the?courts?and?the?judicial?process?for?personal?reasons”;?(2)?petitioner?omitted?from?his?bar?examination?application?certain?litigation?in?which?he?had?participated?until?notified?of?the?omission?by?State?Bar?officials;?and?(3)?petitioner?showed?a?”lack?of?respect?for?the?law?and?for?the?legal?canons?of?ethics”?by?tape-recording?two?telephone?conversations?with?Robert?Friedman?without?Friedman’s?knowledge?or?consent.?As?we?shall?see,?all?three?grounds?are?questionable;?none?standing?alone?would?suffice?to?establish?petitioner’s?bad?moral?character;?and?together?they?fail?to?rebut?petitioner’s?prima?facie?case?of?good?moral?character. A. The?”pattern”?of?litigation?harassment.?In?its?decision,?the?hearing?panel?noted?that?a?defamation?action?filed?by?petitioner?against?Robert?Friedman?and?others?was?dismissed?by?the?trial?court?on?privilege?grounds,?a?result?upheld?by?the?Court?of?Appeal.fn.?5?The?panel?then?recounted?petitioner’s?small?[54?Cal.3d?316]?claims?proceeding?against?one?of?Friedman’s?codefendants?in?the?defamation?action,?in?which?petitioner?had?sought?damages?and?a?statutory?fine?following?the?codefendant’s?failure?to?attend?a?noticed?deposition-including?petitioner’s?subsequent?(and?unsuccessful)?petition?to?the?superior?court?seeking?review?of?the?adverse?small?claims?ruling.fn.?6 [4]?To?the?hearing?panel,?petitioner’s?conduct?in?these?two?matters?bore?similarities?to?the?1975?defamation?action?against?his?former?friend,?Arguimbau.?And?despite?recognition?of?the?fact?that?petitioner?was?represented?by?counsel?in?all?but?the?small?claims?proceeding?and?that?13?years?had?passed?since?the?first?suit?was?instituted,?it?”seemed”?to?the?panel?that?these?lawsuits?”showed?a?pattern?of?harassment?on?the?part?of?[petitioner]?in?using?the?Courts?and?the?judicial?process?for?personal?reasons.”?The?panel?failed?altogether,?however,?to?identify?the?similarities?between?the?1975?and?the?1983?lawsuits?on?which?it?relied.?In?addition,?its?conclusion?on?this?point?suffers?from?a?lamentable?absence?of?precision.?The?panel?did?not?specifically?find?a?pattern?of?harassment?in?petitioner’s?use?of?the?courts-it?only?concluded?that?one?”seemed”?to?exist.?Nor?did?it?purport?to?find?that?any?of?the?actions?lacked?merit?or?were?brought?for?an?improper?purpose. In?analogous?areas,?we?have?required?a?heightened?showing?of?misconduct?by?a?litigant?or?attorney?as?a?condition?of?penalizing?resort?to?the?judicial?process.?In?In?re?Marriage?of?Flaherty?(1982)?31?Cal.3d?637?[183?Cal.Rptr.?508,?646?P.2d?179],?we?formulated?a?strict?standard?for?imposing?sanctions?for?prosecuting?frivolous?appeals-defined?to?include?those?taken?to?harass?an?opponent-noting?that?sanctions?”should?be?used?most?sparingly?to?deter?only?the?most?egregious?conduct.”?(Id.?at?p.?651.)?In?Sheldon?Appel?Co.?v.?Albert?&?Oliker?(1989)?47?Cal.3d?863[254?Cal.Rptr.?336,?765?P.2d?498],?we?adopted?a?modified?Flaherty?standard-“whether?any?reasonable?attorney?would?have?thought?the?claim?tenable”-as?the?standard?under?which?the?probable?cause?element?of?malicious?prosecution?actions?is?to?be?tested.?As?in?Flaherty,?we?were?motivated?in?part?by?a?concern?to?avoid?”a?serious?chilling?effect?on?the?assertion?of?litigants’?rights?[of?access].”?(Id.?at?p.?885,?quoting?Flaherty,?supra,?31?Cal.3d?at?p.?650.)?[54?Cal.3d?317] Given?these?expressed?concerns,?we?are?reluctant?to?credit?so?tentative?a?finding?of?moral?turpitude?based?on?undisclosed?grounds?as?that?reached?by?the?hearing?panel?in?this?case.?Especially?where?important?policies?favoring?unfettered?access?to?the?courts?are?implicated,?a?more?carefully?articulated?assessment?of?the?evidence,?leading?to?precisely?formulated?findings,?is?demanded.?We?therefore?decline?to?adopt?the?findings?of?the?hearing?panel?with?respect?to?this?charge?against?petitioner. [5]?Turning?to?the?record?itself?and?evaluating?the?evidence?independently,?we?conclude?that?it?falls?short?of?sustaining?a?determination?that?petitioner’s?resort?to?the?courts?discloses?a?pattern?of?groundless?litigation?designed?to?harass?others.?At?the?outset,?we?are?unpersuaded?that?the?Arguimbau?suit?shares?sufficient?similarities?with?the?Friedman?litigation?to?constitute?a?”pattern.”?True,?both?were?defamation?actions?brought?against?former?friends?of?petitioner?after?a?falling?out.?Beyond?that,?however,?the?similarities?end. More?importantly,?we?find?little?in?the?record?to?warrant?a?conclusion?that?any?of?the?lawsuits?on?which?the?hearing?panel?relied?qualify?as?frivolous.?As?noted,?in?all?of?these?proceedings?except?the?small?claims?action,?petitioner?was?represented?by?counsel.?Each?of?the?lawyers?who?represented?petitioner?in?the?Arguimbau?and?Friedman?lawsuits?appeared?at?the?hearing?and?testified?that?in?counsel’s?opinion?the?suit?had?merit;?petitioner?obtained?a?favorable?settlement?in?the?Arguimbau?matter,?the?small?claims?action?was?authorized?by?statute,?and?the?authority?upon?which?petitioner’s?defamation?complaint?against?the?Friedmans?was?dismissed?was?subsequently?questioned?by?another?division?of?the?Court?of?Appeal.fn.?7 Although?the?lawsuits?do?petitioner?no?particular?credit,?neither?do?they?reveal?anything?more?than?a?trait?for?combativeness?that?many?clients?expect?in?lawyers.?It?is?true?that?the?Friedman?litigation?appears?to?have?been?aggressively?pursued?by?petitioner,?but?the?case?was?aggressively?fought?by?the?attorney?for?the?Friedmans-as?petitioner’s?former?litigation?attorney?[54?Cal.3d?318]?testified.?The?record,?moreover,?suggests?that?petitioner?believed?his?standing?as?a?consumer?advocate?and?would-be?attorney?might?be?jeopardized?if?the?Friedmans’?allegations?were?permitted?to?go?unchallenged.?In?short,?the?record?does?not?disclose?any?basis?upon?which?we?can?reasonably?conclude?that?the?lawsuits?were?improper,?especially?when?evaluated?in?light?of?the?maxim?that?all?reasonable?doubts?in?admission?proceedings?are?to?be?resolved?in?favor?of?the?applicant.fn.?8 We?have?previously?found?an?applicant’s?participation?in?five?lawsuits?to?be?so?”relatively?insignificant”?as?to?merit?no?more?than?a?footnote.?(Hall?v.?Committee?of?Bar?Examiners,?supra,?25?Cal.3d?730,?733,?fn.?2.)?Standing?alone,?these?incidents?are?insufficient?to?sustain?a?finding?of?bad?moral?character.?(Cf.?Hallinan,?supra,?65?Cal.2d?at?p.?464?et?seq.?[repeated?fistfights?insufficient?to?support?exclusion].) B. Omissions?in?bar?examination?applications.?Under?this?heading,?the?hearing?panel?found?that?petitioner?failed?to?list?on?his?bar?examination?applications?the?Friedman?lawsuits?and?the?action?against?the?Regents?until?these?omissions?were?brought?to?his?attention?by?the?State?Bar.?Petitioner’s?explanation?was?that?he?had?submitted?a?complete?list?of?litigation?in?his?original?”long?form”?application?in?1980,?the?first?time?he?took?the?bar?examination;?that?he?had?subsequently?filed?”short?form”?applications?each?time?he?took?the?bar?examination;?that?he?had?failed?to?disclose?the?Friedman?litigation?under?the?mistaken?belief?that?he?had?included?it?in?one?of?the?previous?short?form?applications?he?submitted?(he?filed?12?such?forms?over?the?years);?and?that?he?had?not?listed?the?Regents?suit?after?being?advised?by?a?State?Bar?official?that?he?need?not?include?a?matter?ordered?sealed?by?the?court.?It?is?undisputed?that?on?passing?the?bar?examination?and?being?asked?by?the?State?Bar?to?submit?an?updated?long-form?application,?petitioner?did?so?in?1988,?disclosing?all?of?the?litigation?in?which?he?had?been?involved,?including?the?Regents?matter,?and?that?this?disclosure?occurred?before?petitioner?was?notified?that?the?State?Bar?intended?to?institute?moral?character?proceedings?against?him. The?hearing?panel?found?petitioner’s?explanation?that?he?had?overlooked?the?Friedman?litigation?unconvincing?”because?[petitioner]?appeared?to?be?[54?Cal.3d?319]?otherwise?meticulous?in?dealing?with?details.”?We?are?not?informed?by?its?decision,?however,?what?the?panel?made?of?these?omissions-it?made?no?finding?that?they?constituted?acts?of?moral?turpitude.?Presumably?the?panel?inferred?that?petitioner’s?failure?to?disclose?the?lawsuits?until?asked?by?the?State?Bar?to?submit?an?updated?long-?form?application?was?accompanied?by?an?intention?to?conceal?the?fact?of?the?litigation?from?the?State?Bar. The?evidence,?however,?undermines?such?an?inference.?It?discloses?correspondence?in?1986?between?petitioner,?the?State?Bar,?and?the?Friedmans’?attorney?in?which?petitioner?noted?the?restraining?order?he?had?obtained?against?Robert?Friedman?and?his?subsequent?defamation?action?against?the?Friedman?family.?The?record?includes?a?reply?from?the?State?Bar’s?executive?director?inviting?petitioner?to?provide?any?additional?information?regarding?the?Friedman?litigation?and?the?underlying?controversy?when?he?had?passed?the?bar?examination.?Thus,?in?1986?petitioner?certainly?knew?that?the?State?Bar?was?aware?of?the?Friedman?litigation?since?he?had?discussed?it?with?them?in?correspondence.?He?would?thus?have?had?no?discernible?reason?to?fail?to?disclose?the?litigation?in?his?application?in?the?hope?of?concealing?it?from?the?State?Bar. [6]?We?have?distinguished?between?affirmative?misstatements?intended?to?place?an?applicant?at?an?advantage?and?the?unintentional?nondisclosure?of?information?which,?under?the?circumstances,?is?not?morally?significant.?(Hallinan,?supra,?65?Cal.2d?at?p.?473?[failure?to?disclose?arrests?de?minimus?in?light?of?disclosure?of?several?other?arrests];?Greene?v.?Committee?of?Bar?Examiners,?supra,?4?Cal.3d?189,?194?[unintentional?failure?to?disclose?prior?bar?examination?applications?and?prior?law?school?attendance?not?grounds?for?exclusion].)?Given?the?circumstances?of?record,?notably?the?absence?of?any?apparent?motive?on?the?part?of?petitioner?to?lie?about?the?matter,?the?failure?to?include?the?litigation?appears?to?us?to?qualify?as?the?sort?of?”unintentional?nondisclosure?of?a?relatively?unimportant?matter”?which?does?not?justify?exclusion?from?the?bar.?(Greene,?supra,?at?p.?194.) C. Unconsented?taping?of?telephone?conversations.?As?part?of?an?effort?to?impeach?Robert?Friedman’s?testimony,?petitioner’s?counsel?offered?into?evidence?a?cassette?recording?of?two?telephone?conversations?between?petitioner?and?Friedman?during?which?they?discussed?the?obscene?mail,?the?hang-up?calls,?and?related?matters.?These?conversations?were?tape-recorded?by?petitioner?without?Friedman’s?knowledge.?Their?contents?are?unquestionably?probative?on?the?issue?of?Friedman’s?role?in?the?postcard?affair-they?inculpate?Robert?Friedman?as?the?source?of?the?hang-up?calls?and?establish?[54?Cal.3d?320]?that?he?invented?the?names?of?two?fictitious?Los?Angeles?art?galleries?that?he?said?had?received?obscene?postcards.fn.?9 According?to?petitioner,?Friedman?had?admitted?to?him?that?he?(Friedman)?was?responsible?for?the?hang-up?calls,?but?had?threatened?to?blame?petitioner?for?them?if?denounced.?Petitioner?further?testified?that?before?deciding?to?make?the?recordings,?he?researched?the?legal?aspects?of?the?unconsented?recording?of?telephone?calls,?checked?with?a?police?detective?investigating?the?Friedman?matter?and?a?county?prosecutor?(both?of?whom,?he?testified,?advised?him?of?its?legality?under?certain?circumstances),?and?concluded?that?a?recording?of?a?telephone?conversation?with?Friedman?without?his?knowledge,?if?undertaken?with?certain?safeguards,?would?not?be?unlawful?under?the?circumstances. [7]?Rather?than?assess?the?substantive?evidential?value?of?the?content?of?the?cassette?recordings?in?assisting?it?in?resolving?the?pivotal?issue?in?the?case,?the?hearing?panel?instead?seized?on?the?fact?that?the?tape?recordings?were?made?without?Friedman’s?knowledge?as?an?additional?basis?on?which?to?fault?petitioner’s?character.fn.?10?It?ruled?that?the?making?of?the?cassette?revealed?another?character?defect-a?”lack?of?respect?for?the?law”-and?furnished?an?additional?ground?on?which?to?deny?petitioner?admission. Of?all?the?evidentiary?uses?to?which?the?tape?recordings?and?their?contents?might?have?been?put,?the?hearing?panel’s?seems?the?most?dubious.fn.?11?Accepting?[54?Cal.3d?321]?as?reasonable?petitioner’s?uncontradicted?testimony?that?he?believed?that?Friedman?was?himself?the?source?of?the?hang-up?calls,?the?taping?episode?falls?within?an?exception?to?the?general?statutory?criminalization?of?unconsented?telephone?recordings.?Although?Penal?Code?section?632?makes?the?recording?of?a?confidential?telephone?conversation?without?the?consent?of?all?parties?a?criminal?offense,?Penal?Code?section?633.5?exempts?from?the?sweep?of?the?statute?an?undisclosed?recording?by?one?of?the?parties?of?a?conversation?”reasonably?believed?to?relate?to?the?commission?by?another?party?[to?the?conversation]?of?[certain?enumerated?crimes]?…?or?a?violation?of?section?653m.”?Penal?Code?former?section?653m,?subdivision?(b),?in?turn,?made?it?a?misdemeanor?to?telephone?anyone?”with?intent?to?annoy?…?and?without?disclosing?[the?caller’s]?identity?…?whether?or?not?conversation?ensues?….” Several?decisions?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?have?examined?the?relationship?between?Penal?Code?sections?632?and?633.5.?All?have?concluded-correctly-that?the?latter?exempts?from?the?former?an?unconsented?recording?made?with?the?requisite?reasonable?belief?although?the?recording?fails?to?capture?the?anticipated?evidence?(People?v.?Parra?(1985)?165?Cal.App.3d?874,?880-881?[212?Cal.Rptr.?53])?or?the?initial?purpose?of?the?recording?is?self-?protection?rather?than?to?gather?evidence?for?use?in?a?criminal?prosecution?(People?v.?Ayers?(1975)?51?Cal.App.3d?370,?377?[124?Cal.Rptr.?283]).?(See?also?People?v.?Montgomery?(1976)?61?Cal.App.3d?718,?731?[132?Cal.Rptr.?558];?People?v.?Strohl?(1976)?57?Cal.App.3d?347?[129?Cal.Rptr.?224].)?In?light?of?our?conclusion?that?the?tape?recordings?were?made?by?petitioner?under?the?reasonable?belief?that?the?conversations?with?Friedman?would?relate?to?hang-up?calls,?the?evidence?fails?to?support?a?finding?of?moral?turpitude?with?respect?to?these?incidents.fn.?12?[54?Cal.3d?322] D. [8]?The?obscene?mail.?This?brings?us?to?what,?by?any?account?of?the?matter,?is?the?hinge?of?the?case:?the?charge?that?petitioner?authored?and?mailed?literally?scores?of?obscene?postcards?to?Robert?Friedman?and?others.?As?noted,?petitioner’s?defense?to?this?charge?was?that?Friedman,?the?State?Bar’s?chief?witness,?was?himself?the?offender?and?had?framed?petitioner,?acting?out?of?a?combination?of?vindictiveness?and?a?need?for?attention. On?a?cold?record,?Friedman?is?not?a?convincing?witness.?The?hearing?panel?itself?conceded?that?his?testimony?was?substantially?”impeached?and?discredited.”?The?State?Bar?admitted?as?much?in?its?brief?before?the?review?department.?Witness?after?witness?testified?to?Friedman’s?bizarre?behavior,?and?much?of?the?evidence?pointed?to?him?as?the?source?of?the?hang-up?calls,?including?his?own?admission?in?one?of?the?recorded?telephone?conversations.?Other?testimony?suggested?that?his?modus?operandi?included?the?use?of?anonymous?postcards?and?obscene?telephone?messages;?one?witness?testified?convincingly?to?circumstances?suggesting?that?Friedman?had?contrived?to?frame?her?by?making?it?appear?(falsely)?that?she?was?responsible?for?painting?obscene?graffiti?on?the?wall?of?a?building?in?which?she?and?Friedman?had?apartments. Yet?even?in?the?face?of?the?admission?by?Friedman?that?he?was?the?source?of?the?hang-up?calls,?other?evidence?that?he?had?lied?under?oath,?and?the?hearing?panel’s?own?conclusion?that?his?credibility?had?been?destroyed,?the?panel?found?that?Friedman?”did?not?appear?capable?of?composing?[an]?obscene?post?card,”?and?found?it?incredible?that?he?could?have?mailed?obscene?material?to?his?mother.fn.?13 Absent?the?evidence?of?petitioner’s?fingerprint,?it?is?unlikely?that?the?hearing?panel?would?have?concluded?that?the?State?Bar’s?case-in-rebuttal?on?the?postcard?charge?had?been?made?out;?indeed,?it?is?unlikely?that?moral?character?proceedings?would?have?been?brought?against?petitioner?at?all.?It?is?easy-and?tempting?in?the?face?of?a?record?as?dauntingly?ambiguous?as?this?one-to?make?too?much?of?the?fingerprint?evidence,?to?make?it,?in?the?words?[54?Cal.3d?323]?of?the?State?Bar,?the?”smoking?gun”?inculpating?petitioner?irrefutably.fn.?14?The?significance?of?this?almost?theatrical?piece?of?physical?evidence,?however,?must?be?evaluated?in?the?context?of?the?entire?case. Petitioner’s?explanation?of?the?appearance?of?his?fingerprint?on?one?of?the?cards?was,?again,?that?Friedman?had?framed?him,?either?by?showing?him?the?postcard?before?it?was?mailed,?by?arranging?to?obtain?a?piece?of?tape?from?petitioner?bearing?his?fingerprint,?or?by?retrieving?the?card?from?the?addressee?(a?Los?Angeles?art?gallery?with?which?Friedman?had?a?family?connection)?and?then?showing?it?to?petitioner.?Petitioner?offered?expert?testimony?to?make?this?account?plausible,?including?the?results?of?a?microscopic?examination?of?the?postcard?by?a?questioned?documents?analyst.?The?expert?testified?that?his?examination?revealed?the?presence?of?debris?beneath?the?tape,?damage?to?one?of?the?taped?corners?of?the?card,?newsprint?on?the?tape?mucilage,?and?a?”double”?print?image-all?features?consistent?with?the?conclusion?that?the?tape?had?at?some?time?been?lifted.fn.?15 In?addition,?petitioner?offered?demonstrative?evidence?to?support?his?theory.?This?consisted?of?expert?testimony?and?the?physical?results?of?an?experimental?replication?of?the?process?by?which,?in?examining?the?postcard,?tape,?and?newsprint,?the?telltale?print?might?have?been?deposited.?The?expert’s?testimony?and?the?demonstrative?evidence?at?least?show?the?plausibility?of?petitioner’s?theory.?That?is,?the?evidence?demonstrates?that?the?postcard?could?have?been?examined?in?the?manner?described?by?petitioner,?and?that?such?an?examination?could?have?left?a?fingerprint?like?the?one?on?the?actual?postcard?without?leaving?evidence?of?tampering?visible?to?the?unaided?eye.fn.?16 The?hearing?panel,?however,?assessed?neither?the?probative?value?of?the?expert’s?findings?of?physical?evidence?of?tampering?nor?the?effect?of?the?experimental?results?on?the?question?whether?petitioner?sent?the?postcards.?[54?Cal.3d?324]?Instead,?it?rejected?petitioner’s?account?on?the?ground?that,?had?Friedman?shown?him?the?card?before?mailing?it,?petitioner?would?have?noticed?that?it?bore?no?postmark.fn.?17?Given?the?state?of?the?record,?however,?this?manner?of?assessing?the?evidence?was?short?of?satisfactory. It?is?true?that?someone?scrutinizing?a?postal?item?for?clues?to?its?origin?might?be?expected?to?notice?the?absence?of?a?cancellation?mark.?But?it?is?also?not?uncommon?to?receive?items?in?the?mail?bearing?neither?a?cancellation?nor?other?evidence?of?mailing.?Although?probative?on?the?issue?of?who?was?responsible?for?the?mailings,?the?fact?that?petitioner?did?not?notice?the?absence?of?a?postal?cancellationfn.?18?is?not,?as?the?hearing?panel?seems?to?have?reasoned,?conclusive?on?the?question.?We?are?not?convinced?that?the?failure?to?observe?that?the?postcard?bore?no?cancellation?ipso?facto?discredited?petitioner’s?explanation?of?the?fingerprint,?and?led?inexorably?to?the?conclusion?that?petitioner?was?responsible?for?the?mailings.?At?the?least,?the?hearing?panel?should?have?provided?some?account?of?the?substantial?evidence?pointing?to?the?opposite?conclusion. Apart?from?the?fingerprint,?there?is?virtually?no?evidence?to?inculpate?petitioner?as?the?author?of?the?obscene?mail;?indeed,?as?noted,?there?is?much?evidence?in?the?record?pointing?to?someone?else.?It?is?not,?of?course,?the?province?of?the?fact?finder?in?this?proceeding?to?determine?who?was?responsible?vel?non?for?the?obscene?mail;?it?is?enough?that?our?independent?review?of?the?entire?record?leaves?us?with?reservations?short?of?being?persuaded?that?petitioner?was?responsible?for?the?obscene?mail.?That?charge?not?being?sustained?by?the?evidence,?and?the?remaining?allegations?against?petitioner?either?being?likewise?unsustained?or,?where?sustained,?not?being?evidence?of?bad?moral?character,?we?conclude?that?the?State?Bar’s?case-?in-rebuttal?failed?to?rebut?petitioner’s?prima?facie?case?of?good?moral?character. III.?Conclusion It?is?ordered?that?the?Committee?of?Bar?Examiners?certify?petitioner?Richard?H.?Lubetzky?to?this?court?as?a?person?qualified?to?be?admitted?to?practice?law.?[54?Cal.3d?325] Our?order?is?effective?upon?finality?of?this?decision?in?this?court.?(See?Cal.?Rules?of?Court,?rule?953(a).) FN?1.?Rule?X,?section?1(a),?Rules?Regulating?Admission?to?Practice?Law?in?California. FN?2.?Between?1980?and?1987,?petitioner?took?the?California?Bar?Examination?13?times?before?passing?in?June?1987.?In?other?words,?except?for?1985,?applicant?took?the?bar?examination?every?time?it?was?offered?for?six?years.?This?may?be?a?record,?but?of?course?it?is?not?fatal?or?even?relevant?to?the?decision?whether?petitioner?should?be?denied?admission?to?practice?on?moral?character?grounds.?(Cf.?Hightower?v.?State?Bar,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?at?p.?153?[applicant?who?had?taken?bar?seven?times?ordered?admitted?over?claims?of?misconduct].) […]

Izazaga?v.?Superior?Court?(People)?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?356?,?285?Cal.Rptr.?231;?815?P.2d?304 [No.?S017642. Aug?30,?1991.] JAVIER?VALLE?IZAZAGA,?Petitioner,?v.?THE?SUPERIOR?COURT?OF?TULARE?COUNTY,?Respondent;?THE?PEOPLE,?Real?Party?in?Interest. (Superior?Court?of?Tulare?County,?No.?29058,?Robert?C.?Van?Auken,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Lucas,?C.?J.,?with?Panelli,?Arabian?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.?Separate?dissenting?opinions?by?Mosk?and?Broussard,?JJ.) COUNSEL Neal?Pereira,?Public?Defender,?Tim?Bazar,?Assistant?Public?Defender,?and?Hugo?Loza,?Deputy?Public?Defender,?for?Petitioner.?[54?Cal.3d?363] Norwood?Nedom,?Michael?E.?Cantrall,?Linda?F.?Robertson,?Thomas?Havlena,?Kevin?J.?Phillips,?Wilbur?Littlefield,?Public?Defender?(Los?Angeles),?Laurence?M.?Sarnoff?and?Albert?J.?Menaster,?Deputy?Public?Defenders,?Jay?B.?Gaskill,?Public?Defender?(Alameda),?and?Harold?G.?Friedman,?Assistant?Public?Defender,?as?Amici?Curiae?on?Behalf?of?Petitioner. No?appearance?for?Respondent. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart?and?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Arnold?O.?Overoye?and?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Michael?J.?Weinberger?and?David?D.?Salmon,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Real?Party?in?Interest. Edwin?L.?Miller,?Jr.,?District?Attorney?(San?Diego),?Thomas?F.?McArdle,?Deputy?District?Attorney,?and?Kent?S.?Scheidegger?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Real?Party?In?Interest. OPINION LUCAS,?C.?J. In?this?case?we?resolve?several?issues?presented?by?the?adoption?on?June?5,?1990,?of?an?initiative?measure?designated?on?the?ballot?as?Proposition?115?and?entitled?the?”Crime?Victims?Justice?Reform?Act.”?Petitioner?raises?various?challenges?under?the?federal?and?state?Constitutions?to?the?provisions?of?the?measure?authorizing?reciprocal?discovery?in?criminal?cases.?(See?also?Raven?v.?Deukmejian?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?336?[276?Cal.Rptr.?326,?801?P.2d?1077]?[Raven;?single-subject?and?revision?challenges?to?Prop.?115];?Tapia?v.?Superior?Court?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?282?[279?Cal.Rptr.?592,?807?P.2d?434]?[challenge?to?retroactive?application?of?Prop.?115].) We?conclude?that,?properly?construed?and?applied,?the?discovery?provisions?of?Proposition?115?are?valid?under?the?state?and?federal?Constitutions,?and?that?Proposition?115?effectively?reopened?the?two-way?street?of?reciprocal?discovery?in?criminal?cases?in?California. Facts Petitioner?was?charged?with?two?counts?of?forcible?rape?(Pen.?Code,?former???261,?subd.?(2)),?one?count?of?kidnapping?(Pen.?Code,???207),?and?numerous?enhancement?allegations.?The?acts?were?alleged?to?have?occurred?on?June?18,?1990.?The?People?served?on?petitioner?an?informal?request?for?[54?Cal.3d?364]?discovery?pursuant?to?newly?adopted?Penal?Code?section?1054.5,?subdivision?(b)?(section?1054.5(b)).?After?petitioner?refused?the?informal?discovery?request,?the?People?filed?a?formal?motion?for?discovery?in?superior?court,?to?which?petitioner?filed?an?opposition.?Following?a?hearing,?the?court?granted?the?motion?and?issued?an?order?requiring?discovery.fn.?1 The?Court?of?Appeal?summarily?denied?petitioner’s?application?for?a?writ?of?mandate?or?prohibition.?We?stayed?the?discovery?order?and?issued?an?alternative?writ?of?mandate?to?consider?the?important?constitutional?and?interpretive?questions?presented.?Petitioner?raises?several?arguments?regarding?the?constitutionality?of?the?discovery?provisions?added?by?Proposition?115.?Before?we?consider?these?contentions,?we?first?review?these?new?discovery?provisions. Constitutional?and?Statutory?Provisions Proposition?115?added?both?constitutional?and?statutory?language?authorizing?reciprocal?discovery?in?criminal?cases.?Section?30,?subdivision?(c),?added?to?article?I?of?the?California?Constitution?(article?I,?section?30(c))?by?Proposition?115,?declares?discovery?to?be?”reciprocal”?in?criminal?cases.?(“In?order?to?provide?for?fair?and?speedy?trials,?discovery?in?criminal?cases?shall?be?reciprocal?in?nature,?as?prescribed?by?the?Legislature?or?by?the?People?through?the?initiative?process.”) Proposition?115?also?added?a?new?Penal?Code?chapter?on?discovery.?(Pen.?Code,???1054?et?seq.?[hereafter,?the?new?discovery?chapter].)?The?new?Penal?Code?sections?relevant?to?the?issues?that?arise?in?this?case?are?section?1054?(providing?for?interpretation?of?the?chapter?to?give?effect?to?certain?specified?purposes),?section?1054.1?(providing?for?defense?discovery),?section?1054.3?(providing?for?prosecutorial?discovery),?section?1054.5?(providing?mechanism?for?compelled?discovery),?section?1054.6?(providing?that?discovery?shall?not?be?required?of?work?product?or?otherwise?privileged?information?and?material),?and?section?1054.7?(requiring?disclosure?at?least?30?days?prior?to?trial,?placing?a?continuing?duty?to?disclose?on?both?prosecution?and?[54?Cal.3d?365]?defense,?and?providing?for?denial?of?disclosure?on?a?showing?of?”good?cause”).fn.?2 Proposition?115?also?repealed?several?discovery?provisions,?including?former?Penal?Code?section?1102.5?(previously?declared?unconstitutional?in?In?re?Misener?(1985)?38?Cal.3d?543?[213?Cal.Rptr.?569,?698?P.2d?637]?[Misener],?discussed?below),?and?Penal?Code?former?section?1430?(requiring?prosecutor?to?furnish?defendant?with?police?and?arrest?reports).?Furthermore,?Proposition?115?repealed?the?provisions?in?Penal?Code?section?859?requiring?prosecutors?to?furnish?defendants?with?police?and?arrest?reports. III.?Discussion Privilege?Against?Self-incrimination Petitioner?asserts?application?of?the?discovery?provisions?enacted?by?Proposition?115?would?violate?his?state?and?federal?constitutional?privileges?against?compelled?self-?incrimination.?We?disagree. Federal?Constitutional?Challenge.?The?Fifth?Amendment?of?the?United?States?Constitution?recites?in?pertinent?part:?”No?person?…?shall?be?compelled?in?any?criminal?case?to?be?a?witness?against?himself?….”?Petitioner?asserts?that?the?new?discovery?chapter?enacted?by?Proposition?115?compels?a?criminal?defendant?to?be?a?witness?against?oneself?in?violation?of?the?foregoing?self-incrimination?clause. [1]?First,?petitioner?argues?that?the?requirement?under?section?1054.3fn.?3?that?the?defense?must?disclose?to?the?prosecution?the?names?and?addresses?of?all?witnesses?it?intends?to?call?at?trial,?rather?than?merely?its?alibi?witnesses,?violates?the?self-incrimination?clause.?Decisions?of?the?Supreme?Court?compel?a?contrary?conclusion. In?Williams?v.?Florida?(1970)?399?U.S.?78?[26?L.Ed.2d?446,?90?S.Ct.?1893]?(Williams),?the?high?court?upheld?against?a?self-incrimination?clause?challenge?[54?Cal.3d?366]?Florida’s?”notice-of-alibi”?rule,?which?required?a?criminal?defendant?intending?to?rely?on?an?alibi?defense?to?notify?the?prosecution?of?the?place?where?the?defendant?claimed?to?be?at?the?time?in?question,?and?of?the?names?and?addresses?of?the?witnesses?the?defendant?intended?to?call?in?support?of?the?alibi.?Petitioner,?noting?that?section?1054.3?is?not?limited?to?situations?involving?an?alibi?defense,?attempts?to?distinguish?Williams?and?argues?that?the?self-?incrimination?clause?prohibits?the?compelled?discovery?of?defense?witnesses?in?the?absence?of?an?alibi?defense?and?the?special?problems?it?presents.?As?support?for?this?argument?petitioner?cites?the?language?in?Williams?that,?”Given?the?ease?with?which?an?alibi?can?be?fabricated,?the?State’s?interest?in?protecting?itself?against?an?eleventh-hour?defense?is?both?obvious?and?legitimate.”?(Id.?at?p.?81?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?450].) Petitioner’s?argument?is?misguided.?The?language?in?Williams?on?which?he?relies?relates?to?the?due?process?and?fair?trial?issues?addressed?in?that?case,?and?is?not?relevant?to?the?Fifth?Amendment?analysis.?Moreover,?petitioner’s?argument?misinterprets?the?scope?of?the?self-incrimination?clause,?which?”protects?a?person?only?against?being?incriminated?by?his?own?compelled?testimonial?communications.”?(Fisher?v.?United?States?(1976)?425?U.S.?391,?409?[48?L.Ed.2d?39,?55,?96?S.Ct.?1569],?italics?added.)?Under?cases?of?the?Supreme?Court,?there?are?four?requirements?that?together?trigger?this?privilege:?the?information?sought?must?be?(i)?”incriminating”;?(ii)?”personal?to?the?defendant”;?(iii)?obtained?by?”compulsion”;?and?(iv)?”testimonial?or?communicative?in?nature.”?(See?United?States?v.?Nobles?(1975)?422?U.S.?225?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?95?S.Ct.?2160]?[Nobles];?Schmerber?v.?California?(1966)?384?U.S.?757,?761?[16?L.Ed.2d?908,?914,?86?S.Ct.?1826];?Doe?v.?United?States?(1988)?487?U.S.?201,?207?[101?L.Ed.2d?184,?194-195,?108?S.Ct.?2341].)fn.?4 Statutorily?mandated?discovery?of?evidence?that?meets?these?four?requirements?is?prohibited.?Conversely,?discovery?of?evidence?that?does?not?meet?each?of?these?requirements?is?not?barred?by?the?self-?incrimination?clause.?(See?Schmerber?v.?California,?supra,?384?U.S.?757,?761?[16?L.Ed.2d?908,?914].)?This?is?so?even?in?the?absence?of?special?state?interests?such?as?protection?against?easily?fabricated?”eleventh-hour”?defenses.?The?absence?of?particular?state?interests?in?disclosure?affects?none?of?these?four?requirements,?and?thus?cannot?itself?trigger?the?self-incrimination?clause.?(See?New?Jersey?v.?Portash?(1979)?440?U.S.?450,?459?[59?L.Ed.2d?501,?510,?99?S.Ct.?1292].) In?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?the?high?court?held?that?discovery?of?the?names?and?addresses?of?a?defendant’s?alibi?witnesses?is?not?”compelled”?self-incrimination,?and?therefore?does?not?violate?the?Fifth?Amendment.?(Id.?[54?Cal.3d?367]?at?p.?85?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?452].)?The?court?reasoned,?”At?most,?the?rule?only?compelled?[defendant]?to?accelerate?the?timing?of?his?disclosure,?by?forcing?him?to?divulge?at?an?earlier?date?information?that?the?[defendant]?from?the?beginning?planned?to?divulge?at?trial.”?(Ibid.?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?452],?italics?added.)?Thus,?discovery?of?the?names?and?addresses?of?the?witnesses?that?the?defense?intends?to?call?at?trial,?whether?or?not?in?support?of?an?alibi?defense,?merely?forces?the?defendant?”to?divulge?at?an?earlier?date?information?that?the?[defendant]?from?the?beginning?planned?to?divulge?at?trial.”?(Ibid.?[26?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?452].)?Under?the?rationale?of?Williams,?such?discovery?does?not?constitute?compelled?self-incrimination,?and?therefore?does?not?implicate?the?privilege.fn.?5 [2a]?We?thus?address?petitioner’s?second?contention,?that?insofar?as?section?1054.3?requires?the?defense?to?disclose?before?trial?any?statements?of?the?witnesses?it?intends?to?call?at?trial,?that?section?violates?the?self-incrimination?clause.?Once?again,?decisions?of?the?Supreme?Court?compel?a?contrary?conclusion. Compelled?disclosure?of?the?statements?of?defense?witnesses?does?not?meet?all?of?the?requirements?necessary?to?implicate?the?self-incrimination?clause.?We?agree?with?petitioner?that?the?acceleration?doctrine?of?Williams?discussed?above?is?not?dispositive?here,?for?it?is?not?a?matter?of?merely?forcing?the?defendant?”to?divulge?at?an?earlier?date?information?that?the?[defendant]?from?the?beginning?planned?to?divulge?at?trial.”?(Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?85?[26?L.Ed.2d?446,?452].)?Some?statements?of?witnesses?the?defense?intends?to?call?might?never?be?offered?at?trial?by?the?defense.?Thus,?to?the?extent?that?the?statements?are?incriminating,?such?incrimination?is?indeed?compelled.?And?clearly?such?statements?are?”testimonial?or?communicative?in?nature.”?(See?Schmerber?v.?California,?supra,?384?U.S.?757,?761?[16?L.Ed.2d?908,?914].)?Such?statements?are?not,?however,?”personal?to?the?defendant.”?[54?Cal.3d?368] [3]?As?the?high?court?stated?in?Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?”?’is?a?personal?privilege:?it?adheres?basically?to?the?person,?not?to?information?that?may?incriminate?him.’?”?(Id.?at?p.?233?[45?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?150-151],?quoting?Couch?v.?United?States?(1973)?409?U.S.?322,?327?[34?L.Ed.2d?548,?553-554,?93?S.Ct.?611],?italics?in?original.)?In?Nobles,?the?court?rejected?a?self-incrimination?challenge?to?a?trial?court?order?requiring?the?defense?to?disclose?its?investigator’s?report?of?statements?made?by?prosecutorial?witnesses?once?the?defense?called?its?investigator?as?a?trial?witness. In?Nobles?the?high?court?reasoned:?”The?fact?that?these?statements?of?third?parties?were?elicited?by?a?defense?investigator?on?[defendant’s]?behalf?does?not?convert?them?into?[defendant’s]?personal?communications.?Requiring?their?production?from?the?investigator?therefore?would?not?in?any?sense?compel?[defendant]?to?be?a?witness?against?himself?or?extort?communications?from?him.”?(Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?234?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?151].)?The?court?concluded,?”the?Fifth?Amendment?privilege?against?compulsory?self-incrimination,?being?personal?to?the?defendant,?does?not?extend?to?the?testimony?or?statements?of?third?parties?called?as?witnesses?at?trial.”?(Ibid.?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?151].) The?high?court’s?reasoning?in?Nobles?is?controlling?here.?Section?1054.3?requires?disclosure?by?the?defense?of?statements,?and?reports?of?statements,?of?”persons,?other?than?defendant,”?that?the?defense?intends?to?call?as?witnesses?at?trial.?[2b]?Thus,?the?compelled?statements?are?those?of?”third?parties”?within?the?meaning?of?Nobles?and?are?therefore?outside?of?the?scope?of?the?self-incrimination?clause.?(Nobles,?supra,?422?U.S.?225,?234?[45?L.Ed.2d?141,?151].)fn.?6 Petitioner?attempts?to?distinguish?Nobles,?noting?that?the?Supreme?Court?has?never?upheld?disclosure?of?statements?of?defense?witnesses?before?trial.fn.?7?He?further?observes?that?the?Federal?Rules?of?Criminal?Procedure?provide?for?disclosure?of?statements?of?defense?witnesses?only?after?they?testify?at?trial,?citing?rule?26?of?the?Federal?Rules?of?Criminal?Procedure?(18?U.S.C.). Here?again?petitioner’s?argument?misinterprets?the?scope?of?the?self-?incrimination?clause.?The?timing?of?the?disclosure,?whether?before?or?during?[54?Cal.3d?369]?trial,?does?not?affect?any?of?the?four?requirements?that?together?trigger?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination,?and?therefore?cannot?implicate?the?privilege.?The?acceleration?doctrine?of?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?compels?this?conclusion.?We?conclude?that?statements?of?the?witnesses?that?the?defense?intends?to?call?at?trial?are?not?personal?to?the?defendant,?and?therefore?compelled?discovery?of?such?statements?does?not?implicate?the?self-incrimination?clause.fn.?8 Having?concluded?that?application?of?the?discovery?provisions?enacted?by?Proposition?115?does?not?violate?petitioner’s?Fifth?Amendment?privilege?against?self-incrimination,?we?turn?now?to?the?privilege?under?the?state?Constitution. State?Constitutional?Challenge.?Section?15?of?article?I?of?the?California?Constitution?(hereafter?article?I,?section?15)?guarantees?the?defendant?in?a?criminal?case?certain?procedural?rights,?including?the?right?not?to?be?compelled?to?testify?against?oneself.?This?court?relied?on?that?provision?in?Misener,?supra,?38?Cal.3d?543,?to?invalidate?former?Penal?Code?section?1102.5,?which?permitted?the?prosecution?to?discover?from?the?defendant,?following?testimony?on?direct?examination?of?defense?witnesses?other?than?the?defendant,?prior?statements?made?by?those?witnesses.?[4a]?Petitioner?asserts?the?new?discovery?chapter?is?unconstitutional?under?our?decisions?in?Misener?and?other?cases?interpreting?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-?incrimination. Misener,?supra,?38?Cal.3d?543,?was?preceded?by?a?long?line?of?decisions?of?this?court?on?the?subject?of?prosecutorial?discovery,?beginning?with?Jones?v.?Superior?Court?(1962)?58?Cal.2d?56[22?Cal.Rptr.?879,?372?P.2d?919,?96?A.L.R.2d?1213]?(Jones;?holding?that?pretrial?discovery?by?prosecution?of?identities?and?written?reports?of?expert?witnesses?defendant?intends?to?call?at?trial?does?not?violate?state?self-incrimination?clause?or?attorney-client?privilege).?It?is?appropriate?that?our?analysis?of?the?state?Constitution?begin?with?the?observation?of?then-Justice?Traynor?in?Jones?that?”absent?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?or?other?privileges?provided?by?law,?the?defendant?in?a?criminal?case?has?no?valid?interest?in?denying?the?prosecution?access?to?evidence?that?can?throw?light?on?issues?in?the?case.”?(Jones,?supra,?58?Cal.2d?at?p.?59.)?In?Jones?the?court?concluded?that?discovery,?functioning?so?as?to?[54?Cal.3d?370]?promote?”the?orderly?ascertainment?of?truth,”?”should?not?be?a?one-way?street.”?(Id.?at?p.?60.) The?two-way?street?envisioned?by?then-Justice?Traynor?in?Jones?was?short?lived?as?the?road?to?prosecutorial?discovery?was?effectively?closed?in?Prudhomme?v.?Superior?Court?(1970)?2?Cal.3d?320?[85?Cal.Rptr.?129,?466?P.2d?673]?(Prudhomme).?In?Prudhomme,?we?reasoned?that?”certain?significant?developments?in?the?law?since?Jones,”?including?a?decision?of?the?Supreme?Court?applying?the?Fifth?Amendment?privilege?against?self-incrimination?to?the?states?(Malloy?v.?Hogan?(1964)?378?U.S.?1?[12?L.Ed.2d?653,?84?S.Ct.?1489]),?and?the?high?court’s?”increasing?emphasis?upon?the?role?played?by”?that?privilege,?were?cause?to?reexamine?the?policies?underlying?prosecutorial?discovery.?(Prudhomme,?supra,?2?Cal.3d?at?p.?323.)?Prudhomme,?essentially?limiting?Jones?to?its?facts,?reasoned?that?the?focus?must?be?whether?the?compelled?discovery?”conceivably?might?lighten?the?prosecution’s?burden?of?proving?its?case?in?chief”?and?held?that?the?privilege?”forbids?compelled?disclosures?which?could?serve?as?a?’link?in?a?chain’?of?evidence?tending?to?establish?guilt?of?a?criminal?offense.”?(Id.?at?p.?326.)?Accordingly,?Prudhomme?annulled?a?discovery?order?that?would?have?required?the?defendant?to?disclose?to?the?prosecution?the?names,?addresses?and?expected?testimony?of?all?witnesses?he?intended?to?call?at?trial.?(Id.?at?p.?328.) The?federal?trend?that?we?perceived?in?Prudhomme,?supra,?2?Cal.3d?320,?was?abruptly?terminated?two?months?later?by?the?high?court’s?decision?in?Williams,?supra,?399?U.S.?78,?upholding?Florida’s?notice-of-alibi?rule?against?a?Fifth?Amendment?self-incrimination?challenge.?Thereafter,?in?a?case?addressing?the?validity?of?a?nonstatutory?discovery?order?requiring?the?defense?to?disclose?to?the?prosecution?the?names?and?addresses?of?the?witnesses?it?would?call,?we?retained?the?Prudhomme?rule,?resting?it?on?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?contained?in?the?California?Constitution.?(Reynolds?v.?Superior?Court?(1974)?12?Cal.3d?834?[117?Cal.Rptr.?437,?528?P.2d?45]?[Reynolds].)?We?stated?in?Reynolds,?”it?cannot?be?gainsaid?that?Prudhomme?put?this?court?on?record?as?being?considerably?more?solicitous?of?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination?than?federal?law?currently?requires.”?(Id.?at?p.?843;?see?also?Allen?v.?Superior?Court?(1976)?18?Cal.3d?520,?524-526?[134?Cal.Rptr.?774,?557?P.2d?65]?[invalidating?court?order?requiring?disclosure?by?defendant?of?prospective?witnesses,?so?jurors?could?ascertain?whether?they?were?acquainted?with?them,?as?violative?of?state?privilege?against?self-incrimination?in?absence?of?finding?that?such?disclosure?could?not?possibly?tend?to?incriminate?defendant?or?lessen?prosecution’s?burden?of?proof].) Any?possibility?that?the?state?privilege?against?self-incrimination?would?nonetheless?permit?some?form?of?prosecutorial?discovery?was?eliminated?in?[54?Cal.3d?371]?Misener,?supra,?38?Cal.3d?543,?in?which?we?struck?down?the?Legislature’s?attempt?to?fashion?a?reciprocal?discovery?statute,?reasoning?that?to?the?extent?a?compelled?disclosure?is?useful?to?the?prosecution’s?case,?it?violates?the?defendant’s?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination. The?foregoing?cases?represented?the?state?of?the?law?facing?the?voters?in?June?1990?when?they?voted?to?amend?the?California?Constitution.?As?discussed?above,?Proposition?115?added?article?I,?section?30(c)?to?the?California?Constitution,?providing?that?”discovery?in?criminal?cases?shall?be?reciprocal?in?nature,?as?prescribed?by?the?Legislature?or?by?the?people?through?the?initiative?process.”?The?concept?of?”reciprocal”?discovery?mandated?by?article?I,?section?30(c)?is?inherently?inconsistent?with?the?roadblock?to?prosecutorial?discovery?created?by?our?earlier?interpretations?of?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination?as?developed?in?the?Prudhomme?line?of?cases.?Thus,?in?resolving?this?inconsistency?we?must?apply?principles?of?constitutional?interpretation. [5]?Rudimentary?principles?of?construction?dictate?that?when?constitutional?provisions?can?reasonably?be?construed?so?as?to?avoid?conflict,?such?a?construction?should?be?adopted.?(Serrano?v.?Priest?(1971)?5?Cal.3d?584,?596?[96?Cal.Rptr.?601,?487?P.2d?1241,?41?A.L.R.3d?1187];?see?also?Lungren?v.?Deukmejian?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?727,?735?[248?Cal.Rptr.?115,?755?P.2d?299].)?As?a?means?of?avoiding?conflict,?a?recent,?specific?provision?is?deemed?to?carve?out?an?exception?to?and?thereby?limit?an?older,?general?provision.?(See,?e.g.,?People?v.?Valentine?(1986)?42?Cal.3d?170,?181?[228?Cal.Rptr.?25,?720?P.2d?913];?Serrano?v.?Priest,?supra,?5?Cal.3d?at?p.?596;?People?v.?Western?Airlines,?Inc.?(1954)?42?Cal.2d?621,?637?[268?P.2d?723].)?[4b]?Therefore,?to?the?extent?that?the?Prudhomme?line?of?cases?impeded?reciprocal?discovery,?article?I,?section?30(c)?must?be?seen?as?abrogating?those?cases,?and?limiting?the?scope?of?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination?as?it?relates?to?reciprocal?discovery.?(See?People?v.?Valentine,?supra,?42?Cal.3d?at?p.?181.)fn.?9?Article?I,?section?30(c)?constitutes?a?specific?exception?to?the?broad?[54?Cal.3d?372]?privilege?against?self-?incrimination?set?forth?in?article?I,?section?15?of?the?California?Constitution.?(Ibid.) Such?an?interpretation?gives?effect?to?the?intent?of?the?voters?in?passing?Proposition?115.?[6]?The?manifest?intent?behind?the?measure?was?to?reopen?the?two-way?street?of?reciprocal?discovery.?The?preamble?to?Proposition?115?states?that?”comprehensive?reforms?are?needed?to?restore?balance?and?fairness?to?our?criminal?justice?system.”?(Prop.?115,???1(a),?italics?added.)?In?order?to?accomplish?this?goal,?the?voters?intended?to?remove?the?roadblock?to?prosecutorial?discovery?created?by?our?interpretations?of?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-?incrimination?as?developed?in?the?Prudhomme?line?of?cases.?The?preamble?further?states,?”In?order?to?address?these?concerns?and?to?accomplish?these?goals,?we?the?people?further?find?that?it?is?necessary?to?reform?the?law?as?developed?in?numerous?California?Supreme?Court?decisions?….”?(Prop.?115,???1(b).) [4c]?We?note?the?California?Constitution?continues?to?afford?criminal?defendants?an?independent?source?of?protection?from?infringement?of?certain?rights,?including?the?privilege?against?self-incrimination.?(See?Raven,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?336?[invalidating?Prop.?115?to?extent?it?would?have?required?interpretation?of?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination,?and?other?rights?of?criminal?defendants,?consistently?with?analogous?rights?in?federal?Constitution].)?These?general?rights?of?criminal?defendants,?however,?are?necessarily?limited?to?the?extent?they?are?inconsistent?with?article?I,?section?30(c),?pertaining?to?reciprocal?discovery.?(See?People?v.?Valentine,?supra,?42?Cal.3d?at?p.?181.)?Thus,?petitioner’s?reliance?on?the?state?constitutional?privilege?against?self-incrimination?as?a?restriction?on?reciprocal?discovery?is?unavailing. Right?to?Due?Process?of?Law Petitioner?asserts?the?new?discovery?chapter?violates?his?right?to?due?process?of?the?law?under?the?Fourteenth?Amendment?of?the?United?States?Constitution.?We?disagree.?The?Fourteenth?Amendment?recites?in?pertinent?part:?”No?state?shall?…?deprive?any?person?of?life,?liberty,?or?property,?without?due?process?of?law?….” Reciprocity?Challenge.?[7]?The?foregoing?due?process?clause?has?little?to?say?about?the?amount?of?discovery?which?must?be?afforded?the?parties?in?a?criminal?prosecution.?(Wardius?v.?Oregon,?supra,?412?U.S.?470,?474[37?L.Ed.2d?82,?87]?[Wardius];?but?cf.?Brady?v.?Maryland?(1963)?373?U.S.?83?[10?L.Ed.2d?215,?83?S.Ct.?1194]?[Brady;?prosecutor?has?obligation?to?disclose?exculpatory?evidence].)?The?due?process?clause,?however,?”does?[54?Cal.3d?373]?speak?to?the?balance?of?forces?between?the?accused?and?his?accuser.”?(Wardius,?supra,?at?p.?474?[37?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?87],?italics?added.)?That?is,?when?the?prosecution?is?allowed?discovery?of?the?defense,?that?discovery?must?be?reciprocal.?(Ibid.?[37?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?87.].)?In?Wardius?the?Supreme?Court?held?that?under?the?due?process?clause,?a?criminal?defendant?cannot?be?compelled?by?discovery?procedures?to?reveal?his?alibi?defense?in?the?absence?of?fair?notice?that?he?would?have?the?opportunity?to?discover?the?prosecution’s?rebuttal?witnesses. [8]?Petitioner?asserts?the?new?discovery?chapter?fails?on?its?face?to?provide?for?reciprocal?discovery?as?required?by?the?due?process?clause.?Properly?construed,?we?conclude?that?the?new?discovery?chapter?affords?defendants?sufficient?rights?of?reciprocal?discovery?to?meet?the?requirements?of?the?due?process?clause.?At?the?outset?we?note?that,?for?two?reasons,?our?interpretation?of?the?statutory?scheme?should?favor?an?implicit?requirement?of?reciprocity. First,?article?I,?section?30(c),?the?new?constitutional?provision?enacted?contemporaneously?with?the?new?discovery?chapter,?expressly?provides?that?”discovery?in?criminal?cases?shall?be?reciprocal?in?nature,?as?prescribed?by?the?Legislature?or?by?the?People?through?the?initiative?process.”?It?follows?that?the?voters,?in?requiring?that?any?initiative?prescribing?that?discovery?in?criminal?cases?be?”reciprocal?in?nature,”?would?naturally?intend?that?their?contemporaneous?enactment?of?a?discovery?scheme?for?criminal?cases?would?in?fact?provide?for?such?reciprocity. Second,?turning?to?the?statutory?enactment?itself,?Penal?Code?section?1054?(section?1054)?expressly?provides?that?the?entire?new?discovery?chapter?”shall?be?interpreted?to?give?effect?to?all?of?the?following?purposes,”?including?the?provision?that?”no?discovery?shall?occur?in?criminal?cases?except?as?provided?by?this?chapter,?other?express?statutory?provisions,?or?as?mandated?by?the?Constitution?of?the?United?States.”?(??1054,?subd.?(e),?italics?added.)?Given?that?the?due?process?clause?mandates?reciprocity?when?the?prosecution?obtains?discovery?materials?from?the?defense?(Wardius,?supra,?412?U.S.?470),?and?given?that?the?new?discovery?chapter?provides?for?prosecutorial?discovery?of?defense?evidence?(see?Pen.?Code,???1054.1?[section?1054.1]),fn.?10?it?follows?that?the?new?discovery?chapter?should,?if?possible,?be?interpreted?as?providing?such?reciprocity.?[54?Cal.3d?374] […]

Kinlaw?v.?State?of?California?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?326?,?285?Cal.Rptr.?66;?814?P.2d?1308 [No.?S014349.?Aug?30,?1991.] FRANCES?KINLAW?et?al.,?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants,?v.?THE?STATE?OF?CALIFORNIA?et?al.,?Defendants?and?Respondents. (Superior?Court?of?Alameda?County,?No.?632120-4,?Henry?Ramsey,?Jr.,?and?Demetrios?P.?Agretelis,?Judges.) (Opinion?by?Baxter,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?Kennard,?and?Arabian,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Broussard,?J.,?with?Mosk,?J.,?concurring.) COUNSEL Stephen?D.?Schear,?Stephen?E.?Ronfeldt,?Armando?M.?Menocal?III,?Lois?Salisbury,?Laura?Schulkind?and?Kirk?McInnis?for?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants.?[54?Cal.3d?328] Catherine?I.?Hanson,?Astrid?G.?Meghrigian,?Alice?P.?Mead,?Alan?K.?Marks,?County?Counsel?(San?Bernardino),?Paul?F.?Mordy,?Deputy?County?Counsel,?De?Witt?W.?Clinton,?County?Counsel?(Los?Angeles),?Robert?M.?Fesler,?Assistant?County?Counsel,?Frank?J.?DaVanzo,?Deputy?County?Counsel,?Weissburg?&?Aronson,?Mark?S.?Windisch,?Carl?Weissburg?and?Howard?W.?Cohen?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?N.?Eugene?Hill,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Richard?M.?Frank,?Asher?Rubin?and?Carol?Hunter,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Defendants?and?Respondents. OPINION BAXTER,?J. Plaintiffs,?medically?indigent?adults?and?taxpayers,?seek?to?enforce?section?6?of?article?XIII?B?(hereafter,?section?6)?of?the?California?Constitution?through?an?action?for?declaratory?and?injunctive?relief.?They?invoked?the?jurisdiction?of?the?superior?court?as?taxpayers?pursuant?to?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?526a?and?as?persons?affected?by?the?alleged?failure?of?the?state?to?comply?with?section?6.?The?superior?court?granted?summary?judgment?for?defendants?State?of?California?and?Director?of?the?Department?of?Health?Services,?after?concluding?that?plaintiffs?lacked?standing?to?prosecute?the?action.?On?appeal,?the?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?plaintiffs?have?standing?and?that?the?action?is?not?barred?by?the?availability?of?administrative?remedies. We?reverse.?The?administrative?procedures?established?by?the?Legislature,?which?are?available?only?to?local?agencies?and?school?districts?directly?affected?by?a?state?mandate,?are?the?exclusive?means?by?which?the?state’s?obligations?under?section?6?are?to?be?determined?and?enforced.?Plaintiffs?therefore?lack?standing. I?State?Mandates Section?6,?adopted?on?November?6,?1979,?as?part?of?an?initiative?measure?imposing?spending?limits?on?state?and?local?government,?also?imposes?on?the?state?an?obligation?to?reimburse?local?agencies?for?the?cost?of?most?programs?and?services?which?they?must?provide?pursuant?to?a?state?mandate?if?the?local?agencies?were?not?under?a?preexisting?duty?to?fund?the?activity.?It?provides:?[54?Cal.3d?329] “Whenever?the?Legislature?or?any?state?agency?mandates?a?new?program?or?higher?level?of?service?on?any?local?government,?the?state?shall?provide?a?subvention?of?funds?to?reimburse?such?local?government?for?the?costs?of?such?program?or?increased?level?of?service,?except?that?the?Legislature?may,?but?need?not,?provide?such?subvention?of?funds?for?the?following?mandates: “(a)?Legislative?mandates?requested?by?the?local?agency?affected; “(b)?Legislation?defining?a?new?crime?or?changing?an?existing?definition?of?a?crime;?or “(c)?Legislative?mandates?enacted?prior?to?January?1,?1975,?or?executive?orders?or?regulations?initially?implementing?legislation?enacted?prior?to?January?1,?1975.” A?complementary?provision,?section?3?of?article?XIII?B,?provides?for?a?shift?from?the?state?to?the?local?agency?of?a?portion?of?the?spending?or?”appropriation”?limit?of?the?state?when?responsibility?for?funding?an?activity?is?shifted?to?a?local?agency: “The?appropriations?limit?for?any?fiscal?year?…?shall?be?adjusted?as?follows:?[?]?(a)?In?the?event?that?the?financial?responsibility?of?providing?services?is?transferred,?in?whole?or?in?part,?…?from?one?entity?of?government?to?another,?then?for?the?year?in?which?such?transfer?becomes?effective?the?appropriations?limit?of?the?transferee?entity?shall?be?increased?by?such?reasonable?amount?as?the?said?entities?shall?mutually?agree?and?the?appropriations?limit?of?the?transferor?entity?shall?be?decreased?by?the?same?amount.” II?Plaintiffs’?Action The?underlying?issue?in?this?action?is?whether?the?state?is?obligated?to?reimburse?the?County?of?Alameda,?and?shift?to?Alameda?County?a?concomitant?portion?of?the?state’s?spending?limit,?for?the?cost?of?providing?health?care?services?to?medically?indigent?adults?who?prior?to?1983?had?been?included?in?the?state?Medi-Cal?program.?Assembly?Bill?No.?799?(1981-1982?Reg.?Sess.)?(AB?799)?(Stats.?1982,?ch.?328,?p.?1568)?removed?medically?indigent?adults?from?Medi-Cal?effective?January?1,?1983.?At?the?time?section?6?was?adopted,?the?state?was?funding?Medi-Cal?coverage?for?these?persons?without?requiring?any?county?financial?contribution. Plaintiffs?initiated?this?action?in?the?Alameda?County?Superior?Court.?They?sought?relief?on?their?own?behalf?and?on?behalf?of?a?class?of?similarly?[54?Cal.3d?330]?situated?medically?indigent?adult?residents?of?Alameda?County.?The?only?named?defendants?were?the?State?of?California,?the?Director?of?the?Department?of?Health?Services,?and?the?County?of?Alameda. In?the?complaint?for?declaratory?and?injunctive?relief,?plaintiffs?sought?an?injunction?compelling?the?state?to?restore?Medi-Cal?eligibility?to?medically?indigent?adults?or?to?reimburse?the?County?of?Alameda?for?the?cost?of?providing?health?care?to?those?persons.?They?also?prayed?for?a?declaration?that?the?transfer?of?responsibility?from?the?state-financed?Medi-?Cal?program?to?the?counties?without?adequate?reimbursement?violated?the?California?Constitution.fn.?1 At?the?time?plaintiffs?initiated?their?action?neither?Alameda?County,?nor?any?other?county?or?local?agency,?had?filed?a?reimbursement?claim?with?the?Commission?on?State?Mandates?(Commission).fn.?2 Whether?viewed?as?an?action?seeking?restoration?of?Medi-Cal?benefits,?one?to?compel?state?reimbursement?of?county?costs,?or?one?for?declaratory?relief,?therefore,?the?action?required?a?determination?that?the?enactment?of?AB?799?created?a?state?mandate?within?the?contemplation?of?section?6.?Only?upon?resolution?of?that?issue?favorably?to?plaintiffs?would?the?state?have?an?obligation?to?reimburse?the?county?for?its?increased?expense?and?shift?a?portion?of?its?appropriation?limit,?or?to?reinstate?Medi-Cal?benefits?for?plaintiffs?and?the?class?they?seek?to?represent. The?gravamen?of?the?action?is,?therefore,?enforcement?of?section?6.fn.?3?[54?Cal.3d?331] III?Enforcement?of?Article?XIII?B,?Section?6 In?1984,?almost?five?years?after?the?adoption?of?article?XIII?B,?the?Legislature?enacted?comprehensive?administrative?procedures?for?resolution?of?claims?arising?out?of?section?6.?(??17500.)?The?Legislature?did?so?because?the?absence?of?a?uniform?procedure?had?resulted?in?inconsistent?rulings?on?the?existence?of?state?mandates,?unnecessary?litigation,?reimbursement?delays,?and,?apparently,?resultant?uncertainties?in?accommodating?reimbursement?requirements?in?the?budgetary?process.?The?necessity?for?the?legislation?was?explained?in?section?17500: “The?Legislature?finds?and?declares?that?the?existing?system?for?reimbursing?local?agencies?and?school?districts?for?the?costs?of?state-?mandated?local?programs?has?not?provided?for?the?effective?determination?of?the?state’s?responsibilities?under?Section?6?of?Article?XIII?B?of?the?California?Constitution.?The?Legislature?finds?and?declares?that?the?failure?of?the?existing?process?to?adequately?and?consistently?resolve?the?complex?legal?questions?involved?in?the?determination?of?state-mandated?costs?has?led?to?an?increasing?reliance?by?local?agencies?and?school?districts?on?the?judiciary?and,?therefore,?in?order?to?relieve?unnecessary?congestion?of?the?judicial?system,?it?is?necessary?to?create?a?mechanism?which?is?capable?of?rendering?sound?quasi-judicial?decisions?and?providing?an?effective?means?of?resolving?disputes?over?the?existence?of?state-mandated?local?programs.”?(Italics?added.) In?part?7?of?division?4?of?title?2?of?the?Government?Code,?”State-Mandated?Costs,”?which?commences?with?section?17500,?the?Legislature?created?the?Commission?(??17525),?to?adjudicate?disputes?over?the?existence?of?a?state-mandated?program?(???17551,?17557)?and?to?adopt?procedures?for?submission?and?adjudication?of?reimbursement?claims?(??17553).?The?five-member?Commission?includes?the?Controller,?the?Treasurer,?the?Director?of?Finance,?the?Director?of?the?Office?of?Planning?and?Research,?and?a?public?member?experienced?in?public?finance.?(??17525.) The?legislation?establishes?a?test-claim?procedure?to?expeditiously?resolve?disputes?affecting?multiple?agencies?(??17554),fn.?4?establishes?the?method?of?[54?Cal.3d?332]?payment?of?claims?(???17558,?17561),?and?creates?reporting?procedures?which?enable?the?Legislature?to?budget?adequate?funds?to?meet?the?expense?of?state?mandates?(???17562,?17600,?17612,?subd.?(a).) Pursuant?to?procedures?which?the?Commission?was?authorized?to?establish?(??17553),?local?agenciesfn.?5?and?school?districtsfn.?6?are?to?file?claims?for?reimbursement?of?state-mandated?costs?with?the?Commission?(???17551,?17560),?and?reimbursement?is?to?be?provided?only?through?this?statutory?procedure.?(???17550,?17552.) The?first?reimbursement?claim?filed?which?alleges?that?a?state?mandate?has?been?created?under?a?statute?or?executive?order?is?treated?as?a?”test?claim.”?(??17521.)?A?public?hearing?must?be?held?promptly?on?any?test?claim.?At?the?hearing?on?a?test?claim?or?on?any?other?reimbursement?claim,?evidence?may?be?presented?not?only?by?the?claimant,?but?also?by?the?Department?of?Finance?and?any?other?department?or?agency?potentially?affected?by?the?claim.?(??17553.)?Any?interested?organization?or?individual?may?participate?in?the?hearing.?(??17555.) A?local?agency?filing?a?test?claim?need?not?first?expend?sums?to?comply?with?the?alleged?state?mandate,?but?may?base?its?claim?on?estimated?costs.?(??17555.)?The?Commission?must?determine?both?whether?a?state?mandate?exists?and,?if?so,?the?amount?to?be?reimbursed?to?local?agencies?and?school?districts,?adopting?”parameters?and?guidelines”?for?reimbursement?of?any?claims?relating?to?that?statute?or?executive?order.?(??17557.)?Procedures?for?determining?whether?local?agencies?have?achieved?statutorily?authorized?cost?savings?and?for?offsetting?these?savings?against?reimbursements?are?also?provided.?(??17620?et?seq.)?Finally,?judicial?review?of?the?Commission?decision?is?available?through?petition?for?writ?of?mandate?filed?pursuant?to?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?1094.5.?(??17559.) The?legislative?scheme?is?not?limited?to?establishing?the?claims?procedure,?however.?It?also?contemplates?reporting?to?the?Legislature?and?to?departments?and?agencies?of?the?state?which?have?responsibilities?related?to?funding?state?mandates,?budget?planning,?and?payment.?The?parameters?and?guidelines?adopted?by?the?Commission?must?be?submitted?to?the?Controller,?who?is?to?pay?subsequent?claims?arising?out?of?the?mandate.?(??17558.)?Executive?orders?mandating?costs?are?to?be?accompanied?by?an?appropriations?[54?Cal.3d?333]?bill?to?cover?the?costs?if?the?costs?are?not?included?in?the?budget?bill,?and?in?subsequent?years?the?costs?must?be?included?in?the?budget?bill.?(??17561,?subds.?(a)?&?(b).)?Regular?review?of?the?costs?is?to?be?made?by?the?Legislative?Analyst,?who?must?report?to?the?Legislature?and?recommend?whether?the?mandate?should?be?continued.?(??17562.)?The?Commission?is?also?required?to?make?semiannual?reports?to?the?Legislature?of?the?number?of?mandates?found?and?the?estimated?reimbursement?cost?to?the?state.?(??17600.)?The?Legislature?must?then?adopt?a?”local?government?claims?bill.”?If?that?bill?does?not?include?funding?for?a?state?mandate,?an?affected?local?agency?or?school?district?may?seek?a?declaration?from?the?superior?court?for?the?County?of?Sacramento?that?the?mandate?is?unenforceable,?and?an?injunction?against?enforcement.?(??17612.) Additional?procedures,?enacted?in?1985,?create?a?system?of?state-mandate?apportionments?to?fund?reimbursement.?(??17615?et?seq.) [1]?It?is?apparent?from?the?comprehensive?nature?of?this?legislative?scheme,?and?from?the?Legislature’s?expressed?intent,?that?the?exclusive?remedy?for?a?claimed?violation?of?section?6?lies?in?these?procedures.?The?statutes?create?an?administrative?forum?for?resolution?of?state?mandate?claims,?and?establishes?procedures?which?exist?for?the?express?purpose?of?avoiding?multiple?proceedings,?judicial?and?administrative,?addressing?the?same?claim?that?a?reimbursable?state?mandate?has?been?created.?The?statutory?scheme?also?designates?the?Sacramento?County?Superior?Court?as?the?venue?for?judicial?actions?to?declare?unfunded?mandates?invalid?(??17612). The?legislative?intent?is?clearly?stated?in?section?17500:?”It?is?the?intent?of?the?Legislature?in?enacting?this?part?to?provide?for?the?implementation?of?Section?6?of?Article?XIII?B?of?the?California?Constitution?and?to?consolidate?the?procedures?for?reimbursement?of?statutes?specified?in?the?Revenue?and?Taxation?Code?with?those?identified?in?the?Constitution.?…”?And?section?17550?states:?”Reimbursement?of?local?agencies?and?school?districts?for?costs?mandated?by?the?state?shall?be?provided?pursuant?to?this?chapter.” Finally,?section?17552?provides:?”This?chapter?shall?provide?the?sole?and?exclusive?procedure?by?which?a?local?agency?or?school?district?may?claim?reimbursement?for?costs?mandated?by?the?state?as?required?by?Section?6?of?Article?XIII?B?of?the?California?Constitution.”?(Italics?added.) In?short,?the?Legislature?has?created?what?is?clearly?intended?to?be?a?comprehensive?and?exclusive?procedure?by?which?to?implement?and?enforce?section?6.?[54?Cal.3d?334] IV?Exclusivity [2]?Plaintiffs?argued,?and?the?Court?of?Appeal?agreed,?that?the?existence?of?an?administrative?remedy?by?which?affected?local?agencies?could?enforce?their?right?under?section?6?to?reimbursement?for?the?cost?of?state?mandates?did?not?bar?this?action?because?the?administrative?remedy?is?available?only?to?local?agencies?and?school?districts. The?Court?of?Appeal?recognized?that?the?decision?of?the?County?of?Alameda,?which?had?not?filed?a?claim?for?reimbursement?at?the?time?the?complaint?was?filed,?was?a?discretionary?decision?which?plaintiffs?could?not?challenge.?(Dunn?v.?Long?Beach?L.?&?W.?Co.?(1896)?114?Cal.?605,?609,?610-611?[46?P.?607];?Silver?v.?Watson?(1972)?26?Cal.App.3d?905,?909?[103?Cal.Rptr.?576];?Whitson?v.?City?of?Long?Beach?(1962)?200?Cal.App.2d?486,?506?[19?Cal.Rptr.?668];?Elliott?v.?Superior?Court?(1960)?180?Cal.App.2d?894,?897?[5?Cal.Rptr.?116].)?The?court?concluded,?however,?that?public?policy?and?practical?necessity?required?that?plaintiffs?have?a?remedy?for?enforcement?of?section?6?independent?of?the?statutory?procedure. The?right?involved,?however,?is?a?right?given?by?the?Constitution?to?local?agencies,?not?individuals?either?as?taxpayers?or?recipients?of?government?benefits?and?services.?Section?6?provides?that?the?”state?shall?provide?a?subvention?of?funds?to?reimburse?…?local?governments?….”?(Italics?added.)?The?administrative?remedy?created?by?the?Legislature?is?adequate?to?fully?implement?section?6.?That?Alameda?County?did?not?file?a?reimbursement?claim?does?not?establish?that?the?enforcement?remedy?is?inadequate.?Any?of?the?58?counties?was?free?to?file?a?claim,?and?other?counties?did?so.?The?test?claim?is?now?before?the?Court?of?Appeal.?The?administrative?procedure?has?operated?as?intended. The?Legislature?has?the?authority?to?establish?procedures?for?the?implementation?of?local?agency?rights?under?section?6.?Unless?the?exercise?of?a?constitutional?right?is?unduly?restricted,?the?court?must?limit?enforcement?to?the?procedures?established?by?the?Legislature.?(People?v.?Western?Air?Lines,?Inc.?(1954)?42?Cal.2d?621,?637?[268?P.2d?723];?Chesney?v.?Byram?(1940)?15?Cal.2d?460,?463?[101?P.2d?1106];?County?of?Contra?Costa?v.?State?of?California?(1986)?177?Cal.App.3d?62,?75?[222?Cal.Rptr.?750].) Plaintiffs’?argument?that?they?must?be?permitted?to?enforce?section?6?as?individuals?because?their?right?to?adequate?health?care?services?has?been?compromised?by?the?failure?of?the?state?to?reimburse?the?county?for?the?cost?[54?Cal.3d?335]?of?services?to?medically?indigent?adults?is?unpersuasive.?Plaintiffs’?interest,?although?pressing,?is?indirect?and?does?not?differ?from?the?interest?of?the?public?at?large?in?the?financial?plight?of?local?government.?Although?the?basis?for?the?claim?that?the?state?must?reimburse?the?county?for?its?costs?of?providing?the?care?that?was?formerly?available?to?plaintiffs?under?Medi-Cal?is?that?AB?799?created?a?state?mandate,?plaintiffs?have?no?right?to?have?any?reimbursement?expended?for?health?care?services?of?any?kind.?Nothing?in?article?XIII?B?or?other?provision?of?law?controls?the?county’s?expenditure?of?the?funds?plaintiffs?claim?must?be?paid?to?the?county.?To?the?contrary,?section?17563?gives?the?local?agency?complete?discretion?in?the?expenditure?of?funds?received?pursuant?to?section?6,?providing:?”Any?funds?received?by?a?local?agency?or?school?district?pursuant?to?the?provisions?of?this?chapter?may?be?used?for?any?public?purpose.” The?relief?plaintiffs?seek?in?their?prayer?for?state?reimbursement?of?county?expenses?is,?in?the?end,?a?reallocation?of?general?revenues?between?the?state?and?the?county.?Neither?public?policy?nor?practical?necessity?compels?creation?of?a?judicial?remedy?by?which?individuals?may?enforce?the?right?of?the?county?to?such?revenues.?The?Legislature?has?established?a?procedure?by?which?the?county?may?claim?any?revenues?to?which?it?believes?it?is?entitled?under?section?6.?That?test-claim?statute?expressly?provides?that?not?only?the?claimant,?but?also?”any?other?interested?organization?or?individual?may?participate”?in?the?hearing?before?the?Commission?(??17555)?at?which?the?right?to?reimbursement?of?the?costs?of?such?mandate?is?to?be?determined.?Procedures?for?receiving?any?claims?must?”provide?for?presentation?of?evidence?by?the?claimant,?the?Department?of?Finance?and?any?other?affected?department?or?agency,?and?any?other?interested?person.”?(??17553.?Italics?added.)?Neither?the?county?nor?an?interested?individual?is?without?an?opportunity?to?be?heard?on?these?questions.?These?procedures?are?both?adequate?and?exclusive.fn.?7 The?alternative?relief?plaintiffs?seek-reinstatement?to?Medi-Cal?pending?further?action?by?the?state-is?not?a?remedy?available?under?the?statute,?and?thus?is?not?one?which?this?court?may?award.?The?remedy?for?the?failure?to?fund?a?program?is?a?declaration?that?the?mandate?is?unenforceable.?That?relief?is?available?only?after?the?Commission?has?determined?that?a?mandate?exists?[54?Cal.3d?336]?and?the?Legislature?has?failed?to?include?the?cost?in?a?local?government?claims?bill,?and?only?on?petition?by?the?county.?(??17612.)fn.?8 Moreover,?the?judicial?remedy?approved?by?the?Court?of?Appeal?permits?resolution?of?the?issues?raised?in?a?state?mandate?claim?without?the?participation?of?those?officers?and?individuals?the?Legislature?deems?necessary?to?a?full?and?fair?exposition?and?resolution?of?the?issues.?Neither?the?Controller?nor?the?Director?of?Finance?was?named?a?defendant?in?this?action.?The?Treasurer?and?the?Director?of?the?Office?of?Planning?and?Research?did?not?participate.?All?of?these?officers?would?have?been?involved?in?determining?the?question?as?members?of?the?Commission,?as?would?the?public?member?of?the?Commission.?The?judicial?procedures?were?not?equivalent?to?the?public?hearing?required?on?test?claims?before?the?Commission?by?section?17555.?Therefore,?other?affected?departments,?organizations,?and?individuals?had?no?opportunity?to?be?heard.fn.?9 Finally,?since?a?determination?that?a?state?mandate?has?been?created?in?a?judicial?proceeding?rather?than?one?before?the?Commission?does?not?trigger?the?procedures?for?creating?parameters?and?guidelines?for?payment?of?claims,?or?for?inclusion?of?estimated?costs?in?the?state?budget,?there?is?no?source?of?funds?available?for?compliance?with?the?judicial?decision?other?than?the?appropriations?for?the?Department?of?Health?Services.?Payment?from?those?funds?can?only?be?at?the?expense?of?another?program?which?the?department?is?obligated?to?fund.?No?public?policy?supports,?let?alone?requires,?this?result. The?superior?court?acted?properly?in?dismissing?this?action. The?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?reversed. Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?J.,?Kennard,?J.,?and?Arabian,?J.,?concurred. […]

People?v.?Webster?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?411?,?285?Cal.Rptr.?31;?814?P.2d?1273 [No.?S004528.?Crim.?No.?23128. Aug?30,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?LARRY?JUNIOR?WEBSTER,?Defendant?and?Appellant. [No.?S007757. Aug?30,?1991.] In?re?LARRY?JUNIOR?WEBSTER?on?Habeas?Corpus. (Superior?Court?of?Sacramento?County,?No.?62613,?Sheldon?H.?Grossfeld,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?[54?Cal.3d?412]?Baxter,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli?and?Arabian,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?and?dissenting?opinions?by?Mosk,?Broussard?and?Kennard,?JJ.) COUNSEL Joseph?D.?Allen,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?Allen?&?Allen?and?David?K.?Allen?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Steve?White?and?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Arnold?O.?[54?Cal.3d?423]?Overoye,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Jane?N.?Kirkland,?Ward?A.?Campbell?and?Edmund?D.?McMurray,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION BAXTER,?J. Defendant?Larry?Junior?Webster?and?three?other?men?were?jointly?tried?on?charges?arising?from?the?death?of?William?Burke.?A?jury?convicted?defendant?of?first?degree?murder?with?personal?use?of?a?deadly?and?dangerous?weapon?(Pen.?Code,????187,?189,?12022,?subd.?(b)),fn.?1?robbery?(??211),?conspiracy?to?commit?first?degree?murder?and?robbery?(??182,?former?subd.?1?[now?subd.?(a)(1)]),?and?grand?theft?of?an?automobile?(former???487,?subd.?3?[see?now???487h]).?Under?the?1978?death?penalty?law,?the?jury?found?as?special?circumstances?of?the?murder?that?defendant?intentionally?committed?it?while?lying?in?wait?(??190.2,?subd.?(a)(15))?and?while?engaged?in?the?commission?or?attempted?commission?of?a?robbery?(id.,?subd.?(a)(17)(i)).?After?a?penalty?trial,?the?jury?fixed?defendant’s?punishment?at?death.?His?motion?for?modification?of?the?death?verdict?(??190.4,?subd.?(e))?was?denied.?Defendant’s?appeal?is?automatic. We?find?no?prejudicial?error?affecting?either?the?guilt?or?penalty?judgments.?We?will?therefore?affirm?them?in?full. Defendant?has?filed?a?separate?petition?for?habeas?corpus?alleging?(1)?that?his?trial?counsel?rendered?ineffective?assistance?in?various?respects?and?(2)?that?newly?discovered?evidence?warrants?guilt?and?penalty?retrials.?We?conclude?that?the?petition?fails?to?state?a?prima?facie?case?for?relief.?We?will?therefore?deny?the?petition. Guilt?Trial Prosecution?evidence. The?principal?prosecution?witnesses?were?Bruce?Smith?and?Michelle?Cram.?As?the?jury?knew,?Smith?had?already?pled?guilty?to?second?degree?murder?in?connection?with?the?homicide,?and?Cram?had?been?granted?immunity?in?return?for?her?testimony. Smith?and?Cram?provided?the?following?account,?differing?only?in?minor?details:?In?late?August?1981,?defendant,?Joseph?Madrigal,?Carl?Williams,?Robert?Coville,?Smith,?and?the?17-year-old?Cram?were?living?at?a?riverbank?encampment?in?Sacramento.?Defendant?was?the?group?leader.?On?the?night?of?August?29,?Smith,?Madrigal,?and?Coville?robbed?a?nearby?convenience?store.?[54?Cal.3d?424]?Quick?response?by?the?police?forced?the?trio?to?hide?for?several?hours?before?returning?to?camp. The?next?day,?August?30,?defendant?and?Williams?made?one?of?several?trips?to?buy?beer,?which?the?camp?residents?were?consuming?at?a?steady?pace.?When?the?men?returned?in?early?afternoon,?defendant?said?they?had?met?two?”outlaws”?(“street?persons”?or?”survivors”)?at?the?Shell?station?near?the?convenience?store.?Defendant?reported?there?was?still?intense?police?activity?in?the?area?because?of?the?robbery,?and?he?suggested?the?group?needed?to?leave?town.?Defendant?said?he?had?arranged?to?use?the?”outlaws’?”?car?for?joint?drug?purchases?or?robberies?that?evening.?The?opportunity?arose,?he?suggested,?to?lure?one?of?the?”outlaws”?back?to?the?camp,?kill?him,?and?steal?the?car. Madrigal,?Coville,?and?Williams?expressed?enthusiasm?for?the?plan.?According?to?Cram,?defendant?said?he?personally?would?kill?and?dismember?the?victim;?according?to?Smith,?Coville?said?he?”hadn’t?killed?somebody?in?quite?a?while”?and?would?”take?care?of?it.”?When?Cram?expressed?skepticism?about?defendant’s?boasts,?he?insisted?he?was?serious.?Defendant?said?this?would?be?Cram’s?first?criminal?lesson?and?would?help?her?become?more?independent?from?Williams,?with?whom?she?was?living. It?was?decided?that?because?the?”outlaws”?knew?Williams,?he?would?walk?back?to?the?Shell?station?with?defendant?to?meet?them.?Madrigal?would?go?along.?Once?the?three?returned?to?camp?with?the?intended?victim,?either?defendant?(according?to?Cram)?or?Coville?(according?to?Smith)?would?kill?him.?Defendant?showed?Smith?where?to?dig?a?grave?and?told?Cram?to?clean?up?the?campsite?and?pack?in?preparation?for?the?group’s?departure.?Defendant,?Williams,?and?Madrigal?then?left?for?a?7:30?p.m.?meeting?with?the?”outlaws.”?Defendant?had?drunk?beer?all?day?and?may?have?taken?amphetamines.?As?usual,?defendant?was?wearing?glasses;?Williams?wore?a?cowboy?hat. While?the?three?men?were?gone,?Smith?and?Cram?worked?at?their?assignments;?Coville?sat?and?drank?beer.?After?half?an?hour’s?absence,?defendant?called?out?from?the?top?of?a?levee?that?his?group?had?returned.?Four?men?walked?single?file?down?the?trail?to?the?camp.?Williams?was?in?the?lead,?followed?in?order?by?Madrigal,?victim?Burke,?and?defendant.?When?the?four?were?about?halfway?down?the?trail,?defendant?suddenly?grabbed?Burke?and?pulled?a?knife.?According?to?Smith,?defendant?moved?around?to?the?front?of?Burke?and?stabbed?him;?Cram?saw?defendant?reach?from?behind?to?stab?Burke?in?the?chest.?Burke?protested,?and?a?struggle?ensued.?Madrigal?turned?back?to?assist?defendant.?Burke?began?to?make?gurgling?sounds.?[54?Cal.3d?425] Cram?became?hysterical,?so?defendant?and?Williams?told?Smith?to?take?her?to?”Fag?Beach”?and?wait.fn.?2?Ten?minutes?later,?defendant,?Madrigal,?Williams,?and?Coville?arrived?at?the?”Fag?Beach”?parking?lot?with?the?group’s?belongings.?Defendant?gave?Coville?a?car?key,?which?Coville?used?to?unlock?the?trunk?of?a?car?parked?in?the?lot.?The?group?loaded?their?possessions?in?the?car,?proceeded?to?Interstate?5,?and?drove?all?night?toward?Southern?California.?Defendant?indicated?that?they?should?eventually?turn?east,?toward?Missouri. As?they?rode,?Madrigal?explained?to?Smith?that?”the?man?had?died?hard.”?Madrigal?said?Burke?had?managed?to?grab?defendant’s?knife?and?inflict?a?thigh?wound?on?defendant?before?Madrigal?joined?in?to?help?defendant?”finish?the?job?and?get?his?knife?back.”?Madrigal?indicated?that?he?himself?had?been?slashed?across?the?stomach?by?Burke?during?the?struggle.?Smith?said?that,?at?one?point,?he?saw?defendant’s?and?Madrigal’s?knives?in?the?car. About?3:30?p.m.?the?next?day,?as?defendant?was?driving,?an?officer?of?the?California?Highway?Patrol?(CHP)?stopped?the?group’s?car?for?speeding?on?Interstate?15?near?Barstow.?Investigation?stemming?from?the?traffic?stop?eventually?led?to?the?arrest?of?all?six?passengers,?and?to?statements?by?Smith?and?Cram?concerning?the?Burke?homicide.?(See?discussion,?post.)?On?September?8,?Detective?Burchett?of?the?Sacramento?Police?Department?took?an?in-custody?statement?from?Cram?which?essentially?conformed?to?her?trial?testimony. Guided?by?Smith’s?directions,?the?police?found?Burke’s?body?in?its?shallow?riverbank?grave?on?the?morning?of?September?3.?Burke’s?throat?had?been?cut,?and?there?were?24?other?stab?wounds,?8?in?the?rear?of?the?body.?The?wounds?could?have?been?inflicted?by?more?than?one?knife?and?more?than?one?person.?Burke’s?pants?pocket?was?turned?out,?but?his?wallet?had?not?been?taken. The?car?in?which?the?group?was?arrested?was?registered?to?Ronnie?Glover.?Glover?testified?that?on?the?evening?of?August?30,?he?loaned?the?car?to?his?cousin?Burke,?with?whom?he?was?travelling.?Burke?then?left?the?Shell?station?in?the?company?of?three?men?meeting?the?descriptions?of?defendant?(glasses),?Madrigal,?and?Williams?(cowboy?hat).?Glover?never?saw?Burke?or?the?car?again. When?examined?at?the?time?of?booking,?Madrigal?and?defendant?both?had?fresh?injuries.?Defendant’s?wound?was?on?the?knee.?A?bloodstained?knife?was?found?in?the?car?taken?from?Glover?and?Burke.?[54?Cal.3d?426] Defense?evidence. Defendant?testified?in?his?own?behalf.?He?denied?any?plan?to?kill?the?victim?and?steal?his?car.?The?camp?residents?had?engaged?in?a?drunken?discussion?about?killing?people,?but?defendant?insisted?he?merely?taunted?the?others?to?show?they?were?not?as?”tough”?as?they?maintained.?Defendant?did?tell?the?”sniveling”?Cram?that?”[t]his?will?be?your?first?day?of?school,”?but?the?remark?was?intended?only?to?”shut?her?up.”?He?did?not?order?anyone?to?dig?a?grave?or?break?camp?before?he?went?to?meet?Glover?and?Burke. Later,?according?to?defendant,?Burke?handed?him?the?car?keys?when?they?arrived?at?the?”Fag?Beach”?parking?lot.?Defendant?was?”fairly?loaded”?but?not?staggering?drunk.?As?the?four?men?walked?from?the?car?toward?the?camp,?he?and?Burke?were?arguing?over?how?to?split?the?proceeds?of?drug?sales?and?robberies?planned?for?later?in?the?evening.?Burke?wanted?a?larger?share?because?he?had?furnished?the?car.?Burke?suddenly?pulled?a?knife?and?slashed?defendant?on?the?leg.?Defendant?managed?to?get?control?of?Burke’s?weapon?and?defended?himself.?Burke?kept?”charging”?at?defendant?and?Madrigal,?forcing?them?to?continue?stabbing?him.?Burke?could?have?left?had?he?wished?to?do?so. Only?after?Burke’s?death,?defendant?said,?did?the?group?decide?to?take?the?car?and?flee.?Attempts?to?dig?a?makeshift?grave?were?unsuccessful,?so?they?dragged?Burke’s?body?under?a?bush.?They?also?threw?knives?belonging?to?defendant,?Madrigal,?Burke,?and?Smith?into?the?river.?Defendant?denied?going?through?Burke’s?pockets.?He?could?not?name?the?owner?of?the?knife?found?in?the?car?but?said?it?was?not?Madrigal’s. William?Gaida,?a?Sacramento?detective,?testified?about?a?statement?taken?from?Cram?on?September?2,?which?differed?in?minor?respects?from?Cram’s?trial?testimony.?Larry?Moser?testified?that?several?years?earlier,?he?was?seriously?injured?in?a?barroom?fight?initiated?by?Burke. Coville?testified?in?his?own?defense.?He?denied?participating?in?or?overhearing?a?plan?to?kill?Burke.?Coville?said?he?was?drunk?when?defendant,?Madrigal,?and?Williams?returned?to?camp?with?Burke.?Coville?insisted?he?did?not?see?the?killing?of?Burke,?but?defendant?later?told?him?”this?guy?[had]?jumped?on?[defendant]?and?stuck?him?with?a?knife”?and?defendant?thought?the?”guy”?was?dead?after?a?struggle.?Coville?recited?in?some?detail?how?the?group?reached?Burke’s?car?and?left?town. A?psychiatrist,?Dr.?Globus,?testified?that?Coville?was?an?alcoholic?with?brain?damage?and?a?history?of?”amnestic?episodes.”?Coville?told?Dr.?Globus?he?remembered?little?of?the?incident?besides?drinking?and?”partying.”?Dr.?[54?Cal.3d?427]?Globus?believed?Coville?and?concluded?he?could?not?have?formed?the?mental?states?necessary?for?malice,?premeditation,?lying?in?wait,?or?intent?to?kill. Neither?Williams?nor?Madrigal?testified.?Madrigal’s?long?history?of?behavioral?and?psychiatric?problems?and?drug?and?alcohol?abuse?was?detailed.?Dr.?Mungas,?a?psychologist,?testified?that?Madrigal?had?hazy?memories?of?a?fight?but?remembered?no?details.?Dr.?Mertz,?a?psychiatrist,?testified?that?Williams?told?her?he?had?been?consuming?beer?and?amphetamines?continuously?by?the?evening?of?August?30;?he?remembered?going?to?the?Shell?station?and?returning?with?Burke;?he?heard?a?scuffle?behind?him?and?took?Cram?away.?Dr.?Mertz?concluded?that?because?of?drug?and?alcohol?intoxication,?Williams?had?diminished?capacity?to?conspire,?harbor?malice,?premeditate,?or?intend?to?kill.fn.?3 Penalty?Trial Prosecution?evidence. The?People?presented?evidence?that?in?the?early?morning?of?August?31,?1981,?the?day?after?the?Burke?homicide,?defendant,?Madrigal,?Smith,?and?Williams?robbed?a?convenience?store?in?Pacoima.?The?prosecution?presented?a?videotape?of?the?robbery,?along?with?the?testimony?of?Smith?and?the?store?clerk,?Eli?Yitshaky.?The?evidence?indicated?that?defendant?was?the?ringleader,?that?he?and?Madrigal?brandished?knives,?and?that?Yitshaky?was?knocked?unconscious?after?complying?with?the?robbers’?order?to?lie?down?on?the?floor.?The?robbers?took?food,?money?from?the?cash?register,?and?Yitshaky’s?personal?property.?Defendant,?who?followed?Smith?from?the?store,?told?Smith?he?had?”punched?[Yitshaky]?out”?and?had?taken?his?wallet?and?watch. The?prosecution?introduced?evidence?that?on?October?31,?1981,?defendant?and?Madrigal?were?convicted?of?armed?robbery?in?the?Pacoima?case.?Two?Washington?State?felony?convictions?against?defendant?were?also?presented:?a?1977?conviction?for?second?degree?assault,?and?a?1974?conviction?for?second?degree?burglary. Defense?evidence. Several?members?of?defendant’s?family?testified?in?his?behalf.?According?to?his?two?sisters,?the?family?was?poor.?Their?father?was?unemployed?and?a?[54?Cal.3d?428]?cruel?alcoholic?who?often?beat?the?children?and?their?mother.?Still,?defendant?was?cooperative?and?hardworking?until?he?returned?from?his?two?combat?tours?in?Vietnam.?Thereafter,?his?personality?was?completely?changed;?he?was?remote?and?bitter.?He?complained?that?television?news?about?the?war?was?inaccurate.?While?drinking?in?a?bar?with?his?sister?Linda?Moss,?defendant?cried?and?said?he?had?run?over?a?Vietnamese?child?while?driving?his?Army?supply?truck?during?maneuvers.?Defendant’s?mother?confirmed?her?son’s?personality?change?after?Vietnam?and?pleaded?for?his?life. Defendant?produced?documentary?evidence?that?he?had?received?the?Bronze?Star?for?combat?bravery?in?Vietnam.?The?citation?for?this?medal?indicated?that?defendant,?disregarding?his?own?safety,?had?leveled?”devastating”?machine-gun?fire?on?an?advancing?enemy?force?to?protect?tanks?that?were?taking?on?ammunition?from?his?supply?truck. Finally,?defendant?presented?evidence?about?his?efforts?to?learn?a?trade?in?the?Washington?State?Penitentiary.?A?prison?vocational?counselor?said?defendant?approached?him?for?assistance?in?entering?auto-body?and?welding?courses.?According?to?his?instructors,?defendant’s?performance?in?the?auto-?body?class?was?average;?his?performance?in?a?welding?class?was?excellent. Madrigal,?who?was?jointly?tried?on?the?issue?of?penalty,?also?presented?character?and?background?evidence?from?relatives.?Dr.?Mertz?expanded?upon?the?guilt?phase?evidence?of?Madrigal’s?mental?state.?Dr.?Mertz?said?Madrigal?still?had?little?recall?of?the?Burke?homicide?and?had?expressed?remorse.?She?reiterated?that?Madrigal?was?a?chronic?alcoholic?and?amphetamine?abuser?and?diagnosed?an?”atypical?pervasive?developmental?disorder”?with?antisocial?features.?These?conditions,?said?Dr.?Mertz,?impaired?Madrigal’s?capacity?to?appreciate?the?criminality?of?his?conduct?and?to?conform?his?behavior?to?law.?The?jury?sentenced?Madrigal?to?life?imprisonment?without?parole. [1]?(See?fn.?4.)?Guilt?Issuesfn.?4 Search?and?seizure?issues. Defendant?claims?his?convictions?must?be?reversed?because?the?evidence?linking?him?to?Burke’s?death?stems?from?illegal?searches?and?seizures.?(U.S.?Const.,?Amends.?IV,?XIV;?Cal.?Const.,?art.?I,???13.)?We?disagree.?[54?Cal.3d?429] The?pertinent?facts?are?gleaned?from?both?the?preliminary?hearing?and?the?superior?court?suppression?hearing.?On?the?afternoon?of?August?31,?1981,?CHP?Officer?Abbott?stopped?a?Chrysler?automobile?for?speeding?on?Interstate?15?near?Barstow.?Abbott?asked?defendant,?the?driver,?for?his?license;?defendant?produced?only?a?birth?certificate.?While?writing?the?speeding?ticket,?Abbott?asked?defendant?who?owned?the?car.?Defendant?said?”it?belonged?to?a?guy?in?the?back?seat”?but?also?indicated?that?the?passengers?were?hitchhikers.?Abbott?then?received?a?radio?message?that?defendant?was?wanted?on?an?outstanding?warrant.?Abbott?arrested?defendant,?placed?him?in?the?patrol?car,?and?radioed?for?assistance. Backup?units?arrived?within?two?or?three?minutes.?Abbott?then?approached?the?Chrysler?and?asked?the?five?passengers?who?owned?it.?All?shrugged?or?shook?their?heads.?Abbott?ordered?them?out?of?the?vehicle.?Coville?appeared?intoxicated,?so?Abbott?arrested?him?for?public?drunkenness?and?placed?him?in?another?patrol?unit.?Abbott?asked?again?who?owned?the?Chrysler?and?again?received?negative?responses.?Several?of?the?occupants?said?they?were?hitchhikers.?Abbott?then?searched?the?Chrysler’s?glove?compartment?and?visor?for?registration?papers.?None?were?found.?Abbott?also?radioed?for?a?registration?check?on?the?vehicle,?but?he?received?no?immediate?reply. While?Abbott?was?looking?inside?the?Chrysler?for?registration,?he?saw?a?wallet?lying?in?the?middle?of?the?front?seat,?the?position?previously?occupied?by?Coville.?Abbott?retrieved?the?wallet?and?asked?each?of?the?vehicle’s?occupants?who?owned?it.?Defendant?explicitly?denied?ownership,?as?did?all?the?others?with?the?possible?exception?of?the?intoxicated?Coville.?Abbott?then?opened?the?wallet?for?the?purpose?of?determining?its?owner.?He?found?identification?for?Eli?Yitshaky,?the?clerk?of?the?Pacoima?convenience?store?robbed?by?defendant?and?three?of?his?companions?early?that?morning. Abbott?eventually?learned?by?radio?that?the?Chrysler?was?registered?to?a?Mr.?Glover?of?Oroville,?but?the?car?had?not?been?reported?stolen.?The?passengers?were?asked?if?they?knew?Glover;?all?responded?negatively.?Smith,?Cram,?Madrigal,?and?Williams?were?released?by?the?roadside?with?their?belongings,?and?the?car?was?impounded.?Shortly?thereafter,?Abbott’s?investigation?linked?the?wallet?to?the?Pacoima?robbery.?Abbott?learned?that?defendant?and?his?five?passengers?fit?the?four?robbers’?general?descriptions.?The?four?released?passengers?were?located?and?arrested.?Smith?and?Cram?made?in-custody?statements?about?the?Burke?homicide. […]

Nickelsberg?v.?Workers’?Comp.?Appeals?Bd.?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?288?,?285?Cal.Rptr.?86;?814?P.2d?1328 [No.?S013121.?Aug?30,?1991.] DIETER?NICKELSBERG,?Petitioner,?v.?WORKERS’?COMPENSATION?APPEALS?BOARD?and?LOS?ANGELES?UNIFIED?SCHOOL?DISTRICT,?Respondents. (Opinion?by?Panelli,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Arabian?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Broussard,?J.,?with?Mosk?and?Kennard,?JJ.,?concurring.) COUNSEL William?A.?Herreras?and?John?W.?Messer?for?Petitioner. Rucka,?O’Boyle,?Lombardo?&?McKenna?and?N.?Michael?Rucka?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Petitioner. Kegel,?Tobin,?Hamrick?&?Truce,?Robert?W.?Gilpin?and?Michael?A.?Ingler?for?Respondents. Haworth,?Bradshaw?&?Chaney?and?C.?Gordon?Taylor?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Respondents. OPINION PANELLI,?J. We?granted?review?to?determine?whether?a?workers’?compensation?judge?had?jurisdiction?to?award?petitioner?Dieter?Nickelsberg?(Nickelsberg)?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?more?than?five?years?after?the?date?of?his?original?injury.?We?conclude,?as?did?the?Workers’?Compensation?Appeals?Board?(WCAB)?and?the?Court?of?Appeal,?that?the?workers’?compensation?judge?lacked?jurisdiction?to?award?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?to?Nickelsberg. Facts Nickelsberg,?a?truck?driver?for?the?Los?Angeles?Unified?School?District,?suffered?industrial?injuries?to?his?back?and?legs?in?1976?and?again?in?1979.?Nickelsberg?stipulated?with?the?school?district?and?with?the?State?Compensation?Insurance?Fund?that?his?injuries?had?resulted?in?temporary?disability?from?January?6,?1979,?through?June?8,?1981,?and?in?permanent?disability?of?66?3/4?percent.?The?parties?also?stipulated?that?Nickelsberg?might?need?further?medical?treatment?to?cure?or?to?relieve?the?injuries’?effects.?Pursuant?to?the?stipulation,?a?workers’?compensation?judge?awarded?Nickelsberg?indemnity?for?temporary?and?permanent?disability?and?further?medical?treatment?on?February?2,?1983. Nickelsberg?underwent?back?surgery?in?July?1987.?Pursuant?to?the?original?award,?the?school?district?paid?for?Nickelsberg’s?medical?treatment.?He?was?again?temporarily,?totally?disabled?from?March?7,?1987,?to?November?25,?1987.?[54?Cal.3d?292] On?February?8,?1988,?more?than?nine?years?from?the?date?of?his?1979?injury,?Nickelsberg?filed?a?petition?to?reopen?his?original?award.?He?claimed?that?he?had?suffered?a?”new?and?further?disability”?as?defined?in?Labor?Code?section?5410.?He?also?claimed?that,?because?the?new?period?of?disability?was?caused?by?medical?treatment?provided?pursuant?to?his?existing?award,?he?was?entitled?to?recover?further?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?under?Labor?Code?section?4656,fn.?1?as?amended?in?1978?(see???4656,?as?amended?by?Stats.?1978,?ch.?937,???1,?p.?2913).?In?opposition?to?Nickelsberg’s?claim,?the?school?district?contended?that?an?additional?award?would?be?barred?by?the?time?and?jurisdictional?limitations?of?sections?5804?and?5410. Accepting?Nickelsberg’s?argument,?the?workers’?compensation?judge?awarded?further?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?on?November?10,?1988,?and?the?school?district?sought?reconsideration?by?the?WCAB.?The?WCAB?determined?that?the?school?district’s?petition?was?untimely.?However,?because?the?WCAB?determined?that?the?workers’?compensation?judge?erred?in?granting?Nickelsberg?further?temporary?total?disability,?it?decided?to?grant?reconsideration?on?its?own?motion.?(??5900,?subd.?(b).) The?WCAB?rescinded?the?award.?The?WCAB?determined?that?”an?award?of?further?medical?treatment?does?not?implicitly?carry?with?it?a?commensurate?award?of?temporary?total?disability.”?On?that?basis,?the?WCAB?concluded?that?Nickelsberg’s?petition?to?reopen?was?barred?by?section?5804?and?that?the?workers’?compensation?judge?therefore?lacked?jurisdiction?to?award?further?temporary?total?disability?indemnity.?The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed. Discussionfn.?2 Former?section?4656?provided?that?”[a]ggregate?disability?payments?for?a?single?injury?causing?temporary?disability?shall?not?extend?for?more?than?240?compensable?weeks?within?a?period?of?five?years?from?the?date?of?the?injury.” Section?4656?was?amended?in?1978.?(Sen.?Bill?No.?1851?(1977-1978?Reg.?Sess.)?Stats.?1978,?ch.?937,???1,?p.?2913.)?The?1978?amendment?removed?the?240-week?limitation?on?aggregate?temporary?total?disability?within?a?5-year?postinjury?period?for?injuries?occurring?on?or?after?January?1,?1979.?The?statute?now?provides?that?”[a]ggregate?disability?payments?for?a?single?injury?occurring?prior?to?January?1,?1979,?causing?temporary?disability?shall?not?[54?Cal.3d?293]?extend?for?more?than?240?compensable?weeks?within?a?period?of?five?years?from?the?date?of?injury.?[?]?Aggregate?disability?payments?for?a?single?injury?occurring?on?or?after?January?1,?1979,?causing?temporary?partial?disability?shall?not?extend?for?more?than?240?compensable?weeks?within?a?period?of?five?years?from?the?date?of?the?injury.”?(??4656,?italics?added.) Relying?on?the?current?version?of?section?4656,?Nickelsberg?argues?that?the?workers’?compensation?judge?had?jurisdiction?to?award?further?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?more?than?five?years?after?the?original?injury.?Nickelsberg?assumes?that?an?initial?award?of?”future?medical?treatment”?must?reasonably?be?interpreted?to?include,?as?a?”secondary?consequence,”?an?award?of?future?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?resulting?from?such?treatment?and?that?section?4656,?as?amended,?removes?all?limits?on?awards?for?temporary?total?disability.?Based?on?that?assumption,?Nickelsberg?argues?that?the?workers’?compensation?judge?simply?enforced?his?original?award?under?section?5803.fn.?3?Implicit?in?Nickelsberg’s?argument?is?the?understanding?that?the?provisions?in?section?5804?for?the?amendment?of?an?awardfn.?4?and?in?5410?for?an?award?of?”new?and?further?disability”fn.?5?are?inapplicable. The?Workers’?Compensation?Judge?Was?Not?Merely?Enforcing?Nickelsberg’s?Original?Award?Pursuant?to?Section?5803 [1a]?As?indicated,?Nickelsberg?argues?that?an?award?of?future?medical?treatment?implicitly?includes,?as?a?secondary?consequence,?an?award?of?future?temporary?total?disability?indemnity.?We?disagree.?Medical?treatment?and?temporary?total?disability?are?two?different?classes?of?benefits.?(?Burton?v.?[54?Cal.3d?294]?Workers’?Comp.?Appeals?Bd.?(1980)?112?Cal.App.3d?85,?89?[169?Cal.Rptr.?72].)?No?reported?opinion?supports?the?conclusion?that?temporary?total?disability?is?merely?a?secondary?consequence?or?benefit?of?a?medical?award. [2]?Indeed,?”[m]edical?treatment?and?disability?indemnity?are?separate?and?distinct?elements?of?compensation?which?fulfill?different,?though?complementary,?legislative?goals.?Employer?liability?for?medical?and?surgical?services?is?provided?in?major?part?in?order?to?facilitate?the?worker’s?speedy?recovery?and?to?maximize?his?[or?her]?productive?employment.?[Citation.]?Temporary?disability?indemnity?is?intended?primarily?to?substitute?for?the?worker’s?lost?wages,?in?order?to?maintain?a?steady?stream?of?income.?[Citation.]?Permanent?disability?indemnity?has?a?dual?function:?to?compensate?both?for?actual?incapacity?to?work?and?for?physical?impairment?of?the?worker’s?body,?which?may?or?may?not?be?incapacitating.?[Citation.]”?(J.?T.?Thorp,?Inc.?v.?Workers’?Comp.?Appeals?Bd.?(1984)?153?Cal.App.3d?327,?333?[200?Cal.Rptr.?219].)?[1b]?As?the?WCAB?noted?in?the?present?case,?”an?award?of?further?medical?treatment?does?not?implicitly?carry?with?it?a?commensurate?award?of?temporary?total?disability?indemnity.”?Temporary?total?disability,?which?is?paid?as?a?result?of?missing?work?because?of?an?injury,?is?a?benefit?separate?and?distinct?from?medical?treatment. Hence,?Nickelsberg?errs?in?assuming?that?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?is?merely?a?secondary?consequence?of?an?award?of?further?medical?treatment.?Based?on?this?mistaken?assumption,?Nickelsberg?further?argues?that?when?future?medical?treatment?is?included?in?an?original?award,?section?4656,?as?amended,?allows?an?applicant?to?recover?temporary?total?disability?benefits?whenever,?and?for?as?long?as,?they?are?required.?He?is?entitled?to?these?benefits,?he?contends,?as?a?mere?enforcement?of?his?original?award?under?section?5803.?We?disagree. The?plain?language?of?section?4656?does?not?support?Nickelsberg’s?interpretation.?[3]?”The?fundamental?purpose?of?statutory?construction?is?to?ascertain?the?intent?of?the?lawmakers?so?as?to?effectuate?the?purpose?of?the?law.?[Citation.]?In?order?to?determine?this?intent,?we?begin?by?examining?the?language?of?the?statute.?[Citation.]”?(People?v.?Pieters?(1991)?52?Cal.3d?894,?898?[276?Cal.Rptr.?918,?802?P.2d?420].)?[1c]?The?1978?amendment?of?section?4656?removed?the?240-week?limitation?on?aggregate?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?within?a?5-year?postinjury?period.?The?removal?of?this?limitation,?however,?does?not?imply?that?temporary?total?disability?can?now?be?awarded?at?any?time?and?for?any?period?as?a?result?of?an?original?award?of?future?medical?treatment.?Such?a?broad?interpretation?of?the?amendment?would?abrogate?the?time?and?jurisdictional?limitations?of?sections?5410?and?5804.?(See,?post,?pp.?297-299.)?[54?Cal.3d?295] Nickelsberg?bases?his?interpretation?of?the?amendment?to?section?4656?on?the?preenactment?comments?of?various?participants?in?the?legislative?process.?For?example,?the?Department?of?Industrial?Relations?in?its?enrolled?bill?report?stated?that?”[p]resent?law?provides?that?payment?of?temporary?disability?indemnity?shall?not?be?paid?for?more?than?240?weeks?within?a?period?of?5?years?from?the?date?of?injury.?In?most?instances,?temporary?disability?is?concluded?long?before?this?point?is?reached.?There?are?however?cases?which?create?a?hardship?situation?where?an?industrial?injury?results?in?the?need?for?surgery?more?than?5?years?after?the?date?of?injury.?Due?to?the?arbitrary?time?limit,?the?employee?is?then?only?entitled?to?receive?medical?benefits?and?is?precluded?from?receiving?temporary?disability?indemnity?resulting?from?the?hospitalization?and?surgery.?Although?occurring?rarely,?these?situations?create?an?obvious?hardship?that?is?difficult?to?defend.”?(Agr.?&?Services?Agency,?Sen.?Industrial?Relations?Com.?Enrolled?Bill?Rep.?and?Recommendations?to?Governor?on?Sen.?Bill?No.?1851?(1977-1978?Reg.?Sess.)?as?amended?Aug.?14,?1978,?p.?1.) Nickelsberg?also?highlights?a?somewhat?different?interpretation?of?the?amendment?of?section?4656?contained?in?an?Assembly?Ways?and?Means?Committee?staff?analysis?of?Senate?Bill?No.?1851.?The?analysis?states?that?the?intent?of?the?bill?was?”to?provide?disability?benefits?for?temporary?totally?disabled?persons?beyond?the?existing?240?week?limit.?Proponents?contend?that?often?surgery?or?other?treatment?is?required?years?after?an?injury?to?remove?sergically?[sic]?implanted?devices?(plates,?pins,?etc.).”?(Assem.?Ways?and?Means?Com.,?Staff?Analysis?of?Sen.?Bill?No.?1851?(1977-1978?Reg.?Sess.)?as?amended?Aug.?14,?1978,?p.?1.) However,?other?portions?of?the?legislative?history?contradict?Nickelsberg’s?interpretation?of?Senate?Bill?No.?1851.?For?example,?an?Assembly?Finance,?Insurance,?and?Commerce?Committee?analysis?of?the?bill?states?that?the?removal?of?the?limitation?on?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?”would?provide?for?the?payment?of?the?workers’?compensation?temporary?total?disability?benefits?for?as?long?as?the?temporary?total?disability?continues.”?(Assem.?Finance,?Insurance,?&?Commerce?Com.,?Analysis?of?Sen.?Bill?No.?1851?(1977-1978?Reg.?Sess.)?as?amended?May?10,?1978.) This?analysis?of?the?bill?indicates?that,?in?amending?section?4656,?the?Legislature?intended?to?remove?the?cap?of?240?weeks?in?a?5-year?period?for?the?payment?of?temporary?total?disability?and?to?allow?an?applicant?who?is?continuously?temporarily?totally?disabled?to?continue?to?receive?benefits?without?an?arbitrary?cutoff?date.?Such?an?interpretation?is?also?supported?by?a?consultant’s?report?to?the?Senate?Industrial?Relations?Committee.?The?report?states?that?the?proposed?amendment?to?section?4656?”would?eliminate?the?240-week?limitation?on?the?payment?of?temporary?disability?benefits?for?[54?Cal.3d?296]?a?single?injury,?and?instead?provide?that?such?benefits?shall?continue?as?long?as?the?temporary?disability?continues.”?(Rep.?of?Consultant?Casey?L.?Young?to?the?Sen.?Industrial?Relations?Com.?(Apr.?27,?1978)?p.?1,?italics?added.) Furthermore,?the?mandated?cost?estimate?of?the?bill?prepared?by?the?Department?of?Finance?states:?”Although?data?is?not?available?to?predict?the?number?of?cases?affected?[by?the?amendment]?and?the?additional?losses?per?case,?we?believe?that?such?cases?will?be?quite?rare.?In?most?cases,?either?the?disability?becomes?permanent?and?stationary?and?thus?no?longer?temporary,?or?the?worker?recovers?long?before?240?weeks?of?temporary?disability?benefits?are?paid.”?(Dept.?of?Finance,?Mandated?Cost?Estimate?(May?10,?1978)?p.?2,?italics?added.) As?indicated,?these?statements,?consistent?with?the?language?of?the?statute,?suggest?that?the?amendment?to?section?4656?was?intended?to?permit?an?applicant?to?receive?temporary?total?disability?for?as?long?as?he?or?she?is?continuously?disabled?without?an?arbitrary?cutoff?date.?These?statements,?however,?do?not?suggest?the?Legislature?intended?to?permit?an?applicant,?based?on?an?award?of?future?medical?benefits,?to?be?able?to?invoke?the?WCAB’s?jurisdiction?to?award?temporary?total?disability?benefits?whenever?he?or?she?requires?medical?treatment?for?a?previous?injury. Moreover,?the?Department?of?Finance,?in?estimating?the?financial?impact?of?the?amendments?to?section?4656,?indicated?that?the?amendments?would?affect?”very?few?cases”?and?that?the?costs?of?the?amendment?would?be?quite?small.?”Losses?will?increase?less?than?0.1?percent?and?thus?no?premium?increase?will?be?necessary.?Thus?insured?local?governmental?entities?will?incur?no?additional?costs.”?(Dept.?of?Finance,?Mandated?Cost?Estimate,?supra,?at?p.?1.)?The?mandated?cost?estimate?of?the?amendment?prepared?by?the?Department?of?Finance?further?states:?”We?do?not?anticipate?significant?increases?in?loss-experience?to?result?from?this?bill.”?(Id.?at?p.?2.)?These?conservative?cost?estimates?are?inconsistent?with?an?interpretation?of?section?4656?that?would?allow?unlimited?awards?of?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?in?every?case?in?which?future?medical?benefits?have?been?awarded.?The?cost?estimates?are?consistent,?however,?with?an?interpretation?of?the?amendment?as?only?affecting?applicants?who?are?continuously?disabled. Although?Nickelsberg?contends?his?interpretation?of?the?bill?would?effect?only?a?limited?number?of?cases,?the?implications?of?his?proposed?interpretation?are?broad.?Settlements?of?workers’?compensation?claims?often?include?an?award?of?future?medical?care.?Under?Nickelsberg’s?interpretation,?each?of?these?cases?would?implicitly?also?include?an?award?of?future?temporary?total?[54?Cal.3d?297]?disability.?As?a?result,?employers?would?be?liable?for?this?further?temporary?total?disability?indemnity,?although?it?was?not?contemplated?in?the?original?award. As?shown,?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?and?future?medical?benefits?serve?distinct?and?different?roles?in?the?workers’?compensation?system.?The?different?roles?of?the?two?classes?of?benefits?negate?Nickelsberg’s?conclusion?that?an?award?of?future?medical?treatment?implicitly?includes?an?award?of?future?temporary?total?disability.?Furthermore,?the?legislative?history?of?Senate?Bill?No.?1851?does?not?conclusively?support?an?interpretation?of?section?4656?as?allowing?a?workers’?compensation?judge?to?award?unlimited?further?temporary?total?disability?as?a?secondary?consequence?of?an?award?of?further?medical?benefits.?Hence,?it?is?incorrect?to?characterize?the?award?of?further?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?to?Nickelsberg?as?a?mere?enforcement?of?his?original?award?under?section?5804. Moreover,?Nickelsberg’s?interpretation?of?Senate?Bill?No.?1851?would?require?us?to?conclude?that?the?bill?somehow?amended?or?altered?the?time?and?jurisdictional?limits?of?sections?5410?or?5804?to?allow?resumption?of?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?whenever?an?award?of?future?medical?benefits?results?in?a?period?of?further?temporary?total?disability.?We?do?not?believe?that?the?Legislature?intended?such?a?broad?result.?Nickelsberg’s?argument?is?contrary?to?both?clear?statutory?construction?and?well-?established?judicial?interpretation?of?sections?5410?and?5804.?Moreover,?it?controverts?the?entire?statutory?scheme?of?workers’?compensation?judicial?administration,?which?provides?for?time?and?jurisdictional?limitations?upon?the?commencement?of?proceedings?and?modifications?of?prior?determinations. [4]?The?WCAB?is?vested?with?the?authority?and?jurisdiction?to?conduct?proceedings?for?the?recovery?of?compensation.?(??5300?et?seq.)?Concomitantly,?it?is?empowered?with?continuing?jurisdictional?authority?over?all?of?its?orders,?decisions?and?awards.?(??5803.)?However,?this?power?is?not?unlimited.?The?WCAB’s?authority?under?section?5803?to?enforce?its?awards,?including?ancillary?proceedings?involving?commutation,?penalty?assessment?and?the?like,?is?not?to?be?confused?with?its?limited?jurisdiction?to?alter?prior?awards?by?benefit?augmentation?at?a?later?date.?The?latter?action?is?subject?to?the?provisions?of?sections?5410?and?5804.?(General?Foundry?Service?v.?Workers’?Comp.?Appeals?Bd.?(1986)?42?Cal.3d?331?[228?Cal.Rptr.?243,?721?P.2d?124];?Broadway-Locust?Co.?v.?Ind.?Acc.?Com.?(1949)?92?Cal.App.2d?287,?290-294?[206?P.2d?856];?Ruffin?v.?Olson?Co.?(1987)?52?Cal.Comp.Cases?335.)?[54?Cal.3d?298] [1d]?It?may?not?be?inferred,?as?Nickelsberg?suggests,?that?the?1979?amendment,?removing?the?240-week?limitation?on?aggregate?temporary?total?disability?payments?within?a?5-year?postinjury?period,?in?any?manner?modified?the?time?or?jurisdictional?limitations?of?either?section?5410?or?section?5804.?Nickelsberg?supports?his?conclusion,?relying?on?the?liberal?construction?mandate?of?section?3202.fn.?6?[5]?However,?the?rule?of?liberal?construction?stated?in?section?3202?should?not?be?used?to?defeat?the?overall?statutory?framework?and?fundamental?rules?of?statutory?construction.?[6]?Furthermore,?statutes?should?be?interpreted?in?such?a?way?as?to?make?them?consistent?with?each?other,?rather?than?obviate?one?another.?(People?v.?Pieters,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?894,?899.)?[1e]?It?is?logical?to?presume?that?the?Legislature?was?aware?of?the?existence?of?all?relevant?statutes,?including?sections?5410?and?5804,?when?it?considered?the?change?in?section?4656.?Significantly,?as?observed?by?the?Court?of?Appeal,?the?Legislature?did?not?specifically?amend?sections?5410?and?5804?to?accomplish?the?broad?purpose?Nickelsberg?suggests?motivated?the?change?in?section?4656. Since?the?Legislature?did?not?explicitly?change?the?jurisdictional?limitations?of?the?WCAB?or?the?time?limitations?of?section?5410?(see?Singh?v.?Workers’?Comp.?Appeals?Bd.?(1987)?52?Cal.Comp.Cases?15),?accepting?Nickelsberg’s?contention?would?require?us?to?conclude?that?the?Legislature?implicitly?repealed?sections?5804?and?5410.?[7]?Repeals?by?implication?are?disfavored?and?are?recognized?only?when?potentially?conflicting?statutes?cannot?be?harmonized.?(Dew?v.?Appleberry?(1979)?23?Cal.3d?630,?636?[153?Cal.Rptr.?219,?591?P.2d?509].)?[1f]?Disharmony,?however,?between?the?provisions?of?section?4656?and?those?of?sections?5410?and?5804?exists?only?if?one?takes-as?does?Nickelsberg-an?overly?broad?view?of?when?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?may?be?awarded.?Such?a?view?ignores?both?the?statutory?classification?of?these?sectionsfn.?7?and?the?Legislature’s?presumed?awareness,?when?it?amended?section?4656,?of?the?long?history?of?judicial?interpretation?of?sections?5410?and?5804.?(People?v.?Hallner?(1954)?43?Cal.2d?715,?719?[277?P.2d?393].)?[54?Cal.3d?299] Furthermore,?sound?public?policy?supports?the?conclusion?that?the?amendment?to?section?4656?does?not?serve?to?abrogate?the?time?and?jurisdictional?limits?of?sections?5410?and?5804.?Those?sections?do?not?express?a?mere?concern?for?barring?stale?claims.?The?statutes?express?legislative?concern?for?certainty?and?finality?in?the?determination?of?compensation?benefit?obligations.?The?WCAB’s?own?interpretation?of?its?limited?power?to?award?temporary?total?disability?more?than?five?years?after?an?original?injury?recognizes?this?need?for?certainty?and?finality.?As?was?stated?in?Broadway-Locust?Co.?v.?Ind.?Acc.?Com.,?supra,?92?Cal.App.2d?at?page?293:?”This?long?continued?interpretation?by?the?commission?of?its?own?powers?has?necessarily?led?industry?to?recognize?and?adjust?itself?to?liabilities?and?responsibilities?consistent?with?well?understood?limitations?as?to?time.?…?It?is?important?…?that?the?overall?cost?of?[workers’]?compensation?insurance?should?be?ascertainable?with?reasonable?certainty?in?order?that?business?operations?may?be?adjusted?accordingly?and?state?agencies?…?may?be?enabled?to?operate?with?the?greatest?measure?of?efficiency?and?competency.?Contingent?liability?unlimited?as?to?time?for?which?the?commission?now?argues?would?result?in?great?confusion.?No?employer?or?his?insurance?carrier?would?know?what?claims?might?emerge?from?cases?long?since?settled?and?written?off.”fn.?8 Finally,?the?WCAB’s?own?determination?that?the?workers’?compensation?judge?lacked?jurisdiction?under?section?4656,?as?amended,?to?award?further?temporary?total?disability?is?entitled?to?significant?respect?on?judicial?review.?In?the?instant?case,?following?the?workers’?compensation?judge’s?award?of?further?temporary?total?disability?indemnity,?the?WCAB?granted?reconsideration?on?its?own?motion.?(??5900,?subd.?(b).)?The?WCAB?found?that?the?original?”award?of?further?medical?treatment?does?not?implicitly?carry?with?it?a?commensurate?award?of?temporary?total?disability,”?and?concluded?that?Nickelsberg’s?petition?was?time?barred.?The?Court?of?Appeal?agreed?with?the?WCAB?that?”the?workers’?compensation?judge?lacked?jurisdiction?to?award?further?temporary?total?disability?indemnity.”?The?WCAB’s?interpretation?of?its?jurisdictional?authority?to?grant?new?and?further?temporary?disability,?as?expressed?in?its?decision?on?reconsideration,?is?not?only?persuasive?on?this?issue,?its?interpretation?and?application?of?these?three?statutes?is?entitled?to?[54?Cal.3d?300]?significant?respect?upon?judicial?review.fn.?9?(See?Nipper?v.?California?Auto.?Assigned?Risk?Plan?(1977)?19?Cal.3d?35,?45?[136?Cal.Rptr.?854,?560?P.2d?743]?[“We?have?generally?accorded?respect?to?administrative?interpretations?of?a?law?and,?unless?clearly?erroneous,?have?deemed?them?significant?factors?in?ascertaining?statutory?meaning?and?purpose.?[Citations.]”];?Mudd?v.?McColgan?(1947)?30?Cal.2d?463,?470?[183?P.2d?10].)?We?conclude?that?the?WCAB’s?interpretation?and?application?of?the?relevant?statutes?was?correct?and?adds?further?support?to?the?conclusion?that?Nickelsberg’s?petition?to?recover?temporary?total?disability?is?barred.?B.?Nickelsberg?Is?Not?Entitled?to?Receive?Further?Temporary?Total?Disability?Indemnity Having?rejected?Nickelsberg’s?interpretation?of?the?amendment?of?section?4656,?we?still?must?determine?if?the?workers’?compensation?judge?had?jurisdiction?under?another?section?of?the?workers’?compensation?laws?to?award?Nickelsberg?further?temporary?total?disability.?Given?our?interpretation?of?section?4656,?which?precludes?considering?Nickelsberg’s?petition?as?merely?an?enforcement?action?under?section?5803,?Nickelsberg?can?only?recover?for?temporary?total?disability?at?this?point?in?time?if:?(1)?the?WCAB?had?authority?to?amend?its?original?award?under?section?5804;?or?(2)?he?had?suffered?a?”new?and?further?disability”?under?section?5410?and?had?filed?a?timely?claim?for?recovery.?As?will?become?evident,?we?conclude?that?Nickelsberg?cannot?bring?his?petition?within?either?of?these?two?avenues?of?possible?recovery. The?WCAB?Correctly?Determined?That?the?Workers’?Compensation?Judge?Lacked?Jurisdiction?Under?Section?5804 The?first?theory?under?which?Nickelsberg?might?be?able?to?recover?on?his?claim?for?temporary?total?disability?is?if?the?WCAB?had?jurisdiction?to?amend?his?original?award.?Section?5804?allows?a?party,?in?certain?circumstances,?to?file?a?petition?to?rescind,?alter,?or?amend?an?original?award.?However,?such?a?petition?must?be?filed?within?five?years?of?the?original?injury.?(??5804;?see,?ante,?p.?293,?fn.?4.)?Nickelsberg’s?suffered?his?original?injury?on?January?5,?1979,?and?filed?his?petition?for?further?temporary?total?disability?on?February?8,?1988.?Because?Nickelsberg’s?petition?to?reopen?his?award?was?filed?more?than?five?years?from?the?date?of?his?original?injury,?the?[54?Cal.3d?301]?WCAB?correctly?determined?that?the?workers’?compensation?judge?lacked?jurisdiction?to?alter?or?amend?the?original?award?under?section?5804?to?provide?for?further?temporary?total?disability. “New?and?Further?Disability” The?second?possible?avenue?of?recovery?is?a?petition?for?”new?and?further?disability”?under?section?5410.?An?employee?may?institute?proceedings,?within?five?years?from?the?date?of?the?original?injury,?for?the?collection?of?compensation?upon?the?ground?that?the?original?injury?has?caused?new?and?further?disability.?(??5410;?see,?ante,?p.?293,?fn.?5.)?In?the?present?case,?Nickelsberg?initially?filed?his?petition?to?reopen?his?award?claiming?that?he?had?suffered?a?new?and?further?disability?pursuant?to?section?5410.?In?his?trial?memorandum?filed?the?same?day?as?the?petition,?however,?Nickelsberg?argued?that?he?was?seeking?enforcement?of?his?original?award?pursuant?to?section?4656. The?term?”new?and?further?disability”?is?not?defined?by?statute?and?its?meaning?is?not?entirely?clear.?(Pizza?Hut?of?San?Diego,?Inc.?v.?Workers’?Comp.?Appeals?Bd.?(1978)?76?Cal.App.3d?818,?825?[143?Cal.Rptr.?131].)?However,?one?Court?of?Appeal?has?described?a?”new?and?further?disability”?as?”a?disability?in?addition?to?that?for?which?the?employer?previously?provided?benefits?as?required?by?the?statute.”?(Id.?at?p.?822.)?”The?phrase?’further?disability’?presupposes?that?such?disability?is?in?addition?to?that?disability?for?which?proceedings?were?timely?commenced?or?for?which?compensation?already?was?paid?(Kauffman?v.?Industrial?Accident?Com.?[(1918)]?37?Cal.App.?500,?502-503?[174?P.?690]).?It?has?also?been?recognized?'[s]ome?significance?must?be?given?to?the?word?”new.”?’?(See?Westvaco?etc.?Corp.?v.?Ind.?Acc.?Com.?[(1955)]?136?Cal.App.2d?60,?64-?68?[288?P.2d?300].)”?(Id.?at?p.?825.) The?Court?of?Appeal?in?Pizza?Hut?further?noted:?”?’New?and?further?disability?can?develop?only?after?a?cessation?of?temporary?disability?or?an?interruption?of?temporary?disability?by?a?period?of?nondisablement.?A?new?period?of?temporary?disability?…?is?a?new?and?further?disability.?…?[?]?Historically,?a?change?in?physical?condition?necessitating?further?medical?treatment?had?been?considered?new?and?further?disability?whether?or?not?accompanied?by?time?lost?from?work.?[Citation.]’?(Cal.?Workmen’s?Compensation?Practice?(Cont.Ed.Bar?1973)???4.21,?pp.?108-109;?see?also?1?Hanna,?[Cal.?Law?of?Employee?Injuries?and?Workmen’s?Compensation?(2d?ed.)]???9.03[2].)?Thus,?'[c]ommonly,?new?and?further?disability?refers?to?a?recurrence?of?temporary?disability,?a?new?need?for?medical?treatment,?or?the?change?of?a?temporary?disability?into?a?permanent?disability.’?(Cal.?Workmen’s?Compensation?Practice?(Cont.Ed.Bar?1973)???12.12,?p.?410.)”?(?Pizza?[54?Cal.3d?302]?Hut?of?San?Diego,?Inc.?v.?Workers’?Comp.?Appeals?Bd.,?supra,?76?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?825.) Nickelsberg’s?disability?may?indeed?be?a?”new?and?further?disability.”?After?Nickelsberg’s?1979?industrial?injury,?he?received?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?from?January?6,?1979,?through?June?8,?1981.?He?received?a?permanent?disability?rating?of?66?3/4?percent.?After?a?period?of?nondisablement,?Nickelsberg?had?back?surgery?in?July?1987.?As?a?result,?he?now?seeks?temporary?total?disability?indemnity?for?the?period?of?March?7,?1987,?through?November?25,?1987. In?the?final?analysis,?however,?we?need?not?decide?if?Nickelsberg’s?disability?qualifies?as?a?new?and?further?disability.?If?it?does,?his?petition?would?be?untimely?under?section?5410.?If?it?does?not,?his?action?could?only?be?brought?as?a?petition?to?amend?his?award.?However,?as?previously?noted,?such?an?action?under?section?5804?would?also?be?untimely. Conclusion Nickelsberg?seeks?from?this?court?an?interpretation?of?section?4656?that?would?provide?unlimited?temporary?total?disability?when?an?award?of?further?medical?treatment?is?made.?Such?an?interpretation?is?not?justified?by?either?clear?legislative?intent?or?sound?statutory?construction.?Hence,?the?workers’?compensation?judge?lacked?jurisdiction?to?award?temporary?total?disability?to?Nickelsberg. The?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?affirmed. Lucas,?C.?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?and?Baxter,?J.,?concurred. […]

Walnut?Creek?Manor?v.?Fair?Employment?&?Housing?Com.?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?245?,?284?Cal.Rptr.?718;?814?P.2d?704] [No.?S015131. Aug?29,?1991.] WALNUT?CREEK?MANOR?et?al.,?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants,?v.?FAIR?EMPLOYMENT?AND?HOUSING?COMMISSION,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Contra?Costa?County,?No.?304628,?David?A.?Dolgin,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Panelli,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Mosk,?Arabian?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.,?with?Broussard,?J.,?concurring.) COUNSEL Capps,?Staples,?Ward,?Hastings?&?Dodson,?William?H.?Staples?and?Marsha?L.?Stephenson?for?Plaintiffs?and?Appellants. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Andrea?Sheridan?Ordin,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Marian?M.?Johnston?and?M.?Anne?Jennings,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. OPINION PANELLI,?J. Pursuant?to?section?12987?of?the?California?Fair?Employment?and?Housing?Act?(Gov.?Code,???12900?et?seq.)?(the?act),?the?Fair?Employment?and?Housing?Commission?(the?commission)?is?authorized?to?order?a?respondent?who?is?found?to?have?violated?the?housing?provisions?of?the?act?to?pay?”punitive?damages?in?an?amount?not?to?exceed?one?thousand?dollars?($1,000)?…?and?the?payment?of?actual?damages.”?(Gov.?Code,???12987,?subd.?(2).)fn.?1?We?granted?review?in?this?case?to?construe?and?determine?the?constitutionality?of?the?damages?provision?of?the?act. We?conclude?that?while?section?12987?authorizes?the?commission?to?award?compensatory?damages,?an?administrative?award?of?compensatory?damages?for?emotional?distress?violates?the?judicial?powers?clause?of?the?California?Constitution?(art.?VI,???1;?see?McHugh?v.?Santa?Monica?Rent?Control?Bd.?(1989)?49?Cal.3d?348?[261?Cal.Rptr.?318,?777?P.2d?91]?[hereafter?McHugh]).?We?further?conclude,?however,?that?the?section?is?severable?in?its?applications.?We?thus?agree?with?the?Court?of?Appeal?that?the?emotional?distress?compensatory?damages?part?of?the?award?in?this?case?must?be?stricken.?[54?Cal.3d?252]?Finally,?we?determine?that?pursuant?to?section?12987,?the?act?authorizes?only?one?punitive?damages?award?against?a?respondent?for?a?course?of?discriminatory?conduct?against?the?same?individual?on?the?same?unlawful?basis. Facts This?case?arises?from?a?complaint?for?housing?discrimination?filed?with?the?Fair?Employment?and?Housing?Department?(the?department)?by?Robert?Cannon,?an?unmarried?Black?man,?alleging?that?Walnut?Creek?Manor?(Manor)?had?discriminated?against?him?by?refusing?to?rent?him?a?one-bedroom?apartment.?Following?an?investigation,?the?department?issued?an?accusation?charging?Manor,?owner?Marilyn?Boswell,?and?rental?manager?Edith?Indridson?with?violating?section?12955,?subdivisions?(a)?and?(d)?of?the?act?by?refusing?to?rent?to?Cannon?on?grounds?of?race?and?marital?status.?After?a?hearing?before?an?administrative?law?judge?(ALJ),?the?commission?made?the?following?findings?of?fact. Manor?is?a?418-unit?apartment?complex.?In?November?1979,?when?Cannon?first?applied?for?a?one-bedroom?apartment,?Manor?was?consistently?full?and?had?a?waiting?list.?Cannon?was?told?the?waiting?period?was?one?to?one?and?a?half?years?and?that?he?should?check?back?every?six?months?to?see?where?he?stood?on?the?waiting?list.?For?the?ensuing?two?and?one-half?years?Cannon?called?back?approximately?twice?a?year?to?determine?his?position?on?the?waiting?list. In?August?1981,?more?than?one?and?a?half?years?after?Cannon?first?applied,?Edith?Indridson?assumed?the?position?of?rental?manager.?At?that?time?she?believed?Cannon?had?waited?the?normal?time?and?”was?thus?ready?to?be?rented?to.”?Nevertheless,?Indridson?made?no?attempt?to?offer?Cannon?available?one-?bedroom?apartments,?but?did?call?other?non-Black?applicants?who?had?applied?after?Cannon. Following?her?first?meeting?with?Cannon?in?November?1981,?Indridson?marked?his?name?with?the?code?designation?Manor?used?for?undesirable?tenants,?but?after?the?department?commenced?its?investigation?in?June?of?1982,?she?altered?the?code?rating?to?desirable.?In?April?1982?Cannon?was?first?on?the?waiting?list,?but?when?he?visited?the?rental?office?on?April?5,?Indridson?refused?to?tell?him?where?he?stood.?After?this?encounter,?Indridson?wrote?owner?Marilyn?Boswell?for?advice?on?how?to?treat?Cannon.?In?response,?Boswell?sent?Indridson?a?copy?of?an?October?9,?1980,?opinion?letter?written?by?her?attorney?after?a?race?discrimination?complaint?was?filed?against?Phoenix?Manor,?a?housing?development?Boswell?owned?in?Arizona.?The?[54?Cal.3d?253]?letter?recommended?that?applicants?be?required?to?fill?out?a?questionnaire?on?their?interests?and?activities?and?that?the?rental?agents?be?instructed?to?look?to?the?questionnaire?information?for?”other,?nondiscriminatory?reasons”?for?refusing?to?rent?to?”undesired”?applicants.?After?receiving?the?letter,?Indridson?asked?Cannon?to?fill?out?a?questionnaire,?although?she?made?no?similar?request?of?anyone?else?then?on?the?waiting?list.?After?Cannon?had?completed?the?questionnaire,?Indridson?told?him?she?did?not?have?any?rentals?available. In?May?1982,?while?checking?the?availability?of?mobilehomes?for?rent?at?a?Contra?Costa?County?mobilehome?park,?Cannon?met?a?non-Black?man?who?told?Cannon?he?had?applied?to?Manor?a?few?months?before?and?had?moved?in?the?same?month.?The?next?day?Cannon?called?Manor?and?again?asked?where?he?stood?on?the?waiting?list.?Indridson?refused?to?tell?him.?On?the?following?Wednesday,?Indridson’s?day?off,?Cannon?called?Manor?without?identifying?himself?and?asked?how?long?the?waiting?list?was.?He?was?told?the?list?was?one?year?long?and?was?encouraged?to?apply.?Cannon?thereupon?filed?his?complaint?with?the?department. From?November?1981?until?June?28,?1982,?the?date?of?Cannon’s?complaint,?Indridson?rented?18?apartments?to?later,?non-Black?applicants.?Eleven?of?these?were?rented?between?March?and?June;?of?these,?three?were?rented?to?married?couples.?From?June?1982?to?July?1983,?Indridson?rented?another?24?one-bedroom?apartments?to?later,?non-Black?applicants. The?ALJ?found?Cannon’s?claim?of?racial?discrimination?meritorious?and?awarded?Cannon?$1,500?in?unspecified?compensatory?damages?and?$650?in?punitive?damages?assessed?against?rental?manager?Edith?Indridson.?The?commission?did?not?adopt?the?ALJ’s?proposed?decision;?rather,?after?considering?additional?written?argument,?the?commission?found?that?Cannon?had?been?discriminated?against?on?the?basis?of?marital?status?as?well?as?race.?The?commission?awarded?Cannon?special?damages?for?the?cost?of?his?rent?and?utilities?in?excess?of?what?he?would?have?paid?at?Manor,?$162.50?in?attorney?fees,?and?$50,000?in?compensatory?damages?for?emotional?distress.?In?addition,?the?commission?awarded?Cannon?$40,635?in?punitive?damages?(calculated?at?$1,000?for?each?of?35?apartment?rentals?made?to?others?while?his?application?was?pending?and?within?the?120-day?jurisdictional?time?period?[??12980]?from?February?28,?1982,?forward,?as?adjusted,?plus?interest).?The?commission?determined?that?Manor,?owner?Marilyn?Boswell,?and?rental?manager?Indridson?were?jointly?and?severally?liable?for?the?punitive?damage?award.?Finally,?the?commission?issued?a?cease?and?desist?order?and?ordered?affirmative?relief,?which?required?Manor?to?offer?Cannon?the?first?[54?Cal.3d?254]?available?one-bedroom?apartment,?post?certain?notices,?and?conduct?training?sessions?for?employees?to?educate?them?about?housing?discrimination?law. On?petition?for?writ?of?administrative?mandamus?(Code?Civ.?Proc.,???1094.5),?the?trial?court?remanded?the?case?to?the?commission?with?directions?to?reconsider?the?finding?of?marital?status?discrimination?and?limit?punitive?damages?to?$1,000,?as?adjusted.?All?parties?appealed. The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed?in?part?and?reversed?in?part.?The?Court?of?Appeal?interpreted?the?statute?as?authorizing?the?commission?to?award?unlimited?compensatory?damages?for?housing?discrimination.?The?court?held,?however,?that?while?the?commission’s?award?of?special?damages?was?valid,?the?award?of?general?compensatory?damages?for?emotional?distress?constituted?an?unconstitutional?exercise?of?judicial?power?by?a?nonjudicial?body?in?violation?of?the?judicial?powers?clause?of?the?California?Constitution?(art.?VI,???1)?(hereafter?article?VI,?section?1?or?the?judicial?powers?clause).fn.?2?The?Court?of?Appeal?thus?determined?that?the?$50,000?compensatory?damage?award?for?emotional?distress?should?be?stricken. The?Court?of?Appeal?reversed?the?trial?court’s?ruling?that?the?statute?limits?the?punitive?damages?award?against?Manor,?Boswell?and?Indridson?to?a?total?of?$1,000.?The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?section?12987?authorizes?the?commission?to?order?a?separate?award?of?punitive?damages?for?each?act?of?discrimination?within?the?jurisdictional?period.?The?court?determined,?however,?that?as?to?Indridson?the?$40,635?punitive?damages?award?was?excessive?as?a?matter?of?law,?because?the?amount?exceeded?80?percent?of?her?net?worth?of?$50,000.?(Storage?Services?v.?Oosterbaan?(1989)?214?Cal.App.3d?498,?514-516?[262?Cal.Rptr.?689].)?The?court?directed?that?the?punitive?damages?award?be?remanded?to?the?commission?for?determination?of?whether?each?of?the?35?rentals?to?later?non-?Black?applicants?was?the?rental?of?a?one-bedroom?apartment?to?one?person?(rather?than?a?couple),?and?for?reconsideration,?in?light?of?her?net?worth,?of?Indridson’s?liability?for?such?punitive?damages?as?the?commission?should?find?appropriate. The?commission?and?respondents?Manor,?Boswell?and?Indridson?each?petitioned?for?review.fn.?3[54?Cal.3d?255] Discussion The?Award?of?Actual?Damages Section?12987?authorizes?the?commission?to?order?a?respondent?who?has?violated?the?housing?provisions?of?the?act?to?pay?”actual?damages.”?[1]?Neither?party?disputes?that?the?term?”actual?damages”?as?used?in?section?12987?means?compensatory?damages,?and?the?Court?of?Appeal?so?held.?This?conclusion?follows?from?the?legal?as?well?as?the?common?and?usual?meaning?of?the?term.?(See?22?Am.Jur.2d?(rev.)?Damages,???24,?p.?50;?Oleck,?Damages?to?Person?and?Property?(rev.?ed.?1961)???12,?p.?22?[hereafter?Oleck];?see?also?Webster’s?New?Internat.?Dict.?(2d?ed.?1958)?p.?27,?col.?3?[defining?”actual”?as?”[e]xisting?in?act?or?reality;?…?in?fact;?real;-opposed?to?…?speculative”].)?Although?most?cases?construing?the?term?have?done?so?in?the?context?of?a?judicial?rather?than?an?administrative?proceeding,?nothing?in?the?history?of?the?act?suggests?that?in?authorizing?the?commission?to?award?actual?damages?the?Legislature?intended?the?phrase?to?be?construed?differently?than?it?is?understood?in?the?law?of?damages.?(Cf.?Morehead?v.?Lewis?(N.D.Ill.?1977)?432?F.Supp.?674,?678?[construing?the?federal?fair?housing?act].)?The?inference,?rather,?is?to?the?contrary.fn.?4?[2]?Consequently,?like?the?parties,?we?take?no?issue?with?the?Court?of?Appeal’s?determination?that?the?phrase?”actual?damages”?as?used?in?section?12987?means?compensatory?damages,?or?that?compensatory?damages?include?nonquantifiable?general?damages?for?emotional?distress?and?pecuniarily?measurable?special?damages?for?out-of-pocket?losses.?(See?Hess?v.?Fair?Employment?and?Housing?Com.?(1982)?138?Cal.App.3d?232,?237?[187?Cal.Rptr.?712,?33?A.L.R.4th?958];?Weider?v.?Hoffman?(M.D.Pa.?1965)?238?F.Supp.?437,?445?[citing?25?C.J.S.,?Damages,???2];?see?also?Oleck,?supra,???12,?at?pp.?22-23,???80,?at?pp.?59-60;?22?Am.Jur.2d,?supra,???23,?at?p.?50,???28,?at?p.?56.) [3a]?We?turn,?then,?to?the?question?whether?an?administrative?award?of?general,?as?opposed?to?special,?compensatory?damages?violates?the?judicial?[54?Cal.3d?256]?powers?clause.?In?resolving?this?issue,?we?look?for?guidance?to?our?recent?decision?in?McHugh,?supra,?49?Cal.3d?348. In?McHugh?we?considered?whether?a?local?charter?amendment?authorizing?administrative?adjudication?of?excess?rent?claims?and?imposition?of?treble?damages?was?unconstitutional?as?in?violation?of?article?VI,?section?1.?[4]?Reiterating?the?principle?that?”[a]gencies?not?vested?by?the?Constitution?with?judicial?powers?may?not?exercise?such?powers”?(49?Cal.3d?at?p.?356),?we?there?articulated?the?following?standard:?”An?administrative?agency?may?constitutionally?hold?hearings,?determine?facts,?apply?the?law?to?those?facts,?and?order?relief-including?certain?types?of?monetary?relief-so?long?as?(i)?such?activities?are?authorized?by?statute?or?legislation?and?are?reasonably?necessary?to?effectuate?the?administrative?agency’s?primary,?legitimate?regulatory?purposes,?and?(ii)?the?’essential’?judicial?power?(i.e.,?the?power?to?make?enforceable,?binding?judgments)?remains?ultimately?in?the?courts,?through?review?of?agency?determinations.”?(49?Cal.3d?at?p.?372,?italics?in?original.)?The?agency,?we?emphasized,?may?exercise?”only?those?powers?that?are?reasonably?necessary?to?effectuate?[its]?primary,?legitimate?regulatory?purposes.”?(Ibid.,?italics?in?original.) Although?in?McHugh?we?reserved?the?question?now?before?us-i.e.,?whether?an?administrative?agency’s?award?of?general?compensatory?damages?violates?the?judicial?powers?clause?(49?Cal.3d?at?p.?375,?fn.?38),?we?clearly?set?out?the?approach?for?resolving?the?issue.?In?applying?the?first?or?substantive?prong?of?the?standard,?i.e.,?the?”reasonable?necessity/legitimate?regulatory?purpose”?requirements,?we?first?inquire?whether?the?award?is?authorized?by?legislation,?and?is?”reasonably?necessary?to?accomplish?the?administrative?agency’s?regulatory?purposes.”?(49?Cal.3d?at?p.?374.)?Next,?we?must?”closely?scrutinize?the?agency’s?asserted?regulatory?purposes?in?order?to?ascertain?whether?the?challenged?remedial?power?is?merely?incidental?to?a?proper,?primary?regulatory?purpose,?or?whether?it?is?in?reality?an?attempt?to?transfer?determination?of?traditional?common?law?claims?from?the?courts?to?a?specialized?agency?whose?primary?purpose?is?the?processing?of?such?claims.”?(Ibid.) [3b]?The?commission?argues?that?where?the?Legislature?has?clearly?authorized?an?administrative?agency?to?award?monetary?relief,?we?should?not?substitute?our?judgment?for?the?legislative?decision?that?such?authority?is?reasonably?necessary?to?effectuate?the?agency’s?regulatory?purposes;?rather,?pursuant?to?due?process?principles,?our?only?inquiry?should?be?whether?the?remedy?is?procedurally?fair?and?related?to?a?proper?legislative?goal.?(See,?e.g.,?Hale?v.?Morgan?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?388,?398?[149?Cal.Rptr.?375,?584?P.2d?512].)?Here,?the?commission?argues,?the?Legislature?has?clearly?authorized?it?[54?Cal.3d?257]?to?award?actual?damages,?the?eradication?of?discrimination?in?housing?is?a?legitimate?regulatory?purpose,?and?general?damages?limited?to?remedying?the?effects?of?the?unlawful?discriminatory?conduct?serve?to?effectuate?the?purposes?of?the?act. Whatever?merit?the?commission’s?argument?may?have?in?the?context?of?a?due?process?analysis,?in?applying?the?judicial?powers?doctrine?our?role?is?not?so?limited.?[5]?McHugh?clearly?contemplated?that?the?mere?fact?of?legislative?authorization?does?not?shield?a?challenged?power?from?scrutiny?under?the?reasonable?necessity/legitimate?regulatory?purpose?prong?of?the?substantive?test.?This?much?is?clear?from?McHugh,?supra,?49?Cal.3d?at?pages?378-379,?where?the?court?conceded?treble?damages?were?authorized?by?the?city?charter,?yet?found?such?damages?violative?of?the?reasonable?necessity/legitimate?purpose?prong,?in?part?because,?in?the?court’s?view,?there?were?other,?less?intrusive?means?of?accomplishing?the?asserted?regulatory?goal.?It?is?thus?apparent?from?McHugh?that?our?judicial?powers?analysis?contemplates?a?somewhat?higher?level?of?scrutiny?than?rational?basis. The?purposes?of?the?housing?provisions?of?the?act?are?to?prevent?and?eliminate?specified?discriminatory?practices?in?the?sale?or?rental?of?housing.?(See????12920?[housing?discrimination?against?public?policy],?12955?[unlawful?practices],?12980?[procedure?for?prevention?and?elimination?of?housing?discrimination];?cf.?Peralta?Community?College?Dist.?v.?Fair?Employment?and?Housing?Com.?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?40,?48?[276?Cal.Rptr.?114,?801?P.2d?357]?(hereafter?Peralta)?[employment?provisions].)?To?this?end,?the?act?authorizes?any?person?claiming?to?be?the?victim?of?unlawful?discrimination?to?file?a?verified?complaint?with?the?department,?and?authorizes?the?department,?after?preliminary?investigation,?to?seek?to?resolve?the?complaint?by?conference,?conciliation?and?persuasion.?If?that?fails?or?is?unwarranted,?the?director?may?issue?an?accusation?to?be?heard?by?the?commission.?(???12980,?subds.?(a),?(c),?12981.)?Pending?resolution?of?the?complaint,?the?department?may?in?appropriate?cases?seek?an?injunction?preventing?the?owner?of?the?property?from?taking?any?further?action?with?respect?to?its?rental,?lease?or?sale.?(??12983.)?If,?after?hearing,?the?commission?finds?the?respondent?has?engaged?in?an?unlawful?practice,?it?shall?issue?a?cease?and?desist?order?and,?in?addition,?may?order?the?respondent?to?offer?the?complainant?the?same?or?a?like?housing?accommodation,?the?payment?of?punitive?damages?not?to?exceed?$1,000,?the?payment?of?actual?damages,?and?affirmative?or?prospective?relief.?(??12987.) If,?by?contrast,?the?department?fails?to?issue?an?accusation?within?150?days?after?the?filing?of?a?complaint,?or?earlier?determines?none?will?issue,?the?department?issues?a?right-to-sue?letter,?notifying?the?complainant?of?the?right?[54?Cal.3d?258]?to?bring?a?civil?action?in?court.?(??12980,?subd.?(d).)?Although?the?act?expressly?provides?that?the?filing?of?a?complaint?and?pursuit?of?conciliation?or?remedy?under?the?act?will?not?prejudice?the?complainant’s?right?to?pursue?judicial?relief?under?other?applicable?laws,?it?further?provides?(1)?that?if?a?civil?suit?has?been?filed?under?the?Unruh?Civil?Rights?Act?(Civ.?Code,???51?et?seq.),?the?department?must?terminate?proceedings?on?notification?of?the?entry?of?final?judgment?unless?the?judgment?is?a?dismissal?entered?at?the?complainant’s?request?(??12980,?subd.?(a)),?and?(2)?that?no?remedy?shall?be?available?under?the?act?unless?the?complainant?waives?all?rights?or?claims?under?section?52?of?the?Civil?Codefn.?5before?receiving?a?remedy?(??12987,?subd.?(3)). [3c]?Seeking?to?satisfy?the?substantive?test,?the?commission?argues?that?the?award?of?general?compensatory?damages?is?necessary?to?effectuate?the?purpose?of?the?act?to?provide?”effective?remedies”?that?will?eliminate?discriminatory?practices?(see???12920).?The?awarding?of?damages?for?the?pain?and?humiliation?of?race-based?discrimination,?the?commission?asserts,?helps?to?eliminate?such?practices?by?serving?as?a?deterrent?and,?in?addition,?serves?to?make?the?aggrieved?person?whole?by?compensating?for?the?denial?of?the?right?to?be?free?from?discrimination?in?housing?(citing?Memphis?Community?School?Dist.?v.?Stachura?(1986)?477?U.S.?299,?307?[91?L.Ed.2d?249,?258-259,?106?S.Ct.?2537];?Kentucky?Com’n?on?Human?Rights?v.?Fraser?(Ky.?1981)?625?S.W.2d?852). That?compensatory?damages?serve?to?deter?discrimination?and?compensate?its?victim?for?the?psychic?harm?flowing?from?discrimination?is?not?in?dispute,?nor?is?it?the?issue.?Under?McHugh,?supra,?44?Cal.3d?348,?the?issue,?rather,?is?whether?the?award?of?substantial?emotional?distress?compensatory?damages?is?”reasonably?necessary”?to?accomplish?the?commission’s?legitimate?regulatory?[54?Cal.3d?259]?purposes?and?”merely?incidental”?to?its?primary?regulatory?purposes,?or?in?reality?transfers?to?the?agency?the?judicial?function?of?determining?traditional?common?law?claims.?(Id.?at?p.?374.) In?answering?this?question,?we?find?it?helpful?to?trace?the?history?of?the?fair?housing?provisions?of?the?act.?In?1959?the?Legislature?enacted?three?separate?acts?directed?to?the?declaration?and?enforcement?of?civil?rights:?the?Fair?Employment?Practices?Act?(FEPA)?(former?Lab.?Code,???1410?et?seq.;?see?Stats.?1959,?ch.?121,???1,?pp.?1999-2005),?prohibiting?employment?discrimination;?the?Hawkins?Act?(former?Health?&?Saf.?Code,???35700?et?seq.,?enacted?by?Stats.?1959,?ch.?1681,???1,?pp.?4074-4077),?prohibiting?discrimination?in?publicly?assisted?housing?accommodations;?and?the?Unruh?Civil?Rights?Act?(Civ.?Code,????51-52,?added?by?Stats.?1959,?ch.?1866,????1-4,?p.?4424,?replacing?former?Civ.?Code,????51-54,?added?by?Stats.?1905,?ch.?413,????1-4,?pp.?553-554),?prohibiting?discrimination?in?business?establishments.fn.?6?(Dyna-Med,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?1394.) Originally?the?Legislature?intended?only?employment?discrimination?to?be?handled?administratively;?discrimination?in?housing?was?to?be?handled?by?civil?suit?under?the?Hawkins?and?Unruh?Civil?Rights?Acts.?(Stearns?v.?Fair?Employment?Practice?Com.?(1971)?6?Cal.3d?205,?214?[98?Cal.Rptr.?467,?490?P.2d?1155]?(hereafter?Stearns);?see?Burks?v.?Poppy?Construction?Co.,?supra,?57?Cal.2d?463.)?However,?because?civil?damages?in?housing?violations?often?amounted?to?less?than?$1,000?(Stearns,?supra),?defendants?by?means?of?various?procedural?maneuvers?could?force?the?cost?of?litigation?above?the?plaintiff’s?expected?recovery.?To?remedy?this,?the?Legislature?in?1963?replaced?the?Hawkins?Act?with?the?Rumford?Fair?Housing?Act?(former?Health?&?Saf.?Code,???35700?et?seq.,?enacted?by?Stats.?1963,?ch.?1853,????2-4,?pp.?3823-3830),?which?extended?the?housing?discrimination?prohibitions?to?housing?generally?and?for?the?first?time?afforded?an?administrative?remedy?for?housing?discrimination.?(Stearns,?supra,?6?Cal.3d?at?p.?214;?see?Dyna-Med,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?1394;?see?also?56?Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.?332,?336?(1973).)fn.?7?[54?Cal.3d?260] Although?the?Rumford?Fair?Housing?Act?retained?language?authorizing?the?award?of?”damages,”?it?transformed?the?statutory?minimum?recoverable?in?judicial?proceedings?under?the?Hawkins?Act?(see?fn.?6,?ante)?into?a?statutory?maximum?in?administrative?proceedings.?Thus,?the?Rumford?Act?initially?empowered?the?commission’s?predecessor,?the?Fair?Employment?Practice?Commission?(FEPC),?if?it?determined?that?specified?make-whole?remedies?were?not?available,?to?award?damages?in?an?amount?not?to?exceed?$500.?(Stats.?1963,?ch.?1853,???2,?pp.?3828-3829.)fn.?8?In?1975?the?maximum?damage?award?was?increased?to?$1,000.?(Stats.?1975,?ch.?280,???1,?p.?701.)?In?1977?the?Rumford?Act?was?amended?to?specify?that?the?damages?payable?to?the?injured?party?were?”actual?and?punitive”?damages?and?for?the?first?time?to?describe?the?FEPC’s?authority?to?award?damages?in?housing?cases?as?cumulative,?rather?than?alternative.?(Stats.?1977,?ch.?1187,???10,?p.?3893;?Stats.?1977,?ch.?1188,???13.1,?pp.?3905-3906?[describing?the?FEPC’s?authority?as?”including,?but?not?limited?to,”?the?actions?specified].)?(See?Dyna-Med,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?1394?&?fn.?17.)?At?the?same?time,?the?Legislature?extended?to?victims?of?housing?discrimination?the?right?to?bring?a?civil?suit?under?the?act?on?receipt?from?the?department?of?a?right-to-sue?letter.?(Stats.?1977,?ch.?1188,???5.1,?p.?3902;?see???12980,?subd.?(d).) In?1980?the?Legislature?combined?the?employment?and?housing?antidiscrimination?statutory?schemes?to?form?the?present?act,?with?enforcement?of?both?sections?of?the?act?vested?in?the?commission.?(Stats.?1980,?ch.?992,???4,?pp.?3140-3142;?see?Dyna-Med,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?1394.)?In?1981?section?12987?was?amended?to?remove?the?limit?on?the?amount?of?actual?damages,?while?retaining?a?$1,000?limit?on?punitive?damages.?(??12987,?subd.?(2),?as?amended?by?Stats.?1981,?ch.?899,???3,?p.?3424.) As?this?history?illustrates,?from?1963,?when?the?FEPC?was?first?empowered?to?handle?housing?discrimination?complaints,?until?1982,?when?the?amendment?removing?the?cap?on?actual?damages?became?effective,?the?agency’s?primary?remedial?focus?was?on?cease?and?desist?orders?and?affirmative?equitable?or?corrective?”make-whole”?relief?that?would?provide?a?[54?Cal.3d?261]?victim?of?housing?discrimination?with?the?subject?housing?or?housing?substantially?similar?thereto.?The?award?of?damages?was?authorized?in?only?limited?and?minimal?amounts.?Indeed,?from?its?enactment?in?1963?until?its?amendment?in?1977,?the?Rumford?Fair?Housing?Act?authorized?the?FEPC?to?award?monetary?damages?only?if?the?specified?make-whole?remedies?were?not?available;?not?until?1977?did?the?award?of?even?minimal?damages?become?a?cumulative?remedy. The?statutory?focus?on?corrective?measures?was?consistent?with?the?legislative?purpose?to?provide?a?streamlined?procedure?to?prevent?and?eliminate?housing?discrimination.?As?explained?in?Stearns,?supra:?”In?providing?an?administrative?remedy?for?housing?discrimination?the?Legislature?undertook?to?make?sure?that?individual?actions?did?not?become?burdened?with?procedural?technicalities.?[?]?To?achieve?this?end?the?FEPC?established?procedures?that?are?as?simple?and?uncomplicated?as?possible.?Complaints?are?drafted?by?laymen;?the?commission?informally?attempts?to?eliminate?discriminatory?practices?before?instituting?formal?accusations;?the?commission,?on?a?finding?of?discrimination,?may?fashion?remedies?both?to?correct?unique?cases?of?such?practice?as?well?as?to?curb?its?general?incidence.”?(6?Cal.3d?at?p.?214.) [6]?(See?fn.?9.),?[3d]?Until?1982,?therefore,?the?award?of?damages-in?a?minimal?and?limited?amount-was?clearly?incidental?to?the?commission’s?primary?regulatory?purpose?of?correcting?and?preventing?housing?discrimination.fn.?9?The?legislative?history?does?not?disclose?the?reason?for?the?Legislature’s?amendment?of?the?act?to?eliminate?the?ceiling?on?actual?damages.?Since?the?amendment,?however,?the?dollar?amounts?of?the?damage?awards?have?steadily?risenfn.?10?and?may?be?expected?to?continue?to?do?so.?The?availability?of?unlimited?damages?thus?risks?converting?the?focus?of?the?commission’s?remedial?decision?from?one?of?fashioning?equitable?remedies?directed?to?making?the?injured?party?whole?in?the?context?of?housing,?to?one?of?compensating?him?or?her?for?the?psychic?harm?suffered.?As?the?commission?seeks?to?assess?and?evaluate?the?extent?of?the?complainant’s?injury,?what?once?was?an?alternative?or?incidental?adjunct?to?the?primary?relief?of?securing?the?same?or?comparable?housing,?has?assumed?an?independent?importance?[54?Cal.3d?262]?that?potentially?threatens?to?dominate?the?administrative?hearing.?(See,?e.g.,?Dept.?Fair?Empl.?&?Hous.?v.?Aluminum?Precision?Products,?Inc.?(1988)?No.?88-05,?FEHC?Precedential?Decs.?1988-1989,?CEB?4,?p.?11?[reciting?the?numerous?factors?the?commission?considers?in?awarding?compensatory?damages?and?the?relevant?expert?and?percipient?witnesses];?Dept.?Fair?Empl.?&?Hous.?v.?Davis?Realty?Co.,?supra,?FEHC?Dec.?No.?87-02,?CEB?5?[five?pages?of?findings?devoted?to?the?emotional?impact?of?the?discrimination?on?the?four?complainants,?each?of?whom,?at?the?department’s?behest,?was?examined?by?a?psychologist].) [7]?As?we?recognized?in?Youst?v.?Longo?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?64,?80?[233?Cal.Rptr.?294,?729?P.2d?728,?85?A.L.R.4th?1025]:?”[T]he?power?to?award?compensatory?and?punitive?tort?damages?to?an?injured?party?is?a?judicial?function.”?(Accord,?Curtis?v.?Loether,?supra,?415?U.S.?at?p.?196?[39?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?267-268];?see?also?Broward?County?v.?La?Rosa?(Fla.?1987)?505?So.2d?422,?423-424?[where?the?court?stated?that?it?could?not?”imagine?a?more?purely?judicial?function?than?a?contested?adjudicatory?proceeding?involving?disputed?facts?that?results?in?an?award?of?unliquidated?common?law?damages?for?personal?injuries?in?the?form?of?humiliation?and?embarrassment”].) Although?in?McHugh,?supra,?49?Cal.3d?348,?we?rejected?a?rigid?rule?that?would?hold?administrative?agencies?incompetent?under?the?doctrine?of?judicial?powers?to?award?”damages”?of?any?kind?(id.?at?p.?358),?in?upholding?the?administrative?award?of?damages?we?repeatedly?distinguished?incidental,?”restitutive”?damages-permissible?under?the?judicial?powers?clause-from?the?award?of?unlimited,?nonquantifiable?compensatory?damages,?as?to?which?we?reserved?opinion.?(See,?e.g.,?id.?at?pp.?358,?359-?360,?375?&?fn.?38.)?In?Curtis?v.?Loether,?supra,?415?U.S.?189,?a?title?VIII?housing?discrimination?case,?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?made?a?similar?distinction.?Referring?to?the?plaintiff’s?complaint,?the?Supreme?Court?stated,?”[T]he?relief?sought?here-actual?and?punitive?damages-is?the?traditional?form?of?relief?offered?in?the?courts?of?law.?[Fn.?omitted.]”?(415?U.S.?at?p.?196?[39?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?267].)?Backpay,?by?contrast-the?only?monetary?relief?afforded?under?title?VII?for?employment?discrimination-“is?an?integral?part?of?an?equitable?remedy,?a?form?of?restitution.”?(Id.?at?p.?197?[39?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?197]?[explaining?why?the?jury?trial?right?applies?to?a?title?VIII,?but?not?a?title?VII,?civil?suit].)fn.?11?[54?Cal.3d?263] Although?in?McHugh?we?did?not?expressly?define?”restitutive?damages,”?both?in?context?and?common?parlance?the?meaning?of?the?phrase?seems?clear.?[8]?”Restitutive,”?relates?to?restitution:?”of?the?nature?of,?or?tending?to,?restitution.”?(Webster’s?New?Internat.?Dict.,?supra,?at?p.?2125,?col.?1.)”?”Restitution,”?in?turn,?is?”the?act?of?making?good,?or?of?giving?an?equivalent?for,?loss?….”?(Ibid.;?see?also?Black’s?Law?Dict.,?supra,?at?p.?1313,?col.?2;?Curtis?v.?Loether,?supra,?415?U.S.?at?p.?197?[39?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?268].)?Applying?the?stated?guidelines,?in?McHugh?we?upheld?the?authority?of?a?local?rent?control?board?to?adjudicate?excess?rent?claims?and?to?order?repayment?of?the?excess?amounts?collected?(49?Cal.3d?at?p.?375).?In?so?doing?we?disapproved?Jersey?Maid?Milk?Products?Co.?v.?Brock?(1939)?13?Cal.2d?620?[91?P.2d?577],?which?found?unconstitutional?a?statutory?provision?that?authorized?the?Director?of?Agriculture?to?resolve?wholesale?milk?price?disputes?and?to?award?milk?producers?such?amounts?as?he?determined?the?distributors?had?wrongfully?refused?to?pay.?(49?Cal.3d?at?pp.?356-358.) By?implication,?therefore,?restitutive?damages?encompass,?at?a?minimum,?quantifiable?sums?that?one?private?party?subject?to?the?jurisdiction?of?the?agency?owes?to?another?party?who?claims?the?sum?was?obtained,?or?not?paid,?in?violation?of?a?law?or?regulation?the?agency?is?empowered?to?enforce.?To?the?foregoing?we?would?add,?as?here,?out-of-pocket?expenditures?incurred?or?economic?harm?suffered?by?one?party?in?consequence?of?another?party’s?violation?of?a?law?or?regulation?the?agency?is?empowered?to?enforce.?Restitutive?damages,?in?short,?are?akin?to?special?damages,?i.e.,?they?are?quantifiable?amounts?of?money?due?an?injured?private?party?from?another?party?to?compensate?for?the?pecuniary?loss?directly?resulting?from?the?second?party’s?violation?of?law. [9]?General?compensatory?damages?for?emotional?distress,?by?contrast,?are?not?pecuniarily?measurable,?defy?a?fixed?rule?of?quantification,?and?are?awarded?without?proof?of?pecuniary?loss.?(Oleck,?supra,???46,?at?pp.?31-32;?22?Am.Jur.2d,?Damages,?supra,???28,?at?p.?56.)?As?the?commission?itself?has?recognized,?in?seeking?to?place?a?dollar?value?on?a?complainant’s?mental?and?emotional?injuries?there?is?little?in?legal?authority?to?guide?it,?for?the?reason?that?”[i]t?has?traditionally?been?left?to?the?trier?of?fact?to?assess?the?degree?of?harm?suffered?and?to?fix?a?monetary?amount?as?just?compensation?therefor.?[Citation.]”?(Dept.?Fair?Empl.?&?Hous.?v.?Ambylou?Enterprises?(1982)?No.?82-06,?FEHC?Precedential?Decs.?1982-1983,?CEB?3,?p.?11?[employment?discrimination];?see?Peralta,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?p.?56;?see?generally?Schwemm,?Compensatory?Damages?in?Federal?Fair?Housing?Cases?(1981)?16?Harv.?C.R.-C.L.?L.Rev.?83?[discussing?the?difficulty?of?evaluating?intangible?injuries?in?housing?discrimination?cases]?[hereafter?Schwemm].)?[54?Cal.3d?264] Contrasting?general?compensatory?damages?with?the?equitable?remedy?of?restitution,?the?court?in?Dean?Witter?Reynolds,?Inc.?v.?Superior?Court?(1989)?211?Cal.App.3d?758,?774?[259?Cal.Rptr.?789],?made?the?following?apt?observation?in?concluding?that?general?compensatory?damages?are?not?available?under?the?unfair?competition?statute?(Bus.?&?Prof.?Code,???17200?et?seq.):?”The?exclusion?of?claims?for?compensatory?damages?is?…?consistent?with?the?overarching?legislative?concern?to?provide?a?streamlined?procedure?for?the?prevention?of?ongoing?or?threatened?acts?of?unfair?competition.?To?permit?individual?claims?for?compensatory?damages?to?be?pursued?as?part?of?such?a?procedure?would?tend?to?thwart?this?objective?by?requiring?the?court?to?deal?with?a?variety?of?damage?issues?of?a?higher?order?of?complexity.”?(Italics?in?original.) [3e]?The?same,?we?believe,?holds?true?for?the?administrative?adjudication?of?nonquantifiable?emotional?distress?damages?in?housing?discrimination?cases.?As?shown,?the?purpose?of?the?act?was?to?provide?a?streamlined?and?economic?procedure?for?preventing?and?redressing?discrimination?in?housing?as?an?alternative?to?the?more?cumbersome?and?costly?procedure?of?a?civil?suit.?The?availability?of?alternate?civil?remedies?underscores?that?the?primary?regulatory?purpose?of?the?act?is?to?prevent?discrimination?in?housing?before?it?happens?and,?when?it?does?occur,?to?offer?a?streamlined?and?economical?administrative?procedure?to?make?its?victim?whole?in?the?context?of?the?housing?(cf.?Dyna-?Med,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?1387).?The?award?of?unlimited?general?compensatory?damages?is?neither?necessary?to?this?purpose?nor?merely?incidental?thereto;?its?effect,?rather,?is?to?shift?the?remedial?focus?of?the?administrative?hearing?from?affirmative?actions?designed?to?redress?the?particular?instance?of?unlawful?housing?discrimination?and?prevent?its?recurrence,?to?compensating?the?injured?party?not?just?for?the?tangible?detriment?to?his?or?her?housing?situation,?but?for?the?intangible?and?nonquantifiable?injury?to?his?or?her?psyche?suffered?as?a?result?of?the?respondent’s?unlawful?acts,?in?the?manner?of?a?traditional?private?tort?action?in?a?court?of?law.?(Cf.?Peralta,?supra,?52?Cal.3d?at?p.?49;?see?also?Schwemm,?supra,?16?Harv.?C.R.-C.L.?L.Rev.?at?pp.?89-90?[federal?housing?discrimination?claims?sound?in?tort?and?damage?awards?should?be?governed?by?compensation?principles?applicable?to?tort?law].)?As?we?stated?in?Peralta,?supra,?”[t]his?effect,?we?believe,?is?beyond?the?scope?of?the?Legislature’s?intended?purpose?in?enacting?the?FEHA?to?prevent?and?eliminate?discrimination?….”?(52?Cal.3d?at?p.?49.) The?commission,?however,?argues?that?a?distinction?exists?between?the?performance?of?a?judicial?function,?on?the?one?hand,?and?the?exercise?of?judicial?power,?on?the?other,?and?that?the?state?Constitution?does?not?preclude?the?vesting?of?”court-like”?functions?in?an?administrative?agency,?so?long?as?[54?Cal.3d?265]?the?judicial?power?of?review?remains?in?the?courts.?As?a?general?proposition,?we?accepted?this?argument?in?McHugh,?supra,?49?Cal.3d?at?pages?372-373.?From?this,?however,?the?commission?argues?that?because?its?award?of?general?compensatory?damages?is?not?a?final?judgment,?but?is?enforceable?only?in?the?superior?court?and?subject?to?judicial?review?by?way?of?administrative?mandamus?(???11523,?12987;?Code?Civ.?Proc.,???1094.5;?see?also???12981,?subd.?(d)),?its?award?is?not?an?unconstitutional?exercise?of?judicial?power.?In?effect,?the?commission?would?have?us?find?that?satisfaction?of?the?procedural?prong?of?the?McHugh?standard-the?”principle?of?check”?(see?49?Cal.3d?at?pp.?374,?376)-is?sufficient?to?meet?a?judicial?powers?challenge?to?an?agency’s?administrative?adjudications. In?support?of?its?argument,?the?commission?cites?numerous?out-of-state?cases?that?hold?the?administrative?award?of?unlimited?nonquantifiable?damages?is?permissible?when,?as?here,?due?process?procedural?rights?have?been?protected,?prohibited?conduct?has?been?well?defined?by?the?governing?statute,?and?judicial?review?is?available.?(E.g.,?Kentucky?Com’n?on?Human?Rights?v.?Fraser,?supra,?625?S.W.2d?852;?Plasti-Line,?Inc.?v.?Human?Rights?Com’n?(Tenn.?1988)?746?S.W.2d?691.)?In?many?of?the?cited?cases,?however,?the?administrative?award?of?unlimited?damages?for?emotional?distress?type?injuries?was?not?at?issue.?(See,?e.g.,?Percy?Kent?Bag?Co.?v.?Missouri?Com’n,?(Mo.?1982)?632?S.W.2d?480,?483-485?[backpay];?General?Drivers?&?Helpers?U.?v.?Wisconsin?Emp.?Rel.?Bd.?(1963)?21?Wis.2d?242?[124?N.W.2d?123]?[vacation?pay];?cf.?Zahorian?v.?Russell?Fitt?Real?Estate?Agency?(1973)?62?N.J.?399?[301?A.2d?754,?761,?61?A.L.R.3d?927]?[“minor?or?incidental”?awards,?here?$750].)?In?McHugh,?moreover,?we?expressly?rejected?the?proposition?that?”an?administrative?agency?may?exercise?all?manner?of?’judicial-like’?power?on?the?simple?condition?that?judicial?review?of?the?administrative?decision?remains?available.”?(49?Cal.3d?at?p.?364.)?Although?we?recognized?that?sister?states’?decisions?have?occasionally?accorded?little?consideration?to?the?”substantive?limitations”?principle?discussed?above?(id.?at?p.?371),?we?adhered?to?the?guiding?principles?of?substantive?as?well?as?procedural?limitations?on?the?remedial?power?of?administrative?agencies?(id.?at?p.?374). In?sum,?we?agree?with?the?Court?of?Appeal?that?the?commission’s?award?of?unlimited?general?compensatory?damages?for?emotional?distress?was?in?violation?of?the?judicial?powers?clause.fn.?12?[54?Cal.3d?266] [10]?The?commission’s?award,?by?contrast,?of?damages?for?Cannon’s?out-of-pocket?expenditures?for?increased?rent?and?utilities?clearly?satisfies?the?McHugh?standard,?as?respondents?acknowledge.?The?substantive?limitations?prong?is?satisfied?because?(1)?the?damages?are?authorized?by?the?statutory?language?permitting?the?award?of?actual?damages?(??12987);?(2)?in?providing?recompense?for?sums?actually?expended?as?a?result?of?the?unlawful?discrimination,?the?damages?are?reasonably?necessary?to?effectuate?the?commission’s?statutory?purpose?of?providing?effective?remedies?to?eliminate?discriminatory?practices?(??12920);?and?(3)?because?they?are?tangible?and?readily?quantifiable,?the?damages?remain?incidental?to?the?commission’s?primary?regulatory?purposes?of?preventing?and?eliminating?housing?discrimination?and?making?its?victim?whole?in?the?context?of?housing.?The?procedural?prong,?in?turn,?is?met?because?the?award?may?be?reviewed?by?petition?for?a?writ?of?mandamus?(???11523,?12987)?and?is?enforceable?only?by?judgment?and?order?of?the?court?(??12981,?subd.?(d)). […]

Potack?v.?State?Bar?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?132?,?284?Cal.Rptr.?335;?813?P.2d?1365 [No.?S015089.?Aug?19,?1991.] RICHARD?N.?POTACK,?Petitioner,?v.?THE?STATE?BAR?OF?CALIFORNIA,?Respondent. (Opinion?by?The?Court.) COUNSEL Richard?N.?Potack,?in?pro.?per.,?for?Petitioner. Diane?C.?Yu,?Richard?J.?Zanassi?and?Russell?G.?Weiner?for?Respondent. OPINION THE?COURT. We?consider?the?recommendation?of?the?Review?Department?of?the?State?Bar?Court?to?revoke?petitioner’s?probation?for?failing?to?comply?with?our?order?in?a?prior?disciplinary?matter?(Bar?Misc.?No.?5066).?After?considering?the?evidence?and?petitioner’s?contentions,?we?adopt?the?recommendation?of?the?review?department. Findings?of?Fact   Previous?discipline Petitioner?was?admitted?to?the?practice?of?law?in?December?1975.?In?May?1986,?we?adopted?the?recommendation?of?the?review?department?that?petitioner?be?suspended?from?practicing?law?for?three?years,?that?execution?of?the?order?for?such?suspension?be?stayed,?and?that?petitioner?be?placed?on?probation?for?three?years?on?conditions?including?actual?suspension?for?one?year.?Pursuant?to?the?conditions?of?probation,?petitioner?was?required?to?take?and?pass?the?Professional?Responsibility?Examination,?make?restitution?to?several?clients,?comply?with?quarterly?reporting?requirements?(such?reports?due?on?January?10,?April?20,?July?10?and?October?10?of?each?year?of?probation)?and?participate?in?a?drug?rehabilitation?program.?Petitioner’s?prior?misconduct?leading?to?the?discipline?imposed?in?1986?included?the?failure?to?perform?services?in?a?competent?and?diligent?manner?(former?Rules?Prof.?Conduct,?rule?6-102(2)),?the?failure?to?maintain?a?proper?client?trust?account?[54?Cal.3d?135]?(former?Rules?Prof.?Conduct,?rule?8-101(A)),?the?failure?to?refund?promptly?that?part?of?a?fee?paid?in?advance?that?he?had?not?earned?(former?Rules?Prof.?Conduct,?rule?2-111(A)(3)),?the?representation?of?conflicting?interests?without?obtaining?the?written?consent?of?all?parties?concerned?(former?Rules?Prof.?Conduct,?rule?5-102(B))?and?the?violation?of?his?oath?and?duties?as?an?attorney?(Bus.?&?Prof.?Code,????6068,?6103). Present?Misconduct On?October?20,?1988,?the?State?Bar?Court,?through?its?probation?department,?sent?petitioner?a?letter?notifying?him?that?his?October?10,?1988,?report?had?not?been?filed.?The?letter?informed?petitioner?that?if?the?report?was?not?filed?within?10?days,?the?State?Bar?would?file?a?notice?to?show?cause?why?petitioner’s?probation?should?not?be?revoked?pursuant?to?the?Rules?of?Procedure?of?the?State?Bar,?rule?550?et?seq.?Petitioner?failed?to?timely?file?the?report. On?November?17,?1988,?the?State?Bar?filed?a?notice?to?show?cause?regarding?revocation?of?probation?pursuant?to?rule?550?et?seq.?of?the?Rules?of?Procedure?of?the?State?Bar.?The?notice?stated?that?petitioner?had?failed?to?comply?with?the?conditions?of?his?probation?in?that?he?did?not?file?a?quarterly?report?on?or?before?October?10,?1988.?Petitioner?was?notified?to?appear?before?a?referee?at?a?specific?time?and?place?”and?there?to?show?cause?why?it?should?not?be?recommended?to?the?Supreme?Court?of?the?State?of?California?that?the?stay?of?the?Order?of?your?suspension?entered?by?the?Supreme?Court?be?set?aside?and?revoked?and?that?you?be?suspended?from?the?practice?of?law?in?the?State?of?California?for?a?period?of?up?to?three?(3)?years.?On?further?notice,?to?show?cause?why?the?State?Bar?Court?should?not?order?your?involuntary?inactive?enrollment?pursuant?to?Business?and?Professions?Code?[section]?6007?subdivision?(d)?and?Rule?612(b)?of?the?Rules?of?Procedure?of?the?State?Bar?of?California?in?the?event?the?hearing?panel?recommends?that?you?be?suspended?from?the?practice?of?law.”?The?notice?indicated?that?if?petitioner?did?not?file?the?report?within?20?days,?he?would?be?subject?to?default?proceedings?under?rule?552?of?the?Rules?of?Procedure?of?the?State?Bar.?Petitioner?failed?to?timely?respond?to?the?notice. On?November?22,?1988,?petitioner?filed?a?probation?report?for?the?October?1988?reporting?period.?The?State?Bar?found?that?the?report?was?not?in?compliance?with?condition?3(a)?of?the?terms?of?probation?because?it?failed?to?certify?that?petitioner?had?complied?with?all?the?provisions?of?the?State?Bar?Act?and?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct?during?the?period?specified?in?the?report.?The?next?day,?the?State?Bar?informed?petitioner?that?he?should?submit?an?amended?report?within?10?days.?When?petitioner?failed?to?comply?with?the?State?Bar’s?directive,?he?was?notified?(by?certified?mail)?that?a?mandatory?[54?Cal.3d?136]?settlement?conference?had?been?scheduled?for?March?1989?pursuant?to?former?rules?1210?to?1225?of?the?Provisional?Rules?of?Practice?of?the?State?Bar?Court. On?February?15,?1989,?the?State?Bar?served?petitioner?with?a?notice?of?application?to?enter?default,?charging?petitioner?with?failing?to?file?an?answer?to?the?November?notice?to?show?cause?as?required?by?rule?552?of?the?Rules?of?Procedure?of?the?State?Bar.?Petitioner?was?informed?that?the?State?Bar?would?seek?a?default?on?the?probation?revocation?unless?petitioner?responded?to?the?notice?within?20?days.?Again,?petitioner?failed?to?timely?respond?to?the?notice. On?March?8,?petitioner?was?served?with?a?notice?of?entry?of?default?for?failure?to?answer.?The?notice?advised?petitioner?that?a?default?had?been?entered?against?him?because?he?failed?to?file?a?timely?answer?to?the?notice?to?show?cause. On?March?23,?petitioner?was?served?with?a?separate?notice?to?show?cause?regarding?revocation?of?probation?(No.?88-P-11031).?The?notice?charged?that?petitioner?had?failed?to?file?an?amended?report?as?required?by?the?probation?department?on?November?23,?1988,?and?further?charged?that?petitioner?violated?the?conditions?of?his?probation?by?failing?to?make?timely?restitution?to?his?clients.?Although?petitioner?informed?the?State?Bar?that?he?would?be?making?a?motion?to?set?aside?the?default,?he?failed?to?do?so. In?May?1989,?a?default?hearing?was?held?on?petitioner’s?failure?to?file?a?timely?quarterly?report.?The?hearing?panel?concluded?that?petitioner?had?willfully?failed?to?file?a?report?for?the?October?1988?period.?In?addition,?the?hearing?panel?found?in?aggravation?that?petitioner?had?failed?to?show?he?made?restitution?to?his?former?clients?pursuant?to?our?May?1986?order. Discipline The?hearing?panel?recommended?that?petitioner?be?placed?on?actual?suspension?for?the?two?remaining?years?of?his?stayed?suspension.fn.?1?One?month?later,?petitioner?moved?to?set?aside?the?default.?The?State?Bar?Court?denied?the?motion?after?concluding?that?petitioner?failed?to?demonstrate?either?good?cause?or?excusable?neglect?for?his?failure?to?comply?with?the?conditions?of?probation. Thereafter,?the?review?department,?by?a?vote?of?nine?to?five,?adopted?the?decision?of?the?hearing?panel?with?the?exception?that?it?deleted?the?hearing?[54?Cal.3d?137]?panel’s?conclusion?that?petitioner?failed?to?make?restitution.?All?five?of?the?dissenters?believed?the?discipline?was?excessive.?Four?dissenters?recommended?a?three-month?actual?suspension?with?a?one-year?extension?of?probation,?and?the?fifth?dissenter?recommended?a?three-month?actual?suspension?without?an?extension?of?probation. Discussion Petitioner?raises?a?number?of?objections?to?the?State?Bar’s?conclusions.?As?we?explain,?petitioner’s?claims?lack?merit.?We?conclude?the?review?department?recommended?the?correct?discipline?under?the?facts. Notice [1]?Petitioner?contends?the?hearing?panel?abused?its?discretion?when?it?denied?his?motion?to?set?aside?his?default?in?failing?to?appear?at?the?show?cause?hearing.?He?claims?that?a?second?notice?to?show?cause?issued?by?the?State?Bar?erroneously?led?him?to?believe?that?he?was?not?required?to?respond?to?the?original?notice.?Petitioner?asserts?that?he?was?misled?by?a?clerk?of?the?State?Bar?Court?who?apparently?told?him?that?the?second?notice?to?show?cause?would?”combine?the?original?allegation?of?failure?to?file?a?timely?probation?report?with?a?second?allegation?of?the?late?restitution?payment.”?Petitioner?claims?that?based?on?the?representation?of?the?clerk?and?the?”overlapping?orders”?of?the?State?Bar,?he?did?not?understand?that?he?would?be?in?default?if?he?did?not?file?an?answer?to?the?original?notice?to?show?cause,?and?he?thus?had?no?opportunity?to?present?mitigating?evidence?(apparently?to?explain?the?default)?to?the?State?Bar.?The?record?shows,?however,?petitioner?was?not?misled?as?to?his?responsibilities?in?this?regard. As?the?State?Bar?observes,?the?initial?notice?to?show?cause?charged?petitioner?with?violating?the?conditions?of?his?probation?because?he?failed?to?file?an?October?1988?probation?report.?Petitioner?eventually?filed?a?report?(in?late?November)?that?did?not?comply?with?the?terms?of?our?1986?order.?Although?petitioner?was?notified?of?the?deficiency,?he?failed?to?submit?an?amended?report.?In?addition,?the?record?shows?that?petitioner?chose?to?ignore?several?notices?regarding?his?noncompliance?with?the?original?notice?to?show?cause.?Accordingly,?his?assertion?that?he?was?”misled”?by?the?notices?is?meritless. Aggravating?Evidence [2]?Petitioner?contends?he?was?prejudiced?by?the?fact?that?the?hearing?panel?incorrectly?considered?as?an?aggravating?factor?his?failure?to?make?timely?restitution?to?several?former?clients?as?required?by?our?1986?order.?[54?Cal.3d?138]?He?asserts:?”In?fact,?by?the?time?the?original?statement?of?decision?was?decided,?full?restitution?had?been?made?to?each?client.”?Petitioner?is?incorrect?in?asserting?that?full?restitution?had?been?made?before?the?hearing?panel’s?decision?was?filed?with?the?State?Bar?Court.?Indeed,?in?his?declaration?in?support?of?the?motion?to?set?aside?the?default,?petitioner?admits?that?full?restitution?was?not?made?until?May?30,?1989,?nearly?15?days?after?the?hearing?panel’s?decision?was?filed.?Thus,?although?it?would?have?been?improper?for?the?hearing?panel?to?use?petitioner’s?failure?to?pay?restitution?as?an?independent?ground?of?discipline,?such?misconduct?was?properly?considered?as?establishing?a?circumstance?in?aggravation.?(Edwards?v.?State?Bar?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?28,?36?[276?Cal.Rptr.?153,?801?P.2d?396].) In?any?event,?as?we?explained,?the?review?department?did?not?consider?petitioner’s?failure?to?make?timely?restitution?as?a?factor?in?aggravation?when?it?adopted?the?hearing?panel’s?recommended?discipline.?Accordingly,?petitioner’s?contention?is?without?merit. Excessive?Discipline [3a]?Petitioner?asserts?that?two?years’?actual?suspension?for?the?failure?to?file?a?probation?report?that?complied?with?the?”precise?language”?of?our?order?is?excessive?because?he:?(i)?filed?a?timely?report?indicating?he?”was?complying?with?all?the?terms?and?conditions?of?his?probation,”?(ii)?complied?with?every?other?condition?of?his?probation,?(iii)?timely?responded?to?the?second?order?to?show?cause?and?presented?extensive?evidence?of?circumstances?in?mitigation?that?”would?warrant?that?any?proposed?discipline?not?include?any?further?actual?suspension,”?and?(iv)?has?performed?substantial?pro?bono?work?and?is?active?in?community?volunteer?work.?In?addition,?petitioner?argues?that?a?member?of?the?review?department?should?have?abstained?from?voting?on?the?hearing?panel’s?recommended?discipline?because?he?was?appointed?as?the?referee?to?decide?petitioner’s?motion?to?set?aside?the?default?judgment,?which?was?denied?without?a?hearing.?Petitioner?makes?several?requests?for?alternative?relief,?namely:?that?a?mitigation?hearing?be?held?before?a?judge?of?the?State?Bar?Court,?or?that?an?extended?period?of?probation?without?actual?suspension?be?imposed.?As?we?explain,?we?find?petitioner’s?contentions?to?be?without?merit. The?scope?of?our?review?is?well?established.?[4]?The?recommendation?of?the?review?department,?while?not?binding?on?this?court,?is?entitled?to?great?weight.?(Ainsworth?v.?State?Bar?(1988)?46?Cal.3d?1218,?1233?[252?Cal.Rptr.?267,?762?P.2d?431,?86?A.L.R.4th?1053].)?The?burden?is?on?petitioner?to?show?the?findings?are?not?supported?by?the?evidence?or?that?the?review?department?recommendation?is?erroneous.?(Chefsky?v.?State?Bar?(1984)?36?Cal.3d?116,?121?[202?Cal.Rptr.?349,?680?P.2d?82].)?To?meet?his?burden,?petitioner?must?[54?Cal.3d?139]?demonstrate?that?the?charges?of?misconduct?are?not?supported?by?clear?and?convincing?proof.?(Ibid.) [3b]?Petitioner?has?failed?to?carry?his?burden.?In?our?view,?the?review?department?correctly?determined?that?petitioner?willfully?failed?to?comply?with?the?terms?of?his?probation?after?he?was?given?ample?opportunity?by?the?State?Bar.?Our?1986?order?stayed?execution?of?suspension?on?the?condition?that?petitioner?comply?with?specified?terms?and?conditions?of?probation.?Although?petitioner?attempts?to?minimize?his?probation?violation?and?subsequent?misconduct?with?respect?to?the?default?proceedings,?his?failure?to?abide?by?the?terms?and?conditions?of?his?probation?is?a?serious?violation,?warranting?the?review?department’s?recommendation?that?our?1986?order?staying?suspension?be?set?aside.?(Cal.?Rules?of?Court,?rule?955(e);?Barnum?v.?State?Bar?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?104,?107?[276?Cal.Rptr.?147,?801?P.2d?390]?[probation?breach?amounts?to?indifference?toward?rectification].) Conclusion After?an?independent?review,?we?conclude?the?review?department’s?recommendation?revoking?probation?and?lifting?the?stay?on?two?years’?actual?suspension?is?sound.?Accordingly,?we?adopt?the?recommendation?as?our?own?and?order?that?petitioner’s?probation?be?revoked?and?that?he?commence?the?remaining?period?of?his?suspension?and?comply?with?the?other?conditions?of?our?order?in?State?Bar?Misc.?No.?5066. This?order?is?effective?upon?finality?of?this?decision?in?this?court.?(See?Cal.?Rules?of?Court,?rule?953(a).) FN?1.?The?hearing?panel?further?recommended?that?petitioner?be?enrolled?in?involuntary?inactive?status?pursuant?to?Business?and?Professions?Code?section?6007,?subdivision?(d).?This?recommendation?apparently?was?not?adopted?by?the?review?department.  

People?v.?Mickle?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?140?,?284?Cal.Rptr.?511;?814?P.2d?290 [No.?S004708. Aug?19,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?DENNY?MICKLE,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?San?Mateo?County,?No.?C-12278,?Thomas?McGinn?Smith,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Baxter,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli?and?Arabian,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.?Separate?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.,?concurring?in?the?judgment,?with?Broussard,?J.,?concurring.) COUNSEL Fern?M.?Laethem,?State?Public?Defender,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?Roy?M.?Dahlberg,?Musawwir?M.?Spiegel,?Thomas?L.?Carroll?and?John?Fresquez,?Deputy?State?Public?Defenders,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Ronald?S.?Matthias,?Morris?Beatus,?Aileen?Bunney?and?Edward?P.?O’Brien,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION BAXTER,?J. Defendant?Denny?Mickle?was?convicted?of?one?count?of?first?degree?murder?(Pen.?Code,???187)fn.?1?with?personal?use?of?a?knife?(??12022,?subd.?(b)),?and?arson?(??451,?subd.?(b)).?Under?the?1978?death?penalty?law,?the?jury?found?true?a?special?circumstance?that?the?murder?occurred?while?defendant?was?engaged?in?the?commission?of?a?lewd?and?lascivious?act?upon?a?minor.?(??190.2,?subd.?(a)(17)(v);?see???288,?subd.?(a).) In?a?separate?proceeding?held?after?the?guilt?verdict?was?rendered?but?before?the?penalty?phase?began,?the?jury?found?defendant?competent?to?stand?[54?Cal.3d?156]?trial.?(???1367,?1368.)?Defendant?purported?to?appeal?from?the?competence?determination.?While?that?appeal?was?pending?in?the?Court?of?Appeal,?a?penalty?trial?was?held.?The?jury?sentenced?defendant?to?death,?and?the?trial?court?denied?the?automatic?motion?to?modify?the?verdict.?(??190.4,?subd.?(e).)?The?death?judgment?was?automatically?appealed?to?this?court.?(??1239,?subd.?(b).)?The?interlocutory?appeal?from?the?competence?determination?was?transferred?here?(Crim.?25540)?and?consolidated?with?the?automatic?appeal?(S004708/Crim.?25377). For?reasons?which?will?be?explained,?the?interlocutory?appeal?from?the?competence?determination?will?be?dismissed?and?defendant’s?challenges?to?that?determination?considered?in?the?automatic?appeal?from?the?final?judgment.?We?find?no?prejudicial?error?affecting?the?guilt,?competence,?or?penalty?verdicts.?The?judgment?will?be?affirmed?in?its?entirety. Guilt?Phase?Evidence Prosecution?Case Crime?scene?evidence.?On?February?15,?1983,?the?victim,?12-?year-old?Lashan,?and?her?parents,?Darrell?and?Sally?K.,?moved?from?Pacifica?to?Daly?City.?Their?new?home?was?the?Mission?Bell?Motel,?which?was?occupied?primarily?by?permanent?residents,?including?families.?Darrell?happened?to?see?defendant?on?the?street?during?the?move?and?asked?for?his?help.?Defendant?was?a?longtime?acquaintance?of?Darrell’s?but?apparently?had?not?met?Sally?or?Lashan?before.?Because?defendant?had?no?home?and?all?three?adults?were?unemployed,?the?K.?family?agreed?to?let?defendant?stay?with?them?and?share?expenses. The?foursome?occupied?unit?10.?It?had?a?front?room?with?a?door?facing?onto?the?motel?courtyard,?a?hallway,?a?bathroom,?a?kitchen,?and?a?bedroom?with?a?door?opening?into?an?alley?behind?the?unit.?There?was?no?telephone?in?the?unit,?so?calls?had?to?be?handled?through?the?motel?office?or?at?a?public?booth?nearby.?Defendant?slept?on?a?murphy?bed?in?the?front?room,?and?Lashan?and?her?parents?slept?in?the?bedroom.?The?first?nine?days?of?joint?residence?were?uneventful. On?February?24,?the?day?of?the?crimes,?Lashan’s?parents?left?the?motel?at?noon?and?drove?to?Oakland?to?visit?Darrell’s?sick?grandmother.?At?some?point,?Sally?arranged?by?phone?to?have?a?woman?who?worked?at?Lashan’s?school?drive?Lashan?home?in?the?afternoon.?About?3:45?p.m.,?Sally?called?the?motel?and?told?defendant?about?the?arrangement.?He?promised?to?take?care?of?Lashan?until?Darrell?and?Sally?returned.?[54?Cal.3d?157] Defendant?was?in?the?unit?at?4?p.m.?when?the?school?employee?dropped?Lashan?off?and?departed.?Lashan?was?wearing?pants?and?a?plaid?shirt.?At?5:30?p.m.,?Sally?phoned?to?say?that?she?and?Darrell?would?not?be?home?for?awhile.?Defendant?reported?that?Lashan?had?arrived?home?safely?and?was?doing?homework?and?watching?television.?This?was?the?first?time?defendant?and?Lashan?had?ever?been?alone?together. At?7:30?p.m.,?two?rental?store?employees?arrived?at?unit?10?to?repossess?the?television?set.?Defendant?answered?the?door?and?briefly?chatted?with?them.?One?of?the?employees?went?into?the?bedroom?and?saw?Lashan?lying?on?the?bed?watching?television.?He?exchanged?a?few?words?with?her?and?took?the?set.?The?employee?could?not?remember?at?trial?what?Lashan?was?wearing?or?whether?she?was?lying?underneath?the?covers.?He?was?certain,?however,?that?both?defendant?and?Lashan?were?acting?”normal.” Between?7:30?and?8:30?p.m.,?a?motel?resident?saw?defendant?pace?”back?and?forth”?between?unit?10?and?the?phone?booth?near?the?office.?The?resident?had?been?working?on?his?car?in?the?courtyard?across?from?the?unit?since?1?p.m.,?and?had?seen?defendant?make?the?same?trip?a?few?times?earlier?in?the?day.?Immediately?before?the?resident?left?the?motel?premises?at?8:30?p.m.,?he?saw?defendant?enter?unit?10. Defendant?was?not?seen?again?until?9:50?p.m.,?when?he?arrived?at?the?South?San?Francisco?home?of?his?girlfriend,?Ruthie.?He?told?her?he?had?walked?from?the?motel,?a?one-hour?trip?by?foot.?He?was?carrying?a?clock?radio,?which?belonged?to?the?K.?family?and?had?been?sitting?on?the?television?in?their?bedroom. At?10:30?p.m.,?while?Ruthie?was?in?the?room,?defendant?called?the?motel?and?asked?to?speak?to?the?residents?of?unit?10.?He?hung?up?moments?later?and?told?Ruthie?no?one?was?home.?Defendant?then?carried?the?phone?into?another?room?and?called?Lashan’s?parents?at?a?relative’s?house.?Defendant?told?Darrell?that?he?had?left?the?motel?at?7:30?p.m.,?and?was?calling?from?the?Tenderloin.?Defendant?also?said?he?needed?a?key?to?the?unit.?When?Darrell?noted?that?Lashan?could?open?the?door,?defendant?apologized?for?being?”stupid.”?Darrell?and?Sally?were?disturbed?by?the?call?and?immediately?drove?home.?Meanwhile,?defendant?borrowed?bus?fare?from?Ruthie?and?said?he?was?going?to?the?Tenderloin.?He?left?her?house?for?a?few?hours. At?10:50?p.m.,?shortly?before?Lashan’s?parents?arrived?back?at?the?motel,?an?employee?of?a?nearby?restaurant?saw?flames?shooting?out?of?unit?10’s?bedroom?window.?The?fire?was?soon?extinguished.?Lashan’s?naked,?dead?[54?Cal.3d?158]?body?was?found?lying?facedown?on?the?bathroom?floor.fn.?2?Her?back?was?covered?with?soot?and?she?had?been?stabbed?several?times.?There?was?blood?but?no?soot?on?the?floor?underneath?the?body.?Bloodstains?were?found?near?the?bottom?of?a?hallway?dresser?and?the?bathroom?doorjamb.?A?motel?butcher?knife?with?a?bloodstained?blade?was?found?on?the?counter?near?the?kitchen?sink.fn.?3 The?front?room,?hallway,?bathroom,?and?kitchen?had?been?heavily?damaged?by?soot,?smoke,?and?heat.?Charred?paper?was?found?on?a?burned?section?of?the?murphy?bed?in?the?front?room.?In?the?bedroom,?the?mattress?and?base?of?the?headboard?had?been?consumed?by?flames,?but?the?top?of?the?headboard?and?nearby?furniture?suffered?only?minor?blistering?and?discoloration.?In?the?alley?outside,?broken?glass?from?the?bedroom?windows?had?soot?on?one?side.?The?doors?and?windows?were?locked?and?showed?no?signs?of?forced?entry. Defendant?returned?to?Ruthie’s?house?about?2?a.m.?and?spent?the?night.?At?7?a.m.,?Ruthie?awoke?and?saw?a?television?report?which?apparently?identified?defendant?as?a?suspect?in?the?motel?crimes.?She?immediately?told?him?to?leave?the?house?and?call?the?police.?He?disclaimed?any?knowledge?of?the?events?described?in?the?report?and?then?left.?Ruthie?called?the?police. Defendant?called?the?police?an?hour?later,?at?8?a.m.,?and?said?he?had?heard?about?the?fire?on?television?and?wished?to?discuss?it.?However,?he?did?not?show?up?at?the?prearranged?meeting?place.?Defendant?made?a?similar?call?at?9:30?p.m.,?identified?himself?as?a?”suspect,”?and?was?soon?taken?into?custody. Defendant’s?in-custody?statements.?A?half-hour?after?being?taken?into?custody?on?February?25,?defendant?had?three?consecutive?interviews?at?the?police?station.?He?first?spoke?with?Detectives?Reese?and?McCarthy?pursuant?to?a?Miranda?waiver?(Miranda?v.?Arizona?(1966)?384?U.S.?436[16?L.Ed.2d?694,?86?S.Ct.?1602,?10?A.L.R.3d?974]),?and?denied?committing?the?crimes.?He?said?he?left?Lashan?asleep?at?the?motel?at?8:15?p.m.?on?February?24,?and?rode?a?bus?to?the?Tenderloin.?He?claimed?to?have?called?Lashan’s?parents?from?there?and?then?visited?Ruthie. Defendant?next?spoke?with?his?parole?officer,?Mr.?Bandettini,?pursuant?to?another?Miranda?waiver.?(Bandettini?was?identified?as?a?”state?investigator”?[54?Cal.3d?159]?at?trial.)?Defendant?first?denied?the?crimes,?but?then?said?he?could?not?”remember”?whether?he?had?stabbed?Lashan.?When?asked?if?he?had?sex?with?her,?he?replied,?”I?may?have.” Detectives?Reese?and?McCarthy?immediately?resumed?questioning.?Defendant?began?by?saying?he?”could?have?killed”?Lashan?and?”didn’t?know?what?[he]?was?doing.”?He?admitted?having?”sex”?with?her,?but?was?unclear?about?when?it?occurred.fn.?4?Although?defendant?first?denied?any?involvement?in?the?fire,?he?later?answered?in?the?affirmative?when?asked?if?he?could?have?killed?Lashan?and?set?the?fire.?Defendant?repeatedly?said?that?he?did?not?know?how?many?times?Lashan?had?been?”stuck,”?and?that?his?actions?were?not?”intentional.” When?asked?to?describe?the?evening’s?activities?in?greater?detail,?defendant?replied,?in?somewhat?disjointed?and?emotional?terms,?that?he?and?Lashan?had?prepared?a?meal,?played?cards,?and?arm?wrestled.?He?started?looking?at?her?and?feeling?”crazy.”?He?paced?back?and?forth?between?the?motel?office?and?the?unit.?At?some?point,?he?lifted?the?knife?from?among?the?dirty?dishes?in?the?kitchen?sink,?held?it?in?both?hands?near?his?head,?and?attacked?her?with?it.?When?asked?how?Lashan?got?into?the?bathroom,?defendant?said?he?”might?have?stuck?her?one?time?while?she?was?asleep,”?and?”she?might?have?jumped?up?and?tried?to?get?away?from?it.” Defendant?was?arrested?at?2?a.m.?on?February?26,?four?hours?after?questioning?had?begun.?He?was?carrying?a?small?Bible?and?a?keychain?that?Sally?owned?and?kept?in?the?bedroom?nightstand.?A?lighter?and?matches?were?also?found?in?his?possession. At?10?a.m.?on?February?27,?Detectives?Reese?and?McCarthy?briefly?spoke?with?defendant?at?the?Chope?hospital?jail?ward.?Defendant?said?he?had?started?a?fire?on?the?murphy?bed,?stamped?it?out,?and?then?started?the?bedroom?fire,?using?paper?each?time.?When?asked?whether?Lashan?had?made?him?angry?that?night,?he?said,?”no.”?As?before,?defendant?said?he?could?not?remember?the?number?of?stab?wounds,?but?knew?that?Lashan?had?”jumped?up”?after?the?first?one.?When?asked?what?he?did?with?the?knife?after?the?stabbing,?defendant?replied:?”I?was?holding?it?[in]?both?hands,?my?hands?were?shaking[.]?I?saw?the?blood?dripping?down?the?knife,?I?put?the?knife?in?a?basket.”?When?[54?Cal.3d?160]?asked?if?Lashan?was?still?breathing?at?the?time,?defendant?said:?”Yes[,]?she?was?breathing?and?calling?my?name.?She?had?a?dress?on.” Defendant?told?a?Chope?hospital?nurse?that?he?had?killed?the?12-year-old?daughter?of?a?woman?he?was?living?with?in?a?Daly?City?motel?and?had?set?the?room?on?fire. After?his?arrest?but?before?the?guilt?trial,?defendant?shared?a?county?jail?cell?with?Jeffrey?Steele,?who?was?awaiting?sentencing?after?pleading?guilty?to?burglary.?Steele?testified?that?defendant?said?he?had?”tak[en]?some?young?pussy”?and?”killed”?the?girl?because?she?threatened?to?tell?her?parents?that?he?had?”raped”?her.?Defendant?identified?the?victim?as?the?12-year-old?daughter?of?friends?with?whom?he?had?been?living?in?a?Daly?City?motel.?According?to?Steele,?defendant?admitted?choking?and?stabbing?the?girl,?but?believed?he?would?”beat”?the?charges?because?no?weapon?was?found?and?because?he?had?started?a?fire?to?conceal?the?murder.?When?Steele?mentioned?that?defendant?could?have?had?sex?with?a?prostitute?for?only?a?few?dollars,?defendant?said,?”but?it?is?not?like?that?young?pussy.” Expert?testimony.?City?Fire?Inspector?Christensen?examined?unit?10?and?concluded?that?the?fire?had?been?”intentionally”?set.?It?had?two?separate?points?of?origin?(the?two?beds),?paper?had?been?used?as?an?accelerant?on?the?murphy?bed,?and?no?electrical?or?other?”accidental”?cause?was?found.?The?bedroom?fire?started?quickly?at?the?foot?of?the?bed,?where?the?metal?springs?had?collapsed?from?intense?heat,?and?then?died?down?and?burned?slowly?for?one?or?two?hours.?Christensen?explained?that?the?bedroom?would?have?been?completely?destroyed?had?the?fire?burned?fast?and?hot.?The?large?amount?of?soot-a?sign?of?”incomplete?combustion”-was?also?indicative?of?a?low-oxygen,?slow-burning?fire.?The?buildup?of?carbon?monoxide?and?other?gasses?had?undoubtedly?blown?out?the?windows,?admitting?oxygen?and?causing?the?fire?to?flare?up?shortly?before?discovery.fn.?5 State?Fire?Investigator?McGill?reviewed?official?records?and?conducted?tests?upon?motel?bedding?material.?Like?Christensen,?McGill?concluded?that?the?fire?had?been?intentionally?set?and?smoldered?for?”a?minimum?of?two?hours.” An?autopsy?performed?by?pathologist?Dr.?Lack?revealed?that?Lashan?had?died?of?four?deep?penetrating?stab?wounds,?namely,?a?chest?wound?passing?[54?Cal.3d?161]?through?the?right?lung,?an?abdominal?wound?exiting?through?the?back,?and?two?wounds?entering?from?the?back.?All?wounds?were?made?while?she?was?lying?down,?and?were?”consistent”?with?the?motel?butcher?knife.?No?defensive?knife?wounds?were?found.?Several?other?injuries?suggested?Lashan?had?been?”immobilized”?shortly?before?the?stabbing:?(1)?a?bruise?to?her?left?eye?had?probably?been?inflicted?with?a?punch,?(2)?a?”deep?imprint”?across?the?front?of?her?neck?had?probably?been?made?while?her?necklace?was?being?pulled?tightly?from?the?back,?and?(3)?fingernail?marks?on?her?throat?had?probably?been?made?while?she?was?being?choked. The?autopsy?further?disclosed?that?after?the?stabbing,?Lashan?walked?at?least?briefly?while?the?fire?burned?and?survived?for?an?additional?30?minutes,?probably?in?a?state?of?”incipient?shock.”fn.?6Dr.?Lack?placed?the?time?of?death?at?9?p.m.,?with?a?half-hour?”grace?period”?on?either?side.?No?signs?of?recent?trauma?to?the?genital?area?were?found.?However,?because?Lashan?had?a?”mature”?vagina?in?which?the?hymen?had?been?ruptured?several?months?earlier,?the?absence?of?trauma?was?inconclusive?as?to?whether?intercourse?had?occurred?shortly?before?death.?A?vaginal?swab?revealed?the?presence?of?semen. Dr.?Blake,?the?forensic?expert?who?tested?the?swab,?found?a?small?amount?of?semen?containing?essentially?equivalent?amounts?of?type?A?secretor?and?type?B?secretor?blood?group?substances.fn.?7?The?amount?of?semen?suggested?that?intercourse?had?occurred?3?to?36?hours?before?Lashan’s?death,?probably?18?to?24?hours?beforehand.?The?semen?could?have?been?donated?by?a?single?individual?with?type?AB?secretor?blood.?Alternatively,?there?could?have?been?two?different?donors,?one?of?whom?was?a?type?A?secretor?and?the?other?who,?like?defendant,?was?a?type?B?secretor.?In?order?for?two?donors?to?have?produced?this?equivalent?”A/B”?ratio,?both?must?have?ejaculated?near?the?same?time,?or?one?ejaculated?and?the?other?subsequently?deposited?only?preejaculatory?fluid.fn.?8?[54?Cal.3d?162] Defense?Case The?defense?theory?was?that?the?fire?began?after?defendant?arrived?at?Ruthie’s?house?and?burned?quickly.?One?Detective?Hawthorne?testified?that?Fire?Inspector?Christensen?had?hypothesized?during?his?initial?examination?of?the?crime?scene?that?the?front?room?fire?burned?for?20?to?25?minutes?and?that?the?bedroom?fire?”started?rapidly”?by?means?of?a?liquid?accelerant. Competence?Phase?Evidence After?the?guilt?verdict?was?rendered,?defendant?moved?for?a?competence?hearing?(???1367,?1368.)?The?motion?was?granted?under?circumstances?which?will?be?discussed?later.?Criminal?proceedings?were?suspended,?competence?phase?counsel?was?appointed,?and?a?new?jury?was?empaneled. At?the?ensuing?hearing,?two?court-appointed?psychiatrists?testified?that?they?had?recently?examined?defendant?and?found?him?competent.?Dr.?Small?explained?that?defendant?was?”cooperative”?and?”logical,”?and?showed?no?sign?of?serious?mental?disorder;?even?if?defendant?was?being?truthful?in?claiming?to?have?experienced?a?midtrial?”hallucination”?of?Lashan,?such?an?experience?is?neither?disabling?per?se?nor?unusual?for?persons?suffering?from?personality?problems,?stress,?and/or?a?guilty?conscience.?Dr.?Bryan?testified?that?defendant?suffered?from?a?”passive-aggressive”?personality?problem?and?sexual?deviation,?but?that?he?spoke?about?the?criminal?trial?in?an?”appropriate”?and?”rational”?manner.?Defendant?knew?that?any?”hallucination”?he?had?experienced?was?not?real.?Finally,?a?deputy?sheriff?testified?that?defendant’s?personal?habits?and?deportment?in?jail?over?the?preceding?year?were?excellent,?and?that?he?never?acted?in?a?disruptive?or?bizarre?fashion. The?jury?found?defendant?competent?to?undergo?a?penalty?trial. III.?Penalty?Phase?Evidence As?requested?by?defendant,?a?new?jury?was?empaneled?at?the?penalty?phase. Prosecution?Case The?prosecution?called?most?of?the?witnesses?who?had?testified?against?defendant?at?the?guilt?phase?to?establish?the?circumstances?of?the?crime.?Notable?exceptions?included?forensic?expert?Dr.?Blake?(who?testified?for?[54?Cal.3d?163]?defendant?at?the?penalty?phase)?and?informant?Steele?(who?gave?no?penalty?phase?testimony).?(??190.3,?factor?(a).)fn.?9 The?prosecution?also?introduced?certified?copies?of?defendant’s?two?prior?felony?convictions:?a?1975?jury?conviction?of?lewd?conduct?against?Rosa?S.?(??288,?subd.?(a)),?and?a?1980?conviction?upon?a?guilty?plea?of?wilful?cruelty?to?a?child,?Sheba?R.?(??273a,?subd.?(1)).?The?victims?and?other?witnesses?testified?about?these?crimes,?both?of?which?involved?forcible?sodomy?and/or?rape.?(??190.3,?factors?(b),?(c).)?In?addition,?Sheba’s?sister,?Lakecia?H.,?testified?about?defendant’s?unadjudicated?forcible?rape?of?her?at?age?13?in?1979.?(Id.,?factor?(b).) The?1975?rape?and?sodomy?of?Rosa.?18-year-old?Rosa?testified?that?in?May?1975,?when?she?was?7?years?old,?defendant?came?to?the?house?to?visit?her?mother,?Carol,?who?had?known?defendant’s?family?for?several?years.?Carol?was?not?there.?Defendant?ordered?Rosa,?who?was?at?home?with?her?siblings,?to?go?into?the?bedroom.?She?complied?out?of?fear.?Defendant?disrobed,?opened?Rosa’s?bathrobe,?and?pulled?down?her?panties.?He?then?raped?and?sodomized?her.?She?struggled?and?told?him?to?stop?because?he?was?hurting?her.?He?ignored?her?pleas?and?held?her?down?with?the?weight?of?his?body.?Ashamed,?she?did?not?tell?her?mother.?Several?days?later,?Rosa?began?experiencing?a?painful?vaginal?discharge?and?was?examined?by?her?mother.?Rosa?was?taken?to?a?doctor?and?treated?for?gonorrhea.?Both?Carol?and?the?doctor?described?Rosa’s?symptoms?and?diagnosis?at?trial.?Carol?also?testified?that?she?contracted?gonorrhea?during?a?single?sexual?encounter?with?defendant?near?the?time?Rosa’s?infection?was?discovered. The?1979?rape?of?Sheba.?13-year-old?Sheba?testified?that?in?fall?1979,?when?she?was?7?years?old,?defendant?was?intimately?involved?with?her?mother,?Vesta,?and?was?living?with?the?family.?One?night,?Sheba?was?sleeping?in?a?bed?with?one?of?her?sisters?and?with?Vesta.?Sheba?woke?up?and?found?that?defendant?had?pushed?aside?her?bedclothes?and?was?having?sexual?intercourse?with?her.?She?became?afraid?and?tried?to?pull?away.?Defendant?squeezed?her?stomach?until?it?hurt?and?held?her?down?with?his?arms.?Sheba?told?Vesta?about?the?assault?the?next?day.?Two?weeks?later,?Sheba?began?experiencing?a?painful?vaginal?discharge?but?was?too?ashamed?to?tell?her?mother.?Sheba’s?father,?Herbert,?testified?that?he?noticed?the?discharge?on?Sheba’s?panties?while?she?was?undressing?at?his?house.?He?took?her?to?the?hospital?where?she?was?treated?for?gonorrhea.?The?doctor?confirmed?this?diagnosis?at?trial.?Herbert?also?testified?that?when?Sheba?told?him?about?the?rape,?he?immediately?went?to?confront?defendant?at?Vesta’s?house.?Defendant?[54?Cal.3d?164]?fled.?When?defendant?returned,?he?punched?Herbert?and?the?two?struggled?until?the?police?came.?Vesta?did?not?testify. The?1979?rape?of?Lakecia.?19-year-old?Lakecia?testified?that?she?is?Sheba’s?older?sister?and?Vesta’s?daughter.?Defendant?befriended?Lakecia?on?the?street,?and?met?the?rest?of?the?family?through?her.?In?fall?1979,?when?Lakecia?was?13?years?old,?defendant?forced?his?way?into?the?locked?bathroom?just?as?Lakecia?was?finishing?her?bath.?He?pushed?her?onto?the?floor?and?had?sexual?intercourse?with?her.?She?told?him?to?stop?but?was?afraid?he?would?hurt?her?if?she?resisted.?She?soon?noticed?an?unusual?vaginal?discharge?and?visited?the?doctor.?She?learned?she?had?gonorrhea?and?was?pregnant?with?defendant’s?child.?Lakecia?gave?birth?to?a?daughter,?Makeda,?whom?defendant?acknowledged?as?his?own. […]

Adams?v.?Murakami?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?105?,?284?Cal.Rptr.?318;?813?P.2d?1348 [No.?S003530.?Aug?15,?1991.] MYRETTA?ADAMS,?as?Conservator,?etc.,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?CLIFFORD?MURAKAMI,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Los?Angeles?County,?No.?C418409,?Leon?S.?Kaplan,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Baxter,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli?and?Arabian,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.,?concurring?in?the?judgment.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?with?Stone?(Steven?J.),?J.,fn.?*?concurring.) COUNSEL Kirtland?&?Packard,?Horvitz,?Levy?&?Amerian,?Horvitz?&?Levy,?Barry?R.?Levy,?Ellis?J.?Horvitz,?S.?Thomas?Todd,?Loren?Homer?Kraus,?Greines,?Martin,?Stein?&?Richland,?Irving?H.?Greines,?Alan?G.?Martin,?J.?Richard?Jennings,?Thelen,?Marrin,?Johnson?&?Bridges,?Curtis?A.?Cole,?Patricia?H.?Wirth?and?Steven?J.?Bernheim?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. Fred?J.?Hiestand,?Haight,?Brown?&?Bonesteel?and?Roy?G.?Weatherup?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendant?and?Appellant. Kaufler?&?Scott,?Kaufler,?Bailey?&?Scott,?Philip?Kaufler,?Lawrence?W.?Scott?and?Gary?H.?Amsterdam?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. Ian?Herzog,?Douglas?Devries,?Leonard?Sachs,?Bruce?Broillet,?David?Harney,?Laurence?Drivon,?Robert?Steinberg,?Roland?Wrinkle,?Harvey?R.?Levine,?Leonard?Esquina?and?Evan?D.?Marshall?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION BAXTER,?J. The?question?in?this?personal?injury?action?is?twofold:?(1)?Is?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition?a?prerequisite?to?an?award?of?punitive?damages??(2)?If?so,?is?the?burden?on?the?plaintiff?rather?than?on?the?[54?Cal.3d?109]?defendant?to?introduce?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition??We?answer?both?questions?in?the?affirmative.?Our?prior?decisions,?constitutional?considerations,?and?the?importance?of?appellate?review?indicate?that?an?award?of?punitive?damages?cannot?be?sustained?on?appeal?unless?the?trial?record?contains?meaningful?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.?The?absence?of?this?evidence?thwarts?effective?appellate?review?of?a?claim?that?punitive?damages?are?excessive.?As?to?the?second?question,?we?conclude?that?Evidence?Code?section?500,?the?traditional?allocation?of?burden?of?proof,?and?fundamental?fairness?require?the?plaintiff?rather?than?the?defendant?to?introduce?this?evidence. Facts A?39-year-old?female?(hereafter?patient),?a?diagnosed?chronic?schizophrenic?of?low?intelligence,?was?a?resident?of?View?Heights?Convalescent?Hospital.?Clifford?Murakami,?M.D.,?was?her?attending?physician.?Through?her?conservator,?patient?brought?this?action?against?the?hospital?and?Dr.?Murakami?for?medical?malpractice,?battery,?and?intentional?infliction?of?emotional?distress.?Patient?alleged?that,?as?a?result?of?wrongful?acts?and?omissions?of?the?hospital?and?Dr.?Murakami,?she?became?pregnant?by?another?patient?while?she?was?hospitalized?and?gave?birth?to?a?son?who?was?diagnosed?as?mentally?retarded?and?autistic.?Patient’s?claims?against?the?hospital?were?settled. Patient’s?claims?against?Dr.?Murakami?proceeded?to?a?jury?trial.?Neither?patient?nor?Dr.?Murakami?introduced?at?trial?any?evidence?of?Dr.?Murakami’s?financial?condition.?The?jury?returned?a?verdict?for?patient?on?her?causes?of?action?for?medical?malpractice?and?intentional?infliction?of?emotional?distress.?After?adjustments?by?the?trial?court,?she?was?awarded?a?total?of?$1,024,266,?including?$750,000?in?punitive?damages. Dr.?Murakami?appealed,?contending?in?part?that?the?punitive?damages?award?was?improper?because?patient?had?not?introduced?evidence?of?Dr.?Murakami’s?financial?condition.?The?Court?of?Appeal?rejected?the?argument?without?discussion?and?affirmed?the?judgment. Discussion   Necessity?of?evidence?of?defendant’s?finances   Prior?California?decisions [1]?When?faced?with?a?challenge?to?the?amount?of?a?punitive?damages?award,?our?traditional?function?has?been?to?determine?whether?the?award?is?excessive?as?a?matter?of?law?or?raises?a?presumption?that?it?is?the?product?of?[54?Cal.3d?110]?passion?or?prejudice.?(Neal?v.?Farmers?Ins.?Exchange?(1978)?21?Cal.3d?910,?928?[148?Cal.Rptr.?389,?582?P.2d?980]?(Neal).)?We?set?forth?three?criteria?in?Neal?for?making?that?determination,?”all?of?which?are?grounded?in?the?purpose?and?function?of?punitive?damages.”?(Id.,?at?p.?928.)?That?purpose?is?a?purely?public?one.?The?public’s?goal?is?to?punish?wrongdoing?and?thereby?to?protect?itself?from?future?misconduct,?either?by?the?same?defendant?or?other?potential?wrongdoers.?(Id.,?at?p.?928,?fn.?13.)fn.?1?The?essential?question?therefore?in?every?case?must?be?whether?the?amount?of?damages?awarded?substantially?serves?the?societal?interest.?In?answering?that?question?in?Neal,?we?first?explained?the?importance?of?the?nature?of?the?defendant’s?wrongdoing?and?the?amount?of?compensatory?damages.?We?then?observed,?”Also?to?be?considered?is?the?wealth?of?the?particular?defendant;?obviously,?the?function?of?deterrence?(see?fn.?13,?ante),?will?not?be?served?if?the?wealth?of?the?defendant?allows?him?to?absorb?the?award?with?little?or?no?discomfort.?…?By?the?same?token,?of?course,?the?function?of?punitive?damages?is?not?served?by?an?award?which,?in?light?of?the?defendant’s?wealth?and?the?gravity?of?the?particular?act,?exceeds?the?level?necessary?to?properly?punish?and?deter.”?(21?Cal.3d?at?p.?928.)?This?was?a?reiteration?of?our?prior?observation?that,?”It?follows?that?the?wealthier?the?wrongdoing?defendant,?the?larger?the?award?of?exemplary?damages?need?be?in?order?to?accomplish?the?statutory?objective.”?(Bertero?v.?National?General?Corp.?(1974)?13?Cal.3d?43,?65?[118?Cal.Rptr.?184,?529?P.2d?608,?65?A.L.R.3d?878].) Because?the?quintessence?of?punitive?damages?is?to?deter?future?misconduct?by?the?defendant,?the?key?question?before?the?reviewing?court?is?whether?the?amount?of?damages?”exceeds?the?level?necessary?to?properly?punish?and?deter.”?(Neal,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?at?p.?928;?Merlo?v.?Standard?Life?&?Acc.?Ins.?Co.?(1976)?59?Cal.App.3d?5,?18?[130?Cal.Rptr.?416].)?The?question?cannot?be?answered?in?the?abstract.?The?reviewing?court?must?consider?the?amount?of?the?award?in?light?of?the?relevant?facts.?The?nature?of?the?inquiry?is?a?comparative?one.?Deciding?in?the?abstract?whether?an?award?is?”excessive”?is?like?deciding?whether?it?is?”bigger,”?without?asking?”Bigger?than?what?” A?reviewing?court?cannot?make?a?fully?informed?determination?of?whether?an?award?of?punitive?damages?is?excessive?unless?the?record?contains?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.?Since?Neal,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?910,?we?have?repeatedly?examined?punitive?damage?awards?in?light?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.?(Wyatt?v.?Union?Mortgage?Co.?(1979)?24?[54?Cal.3d?111]?Cal.3d?773,?790-791?[157?Cal.Rptr.?392,?598?P.2d?45];?Egan?v.?Mutual?of?Omaha?Ins.?Co.?(1979)24?Cal.3d?809,?823-824?[169?Cal.Rptr.?691,?620?P.2d?141].)?This?simple?principle?is?well?understood?by?the?bench.?The?standard?jury?instruction?on?punitive?damages?given?in?this?case?expressly?directed?the?jury?to?consider?the?”defendant’s?financial?condition.”?(BAJI?No.?14.71?(7th?ed.?1986?bound?vol.)?p.?205.)?The?Use?Note?to?this?instruction?explained?that?consideration?of?this?factor?was?necessary?under?Neal,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?910.?(BAJI?No.?14.71,?supra,?at?p.?207.)?The?principle?is?also?axiomatic?to?the?bar.?For?example,?a?recent?practice?guide?for?attorneys?lists?”The?Ten?Essential?Steps?To?A?Proper?Punitive?Damage?Award.”?(Riley,?Proving?Punitive?Damages:?The?Complete?Handbook?(1981)?p.?6.)?The?guide?states,?”RULE?9:?Show?the?defendant’s?wealth.”?(Id.,?at?p.?7,?emphasis?in?original.) [2a]?Plaintiff?would?dispense?with?the?need?for?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition?because?such?evidence?was?only?one?of?the?three?factors?set?forth?in?Neal,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?910,?928.?Apparently,?plaintiff?contends?that,?because?the?Neal?court?listed?three?criteria,?less?than?three?are?sufficient.?We?find?no?logical?premise?for?this?conclusion.?The?effect?of?such?approach?would?be?to?eliminate?a?three-pronged?analysis?in?favor?of?a?two-pronged?analysis.?The?Neal?court?set?forth?three?factors,?explaining?the?importance?of?each.?Nothing?in?Neal?suggests?that?any?of?the?three?is?dispensable.fn.?2 [3a]?To?the?contrary,?the?most?important?question?is?whether?the?amount?of?the?punitive?damages?award?will?have?deterrent?effect-without?being?excessive.?Even?if?an?award?is?entirely?reasonable?in?light?of?the?other?two?factors?in?Neal,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?910?(nature?of?the?misconduct?and?amount?of?compensatory?damages),?the?award?can?be?so?disproportionate?to?the?defendant’s?ability?to?pay?that?the?award?is?excessive?for?that?reason?alone.?For?example,?in?Burnett?v.?National?Enquirer,?Inc.?(1983)?144?Cal.App.3d?991?[193?Cal.Rptr.?206,?49?A.L.R.4th?1125],?the?court?reiterated?the?Neal?factors?(supra,?21?Cal.3d?910)?and?concluded?that,?although?the?defendant’s?misconduct?was?”reprehensible,”?the?punitive?damages?award?had?to?be?reduced?solely?because?it?constituted?too?great?a?portion?of?the?defendant’s?net?worth?and?income.?(Burnett?v.?National?Enquirer,?Inc.,?supra,?144?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1012.)?The?court?explained?that?it?could?”find?acceptable?[54?Cal.3d?112]?only?that?balance?between?the?gravity?of?a?defendant’s?illegal?act?and?a?penalty?necessary?to?properly?punish?and?deter?….”?(Ibid.)?This?balance?cannot?be?made?absent?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.?Similarly,?in?Zhadan?v.?Downtown?L.?A.?Motors?(1976)?66?Cal.App.3d?481?[136?Cal.Rptr.?132],?the?court?concluded?that?substantial?punitive?damages?were?warranted?in?light?of?the?defendant’s?serious?misconduct?(id.,?at?p.?497)?and?that?the?ratio?between?compensatory?and?punitive?damages?was?not?objectionable?(id.,?at?p.?499),?but?nevertheless?reversed?the?judgment?because?the?punitive?damages?were?excessive?in?light?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.?(Id.,?at?p.?500?[award?exceeded?one-third?of?the?defendant’s?net?worth].) The?determination?of?whether?an?award?is?excessive?is?admittedly?more?art?than?science.?”The?channeling?of?just?the?correct?quantum?of?bile?to?reach?the?correct?level?of?punitive?damages?is,?to?put?it?mildly,?an?unscientific?process?complicated?by?personality?differences.”?(Devlin?v.?Kearney?Mesa?AMC/Jeep/Renault,?Inc.?(1984)?155?Cal.App.3d?381,?388?[202?Cal.Rptr.?204].)?[2b]?However,?when?provided?with?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition,?the?reviewing?court?can?at?least?reach?a?reasonably?informed?decision.?Without?such?evidence,?a?reviewing?court?can?only?speculate?as?to?whether?the?award?is?appropriate?or?excessive.?Plaintiff?offers?no?justification?for?imposing?such?a?burden?on?reviewing?courts?or?for?encouraging?ill-informed?decisions.?Sound?judicial?policy?weighs?in?favor?of?fully?informed?decisions,?especially?when?a?public?interest?is?at?stake.?One?state’s?high?court?explained,?”Indeed?the?public?policy?nature?of?the?award?places?in?question?the?jurisdiction?of?the?district?court?to?award?relief?in?the?form?of?punitive?damages?in?the?absence?of?proof?of?the?wealth?or?financial?condition?of?the?defendant.”?(Adel?v.?Parkhurst?(Wyo.?1984)?681?P.2d?886,?892.) An?example?demonstrates?the?wisdom?of?Neal,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?910.?Assume?that?no?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition?is?introduced.?A?jury?renders?an?award?of?$2?million.?The?defendant’s?financial?condition,?however,?is?limited?so?as?to?preclude?payment?of?punitive?damages?in?excess?of?$10,000.?Neal?recognized?that?the?purpose?of?punitive?damages?is?not?served?by?financially?destroying?a?defendant.?The?purpose?is?to?deter,?not?to?destroy.?Under?plaintiff’s?approach,?however,?the?reviewing?court?will?be?rendered?unable?to?consider?the?effect?of?the?award?because?the?record?will?contain?no?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.?Such?result?is?contrary?to?the?well-established?rule?that?a?punitive?damages?award?is?excessive?if?it?is?disproportionate?to?the?defendant’s?ability?to?pay.?(Egan?v.?Mutual?of?Omaha?Ins.?Co.,?supra,24?Cal.3d?809,?824?[punitive?damages?award?reversed?because?it?exceeded?more?than?two?and?one-half?months?of?defendant’s?annual?net?income];?Merlo?v.?Standard?Life?&?Acc.?Ins.?Co.,?[54?Cal.3d?113]?supra,?59?Cal.App.3d?5,?18?[award?of?punitive?damages?excessive?because?it?was?more?than?30?percent?of?defendant’s?net?worth];?Little?v.?Stuyvesant?Life?Ins.?Co.?(1977)?67?Cal.App.3d?451,?469-470?[136?Cal.Rptr.?653]?[award?greater?than?15?percent?of?net?worth?reversed];?Zhadan?v.?Downtown?L.?A.?Motors,?supra,?66?Cal.App.3d?481,?500?[award?excessive?because?it?was?one-third?of?the?net?worth].)fn.?3 The?principle?that?a?punitive?award?must?be?considered?in?light?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition?is?ancient.?After?the?Norman?conquest?in?1066,?there?arose?in?English?law?a?system?of?civil?sanctions?known?as?”amercements.”?(Browning-Ferris?Industries?v.?Kelco?Disposal?(1989)?492?U.S.?257,?287-289?[106?L.Ed.2d?219,?246-247,?109?S.Ct.?2909,?2927]?[conc.?and?dis.?opn.?of?O’Connor,?J.].)?Because?of?the?sometimes?abusive?nature?of?amercements,?the?Magna?Carta?prohibited?those?that?were?disproportionate?to?the?offense?or?that?would?deprive?the?wrongdoer?of?his?means?of?livelihood:?”A?freeman?shall?only?be?amerced?for?a?small?offence?according?to?the?measure?of?that?offence.?And?for?a?great?offence?he?shall?be?amerced?according?to?the?magnitude?of?the?offence,?saving?his?contenement;?and?a?merchant,?in?the?same?way,?saving?his?merchandize.?[4,?5]?(See?fn.?4.)?And?a?villein,?in?the?same?way,?if?he?fall?under?our?mercy,?shall?be?amerced?saving?his?wainnage.”?(Magna?Carta?(1215)?ch.?20,?italics?added.)fn.?4?Absent?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition,?a?punitive?damages?award?can?financially?annihilate?the?defendant.?We?see?no?reason?why?a?modern-day?civil?defendant?should?be?entitled?to?less?consideration?than?one?was?given?800?years?ago. [2c]?Plaintiff?attempts?to?justify?discarding?the?defendant’s?financial?condition?from?the?analysis?under?Neal,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?910,?by?claiming?that?a?reviewing?court?will?be?able?to?consider?the?other?two?Neal?factors-the?nature?of?the?misconduct?and?the?amount?of?compensatory?damages.?[54?Cal.3d?114]?Those?two?factors?standing?alone,?however,?will?not?enable?a?reviewing?court?to?make?an?informed?determination?of?whether?an?award?is?excessive.?As?explained?above?(maj.?opn.,?ante,?pp.?111-112),?an?award?might?seem?to?be?warranted?under?those?factors,?but?nevertheless?be?excessive?in?light?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition. The?better?reasoned?line?of?Court?of?Appeal?decisions?requires?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.?In?Forte?v.?Nolfi?(1972)?25?Cal.App.3d?656?[102?Cal.Rptr.?455],?the?court?reversed?a?punitive?damages?award,?primarily?because?the?trial?court?entered?judgment?”without?taking?any?evidence?of?the?resources?of?the?alleged?wrongdoers?which?it?sought?to?punish.”?(Id.,?at?p.?689.)?More?recently,?in?Dumas?v.?Stocker?(1989)?213?Cal.App.3d?1262?[262?Cal.Rptr.?311]?(Dumas),?the?court?fully?considered?our?decision?in?Neal,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?910,?and?explained?that?the?absence?of?evidence?as?to?financial?condition?”frustrates?meaningful?appellate?review?of?punitive?damage?awards?(i.e.,?of?whether?the?award?was?’grossly?disproportionate’),?since?the?absence?of?evidence?of?net?worth?precludes?an?appellate?court?from?deciding?whether?an?award?might,?for?example,?bankrupt?the?defendant.”?(Dumas,?supra,?213?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1269.) The?Dumas?court,?supra,?213?Cal.App.3d?1262,?also?correctly?observed?that,?absent?financial?evidence,?a?jury?will?be?encouraged?(indeed,?required)?to?speculate?as?to?a?defendant’s?net?worth?in?seeking?to?return?a?verdict?that?will?appropriately?punish?the?defendant.?The?present?case?bears?out?that?concern.?At?plaintiff’s?request,?the?jury?was?given?BAJI?No.?14.71?(7th?ed.?1986?bound?vol.),?which?stated,?”In?arriving?at?any?award?of?punitive?damages,?you?are?to?consider?the?following:?…?[?]?The?amount?of?punitive?damages?which?will?have?a?deterrent?effect?on?the?defendant?in?the?light?of?defendant’s?financial?condition?….”?(Italics?added.)?Plaintiff’s?present?argument?that?financial?evidence?is?not?necessary?rings?hollow?in?light?of?her?own?decision?to?request?that?the?jury?be?instructed?to?base?its?punitive?damages?award?on?defendant’s?financial?condition.?More?important,?the?jury?was?told?to?base?its?award?on?a?factor?as?to?which?there?was?no?evidence.?Faced?with?such?a?dilemma,?the?jury?was?forced?to?speculate?as?to?defendant’s?financial?condition.?Sound?public?policy?should?preclude?awards?based?on?mere?speculation.?[6]?The?traditional?rule?is?that?compensatory?damages?must?not?be?based?on?speculation.?(Dumas,?supra,?213?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1269.)?There?is?no?reason?for?a?different?standard?for?punitive?damages.?Dumas?states?the?correct?rule.?(See?also?Storage?Services?v.?Oosterbaan?(1989)?214?Cal.App.3d?498,?516?[262?Cal.Rptr.?689]?[expressly?following?Dumas?rule].) [2d]?The?decision?most?commonly?cited?for?the?contrary?view?is?Vossler?v.?Richards?Manufacturing?Co.?(1983)?143?Cal.App.3d?952?[192?Cal.Rptr.?[54?Cal.3d?115]?219]?(Vossler).?As?the?court?explained,?however,?in?Dumas,?supra,?213?Cal.App.3d?1262,?all?of?the?decisions?relied?on?by?the?Vossler?court,?supra,?143?Cal.App.3d?952,?were?themselves?based?on?a?single?decision-Hanley?v.?Lund?(1963)?218?Cal.App.2d?633?[32?Cal.Rptr.?733]?(Hanley).?Hanley?is?unpersuasive?in?several?respects.?First,?the?court’s?consideration?of?the?issue?was?minimal,?two?short?paragraphs.?The?court?noted?only?that?the?defendant?had?cited?no?authority?directly?in?support?of?his?position.?(Id.,?at?p.?645.)?The?court,?however,?cited?no?contrary?authority.?Without?any?support?one?way?or?the?other?and?without?any?meaningful?discussion?of?the?issue,?Hanley?provides?slender?support?for?the?subsequent?cases?that?have?relied?on?it. Second,?as?a?later?court?put?it,?Hanley,?supra,?218?Cal.App.2d?633,?”reached?its?conclusion?on?a?unique?rationale.”?(Dumas,?supra,?213?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1268.)?The?defendant?in?Hanley,?supra,?218?Cal.App.2d?633,?”did?not?contend,?either?in?the?trial?court?or?here?[on?appeal],?that?in?fact?the?award?made?was?excessive?in?the?light?of?his?financial?status.”?(Id.,?at?p.?646.)?As?the?Dumas?court,?supra,?213?Cal.App.3d?1262,?explained,?”In?effect,?Hanley?held?that?under?the?circumstances?of?that?case,?and?in?light?of?the?failure?to?raise?the?issue?of?excessiveness,?the?parties?inferentially?stipulated?away?the?issue?of?[the?defendant’s]?net?worth,?rendering?evidence?by?the?plaintiff?unnecessary.”?(Id.,?at?p.?1268.)?Petitioner?in?this?case,?however,?has?contended?that?the?punitive?damages?are?excessive.fn.?5 Third?and?most?important,?Hanley,?supra,?218?Cal.App.2d?633,?was?decided?long?before?our?decision?in?Neal,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?910,?in?which?we?emphasized?the?importance?of?considering?a?defendant’s?financial?condition?in?order?to?determine?whether?an?award?of?punitive?damages?is?excessive. A?Court?of?Appeal?recently?faced?with?the?conflict?on?this?issue?concluded:?”We?have?reviewed?Dumas?[supra,?213?Cal.App.3d?1262,]?and?Vossler?[supra,?143?Cal.App.3d?952,?961-965,]?and?the?California?cases?upon?which?they?rely,?and?we?are?persuaded?that?Dumas?states?the?better?rule.?There?is?no?basis?for?meaningful?appellate?review?of?a?punitive?damage?award?without?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.”?(Storage?Services?v.?Oosterbaan,?supra,?214?Cal.App.3d?498,?516.)?We?agree.?We?affirm?the?rule?[54?Cal.3d?116]?stated?in?Dumas,?supra,?213?Cal.App.3d?1262,?and?disapprove?of?Hanley,?supra,?218?Cal.App.2d?633,?and?its?progeny.?(See,?e.g.,?Fenlon?v.?Block?(1989)?216?Cal.App.3d?1174,?1178-1183?[265?Cal.Rptr.?324];?Pat?Rose?Associates?v.?Coombe?(1990)?225?Cal.App.3d?9,?23?[275?Cal.Rptr.?1];?Liberty?Transport,?Inc.?v.?Harry?W.?Gorst?Co.?(1991)?229?Cal.App.3d?417,?438?[280?Cal.Rptr.?159].)fn.?6 Our?decision?in?Neal,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?910,?reflected?sound?considerations?of?fairness?and?a?concern?for?rationality?in?the?awarding?of?punitive?damages.?We?decline?to?eviscerate?that?decision?by?eliminating?the?need?for?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.?Without?such?evidence,?reviewing?courts?will?be?unduly?restricted?in?their?attempts?to?assess?whether?awards?of?punitive?damages?are?excessive.fn.?7 Constitutional?considerations The?question?before?us?is?one?of?state?law,?but?it?has?recently?acquired?a?federal?constitutional?dimension,?which?although?not?dispositive,?weighs?strongly?in?favor?of?requiring?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition.?In?Pacific?Mut.?Life?Ins.?Co.?v.?Haslip?(1991)?499?U.S.?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?1,?111?S.Ct.?1032]?(Haslip),?the?high?court?rejected?a?due?process?challenge?to?a?punitive?damages?award?under?Alabama?law,?holding?that?the?long-entrenched?common?law?method?for?assessing?punitive?damages?is?not?”per?se?unconstitutional.”?(Id.,?at?p.?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?19,?111?S.Ct.?at?p.?1043],?italics?in?original.)?More?important?for?the?issue?before?us,?however,?the?court?also?made?clear?that,?”It?would?be?just?as?inappropriate?to?say?that,?because?punitive?damages?have?been?recognized?for?so?long,?their?imposition?is?never?unconstitutional.?…?We?note?once?again?our?concern?about?punitive?damages?that?’run?wild.’?…?[?]?One?must?concede?that?unlimited?jury?discretion-or?unlimited?judicial?discretion?for?that?matter-in?the?fixing?of?[54?Cal.3d?117]?punitive?damages?may?invite?extreme?results?that?jar?one’s?constitutional?sensibilities.”?(499?U.S.?at?p.?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?20,?111?S.Ct.?at?p.?1043].) To?determine?if?the?constitutional?line?had?been?crossed?in?that?case,?the?court?carefully?examined?the?Alabama?law?governing?punitive?damages.?In?upholding?the?award,?the?court?noted?the?state’s?”post-trial?procedures?for?scrutinizing?punitive?awards.”?(Haslip,?supra,?499?U.S.?at?p.?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?21,?111?S.Ct.?at?p.?1044].)?The?trial?court?was?required?”?’to?reflect?in?the?record?the?reasons?for?interfering?with?a?jury?verdict,?or?refusing?to?do?so,?on?grounds?of?excessiveness?of?the?damages.’?”?(Ibid.?[113?L.Ed.2d?at?p.21,?111?S.Ct.?at?p.?1044],?quoting?Hammond?v.?City?of?Gadsden?(Ala.?1986)?493?So.2d?1374,?1379.)?The?factors?deemed?appropriate?for?the?trial?court?to?consider?included?”?’the?impact?upon?the?parties.’?”?(Haslip,?supra,?499?U.S.?at?p.?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?21,?111?S.Ct.?at?p.?1044].)?Obviously,?this?factor?would?encompass?consideration?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.?Otherwise,?effect?on?the?defendant?could?not?be?considered. Most?important,?the?high?court?emphasized?the?”detailed?substantive?standards”?the?Alabama?Supreme?Court?uses?in?evaluating?punitive?awards?on?appeal.?(Haslip,?supra,?499?U.S.?at?p.?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?22,?111?S.Ct.?at?p.?1045].)?The?Alabama?court?had?made?clear?that?the?defendant’s?financial?condition?is?”a?consideration?essential?to?a?post-judgment?critique?of?a?punitive?damages?award.”?(Green?Oil?Co.?v.?Hornsby?(Ala.?1989)?539?So.2d?218,?222,?italics?added.)?The?high?court?explained,?that?”The?[Alabama]?standards?provide?for?a?rational?relationship?in?determining?whether?a?particular?award?is?greater?than?reasonably?necessary?to?punish?and?deter.”?(Haslip,?supra,?499?U.S.?at?p.?___?[113?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?23,?111?S.Ct.?at?pp.?1045-?1046].)?Absent?a?consideration?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition,?a?court?(whether?at?the?trial?or?appellate?level)?simply?cannot?make?an?informed?decision?whether,?as?the?high?court?put?it,?”a?particular?award?is?greater?than?reasonably?necessary.”?(Ibid.?[113?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?23,?111?S.Ct.?at?p.?1046])?Or,?as?the?Alabama?high?court?phrased?it,?”What?(i.e.,?how?much)?will?it?take?to?punish?this?Defendant??…?[?]?The?gravity?of?the?wrong?may?be?the?same,?whether?the?defendant?is?a?salaried?employee?or?a?multimillion?dollar?corporation,?but,?in?the?case?of?the?former,?the?$220,000?verdict?would?be?far?out?of?proportion?to?its?intended?purpose.?What?it?takes?to?punish?the?one?bears?no?relationship?to?what?it?takes?to?punish?the?other.”?(Green?Oil?Co.?v.?Hornsby,?supra,?539?So.2d?218,?223,?italics?in?opinion,?quoting?Ridout’s-Brown?Service,?Inc.?v.?Holloway?(Ala.?1981)?397?So.2d?125,?127-128?(conc.?opn.?of?Jones,?J.).)fn.?8?[54?Cal.3d?118]?We?need?not?decide,?and?do?not?decide,?whether?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition?is?a?constitutional?prerequisite?under?Haslip,?supra,?499?U.S.?___,?to?an?award?of?punitive?damages.?[7]?At?a?minimum,?however,?the?high?court?has?made?clear?a?constitutional?mandate?for?meaningful?judicial?scrutiny?of?punitive?damages?awards.?This?requirement?weighs?heavily?in?favor?of?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition.?Absent?such?evidence,?a?reviewing?court?cannot?make?an?informed?decision?whether?the?amount?of?punitive?damages?is?excessive?as?a?matter?of?law.?That?commonsense?concern?is?itself?sufficient?to?require?such?evidence?as?a?matter?of?state?law.?Moreover,?in?light?of?Haslip,?the?absence?of?such?evidence?raises?doubt?as?to?the?constitutionality?of?a?punitive?damages?award.fn.?9?[54?Cal.3d?119] Allocation?of?the?burden?of?proof [8a]?If?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition?is?a?prerequisite?to?a?punitive?damages?award,?the?next?question?is?which?party?bears?the?burden?of?introducing?the?evidence?at?trial.?Plaintiff?contends?that,?because?such?evidence?is?unnecessary,?neither?party?bears?the?burden?of?producing?it.?This?reasoning?is?tenable?only?if?one?accepts?plaintiff’s?argument?that?the?evidence?is?unnecessary,?period.?The?correct?rule?is?that?the?evidence?is?required.?(Maj.?opn.,?ante,?pp.?109-118.)?Thus,?one?side?or?the?other?must?bear?the?burden?of?producing?it.?As?we?shall?explain,?the?burden?is?properly?placed?on?the?plaintiff. Evidence?Code?section?500?states,?”Except?as?otherwise?provided?by?law,?a?party?has?the?burden?of?proof?as?to?each?fact?the?existence?or?nonexistence?of?which?is?essential?to?the?claim?for?relief?or?defense?that?he?is?asserting.”?(Italics?added.)?As?the?California?Law?Revision?Commission?explained,?”The?facts?that?must?be?shown?to?establish?a?cause?of?action?or?a?defense?are?determined?by?the?substantive?law,?not?the?law?of?evidence.”?(Cal.?Law?Revision?Com.?com.,?29B?West’s?Ann.?Evid.?Code?(1966?ed.)???500,?at?p.?431?[Deering’s?Ann.?Evid.?Code,?(1986?ed.)???500,?p.?215].)?In?light?of?our?holding?that?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition?is?essential?to?support?an?award?of?punitive?damages,?Evidence?Code?section?500?mandates?that?the?plaintiff?bear?the?burden?of?proof?on?the?issue.?A?plaintiff?seeking?punitive?damages?is?not?seeking?a?mere?declaration?by?the?jury?that?the?plaintiff?is?entitled?to?punitive?damages?in?the?abstract.?The?plaintiff?is?seeking?an?award?of?real?money?in?a?specific?amount?to?be?set?by?the?jury.?Because?the?award,?whatever?its?amount,?cannot?be?sustained?absent?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition,?such?evidence?is?”essential?to?the?claim?for?relief.”?(Evid.?Code,???500.) Fundamental?fairness?must?be?the?lodestar?for?our?analysis.?The?California?Law?Revision?Commission?comment?to?Evidence?Code?section?500?states,?[54?Cal.3d?120]?”In?determining?the?incidence?of?the?burden?of?proof,?’the?truth?is?that?there?is?not?and?cannot?be?any?one?general?solvent?for?all?cases.?It?is?merely?a?question?of?policy?and?fairness?based?on?experience?in?the?different?situations.’?”?(Cal.?Law?Revision?Com.?com.,?supra,???500,?at?p.?431?[Deering’s?Ann.?Evid.?Code,???500,?p.?215],?quoting?9?Wigmore,?Evidence?(3d?ed.?1940)???2486,?p.?275,?italics?added.)?These?bedrock?concerns-policy?and?fairness-support?placing?the?burden?on?a?plaintiff?to?prove?a?defendant’s?financial?condition.?The?very?nature?of?punitive?damages?points?to?this?conclusion.?Whatever?his?or?her?injury,?a?plaintiff?will?be?made?whole?by?the?award?of?compensatory?damages.?An?award?of?punitive?damages,?though?perhaps?justified?for?societal?reasons?of?deterrence,?is?a?boon?for?the?plaintiff.?”Such?damages?constitute?a?windfall?….”?(Rosener?v.?Sears,?Roebuck?&?Co.?(1980)?110?Cal.App.3d?740,?750?[168?Cal.Rptr.?237];?Electrical?Workers?v.?Foust?(1979)?442?U.S.?42,?50?[60?L.Ed.2d?698,?706,?99?S.Ct.?2121]?[also?referring?to?punitive?damages?as?”windfall?recoveries”].)?”[I]t?is?indeed?an?anomaly?to?find?that?in?any?case?more?than?full?compensation?may?be?awarded?him?[the?plaintiff].”?(Davis?v.?Hearst?(1911)?160?Cal.?143,?162?[116?P.?530].)?The?general?rule?has?long?been?that?”He?who?takes?the?benefit?must?bear?the?burden.”?(Civ.?Code,???3521.)?It?is?not?too?much?to?ask?of?a?plaintiff?seeking?such?a?windfall?to?require?that?he?or?she?introduce?evidence?that?will?allow?a?jury?and?a?reviewing?court?to?determine?whether?the?amount?of?the?award?is?appropriate?and,?in?particular,?whether?it?is?excessive?in?light?of?the?central?goal?of?deterrence.?As?explained?above,?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?financial?condition?is?crucial?to?that?determination. The?potential?unfairness?of?imposing?the?burden?on?the?defendant?becomes?even?more?clear?when?considered?in?light?of?trial?practice?reality.?The?issue?is?not?merely?a?question?of?trial?strategy.?As?our?former?colleague?Justice?Peters?aptly?put?it,?”The?trial?of?a?law?suit?is?not?a?game?where?the?spoils?of?victory?go?to?the?clever?and?technical?regardless?of?the?merits,?but?a?method?devised?by?a?civilized?society?to?settle?peaceably?and?justly?disputes?between?litigants.?The?rules?of?the?contest?are?not?an?end?in?themselves.”?(Simon?v.?City?&?County?of?San?Francisco?(1947)?79?Cal.App.2d?590,?600?[180?P.2d?393].)?An?award?of?punitive?damages?can?be?a?matter?of?economic?life?or?death?for?a?defendant.?The?”game”?theory?of?litigation?is?particularly?inappropriate?when?the?public?interest?is?at?stake. If?the?plaintiff?does?not?introduce?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?finances,?the?only?alternative?source?of?the?information?is?the?defendant.?It?is?inherently?prejudicial?to?require?a?defendant?to?introduce?evidence?of?personal?finances.?Doing?so?places?a?defendant?in?the?position?of?bidding?against?himself?or?herself.?A?defendant?in?that?position?is?forced?to?tell?the?jury?in?effect?that:?”My?conduct?doesn’t?warrant?punitive?damages.?But,?by?the?way,?if?you?disagree,?please?be?gentle,?I’m?worth?only?the?following?amount.”?Such?an?[54?Cal.3d?121]?approach?has?the?not?unexpected?effect?of?suggesting?to?the?jury?that?the?defendant?is?admitting?punitive?damages?should?be?assessed.?Put?colloquially,?the?jury?is?led?to?think,?”This?person?must?know?he?deserves?a?beating?or?else?he?would?not?be?pleading?poverty.”?Under?current?Civil?Code?section?3295,?subdivision?(d),?the?jury?is?asked?to?decide?at?the?same?time?whether?to?impose?punitive?damages?and,?if?so,?in?what?amount.?(See?also?BAJI?No.?14.72.2,?supra,?at?p.?66.)?Requiring?a?defendant?to?prove?his?or?her?own?financial?condition?may?improperly?taint?the?jury’s?decision?whether?to?impose?punitive?damages?in?the?first?instance.?The?defendant’s?only?alternative?is?to?remain?silent?as?to?personal?finances?and?run?the?risk?of?being?annihilated?financially. It?is?simply?unfair?and?unnecessary?to?put?the?defendant?in?this?”damned?if?you?do,?damned?if?you?don’t”?position.?A?commonly?used?practice?guide?for?attorneys?(authored?in?part?by?former?Justice?Kaufman?of?this?court)?illustrates?the?problem.?”Practice?Pointer?for?Defense:?The?insurer?[defendant]?should?be?careful?about?presenting?’mitigating’?evidence?as?to?its?financial?condition.?The?jury?may?regard?it?as?a?tacit?admission?that?some?award?of?punitive?damages?is?appropriate.?Quibbles?as?to?its?finances?could?be?viewed?as?’just?one?more?instance?of?insurer?cover-up!’?”?(Kornblum,?Cal.?Practice?Guide:?Bad?Faith?(Rutter?1989)???11.236,?p.?11-66,?italics?in?original.)?We?need?not?blind?ourselves?to?this?reality?of?trial?dynamics?that?is?well?understood?by?the?bar?and?our?colleagues?on?the?trial?bench. The?prejudice?in?this?case?was?exacerbated?because?it?was?tried?before?Civil?Code?section?3295?was?amended?to?provide?for?bifurcation.?Under?the?current?procedure,?the?jury?first?decides?whether?to?impose?liability?for?compensatory?damages?and?whether?the?defendant?acted?with?fraud,?oppression,?or?malice.?(Civ.?Code,???3295,?subd.?(d);?see?also?BAJI?No.?14.72.1?(1989?re-rev.)(7th?ed.?1991?pocket?pt.)?p.?64.)?Only?after?finding?such?misconduct,?is?the?jury?then?asked?to?decide?whether?to?impose?punitive?damages?and,?if?so,?in?what?amount.?As?explained?in?the?preceding?paragraph,?there?is?a?serious?risk?of?prejudice?to?the?defendant?under?this?scheme?if?the?defendant?is?required?to?prove?its?own?finances.?The?risk,?of?course,?was?greater?under?former?Civil?Code?section?3295?because?it?made?no?provision?for?bifurcation.?Under?plaintiff’s?view,?Dr.?Murakami?would?have?had?to?introduce?evidence?of?his?finances?even?before?the?jury?decided?whether?he?was?liable?for?compensatory?damages.?The?Association?for?California?Tort?Reform,?appearing?as?amicus?curiae?on?behalf?of?defendant,?well?states?the?point:?”According?to?plaintiff,?if?defendant?had?any?substantial?net?worth,?he?also?had?but?a?Hobson’s?choice?in?a?trial?where?liability?and?penalty?were?to?be?decided?in?the?same?hearing:?evidence?of?his?financial?condition?could?be?introduced?with?the?likely?result?that?it?would?inflame?the?passion?and?prejudice?of?the?jury?to?tip?their?judgment?in?favor?of?liability.”?[54?Cal.3d?122]?Putting?the?defendant?in?this?untenable?situation?is?analytically?similar?to?imposing?on?the?defendant?the?burden?of?contesting?liability?for?compensatory?damages?while?simultaneously?proving?the?amount?of?compensatory?damages?that?should?be?awarded.?That,?of?course,?is?not?the?law.?A?plaintiff?must?prove?the?amount?of?compensatory?damages?to?which?he?or?she?is?entitled. Consideration?of?the?question?from?the?plaintiff’s?perspective?also?leads?to?the?conclusion?that?the?burden?is?properly?hers.?Unlike?the?defendant,?the?plaintiff?faces?no?risk.?As?one?practice?guide?for?attorneys?explains?in?plain?language,?”Plaintiff’s?counsel?has?everything?to?gain?and?nothing?to?lose?by?utilizing?the?rule?that?permits?(and?if?the?verdict?is?high)?compels?introduction?of?the?defendant’s?wealth.”?(Riley,?Proving?Punitive?Damages:?The?Complete?Handbook,?supra,???9.15,?pp.?6-7;?see?also?Kornblum,?Cal.?Practice?Guide:?Bad?Faith,?supra,???11.235,?p.?11-66?[explaining?benefit?to?plaintiff?of?introducing?the?evidence].)?Perhaps?a?plaintiff?might?want?to?keep?from?a?jury?the?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?resources?if?they?were?meager?and?thus?might?lead?to?a?small?punitive?damages?award.?In?that?circumstance,?however,?the?plaintiff?would?be?deliberately?seeking?an?award?disproportionate?(or?at?least?unrelated)?to?the?defendant’s?ability?to?pay.?That?result,?of?course,?is?contrary?to?the?public?purpose?of?punitive?damages. Moreover,?under?Civil?Code?section?3295,?subdivision?(c),?the?plaintiff?is?allowed,?on?a?proper?showing,?to?”subpoena?documents?or?witnesses?to?be?available?at?the?trial?for?the?purpose?of?establishing?the?profits?or?financial?condition”?of?the?defendant.?The?plaintiff?may?also?obtain?pretrial?discovery?of?that?information.?”Like?the?Colt?revolver?made?all?men?in?the?west?the?same?size,?discovery?procedures?reduce?the?advantage?the?giant?corporations?[or?any?other?defendant]?otherwise?have?over?the?individual?plaintiff?in?litigation,?and?if?the?goal?is?a?large?verdict,?such?discovery?procedures?should?not?be?used?sparingly.”?(Riley,?Proving?Punitive?Damages:?The?Complete?Handbook,?supra,???9.16,?at?p.?102.)?We?see?no?reason?why?it?is?even?slightly?unfair?to?require?a?plaintiff?to?use?the?procedures?available. The?apparent?legislative?intent?underlying?the?punitive?damages?statutes?is?also?consonant?with?having?plaintiff?assume?this?responsibility.?At?the?time?this?case?was?tried?(July?1987),?Civil?Code?section?3295,?subdivision?(a)?provided?that?the?trial?court?could?grant?a?defendant?a?protective?order?requiring?the?plaintiff?to?prove?a?prima?facie?case?of?punitive?damages?liability?before?being?allowed?to?introduce?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?profits?or?financial?condition.?This?provision,?though?not?directly?on?point,?reflects?a?legislative?awareness?that?the?plaintiff?is?the?party?who?must?introduce?such?evidence.?By?setting?forth?the?procedure?for?the?plaintiff?to?do?so,?the?Legislature?acknowledged?that?the?orthodox?practice?had?long?been?[54?Cal.3d?123]?for?plaintiffs,?not?defendants,?to?prove?a?defendant’s?financial?condition.?Indeed,?the?Legislature’s?awareness?of?this?reality?is?reflected?in?the?1980?amendments?to?Civil?Code?section?3295?regarding?introduction?of?evidence?of?a?defendant’s?financial?condition.?The?Legislative?Counsel’s?Digest?to?Senate?Bill?No.?227?(1979-1980?Reg.?Sess.),?which?gave?rise?to?the?amendments,?stated,?”In?general,?the?application?of?this?provision?is?governed?by?case?law?which?generally?provides?that?the?plaintiff?has?the?burden?of?proof?….”?(Legis.?Counsel’s?Dig.,?Sen.?Bill?No.?227,?4?Stats.?1979?(Reg.?Sess.)?Summary?Dig.,?p.?227,?italics?added.)?It?seems?clear?enough?that,?to?the?extent?the?Legislature?gave?any?thought?to?the?burden?of?proof,?the?assumption?was?that?the?burden?always?had?belonged?to?plaintiffs?and?would?remain?theirs. Subsequent?amendments?to?Civil?Code?section?3295,?though?not?applicable?to?this?case,?reinforce?the?conclusion?that?the?Legislature?was?aware?of?the?traditional?allocation?of?burden?of?proof.?Subdivision?(d)?was?added?to?section?3295?effective?January?1,?1988.?It?states,?”The?court?shall,?on?application?of?any?defendant,?preclude?the?admission?of?evidence?of?that?defendant’s?profits?or?financial?condition?until?after?the?trier?of?fact?returns?a?verdict?for?plaintiff?awarding?actual?damages?and?finds?that?a?defendant?is?guilty?of?malice,?oppression,?or?fraud?in?accordance?with?Section?3294.”?(Stats.?1987,?ch.?1498,???6,?pp.?5781-5782.)?On?its?face,?this?amendment?does?not?purport?to?address?the?precise?question?before?us.?The?provision,?however,?does?clearly?illustrate?the?Legislature’s?awareness?that?plaintiffs,?rather?than?defendants,?seek?to?introduce?financial?evidence.?More?important,?Civil?Code?section?3295?offers?no?support,?not?even?a?suggestion,?for?the?view?that?defendants?bear?the?burden?of?introducing?such?evidence.?If?defendants?had?that?burden,?the?provisions?regulating?plaintiffs’?introduction?of?the?evidence?would?be?meaningless.?[9]?We?do?not?presume?that?the?Legislature?engages?in?idle?acts.?(Shoemaker?v.?Myers?(1990)?52?Cal.3d?1,?22?[276?Cal.Rptr.?303,?801?P.2d?1054].) [2e]?,?[8b]?In?summary,?Evidence?Code?section?500?and?consideration?of?fundamental?fairness?lead?to?the?conclusion?that?a?plaintiff?who?seeks?to?recover?punitive?damages?must?bear?the?burden?of?establishing?the?defendant’s?financial?condition.?A?defendant?should?not?be?required?to?justify?the?amount?of?the?award?he?or?she?is?seeking?to?avoid. […]

In?re?Horton?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?82?,?284?Cal.Rptr.?305;?813?P.2d?1335 [No.?S012531.?Aug?12,?1991.] In?re?JAMES?F.?HORTON?II?on?Habeas?Corpus. (Opinion?by?Broussard,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?Kennard,?Arabian?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.) COUNSEL Altshuler?&?Berzon,?Altshuler,?Berzon,?Nussbaum,?Berzon?&?Rubin,?Michael?Rubin?and?Marsha?S.?Berzon?for?Petitioner. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Marc?E.?Turchin,?Susan?L.?Frierson?and?Joan?Comparet,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Respondent. OPINION BROUSSARD,?J. The?issue?in?this?case?is?whether?a?court?commissioner?may?conduct?a?trial?in?a?capital?case?when?no?oral?or?written?stipulation?of?the?parties?authorized?him?to?sit?as?a?temporary?judge,?but?when?defense?counsel?proceeded?to?trial?without?objection,?knowing?that?the?judge?was?a?court?commissioner.?Petitioner?contends?that?the?right?to?be?tried?by?a?regularly?appointed?or?elected?superior?court?judge?is?a?fundamental?and?personal?one?that?can?only?be?waived?after?full?admonition?of?the?defendant?and?after?he?has?entered?an?express?waiver?of?the?right?on?the?record.?We?conclude?that?the?right?is?not?a?fundamental?personal?one?requiring?an?admonition?and?express?waiver,?and?that?the?stipulation?necessary?to?vest?the?commissioner?with?authority?to?try?the?case?can?be?inferred?from?the?conduct?of?counsel. I Petitioner?was?charged?with?the?October?11,?1982,?murder?and?robbery?of?Herschel?Bowser.?The?complaint?alleged?as?special?circumstances?that?petitioner?murdered?Bowser?in?the?commission?of?a?robbery,?and?that?petitioner?had?previously?been?convicted?of?a?murder.?An?information?was?filed?on?October?11,?1983,?and?petitioner?was?arraigned?in?the?Norwalk?branch?of?the?[54?Cal.3d?87]?Los?Angeles?County?Superior?Court?on?the?same?date.?On?April?6,?1984,?petitioner’s?case?was?transferred?to?Department?E?of?the?Norwalk?branch?of?the?Los?Angeles?County?Superior?Court,?where?Los?Angeles?County?Commissioner?Michael?Cowell?presided.?The?transfer?to?Department?E?was?automatic?under?Norwalk’s?direct?calendaring?system,?and?petitioner?was?not?asked?to?nor?did?he?give?his?consent?to?the?transfer.?The?case?proceeded?to?trial,?and?on?April?1,?1985,?the?jury?found?petitioner?guilty?of?murder?and?robbery?and?found?true?a?felony-murder?special?circumstance?and?a?prior-?murder?special?circumstance.?On?April?16,?1985,?the?jury?returned?a?death?verdict.?The?court?formally?imposed?the?sentence?of?death?on?petitioner?on?October?7,?1985.?Petitioner’s?automatic?appeal?is?pending?before?this?court. On?October?17,?1989,?petitioner?filed?a?petition?for?writ?of?habeas?corpus,?or?in?the?alternative,?a?motion?for?summary?reversal.?Though?the?record?on?appeal?had?not?been?completed,?he?argued?that?he?was?entitled?to?relief?either?by?way?of?writ?of?habeas?corpus?or?by?way?of?summary?reversal?because?his?trial?had?been?conducted?before?a?court?commissioner,?and?neither?he?nor?counsel?had?entered?a?formal?written?or?oral?stipulation?to?trial?by?a?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge.?On?July?11,?1990,?this?court?issued?an?order?to?show?cause?why?the?relief?prayed?for?in?the?petition?for?writ?of?habeas?corpus?should?not?be?granted. The?following?facts?can?be?stated?on?the?basis?of?the?allegations?in?the?pleadings?in?the?habeas?corpus?proceeding.?It?is?uncontroverted?that?Commissioner?Cowell’s?standard?practice?was?to?inquire?of?all?counsel?whether?a?stipulation?had?been?filed?appointing?him?as?a?temporary?judge,?and?that?neither?petitioner,?nor?his?counsel,?nor?the?district?attorney?had?ever?executed?a?written?stipulation?appointing?Commissioner?Cowell?as?temporary?judge?in?petitioner’s?case.?It?is?further?uncontroverted?that?neither?Commissioner?Cowell?nor?defense?counsel?informed?petitioner?that?he?had?the?right?to?be?tried?by?a?regularly?appointed?or?elected?superior?court?judge,?that?petitioner?was?not?given?a?copy?of?a?stipulation?form?to?sign,?and?that?he?did?not,?either?orally?or?in?writing,?stipulate?to?trial?by?the?commissioner?as?a?temporary?judge. Petitioner?alleges?that?he?did?not?know?of?his?right?to?trial?by?a?superior?court?judge,?and?that?if?he?had?been?informed?of?the?right,?he?would?not?have?waived?it.?He?alleges?that?he?did?not?intend?to?stipulate?to?trial?by?a?commissioner.?Respondent?denies?these?allegations. Petitioner’s?lead?counsel?executed?a?declaration?stating?that?petitioner?never?stipulated,?either?orally?or?in?writing,?to?have?his?trial?before?a?[54?Cal.3d?88]?commissioner,?that?neither?of?petitioner’s?counsel?ever?discussed?the?subject?of?a?stipulation,?that?petitioner?was?never?advised?of?his?right?to?trial?before?a?regularly?appointed?or?elected?superior?court?judge,?and?that?to?the?best?of?counsel’s?knowledge,?petitioner?first?learned?of?the?right?to?trial?before?such?a?judge?when?appellate?counsel?informed?him?of?the?right.?He?further?declared?that?petitioner?never?authorized?him?or?cocounsel?to?waive?his?right,?that?neither?he?nor?cocounsel?ever?purported?to?waive?the?right?on?behalf?of?petitioner,?and?that?it?was?his?opinion?that?counsel?lacked?the?power?to?waive?the?right?for?petitioner.?He?explained,?however,?that?he?believed?at?the?time?of?trial?that?petitioner?had?signed?a?written?stipulation?and?that?it?was?on?file. Respondent?admits?that?counsel?did?not?discuss?the?stipulation?with?petitioner,?but?denies?that?defense?counsel?did?not?intend?to?stipulate?and?were?not?authorized?to?stipulate?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge,?and?also?denies?that?they?did?not?actually?stipulate?by?their?actions?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge. The?clerk’s?and?reporter’s?transcripts?prepared?in?the?course?of?petitioner’s?trial?establish?these?further?facts.?At?the?first?hearing?in?the?capital?trial?before?Commissioner?Cowell,?on?April?6,?1984,?petitioner?was?not?present.?The?clerk?of?the?court?reminded?the?court?that?a?stipulation?to?the?commissioner?serving?as?a?temporary?judge?was?needed?from?petitioner.?The?hearing?(on?discovery?compliance)?was?put?over?one?week,?and?the?court?asked?counsel:?”Do?you?promise?to?get?a?stipulation?when?he?comes?out?on?that?date,”?and?counsel?responded:?”I?will?get?a?stipulation.”?The?bailiff?commented?that?unless?the?court?ordered?petitioner?out?of?jail,?he?would?not?be?present?at?the?continued?hearing.?The?court?said:?”The?Court?will?order?him?out,?because?we?do?need?a?stipulation.”?Counsel?responded:?”Will?the?Court?permit?me?to?take?one?to?the?County?Jail.?I’ll?be?seeing?him,?and?bring?it?in?and?file?it.”?The?court?stated:?”Fine.?As?long?as?the?stipulation?is?filed?we?don’t?need?him?present.”?The?hearing?ended?with?this?exchange:?”The?Court:?My?understanding?is?that?you?will?secure?a?stipulation-[?]?Mr.?Newton?[defense?counsel]:?Yes,?your?Honor.?[?]?The?Court:-on?the?matter?before?that?date.” Respondent?also?submits?the?declaration?of?Commissioner?Cowell?that?he?habitually?solicited?stipulations?to?his?presiding,?that?he?reminded?petitioner’s?counsel?to?get?a?stipulation,?that?both?defense?counsel?had?appeared?before?him?on?many?occasions?and?knew?that?he?was?a?commissioner?and?that?neither?had?ever?declined?to?stipulate?to?his?presiding?in?the?past.?He?had?no?reason?to?doubt?that?counsel?would?obtain?and?file?the?necessary?stipulation.?Petitioner?was?absent?on?one?or?both?of?the?hearing?dates.?When?petitioner?finally?appeared?in?his?courtroom,?Commissioner?Cowell?assumed?[54?Cal.3d?89]?that?the?stipulation?had?been?filed,?and?believed?that?counsel?shared?this?assumption.?He?added?that?at?the?front?of?his?bench?is?a?large?nameplate?bearing?his?name?and?title.?In?a?supplemental?declaration?filed?by?petitioner,?Commissioner?Cowell?added?that?he?did?not?construe?counsel’s?statements?at?the?April?6,?1984,?hearing?as?indicating?that?petitioner?had?already?agreed?to?enter?into?a?stipulation. The?reporter’s?transcript,?as?well?as?a?settled?statement,?indicate?that?petitioner?appeared?before?Commissioner?Cowell?twice?early?in?the?proceedings,?once?to?waive?his?right?to?a?speedy?trial,?and?once?for?a?continuance.?On?his?third?appearance,?some?10?months?after?the?case?was?transferred?to?Commissioner?Cowell’s?department,?there?was?a?Marsden?hearing?(People?v.?Marsden?(1970)?2?Cal.3d?118?[84?Cal.Rptr.?156,?465?P.2d?44])?at?which?petitioner?attempted?to?remove?his?counsel?on?account?of?their?incompetence.?(He?had?filed?a?malpractice?action?against?them?in?the?Los?Angeles?County?Superior?Court.)?He?contended?that?they?were?not?properly?preparing?the?case,?that?they?had?refused?to?contact?witnesses?whom?petitioner?had?identified,?that?they?had?refused?to?file?certain?motions,?and?that?they?were?pressuring?him?to?accept?a?guilty?plea?despite?his?innocence.?After?a?series?of?rulings?adverse?to?him,?and?as?the?court?was?about?to?take?a?time?waiver?from?petitioner,?this?interchange?took?place:?”[Petitioner:]?May?I?ask?you?a?question??[?]?The?Court:?Yes,?sir.?[?]?The?defendant:?With?no?offense?intended,?but?are?you?a?Judge?or?are?you?a?Commissioner??[?]?The?court:?A?Commissioner,?Mr.?Horton,?for?this?case,?you?having?signed?a?stipulation,?I’m?a?Judge?for?all?purposes.?[?]?The?Defendant:?I?signed?it??[?]?The?Court:?Yes,?sir.?When?the?matter?was?first?brought?before?this?Court.?No?offense?intended,?no?offense?taken.”?The?settled?statement?indicated?that?after?Commissioner?Cowell?stated?that?petitioner?had?signed?a?written?stipulation,?petitioner?responded,?”I?signed?it”?in?a?questioning?tone?of?voice,?and?shook?his?head?from?side?to?side?to?indicate?disagreement.?He?was?interrupted?by?counsel,?who?spoke?to?him?on?another?topic.?Petitioner?dropped?the?subject?and?moved?on?to?discuss?his?motions.?The?case?proceeded?to?trial?and?the?subject?of?the?stipulation?was?not?renewed?until?this?collateral?attack?on?the?judgment. II The?judicial?power?of?the?state?is?vested?in?the?Supreme?Court,?Courts?of?Appeal,?superior?courts,?municipal?courts,?and?justice?courts.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???1;?McHugh?v.?Santa?Monica?Rent?Control?Bd.?(1989)?49?Cal.3d?348,?355?[261?Cal.Rptr.?318,?777?P.2d?91].)?The?California?Constitution?provides?that?the?Governor?appoints?superior?court?judges?when?there?are?vacancies,?but?that?after?appointment,?on?completion?of?the?term,?superior?court?judges?must?sit?for?nonpartisan?election.?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???16,?&?art.?II,???6.)?It?[54?Cal.3d?90]?also?provides?for?qualifications?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???15),?a?six-year?term?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???16),?and?limited?grounds?for?removal?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???18). Since?1862,?our?Constitution?has?contemplated?the?use?of?court?commissioners?to?perform?”chamber?business”?(see?Cal.?Const.?of?1849,?art.?VI,???11,?as?amended?Sept.?3,?1862;?Cal.?Const.,?former?art.?VI,???14),?now?referred?to?as?”subordinate?judicial?duties.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???22;?Rooney?v.?Vermont?Investment?Corp.?(1973)?10?Cal.3d?351,?361-362?[110?Cal.Rptr.?353,?515?P.2d?297].)?In?addition,?since?1879,?our?Constitution?has?permitted?a?cause?to?be?tried?in?the?superior?court?by?a?temporary?judge.?(Cal.?Const.?of?1879,?former?art.?VI,???8;?see?also?Cal.?Const.,?former?art.?VI,???5,?as?amended?in?1928.)?The?original?provision?was?that?such?a?judge?must?be?”a?member?of?the?bar,?agreed?upon?in?writing?by?the?parties?litigant?or?their?attorneys?of?record,?approved?by?the?Court,?and?sworn?to?try?the?cause.”?(Ibid.)?This?provision?was?repealed?in?1926,?but?was?reinstated?in?article?VI,?section?5?in?1928?to?provide?for?trial?by?a?temporary?judge?”[u]pon?stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant?or?their?attorneys?of?record.?…”?(Cal.?Const.,?former?art.?VI,???5,?as?amended?in?1928.)?The?current?version?of?this?language,?as?revised?in?1966,?provides:?”On?stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant?the?court?may?order?a?cause?to?be?tried?by?a?temporary?judge?who?is?a?member?of?the?State?Bar,?sworn?and?empowered?to?act?until?final?determination?of?the?cause.”?(Cal.?Const.,?art.?VI,???21.)fn.?1 [1]?The?jurisdiction?of?a?court?commissioner,?or?any?other?temporary?judge,?to?try?a?cause?derives?from?the?parties’?stipulation.?(Rooney?v.?Vermont?Investment?Corp.,?supra,?10?Cal.3d?at?p.?360.)?Thus?in?the?absence?of?a?proper?stipulation,?the?judgment?entered?by?the?court?commissioner?in?this?case?would?be?void.?(People?v.?Tijerina,?supra,?1?Cal.3d?at?p.?49;?In?re?Frye?(1983)?150?Cal.App.3d?407,?409-?410?[197?Cal.Rptr.?755].) [2a]?Petitioner?contends?that?the?right?to?be?tried?by?a?regularly?elected?or?appointed?superior?court?judge?rather?than?a?court?commissioner?or?other?temporary?judge?is?a?fundamental?one,?so?that?he?cannot?be?charged?with?stipulating?to?trial?by?commissioner?without?a?full,?on?the?record?admonition?regarding?his?right?to?trial?by?a?regularly?appointed?judge,?and?his?personal,?knowing?and?voluntary?waiver?of?that?right.?He?draws?an?analogy?between?this?case?and?Boykin?v.?Alabama?(1969)?395?U.S.?238?[23?L.Ed.2d?274,?89?S.Ct.?1709]?and?In?re?Tahl?(1969)?1?Cal.3d?122?[81?Cal.Rptr.?577,?460?P.2d?449],?which?impose?requirements?of?admonition?and?knowing?waiver?of?a?number?of?fundamental?constitutional?rights?in?the?context?of?a?guilty?plea.?[54?Cal.3d?91] For?several?reasons,?we?do?not?accept?this?argument.?First,?although?the?original?constitutional?language?providing?for?temporary?judges,?as?well?as?the?current?language?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure,fn.?2?speaks?of?a?written?stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant,?we?have?ratified?a?line?of?cases?recognizing?that?a?valid?stipulation?for?purposes?of?the?constitutional?provision?may?arise?as?a?result?of?the?conduct?of?the?parties.?These?cases?hold?that?conduct?short?of?an?express?oral?or?written?stipulation?may?be?tantamount?to?a?stipulation?that?a?court?commissioner?may?sit?as?a?temporary?judge.?(In?re?Mark?L.?(1983)?34?Cal.3d?171,?178-179?[193?Cal.Rptr.?165,?666?P.2d?22];?E.N.W.?v.?Michael?W.?(1983)?149?Cal.App.3d?896,?899-900?[198?Cal.Rptr.?355];?Estate?of?Lacy?(1975)?54?Cal.App.3d?172,?182?[126?Cal.Rptr.?432];?People?v.?Oaxaca?(1974)?39?Cal.App.3d?153?[114?Cal.Rptr.?178];?Estate?of?Soforenko?(1968)?260?Cal.App.2d?765,?766?[67?Cal.Rptr.?563];?see?also?2?Witkin,?Cal.?Procedure?(3d?ed.?1985)?Courts,???283,?pp.?306-307.)?As?one?Court?of?Appeal?has?said,?”An?attorney?may?not?sit?back,?fully?participate?in?a?trial?and?then?claim?that?the?court?was?without?jurisdiction?on?receiving?a?result?unfavorable?to?him.”?(Estate?of?Lacy,?supra,?54?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?182.) The?idea?that?parties?may,?through?their?conduct,?be?held?to?have?stipulated?to?trial?by?a?court?commissioner?is?not?controversial.?The?tantamount?stipulation?doctrine?apparently?first?arose?in?Estate?of?Soforenko,?supra,?260?Cal.App.2d?765.?In?that?probate?matter,?the?appellate?court?explained:?”[A]ppellant?was?represented?by?an?attorney?who?noted?his?appearance?on?the?record;?he?voiced?no?objection?to?the?matter?being?heard?by?the?commissioner,?and?he?participated?fully?in?the?hearing?which?ensued.?He?examined?the?executor?as?a?witness?at?some?length.?He?argued?appellant’s?objections?to?the?account,?and?the?asserted?inadequacy?of?the?report.?At?the?conclusion?of?the?hearing?and?in?response?to?the?court’s?inquiry?as?to?findings,?the?attorney?replied?’Findings?waived,’?as?did?the?attorney?for?the?executor.?We?construe?all?this?deportment?on?the?part?of?appellant’s?attorney?as?tantamount?to?a?stipulation?that?the?matter?could?be?heard?by?the?commissioner.”?(Id.?at?p.?766.) The?doctrine?was?first?applied?in?the?criminal?context?in?People?v.?Oaxaca,?supra,?39?Cal.App.3d?153,?where?the?defendant?sought?to?vacate?his?guilty?[54?Cal.3d?92]?plea?and?sentence?on?the?ground?that?the?judge?presiding?over?them?was?merely?a?commissioner.?The?court?relied?on?Estate?of?Soforenko,?supra,?260?Cal.App.2d?765,?observing?that:?”The?fact?that?defendant?was?represented?by?an?experienced?public?defender,?participated?in?the?plea?bargaining,?and?accepted?the?sentence?which?was?part?of?that?plea?bargain,?strongly?suggests?that?the?proceedings?were?in?accordance?with?a?de?facto?stipulation?that?the?commissioner?might?act?as?a?temporary?judge.”?(People?v.?Oaxaca,?supra,?39?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?161.)?The?doctrine?subsequently?has?been?applied?in?several?juvenile?cases.?(See?In?re?Lamonica?H.?(1990)?220?Cal.App.3d?634,?640,?644?[270?Cal.Rptr.?60]?[dependency?proceeding];?In?re?P.?I.?(1989)?207?Cal.App.3d?316,?322?[254?Cal.Rptr.?774]?[wardship?proceeding];?In?re?Robert?S.?(1988)?197?Cal.App.3d?1260,?1264?[243?Cal.Rptr.?459];?but?see?In?re?Heather?P.?(1988)?203?Cal.App.3d?1214,?1225?[250?Cal.Rptr.?468];?In?re?Damian?V.?(1988)?197?Cal.App.3d?933?[243?Cal.Rptr.?185]?[termination?of?parental?rights],?refusing?to?apply?the?doctrine?where?rule?244?of?the?California?Rules?of?Court?requires?a?written?stipulation.)fn.?3 We?applied?the?doctrine?in?In?re?Mark?L.,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?171,?where?we?rejected?a?district?attorney’s?claim?that?a?court?commissioner?who?took?a?negotiated?plea?in?a?juvenile?wardship?matter?and?entered?a?dispositional?order?actually?lacked?authority?to?sit?as?a?juvenile?court?judge.?”The?District?Attorney?of?San?Mateo?County?initiated?this?[Welfare?and?Institutions?Code]?section?602?proceeding.?Through?his?deputy,?he?willingly?appeared?before?[the?commissioner],?raising?no?objection?when?that?officer?announced?he?was?proceeding?under?an?Arbuckle?[People?v.?Arbuckle?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?749?(150?Cal.Rptr.?778,?587?P.2d?220,?3?A.L.R.4th?1171)]?condition?[that?the?disposition?would?be?by?the?same?judge]?and?later?entered?a?disposition?on?that?basis.?Such?conduct,?we?think,?was?’tantamount?to?a?stipulation’?that?Browning,?by?virtue?of?his?status?as?a?commissioner,?was?acting?as?a?temporary?judge?rather?than?as?a?referee.”?(34?Cal.3d?at?p.?179.) The?constitutional?language?providing?for?trial?by?a?temporary?judge?has?not?been?interpreted?to?mean?that?the?authority?to?stipulate?rests?solely?with?the?client,?or?that?the?client’s?express?stipulation?is?necessary.?On?the?contrary,?the?cases?establishing?the?doctrine?of?tantamount?stipulation?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge?refer?routinely?both?to?the?client’s?and?to?the?attorney’s?conduct?in?entering?the?stipulation.?(See?In?re?Frye,?supra,?150?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?408-?409;?People?v.?Oaxaca,?supra,?39?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?161;?but?see?In?re?Samkirtana?S.?(1990)?222?Cal.App.3d?1475,?1484?[272?Cal.Rptr.?489]?[dictum?[54?Cal.3d?93]?suggests,?without?analysis,?that?client?must?expressly?consent?to?stipulation?in?normal?civil?case].)?Frequently,?only?the?attorney’s?conduct?is?discussed?and?is?dispositive.?(See?Yetenekian?v.?Superior?Court?(1983)?140?Cal.App.3d?361?[189?Cal.Rptr.?458]?[attorney’s?conduct?alone?analyzed;?held?not?to?amount?to?stipulation];?Estate?of?Lacy,?supra,?54?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?182?[attorney’s?conduct?held?tantamount?to?stipulation];?People?v.?Benedict?(1969)?2?Cal.App.3d?400,?405?[82?Cal.Rptr.?759]?[express?stipulation?by?counsel?alone?upheld];?Estate?of?Soferenko,?supra,?260?Cal.App.2d?at?pp.?766-767?[counsel’s?conduct?alone?tantamount?to?stipulation].) Thus,?our?ratification?of?the?doctrine?of?tantamount?stipulation?strongly?suggests?not?only?that?an?express?stipulation?by?the?client?is?unnecessary,?but?also?that?counsel’s?conduct?may?provide?the?basis?for?the?tantamount?stipulation. Second,?we?have?already?strongly?suggested?that?the?right?to?trial?by?a?regularly?appointed?or?elected?superior?court?judge,?rather?than?a?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge,?is?not?so?fundamental?that?it?necessitates?the?kind?of?admonition?and?waiver?that?must?precede?a?guilty?plea.?In?People?v.?Haskett?(1982)?30?Cal.3d?841?[180?Cal.Rptr.?640,?640?P.2d?776],?also?a?capital?case,?the?defendant?contended?that?his?oral?stipulation?to?have?a?court?commissioner?preside?at?his?preliminary?hearing?was?ineffective?because?he?had?not?been?admonished?regarding?his?right?to?have?the?hearing?before?a?magistrate.?We?said:?”The?right?to?have?a?magistrate?rather?than?a?qualified?court?commissioner?preside?at?the?preliminary?hearing?is?palpably?less?fundamental?than?the?rights?of?confrontation,?jury?trial,?and?protection?from?compelled?self-incrimination?safeguarded?in?Boykin?and?Tahl.?Furthermore,?there?is?no?inherent?danger?here,?as?there?is?when?a?plea?of?guilty?is?entered,?that?the?defendant?will?be?irretrievably?prejudiced?by?unknowing?waiver?of?the?underlying?right.?To?act?as?magistrate?at?a?preliminary?hearing,?a?court?commissioner?must?attain?the?status?of?’temporary?judge.’?[Citations.]?Consequently,?he?must?be?a?member?of?the?State?Bar?and?must?obtain?the?’stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant.’?[Citation.]?Moreover,?the?law?…?required?that?…?the?commissioner?be?appointed?and?supervised?by?the?trial?court?and?be?’otherwise?qualified.’?[Citation.]?These?safeguards?minimize?the?risk?that?the?defendant?will?be?incompetently?tried?or?prejudicially?affected?by?a?commissioner?acting?as?magistrate.”?(People?v.?Haskett,?supra,?30?Cal.3d?at?p.?858.) Our?decision?in?People?v.?Haskett?(supra,?30?Cal.3d?841)?seems?dispositive?on?the?question?whether?petitioner?was?entitled?to?an?admonition?regarding?his?right?to?trial?before?a?regularly?appointed?superior?court?judge.?As?petitioner?points?out,?however,?since?Haskett?had?actually?stipulated?to?a?[54?Cal.3d?94]?hearing?before?a?commissioner,?that?decision?is?not?fully?dispositive?of?the?question?whether?the?defendant?must?personally?waive?the?right.?Nonetheless,?our?refusal?to?equate?the?right?at?stake?with?the?personal?rights?secured?by?the?decisions?in?Boykin?and?Tahl?suggests?that?no?personal?waiver?is?constitutionally?required. [3]?We?see?no?indication?that?the?constitutional?language?authorizing?trial?by?a?temporary?judge?was,?as?a?general?proposition,?intended?to?vest?in?the?client,?as?opposed?to?counsel,?the?sole?authority?to?decide?whether?to?stipulate?to?trial?by?such?a?judge.?As?we?have?noted,?the?original?constitutional?language?spoke?in?terms?of?a?stipulation?by?the?party?or?the?attorney?of?record.?(Cal.?Const.,?former?art.?VI,???5.)?Though?the?reference?to?stipulation?by?the?attorney?was?eliminated?in?the?revision?of?1966,?we?have?said?that?the?purpose?of?the?revision?was?simply?to?state?the?prior?provision?concisely?in?modern?terms,?not?to?change?its?meaning.?(People?v.?Tijerina,?supra,?1?Cal.3d?at?p.?48;?see?also?Sarracino?v.?Superior?Court?(1974)?13?Cal.3d?1,?6-8?[118?Cal.Rptr.?21,?529?P.2d?53];?Estate?of?Soforenko,?supra,?260?Cal.App.2d?at?p.?766,?fn.?2.)?Further,?though?a?statute?may?refer?to?procedural?steps?to?be?taken?by?”the?parties,”?normally?this?language?is?not?taken?literally?but?is?interpreted?in?accordance?with?the?normal?rule?that?procedural?steps?must?be?taken?for?the?party?by?the?attorney?of?record.?(See?Boca?etc.?R.?R.?Co.?v.?Superior?Court?(1907)?150?Cal.?153,?157?[88?P.?718];?Toy?v.?Haskell?(1900)?128?Cal.?558,?560?[61?P.?89];?see?also?1?Witkin,?Cal.?Procedure?(3d?ed.?1985)?Attorneys,???188,?p.?217.)?Finally,?the?term?”stipulation”?normally?refers?to?an?agreement?between?attorneys.?(See?1?Witkin,?Cal.?Procedure,?Attorneys,?supra,???207,?at?p.?238,?and?cases?cited.) [4]?We?must?read?the?constitutional?language?in?light?of?the?general?rule?that?in?both?civil?and?criminal?matters,?a?party’s?attorney?has?general?authority?to?control?the?procedural?aspects?of?the?litigation?and,?indeed,?to?bind?the?client?in?these?matters.?(Blanton?v.?Womancare,?Inc.?(1985)?38?Cal.3d?396,?403?[212?Cal.Rptr.?151,?696?P.2d?645,?48?A.L.R.4th?109];?People?v.?Hamilton?(1989)48?Cal.3d?1142,?1163?[259?Cal.Rptr.?701,?774?P.2d?730],?and?cases?cited.)?In?the?civil?context,?the?attorney?has?authority?to?enter?into?stipulations?binding?on?the?client?in?all?matters?of?procedure,?though?he?or?she?may?not?stipulate?in?a?manner?to?”?’impair?the?client’s?substantial?rights?or?the?cause?of?action?itself.’?”?(Blanton?v.?Womancare,?Inc.,?supra,?38?Cal.3d?at?p.?404.)?Thus?the?attorney?cannot?without?authorization?settle?the?suit,?stipulate?to?a?matter?that?would?eliminate?an?essential?defense,?agree?to?entry?of?a?default?judgment,?or?stipulate?to?nominal?damages.?(Ibid.;?see?also?Linsk?v.?Linsk?(1969)?70?Cal.2d?272,?277-278?[74?Cal.Rptr.?544,?449?P.2d?760];?In?re?Marriage?of?Helsel?(1988)?198?Cal.App.3d?332,?337-338?[243?Cal.Rptr.?657].)?[54?Cal.3d?95] In?the?criminal?context,?too,?counsel?is?captain?of?the?ship.?[5]?As?we?said?recently:?”When?the?accused?exercises?his?constitutional?right?to?representation?by?professional?counsel,?it?is?counsel,?not?defendant,?who?is?in?charge?of?the?case.?By?choosing?professional?representation,?the?accused?surrenders?all?but?a?handful?of?’fundamental’?personal?rights?to?counsel’s?complete?control?of?defense?strategies?and?tactics.”?(People?v.?Hamilton,?supra,?48?Cal.3d?at?p.?1163;?see?also?Townsend?v.?Superior?Court?(1975)?15?Cal.3d?774,?781?[126?Cal.Rptr.?251,?543?P.2d?619];?1?ABA?Standards?for?Criminal?Justice,?std.?4-5.2?(2d?ed.?1980)?pp.?4.65-4.68.)?It?is?for?the?defendant?to?decide?such?fundamental?matters?as?whether?to?plead?guilty?(Brookhart?v.?Janis?(1966)?384?U.S.?1,?7-8?[16?L.Ed.2d?314,?318-319,?86?S.Ct.?1245]),?whether?to?waive?the?right?to?trial?by?jury?(People?v.?Holmes?(1960)?54?Cal.2d?442,?443-444?[5?Cal.Rptr.?871,?353?P.2d?583]),?whether?to?waive?the?right?to?counsel?(Faretta?v.?California?(1975)?422?U.S.?806,?834?[45?L.Ed.2d?562,?581,?95?S.Ct.?2525]),?and?whether?to?waive?the?right?to?be?free?from?self-incrimination?(In?re?Tahl,?supra,?1?Cal.3d?122,?132).?As?to?these?rights,?the?criminal?defendant?must?be?admonished?and?the?court?must?secure?an?express?waiver;?as?to?other?fundamental?rights?of?a?less?personal?nature,?courts?may?assume?that?counsel’s?waiver?reflects?the?defendant’s?consent?in?the?absence?of?an?express?conflict.?(People?v.?Guzman?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?915,?936?[248?Cal.Rptr.?467,?755?P.2d?917].)?When?the?decision?is?whether?to?testify?(see?People?v.?Robles?(1970)?2?Cal.3d?205,?215?[85?Cal.Rptr.?166,?466?P.2d?710])?or?whether?to?present?a?defense?at?the?guilt?phase?of?a?capital?trial?(see?People?v.?Frierson?(1985)?39?Cal.3d?803,?817-818?[218?Cal.Rptr.?73,?705?P.2d?396]),?it?is?only?in?case?of?an?express?conflict?arising?between?the?defendant?and?counsel?that?the?defendant’s?desires?must?prevail.?In?the?latter?situation,?there?is?no?duty?to?admonish?and?secure?an?on?the?record?waiver?unless?the?conflict?comes?to?the?court’s?attention.?(Id.,?at?p.?818,?fn.?8.) [6]?Contrary?to?petitioner’s?claim,?the?fact?that?a?right?is?of?constitutional?stature?does?not?mean?that?only?the?defendant?can?waive?the?right.?(People?v.?Guzman,?supra,?45?Cal.3d?at?p.?935.)?We?have?explained?that?a?right?may?exist?to?secure?community?interests?as?well?as?to?safeguard?personal?rights?of?the?defendant?to?a?fair?trial?or?to?basic?respect?as?an?individual.?Thus?in?the?case?of?the?right?to?trial?in?the?vicinage?of?the?crime,?we?concluded?that?though?this?right?is?an?essential?feature?of?the?state?and?federal?constitutional?right?to?jury?trial,?and?is?important?to?protect?the?accused’s?constitutional?rights,?it?also?is?important?to?vindicate?the?interests?of?the?community.?The?right?is?therefore?not?comparable?to?the?essential?rights?to?jury?trial?or?to?counsel,?and?counsel?has?authority?to?waive?it?even?over?the?defendant’s?objection.?”A?change?of?venue?to?ensure?a?fair?trial,?even?over?an?accused’s?objections,?does?not?threaten?’?”that?respect?for?the?individual?which?is?the?lifeblood?of?the?law.”?’?[Citation.]?Nor?does?the?right?exist?solely?to?protect?[54?Cal.3d?96]?fair?and?impartial?factfinding.?Its?waiver?…?is?a?tactical?matter?within?counsel’s?power?to?control.”?(Id.,?at?p.?937.) Petitioner?places?great?weight?on?federal?authority?establishing?the?primacy?of?article?III?courts.?(U.S.?Const.,?art.?III.)?[7]?We?are?well?aware?that?under?article?III?of?the?federal?Constitution,?litigants?enjoy?a?personal?interest?in?being?tried?by?an?article?III?judge,?whose?independence?from?other?branches?of?government?and?from?public?outcry?is?secured?by?life?tenure.?(Commodity?Futures?Trading?Comm’n?v.?Schor?(1986)?478?U.S.?833,?847-848?[92?L.Ed.2d?675,?690-691,?106?S.Ct.?3245];?Northern?Pipeline?Co.?v.?Marathon?Pipe?Line?Co.?(1981)?458?U.S.?50,?57-60?[73?L.Ed.2d?598,?606-608,?102?S.Ct.?2858];?Pacemaker?Diagnostic?Clinic?of?America?v.?Instromedix?(9th?Cir.?1984)?725?F.2d?537,?541?(opn.?of?Kennedy,?J.).)?The?federal?courts?have?been?jealous?to?protect?the?judicial?power?of?article?III?courts,?and?their?care?is?grounded?on?the?understanding?that?the?founders?of?our?nation?considered?it?essential?to?the?balance?of?power?among?the?three?branches?of?government?that?the?federal?judiciary?have?lifetime?tenure?in?order?to?assure?their?independence?from?the?other?branches.?(Northern?Pipeline?Co.?v.?Marathon?Pipe?Line?Co.,?supra,?458?U.S.?at?pp.?57-60?[73?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?606-608].)?We?recognize,?too,?that?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?has?found?that?article?III?secures?both?institutional?and?personal?interests,?and?that?it?primarily?”?’was?designed?as?a?protection?for?the?parties?from?the?risk?of?legislative?or?executive?pressure?on?judicial?decision.’?”?(Commodity?Futures?Trading?Comm’n?v.?Schor,?supra,?478?U.S.?at?p.?848?[92?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?691].) [2b]?On?the?other?hand,?nothing?in?these?cases?suggests?that?a?state?constitution?cannot?provide,?as?our?Constitution?does,?that?the?parties?may?consent?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge.?Even?in?the?federal?system,?the?high?court?has?recognized?that?although?article?III?of?the?federal?Constitution?secures?a?personal?right,?that?right?may?be?waived?by?consent?to?trial?in?a?lesser?tribunal.?(Commodity?Futures?Trading?Comm’n?v.?Schor,?supra,?478?U.S.?at?pp.?848-849?[92?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?690-692];?Pacemaker?Diagnostic?Clinic?of?America?v.?Instromedix,?supra,?725?F.2d?at?pp.?542-544,?547;?Geras?v.?Lafayette?Display?Fixtures,?Inc.?(7th?Cir.?1984)?742?F.2d?1037,?1041-1042.)?Although?some?circuits?have?said?that?when?trial?is?under?the?Federal?Magistrates?Act?(28?U.S.C.???636(b)(3)),?the?act?requires?that?the?waiver?be?express?and?personal?(see?Hall?v.?Sharpe?(11th?Cir.?1987)?812?F.2d?644,?647;?Adams?v.?Heckler?(7th?Cir.?1986)?794?F.2d?303,?307),?recent?authority?from?the?high?court?suggests?that?failure?to?object?may?be?considered?as?consent,?or?at?least?as?waiver?of?the?article?III?claim.?(See?Peretz?v.?United?States?(1991)?501?U.S.?___,?___?[115?L.Ed.2d?808,?822,?111?S.Ct.?2661,?2669].)?In?other?contexts,?too,?consent?may?be?expressed?by?the?litigant’s?conduct.?Thus,?for?example,?in?the?context?of?hearings?before?the?Commodities?[54?Cal.3d?97]?Futures?Trading?Commission,?where?there?is?a?right?to?trial?de?novo,?the?waiver?need?not?be?express,?but?can?be?derived?from?the?conduct?of?the?litigant.?(Commodity?Futures?Trading?Comm’n?v.?Schor,?supra,?478?U.S.?at?p.?849?[92?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?691-692].) [8]?The?California?Constitution,?too,?is?based?on?the?doctrine?of?the?separation?of?powers,?and?preserves?the?fundamental?power?of?the?courts?to?”test?legislative?and?executive?acts?by?the?light?of?constitutional?mandate?and?in?particular?to?preserve?constitutional?rights,?whether?of?individual?or?minority,?from?obliteration?by?the?majority.”?(Bixby?v.?Pierno?(1971)?4?Cal.3d?130,?141?[93?Cal.Rptr.?234,?481?P.2d?242].)?Our?judicial?system?is?grounded?on?the?existence?of?a?nonpartisan,?independent?judiciary,?but?our?state?Constitution,?unlike?the?federal?Constitution,?also?contemplates?in?the?interest?of?judicial?efficiency?that?the?ranks?of?the?regular?judiciary?may?be?extended?from?time?to?time?by?qualified?temporary?judges?who?serve?as?officers?of?the?superior?court.?(See?Estate?of?Kent?(1936)?6?Cal.2d?154,?158?[57?P.2d?901].)fn.?4?This?community?interest?in?judicial?efficiency?is?of?constitutional?magnitude,?and?somewhat?tempers?the?individual’s?interest?in?trial?by?a?regularly?appointed?judge.?This?distinction?between?our?Constitution?and?the?federal?Constitution?persuades?us?that?litigants?lack?the?essential,?personal?interest?in?trial?by?a?regularly?appointed?judge?that?requires?personal?waiver. Petitioner?points?to?the?decision?of?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?in?Gomez?v.?United?States?(1989)?490?U.S.?858?[104?L.Ed.2d?923,?109?S.Ct.?2237],?which?held?under?the?Federal?Magistrates?Act,?a?federal?magistrate?lacks?jurisdiction?to?preside?over?jury?selection?in?a?felony?trial?over?the?defendant’s?objection.?The?court?has?subsequently?explained,?however,?that?under?article?III?of?the?federal?Constitution?and?under?the?act,?a?magistrate?may?conduct?voir?dire?in?a?felony?trial?when?the?defendant?does?not?object?to?the?procedure.?(Peretz?v.?United?States,?supra,?501?U.S.?___,?___?[115?L.Ed.2d?808,?822,?111?S.Ct.?2661,?2669].)?In?the?particular?case,?the?magistrate?secured?counsel’s?verbal?representation?that?the?defendant?consented?to?the?assignment?of?the?magistrate,?but?the?opinion?clearly?suggests?that?a?mere?failure?to?object?would?be?fatal.?(Id.,?at?pp.?___-___?[115?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?821-822,?111?S.Ct.?at?pp.?2668-2669].)?Petitioner?can?take?no?comfort?from?this?case. [2c]?In?conclusion,?in?view?of?our?constitutional?provision?for?trial?by?temporary?judge?by?stipulation,?and?in?view?of?counsel’s?traditional?authority?to?act?for?the?client?in?the?procedural?aspects?of?the?case,?we?are?confident?[54?Cal.3d?98]?that?counsel?can?enter?a?stipulation?to?a?temporary?judge?even?though?the?court?has?not?secured?an?express?waiver?from?the?litigant.?The?original?constitutional?language?referred?to?stipulation?by?an?attorney,?and?the?later?omission?of?this?language?was?not?intended?to?change?the?law.?Regardless?of?the?identity?of?the?judge,?the?defendant?retains?the?basic?right?to?present?a?defense?under?the?same?rule?of?law?applicable?in?any?courtroom?in?the?state.?A?stipulation?to?trial?by?a?court?commissioner?in?no?way?impairs?the?defendant’s?right?to?a?hearing.?(Compare?Linsk?v.?Linsk,?supra,?70?Cal.2d?at?p.?278.)?Just?as?counsel?has?authority?to?decide?whether?to?challenge?a?judge?under?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?170.6?(People?v.?Jackson?(1960)?186?Cal.App.2d?307,?317?[8?Cal.Rptr.?849],?cited?with?approval?in?People?v.?Frierson,?supra,?39?Cal.3d?at?p.?813),?we?think?that?counsel?has?authority?to?enter?the?stipulation?at?issue?here,?without?an?on?the?record?admonition?of?the?defendant,?or?the?defendant’s?express,?on?the?record?waiver?of?the?right.fn.?5 III [9]?Petitioner?argues?that?even?if?an?admonition?and?express?waiver?are?not?required,?neither?his?conduct?nor?that?of?his?attorneys?was?tantamount?to?a?stipulation.?He?relies?on?declarations,?both?his?own?and?those?of?counsel,?denying?any?intent?to?enter?into?a?stipulation,?and?his?own?declaration?that?he?did?not?know?he?had?a?right?to?a?regularly?appointed?judge,?and?would?not?have?stipulated?to?waive?that?right?had?he?known?of?it. Petitioner?argues?that?since?neither?he?nor?counsel?specifically?intended?to?enter?a?stipulation,?none?can?be?found.?We?disagree.?We?have?explained?that?”[u]nder?the?’tantamount?stipulation’?doctrine,?the?parties?confer?judicial?power?not?because?they?thought?in?those?terms;?had?they?done?so,?the?stipulation?presumably?would?be?express.?Rather,?an?implied?stipulation?arises?from?the?parties’?common?intent?that?the?subordinate?officer?hearing?their?case?do?things?which,?in?fact,?can?only?be?done?by?a?judge.”?(In?re?Mark?L.,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?at?p.?179,?fn.?6.)?Here,?it?is?uncontroverted?that?counsel?participated?fully?and?vigorously?in?the?trial,?at?every?point?treating?the?commissioner?as?competent?to?rule?on?matters?which?rest?solely?in?the?discretion?of?a?superior?court?judge.?This?conduct?was?a?tacit?recognition?of,?and?reliance?upon,?the?authority?of?the?commissioner?to?act?as?a?temporary?judge. Petitioner?also?refers?us?to?cases?calling?for?a?knowing?stipulation,?and?argues?that?without?evidence?that?he?knew?he?had?a?right?to?trial?by?a?[54?Cal.3d?99]?regularly?appointed?judge,?there?can?be?no?knowing?stipulation.?An?examination?of?the?cases?exposes?petitioner’s?misunderstanding?of?them.?In?In?re?Frye,?supra,?150?Cal.App.3d?at?page?409,?there?was?no?indication?that?either?counsel?or?the?defendant?in?a?contempt?proceeding?were?aware?that?the?judicial?officer?sitting?on?the?bench?was?a?commissioner?rather?than?a?judge.?In?fact?counsel,?who?practiced?rarely?in?the?particular?superior?court,?was?under?the?impression?that?the?commissioner?was?a?judge.?It?was?in?this?context?that?the?reviewing?court,?in?an?opinion?by?Justice?Kaufman,?held?that?the?constitutional?provision?regarding?temporary?judges?”contemplates?a?knowing?and?voluntary?assent”?that?was?absent?under?the?facts?of?the?case.?Here,?by?contrast,?it?is?uncontroverted?that?both?counsel?and?petitioner?were?aware?that?the?judge?was?a?commissioner;?indeed,?counsel?had?appeared?before?the?same?commissioner?many?times?and?had?always?stipulated?to?his?presiding?in?the?past. Petitioner?also?relies?on?Yetenekian?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?140?Cal.App.3d?361,?where?counsel?announced?”ready,”?under?the?mistaken?impression?that?the?commissioner?was?sitting?only?as?a?master?calendar?court.?The?Court?of?Appeal?found?no?stipulation,?since?counsel?objected?to?the?commissioner’s?authority?as?soon?as?he?realized?that?the?commissioner?proposed?to?try?the?case.?This?case?lends?no?support?to?petitioner’s?position,?however,?since?here?counsel?never?objected?to?trial?by?the?commissioner,?though?they?were?well?aware?that?he?was?a?commissioner?and?that?he?proposed?to?try?the?case. Petitioner?argues?that?he?cannot?be?bound?by?a?stipulation?to?the?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge,?because?he?was?not?”voluntarily?before?the?court,”?but?rather?was?haled?in?involuntarily?as?a?criminal?defendant.?He?refers?to?language?in?In?re?Mark?L.,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?at?page?179,?where?we?distinguished?two?cases?finding?no?stipulation?(People?v.?Tijerina,?supra,?1?Cal.3d?41,?and?Rooney?v.?Vermont?Investment?Corp.,?supra,?10?Cal.3d?351)?on?the?ground?that?”the?party?asserting?the?absence?of?a?stipulation?had?not?initiated?the?disputed?proceeding?and?had?participated?involuntarily.”?We?did?not?suggest?in?Mark?L.,?however,?that?criminal?defendants?were?exempt?from?the?tantamount?stipulation?doctrine.?In?fact?we?cited?with?approval?the?criminal?case?of?People?v.?Oaxaca,?supra,?39?Cal.App.3d?153,?as?representing?an?instance?in?which?the?conduct?of?a?criminal?defendant’s?attorney?was?tantamount?to?a?stipulation?that?a?commissioner?would?act?as?a?temporary?judge.?Far?from?creating?an?exemption?for?criminal?cases,?we?carefully?explained?that?in?Tijerina?the?defendant?was?not?a?willing?participant?because?he?had?requested?a?continuance?of?the?hearing?to?obtain?counsel.?He?was?forced?to?proceed?without?counsel,?so?his?participation?was?not?tantamount?to?a?stipulation?to?trial?by?a?temporary?judge.?(In?re?Mark?L.,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?[54?Cal.3d?100]?at?p.?179.)?The?same?distinction?from?Tijerina?was?offered?by?the?court?in?People?v.?Oaxaca,?supra,?39?Cal.App.3d?at?pages?162-163.?We?explained?our?decision?in?Rooney,?that?there?had?been?no?stipulation?by?conduct?of?the?parties?in?a?confession?of?judgment?case,?on?the?grounds?that?”?’defendants?[there]?were?not?notified?of?any?date?of?hearing?and?were?not?present?at?the?presentation?to?the?commissioner?of?plaintiffs’?application?for?entry?of?the?judgment.’?”?(In?re?Mark?L.,?supra,?34?Cal.3d?at?p.?179.) Here,?petitioner?was?represented?by?counsel?who?willingly?participated?in?the?trial?on?petitioner’s?behalf.?This?is?not?a?case?like?Tijerina,?where?the?defendant?was?forced?over?protest?to?represent?himself?in?a?proceeding?he?was?trying?to?postpone.?Nor?is?it?a?case?like?Rooney,?where?the?defendants?not?only?did?not?participate,?they?lacked?notice?of?the?proceedings,?and?thus?could?not?be?held?to?have?stipulated.?Here?petitioner,?through?his?counsel,?participated?in?a?lengthy?trial?presided?over?by?a?person?known?to?all?parties?as?a?court?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge.?Counsel?never?objected?to?proceeding?before?the?commissioner;?the?first?objection?came?in?this?collateral?attack?on?the?judgment.?Further,?counsel?evinced?every?intention?of?securing?petitioner’s?personal?written?stipulation?to?trial?by?the?commissioner;?that?through?some?oversight?they?failed?to?do?so?does?not?change?the?meaning?of?their?conduct.?They?knowingly?presented?their?motions,?objections,?and?arguments?to?the?commissioner,?treating?him?in?every?respect?as?a?judge?of?the?superior?court,?vested?with?the?authority?to?make?binding?rulings?in?a?trial?involving?the?most?serious?of?criminal?charges.?This?conduct,?we?think,?satisfied?the?constitutional?requirement?that?a?temporary?judge?may?be?authorized?to?try?a?cause?on?the?stipulation?of?the?parties?litigant. IV Petitioner?argues?finally?that?the?commissioner’s?exercise?of?jurisdiction?over?his?capital?trial?without?any?express?stipulation?to?the?commissioner’s?authority?violates?defendant’s?state?and?federal?constitutional?rights?to?due?process,?equal?protection,?a?fair?trial,?and?reliable?capital?trial?proceedings.?This?argument?is?presented?in?the?most?summary?terms?and?is?not?supported?by?any?analysis.?We?fail?to?see?how?trial?by?a?commissioner?under?a?tantamount?stipulation?violates?these?rights,?since?the?commissioner?takes?on?the?mantle?of?a?regularly?appointed?superior?court?judge?in?presiding?over?the?trial?and?applies?all?the?usual?rules?and?procedures?applicable?in?such?a?proceeding.?Unless?all?trials?by?commissioner?are?unconstitutional?under?the?federal?Constitution-an?argument?petitioner?does?not?make-there?seems?to?[54?Cal.3d?101]?be?no?basis?for?questioning?the?authority?of?a?commissioner?sitting?as?a?temporary?judge?under?conduct?tantamount?to?a?stipulation?to?try?a?capital?case.?The?order?to?show?cause?is?discharged?and?the?petition?for?writ?of?habeas?corpus?is?denied. Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?J.,?Kennard,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?and?Baxter,?J.,?concurred. MOSK,?J. I?dissent. Defense?counsel?stated?in?open?court?that?they?would?obtain?defendant’s?signature?on?a?stipulation?form?to?permit?the?court?commissioner?to?try?this?capital?case.fn.?1?They?never?did.?Neglecting?to?check?the?file,?the?commissioner?apparently?believed?a?signed?stipulation?was?in?the?file.?It?was?not.?Defendant?made?it?clear?in?open?court?that?he?had?not?signed?a?stipulation.?He?was?ignored.?Despite?those?crucial?omissions,?the?majority?approve?of?one?who?is?not?a?superior?court?judge?hearing?a?capital?case?and?imposing?a?death?sentence.?This?cannot?be?condoned. […]

People?v.?Tilbury?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?56?,?284?Cal.Rptr.?288;?813?P.2d?1318 [No.?S012984.?Aug?1,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?MICHAEL?GORDON?TILBURY,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Orange?County,?No.?C-?53835,?Kathleen?E.?O’Leary,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Panelli,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Broussard,?Arabian?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinions?by?Mosk?and?Kennard,?JJ.) COUNSEL Charles?R.?Khoury,?Jr.,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. Jean?F.?Matulis,?Joseph?A.?Ragazzo?and?Stacy?C.?Mickell?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendant?and?Appellant.?[54?Cal.3d?59] John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Steve?White?and?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Harley?D.?Mayfield,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Frederick?R.?Millar,?Jr.,?Robert?M.?Foster,?Jay?M.?Bloom?and?Janelle?B.?Davis,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION PANELLI,?J. The?question?before?us?is?whether?appellant,?who?has?been?found?not?guilty?by?reason?of?insanity?and?committed?to?a?state?hospital,?is?entitled?to?a?jury?trial?on?the?issue?of?his?eligibility?for?placement?in?a?community?mental?health?program?as?a?supervised?outpatient.?(See?Pen.?Code,???1026.2,?subd.?(e).)fn.?1?The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?appellant?was?entitled?to?a?jury?trial.?We?reverse. Facts?and?Procedural?Background On?April?4,?1984,?appellant?Michael?Gordon?Tilbury?went?on?a?shooting?spree?with?a?.22-caliber?rifle.?Insane,?he?believed?that?he?was?being?persecuted?by?secret?organizations,?bombarded?with?microwaves,?and?poisoned?with?drugs?in?the?water?supply.?During?this?episode?Tilbury?shot?at?and?tried?to?kill?several?persons,?including?police?officers.?Fortunately,?he?injured?only?one?person. On?January?28,?1985,?following?treatment?to?restore?his?competence?to?stand?trial?(???1370,?1372),?Tilbury?pled?guilty?to?six?counts?of?attempted?murder,?three?counts?of?assault?with?a?firearm,?and?three?counts?of?assaulting?police?officers?with?a?firearm,?and?admitted?one?enhancement?for?inflicting?great?bodily?injury.?Pursuant?to?the?plea?bargain?Tilbury?waived?his?right?to?a?jury?trial?on?the?issue?of?sanity?(??1026,?subd.?(a))?and?submitted?that?question?to?the?court.?Based?upon?psychiatric?reports,?the?court?found?that?Tilbury?was?insane?at?the?time?of?the?offenses?and,?thus,?not?guilty?by?reason?of?insanity.?(Ibid.)?On?March?19,?1985,?after?additional?psychiatric?evaluation?(??1026,?subd.?(b)),?the?court?determined?that?Tilbury?had?not?fully?recovered?his?sanity?and?committed?him?to?Patton?State?Hospital?for?a?maximum?term?of?23?years?and?8?months.?(??1026.1,?subd.?(b).) In?October?1987,?following?the?required?minimum?commitment?period?of?180?days?(??1602,?subd.?(a)),?the?director?of?Patton?State?Hospital?[54?Cal.3d?60]?recommended?that?Tilbury?be?placed?on?outpatient?status?pursuant?to?section?1603.?Because?the?county?mental?health?director?did?not?advise?the?court?that?Tilbury?would?benefit?from?that?status?(??1602,?subd.?(a)(2)),?the?court?disapproved?outpatient?status?as?it?was?required?to?do.?(??1601,?subd.?(a).)?The?hospital?director?recommended?outpatient?placement?again?in?April?and?October?1987.?For?the?same?reasons,?the?court?denied?the?recommendations.?None?of?these?hearings?were?pursuant?to?section?1026.2. In?December?1987,?Tilbury?applied?for?supervised?outpatient?placement?on?his?own?behalf?(??1026.2,?subd.?(a))?and?requested?a?jury?trial.?Tilbury’s?counsel?argued?that?he?was?entitled?to?a?jury?under?In?re?Franklin?(1972)?7?Cal.3d?126?[101?Cal.Rptr.?553,?496?P.2d?465],?in?which?we?held?under?a?former?statute?that?juries?were?required?at?hearings?on?unconditional?release.?The?trial?court?denied?the?request?based?on?Barnes?v.?Superior?Court?(1986)?186?Cal.App.3d?969?[231?Cal.Rptr.?158],?in?which?the?Court?of?Appeal?held?under?the?current?statute?that?juries?were?not?required?at?placement?hearings. At?the?ensuing?placement?hearing,?for?which?the?court?did?not?empanel?a?jury,?Tilbury?testified?that?he?had?recently?experienced?a?delusion?similar?to?that?which?preceded?his?1984?shooting?spree.?Based?on?Tilbury’s?testimony?and?on?the?reports?of?psychiatrists,?the?county?mental?health?department,?and?the?state?hospital,?the?court?denied?Tilbury’s?application.?On?appeal,?the?Court?of?Appeal?reversed?and?remanded?for?a?jury?trial. Discussion [1]?A?person?who?has?been?found?not?guilty?by?reason?of?insanity?and?committed?to?a?state?hospital?must?spend?one?year?under?supervision?as?an?outpatient?in?a?community?mental?health?program?before?applying?for?a?trial?to?declare?the?restoration?of?sanity?and?thereby?to?obtain?unconditional?release.?(??1026.2,?subd.?(e),?operative?until?Jan.?1,?1994.)?We?held?in?In?re?Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?126,?148-?149?(Franklin),?that?equal?protection?principles?entitled?a?committed?person?to?a?jury?at?the?sanity-restoration?trial.?At?the?time?we?decided?Franklin,?however,?the?statute?did?not?require?a?term?of?outpatient?treatment?as?a?prerequisite?to?unconditional?release.?(See?former???1026a,?renumbered?as???1026.2?and?amended?by?Stats.?1979,?ch.?1114,???2,?p.?4051.)?The?question?now?before?us?is?whether?the?committed?person?is?also?entitled?to?a?jury?at?the?first-stage?hearing?on?outpatient?placement. Statutory?Interpretation We?consider?the?question?initially?as?a?matter?of?statutory?interpretation.?The?relevant?statute?does?not?purport?to?give?a?committed?person?the?right?to?[54?Cal.3d?61]?a?jury?at?the?hearing?on?outpatient?placement.?Instead,?the?statute?provides?that?”[t]he?court?shall?hold?a?hearing?to?determine?if?the?person?applying?for?restoration?of?sanity?would?no?longer?be?a?danger?to?the?health?and?safety?of?others,?including?himself?or?herself,?if?under?supervision?and?treatment?in?the?community.?If?the?court?at?the?hearing?determines?the?applicant?[meets?this?standard],?the?court?shall?order?the?applicant?placed?with?an?appropriate?local?mental?health?program?for?one?year.”?(??1026.2,?subd.?(e),?italics?added.)fn.?2?If?the?Legislature?had?intended?to?require?juries?at?placement?hearings,?it?knew?how?to?say?so?clearly.?In?the?same?statutory?scheme?the?Legislature?expressly?provided?for?juries?at?the?sanity?phase?of?criminal?trials?(??1026,?subd.?(a))fn.?3?and?at?hearings?to?recommit?at?the?end?of?the?maximum?term?(??1026.5,?subd.?(b)(4)).fn.?4 Even?though?the?Legislature?did?not?expressly?provide?for?jury?trials?on?the?issue?of?outpatient?placement,?Tilbury?advances?two?arguments?to?show?that?it?did?so?implicitly.?Neither?argument?is?persuasive. First,?Tilbury?argues?that?the?statutory?term?”hearing”?actually?means?”jury?trial.”?Tilbury?bases?this?argument?on?Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?126,?in?which?we?held?that?a?committed?person?was?entitled?to?a?jury?at?the?[54?Cal.3d?62]?sanity-restoration?hearing?described?in?former?section?1026a.fn.?5?The?former?statute?referred?to?that?proceeding?simply?as?a?”hearing,”?without?expressly?requiring?a?jury.fn.?6?In?1984,?many?years?after?the?Franklin?decision,?the?Legislature?amended?the?statute?to?require?that?a?committed?person?spend?one?year?as?a?supervised?outpatient?before?applying?for?a?sanity-restoration?hearing.?(??1026.2,?subd.?(e),?added?by?Stats.?1984,?ch.?1416,???1,?p.?4983.)?Like?the?statute?we?interpreted?in?Franklin,?the?1984?amendment?once?again?uses?the?generic?term?”hearing,”?but?this?time?to?refer?to?the?newly?required?proceeding?on?the?committed?person’s?application?for?outpatient?placement.?Consequently,?to?complete?Tilbury’s?argument,?we?should?give?a?similar?interpretation?to?similar?language. The?defect?in?this?argument?is?that?Franklin?mandated?juries?at?sanity-restoration?hearings?solely?on?equal?protection?grounds,?without?regard?to?statutory?language?or?legislative?intent.?(See?Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?at?pp.?148-149.)?We?did?not?hold?that?the?term?”hearing”?meant,?or?was?intended?to?mean,?”jury?trial.” Second,?Tilbury?argues?that?we?can?infer?a?legislative?intent?to?provide?juries?at?placement?hearings?without?regard?to?the?statutory?language?because?the?Legislature?was?aware?of?Franklin?at?the?time?it?amended?the?statute?to?require?such?hearings.?However,?the?legislators’?awareness?of?Franklin?logically?suggests?no?more?than?that?they?took?it?for?granted?juries?would?continue?to?be?required?at?sanity-restoration?hearings.?This?was?all?that?Franklin?held. Accordingly,?there?is?no?good?reason?to?believe?that?the?Legislature?actually?intended?to?require?jury?trials?on?the?issue?of?outpatient?placement.?This?conclusion?is?consistent?with?the?purpose?of?the?1984?amendment,?which?was?to?make?the?requirements?for?release?”stricter”?and?to?”prevent?premature?release.”?(See?Sen.?Com.?on?Judiciary,?Rep.?on?Sen.?Bill?No.?1984?(1983-1984?Reg.?Sess.)?(1984)?pp.?1,?2;?Assem.?Com.?on?Crim.?Law?and?[54?Cal.3d?63]?Public?Safety,?Rep.?on?Sen.?Bill?No.?1984?(1983-1984?Reg.?Sess.)?(1984)?p.?3.)?In?light?of?these?purposes,?it?is?far?more?reasonable?to?view?the?Legislature’s?imposition?of?a?qualifying?period?as?a?reaction?to?Franklin?rather?than?as?an?effort?to?require?jury?trials?at?an?earlier?phase?of?the?release?process.?Franklin’s?effect,?until?the?1984?amendment,?was?to?require?jury?trials?every?year?upon?demand,?no?matter?how?hopeless?the?case?for?unconditional?release.?After?the?1984?amendment,?a?committed?person?must?first?carry?the?lesser?burden?of?demonstrating?that?he?is?no?longer?a?danger?to?self?or?others?while?”under?supervision?and?treatment?in?the?community.”?(??1026.2,?subd.?(e).) Equal?Protection [2]?Because?the?relevant?statute?does?not?give?Tilbury?the?right?to?a?jury?trial,?we?must?address?the?further?question?whether?constitutional?law?gives?him?that?right.?Tilbury?claims?that?equal?protection?principles?entitle?him?to?a?jury?because?a?person?committed?civilly?would?be?entitled?to?a?jury?under?similar?circumstances. To?address?Tilbury’s?claim,?we?briefly?review?the?criminal?and?civil?commitment?schemes.?When?a?criminal?defendant?pleads?not?guilty?by?reason?of?insanity,?the?finder?of?fact?must?determine?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence?whether?the?defendant?was?insane?at?the?time?of?the?offense.?(??1026,?subd.?(a);?see?Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?at?pp.?147-148.)?It?is?the?defendant?who?must?raise?the?defense?and?who?bears?the?burden?of?proof.?(??1026,?subd.?(a);?see?People?v.?Baker?(1954)?42?Cal.2d?550,?564?[268?P.2d?705];?People?v.?Daugherty?(1953)?40?Cal.2d?876,?901?[256?P.2d?911].)?If?the?defendant?succeeds?in?proving?his?insanity?at?the?time?of?the?offense,?commitment?follows?unless?the?court?determines?that?the?defendant?has?fully?recovered?his?sanity.?(??1026,?subds.?(a),?(b).)?The?maximum?term?of?commitment?is?equal?to?the?longest?term?of?imprisonment?which?could?have?been?imposed?for?the?offenses?of?which?the?defendant?was?convicted.?(??1026.5,?subd.?(a)(1).)?If?the?state?at?the?end?of?the?maximum?term?wishes?to?continue?the?commitment,?it?must?bear?the?burden?of?proving,?in?a?jury?trial,?that?the?defendant?”by?reason?of?a?mental?disease,?defect,?or?disorder?represents?a?substantial?danger?of?physical?harm?to?others.”?(??1026.5,?subd.?(b).)?Any?ensuing?recommitment?is?for?two?years?only,?and?additional?recommitments?require?additional?jury?trials.?(??1026.5,?subd.?(b)(6),?(8).) Of?course,?a?defendant?who?recovers?his?sanity?need?not?remain?confined?for?the?maximum?term.?Release?is?possible?at?any?time?following?a?mandatory,?180-day?commitment?period?(??1026.2,?subd.?(d))?if?the?defendant?demonstrates?his?fitness?for?release,?first?by?successfully?completing?one?year?under?supervision?in?a?community?mental?health?program?and?then?in?a?sanity-restoration?trial.?(??1026.2.?subd.?(e).)?[54?Cal.3d?64] The?procedure?for?involuntary?civil?commitments?is?set?out?in?the?Lanterman-Petris-Short?Act.?(Welf.?&?Inst.?Code,???5000?et?seq.)?The?process?leading?to?commitment?ordinarily?begins?with?a?72-hour?period?of?intensive?treatment?and?evaluation.?(Id.,????5150,?5170,?5200,?5206.)?At?the?conclusion?of?the?72-hour?period,?the?professional?in?charge?of?the?treatment?facility?and?one?other?physician?or?psychologist?may?certify?the?person?for?an?additional?14?days?of?intensive?treatment.?(Id.,???5250?et?seq.)?Judicial?review?of?the?14-day?certification?is?permitted?before?a?commissioner,?referee,?or?certification?review?officer.?(Id.,????5254,?5256.1.)?Review?is?also?possible?through?the?writ?of?habeas?corpus.?(Id.,???5254.1.)?The?right?to?a?jury?trial?attaches?only?when?there?is?a?petition?to?extend?treatment?beyond?14?days,?or?to?establish?a?conservatorship?for?a?gravely?disabled?person.?(Id.,????5300-5303.1,?5350,?subd.?(d).)fn.?7?A?commitment?for?involuntary?treatment?automatically?terminates?in?180?days?(id.,???5304,?subd.?(b))?and?a?conservatorship?in?one?year?(id.,???5361).?The?continuance?of?a?commitment?or?conservatorship?past?the?end?of?the?designated?term?requires?an?additional?petition?and?jury?trial,?if?one?is?demanded.?(Id.,????5304,?subd.?(b),?5361,?5362,?subd.?(b).)fn.?8 A?civil?committee?or?gravely?disabled?conservatee?does?not?have?the?right?to?a?jury?trial?on?the?question?of?his?eligibility?for?release?prior?to?the?end?of?the?designated?term.?However,?both?may?invoke?the?writ?of?habeas?corpus.?(Welf.?&?Inst.?Code,????5254.1,?5358.7,?7250.)?A?gravely?disabled?conservatee,?in?addition,?may?petition?the?court?for?a?rehearing?as?to?his?status?(id.,???5364)?but?is?not?entitled?to?a?jury?at?that?hearing.?(Baber?v.?Superior?Court?(1980)?113?Cal.App.3d?955,?960-965?[170?Cal.Rptr.?353].) To?summarize,?civil?and?criminal?commitments?each?begin?with?a?jury?trial,?after?any?emergency?treatment?or?pretrial?detention.?In?the?civil?context,?the?jury?trial?is?the?hearing?on?the?petition?for?involuntary?commitment?or?to?establish?a?conservatorship.?In?the?criminal?context,?the?jury?trial?is?the?sanity?phase?of?the?criminal?trial.?In?addition,?both?civil?and?criminal?committees?are?entitled?to?juries?at?the?conclusion?of?the?designated?term?of?commitment?if?there?is?a?petition?to?recommit.?Thus,?the?difference?between?the?civil?and?criminal?schemes?is?not?the?committed?person’s?right?to?a?jury?trial?but?the?amount?of?time?before?recommitment?is?required.?A?civil?commitment?automatically?terminates?after?180?days,?and?a?conservatorship?after?one?year.?A?criminal?commitment?automatically?terminates?at?the?end?of?the?variable?maximum?term?unless,?of?course,?the?defendant?has?already?demonstrated?his?sanity.?[54?Cal.3d?65] In?Jones?v.?United?States?(1983)?463?U.S.?354?[77?L.Ed.2d?694,?103?S.Ct.?3043]?(Jones),?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?upheld?the?District?of?Columbia’s?substantially?similar?criminal?commitment?procedures.?As?in?California,?commitment?in?the?District?of?Columbia?followed?the?verdict?of?insanity?at?the?time?of?the?offense?and?the?court’s?determination?that?the?defendant?had?not?recovered?his?sanity.?Also?as?in?California,?the?committed?person?was?entitled?to?a?review?of?his?present?sanity?shortly?after?commitment,?although?not?by?a?jury.?(Id.,?at?pp.?356-359?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?700-702];?cf.????1026,?subd.?(a),?1026.2,?subds.?(d),?(e).) The?committed?person?in?Jones?challenged?the?District?of?Columbia’s?procedures?as?violative?of?due?process?and?equal?protection.?He?claimed?that?the?verdict?of?insanity?at?the?time?of?the?offense?did?not?provide?a?constitutionally?sufficient?basis?for?commitment.?(463?U.S.?at?p.?363?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?704-705].)?Based?upon?his?assumption?that?the?verdict?did?not?provide?a?sufficient?basis?for?commitment,?Jones?also?claimed?that?equal?protection?principles?entitled?him?to?a?jury?at?a?mandatory?hearing?50?days?after?confinement?because?civil?committees?were?entitled?to?a?jury?trial?upon?commitment.?(Id.,?at?p.?362,?fn.?10?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?704].) Rejecting?Jones’s?due?process?challenge,?the?high?court?held?that?the?verdict?of?insanity?adequately?supported?the?presumption?that?insanity?continues:?”[A]?finding?of?not?guilty?by?reason?of?insanity?is?a?sufficient?foundation?for?commitment?of?an?insanity?acquittee?for?the?purposes?of?treatment?and?the?protection?of?society.”?(Jones,?supra,?463?U.S.?at?p.?366?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?706].)?Moreover,?the?permissible?duration?of?confinement?need?not?be?limited?by?the?term?of?the?hypothetical?criminal?sentence.?”[W]hen?a?criminal?defendant?establishes?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence?that?he?is?not?guilty?of?a?crime?by?reason?of?insanity,?the?Constitution?permits?the?Government,?on?the?basis?of?the?insanity?judgment,?to?confine?him?to?a?mental?institution?until?such?time?as?he?has?regained?his?sanity?or?is?no?longer?a?danger?to?himself?or?society.”?(Id.,?at?p.?370?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?709].) The?high?court’s?rejection?of?Jones’s?due?process?challenge?logically?compelled?the?rejection?of?his?equal?protection?challenge,?as?well.?Jones?argued?that?equal?protection?entitled?him?to?a?jury?at?the?mandatory?hearing?50?days?after?commitment?because?a?civil?committee?would?have?been?entitled?to?a?jury?at?the?time?of?commitment.?However,?since?the?criminal?commitment?was?based?on?the?verdict?of?insanity?in?the?criminal?trial,?and?since?that?procedure?satisfied?due?process,?it?followed?that?”the?relevant?equal?protection?comparison?concern[ed]?the?procedures?available?at?the?criminal?trial?and?at?a?civil-commitment?hearing.”?(Jones,?supra,?463?U.S.?at?p.?362,?fn.?10?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?704].)?Because?Jones?had?received?a?jury?trial?at?the?sanity?phase?of?the?criminal?trial,?equal?protection?was?satisfied.?(Ibid.?[?77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?704].)?[54?Cal.3d?66] Our?reasoning?in?Franklin?is?partly?consistent?with?Jones?and?partly?inconsistent.?One?of?the?questions?before?us?in?Franklin?was?whether?the?required?waiting?period?between?the?verdict?of?insanity?in?the?criminal?trial?and?the?first?release?hearing?was?constitutional.fn.?9?As?the?high?court?would?later?recognize?in?Jones,?we?recognized?that?the?verdict?of?insanity?at?the?criminal?trial?supported?”a?presumption?of?continued?insanity.”?(Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?at?p.?141,?fn.?9.)?We?reasoned?that?”?’commitment?without?a?hearing?[on?present?sanity]?is?permissible?for?the?period?required?to?determine?present?mental?condition.?The?jury’s?finding?of?a?reasonable?doubt?as?to?defendant’s?sanity?at?the?time?of?the?offense?provides?sufficient?warrant?for?further?examination.’?”?(Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?at?p.?142,?quoting?Ragsdale?v.?Overholser?(D.C.?Cir.?1960)?281?F.2d?943,?948,?italics?omitted.)?In?other?words,?because?”the?defendant?[has]?had?the?burden?of?proving?his?insanity?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence,”?”it?is?reasonable?to?presume?…?that?defendant’s?insanity,?established?by?a?preponderance?of?the?evidence,?has?continued?to?the?date?of?trial?[on?present?sanity,?i.e.,?the?release?hearing].”?(Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?at?p.?141,?fn.?deleted.) This?much?of?the?Franklin?opinion?is?entirely?consistent?with?Jones.?So?also,?we?assume,?is?our?explicit?assumption?in?Franklin?that?”California’s?initial?commitment?procedures?are?valid?only?because?the?person?committed?has?a?reasonable?opportunity?to?obtain?his?release.”?(Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?at?p.?145.)?Because?an?insanity?acquittee?is?entitled?to?a?hearing?on?outpatient?placement?180?days?after?commitment,?here,?as?in?Jones,?”there?is?assurance?that?every?acquittee?has?prompt?opportunity?to?obtain?release?if?he?has?recovered.”?(Jones,?supra,?463?U.S.?at?p.?366?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?706].)fn.?10 Franklin?differs?from?Jones,?however,?in?holding?that?postjudgment?hearings?on?present?mental?sanity?must?be?conducted?before?juries.?In?Franklin?we?”found?no?sufficient?reason?why?[an?insanity?acquittee’s]?status?necessarily?must?deny?him?the?jury?hearing?available?to?other?persons?committed?to?state?hospitals.”?(Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?at?p.?148;?see?Jones,?supra,?463?U.S.?at?pp.?364-366?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?pp.?705-706].)?We?then?proceeded?to?[54?Cal.3d?67]?compare?California’s?criminal?release?statute?with?various?civil?commitment?and?recommitment?statutes.?(Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?at?p.?148,?citing?Welf.?&?Inst.?Code,????1800-1803?[California?Youth?Authority?wards],?5302?[persons?committed?for?involuntary?treatment],?5350?[gravely?disabled?conservatees];?see?ante,?pp.?63-64.)?Because?persons?committed?civilly?were?entitled?to?juries?at?commitment?and?recommitment?hearings?under?those?statutes,?we?held?that?equal?protection?also?required?juries?at?criminal?release?hearings.?(Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?at?p.?148.) Some?history?is?necessary?to?put?the?18-year-old?Franklin?holding?into?context.?The?statutes?in?effect?in?1973?did?not?provide?for?a?hearing?before?a?jury?at?any?time?after?the?determination?of?insanity?at?the?criminal?trial.?(See?former????1026,?1026a;?Stats.?1935,?ch.?318,????1,?2,?pp.?1075-1076,?as?amended?by?Stats.?1957,?ch.?1766,???1,?p.?3160.)?In?1979,?responding?to?criticism?by?this?court,?the?Legislature?amended?the?law?to?require?that?an?insanity?acquittee?be?either?released?or?recommitted?at?the?end?of?a?designated,?maximum?term.?The?maximum?term?is?equal?to?the?longest?term?of?imprisonment?which?could?have?been?imposed?for?the?offenses?that?the?person?committed.?(??1026.5,?added?by?Stats.?1979,?ch.?1114,???3,?pp.?4051-4053;?see?In?re?Moye?(1978)?22?Cal.3d?457?[149?Cal.Rptr.?491,?584?P.2d?1097]?[requiring?recommitment?of?insanity?acquittees?under?civil?commitment?procedures?at?the?end?of?the?maximum?term?provided?for?the?underlying?offense].)?If?the?state?wishes?to?recommit?at?the?expiration?of?the?maximum?term,?it?must?prove?in?a?jury?trial?that?the?defendant,?by?reason?of?a?mental?disease,?defect,?or?disorder,?continues?to?represent?a?substantial?danger?of?physical?harm?to?others.?(??1026.5,?subd.?(b).)?Thus,?the?current?statute?shifts?to?the?state?at?the?end?of?the?maximum?term?the?burden?of?proving?that?confinement?continues?to?be?necessary. These?changes?in?the?law?since?Franklin,?as?well?as?the?high?court’s?decision?in?Jones,?make?it?unnecessary?to?require?a?jury?in?every?postjudgment?hearing?on?present?mental?sanity?when?the?defendant?has?pled?and?proved?his?own?insanity?at?the?criminal?trial?before?a?jury,?if?one?was?demanded.?Even?though?success?at?the?placement?hearing?is?a?prerequisite?to?eventual?release,?equal?protection?does?not?give?a?criminal?committee?the?right?to?a?jury?at?such?hearings?because?civil?committees?likewise?do?not?have?the?right?to?juries?at?release?hearings,?which?in?the?civil?context?take?the?form?of?habeas?corpus?proceedings?or?court?hearings?to?reconsider?a?gravely?disabled?conservatee’s?status.?(See?ante,?pp.?63-65.)?In?Franklin,?as?already?mentioned,?we?made?a?different?comparison:?we?compared?criminal?release?procedures?with?civil?commitment?and?recommitment?procedures.?(See?Franklin,?supra,?7?Cal.3d?at?p.?148,?and?the?statutes?cited?therein.)?However,?the?correct?comparison?is?articulated?in?Jones:?When?a?defendant’s?commitment?is?based?on?the?judgment?of?insanity?at?the?criminal?trial,?”the?relevant?[54?Cal.3d?68]?equal?protection?comparison?concerns?the?procedures?available?at?the?criminal?trial?and?at?a?civil-commitment?hearing.”?(Jones,?supra,?463?U.S.?at?p.?362,?fn.?10?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?704],?italics?added.) Because?criminal?and?civil?committees?enjoy?the?right?to?jury?trials?at?the?same?stages?of?the?commitment?process,?equal?protection?is?not?offended.?Although?the?law?treats?insanity?acquittees?differently?with?respect?to?the?amount?of?time?before?recommitment?is?required,?differences?in?criminal?and?civil?commitment?procedures?need?only?be?justified?by?a?rational?basis.?(See?Jones,?supra,?463?U.S.?at?p.?362,?fn.?10?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?704];?Buthy?v.?NY?Com’r?of?Office?of?Mental?Health?(2d?Cir.?1987)?818?F.2d?1046,?1049;?Benham?v.?Ledbetter?(11th?Cir.?1986)?785?F.2d?1480,?1485.)?Such?differences?reflect?”the?widely?and?reasonably?held?view?that?insanity?acquittees?constitute?a?special?class?that?should?be?treated?differently?from?other?candidates?for?commitment.”?(Jones,?supra,?463?U.S.?at?p.?370?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?709].)?The?rational?basis?for?California’s?different?treatment?of?insanity?acquittees?is?that?such?a?person?initiates?the?commitment?process?himself?by?pleading?and?proving?that?mental?illness?has?led?him?to?commit?a?crime.?These?circumstances?substantially?reduce?the?risk?of?erroneous?commitment,?or?commitment?for?harmless,?abnormal?behavior,?that?justifies?the?need?for?frequent?recommitment?hearings?in?the?civil?context. There?is?no?need?in?this?case?to?reconsider?Franklin’s?holding?that?a?criminally?committed?person?is?entitled?to?a?jury?at?the?sanity-?restoration?trial.?Since?the?Legislature?was?aware?of?that?holding?at?the?time?it?amended?the?statute?and?made?no?effort?to?abrogate?it,?we?assume?that?juries?at?sanity-restoration?hearings?have?become?part?of?California’s?current?statutory?scheme.?In?view?of?Jones,?however,?there?is?no?reason?to?extend?Franklin’s?holding?to?the?first-stage?hearing?on?outpatient?placement. Due?Process [3a]?Nor?does?due?process?entitle?Tilbury?to?a?jury?at?the?outpatient-placement?hearing.?There?is,?of?course,?no?doubt?that?criminal?commitment?procedures?must?satisfy?due?process.?”?'[C]ommitment?for?any?purpose?constitutes?a?significant?deprivation?of?liberty?that?requires?due?process?protection.’?”?(Jones,?supra,?463?U.S.?at?p.?361?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?703],?quoting?Addington?v.?Texas?(1979)?441?U.S.?418,?425?[60?L.Ed.2d?323,?330-331,?99?S.Ct.?1804].)?However,?due?process?does?not?call?for?the?same?procedures?in?every?situation.?Instead,?”?'[d]ue?process?is?flexible?and?calls?for?such?procedural?protections?as?the?particular?situation?demands.’?”?(Jones,?supra,?463?U.S.?at?p.?367?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?707],?quoting?Morrissey?v.?Brewer?(1972)?408?U.S.?471,?481?[33?L.Ed.2d?484,?494,?92?S.Ct.?2593].)?[54?Cal.3d?69] [4]?In?determining?whether?a?particular?set?of?procedural?safeguards?is?adequate,?it?has?become?traditional?to?weigh?several?factors:?”[F]irst,?the?private?interest?that?will?be?affected?by?the?official?action;?second,?the?risk?of?an?erroneous?deprivation?of?such?interest?through?the?procedures?used,?and?the?probable?value,?if?any,?of?additional?or?substitute?safeguards;?and?finally,?the?Government’s?interest,?including?the?function?involved?and?the?fiscal?and?administrative?burdens?that?the?additional?or?substitute?procedural?requirement?would?entail.”?(Mathews?v.?Eldridge?(1976)?424?U.S.?319,?335?[47?L.Ed.2d?18,?33,?96?S.Ct.?893];?see?also?Zinermon?v.?Burch?(1990)494?U.S.?113?[108?L.Ed.2d?100,?115?110?S.Ct.?975].) [3b]?Consideration?of?these?three?factors?does?not?lead?to?the?conclusion?that?due?process?requires?the?state?to?provide?juries?at?placement?hearings.?First,?the?involvement?of?a?liberty?interest?does?not?by?itself?implicate?the?right?to?a?jury.?Juries?have?not?been?found?necessary?in?other?proceedings?that?can?result?in?deprivations?of?liberty.?(E.g.,?Morrissey?v.?Brewer,?supra,?408?U.S.?471,?488-489?[33?L.Ed.2d?484,?498-499]?[stating?the?minimum?requirements?of?due?process?in?parole?revocation?hearings];?McKeiver?v.?Pennsylvania?(1971)?403?U.S.?528,?541-551?[29?L.Ed.2d?647,?658-664,?91?S.Ct.?1976]?[the?due?process?clause?of?the?Fourteenth?Amendment,?incorporating?the?Sixth?Amendment,?does?not?require?juries?in?juvenile?court?proceedings];?Baldwin?v.?New?York?(1970)?399?U.S.?66,?68-74?[26?L.Ed.2d?437,?439-443,?90?S.Ct.?1886]?[the?same?is?true?in?trials?of?petty?offenses].)?Instead,?the?importance?of?the?insanity?acquittee’s?liberty?interest?is?reflected?by?such?a?person’s?right?to?the?substantial?procedural?safeguards?associated?with?trials,?including,?among?other?things,?the?right?to?counsel,?to?a?detached?and?neutral?judicial?officer,?to?present?evidence,?and?to?cross-examine?adverse?witnesses.?(See???1026.2,?subd.?(e)?[the?hearing?on?unconditional?release?is?a?”trial”?before?the?superior?court].) Second,?there?is?no?reason?to?believe?that?a?jury’s?decision?on?outpatient?placement?would?be?more?reliable?than?a?judge’s.?The?decision?to?be?made?is?whether?”the?applicant?will?not?be?a?danger?to?the?health?and?safety?of?others,?including?himself?or?herself,?while?under?supervision?and?treatment?in?the?community.”?(??1026.2,?subd.?(e).)?Juries?have?no?more?expertise?in?predicting?future?dangerousness?than?judges.?Moreover,?in?the?event?of?an?erroneous?decision?the?committed?person?has?recourse?to?the?writ?of?habeas?corpus?and?to?direct?appeal?(see?Code?Civ.?Proc.,???904.1,?subd.?(b)),?which?are?the?same?mechanisms?that?ensure?the?reliability?of?jury?verdicts. Third,?the?state?has?an?obvious?and?valid?interest?in?avoiding?the?cost?of?unnecessary?jury?trials.?On?this?point,?it?is?well?to?bear?in?mind?that?Franklin’s?effect?was?to?require?the?state?to?provide?jury?trials?every?year?upon?demand,?even?for?a?committed?person?who?could?not?reasonably?hope?[54?Cal.3d?70]?to?prove?that?he?would?no?longer?be?a?danger?to?self?or?others.?The?current?statute?mitigates?this?unnecessary?burden?by?requiring?a?committed?person?first?to?demonstrate?that?he?would?not?be?dangerous?to?self?or?others?”while?under?supervision?and?treatment?in?the?community.”?(??1026.2,?subd.?(e).)?A?person?who?cannot?satisfy?this?lower?standard?cannot,?by?definition,?satisfy?the?higher?standard?for?unconditional?release.?(See?Barnes?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?186?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?976.) In?summary,?the?relevant?factors?do?not,?singly?or?in?combination,?support?the?conclusion?that?it?violates?due?process?for?a?judge?to?consider?an?insanity?acquittee’s?application?for?placement?in?a?community?mental?health?program.?Insanity?acquittees?already?enjoy?substantial?procedural?safeguards?at?placement?hearings,?and?the?addition?of?juries?would?make?such?hearings?more?costly?and?burdensome?without?making?their?outcomes?more?reliable.?Under?these?circumstances,?due?process?does?not?require?more?than?the?statute?already?provides.fn.?11 The?Legislature’s?effort?to?deal?with?the?problem?of?criminal?commitments?is?entitled?to?as?much?judicial?deference?as?constitutional?principles?permit.?[5]?As?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?has?recognized,?”?'[w]hen?[a?legislative?body]?undertakes?to?act?in?areas?fraught?with?medical?and?scientific?uncertainties,?legislative?options?must?be?especially?broad?and?courts?should?be?cautious?not?to?rewrite?legislation?….’?”?(Jones,?supra,?463?U.S.?at?p.?370?[77?L.Ed.2d?at?p.?709],?quoting?Marshall?v.?United?States?(1974)?414?U.S.?417,?427?[38?L.Ed.2d?618,?626,?94?S.Ct.?700].)?To?require?jury?trials?at?placement?hearings?without?the?clearest?constitutional?necessity?would?send?the?message?that?we,?not?the?Legislature,?make?the?rules?in?this?area,?and?thus?stifle?further?legislative?efforts?to?fashion?appropriate?solutions.?[54?Cal.3d?71] Disposition The?decision?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?reversed. […]

California?Fed.?Savings?&?Loan?Assn.?v.?City?of?Los?Angeles?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?1?,?283?Cal.Rptr.?569;?812?P.2d?916 [No.?S013951.?Jul?29,?1991.] CALIFORNIA?FEDERAL?SAVINGS?AND?LOAN?ASSOCIATION,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?CITY?OF?LOS?ANGELES,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Los?Angeles?County,?No.?C579296,?Vernon?G.?Foster,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Arabian,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Broussard,?Panelli,?Kennard?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Mosk,?J.,?concurred?in?the?judgment.) COUNSEL James?K.?Hahn,?City?Attorney,?Richard?A.?Dawson,?Assistant?City?Attorney,?and?Myrtle?Dankers,?Deputy?City?Attorney,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. Louise?H.?Renne,?City?Attorney?(San?Francisco),?John?J.?Doherty?and?Thomas?J.?Owens,?Deputy?City?Attorneys,?Joan?R.?Gallo,?City?Attorney?(San?Jose),?Michael?F.?Dean,?City?Attorney?(Roseville),?Jack?L.?White,?City?Attorney?(Anaheim),?and?William?C.?Marsh,?City?Attorney?(Monterey),?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendant?and?Appellant. Martin?S.?Schwartz,?McKenna,?Conner?&?Cuneo,?McKenna?&?Fitting,?Aaron?M.?Peck,?Michael?T.?Lambert?and?Theresa?A.?Kristovich?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. Christopher?Chenoweth,?Philip?M.?Plant,?Ronald?A.?Zumbrun,?Anthony?T.?Caso?and?Jonathan?M.?Coupal?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION ARABIAN,?J. Since?the?addition?of?the?”home?rule”?provision?to?our?Constitution?in?1896,?the?organic?law?of?California?has?granted?charter?cities?[54?Cal.3d?6]?sovereignty?over?”municipal?affairs.”?Although?this?court?and?the?Court?of?Appeal?have?parsed?that?cryptic?phrase?in?literally?scores?of?cases?in?the?95?years?since?the?adoption?of?what?is?now?article?XI,?section?5,?subdivision?(a)?of?the?Constitution,?what?an?early?member?of?this?court?called?those?”wild?words”?have?defeated?efforts?at?a?defining?formulation?of?the?content?of?”municipal?affairs.”?We?granted?review?in?this?case?to?decipher?the?”municipal?affairs”?clause?as?it?governs?conflicting?claims?of?the?Legislature?and?a?charter?city?to?levy?taxes?on?financial?corporations. Introduction The?City?of?Los?Angeles?(City)?imposes?an?annual?license?tax?on?most?businesses?within?its?municipal?boundaries.?It?sought?to?collect?the?tax?from?California?Federal?Savings?and?Loan?Association,?petitioner?here,?for?the?1982?through?1984?tax?years?despite?the?Legislature’s?1979?amendment?of?Revenue?and?Taxation?Code?section?23182,?which?declared?that?a?state?income?tax?on?financial?corporations?such?as?petitioner?was?in?lieu?of?all?other?taxes?and?licenses,?including?charter?city?business?license?taxes. Petitioner?paid?the?business?license?tax?under?protest?and?filed?this?refund?action?in?the?superior?court,?claiming?that?the?state?statute,?as?amended,?nullified?the?City’s?power?to?levy?the?business?license?tax?upon?it.?The?City?defended?on?the?ground?that?its?tax?was?a?local?revenue?measure?to?raise?funds?for?local?expenditure?and?that?as?such?it?qualified?as?a?”municipal?affair”?immune?from?state?legislative?interference?by?virtue?of?article?XI,?section?5,?subdivision?(a)?of?the?Constitution?(hereafter?article?XI,?section?5(a)).fn.?1?Following?a?bench?trial,?the?superior?court?ruled?for?petitioner,?holding?that?the?taxation?of?financial?corporations?is?a?subject?of?”statewide?concern”?rather?than?a?”municipal?affair”?and?that?the?record?before?it?supported?findings?of?the?Legislature?to?that?effect. The?Court?of?Appeal?disagreed.?Reversing?the?trial?court,?it?concluded?that?unlike?regulatory?matters,?where?state?laws?addressing?subjects?of?statewide?concern?prevail?over?conflicting?charter?city?enactments,?our?decisions?presented?a?distinct?line?of?authority?that?charter?city?tax?measures?are?inflexibly?”municipal?affairs”?and?thus?invariably?are?immune?from?state?legislative?supremacy.?[54?Cal.3d?7] We?reverse.?Although?municipal?taxation?is?a?”municipal?affair”?within?the?meaning?of?article?XI,?section?5(a),?in?that?it?is?a?necessary?and?appropriate?power?of?municipal?government,?aspects?of?local?taxation?may?under?some?circumstances?acquire?a?”supramunicipal”?dimension,?transforming?an?otherwise?intramural?affair?into?a?matter?of?statewide?concern?warranting?legislative?attention.?In?short,?our?cases?do?not?support?the?distinction?drawn?by?the?Court?of?Appeal;?charter?city?tax?measures?are?subject?to?the?same?legal?analysis?and?accumulated?body?of?decisional?law?under?article?XI,?section?5(a),?as?charter?city?regulatory?measures.?In?the?event?of?a?true?conflict?between?a?state?statute?reasonably?tailored?to?the?resolution?of?a?subject?of?statewide?concern?and?a?charter?city?tax?measure,?the?latter?ceases?to?be?a?”municipal?affair”?to?the?extent?of?the?conflict?and?must?yield.?In?addition,?we?hold?that?under?the?circumstances?of?this?case?the?trial?court?correctly?concluded?that?the?aggregate?intrastate?tax?burden?on?financial?corporations-including?local?taxes?such?as?the?City’s?business?license?tax-is?a?subject?of?statewide?concern. The?path?to?these?conclusions?requires?our?review?of?the?recent?history?of?California’s?differing?tax?treatment?of?commercial?banks?and?savings?banks?such?as?petitioner?as?well?as?the?development?of?the?”municipal?affairs”?doctrine?in?this?state.fn.?2 The?Regulatory?Setting   A. In?the?idiom?of?banking?law,?petitioner?is?a?”HOLA”?institution,?meaning?it?holds?a?charter?granted?by?the?Federal?Home?Loan?Bank?Board?under?the?federal?Home?Owners’?Loan?Act?of?1933?(12?U.S.C.???1461?et?seq.).?Although?headquartered?in?Los?Angeles,?petitioner?maintains?135?branch?offices?throughout?the?state?as?well?as?a?smaller?number?of?full?service?branches?in?Nevada,?Florida,?and?Georgia.?Together?with?other?commercial?and?savings?banks,?petitioner?participates?in?a?network?that?operates?several?thousand?automatic?teller?machines?across?North?America.?Many?of?petitioner’s?borrowers?and?depositors?reside?outside?of?both?Los?Angeles?and?California.?Much?of?the?real?property?securing?loans?made?by?petitioner?lies?outside?of?Los?Angeles,?and?some?lies?outside?of?the?state.?[54?Cal.3d?8] California-chartered?counterparts?to?federal?HOLA?institutions?such?as?petitioner?are?known?as?”Division?Two”?institutions,?a?term?derived?from?the?regulatory?locus?of?state?savings?banks?in?division?2?of?the?California?Financial?Code.?In?statutory?origin,?state?and?federally?chartered?savings?banks?are?distinct?from?the?two?major?types?of?commercial?banks?operating?in?California:?national?banks?established?under?the?federal?National?Bank?Act?(12?U.S.C.???21?et?seq.),?and?state?commercial?banks?chartered?and?regulated?under?division?1?of?the?California?Financial?Code. For?over?60?years,?both?state?and?federally?chartered?commercial?banks?operating?in?California?have?been?subject?to?a?single?state?tax?levied?on?their?net?income?and?imposed?in?lieu?of?all?other?taxes,?whether?state,?county,?or?municipal.?The?Legislature’s?exclusive?power?to?tax?commercial?banks?is?conferred?by?article?XIII,?section?27,?of?our?Constitution,?a?provision?first?adopted?by?the?voters?in?1928?following?a?series?of?decisions?by?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?requiring?in?effect?a?single?state?tax?on?national?banks?in?lieu?of?all?other?state?taxes?and?one?no?higher?than?the?highest?tax?rate?levied?on?nonfinancial?corporations.fn.?3 Although?not?included?within?the?class?of?banks?subject?to?the?exclusive?state?tax?required?by?article?XIII,?section?27?of?the?Constitution,?state?and?federal?savings?banks?also?became?indirectly?entitled?in?1928?to?substantially?equivalent?tax?treatment?through?a?so-called?”offset”?system?effected?by?statute.?Under?the?offset?system,?both?state?and?federal?savings?banks?could?claim?a?credit?against?their?net?state?tax?liability?for?taxes?paid?to?municipalities.?In?effect,?the?offset?system?promoted?a?rough?albeit?indirect?equality?between?the?aggregate?California?tax?burden?on?commercial?banks-whether?state?or?federal-and?on?their?state?and?federal?savings?bank?counterparts.fn.?4?[54?Cal.3d?9] The?offset?arrangement?continued?in?effect?until?1979.?In?that?year,?the?Legislature?passed?Assembly?Bill?No.?66?(1979-1980?Reg.?Sess.;?enacted?as?Stats.?1979,?ch.?1150),?an?omnibus?tax?measure?that?included?the?statute?at?issue?in?this?case.?[1]?(See?fn.?6.)?Section?14?of?Assembly?Bill?No.?66,?set?out?in?the?margin,fn.?5?amended?Revenue?and?Taxation?Code?section?23182?(further?unspecified?statutory?references?are?to?this?code)?to?abolish?the?offset?system?by?declaring?that?the?in?lieu?feature?of?the?net?income?tax,?formerly?applicable?only?to?commercial?banks,?extended?to?financial?corporations.fn.?6?Effective?January?1,?1981,?except?for?taxes?on?their?real?property?and?miscellaneous?imposts,?section?23182?subjected?both?commercial?and?savings?banks-whether?national?banks?or?federal?HOLA?savings?banks,?state?division?1?commercial?banks?or?division?2?savings?banks-to?a?single?state-imposed?net?income?tax?and?to?no?others.?At?the?same?time?that?it?placed?commercial?and?savings?banks?under?a?unitary?income?tax?regime,?the?Legislature?moved?to?mitigate?the?anticipated?revenue?loss?to?local?governments?resulting?from?the?elimination?of?municipal?taxes?on?financial?corporations.fn.?7?[54?Cal.3d?10] The?net?effect?of?the?1979?amendment?to?section?23182?was?to?place?savings?banks?and?other?financial?corporations?on?an?equal?footing?with?commercial?banks?as?far?as?their?California?income?tax?burden?was?concerned?by,?among?other?changes?in?tax?treatment,?eliminating?municipal?taxes?on?their?activities.?As?part?of?Assembly?Bill?No.?66,?the?Legislature?made?the?express?findings?in?support?of?the?amendment?to?section?23182?set?out?in?the?margin.fn.?8?In?brief,?the?Legislature?explained?that?the?amendment?sought?to?”insur[e]?competitive?parity?between?banks?and?financial?corporations”?by?imposing?on?both?”an?equivalent?tax?burden.”?Tax?equality,?it?went?on?to?find,?would?promote?the?continued?existence?of?both?types?of?institutions?as?well?as?ensure?that?the?tax?burden?on?both?remained?comparable?to?that?on?nonfinancial?corporations.?In?addition,?the?legislative?findings?in?support?of?the?amendment?asserted?that?local?taxes?on?financial?corporations?were?”divergent?and?competing”?and?”impair[ed]?the?uniform?statewide?regulation?of?banks?and?financial?corporations.”?For?these?reasons,?the?Legislature?declared,?it?had?”preempted”?the?local?taxation?of?financial?corporations?”to?the?same?extent?as?the?state?has?heretofore?preempted?local?taxation?of?banks.”?(Stats.?1979,?ch.?1150,???20,?p.?4220.)fn.?9?[54?Cal.3d?11] B. Los?Angeles?is?a?charter?city?within?the?meaning?of?article?XI,?section?5,?of?the?California?Constitution.?For?more?than?40?years?the?City?has?assessed?the?annual?business?license?tax?under?the?provisions?of?its?municipal?code?on?financial?corporations?(L.A.?Mun.?Code,???21.00?et?seq.),?including?savings?banks?such?as?petitioner.?The?tax?is?a?gross?receipts?tax?calculated?as?a?percentage?of?the?total?dollar?value?of?the?taxpayer’s?entire?annual?business?activity,?payable?even?in?the?absence?of?net?income?to?the?taxpayer?in?a?given?tax?year.?Evidence?before?the?trial?court?disclosed?that?for?the?1985-1986?budget?year,?City?revenues?derived?from?the?business?license?tax?amounted?to?$186?million,?or?just?under?9?percent?of?the?City’s?$2.1?billion?in?total?revenues.?Of?this?sum,?less?than?10?percent?or?approximately?$17?million?in?revenues?was?derived?from?business?license?taxes?paid?by?savings?banks?and?other?financial?corporations,?a?figure?amounting?to?roughly?0.8?percent?of?the?City’s?total?1985-1986?budget. Following?enactment?of?Assembly?Bill?No.?66,?the?City?did?not?attempt?to?collect?the?business?license?tax?from?financial?corporations?within?its?jurisdiction?for?the?1981?tax?year.?But?beginning?with?the?1982?tax?year,?after?the?Legislature?failed?to?renew?the?FALA?allocation?established?by?Assembly?Bill?No.?66,?the?City?again?assessed?the?tax?against?petitioner.?As?we?have?noted,?petitioner?paid?the?taxes?due?under?protest,?brought?this?suit?seeking?a?refund,?and?prevailed?in?the?trial?court?before?that?judgment?was?reversed?by?the?Court?of?Appeal. III.?”Municipal?Affairs”?and?the?Amendment?of?1896   A. The?fulcrum?of?the?Court?of?Appeal’s?opinion?reversing?the?trial?court’s?judgment?was?Ex?Parte?Braun?(1903)?141?Cal.?204?[74?P.?780],?one?of?the?early?decisions?of?this?court?interpreting?the?”municipal?affairs”?clause?following?its?adoption?by?the?voters?in?the?election?of?1896.?In?Braun,?we?considered?a?City?ordinance?imposing?a?license?tax?on?a?variety?of?occupations?solely?for?revenue?purposes.?Braun,?a?wholesale?liquor?dealer?subject?to?the?tax,?resisted?paying?it?on?the?ground?that?the?Legislature?had?forbidden?the?City?to?license?occupations?for?revenue?purposes?by?enacting?a?statute?declaring?that?municipalities?could?impose?license?taxes?for?regulatory?purposes?only.?Braun?was?prosecuted?by?the?City?and?convicted?of?failing?to?pay?the?tax;?he?sought?habeas?corpus?relief?before?this?court. [2]?We?upheld?the?tax?against?Braun’s?claim?that?the?Legislature?could?determine?by?general?laws?the?tax?policies?of?charter?cities,?ruling?that?the?[54?Cal.3d?12]?recently?adopted?home?rule?provision?was?intended?to?secure?to?such?cities?”the?maintenance?of?…?charter?provisions?in?municipal?matters,?and?to?deprive?the?legislature?of?the?power?…?to?interfere?in?the?government?and?management?of?the?municipality.”?(Ex?Parte?Braun,?supra,?141?Cal.?at?p.?209.)?We?reasoned?that?”the?power?of?taxation?is?a?power?appropriate?for?a?municipality?to?possess”;?that?that?proposition?was?”too?obvious?to?merit?discussion”;?and?that?the?use?of?licensing?statutes?as?revenue?measures?was?”a?well-recognized?exercise?of?the?taxing?power.”?(Ibid.)?Braun’s?effort?to?avoid?paying?a?municipal?tax?on?the?ground?that?the?Legislature?had?forbidden?a?charter?city?to?levy?it?thus?failed. After?almost?a?century?of?litigation?inspired?by?the?uncertain?meaning?of?”municipal?affairs,”?we?see?no?reason?to?question?the?soundness?of?Ex?Parte?Braun?or?to?depart?from?its?holding.?The?opinion?remains?a?germinal?gloss?on?the?home?rule?provision?of?article?XI,?section?5(a),?and?one?vital?meaning?of?the?doctrine?it?embodies-a?recognition?of?the?affirmative?constitutional?grant?to?charter?cities?of?”all?powers?appropriate?for?a?municipality?to?possess?…”?and?of?the?important?corollary?that?”so?far?as?’municipal?affairs’?are?concerned,”?charter?cities?are?”supreme?and?beyond?the?reach?of?legislative?enactment.”?(141?Cal.?at?p.?207.) We?had?no?occasion?in?Ex?Parte?Braun,?however,?to?deal?with?a?correlative?dimension?of?the?”municipal?affairs”?doctrine,?namely?those?conditions?under?which?the?obverse?proposition?applies?and?the?Legislature?constitutionally?may?supplant?charter?city?measures?with?its?own?enactments.?No?argument?was?made?in?Braun,?for?example,?that?the?state?statute?purporting?to?dictate?charter?city?tax?policy?was?driven?by?a?widespread?fiscal?crisis?across?the?state,?or?provoked?by?some?other?broad?controversy?of?the?day?making?municipal?tax?policy?an?overarching?issue,?or?by?any?other?extramunicipal?concern?sufficient?to?compel?legislative?action?or?make?its?exercise?appropriate. Rather,?as?our?opinion?in?Ex?Parte?Braun?noted,?the?effect?of?the?city’s?revenue?measure?was?entirely?local,?”confined?in?operation?to?the?city?of?Los?Angeles,?and?affect[ing]?none?but?its?citizens?and?taxpayers?and?those?doing?business?within?its?limits.”?(141?Cal.?at?p.?210.)?Nor?is?there?any?suggestion?that?Braun?offered?a?defense?to?his?prosecution?based?on?the?claim?that?the?state?statute?was?prompted?by?anything?more?than?an?anchorless?legislative?desire?to?continue?to?assert?plenary?control?over?municipal?governments,?including?charter?cities.fn.?10?Our?opinion?rejected?the?state’s?attempt?as?a?[54?Cal.3d?13]?groundless?invasion?of?a?core?area?of?municipal?concern-the?power?to?tax?in?support?of?local?government-prohibited?by?the?home?rule?provision.?Seminal?as?the?Braun?opinion?was?to?the?evolution?of?the?”municipal?affairs”?doctrine?in?California,?it?necessarily?represents?an?incomplete?analysis,?standing?for?nothing?so?much?as?the?now?unexceptional?proposition?that?levying?taxes?to?support?local?expenditures?qualifies?as?a?”municipal?affair”?within?the?meaning?of?the?home?rule?provision?of?our?Constitution. In?short,?Ex?Parte?Braun,?supra,?141?Cal.?204,?illustrates?only?one?side?of?the?coin?of?home?rule.?The?clause?affirmatively?grants?charter?cities?sovereignty?over?those?matters?deemed?to?be?”municipal?affairs,”?but?it?also?implicitly?recognizes?state?legislative?supremacy?over?matters?not?within?the?ambit?of?that?phrase.?Although?we?held?in?Braun?that?the?power?to?levy?local?taxes?in?support?of?local?expenditures?is?an?essential?function?of?municipal?government,?secure?against?legislative?usurpation,?we?did?not?address?directly?this?countervailing?dimension.?It?is?one?thing?to?identify?local?taxation?as?an?affirmative?power?of?local?government,?as?we?did?in?Braun,?and?therefore?a?”municipal?affair.”?It?is?a?quite?different?undertaking?to?formulate?the?criteria?by?which?the?choice?is?made?between?conflicting?state?and?municipal?enactments?when?both?stem?from?concerns?rooted?in?their?respective?spheres?of?government. Subsequent?cases?rounded?out?the?”municipal?affairs”?doctrine?by?taking?up?the?larger?theme?of?the?limits?on?a?charter?city’s?sovereignty?when?aspects?of?its?activities?interfere?with?interests?which?transcend?the?municipality.?In?the?main,?our?later?decisions?reject?a?static?and?compartmentalized?description?of?”municipal?affairs”?in?favor?of?a?more?dialectical?one.?Out?of?these?cases?emerges?the?counterpoint?of?”statewide?concern”?as?a?conceptual?limitation?on?the?scope?of?”municipal?affairs”?and?thus?on?the?supremacy?of?charter?city?measures?over?conflicting?legislative?enactments. The?Court?of?Appeal?in?this?case?purported?to?distinguish?these?later?”statewide?concern”?cases?on?the?ground?that?they?dealt?exclusively?with?charter?city?regulatory,?rather?than?taxation,?measures.?That?distinction,fn.?11?together?with?the?companion?conclusion?that?our?opinion?in?Ex?Parte?Braun?[54?Cal.3d?14]?made?charter?city?powers?of?taxation?forever?sacrosanct,?led?the?Court?of?Appeal?to?fracture?the?doctrine?of?”municipal?affairs”?and?the?case?law?supporting?it?into?two?halves,?”each?with?uncompromising?language?and?holdings,”?as?the?opinion?put?it.?It?declined?altogether?to?apply?the?concept?of?statewide?concern?as?a?limitation?on?the?power?of?the?City?to?levy?its?business?license?tax?against?petitioner;?in?a?case?such?as?this?presenting?a?taxation?rather?than?a?regulatory?measure,?limits?derived?from?that?notion?were?deemed?”irrelevant.” As?our?exposition?of?the?Ex?Parte?Braun?holding?suggests,?however,?the?duality?perceived?in?our?opinions?by?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?illusory;?Ex?Parte?Braun,?supra,?141?Cal.?204,?does?not?reject?the?statewide?concern?analysis?as?irrelevant?to?”municipal?affairs”?cases?presenting?local?taxation?issues.?It?simply?predates?the?development?of?that?branch?of?the?doctrine;?more?importantly,?Braun?dealt?with?a?statute?which,?as?we?have?discussed,?sprang?from?an?attempt?to?decree?the?essentials?of?municipal?tax?policy?rather?than?to?further?an?identifiable?interest?of?extramural?dimension. Nor?is?the?post-Braun?authority?invoked?by?the?Court?of?Appeal?supportive.?None?of?the?half?dozen?of?our?decisions?relied?on?to?shore?up?the?conclusion?that?Ex?Parte?Braun?holds?immutable?the?power?of?charter?cities?to?levy?taxes?considers?the?question?at?issue?in?this?case-whether?a?charter?city?tax?measure?continues?to?qualify?as?a?”municipal?affair”?to?the?extent?that?it?conflicts?with?a?statute?addressing?a?subject?of?statewide?dimension.fn.?12?[54?Cal.3d?15] [3]?Moreover,?we?find?no?reason?in?any?policy?underlying?the?municipal?home?rule?provision?why?the?subject?of?charter?city?taxation?should?merit?treatment?different?from?charter?city?regulatory?measures.?It?is?true,?as?we?pointed?out?in?Ex?Parte?Braun,?supra,?141?Cal.?204,?that?the?power?to?govern-whether?local?or?state-means?little?without?the?coordinate?power?to?tax,?so?integral?is?finance?to?government.?But?that?is?only?a?truism.?It?fails?to?explain?why,?among?all?other?municipal?powers,?the?power?to?tax?should?be?singled?out?as?specially?protectible,?as?uniquely?unyielding?to?transcendent?interests.?The?answer?cannot?be?that?the?Legislature’s?power?to?deprive?a?charter?city?of?its?authority?to?levy?taxes?is?the?power?to?cripple?or?destroy?it,?at?least,?to?borrow?Justice?Holmes’s?phrase,?”while?this?Court?sits.”?(Panhandle?Oil?Co.?v.?Knox?(1928)?277?U.S.?218,?223?[72?L.Ed.?857,?859,?48?S.Ct.?451,?56?A.L.R.?583].)?Our?charge?under?the?Constitution?to?adjudicate?such?disputes?confers?ample?power?to?preserve?the?core?meaning?of?municipal?home?rule?against?legislative?inroads. Thus?the?problem?set?for?us?by?this?case?is?not?the?one?we?faced?in?Ex?Parte?Braun?of?identifying?the?essentials?of?”municipal?affairs.”?Instead,?it?is?that?of?adjusting?the?conflict?between?the?effects?of?the?City’s?business?license?tax?and?the?Legislature’s?asserted?interest?in?the?uniform?taxation?of?commercial?banks?and?financial?corporations,?including?savings?banks?such?as?petitioner.?That,?rather?than?the?question?whether?the?City’s?status?as?a?charter?city?encompasses?the?power?to?levy?local?taxes?in?support?of?its?expenditures,?is?the?real?issue?before?us. B. Concurring?in?the?majority?opinion?in?Ex?Parte?Braun,?Justice?McFarland?wrote?that?the?Constitution?”uses?the?loose,?indefinable,?wild?words?’municipal?affairs,’?and?imposes?upon?the?courts?the?almost?impossible?duty?of?[54?Cal.3d?16]?saying?what?they?mean.”?(141?Cal.?at?p.?214.)?He?predicted-with?foresight-that?this?court?”probably?will?not?undertake?to?give?a?general?definition?of?the?words,?so?as?to?bring?all?future?cases?within?the?two?categories?of?what?is?and?what?is?not?a?municipal?affair.?A?few?cases?…?have?arisen,?and?in?each?of?such?cases?the?court?has?merely?determined?…?whether?the?thing?there?involved?was?or?was?not?within?the?indeterminate?constitutional?words.”?(Ibid.) [4]?The?idea?that?the?content?of?”municipal?affairs”?is?indefinite?in?its?essentials?is?one?that?has?taken?root?in?our?cases?on?the?subject.?We?have?said?that?the?task?of?determining?whether?a?given?activity?is?a?”municipal?affair”?or?one?of?statewide?concern?is?an?ad?hoc?inquiry;?that?”the?constitutional?concept?of?municipal?affairs?is?not?a?fixed?or?static?quantity”?(Pac.?Tel.?&?Tel.?Co.?v.?City?and?County?of?S.?F.?(1959)?51?Cal.2d?766,?771?[336?P.2d?514]);?and?that?the?question?”must?be?answered?in?light?of?the?facts?and?circumstances?surrounding?each?case”?(In?re?Hubbard?(1964)?62?Cal.2d?119,?128?[41?Cal.Rptr.?393,?396?P.2d?809]).?”No?exact?definition?of?the?term?’municipal?affairs’?can?be?formulated?and?the?courts?have?made?no?attempt?to?do?so,?but?instead?have?indicated?that?judicial?interpretation?is?necessary?to?give?it?meaning?in?each?controverted?case.”?(Butterworth?v.?Boyd?(1938)?12?Cal.2d?140,?147?[82?P.2d?434,?126?A.L.R.?838].)?But?our?decisions?have?also?strived?to?confine?the?element?of?judicial?interpretation?by?hedging?it?with?a?decisional?procedure?intended?to?bring?a?measure?of?certainty?to?the?process,?narrowing?the?scope?within?which?a?sometimes?mercurial?discretion?operates. In?broad?outline,?a?court?asked?to?resolve?a?putative?conflict?between?a?state?statute?and?a?charter?city?measure?initially?must?satisfy?itself?that?the?case?presents?an?actual?conflict?between?the?two.?If?it?does?not,?a?choice?between?the?conclusions?”municipal?affair”?and?”statewide?concern”?is?not?required.?Our?decisions?in?Bishop?v.?City?of?San?Jose?(1969)?1?Cal.3d?56,?63-64?[81?Cal.Rptr.?465,?460?P.2d?137],?upholding?a?charter?city’s?wage?scale?on?the?ground?that?the?Legislature?did?not?intend?to?subject?it?to?the?prevailing?wage?provisions?of?the?Labor?Code,?and?Weekes?v.?City?of?Oakland,?supra,?21?Cal.3d?386,?upholding?a?”license?fee”?on?all?persons?employed?in?a?charter?city?on?the?ground?that?it?was?not?an?income?tax?prohibited?by?state?law,?are?examples?of?cases-important?perhaps?more?for?their?influential?obiter?than?for?their?holdings-in?which?we?found?no?real?conflict.?And?as?the?summary?of?the?cases?relied?on?by?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?this?case,?ante,?at?footnote?12,?illustrates,?many?opinions?purportedly?involving?competing?state?and?local?enactments?do?not?present?a?genuine?conflict.?To?the?extent?difficult?choices?between?competing?claims?of?municipal?and?state?governments?can?be?forestalled?in?this?sensitive?area?of?[54?Cal.3d?17]?constitutional?law,?they?ought?to?be;?courts?can?avoid?making?such?unnecessary?choices?by?carefully?insuring?that?the?purported?conflict?is?in?fact?a?genuine?one,?unresolvable?short?of?choosing?between?one?enactment?and?the?other. In?those?cases?where?the?preliminary?conditions?are?satisfied,?that?is,?where?the?matter?implicates?a?”municipal?affair”?and?poses?a?genuine?conflict?with?state?law,?the?question?of?statewide?concern?is?the?bedrock?inquiry?through?which?the?conflict?between?state?and?local?interests?is?adjusted.?If?the?subject?of?the?statute?fails?to?qualify?as?one?of?statewide?concern,?then?the?conflicting?charter?city?measure?is?a?”municipal?affair”?and?”beyond?the?reach?of?legislative?enactment.”?Ex?Parte?Braun,?supra,?141?Cal.?204,?itself?is?the?paradigm?of?a?legislative?effort?to?prescribe?a?core?municipal?activity-local?taxation-without?support?originating?in?identifiable?statewide?concerns.?If,?however,?the?court?is?persuaded?that?the?subject?of?the?state?statute?is?one?of?statewide?concern?and?that?the?statute?is?reasonably?related?to?its?resolution,?then?the?conflicting?charter?city?measure?ceases?to?be?a?”municipal?affair”?pro?tanto?and?the?Legislature?is?not?prohibited?by?article?XI,?section?5(a),?from?addressing?the?statewide?dimension?by?its?own?tailored?enactments. [5]?The?phrase?”statewide?concern”?is?thus?nothing?more?than?a?conceptual?formula?employed?in?aid?of?the?judicial?mediation?of?jurisdictional?disputes?between?charter?cities?and?the?Legislature,?one?that?facially?discloses?a?focus?on?extramunicipal?concerns?as?the?starting?point?for?analysis.?By?requiring,?as?a?condition?of?state?legislative?supremacy,?a?dimension?demonstrably?transcending?identifiable?municipal?interests,?the?phrase?resists?the?invasion?of?areas?which?are?of?intramural?concern?only,?preserving?core?values?of?charter?city?government.?As?applied?to?state?and?charter?city?enactments?in?actual?conflict,?”municipal?affair”?and?”statewide?concern”?represent,?Janus-like,?ultimate?legal?conclusions?rather?than?factual?descriptions.?Their?inherent?ambiguity?masks?the?difficult?but?inescapable?duty?of?the?court?to,?in?the?words?of?one?authoritative?commentator,?”allocate?the?governmental?powers?under?consideration?in?the?most?sensible?and?appropriate?fashion?as?between?local?and?state?legislative?bodies.”?(Van?Alstyne,?Background?Study?Relating?to?Article?XI,?Local?Government,?Cal.?Const.?Revision?Com.,?Proposed?Revision?(1966)?p.?239.) In?performing?that?constitutional?task,?courts?should?avoid?the?error?of?”compartmentalization,”?that?is,?of?cordoning?off?an?entire?area?of?governmental?activity?as?either?a?”municipal?affair”?or?one?of?statewide?concern.?Beginning?with?the?observation?in?Pac.?Tel.?&?Tel.?Co.?v.?City?and?County?of?S.?F.,?supra,?51?Cal.2d?at?page?771,?that?”the?constitutional?concept?of?[54?Cal.3d?18]?municipal?affairs?is?not?a?fixed?or?static?quantity?…?[but?one?that]?changes?with?the?changing?conditions?upon?which?it?is?to?operate,”?our?cases?display?a?growing?recognition?that?”home?rule”?is?a?means?of?adjusting?the?political?relationship?between?state?and?local?governments?in?discrete?areas?of?conflict.?When?a?court?invalidates?a?charter?city?measure?in?favor?of?a?conflicting?state?statute,?the?result?does?not?necessarily?rest?on?the?conclusion?that?the?subject?matter?of?the?former?is?not?appropriate?for?municipal?regulation.?It?means,?rather,?that?under?the?historical?circumstances?presented,?the?state?has?a?more?substantial?interest?in?the?subject?than?the?charter?city. A?corollary?of?that?proposition?is?that?every?decision?sustaining?a?state?statute?over?a?charter?city?measure?does?not?mean?that?if?the?former?were?repealed,?charter?cities?would?remain?incompetent?to?legislate?in?the?area.?Nor?does?a?decision?favoring?a?charter?city?measure?preclude?superseding?state?legislation?in?a?later?case?if?the?fact-bound?justification-the?statewide?dimension-is?subsequently?demonstrated.?To?approach?the?dichotomy?of?”municipal?affairs/statewide?concern”?as?one?signifying?reciprocally?exclusive?and?compartmented?domains?would,?as?one?commentator?has?observed,?”ultimately?all?but?destroy?municipal?home?rule.”fn.?13 [6]?In?cases?presenting?a?true?conflict?between?a?charter?city?measure-whether?tax?or?regulatory-and?a?state?statute,?therefore,?the?hinge?of?the?decision?is?the?identification?of?a?convincing?basis?for?legislative?action?originating?in?extramunicipal?concerns,?one?justifying?legislative?supersession?based?on?sensible,?pragmatic?considerations.?We?must?decide?whether?those?criteria?were?met?in?this?case;?that?is,?whether?the?showing?before?the?superior?court?supports?the?Legislature’s?finding?of?a?need?for?paramount?state?control?over?the?aggregate?income?tax?burden?on?financial?corporations?such?as?petitioner. […]

Droeger?v.?Friedman,?Sloan?&?Ross?(1991)?54?Cal.3d?26?,?283?Cal.Rptr.?584;?812?P.2d?931 [No.?S014984.?Jul?29,?1991.] JOHN?E.?DROEGER,?Plaintiff?and?Appellant,?v.?FRIEDMAN,?SLOAN?&?ROSS,?Defendant?and?Respondent. (Superior?Court?of?the?City?and?County?of?San?Francisco,?No.?877550,?Alex?Saldamando,?Judge.fn.?*?) (Opinion?by?Panelli,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Mosk,?Broussard,?Arabian?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.) COUNSEL Cory?A.?Birnberg?and?William?A.?Reppy,?Jr.,?for?Plaintiff?and?Appellant. Friedman,?Sloan?&?Ross,?James?A.?Dorskind,?Jeffrey?S.?Ross,?Howard,?Rice,?Nemerovski,?Canady,?Robertson?&?Falk?and?Jerome?B.?Falk,?Jr.,?for?Defendant?and?Respondent. Lorraine?C.?Gollub,?Ronald?Melin?Supancic,?Sandra?Blair,?James?Scott?Veltman,?Ronald?Rosenfeld,?E.?Stephen?Temko,?Denny?Kershek,?Frieda?Gordon?Daugherty?and?Diana?Gould-Saltman?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendant?and?Respondent. OPINION PANELLI,?J. We?granted?review?to?determine?whether?a?security?interest?in?community?real?property?given?by?one?spouse?to?secure?attorney?fees?during?a?pending?marital?dissolution?proceeding?is?valid?under?Civil?Code?[54?Cal.3d?30]?section?5127.fn.?1?Resolution?of?this?question?requires?that?we?clarify?the?general?rules?governing?transfersfn.?2?by?one?spouse?in?violation?of?section?5127.fn.?3 [1a]?We?conclude?that?pursuant?to?section?5127,?both?spouses?must?consent?to?the?transfer?of?community?real?property.?Consequently,?when?a?nonconsenting?spouse,?during?the?marriage,?timely?challenges?a?transfer?made?in?violation?of?section?5127,?the?transfer?is?voidable.?In?the?present?case,?after?the?parties?had?separated,?Joanna?Droeger?unilaterally?encumbered?two?parcels?of?community?real?property.?Her?husband,?John?E.?Droeger,?did?not?join?in?the?execution?of?the?encumbrance.?Before?the?couple’s?marriage?dissolution?proceedings?were?completed,?John?Droeger?challenged?the?validity?of?the?encumbrance.?As?his?consent?was?required?under?section?5127?to?effect?the?encumbrance,?we?conclude?that?he?is?entitled?to?invalidate?the?encumbrance?in?its?entirety. Facts?and?Proceedings In?1982,?Joanna?Droeger?(Wife)?commenced?a?marital?dissolution?proceeding?against?appellant?John?Droeger?(Husband).?Wife?retained?Friedman,?Sloan?&?Ross?(Friedman)?as?her?counsel?in?the?proceeding.?In?October?1986,?Friedman?moved?in?the?family?law?court?for?an?order?awarding?attorney?fees?and?costs?of?over?$50,000?pendente?lite?pursuant?to?section?4370,?subdivision?(a)?(authorizing?court?orders?for?payment?of?attorney?fees?pendente?lite).?However,?the?court?only?granted?the?motion?in?part,?awarding?Friedman?$9,600,?and?reserving?consideration?of?the?request?for?additional?attorney?fees?and?costs?until?the?time?of?trial. On?November?3,?1986,?Wife?executed?a?promissory?note?in?the?amount?of?$31,158.66?in?favor?of?Friedman?for?attorney?fees?and?costs.?On?the?same?day,?Wife?executed?a?deed?of?trust?on?two?parcels?of?the?community’s?real?property?securing?the?note.?Husband?did?not?join?in?the?execution?of?the?note?or?the?deed?of?trust. Husband?commenced?action?in?superior?court?to?quiet?title?to?the?community?realty?that?is?encumbered?by?the?deed?of?trust.?Relying?on?Mitchell?v.?[54?Cal.3d?31]?American?Reserve?Ins.?Co.?(1980)?110?Cal.App.3d?220?[167?Cal.Rptr.?760]?(Mitchell),?Friedman?demurred?to?Husband’s?second?amended?complaint,?claiming?that?the?deed?of?trust?was?enforceable?against?Wife’s?one-half?interest?in?the?property.?The?court?sustained?the?demurrer?without?leave?to?amend?and?entered?a?judgment?of?dismissal.?Husband’s?motion?for?reconsideration?was?denied. Concluding?that?the?intent?of?section?5127?was?to?prevent?division?of?community?real?property?except?by?agreement?of?both?spouses,?or?by?the?death?of?one?spouse,?or?by?dissolution?of?the?marriage,?the?Court?of?Appeal?reversed.?The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?Husband?was?entitled?to?void?the?encumbrance?in?its?entirety.?We?affirm. Section?5127 Section?5127,?which?applies?to?the?management?and?control?of?community?real?property,?states?in?part,?”either?spouse?has?the?management?and?control?of?the?community?real?property?…,?but?both?spouses?either?personally?or?by?duly?authorized?agent,?must?join?in?executing?any?instrument?by?which?such?community?real?property?or?any?interest?therein?is?leased?for?a?longer?period?than?one?year,?or?is?sold,?conveyed,?or?encumbered?….” Since?1975,?when?reforms?of?the?community?property?laws?(discussed?post)?became?effective,?the?appellate?courts?have?reached?inconsistent?results?in?determining?the?effect?of?violations?of?section?5127?where?one?spouse?has?made?a?transfer?without?obtaining?the?other?spouse’s?signature?or?authorization.?Both?lines?of?cases?agree?that?a?deed?of?trust,?signed?by?only?one?spouse,?cannot?create?a?valid?lien?on?the?entire?community?real?property;?the?nonconsenting?spouse?has?authority?to?void?the?lien?on?his?or?her?one-half?interest?in?the?property.?The?cases?differ,?however,?on?whether?the?nonconsenting?spouse?has?the?authority?to?void?the?lien?entirely.?(See?Mitchell,?supra,?110?Cal.App.3d?220;?Andrade?Development?Co.?v.?Martin?(1982)?138?Cal.App.3d?330?[187?Cal.Rptr.?863]?(Andrade).) The?conflict?in?the?Court?of?Appeal?cases?cannot?be?understood?or?resolved?without?examining?the?history?of?section?5127.?The?language?of?section?5127?is?substantially?derived?from?that?found?in?former?section?172a,?which?dates?back?to?1917.?The?history?of?former?section?172a?and?section?5127?reveals?the?evolution?of?the?recognition?of?the?wife’s?equal?status?in?California?community?property?law.?As?will?be?seen,?however,?the?evolving?recognition?of?the?wife’s?equality?has?not?always?been?reflected?in?the?case?law.?[54?Cal.3d?32] At?the?beginning?of?the?California?community?property?system?in?1849,?the?husband?was?regarded?as?the?full?and?complete?owner?of?the?community?property?and?had?the?exclusive?management?and?control?of?the?community?property.?The?wife’s?interest?was?an?expectancy?which?was?limited?to?the?rights?she?would?accrue?only?if?she?survived?the?termination?of?the?marriage.?(See?Prager,?The?Persistence?of?Separate?Property?Concepts?in?California’s?Community?Property?System?(1977)?24?UCLA?L.Rev.?1,?35.)?The?first?provision?of?our?statutory?law?on?the?subject?of?the?rights?of?the?husband?and?wife?in?community?property?was?section?9?of?the?Community?Property?Act?of?April?17,?1850?(Stats.?1850,?ch.?103,???9,?p.?254).?Under?section?9?of?the?act?”[t]he?husband?shall?have?the?entire?management?and?control?of?the?common?property,?with?the?like?absolute?power?of?disposition?as?of?his?own?separate?estate.” Construing?the?Community?Property?Act?of?1850,?early?cases?held?that,?during?the?marriage,?the?estate?of?the?husband?in?the?community?property?was?absolute,?while?that?of?the?wife?was?a?mere?expectancy,?as?that?of?an?heir.?(See?Spreckels?v.?Spreckels?(1916)?172?Cal.?775?[158?P.?537]?(Spreckels).)?Section?9?of?the?Community?Property?Act?of?1850?remained?in?force?until?the?enactment?of?the?Civil?Code?in?1872.?The?substance?of?section?9?of?the?act?was?covered?by?section?172?of?the?Civil?Code.?In?1891,?former?section?172?was?amended?to?read,?”[t]he?husband?has?the?management?and?control?of?the?community?property,?with?the?like?absolute?power?of?disposition,?other?than?testamentary,?as?he?has?of?his?separate?estate;?provided,?however,?that?he?cannot?make?a?gift?of?such?community?property,?or?convey?the?same?without?a?valuable?consideration,?unless?the?wife,?in?writing,?consent?[sic]?thereto.”?(Original?italics.) Interpreting?the?1891?proviso,?the?Spreckels?court?upheld?the?concept?of?the?husband’s?almost?absolute?power?over?the?community?property.?According?to?the?court,?the?proviso?did?not?”vest?in?the?wife,?during?the?marriage,?any?present?interest?or?estate?in?the?community?property?given?away?by?the?husband?without?her?written?consent.?…?If?[the?proviso]?confers?upon?her,?during?the?marriage,?any?right?respecting?such?gifts,?it?is?nothing?more?than?a?right?to?revoke?the?gift?and,?if?necessary,?sue?to?recover?the?property,?not?as?her?separate?estate,?but?to?reinstate?it?as?a?part?of?the?community?property,?with?the?title?vested?in?the?husband?and?subject?to?sale?by?him,?as?before.”?(Spreckels,?supra,?172?Cal.?at?p.?782.) Dargie?v.?Patterson?(1917)?176?Cal.?714?[169?P.?360]?(Dargie)?addressed?the?question?left?unanswered?by?Spreckels,?i.e.,?whether?the?wife?could?avoid?a?deed?in?its?entirety,?or?”only?so?far?as?is?necessary?to?protect?her?rights.”?(Id.?at?p.?718.)?In?Dargie?the?husband?had?made?a?gift?of?community?real?property?during?the?marriage?without?the?knowledge?or?consent?of?the?wife.?[54?Cal.3d?33]?After?the?husband?died,?the?wife?filed?an?action?to?set?aside?the?transfer.?We?held?that?”the?only?logical?conclusion?is?that?the?wife’s?right?to?assail?the?conveyance?where,?as?here,?the?action?is?brought?after?the?husband’s?death,?is?limited?to?an?undivided?half?of?the?property.”?(Ibid.)?The?rationale?for?the?decision?was?that?because?the?husband?had?died,?his?testamentary?power?existed?and?the?widow?need?not?be?given?greater?rights?than?she?would?have?enjoyed?if?the?gift?had?never?been?made.?Consequently,?we?invalidated?the?transfer?only?as?to?the?wife’s?portion?of?the?community?property. In?1917?former?section?172a?was?added?to?the?Civil?Code.?(Stats.?1917,?ch.?583,???2,?p.?829.)?Former?section?172a?continued?to?uphold?the?husband’s?sole?management?and?control?of?the?community?real?property,?but,?significantly,?provided?that?”the?wife?must?join?with?him?in?executing?any?instrument?by?which?such?community?real?property?or?any?interest?therein?is?leased?for?a?longer?period?than?one?year,?or?is?sold,?conveyed,?or?encumbered?….” The?concept?of?a?wife’s?interest?in?community?property?as?being?no?more?than?a?mere?expectancy?was?abrogated?in?1927.?Legislation?enacted?in?1927?(Stats.?1927,?ch.?265,???1,?p.?484)?gave?the?wife?a?”present,?existing,?and?equal?interest”?in?the?community?property.?(See?Byrd?v.?Blanton?(1983)?149?Cal.App.3d?987,?992?[197?Cal.Rptr.?190].)?This?enactment,?however,?was?motivated?by?the?desire?to?obtain?federal?income?tax?benefits?for?California?taxpayers?(i.e.,?to?allow?income?splitting?based?on?community?co-ownership,?before?joint?returns?were?allowed?for?all?married?couples)?and?did?not?increase?the?wife’s?power?to?manage?the?community?property.?(See?Reppy,?Retroactivity?of?the?1975?Community?Property?Reforms?(1978)?48?So.Cal.L.Rev.?977,?1089.) In?Lahaney?v.?Lahaney?(1929)?208?Cal.?323?[281?P.?67]?we?addressed?a?case?under?former?section?172a?where?the?husband?had?died?prior?to?the?wife?instituting?an?action?to?set?aside?his?inter?vivos?gift?of?community?real?property.?We?held?that?the?deed?executed?by?the?husband?was?valid,?subject?only?to?the?wife’s?right?to?institute,?seasonably,?an?action?in?equity?to?revoke?the?deed?and?reinstate?the?property?as?community?property?with?the?title?vested?in?the?husband.?(208?Cal.?at?p.?326.)?As?the?wife?brought?the?action?after?the?husband’s?death,?we?concluded?that?the?community?was?already?divided?and?she?could?only?recover?her?one-?half?interest?in?the?property. In?Pretzer?v.?Pretzer?(1932)?215?Cal.?659?[12?P.2d?429],?Trimble?v.?Trimble?(1933)?219?Cal.?340?[26?P.2d?477],?and?Heuer?v.?Heuer?(1949)?33?Cal.2d?268?[201?P.2d?385],?we?considered?similar?questions?of?the?effect?of?a?husband’s?disposition?of?community?real?property?without?the?wife’s?consent.?In?all?three?cases?the?community?had?been?dissolved,?either?by?death?or?[54?Cal.3d?34]?divorce,?prior?to?the?wife’s?action,?and?in?all?three?we?held?that?the?transfer?was?invalid?only?as?to?the?wife’s?remaining?one-?half?interest?in?the?property.fn.?4 In?Britton?v.?Hammel?(1935)?4?Cal.2d?690?[52?P.2d?221]?(Britton),?we?discussed?for?the?first?time?an?action?brought?by?a?nonconsenting?spouse?while?the?marriage,?and?hence?the?community,?was?still?in?existence.?John?Britton?procured?a?decree?of?divorce?from?his?first?wife,?Sophie?Britton,?in?1891.?He?acquired?property?in?1916,?and?in?1923?and?1924?he?conveyed?title?to?the?property?to?Rose?Britton,?supposedly?his?second?wife.?She?later?conveyed?it?back?to?him?as?his?separate?property.?Rose?died?in?1926?and?John?deeded?the?property?away.?Sophie?brought?action?to?declare?the?deeds?void?and?to?compel?the?return?of?the?property?to?the?community.?In?a?separate?action,?John’s?divorce?decree?from?Sophie?was?annulled?because?it?had?been?procured?by?fraud.?Because?the?first?marriage?was?determined?to?be?still?in?existence?when?the?deeds?were?made,?we?concluded?that?Sophie?was?entitled?to?set?aside?the?gift?of?community?real?property?in?its?entirety. We?gave?four?reasons?for?our?decision?in?Britton?allowing?a?complete?set?aside?of?the?gift:?If?the?wife?”were?only?permitted?to?recover?a?one-half?interest,?and?that?one-half?interest?recovered?were?to?remain?community?property,?it?would?still?be?subject?to?the?husband’s?control,?with?the?result?that?the?protection?given?the?wife?by?the?statute?would?be?substantially?nullified.?If,?on?the?other?hand,?the?one-half?interest?recovered?were?regarded?as?her?separate?property,?there?would?be?a?resulting?division?or?partition?of?the?community?property?during?the?marriage?by?the?husband’s?arbitrary?act,?without?consent?of?the?wife.?Our?law?does?not?contemplate?this?means?of?dividing?the?community?property.?It?provides?only?for?division?after?dissolution?of?the?community?by?death?or?divorce,?[or?during?marriage?with?the?consent?of?both?spouses].”?(Britton,?supra,?4?Cal.2d?at?p.?692.)?As?mentioned,?we?also?noted?that?the?cases?allowing?the?wife?to?recover?only?one-half?are?based?on?the?right?of?the?husband?to?testamentary?disposition?of?one-half?of?the?property.?Hence,?gifts?before?death?are?will?substitutes.?We?noted?that?this?reasoning?does?not?apply?in?an?ongoing?marriage.?Finally,?under?the?laws?in?effect?at?the?time?the?case?was?decided,?if?the?wife?could?not?recover?the?whole?property?during?the?marriage,?the?husband?could?impair?the?wife’s?right?to?receive?a?larger?share?of?the?community?property?at?dissolution?where?the?grounds?for?divorce?were?adultery?or?extreme?cruelty?of?the?husband.?(Id.?at?pp.?692-?693.)?[54?Cal.3d?35] In?Britton,?we?distinguished?Trimble?v.?Trimble,?supra,?219?Cal.?340,?and?Lahaney?v.?Lahaney,?supra,?208?Cal.?323,?as?cases?that?were?concerned?with?an?action?by?the?wife?after?her?husband’s?death?and?premised?on?the?theory?that?at?his?death,?the?husband?had?a?right?to?dispose?of?his?one-half?interest?in?the?property.fn.?5 In?1969,?former?section?172a?became?part?of?the?Family?Law?Act?as?section?5127?(Stats.?1969,?ch.?1608,???8,?p.?3342,?operative?Jan.?1,?1970).?In?1975,?reforms?of?the?community?property?laws?became?effective,?including?legislation?giving?either?spouse?the?management?and?control?of?the?community?property?(??5125)?and?making?section?5127?gender?neutral.?(Stats.?1974,?ch.?1206,???5,?p.?2610.)?The?1975?reforms,?therefore,?changed?the?context?in?which?section?5127?must?be?interpreted.?As?can?be?seen?from?the?cases?discussed,?the?concept?of?equal?management?was?a?radical?and?significant?change?in?community?property?law?and?was?a?landmark?step?toward?recognizing?equality?of?the?spouses.?Accordingly,?the?1975?reform?legislation?marked?a?significant?dividing?line?between?the?husband-dominated?community?property?law?of?the?past?and?the?equal?managerial?rights?of?the?present?day. Before?the?1975?reforms,?the?law?was?clear?as?to?the?extent?of?relief?allowed?to?a?spouse?who?disapproved?of?a?transfer?made?in?violation?of?section?5127.?If?the?action?was?brought?after?the?transferor-spouse’s?death?or?after?dissolution?of?the?marriage,?the?set-aside?was?limited?to?the?nonconsenting?spouse’s?one-half?community?property?interest.?(See?Trimble?v.?Trimble,?supra,?219?Cal.?340;?Pretzer?v.?Pretzer,?supra,?215?Cal.?659.)?If?the?action?was?brought?during?the?ongoing?marriage,?however,?the?nonconsenting?spouse?was?permitted?to?set?aside?the?transfer?in?its?entirety.?(See?Britton,?supra,?4?Cal.2d?690;?Vaughan?v.?Roberts,?supra,?45?Cal.App.2d?246.) After?the?1975?reforms,?however,?a?split?of?authority?developed?in?the?appellate?courts?concerning?the?extent?of?relief?available?when?the?nonconsenting?spouse?brought?an?action?during?the?marriage.?One?line?of?decisions?holds?that?transfers?are?voidable?only?as?to?the?nonconsenting?spouse’s?[54?Cal.3d?36]?one-half?interest,?regardless?of?when?the?action?is?brought.?(See?Wolfe?v.?Lipsy?(1985)?163?Cal.App.3d?633?[209?Cal.Rptr.?801];?Head?v.?Crawford?(1984)?156?Cal.App.3d?11?[202?Cal.Rptr.?534];?Mitchell,?supra,?110?Cal.App.3d?220.)?Equally?recent?decisions,?including?the?Court?of?Appeal?decision?in?this?case,?expressly?disapprove?of?the?Mitchell?line?of?authority,?and?hold?that?if?relief?is?sought?during?marriage,?the?entire?transfer?should?be?set?aside.?(See?Harper?v.?Raya?(1984)?154?Cal.App.3d?908?[201?Cal.Rptr.?563];?Andrade,?supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?330;?In?re?Jones?(C.D.Cal.?1985)?51?Bankr.?834.?See?also,?Hogoboom?&?King,?Cal.?Practice?Guide:?Family?Law?1?(The?Rutter?Group?1990)???8:163-8:163.3,?rev.?#1,?1991.) As?indicated,?the?leading?and?most?frequently?cited?cases?on?each?side?of?the?issue?are?Mitchell,?supra,?110?Cal.App.3d?220,?and?Andrade,?supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?330.?Mitchell?holds?that?a?transfer?by?one?spouse?is?valid?as?to?the?transferring?spouse’s?one-half?interest?in?the?property,?but?may?be?invalidated?by?the?nonconsenting?spouse?as?to?his?or?her?one-half?interest?in?the?property.?Andrade,?on?the?other?hand,?allows?the?nonconsenting?spouse?to?invalidate?the?transfer?entirely.?[1]?(See?fn.?6.)?Both?cases?are?similar?in?that?the?applicable?law?was?the?same,?the?transfer?was?deemed?by?the?court?not?to?be?a?gift,?title?to?the?property?was?held?in?the?names?of?both?spouses,?and?the?marriage?was?continuing?at?the?time?that?the?nonconsenting?spouse?moved?to?set?aside?the?transfer.?(In?re?Jones,?supra,?51?Bankr.?834,?837.)fn.?6 [1b]?Since?the?confusion?in?this?area?of?the?law?appears?to?have?developed?after?enactment?of?the?1975?amendments?to?the?community?property?laws,?we?must?determine?whether?the?amendments?are?such?that?the?reasoning?of?the?Britton?(supra,?4?Cal.2d?690)?court?is?no?longer?controlling?when?the?nonconsenting?spouse?brings?an?action?while?the?community?is?still?in?existence.?We?shall?conclude?that?our?reasoning?supporting?Britton?is?still?valid,?and?hence?the?Andrade?(supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?330)?line?of?cases?is?correct. In?our?view,?Mitchell?did?not?completely?analyze?section?5127?and?the?relevant?case?law.?The?Mitchell?court?reasoned?that?because?the?community?is?liable?for?the?contracts?of?either?spouse?which?are?made?after?marriage?(??5116),?the?community?realty?is?subject?to?execution?for?the?debts?contracted?[54?Cal.3d?37]?during?the?marriage.?Hence,?the?Mitchell?court?concluded,?it?follows?that?the?deed?of?trust?must?also?be?valid.?(Mitchell,?supra,?110?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?223.) This?analysis?ignores?section?5127’s?plain?language?requiring?the?signature?of?both?spouses?for?a?valid?transfer?of?community?realty.?Furthermore,?Mitchell?makes?no?mention?of?Britton?but?instead?relies?on?Gantner?v.?Johnson?(1969)?274?Cal.App.2d?869?[79?Cal.Rptr.?381]?(Gantner).?Yet,?Gantner?specifically?notes?that?its?discussion?concerned?the?”rules?applying?to?transfers?of?community?property?by?the?husband?as?manager?of?the?community?property.”?(Id.?at?p.?876,?italics?added.)fn.?7 In?its?disapproval?of?Mitchell?and?related?cases,?the?Andrade?court?pointed?out?that?since?Gantner,?supra,?274?Cal.App.2d?869,?section?5127?has?been?amended?to?provide?both?spouses?with?equal?management?and?control?of?community?real?property.?”It?is?highly?questionable?whether?the?rules?espoused?in?Gantner?survive?after?the?amendments?to?section?5127?which?have?significantly?altered?former?concepts?of?the?spouses’?respective?rights?and?responsibilities?concerning?their?community?property.”?(Andrade,?supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?337.)?Like?the?Andrade?court,?we?conclude?that?the?correct?rule?is?the?one?that?protects?each?spouse?from?the?unauthorized?acts?of?the?other?that?may?defeat?the?community?interests?in?the?real?property.?(Andrade,?supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?337.) Of?the?four?reasons?(see,?ante,?p.?34)?for?our?opinion?in?Britton,?only?one?is?called?into?question?by?the?1975?amendments.?In?Britton?we?said?that?allowing?the?husband’s?gift?of?community?real?property?to?stand?might?defeat?the?power?of?the?court?to?award?more?than?half?of?the?community?property?to?an?”innocent”?wife?at?the?time?of?dissolution.?(Britton,?supra,?4?Cal.2d?at?p.?692)?[3]?The?1975?Family?Law?Act?amendments?also?removed?the?concept?of?fault?in?divorce,?and?courts?are?now?generally?required?to?make?an?equal?division?of?the?community?property.?(??4800,?subd.?(a).)?However,?in?making?an?equal?division,?each?individual?piece?of?community?property?does?not?have?to?be?equally?divided.?(??4800,?subd.?(b).)?Although?the?court?may?not?award?a?greater?part?of?the?community?property?to?one?spouse,?it?can?determine?to?which?spouse?a?particular?piece?of?community?property?shall?be?awarded.?Since?the?court?retains?power?to?award?a?specific?asset?to?a?spouse,?[54?Cal.3d?38]?the?change?in?the?law?is?not?so?significant?as?to?undermine?our?holding?in?Britton.?The?other?reasons?underlying?our?decision?in?Britton?are?still?valid?and?support?the?right?of?the?nonconsenting?spouse?during?the?marriage?to?invalidate?the?transfer?in?its?entirety. More?importantly,?the?Britton?(supra,?4?Cal.2d?690)?and?Andrade?(supra,?138?Cal.App.3d?330)?line?of?cases?is?consistent?with?the?plain?language?of?section?5127.?[4]?”It?is?axiomatic?that?in?the?interpretation?of?a?statute?where?the?language?is?clear,?its?plain?meaning?should?be?followed.”?(Great?Lakes?Properties,?Inc.?v.?City?of?El?Segundo?(1977)?19?Cal.3d?152,?155?[137?Cal.Rptr.?154,?561?P.2d?244].)?[1c]?The?statute?requires?that?both?spouses?join?in?executing?”any?instrument”?conveying?”any?interest”?in?the?community’s?real?property.?(Italics?added.)?The?term?”any”?(particularly?in?a?statute)?means?”all”?or?”every.”?(California?State?Auto.?Assn.?Inter-Ins.?Bureau?v.?Warwick?(1976)?17?Cal.3d?190,?195?[130?Cal.Rptr.?520,?550?P.2d?1056]?[“From?the?earliest?days?of?statehood?we?have?interpreted?’any’?to?be?broad,?general?and?all?embracing.”];?Estate?of?Wyman?(1962)?208?Cal.App.2d?489,?492?[25?Cal.Rptr.?280];?Emmolo?v.?Southern?Pacific?Co.?(1949)?91?Cal.App.2d?87,?92?[204?P.2d?427].)?The?language,?”any?interest,”?would?include?the?consenting?spouse’s?one-half?undivided?interest.?Therefore,?under?the?plain?language?of?section?5127,?both?spouses?”must?join?in?executing?any?instrument”?encumbering?such?interest.fn.?8 Friedman?argues?that?encumbrances?under?section?5127?should?be?treated?differently?than?leases,?sales,?and?conveyances.?We?disagree.?[5]?As?the?United?States?Supreme?Court?has?stated,?”[it]?is?a?familiar?principle?of?statutory?construction?that?words?grouped?in?a?list?should?be?given?related?meaning.”?(Third?National?Bank?v.?Impac?Limited,?Inc.?(1974)?432?U.S.?312,?322?[53?L.Ed.2d?368,?376,?97?S.Ct.?2307];?see?also,?Schreiber?v.?Burlington?Northern,?Inc.?(1985)?472?U.S.?1,?8?[86?L.Ed.2d?1,?7,?105?S.Ct.?2458];?Securities?Industry?Ass’n?v.?Board?of?Governors?(1984)?468?U.S.?207,?218?[82?L.Ed.2d?158,?167-168,?104?S.Ct.?3003].)?In?each?of?these?cases?the?high?court?rejected?an?argument?that?one?word?in?a?list?should?be?construed?to?have?a?substantially?different?effect?than?others.?[1d]?Furthermore,?the?Mitchell?analysis,?which?Friedman?urges?us?to?adopt,?does?not?support?the?argument?that?encumbrances?should?be?treated?differently.?Mitchell?noted?that?Gantner,?supra,?274?Cal.App.2d?869,?876-877,?involved?a?conveyance,?and?then?applied?Gantner’s?analysis,?by?analogy,?to?cases?involving?encumbrances.?[54?Cal.3d?39]?The?Mitchell?court?did?not?indicate?that?encumbrances?should?in?any?way?be?treated?differently.?(Mitchell,?supra,?110?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?223.) Amicus?curiae?Mortgage?Institute?of?California?argues?that?after?the?1975?reforms,?the?power?of?either?spouse?to?transfer?community?property?is?greater?than?before?the?reforms.?In?effect,?it?argues?that?equal?management?concepts?lead?to?the?conclusion?that?both?spouses?should?now?be?able?to?transfer?community?property?during?the?marriage,?and?that?the?transfer?should?be?valid?as?to?the?consenting?spouse’s?one-half?interest.?However,?the?earlier?cases?upholding?a?husband’s?ability?to?transfer?his?one-half?community?property?interest?during?the?marriage?were?based?on?the?husband’s?power?as?sole?manager?of?the?community?property.?(See,?e.g.,?Gantner,?supra,?274?Cal.App.2d?at?p.?876.)?The?1975?reforms,?and?the?advent?of?concepts?of?equal?management?and?shared?responsibility?for?the?community?property,?support?our?interpretation?of?section?5127?as?requiring?both?spouses’?consent?for?the?effective?transfer?of?community?real?property. Amicus?curiae?Mortgage?Institute?of?California?also?contends?that?the?Legislature?has?expressed?its?approval?of?Mitchell?by?failing?to?enact?legislation?proposed?by?the?California?Law?Revision?Commission?that?would?have?expressly?overruled?that?case.?We?disagree.?In?our?view,?the?Law?Revision?Commission?did?not?believe?that?its?recommended?legislation?would?change?California?law.?The?commission?stated?that?enactment?of?its?recommendations?would?”[codify]?general?California?law?and?overrule[?]?the?contrary?case?of?Mitchell?….”?(Recommendations?Relating?to?Disposition?of?Community?Property?(Sept.?1983)?17?Cal.?Law?Revision?Com.?Rep.?(1984)?p.?279,?fn.?33.)fn.?9?It?is?apparent?that?the?commission?viewed?the?recommended?statutes?as?codifying?the?general?law?as?it?existed,?and?saw?Mitchell?as?an?aberrant?case,?inconsistent?with?general?California?law.?Given?the?deficiencies?in?the?Mitchell?analysis,?the?soundness?of?the?Britton?and?Andrade?line?of?cases,?and?our?own?interpretation?of?section?5127,?the?fact?that?Mitchell?has?not?specifically?been?legislatively?abrogated?is?not?sufficient?evidence?that?the?Legislature?approves?of?the?decision.fn.?10?[54?Cal.3d?40] III.?Transfers?to?Secure?Attorney?Fees In?the?present?case,?after?the?parties?had?separated,?but?before?a?dissolution?of?the?marriage,?Wife?unilaterally?encumbered?two?parcels?of?the?community’s?realty?to?secure?attorney?fees.?Husband?brought?an?action?to?quiet?title?to?the?community?realty.?As?the?character?of?the?property?as?community?property?had?not?changed?at?the?time?Wife?made?the?unilateral?encumbrance?and?at?the?time?Husband?challenged?the?encumbrance,?we?conclude?that?Husband?is?entitled?to?invalidate?the?encumbrance?in?its?entirety. Seeking?a?contrary?result,?Friedman?and?various?amicus?curiae?groups?have?advanced?some?policy?reasons?for?allowing?a?spouse?to?unilaterally?transfer?community?real?property?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?a?dissolution?proceeding.?Their?concerns?are?primarily?for?economically?weak?spouses.?Before?the?granting?of?pendente?lite?orders?for?litigation?expenses,?an?economically?weak?spouse?seeking?legal?representation?may?be?in?a?disadvantageous?position.?(See,?e.g.,?In?re?Marriage?of?Mulhern?(1973)?29?Cal.App.3d?988,?995?[106?Cal.Rptr.?78].)?Lacking?economic?parity?and?access?to?liquid?funds,?the?economically?weak?spouse’s?only?assets?available?for?the?payment?of?attorney?fees?may?consist?of?his?or?her?interest?in?the?community?real?property.?If?an?economically?weak?spouse?is?unable?to?take?advantage?of?his?or?her?interest?in?the?community?real?property,?then?that?spouse?may?either?have?to?retain?inexperienced?or?incompetent?counsel,?find?counsel?or?a?lender?willing?to?extend?unlimited,?unsecured?credit,?or?appear?in?propria?persona.?Moreover,?important?prehearing?discovery?may?not?be?possible?and?the?retention?of?experts?would?be?most?difficult. We?are?not?unmindful?of?the?concerns?of?economically?weak?spouses?which?are?expressed?by?amici?curiae.?Although,?sections?4370,?4370.5?and?5125.1,?subdivision?(e)?serve?to?protect?the?economically?weak?spouse?to?some?extent,?they?are?not?totally?adequate?to?assure?legal?representation.?Sections?4370?and?4370.5?permit?the?court,?during?the?pendency?of?a?dissolution?proceeding,?to?order?a?party?to?pay?attorney?fees?pendente?lite.?”The?basis?for?awarding?attorney’s?fees?is?that?each?party?must?have?access?to?legal?representation?in?order?to?preserve?all?of?his?or?her?rights.”?(In?re?Marriage?of?Barnert?(1978)?85?Cal.App.3d?413,?428?[149?Cal.Rptr.?616].)?Sections?4370?and?4370.5,?though?helpful?in?many?instances,?admittedly?do?not?always?guarantee?an?award,?or?an?adequate?award,?of?fees?to?a?spouse?without?funds.fn.?11?Moreover,?these?sections?may?also?have?the?unintended?[54?Cal.3d?41]?effect?of?placing?an?economically?weak?spouse?at?the?mercy?of?the?courts.fn.?12?(169?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?1215-1216.)?Section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e),?which?empowers?the?court?to?dispense?with?the?requirements?of?section?5127?in?certain?circumstancesfn.?13?may,?as?a?practical?matter,?not?always?prove?effective.?For?example,?a?spouse?who?is?without?funds?to?initially?hire?an?attorney?in?a?dissolution?proceeding?may?find?himself?or?herself?in?the?incongruous?position?of?also?having?to?hire?an?attorney?to?commence?an?action?under?section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e).?In?most?cases,?then,?section?5125.1,?subdivision?(e)?may?prove?to?be?an?illusory?remedy?for?the?economically?weak?spouse. Although?we?are?sympathetic?to?the?problems?economically?weak?spouses?may?have?in?obtaining?legal?representation?and?recognize?the?limitations?of?sections?4370,?4370.5,?and?5125.1,?subdivision?(e),?we?are?nonetheless?compelled?to?conclude?that?nothing?in?the?language?of?section?5127,?or?in?its?legislative?history,?allows?us?to?carve?out?an?exception?to?the?general?rule?against?unilateral?transfers?of?community?realty.?If?section?5127?is?to?be?amended?to?create?an?exception?allowing?a?spouse?to?unilaterally?transfer?community?realty?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?a?dissolution?proceeding,?it?is?the?task?of?the?Legislature?and?not?the?courts?to?create?that?exception.?”In?the?construction?of?a?statute?or?instrument,?the?office?of?the?judge?is?simply?to?ascertain?and?declare?what?is?in?terms?or?in?substance?contained?therein,?not?to?insert?what?has?been?omitted,?or?to?omit?what?has?been?inserted?….”?(Code?Civ.?Proc.,???1858.?See?also,?Moore?v.?Regents?of?University?of?California?(1990)?51?Cal.3d?120,?147?[271?Cal.Rptr.?146,?793?P.2d?479]?[“Complex?policy?choices?affecting?all?society?are?involved,?and?'[l]egislatures,?in?making?such?policy?decisions,?have?the?ability?to?gather?empirical?evidence,?solicit?the?advice?of?experts,?and?hold?hearings?at?which?all?interested?parties?present?evidence?and?express?their?views?….’?(Foley?v.?Interactive?Data?Corp.?[(1988)]?47?Cal.3d?654,?694,?fn.?31?[254?Cal.Rptr.?211,?765?P.2d?373].).”) While?we?recognize?that?the?separation?period?is?sometimes?treated?differently?from?the?ongoing?marriage,?this?different?treatment?is?based?on?specific?provisions?of?our?code?sections?and?is?not?the?result?of?judicial?fiat.?(See,?e.g.,?section?5118,?providing?that?the?earnings?and?accumulations?of?either?[54?Cal.3d?42]?spouse?during?separation?are?the?separate?property?of?that?spouse;?section?5120.140,?subdivision?(a)(2),?providing?that?debts?incurred?after?separation,?other?than?debts?for?the?necessaries?of?life,?are?the?separate?obligation?of?the?spouse?who?incurred?the?debt;?and?section?4359,?subdivision?(a),?providing?that?during?the?pendency?of?a?dissolution?proceeding,?the?court?may?issue?ex?parte?protective?orders?restraining?any?person?from?transferring,?encumbering,?hypothecating,?concealing?or?disposing?of?any?property,?real?or?personal,?whether?community,?quasi-community,?or?separate.)?Hence,?the?Legislature,?if?it?chooses,?may?decide?to?fashion?a?solution?to?the?problems?faced?by?economically?weak?spouses?in?dissolution?proceedings?in?some?fashion.?Given?the?plain?language?of?section?5127,?and?the?fact?that?community?property?does?not?change?its?character?as?such?upon?separation?of?the?spouses,?we?are?not?the?body?authorized?to?create?an?exception?to?the?statute. [6a]?We?also?note?that?the?Legislature?is?not?unaware?of?some?of?the?problems?we?discuss?above.?The?Legislature?recently?amended?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?provisions?relating?to?the?restraint?on?alienation?of?property,?which?is?contained?in?every?dissolution?summons?after?July?1,?1990.?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21,?subdivision?(a)(2)?(hereafter?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2))?sets?forth?the?provisions?of?the?”automatic”?restraining?order?and?now?concludes?that?”nothing?in?the?restraining?order?shall?preclude?the?parties?from?using?community?property?to?pay?reasonable?attorney’s?fees?in?order?to?retain?legal?counsel?in?the?action.” Amicus?curiae?asserts?that?by?enacting?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2),?the?Legislature?was?”carving?out”?an?exception?to?section?5127?to?allow?transfers?of?community?real?property?for?the?payment?of?attorney?fees.?The?dissent?maintains?that?when?”harmonized,”?section?5127?and?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?allow?a?spouse?to?unilaterally?transfer?community?real?property?to?secure?attorney?fees?in?a?dissolution?action.?Although?we?share?the?concern?for?economically?weak?spouses,?we?do?not?believe?that?either?the?plain?language?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?or?its?legislative?history?supports?the?conclusion?that?the?Legislature?intended?to?create?an?exception?to,?or?implicitly?alter?the?effect?of,?section?5127. As?a?preliminary?matter,?we?observe?that?the?provisions?of?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?do?not?even?apply?to?the?present?case.?Wife?unilaterally?encumbered?the?community?real?property?more?than?three?years?before?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)’s?effective?date?of?July?1,?1990.?As?we?have?often?observed,?”[n]o?part?of?[the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure]?is?retroactive,?unless?expressly?so?declared.”?(Code?Civ.?Proc.,???3.?See?also,?Aetna?Cas.?&?Surety?Co.?v.?Ind.?Acc.?Com.?(1947)?30?Cal.2d?[54?Cal.3d?43]?388,?393?[182?P.2d?159]?[“It?is?an?established?canon?of?interpretation?that?statutes?are?not?to?be?given?a?retrospective?operation?unless?it?is?clearly?made?to?appear?that?such?was?the?legislative?intent.?[Citations.]”].)?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?412.21?(a)(2)?contains?no?such?explicit?language?making?its?provisions?retroactive. […]

Times?Mirror?Co.?v.?Superior?Court?(State?of?California)?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?1325?,?283?Cal.Rptr.?893;?813?P.2d?240 [No.?S014461. Jul?22,?1991.] TIMES?MIRROR?COMPANY,?Petitioner,?v.?THE?SUPERIOR?COURT?OF?SACRAMENTO?COUNTY,?Respondent;?THE?STATE?OF?CALIFORNIA?et?al.,?Real?Parties?in?Interest. (Superior?Court?of?Sacramento?County,?No.?505002,?Fred?K.?Morrison,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Arabian,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Panelli,?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinions?by?Mosk,?J.,?with?Broussard,?J.,?concurring,?and?by?Kennard,?J.,?with?Broussard,?J.,?concurring.) COUNSEL Gibson,?Dunn?&?Crutcher,?Stephen?J.?Burns,?Rex?S.?Heinke,?Ragnhild?Reif,?Kelli?L.?Sager?and?Karen?N.?Fredericksen?for?Petitioner. Pillsbury,?Madison?&?Sutro,?Edward?P.?Davis,?Jr.,?Kevin?M.?Fong?and?Judy?Alexander?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Petitioner. No?appearance?for?Respondent. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Robert?L.?Mukai,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?N.?Eugene?Hill,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Richard?M.?Frank,?Cathy?A.?Neff?and?Ted?Prim,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Real?Parties?in?Interest. De?Witt?W.?Clinton,?County?Counsel?(Los?Angeles),?and?David?L.?Muir,?Deputy?County?Counsel,?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Real?Parties?in?Interest. OPINION ARABIAN,?J. This?case?arises?out?of?a?dilemma?inherent?in?the?very?nature?of?a?free?and?open?society.?An?informed?and?enlightened?electorate?is?essential?to?a?representative?democracy.?Yet?even?democratic?governments?[53?Cal.3d?1329]?require?some?degree?of?confidentiality?to?ensure,?among?other?things,?a?candid?exchange?of?ideas?and?opinions?among?responsible?officials.?This?tension?inevitably?leads?to?conflict,?and?conflict?invariably?leads?to?the?courthouse. The?question?before?us?is?whether,?under?the?California?Public?Records?Act?(Gov.?Code,???6250?et?seq.;?hereafter?the?Act),fn.?1?the?Governor?of?the?State?of?California?(Governor)?properly?refused?a?request?to?disclose?his?daily,?weekly?and?monthly?appointment?calendars?and?schedules.?For?the?reasons?set?forth?below,?we?conclude?that?the?records?were?properly?withheld. Factual?and?Procedural?Background In?August?1988,?a?reporter?for?the?Los?Angeles?Times?(Times)?wrote?the?Governor?requesting,?under?the?Act,?copies?of?his?”appointment?schedules,?calendars,?notebooks?and?any?other?documents?that?would?list?[the?Governor’s]?daily?activities?as?governor?from?[his]?inauguration?in?1983?to?the?present.”?The?Governor’s?legal?affairs?secretary?responded?that?the?information?requested?was?exempt?from?disclosure?under?section?6254,?subdivision?(l)?as?”correspondence?of?and?to?the?Governor?or?employees?of?the?Governor’s?office?….”fn.?2 After?its?request?to?reconsider?this?decision?was?denied,?the?Times?filed?suit?seeking?injunctive?and?declaratory?relief?to?obtain?disclosure?of?the?materials?requested.?In?opposition,?the?Governor?claimed?that?the?records?came?within?the?correspondence?exemption?of?section?6254,?subdivision?(l),?as?well?as?the?public?interest?exemption?of?section?6255,?which?applies?when?the?public?interest?in?nondisclosure?”clearly?outweighs”?the?public?interest?in?disclosure.fn.?3Specifically,?the?Governor?claimed?that?release?of?his?appointment?calendars?and?schedules?would?(1)?create?a?risk?to?his?personal?security,?and?(2)?inhibit?the?free?and?candid?exchange?of?ideas?necessary?to?the?decisionmaking?process. In?support?of?his?opposition,?the?Governor?submitted?several?declarations?explaining?the?process?by?which?his?appointment?calendars?and?schedules?[53?Cal.3d?1330]?are?created,?the?function?they?serve,?and?the?implications?of?their?public?disclosure.?Susan?Pederson,?the?Governor’s?scheduling?secretary,?explained?that?after?reviewing?requests?for?meetings?and?invitations,?she?drafts?a?”scheduling?memorandum”?which?is?then?reviewed?with?four?senior?staff?members?of?the?Governor’s?office.?A?final?scheduling?memorandum?and?a?”tentative?month-long?calendar”?are?then?prepared?in?consultation?with?the?Governor;?the?calendar?”is?a?schematic?representation?of?engagements?and?meetings?discussed?in?the?scheduling?memorandum.”?Thereafter,?a?finished?month-long?calendar?is?produced?which?identifies?the?Governor’s?”major?time?commitments?for?public?appearances?and?private?meetings.”?Copies?of?this?calendar?are?given?to?the?Governor,?a?”limited?number”?of?members?of?the?Governor’s?office,?the?Director?of?Finance,?the?Governor’s?security?director?and?those?responsible?for?the?Governor’s?transportation. Each?week?the?scheduling?secretary?also?formulates?a?schedule?for?the?two?upcoming?weeks,?which?incorporates?information?from?the?monthly?calendar?as?well?as?more?recently?approved?appointments?and?appearances.?The?schedule?for?the?first?week?is?designated?”final,”?and?that?for?the?second?is?designated?”advance.”?Lastly,?a?complete?daily?schedule?is?prepared?on?the?afternoon?or?evening?prior?to?each?working?day;?the?daily?schedule?”accounts?for?all?the?Governor’s?time?from?his?departure?from?home?in?the?morning?until?his?departure?from?the?office?in?the?evening.”?The?two-week?and?daily?schedules?are?distributed?to?the?same?persons?as?the?monthly?calendar.?According?to?Ms.?Pederson,?all?persons?receiving?the?monthly,?two-week?and?daily?schedules?”do?so?with?the?understanding?that?they?are?to?treat?the?schedule[s]?and?any?accompanying?material?as?confidential,?and?destroy?the?schedule?once?they?have?completed?their?use?of?it.”fn.?4?Ms.?Pederson?did?not?indicate?in?her?declaration?whether?or?to?what?extent?copies?of?the?final?calendars?and?schedules?are?normally?retained?by?herself,?the?Governor?or?anyone?else?in?the?Governor’s?office.fn.?5 The?level?of?detail?set?forth?in?the?daily?and?two-week?schedules?is?exhaustive.?Each?reflects,?for?example,?”the?timing?and?details?of?the?Governor’s?arrivals?and?departures?everywhere?he?goes?in?the?course?of?his?day?[53?Cal.3d?1331]?…?whether?and?when?family?members?and?traveling?companions?will?be?with?him,?the?particular?aircraft?or?other?means?of?transportation?to?be?used,?names?of?pilots?and?drivers,?airport?gate?departures,?specific?hotel?accommodations,?[and]?automobile?and?other?ground?arrangements.”?Thus,?according?to?Ms.?Pederson,?the?schedules?and?calendars?necessarily?reflect?the?daily?”patterns?and?habits?of?the?Governor,”?including?the?occasions?”when?he?is?likely?to?be?alone.” Dennis?Williams,?the?director?of?security?for?the?Governor,?also?submitted?a?declaration.?According?to?Mr.?Williams,?disclosure?of?the?Governor’s?schedule?”at?any?time?in?advance?of?the?period?to?which?they?pertain?would?seriously?impair?the?ability?of?[his]?office?to?assure?the?Governor’s?security,?and?would?constitute?a?potential?threat?to?the?Governor’s?safety,?because?the?information?they?contain?will?enable?the?reader?to?know?in?advance?and?with?relative?precision?when?and?where?the?Governor?may?be?found,?those?persons?who?will?be?with?him,?and?when?he?will?be?alone.”?Even?disclosure?of?outdated?schedules?would?pose?a?a?security?risk,?in?Mr.?Williams’s?opinion,?because?they?would?”enable?the?reader?to?discern?characteristic?habits?and?activity?patterns?followed?by?the?Governor,?from?which?opportunities?for?access?to?the?Governor’s?person?may?be?surmised.” The?Governor?also?submitted?a?declaration?in?support?of?his?opposition?to?the?Times?complaint.?In?it?he?asserted?that?disclosure?of?his?calendars?and?schedules?would?”be?detrimental?to?the?substantial?public?interest?now?served?by?protection?of?the?confidential?decisionmaking?processes?of?[his]?office?….”?He?explained?that?he?had?always?considered?his?schedules?and?calendars?to?be?confidential?and?had?required?his?advisors?to?treat?them?as?such,?”because?of?the?essential?character?of?many?of?the?meetings?and?appointments?reflected?in?these?papers,?because?of?the?decision?making?reflected?in?…?these?papers,?and?because?of?concerns?pertaining?to?security.” Elaborating?upon?the?potentially?adverse?consequences?of?disclosure?on?the?decisionmaking?process,?the?Governor?noted?that?his?office?requires?him?to?meet?with?people?of?wide-ranging?views?on?a?multiplicity?of?subjects.?Because?of?the?frequent?sensitivity?of?the?subjects?under?discussion,?”it?is?necessary,”?he?stated,?”that?the?meetings?themselves?be?fundamentally?private,?so?that?those?present?may?feel?free?to?express?their?candid?opinions?to?me?and?so?that?I?can?be?assured?of?the?candor?of?their?expressions?….”?Routine?disclosure?of?the?identities?of?the?persons?with?whom?the?Governor?meets,?he?asserted,?would?inhibit?the?deliberative?process,?in?some?instances?by?discouraging?persons?from?attending?meetings,?in?others?by?leading?to?unwarranted?inferences?about?the?subject?under?discussion.?Furthermore,?the?Governor?argued,?although?the?calendars?and?schedules?contain?”facts”?[53?Cal.3d?1332]?rather?than?opinions?or?advice,?they?necessarily?reflect?the?Governor’s?”deliberative?judgment”?as?to?those?persons,?issues?or?events?he?considers?to?be?of?sufficient?significance?to?occupy?his?time,?and?those?he?does?not.?Thus,?the?Governor?claimed?that?disclosure?of?his?calendars?and?schedules?could?substantially?impair?the?quality?of?his?decisions?and?the?decisionmaking?process?of?his?office. The?Times’s?motion?for?injunctive?and?declaratory?relief?was?heard?on?November?22,?1988.?Following?the?hearing,?the?trial?court?denied?the?Times’s?motion?for?injunctive?relief?as?well?as?its?request?for?an?in?camera?review,?finding?that?the?records?were?exempt?from?disclosure?for?each?of?the?reasons?urged?by?the?Governor.?However,?the?Court?of?Appeal?reversed,?holding?that?the?records?did?not?constitute?correspondence?under?the?Act;?that?disclosure?would?not?implicate?the?deliberative?process?of?government?”because?information?relating?to?the?content?of?meetings?is?not?sought”;?and?that?any?security?risk?to?the?Governor,?however?slight,?could?not?be?evaluated?without?examining?the?documents?themselves.?Accordingly,?the?Court?of?Appeal?remanded?to?the?superior?court?”for?an?in?camera?review,?segregation?of?any?information?posing?a?legitimate?security?risk,?and?disclosure?of?all?nonexempt?material.” Because?we?agree?with?the?trial?court?that?the?public?interest?in?not?disclosing?the?records?clearly?outweighs?the?public?interest?in?disclosure?(??6255),?we?shall?reverse?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal. Discussion Scope?of?Review Before?turning?to?the?merits,?we?address?a?threshold?issue?concerning?the?applicable?scope?of?review.?[1a]?Relying?on?section?6259,?subdivision?(c)?and?Freedom?Newspapers,?Inc.?v.?Superior?Court?(1986)?186?Cal.App.3d?1102?[231?Cal.Rptr.?189]?(hereafter?sometimes?Freedom?Newspapers),?the?Attorney?General?contends?the?Times?can?prevail?only?if?the?trial?court?acted?in?excess?of?its?jurisdiction.?An?erroneous?interpretation?of?the?Act,?abuse?of?judicial?discretion?or?lack?of?substantial?evidence?to?support?the?judgment?would?not,?he?asserts,?justify?reversal?of?the?trial?court’s?decision.?We?disagree. Prior?to?1984,?review?of?a?trial?court?order?either?directing?disclosure?of?a?public?record?or?refusing?disclosure?was?by?appeal.?In?1984,?however,?the?Legislature?substituted?a?writ?procedure?for?the?appellate?process?by?amending?section?6259?to?provide?as?follows:?”In?an?action?filed?on?or?after?January?1,?1985,?an?order?of?the?court,?either?directing?disclosure?by?a?[53?Cal.3d?1333]?public?official?or?supporting?the?decision?of?the?public?official?refusing?disclosure,?is?not?a?final?judgment?or?order?within?the?meaning?of?Section?904.1?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?from?which?an?appeal?may?be?taken,?but?shall?be?immediately?reviewable?by?petition?to?the?appellate?court?for?the?issuance?of?the?extraordinary?writ?of?review?as?defined?in?Section?1067?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure.”?(??6259,?subd.?(c);?Stats.?1984,?ch.?802,???1,?pp.?2804-2805.)fn.?6?Section?1067?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?states:?”The?writ?of?certiorari?may?be?denominated?the?writ?of?review.” In?Freedom?Newspapers,?Inc.?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?186?Cal.App.3d?1102,?the?Court?of?Appeal?considered?the?scope?of?review?available?under?a?writ?of?review?filed?pursuant?to?section?6259,?subdivision?(c).?In?that?case,?a?newspaper?had?filed?a?public-?records?request?for?certain?information?concerning?fees?paid?to?court-?appointed?lawyers?and?investigators?in?an?ongoing?murder?case.?The?trial?court?denied?the?request,?holding?that?the?public?interest?in?nondisclosure-the?defendant’s?right?to?a?fair?trial-outweighed?any?public?interest?in?disclosure. The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed,?despite?the?majority’s?view?that?the?ruling?was?erroneous.?Citing?the?seminal?cases?of?Abelleira?v.?District?Court?of?Appeal?(1941)?17?Cal.2d?280,?288?[109?P.2d?942,?132?A.L.R.?715],?and?Auto?Equity?Sales,?Inc.?v.?Superior?Court?(1962)?57?Cal.2d?450,?454?[20?Cal.Rptr.?321,?369?P.2d?937],?the?court?noted?that?the?granting?of?a?writ?of?review?or?certiorari?is?generally?confined?to?circumstances?in?which?the?trial?court?has?exceeded?its?jurisdiction,?either?in?the?fundamental?sense?that?it?lacks?power?over?the?person?or?subject?matter?of?the?litigation,?or?in?the?broader?sense?that?its?act?exceeds?the?defined?power?of?the?court,?whether?that?power?be?defined?by?the?Constitution,?a?statute,?or?a?court-developed?rule?under?the?doctrine?of?stare?decisis.?By?that?standard,?the?Court?of?Appeal?concluded,?[53?Cal.3d?1334]?the?trial?court?had?not?exceeded?its?jurisdiction?as?no?statute,?constitutional?provision?or?clearly?controlling?precedent?based?on?the?Act?compelled?a?contrary?result.?(Freedom?Newspapers,?supra,?186?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1109.) The?Court?of?Appeal?in?this?matter?purported?to?distinguish?Freedom?Newspapers?on?the?ground?that?the?trial?court’s?decision?in?the?latter?case?was?merely?”arguably?incorrect,”?while?the?lower?court’s?ruling?here?was?”fundamentally?erroneous”?under?settled?law.?The?distinction?is?not?persuasive.?As?discussed?in?the?following?section,?the?question?of?access?to?the?Governor’s?personal?calendars?and?schedules?is?a?difficult?and?unsettled?legal?issue;?whatever?its?substantive?merits,?nothing?in?the?record?suggests?that?the?trial?court’s?decision?constituted?an?act?in?excess?of?jurisdiction.?(Abelleira?v.?District?Court?of?Appeal,?supra,?17?Cal.2d?at?p.?288.) Nevertheless,?we?are?not?persuaded?that?our?scope?of?review?is?as?limited?as?the?Governor?urges?or?as?the?Freedom?Newspapers?court?concluded.?Both?assume?that?by?use?of?the?term?”writ?of?review”?the?Legislature?clearly?and?unambiguously?intended?to?preclude?review?of?lower?court?orders?on?the?merits.?That?assumption?is?unwarranted.?Apart?from?providing?for?issuance?of?the?extraordinary?writ?of?review?as?defined?in?section?1067?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure,?which?merely?states?that?”writ?of?review”?may?be?used?as?an?alternative?to?writ?of?certiorari,?section?6259,?subdivision?(c)?is?silent?as?to?the?scope?of?review?to?be?accorded?orders?under?the?Act. To?be?sure,?the?writ?of?review?is?traditionally?limited?to?acts?in?excess?of?jurisdiction.?(Abelleira?v.?District?Court?of?Appeal,?supra,?17?Cal.2d?228.)?[2]?[1b]?However,?the?legislative?history?of?the?1984?amendment?to?section?6259,?subdivision?(c)?reveals?that?the?exclusive?purpose?of?the?amendment?was?to?speed?appellate?review,?not?to?limit?its?scope.fn.?7?The?bill?which?contained?the?amendment,?Senate?Bill?No.?2222,?1983-1984?Regular?Session,?was?sponsored?by?a?news?organization,?the?California?Newspaper?Publishers’?Association.?It?was?inspired?by?a?case?in?which?a?newspaper?had?successfully?sued?in?the?superior?court?to?obtain?[53?Cal.3d?1335]?government?records,?but?was?forced?to?wait?several?years?while?the?case?was?on?appeal,?by?which?time?the?story?was?no?longer?newsworthy. The?perceived?evil?at?which?the?bill?was?aimed,?according?to?a?Senate?Judiciary?Committee?analysis,?was?”delays?of?the?appeal?process,?[by?means?of?which]?public?officials?are?frustrating?the?intent?of?the?laws?for?disclosure?….”?”The?sponsors?of?this?bill,”?the?analysis?continued,?”seek?to?correct?an?injustice?they?perceive?due?to?…?the?potential?for?…?public?agencies?to?delay?the?disclosure?of?public?documents.”?Accordingly,?the?amendment’s?goal?was?”to?prohibit?public?agencies?from?delaying?the?disclosure?of?public?records?by?appealing?a?trial?court?decision?and?using?continuances?in?order?to?frustrate?the?intent?of?the?Public?Records?Act.”?(Sen.?Com.?on?Judiciary,?Analysis?of?Sen.?Bill?No.?2222?(1983-1984?Reg.?Sess.).) The?synopsis?of?the?bill?prepared?for?the?Assembly?Committee?on?the?Judiciary?was?to?the?same?effect:?”The?bill?is?intended?to?expedite?appellate?review?of?judicial?rulings?relating?to?the?withholding?of?public?records?by?providing?for?the?review?to?be?by?petition?for?issuance?of?a?writ?rather?than?by?appeal.”?Although?the?Assembly?analysis?noted?that?writ?review?might?occasionally?result?in?a?summary?denial?rather?than?an?adjudication?on?the?merits,?there?is?no?indication?that?the?Legislature?intended?to?preclude?review?on?the?merits?altogether?in?every?case.?(Assem.?Com.?on?Judiciary,?Analysis?of?Sen.?Bill?No.?2222?(1983-1984?Reg.?Sess.)?Aug.?6,?1984.) Moreover,?we?believe?such?an?interpretation?to?be?more?fully?in?accord?with?the?Act’s?express?purpose?of?broadening?the?public’s?access?to?public?records.?(CBS,?Inc.?v.?Block?(1986)?42?Cal.3d?646,?651?[230?Cal.Rptr.?362,?725?P.2d?470].)?There?is?no?indication?that?the?Legislature,?in?amending?section?6259,?intended?sub?silentio?to?shelter?trial?court?orders,?particularly?those?denying?disclosure?of?public?records,?from?appellate?oversight.?Nor,?in?light?of?our?responsibility?to?avoid?absurd?results?(County?of?Sacramento?v.?Hickman,?supra,?66?Cal.2d?at?p.?849,?fn.?6),?can?we?believe?that?the?Legislature?could?have?intended?the?chaos?which?might?otherwise?result?from?a?construction?of?the?statute?disallowing?review?on?the?merits?of?conflicting?decisions?in?the?trial?courts. Finally,?we?note?that?effective?January?1,?1991,?the?Legislature?has?provided?that?orders?under?the?Act?”shall?be?immediately?reviewable?by?petition?to?the?appellate?court?for?issuance?of?an?extraordinary?writ.”?(??6259,?subd.?(c);?Stats.?1990,?ch.?908,???2.)?The?amendment?also?added?two?new?provisions:?(1)?the?petition?for?extraordinary?writ?must?be?filed?within?ten?days?after?receipt?of?notice?of?the?trial?court?order,?and?(2)?no?stay?of?the?trial?court?order?shall?be?permitted?”unless?the?petitioning?party?demonstrates?[53?Cal.3d?1336]?it?will?otherwise?sustain?irreparable?damage?and?probable?success?on?the?merits.”?(Ibid.) The?effect?of?the?1990?amendment?providing?for?review?by?”extraordinary?writ,”?including?presumably?writ?of?mandate,?is,?of?course,?to?make?it?plain?that?review?of?orders?subject?to?the?amendment?is?not?confined?to?acts?in?excess?of?jurisdiction.?The?analysis?of?the?bill?prepared?for?the?Assembly?Committee?on?the?Judiciary?indicates?that?the?recent?amendment?was?a?response?to?Freedom?Newspapers,?Inc.?v.?Superior?Court,?supra,?186?Cal.App.3d?1102,?and?was?intended?to?overrule?that?decision?by?”clarifying”?that?the?purpose?of?writ?review?is?to?speed?appellate?review,?not?to?preclude?reviw?on?the?merits.?As?the?analysis?explains,?”[T]he?courts?[(an?apparent?reference?to?Freedom?Newspapers)]?…?have?narrowly?interpreted?[the?1984?amendment]?to?review?questions?of?jurisdiction?and?not?broader?as?intended?by?the?original?statute.?This?bill?expands?the?extraordinary?writ?by?clarifying?that?courts?can?rule?quickly?on?substantive?issues.”?(Assem.?Com.?on?Judiciary,?Analysis?of?Sen.?Bill?No.?2272?(1989-1990?Reg.?Sess.),?italics?added.) Thus,?while?logic?and?history?support?a?broad?interpretation,?we?need?not?ultimately?determine?the?meaning?of?the?1984?amendment;?its?replacement?makes?plain?the?Legislature’s?intent?that?trial?court?orders?under?the?Act?shall?be?reviewable?on?their?merits.?As?a?practical?matter,?therefore,?declining?to?reach?the?substantive?issues?presented?here?would?only?delay?their?resolution?to?a?future?day;?judicial?economy?and?the?significance?of?the?questions?presented?militate?in?favor?of?a?decision?sooner?rather?than?later.?Therefore,?as?we?have?in?the?past,?we?shall?conduct?an?independent?review?of?the?trial?court’s?ruling;?factual?findings?made?by?the?trial?court?will?be?upheld?if?based?on?substantial?evidence.?(CBS,?Inc.?v.?Block,?supra,?42?Cal.3d?at?pp.?650-651.) Disclosure?of?the?Records We?turn?to?the?merits?of?the?Times’s?request?for?disclosure?of?the?Governor’s?appointment?calendars?and?schedules?from?his?inaugural?to?the?date?of?the?request,?a?period?of?approximately?five?years.?As?noted?earlier,?the?Governor?claimed?that?the?records?were?exempt?from?disclosure?on?three?separate?grounds:?the?correspondence?exemption?set?forth?in?section?6254,?subdivision?(l);?the?deliberative?process?privilege,?as?subsumed?under?the?”public?interest”?exception?of?section?6255;?and?the?threat?to?the?Governor’s?personal?security,?also?pursuant?to?section?6255. The?Correspondence?Exemption [3]?Section?6254,?subdivision?(l)?exempts?from?operation?of?the?Act?”correspondence?of?and?to?the?Governor?or?employees?of?the?Governor’s?[53?Cal.3d?1337]?office.”?Black’s?Law?Dictionary?defines?”correspondence”?as?constituting,?inter?alia,?the?”[i]nterchange?of?written?communications.”?(Black’s?Law?Dict.?(5th?ed.?1979)?p.?311.)?Seizing?on?this?broad?definition,?the?Governor?argues?that?his?calendars?and?schedules?constitute?”written?communications”?between?his?scheduling?secretary,?his?senior?staff?and?himself,?and?thus?fall?within?the?scope?of?the?exemption. The?Court?of?Appeal?rejected?the?contention,?however,?ruling?that?Webster’s?definition?of?correspondence?as?”communication?by?letters”?(Webster’s?New?Collegiate?Dict.?(9th?ed.?1984)?p.?293)?was?more?in?conformity?with?the?”ordinary?import?of?the?language”?of?the?statute?and?the?underlying?legislative?intent.?(People?ex?rel.?Younger?v.?Superior?Court?(1976)?16?Cal.3d?30,?43?[127?Cal.Rptr.?122,?544?P.2d?1322].) The?Court?of?Appeal?was?correct.?Prior?to?1975,?the?Act?exempted?from?disclosure?all?records?”[i]n?the?custody?of?or?maintained?by?the?Governor?or?employees?of?the?Governor’s?office?employed?directly?in?his?office?….”?(Stats.?1970,?ch.?1295,???1.5,?p.?2397.)?In?1975,?this?exemption?was?amended?to?limit?the?exemption?to?correspondence?of?or?to?the?Governor?and?his?staff.?(Stats.?1975,?ch.?1246,???3,?p.?3209.)?”Where?changes?have?been?introduced?to?a?statute?by?amendment?it?must?be?assumed?the?changes?have?a?purpose?….”?(Louisiana-Pacific?Corp.?v.?Humboldt?Bay?Mun.?Water?Dist.?(1982)?137?Cal.App.3d?152,?159?[186?Cal.Rptr.?833].) The?Governor’s?suggested?definition?of?correspondence?as?”written?communications”?is?so?broad?as?to?encompass?nearly?every?document?generated?by?the?Governor’s?office,?effectively?reinstating?the?original?exemption?and?rendering?the?1975?amendment?a?nullity.?Refining?the?definition,?as?the?Governor?suggests,?to?written?communications?”directed?to?an?identifiable?person?or?person?for?the?purpose?of?establishing?contact?with?the?recipient,”?accomplishes?little.?Even?under?this?definition,?the?exception?would?swallow?the?rule. Therefore,?we?conclude?that?for?purposes?of?the?Act,?the?correspondence?exemption?must?be?confined?to?communications?by?letter.?The?Governor’s?appointment?calendars?and?schedules?plainly?do?not?meet?this?definition,?and?therefore?are?not?exempt?from?disclosure?under?section?6254,?subdivision?(l). The?Public?Interest?Exemption [4a]?The?Governor?also?asserts?that?his?personal?calendars?and?schedules?are?exempt?from?disclosure?under?section?6255,?the?so-called?”public?[53?Cal.3d?1338]?interest”?exemption.?An?understanding?of?the?claim?requires?a?brief?discussion?of?the?purposes?and?structure?of?the?Act?and?the?exceptions?thereto. The?Act?replaced?a?hodgepodge?of?statutes?and?court?decisions?relating?to?disclosure?of?public?records.?(American?Civil?Liberties?Union?Foundation?v.?Deukmejian?(1982)?32?Cal.3d?440,?447?[186?Cal.Rptr.?235,?651?P.2d?822];?Shaffer?et?al.,?A?Look?at?the?California?Records?Act?and?Its?Exemptions?(1974)?4?Golden?Gate?L.Rev.?203,?210-213.)?Its?preamble?declares?”that?access?to?information?concerning?the?conduct?of?the?people’s?business?is?a?fundamental?and?necessary?right?of?every?person?in?this?state.”?(??6250;?American?Civil?Liberties?Union?Foundation?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?p.?447.)?In?this?and?other?respects?the?Act?was?modeled?on?its?federal?predecessor,?the?Freedom?of?Information?Act?(5?U.S.C.???552?et?seq.;?hereafter?FOIA),?which?was?”broadly?conceived”?(EPA?v.?Mink?(1973)?410?U.S.?73,?80?[35?L.Ed.2d?119,?128,?93?S.Ct.?827])?to?require?”full?agency?disclosure?unless?information?is?[statutorily]?exempted?….”?(Federal?Open?Market?Committee?v.?Merrill?(1979)?443?U.S.?340,?351?[61?L.Ed.2d?587,?598,?99?S.Ct.?2800].)?The?legislative?history?and?judicial?construction?of?the?FOIA?thus?”serve?to?illuminate?the?interpretation?of?its?California?counterpart.”?(American?Civil?Liberties?Union?Foundation?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?p.?447;?CBS,?Inc.?v.?Block,?supra,?42?Cal.3d?at?p.?651.) The?Act?sets?forth?numerous?categories?of?records?exempt?from?compelled?disclosure.?(??6254.)?[5]?In?addition,?section?6255?establishes?a?”catchall”?exemption?that?permits?the?government?agency?to?withhold?a?record?if?it?can?demonstrate?that?”on?the?facts?of?a?particular?case?the?public?interest?served?by?not?making?the?record?public?clearly?outweighs?the?public?interest?served?by?disclosure?of?the?record.” The?Act?does?not?specifically?identify?the?public?interests?that?might?legitimately?be?”served?by?not?making?the?record?public”?under?section?6255.?The?nature?of?those?interests,?however,?may?be?fairly?inferred,?at?least?in?part,?from?the?specific?exemptions?contained?in?section?6254.?As?one?commentator?has?observed:?”[S]ection?6255?was?designed?to?act?as?a?catchall?for?those?individual?records?similar?in?nature?to?the?categories?of?records?exempted?by?section?6254,?but?which?the?Legislature?determined,?in?balancing?the?competing?interests,?would?not?justify?disclosure?as?a?general?rule?….?[T]he?provisions?of?section?6254?will?provide?appropriate?indicia?as?to?the?nature?of?the?public?interest?in?nondisclosure?and?will?thus?aid?the?courts?in?determining?the?disclosability?of?a?document?under?section?6255.”?(Note,?The?California?Public?Records?Act:?The?Public’s?Right?of?Access?to?Governmental?Information?(1976)?7?Pacific?L.J.?105,?119-120,?italics?added;?see?also?American?Civil?Liberties?Union?Foundation?v.?Deukmejian,?supra,?32?Cal.3d?at?p.?462?(conc.?and?dis.?opn.?of?Bird,?C.?J.)?[“The?specific?[53?Cal.3d?1339]?exemptions?of?section?6254?are?of?considerable?aid?in?ascertaining?the?Legislature’s?conception?of?’the?public?interest?served?by?not?making?[a]?record?public?….’?”].) […]

Monterey?County?v.?Cornejo?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?1271?,?283?Cal.Rptr.?405;?812?P.2d?586 [No.?S014436.?Jul?18,?1991.] MONTEREY?COUNTY,?Plaintiff?and?Appellant,?v.?ROBIN?JOSEPH?CORNEJO,?Defendant?and?Respondent. (Superior?Court?of?Monterey?County,?No.?DA6628,?John?N.?Anton,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Arabian,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.J.,?Broussard,?Panelli?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?with?Kennard,?J.,?concurring.) COUNSEL John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorney?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Morris?Beatus?and?Josanna?Berkow,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Appellant. Ira?Reiner,?District?Attorney?(Los?Angeles),?Harry?B.?Sondheim?and?Brent?Riggs,?Deputy?District?Attorneys,?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Plaintiff?and?Appellant. Segretti,?Pitman?&?Erdbacher,?Robert?J.?Pitman?and?John?Viljoen?for?Defendant?and?Respondent. OPINION ARABIAN,?J. We?granted?review?to?determine?whether,?in?a?proceeding?brought?by?the?district?attorney?for?modification?of?a?child?support?order?and?determination?of?arrearages,?the?trial?court?may?allocate?to?the?noncustodial?parent?the?dependency?deduction?for?state?and?federal?tax?purposes.?We?hold?that?the?allocation?was?proper. Facts The?essential?facts?are?undisputed.?Respondent?Robin?Joseph?Cornejo?is?the?natural?father?of?Jason?A.,?born?to?Dina?G.?on?September?17,?1980.?The?couple?never?married.?[53?Cal.3d?1274] Respondent?separated?from?Dina?and?the?unborn?child?in?January?1980.?That?same?month,?Dina?began?to?receive?welfare?benefits?(Aid?to?Families?with?Dependent?Children?(AFDC))?from?Monterey?County?(County);?she?continued?to?receive?public?assistance?until?1983. In?April?1980,?the?district?attorney?of?the?County?filed?a?complaint?on?behalf?of?Dina?and?Jason?for?child?support?and?reimbursement?of?public?assistance.?Respondent?acknowledged?paternity?and?agreed?to?pay?child?support?of?$100?per?month.?He?also?stipulated?to?Dina’s?continued?physical?and?legal?custody?of?Jason.?The?district?attorney?filed?two?subsequent?actions?in?1983?for?upward?modifications?of?the?support?order?and?a?determination?of?arrearages. The?instant?proceeding?commenced?in?December?1988,?when?the?district?attorney?again?sought?an?increase?in?child?support,?to?$385?per?month,?and?a?determination?of?arrearages,?pursuant?to?Welfare?and?Institutions?Code?sections?11350.1?and?11475.1.fn.?1?In?a?responsive?declaration?respondent?agreed?to?monthly?child?support?payments?of?$250?and?$25?per?month?toward?arrearages.?At?the?same?time,?respondent?requested?that?he?be?allowed?to?claim?the?child?as?a?dependent?for?federal?and?state?income?tax?purposes.?Respondent?alleged?that?Dina?had?claimed?the?dependency?deduction?each?year?since?Jason’s?birth.?The?district?attorney?opposed?the?request?on?three?grounds:?(1)?that?the?trial?court’s?”jurisdiction”?in?child?support?enforcement?actions?under?section?11350.1?was?limited?to?the?issues?of?support?and?paternity?and?did?not?extend?to?tax?matters;?(2)?that?it?was?”inappropriate”?to?litigate?the?custodial?parent’s?tax?benefits?in?an?action?to?which?she?was?not?a?party;?and?(3)?that?a?reallocation?of?the?deduction?would?require?a?further?adjustment?of?child?support. The?parties?ultimately?agreed?upon?a?modification?of?child?support?to?$272?per?month,?and?arrearages?of?$2,546.32,?leaving?the?allocation?of?the?dependency?deduction?as?the?sole?unresolved?issue.?Following?a?hearing,?the?trial?court?ordered?that?respondent?”shall?be?allowed?to?claim?the?minor?child?…?as?a?dependent?for?state?and?federal?income?tax?purposes?until?further?order?of?the?court.” The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed,?holding?that?the?trial?court?possessed?the?statutory?authority?to?allocate?the?tax?deduction,?and?that?Dina’s?interests?were?adequately?protected?in?the?enforcement?proceeding.?[53?Cal.3d?1275] The?Attorney?General?filed?a?petition?for?review?on?behalf?of?the?County.fn.?2?In?addition?to?the?statutory?and?due?process?claims?raised?below,?the?County?alleged?that?federal?tax?law?divested?the?trial?court?of?jurisdiction?to?allocate?the?dependency?deduction?to?the?noncustodial?parent.?While?generally?we?will?not?consider?arguments?which?could?have?been?but?were?not?timely?made?in?the?Court?of?Appeal?(Cal.?Rules?of?Court,?rule?29(b)(1)),?we?granted?review?because?the?federal?preemption?claim?presents?an?important?jurisdictional?issue?of?first?impression?in?this?state. Discussion   Federal?Tax?Dependency?Exemption Our?analysis?centers?on?section?152(e)?of?the?Internal?Revenue?Code?(section?152(e)).?Prior?to?January?1,?1985,?the?pertinent?provisions?of?that?section?provided?that?unless?otherwise?specifically?agreed?to?in?a?writing?by?the?parties?or?addressed?in?a?court?decree,?a?noncustodial?parent?was?entitled?to?claim?a?dependency?exemption?where?that?parent?paid?more?than?$1,200?toward?the?support?of?a?child?in?any?calendar?year?and?the?custodial?parent?”did?not?clearly?establish?that?he?[or?she]?provided?more?for?the?support?of?such?child?during?the?calendar?year?than?the?parent?not?having?custody.”?(Int.Rev.?Code?of?1954,???152(e)(2)(B),?as?amended?in?1976.)?State?decisions?had?uniformly?interpreted?the?pre-1985?version?of?section?152(e)?to?allow?state?court?allocation?of?the?exemption?to?the?noncustodial?parent.?(See,?e.g.,?Grider?v.?Grider?(Ala.Civ.?App.?1979)?376?So.2d?1103;?Greeler?v.?Greeler?(Minn.Ct.App.?1985)?368?N.W.2d?2;?Morphew?v.?Morphew?(Ind.Ct.App.?1981)?419?N.E.2d?770;?Pettitt?v.?Pettitt?(La.Ct.App.?1972)?261?So.2d?687;?Westerhof?v.?Westerhof?(1984)?137?Mich.App.?97?[357?N.W.2d?820];?Niederkorn?v.?Niederkorn?(Mo.Ct.App.?1981)?616?S.W.2d?529;?MacDonald?v.?MacDonald?(1982)?122?N.H.?339?[443?A.2d?1017].) Section?152(e)?was?problematic?for?the?Internal?Revenue?Service?(IRS),?however,?because?it?often?involved?the?IRS?as?an?unwilling?mediator?in?factual?disputes?between?divorced?or?separated?parents?over?which?parent?provided?more?support?for?the?child?and?was?thus?entitled?to?the?dependency?exemption.?Accordingly,?the?law?was?amended?by?the?Tax?Reform?Act?of?1984?(Pub.L.?No.?98-369,?98?Stat.?494)?to?provide?that?the?custodial?parent?is?always?entitled?to?the?exemption?unless?he?or?she?signs?a?written?declaration?disclaiming?the?child?as?an?exemption?and?the?noncustodial?parent?[53?Cal.3d?1276]?attaches?the?declaration?to?his?or?her?return.?(Int.Rev.?Code?of?1954,???152(e)(2).)fn.?3 The?reasons?for?the?amendment?to?section?152(e)?are?set?forth?in?the?legislative?history?of?the?Tax?Reform?Act?of?1984,?as?follows:?”The?present?rules?governing?the?allocations?of?the?dependency?exemption?are?often?subjective?and?present?difficult?problems?of?proof?and?substantiation.?The?Internal?Revenue?Service?becomes?involved?in?many?disputes?between?parents?who?both?claim?the?dependency?exemption?based?on?providing?support?over?the?applicable?thresholds.?The?costs?to?the?parties?and?the?Government?to?resolve?these?disputes?is?relatively?high?and?the?Government?generally?has?little?tax?revenue?at?stake?in?the?outcome.?The?committee?wishes?to?provide?more?certainty?by?allowing?the?custodial?spouse?the?exemption?unless?the?spouse?waives?his?or?her?right?to?claim?the?exemption.?Thus,?dependency?disputes?between?parents?will?be?resolved?without?the?involvement?of?the?Internal?Revenue?Service.”?(Legislative?History?of?the?Deficit?Reduction?Act?of?1984?(Pub.L.?No.?98-369)?H.R.Rep.?No.?432,?pt.?II,?98th?Cong.,?2d?Sess.,?reprinted?in?1984?U.S.?Code?Cong.?&?Admin.?News,?pp.?697,?1140.) Since?the?amendment?to?section?152(e),?the?vast?majority?of?jurisdictions?considering?the?issue?have?concluded?that?state?courts?retain?jurisdiction?to?allocate?dependency?exemptions?to?noncustodial?parents.?(Gamble?v.?Gamble?(Ala.Civ.App.?1990)?562?So.2d?1343;?(Lincoln?v.?Lincoln?(1987)?155?Ariz.?272?[746?P.2d?13];?Serrano?v.?Serrano?(1989)?213?Conn.?1?[566?A.2d?413];?In?re?Marriage?of?Einhorn?(1988)?178?Ill.App.3d?212?[533?N.E.2d?29];?Ritchey?v.?Ritchey?(Ind.Ct.App.?1990)?556?N.E.2d?1376;?In?re?Marriage?of?Kerber?(Iowa?Ct.App.?1988)?433?N.W.2d?53;?Hart?v.?Hart?(Ky.Ct.App.?1989)?774?S.W.2d?455;?Rovira?v.?Rovira?(La.Ct.App.?1989)?550?So.2d?1237;?Wassif?v.?Wassif?(1989)?77?Md.App.?750?[551?A.2d?935];?Bailey?v.?Bailey?(1989)?27?Mass.App.?502?[540?N.E.2d?187];?Fudenberg?v.?Molstad?(Minn.Ct.App.?1986)?390?N.W.2d?19;?Nichols?v.?Tedder?(Miss.?1989)?547?So.2d?766?[77?A.L.R.4th?757];?Corey?v.?Corey?(Mo.Ct.App.?1986)?712?S.W.2d?708;?In?re?Marriage?of?Milesnick?(1988)?235?Mont.?88?[765?P.2d?751];?Babka?v.?Babka?(1990)?234?Neb.?674?[452?N.W.2d?286];?Gwodz?v.?Gwodz?(1989)?234?N.J.?Super.?56?[560?A.2d?85];?Zogby?v.?Zogby?(1990)?158?A.D.2d?974?[551?N.Y.S.2d?126];?Cohen?v.?Cohen?(1990)?100?N.C.App.?334?[396?S.E.2d?344];?Fleck?v.?Fleck?(N.D.?1988)?427?N.W.2d?355;?Hughes?v.?Hughes?(1988)?35?Ohio?St.3d?165?[518?N.E.2d?1213],?cert.?den.?488?U.S.?846?[102?L.Ed.?97,?109?S.Ct.?124];?Hooper?v.?Hooper?(Tenn.App.?1988);?Motes?v.?Motes?(Utah?Ct.App.?1989)?786?P.2d?232;?In?re?Marriage?of?Peacock?(1989)?54?Wn.App.?12?[771?P.2d?767];?Cross?[53?Cal.3d?1277]?v.?Cross?(W.Va.?1987)?363?S.E.2d?449;?Pergolski?v.?Pergolski?(1988)?143?Wis.2d?166?[420?N.W.2d?414].)fn.?4 As?the?court?in?Motes?v.?Motes,?supra,?786?P.2d?232,?succinctly?stated,?”the?amendment?was?merely?intended?to?enhance?the?administrative?convenience?of?the?IRS,?not?to?interfere?with?state?court?prerogatives.”?(Id.?at?p.?237;?see?also?Fudenberg?v.?Molstad,?supra,?390?N.W.2d?at?p.?21?[“State?court?allocation?of?the?exemption?does?not?interfere?with?Congressional?intent.?It?does?not?involve?the?IRS?in?fact-finding?determinations.?State?court?involvement?has?no?impact?on?the?IRS.?Thus,?allocation?of?the?exemption?is?permissible.”].) The?same?courts?also?generally?agree?that,?while?a?court?order?by?itself?is?insufficient?under?section?152(e)?to?accomplish?an?allocation?to?the?noncustodial?parent,?state?trial?courts?retain?the?authority?to?allocate?the?dependency?exemption?by?ordering?the?custodial?parent?to?execute?the?necessary?waiver.?(See,?e.g.,?Cross?v.?Cross,?supra,?363?S.E.2d?at?p.?457;?Wassif?v.?Wassif,?supra,?551?A.2d?at?p.?940;?Motes?v.?Motes,?supra,?786?P.2d?at?pp.?236-239;?Nichols?v.?Tedder,?supra,?547?So.2d?at?pp.?772-780;?Fudenberg?v.?Molstad,?supra,?390?N.W.2d?at?p.?21;?Pergolski?v.?Pergolski,?supra,?420?N.W.2d?at?p.?417;?In?re?Marriage?of?Milesnick,?supra,?765?P.2d?at?p.?754;?Lincoln?v.?Lincoln,?supra,?746?P.2d?at?pp.?16-17;?In?re?Marriage?of?Einhorn,?supra,?533?N.E.2d?at?pp.?36-?37;fn.?5?see?also?McKenzie?v.?Jahnke?(N.D.?1988)?[53?Cal.3d?1278]?432?N.W.2d?556,?557;?In?re?Marriage?of?Lovetinsky?(Iowa?Ct.App.?1987)?418?N.W.2d?88,?90;?and?compare?Jensen?v.?Jensen?(1988)?104?Nev.?95?[753?P.2d?342,?345]?[trial?court?may?exercise?its?equitable?powers?to?compel?the?custodial?parent?to?execute?a?waiver,?but?only?if?a?similar?economic?result?cannot?be?achieved,?as?a?matter?of?law,?by?adjusting?alimony?and?child?support?to?achieve?after-tax?financial?parity].) As?the?court?in?Cross?v.?Cross,?supra,?363?S.E.2d?449,?cogently?explained:?”What?the?new?Code?section?sought?to?achieve?was?certainty?in?the?allocation?of?the?dependency?exemption?for?federal?tax?administration?purposes.?By?placing?the?dependency?exemption?in?the?custodial?parent?unless?a?waiver?is?executed,?the?new?statute?relieves?the?Internal?Revenue?Service?of?litigation.?The?new?statute?is?entirely?silent?concerning?whether?a?domestic?court?can?require?a?custodial?parent?to?execute?a?waiver,?and?this?silence?demonstrates?Congress’s?surpassing?indifference?to?how?the?exemption?is?allocated?as?long?as?the?IRS?doesn’t?have?to?do?the?allocating.”?(Id.?at?p.?457,?original?italics.)?Indeed,?in?the?absence?of?any?conflict?with?the?congressional?purpose,?and?in?light?of?the?long-standing?state?court?practice?of?allocating?dependency?exemptions?pursuant?to?their?equitable?powers?in?domestic?relations?cases,?it?is?eminently?reasonable?to?infer?that?if?Congress?had?intended?to?forbid?state?courts?from?allocating?the?exemptions?by?ordering?the?waiver?to?be?signed,?it?would?plainly?have?”said?so.”?(Id.?at?p.?458;?accord?Motes?v.?Motes,?supra,?786?P.2d?at?p.?236;?Wassif?v.?Wassif,?supra,?551?A.2d?at?p.?940;?see?also?Hisquierdo?v.?Hisquierdo?(1979)?439?U.S.?572,?581?[59?L.Ed.2d?1,?11,?99?S.Ct.?802]?[In?family?law?matters?”this?Court?has?limited?review?under?the?Supremacy?Clause?to?a?determination?whether?Congress?has?’positively?required?by?direct?enactment’?that?state?law?be?preempted.”].) A?small?minority?of?courts?have?concluded?otherwise,?holding?either?that?the?1984?amendment?to?section?152(e)?divests?state?courts?of?their?traditional?authority?to?allocate?the?dependency?exemption?(Lorenz?v.?Lorenz?(1988)?166?Mich.App.?58?[419?N.W.2d?770]),?or?that?even?if?state?courts?may?consider?the?exemption?in?awarding?child?or?spousal?support,?they?may?not?order?custodial?parents?involuntarily?to?execute?the?required?waiver.?(Sarver?v.?Dathe?(S.D.?1989)?439?N.W.2d?548;?McKenzie?v.?Kinsey?(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.?1988)?532?So.2d?98;?Brandriet?v.?Larsen?(S.D.?1989)?442?N.W.2d?455.)fn.?6?We?find?these?decisions?to?be?singularly?unpersuasive.?[53?Cal.3d?1279] Michigan?is?the?only?jurisdiction?which?has?clearly?adopted?the?view?that?the?amendments?to?section?152(e)?”divested?state?courts?of?jurisdiction?over?which?party?could?take?the?exemptions.”?(Lorenz?v.?Lorenz,?supra,?419?N.W.2d?at?p.?771)?Lorenz?engaged?in?little?or?no?analysis?beyond?simply?noting?that?section?152(e)?does?not?expressly?authorize?state?authority?in?this?area.?As?discussed?earlier,?however,?neither?does?the?statute?prohibit-expressly?or?impliedly-a?state?court’s?requiring?the?execution?of?a?waiver.?So?long?as?the?declaration?is?signed?by?the?custodial?parent?and?attached?to?the?return?of?the?noncustodial?parent,?the?federal?goal?of?administrative?clarity?and?convenience?is?served;?the?statute?manifests?utter?indifference?to?whether?the?declaration?was?signed?voluntarily?or?pursuant?to?court?order. The?decisions?holding?that?section?152(e)?precludes?an?involuntary?waiver?of?the?dependency?exemption?are?equally?without?merit.?The?Florida?District?Court?of?Appeal?rejected?the?majority?view?on?the?ground?that?”deductions?and?exemptions?…?are?not?to?be?extended?beyond?the?clear?import?of?the?language?used”?(McKenzie?v.?Kinsey,?supra,?532?So.2d?at?p.?100,?fn.?3),?while?the?South?Dakota?Supreme?Court?in?Brandriet?v.?Larsen?concluded?that?the?amendment?to?section?152(e)?”appear[s]?to?contemplate?a?’voluntary’?waiver.”?(442?N.W.2d?at?p.?459.)?As?pointed?out?earlier,?however,?section?152(e)?plainly?grants?the?noncustodial?parent?the?right?to?an?exemption?if?he?or?she?obtains?a?declaration?from?the?custodial?parent;?the?statute?is?absolutely?silent?as?to?whether?or?not?a?state?court?may?direct?the?custodial?parent?to?execute?the?declaration.?Thus,?as?the?court?in?Motes?v.?Motes,?supra,?786?P.2d?232,?aptly?noted,?”the?McKenzie?court?offends?the?very?theory?it?purports?to?uphold?by?imposing?prohibitions?on?state?courts?which?are?not?expressly?or?impliedly?imposed?by?section?152.”?(Id.?at?p.?239.) Furthermore,?as?we?discuss?more?fully?below,?all?of?the?foregoing?decisions?have?recognized-as?indeed?they?must-that?the?dependency?exemption?provides?a?financial?benefit?to?the?parent?entitled?to?claim?it?and?thus?must?be?considered?in?setting?child?and?alimony?support;?indeed,?in?three?of?the?decisions?where?the?exemption?was?held?to?have?been?improperly?awarded?to?the?noncustodial?parent?(Lorenz?v.?Lorenz,?supra,?419?N.W.2d?at?p.?772;?Davis?v.?Fair,?supra,?707?S.W.2d?at?p.?718;?Sarver?v.?Dathe,?supra,?439?N.W.2d?at?p.?552),?the?matter?was?remanded?to?the?trial?court?to?reduce?the?previously?awarded?child?support?and?alimony?in?light?of?the?noncustodial?parent’s?loss?of?this?financial?benefit.?Thus,?as?several?courts?have?observed,?[53?Cal.3d?1280]?invalidating?the?allocation?constitutes?little?more?than?a?perverse?exercise?in?futility:?”[T]he?minority?view?forces?state?courts?to?achieve?financial?parity?indirectly,?by?downwardly?adjusting?otherwise?appropriate?alimony?and?child?support,?rather?than?achieving?parity?directly,?by?sensibly?allocating?the?exemptions.”?(Motes?v.?Motes,?supra,?786?P.2d?at?p.?239;?accord?Cross?v.?Cross,?supra,?363?S.E.2d?at?pp.?458-459;?Nichols?v.?Tedder,?supra,?547?So.2d?at?p.?779;?Gamble?v.?Gamble,?supra,?562?So.2d?at?p.?1346.) Finally,?as?many?states?have?recognized,?practical?considerations?militate?strongly?in?favor?of?states?retaining?discretion?to?allocate?the?exemption?by?ordering?the?execution?of?a?waiver.?”The?facts?of?life?are?that?income?tax?exemptions?are?valuable?only?to?persons?with?income,?and?up?to?a?certain?point,?the?higher?the?income?the?more?valuable?exemptions?become?because?of?the?progressivity?of?the?federal?income?tax.”?(Cross?v.?Cross,?supra,?363?S.E.2d?at?p.?459;?accord?Nichols?v.?Tedder,?supra,?547?So.2d?at?pp.?776-777;?Motes?v.?Motes,?supra,?786?P.2d?at?p.?239.)?The?respective?incomes?of?the?parents?may?be?such?that?if?the?noncustodial?parent?is?allowed?the?exemption,?his?or?her?income?tax?may?be?reduced?by?an?amount?greater?than?the?increase?in?the?tax?liability?of?the?custodial?parent?deprived?of?the?exemption.?This?circumstance?will?obtain?where,?as?is?often?the?case,?the?custodial?parent’s?adjusted?gross?income?is?less?than?the?adjusted?gross?income?of?the?noncustodial?parent.?(See?Nichols?v.?Tedder,?supra,?547?So.2d?at?pp.?773-775.) In?such?a?case,?the?effect?of?awarding?the?exemption?to?the?noncustodial?parent?is?to?increase?the?after-tax?spendable?income?of?the?family?as?a?whole,?which?may?then?be?channeled?into?child?support?or?other?payments.?(Nichols?v.?Tedder,?supra,?547?So.2d?at?pp.?774-775.)?To?deny?state?courts?the?power?to?allocate?the?exemption?in?these?circumstances?would?only?”maximize?the?federal?taxes?to?be?paid?to?the?detriment?of?the?parents?and?the?children.”?(Ibid.;?accord?Motes?v.?Motes,?supra,?786?P.2d?at?p.?239;?Cross?v.?Cross,?supra,?363?S.E.2d?at?p.?459;?Young?v.?Young?(1990)?182?Mich.App.?643?[453?N.W.2d?282,?289]?(conc.?opn.?of?Sawyer,?J.).)?Consequently,?it?is?eminently?reasonable?for?a?trial?court?to?allocate?the?dependency?exemption?to?the?noncustodial?parent?in?the?higher?income?bracket,?and?increase?the?child?support?payments?to?offset?the?cash?value?of?the?exemption. In?sum,?we?find?nothing?in?the?1984?amendment?to?section?152(e)?that?precludes?our?state?trial?courts?from?exercising?their?traditional?equitable?power?to?allocate?the?dependency?exemption?to?the?noncustodial?parent?by?ordering?the?custodial?parent?to?execute?a?declaration?waiving?the?exemption.?In?the?instant?case,?however,?we?note?that?the?trial?court?assigned?the?tax?exemption?for?the?minor?child?to?respondent?but?did?not?order?the?custodial?parent,?Dina,?to?sign?the?necessary?declaration?which?must?be?[53?Cal.3d?1281]?attached?to?respondent’s?tax?return.?Nevertheless,?it?appears?from?the?record?that?the?trial?court?fully?intended?to?allocate?the?exemption?in?accordance?with?section?152(e).fn.?7?Accordingly,?the?matter?will?be?remanded?to?the?trial?court?to?make?clear?that?Dina?is?to?execute?the?requisite?declaration?in?consideration?of?the?increased?child?support?she?will?be?receiving.fn.?8 Due?Process [2]?Apart?from?the?question?of?federal?preemption,?the?Attorney?General?contends?that?allocation?of?the?exemption?to?the?noncustodial?parent?in?a?proceeding?in?which?the?custodial?parent?is?not?a?party?violates?the?latter’s?due?process?rights.?We?do?not?agree. As?noted?earlier,?the?County,?represented?by?its?district?attorney,?brought?this?action?on?behalf?of?the?mother?pursuant?to?sections?11475.1?and?11350.1.?Both?statutes?were?enacted?by?the?California?Legislature?as?a?precondition?to?the?state’s?participation?in?the?federal?AFDC?program.?(See????10600?et?seq.?&?11200?et?seq.)?A?1975?amendment?to?title?IV?of?the?federal?Social?Security?Act?mandates?that?states?which?participate?in?the?AFDC?program?shall?provide?child?support?collection?services?to?all?individuals,?whether?or?not?they?are?receiving?public?assistance.?(42?U.S.C.???654(6)(A);?45?C.F.R.???302.33(a).) Section?11475.1?implements?this?mandate.?At?the?time?of?these?proceedings,?the?statute?specifically?provided?in?part?that?the?district?attorney?”shall?have?the?responsibility?for?promptly?and?effectively?enforcing?child?and?spousal?support?obligations”?and?that?the?district?attorney?”shall?take?appropriate?action,?both?civil?and?criminal,?to?enforce?this?obligation?when?the?child?is?receiving?public?assistance,?including?Medi-Cal,?and?when?requested?to?do?so?by?the?individual?on?whose?behalf?enforcement?efforts?will?be?made?when?the?child?is?not?receiving?public?assistance?….”fn.?9?(??11475.1,?subd.?(a);?Worth?v.?Superior?Court?(1989)?207?Cal.App.3d?1150,?1154?[255?Cal.Rptr.?304].) Section?11350.1?specifies?the?procedures?to?be?followed?and?limits?the?issues?to?be?litigated?in?actions?brought?under?section?11475.1.?Section?[53?Cal.3d?1282]?11350.1?reads?in?part?as?follows:?”Notwithstanding?any?other?statute,?in?any?action?brought?by?the?district?attorney?for?child?support?of?a?minor?child?or?children,?the?action?may?be?prosecuted?in?the?name?of?the?county?on?behalf?of?the?child,?children,?or?caretaker?parent.?The?caretaker?parent?shall?not?be?a?necessary?party?in?the?action?but?may?be?supoenaed?as?a?witness.?In?an?action?under?this?section?there?shall?be?no?joinder?of?actions,?or?coordination?of?actions,?or?cross-complaints,?and?the?issues?shall?be?limited?strictly?to?the?question?of?paternity,?if?applicable,?and?child?support?….?[?]?…?Nothing?contained?in?this?section?shall?be?construed?to?prevent?the?parties?from?bringing?an?independent?action?under?the?Family?Law?Act?(Part?5?(commencing?with?Section?4000)?of?Division?4?of?the?Civil?Code)?or?otherwise,?and?litigating?the?issue?of?support.?In?that?event,?the?court?in?those?proceedings?shall?make?an?independent?determination?on?the?issue?of?support?which?shall?supersede?the?support?order?made?pursuant?to?this?section.” Although?contested?below,?the?relevance?of?the?dependency?exemption?to?the?issue?of?child?support?and?the?authority?of?the?trial?court?under?section?11350.1?to?allocate?the?exemption,?are?now?conceded?by?the?Attorney?General.?To?be?sure,?section?11350.1?limits?the?triable?issues?to?paternity?and?child?support.?Both?statutory?and?case?law?make?clear,?however,?that?the?dependency?exemption?is?highly?pertinent?to?the?issue?of?child?support,?and?is?therefore?a?proper?subject?of?consideration?in?enforcement?proceedings?undertaken?by?the?County.?Section?11476.1,?subdivision?(g)?directs?that?in?determining?the?noncustodial?parent’s?reasonable?ability?to?pay,?”any?relevant?circumstances?set?out?in?Section?246?of?the?Civil?Code?shall?be?considered.”?Civil?Code?section?246?requires?the?court?to?consider,?inter?alia,?the?earning?capacity?and?needs?of?each?party?(subd.?(a)),?the?obligations?and?assets?of?each?(subd.?(b)),?and?any?other?factors?which?the?court?deems?just?and?equitable?(subd.?(h)).?(See?Van?Diest?v.?Van?Diest?(1968)?266?Cal.App.2d?541,?545?[72?Cal.Rptr.?304]?[“Circumstances?to?be?considered?by?the?trial?judge?in?awarding?…?child?support?are?the?needs?of?the?parties?and?the?ability?to?meet?those?needs,?including?property?owned,?obligations?to?be?met,?ability?to?earn?and?actual?earnings.”].) Clearly?the?parents’?income?tax?liability?is?an?”obligation?to?be?met”?under?this?rubric?(In?re?Marriage?of?Neal?(1979)?92?Cal.App.3d?834,?847?[155?Cal.Rptr.?157])?and?the?allocation?of?the?dependency?exemption?a?”just?and?equitable”?factor?to?be?considered?in?the?determination?of?the?amount?to?be?paid.?(Fuller?v.?Fuller?(1979)?89?Cal.App.3d?405,?409?[152?Cal.Rptr.?467].)?As?alluded?to?earlier,?nearly?every?state?to?consider?the?matter?has?concluded?that,?in?the?words?of?the?Iowa?Court?of?Appeals:?”[D]ependency?deductions?are?connected?directly?with?the?requirements?of?a?noncustodial?[53?Cal.3d?1283]?parent?to?provide?support?and?the?allocation?of?the?allowance?has?a?direct?effect?on?the?financial?resources?available?to?the?child.”?(In?re?Marriage?of?Lovetinsky,?supra,?418?N.W.2d?at?p.?90;?See?also?Baird?v.?Baird?(Mo.Ct.App.?1988)?760?S.W.2d?571,?573?[allocation?of?the?dependency?exemption?”may?directly?affect?the?entire?financial?position?of?each?party.”];?In?re?Marriage?of?Fowler,?supra,?554?N.E.2d?at?p.?243?[“The?allocation?of?the?tax?exemption?is?an?element?of?support,?over?which?a?trial?court?has?considerable?discretion.”];?Sarver?v.?Dathe,?supra,?439?N.W.2d?at?p.?551?[“[A]llocation?of?this?tax?exemption?affects?the?financial?situation?of?the?parties?and?constitutes?a?factor?in?considering?ability?to?pay?child?support.?These?are?absolutely?interlocking?considerations.”].) Notwithstanding?the?undisputed?relevance?of?the?dependency?exemption?to?the?issue?of?child?support,?the?Attorney?General?contends?that?consideration?of?the?tax?matter?in?a?proceeding?to?which?the?custodial?parent?was?not?a?party,?such?as?a?child?support?enforcement?action?brought?by?the?district?attorney,?violates?the?custodial?parent’s?due?process?rights.?We?do?not?agree.?As?noted?earlier,?the?County,?represented?by?the?district?attorney,?filed?this?action?”on?behalf?of”?the?minor?child?and?Dina,?the?custodial?parent.?(???11350.1,?11475.1,?subd.?(a).)?Although?it?is?true?that?she?was?not?a?party,?Dina?fully?cooperated?with?the?district?attorney’s?efforts?on?her?behalf,?submitted?financial?disclosure?statements?and?was?available?to?testify?as?a?witness.?Both?parents?have?an?equal?responsibility?under?the?law?to?support?and?educate?their?child.?(Civ.?Code,???196a.)?Thus,?like?that?of?respondent,?Dina’s?employment,?income,?obligations,?number?of?dependents,?withholding?and?other?tax?information?were?highly?pertinent?to?the?County’s?motion?for?modification?of?support. Dina?not?only?had?an?opportunity?and?an?obligation?to?present?evidence?on?the?question?of?the?dependency?exemption,?but?affirmatively?did?so;?the?district?attorney?submitted?written?points?and?authorities?in?opposition?to?the?award?and?argued?the?matter?to?the?court.?Accordingly,?we?perceive?no?denial?of?her?due?process?rights.fn.?10 Significantly,?we?note?also?that?section?11350.1?explicitly?preserves?Dina’s?right?to?relitigate?the?issue?of?child?support,?and?the?related?matter?of?the?dependency?exemption,?in?a?subsequent?action?under?the?Family?Law?Act,?and?expressly?provides?that?”[i]n?that?event,?the?court?in?those?[subsequent]?proceedings?shall?make?an?independent?determination?on?the?issue?of?support?[53?Cal.3d?1284]?which?shall?supersede?the?support?order?made?pursuant?to?this?section.”?(Italics?added.)?Thus,?as?the?court?in?County?of?Santa?Clara?v.?Farnese?(1985)?183?Cal.App.3d?257?[237?Cal.Rptr.?457]?trenchantly?observed,?an?order?under?section?11350.1?”is?not?graven?in?stone.”?(183?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?265.)?Dina,?in?short,?is?not?bound?by?the?allocation?of?the?exemption?in?the?section?11350.1?enforcement?proceeding;?she?may?initiate?a?subsequent?action?on?her?own?behalf,?and?the?court?in?that?proceeding?must?make?an?”independent”?determination?of?the?issue,?which?shall?”supersede”?the?earlier?order. The?Attorney?General?and?amicus?curiae?nevertheless?assert?that?allocation?of?the?dependency?exemption?in?a?section?11350.1?action?may?implicate?tax?law?considerations?beyond?the?expertise?of?the?district?attorney,?and?thereby?prejudice?the?interests?of?the?custodial?parent.?We?note,?however,?that?the?matter?here?was?not?unduly?complex;?both?parents?were?single,?both?had?incomes?limited?to?wages?or?commissions,?and?the?only?dependent?involved?was?the?one?minor?child.?Moreover,?to?the?extent?that?either?the?district?attorney?or?the?custodial?parent?is?concerned?that?the?latter’s?rights?are?not?adequately?represented,?either?one?may?seek?to?have?the?custodial?parent?made?a?party?to?the?proceedings.?Furthermore,?the?court?is?not?obligated?to?decide?the?issue;?if?it?concludes?that?the?exemption?question?involves?collateral?matters?or?that?the?evidence?before?it?is?inadequate?to?decide?the?issue,?it?may?simply?decline?to?treat?it?and?leave?the?parents?to?an?independent?action?under?the?Family?Law?Act.?(County?of?San?Joaquin?v.?Woods?(1989)?210?Cal.App.3d?56,?61?[258?Cal.Rptr.?110].) The?Attorney?General?and?amicus?curiae?also?express?concern?that?the?district?attorney?may?be?placed?in?a?position?of?conflict?or?even?potential?liability?if?the?relationship?with?the?custodial?parent?is?characterized?as?that?of?attorney/client;?there?may?be?circumstances,?for?example,?where?custody?of?the?minor?child?changes?and?the?district?attorney?is?compelled?to?seek?support?from?the?parent?whom?it?earlier?”represented.”?We?discern?no?such?dilemma.?The?statutory?scheme?empowers?the?district?attorney?to?establish,?modify?and?enforce?support?obligations?”in?the?name?of?the?county?on?behalf?of?the?child,?children?or?caretaker?parent.”?(??11350.1.)?[3]?The?purpose?of?such?actions?is?to?provide?a?direct?procedure?for?a?county?to?recoup?public?assistance,?and?to?assist?parents?with?limited?resources?to?enforce?support?obligations?so?that?public?funds?are?not?again?unnecessarily?expended.?(City?and?County?of?San?Francisco?v.?Thompson?(1985)?172?Cal.App.3d?652?[218?Cal.Rptr.?445];?In?re?Marriage?of?Shore?(1977)?71?Cal.App.3d?290,?298-300?[139?Cal.Rptr.?349].)?Notwithstanding?the?collateral?benefit?to?the?custodial?parent,?the?”client”?in?such?actions?remains?the?county.?[53?Cal.3d?1285] In?conclusion,?we?find?no?merit?to?the?claim?that?the?award?of?the?dependency?exemption?in?this?case?violated?the?due?process?rights?of?the?custodial?parent. Conclusion The?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?affirmed?and?modified?to?provide?that?the?matter?be?remanded?to?the?superior?court?for?entry?of?an?order?conditioning?its?award?of?support?upon?execution?by?the?custodial?parent?of?an?appropriate?waiver?of?the?dependency?exemption. Lucas,?C.?J.,?Broussard,?J.,?Panelli,?J.,?and?Baxter,?J.,?concurred. MOSK,?J., Dissenting. […]

People?v.?McAlpin?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?1289?,?283?Cal.Rptr.?382;?812?P.2d?563 [No.?S010577.?Jul?18,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?BRUCE?McALPIN,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Santa?Clara?County,?No.?116671,?John?A.?Flaherty,?Judge.) (Opinion?by?Mosk,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Kennard,?Arabian?[53?Cal.3d?1290]?and?Baxter,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion?by?Broussard,?J.?with?Panelli,?J.,?concurring.) COUNSEL Campbell?&?Demetrick,?James?Farragher?Campbell?and?Linda?Lee?DeMetrick?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Steve?White?and?Richard?B.?Iglehart,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?John?H.?Sugiyama,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Stan?M.?Helfman,?Rene?A.?Chacon,?Laurence?K.?Sullivan?and?Catherine?A.?Rivlin,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. Kent?S.?Scheidegger?and?Charles?L.?Hobson?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION MOSK,?J. Defendant?appeals?from?a?judgment?convicting?him?of?nonviolent?lewd?conduct?with?a?child?under?the?age?of?14.?(Pen.?Code,???288,?subd.?(a).)?He?complains?of?a?number?of?evidentiary?rulings?by?the?trial?court.?As?will?appear,?we?conclude?that?the?principal?rulings?were?correct,?and?the?incorrect?rulings?were?not?prejudicial?on?the?entire?record?of?this?case.?We?therefore?affirm?the?judgment. Defendant?met?Anita?M.?at?a?church?dance?in?April?1985?and?began?dating?her.?Anita,?who?was?divorced,?had?three?children:?Stephanie?(then?age?8),?Valerie?(then?age?7),?and?Isaac?(then?age?1).?Sunday,?June?9,?1985,?was?Stephanie’s?ninth?birthday.?About?noon?on?that?day,?defendant,?Anita,?and?her?children?went?shopping?for?birthday?gifts?for?Stephanie.?Next?they?[53?Cal.3d?1295]?drove?to?defendant’s?house,?and?after?looking?at?Stephanie’s?gifts?they?all?lay?down?together?on?a?large?bed?in?defendant’s?bedroom?to?watch?television.?It?was?hot,?and?the?children?were?lightly?clothed;?the?girls?wore?short?”jumper”?suits.?Anita?soon?left?with?Isaac?to?sit?on?the?floor,?and?eventually?took?him?outside?to?play.?Defendant?remained?lying?on?the?bed?between?the?two?girls,?facing?Stephanie. Stephanie?testified?that?defendant?began?touching?her?while?her?mother?was?tending?to?Isaac,?and?”When?my?mom?would?turn?around?to?look?at?the?T.V.?or?so?or?somewhere?close?where?he?was,?he’d?stop.”?The?touching?continued?after?her?mother?took?Isaac?outside,?and?Stephanie?described?the?events?in?detail.?On?direct?examination?she?testified?that?”At?first?[it]?was?around?my?pants?and?then?around?the?elastic?part?of?my?underwear.”?At?different?times?defendant?used?either?his?fingers?or?his?whole?hand.?Stephanie?continued,?”Then?it?was?inside?my?underwear,”?against?her?skin.?Finally,?Stephanie?testified?that?defendant?put?his?finger?”inside?…?my?vagina”?and?also?touched?”my?chest.”?Stephanie?testified?she?knew?it?was?wrong?for?defendant?to?touch?her?in?this?way,?but?she?did?not?move?away?at?first?because?she?was?scared.?After?a?few?minutes,?however,?she?told?defendant?she?had?to?go?to?the?bathroom;?instead,?she?went?directly?to?her?mother?and?told?her?what?defendant?had?done. On?cross-examination?Stephanie?not?only?adhered?to?her?description?of?defendant’s?conduct,?but?gave?additional?details?in?response?to?defense?counsel’s?questions.?For?example,?she?explained?precisely?how?defendant?touched?her?when?his?hand?reached?the?cuff?of?her?suit,?illustrating?her?testimony?both?by?gesture?and?by?reference?to?a?photograph?of?her?taken?in?that?suit?on?that?day.fn.?1?She?also?reiterated?that?she?did?not?call?out?during?the?touching,?but?that?as?defendant?moved?his?hand?closer?to?her?vagina?she?[53?Cal.3d?1296]?became?”scareder?and?scareder.”?On?redirect?examination?she?testified?that?she?did?not?know?what?to?do?when?defendant?began?touching?her.?And?when?the?prosecutor?asked?her?if?she?had?any?other?feeling?about?the?experience,?she?replied,?”Sad.” Anita?corroborated?much?of?her?daughter’s?testimony.?She?stated?that?Stephanie?emerged?from?defendant’s?bedroom?about?10?minutes?after?she?had?left?with?Isaac.?According?to?Anita,?Stephanie?”came?out?of?the?house?a?little?in?a?hurry?and?looked?at?me?with?an?expression?that?I’ve?never?seen?on?her?face?before.?…?She?looked?sick.?And?she?had?tears?in?her?eyes.”?Anita?asked?what?was?the?matter;?at?first?Stephanie?was?”pretty?choked?up?with?crying”?and?said?that?defendant?was?”bothering”?her.?When?pressed?to?say?how?he?was?”bothering”?her,?Stephanie?”stuttered?around?with?it?and?finally?said,?’Well,?he?put?his?hand?in?my?private.’?”?Anita?immediately?went?inside?and?confronted?defendant,?demanding?an?explanation.?Defendant,?however,?”denied?having?any?idea?what?was?wrong,”?and?went?back?to?whatever?he?was?doing?at?the?time.?Anita?testified,?”I?was?lost?for?words”?and?”I?went?into?shock.?I?didn’t?know?what?to?do.”?She?told?defendant?that?maybe?she?should?”just?go?home,”?but?he?suggested?instead?that?they?all?get?something?to?eat.fn.?2?They?went?to?a?restaurant?for?dinner;?at?the?restaurant?Stephanie?was?quiet?and?withdrawn,?and?in?the?restroom?she?again?talked?to?her?mother?about?the?event. Anita?acknowledged?that?she?dated?defendant?once?more?a?week?or?two?later,?and?that?she?did?not?report?the?matter?to?the?police.?She?did,?however,?discuss?it?with?her?mother,?who?knew?defendant.?Shortly?thereafter?Anita?also?saw?defendant?with?a?mutual?friend?on?a?rafting?trip?sponsored?by?her?church?group,?and?at?that?time?she?told?the?friend?about?the?incident.?On?redirect?examination?Anita?was?asked?why?she?went?out?with?defendant?once?more?after?Stephanie?told?her?what?had?happened,?and?she?replied,?”It’s?in?my?personality?or?character,?if?you?will,?to?sit?on?the?fence?until?you?have?enough?information?to?actually?point?your?finger?and?accuse?somebody?of?something?that?is?that?extreme?and?emotional?and?traumatic.”?She?also?stressed?that?she?had?”los[t]?a?baby?and?a?husband,”?the?latter?through?divorce,?in?the?year?preceding?these?events. In?June?1986?Stephanie?reported?the?incident?to?authorities?at?her?school,?and?the?police?were?notified. Defendant?took?the?stand?and?denied?the?charge.?His?version?of?the?events?leading?up?to?the?molestation?was?the?same?as?that?of?Stephanie?and?[53?Cal.3d?1297]?her?mother,?except?that?he?insisted?it?all?occurred?one?day?earlier.?With?regard?to?the?touching,?he?told?a?very?different?story.?First?he?acknowledged?that?while?they?were?lying?together?on?his?bed?he?put?his?right?arm?on?Stephanie’s?thigh.?Then?he?claimed?that?after?Anita?left?the?room?with?Isaac,?Stephanie?”started?moving?her?left?arm?over?next?to?my?genitals.”?Defendant?testified?that?he?”grabbed?her?arm?and?said,?’don’t?touch?me?there’?”;?that?Stephanie?left?the?room?and?Anita?returned?soon?thereafter;?that?he?and?Anita?discussed?the?incident?in?private;?that?he?told?Anita,?”Your?daughter?touched?me?where?she?shouldn’t?have?been”;?that?Anita?replied,?”yeah,?I?can?believe?that.?She’s?pretty?aggressive?at?times”;?and?that?he?and?Anita?then?calmly?told?Stephanie?not?to?let?it?happen?again. Defendant?was?allowed?to?introduce?evidence?of?his?standing?in?the?community.?Counsel?began?the?case?for?the?defense?by?eliciting?without?objection?a?full?statement?of?defendant’s?education?and?employment?history:?thus?defendant?testified?he?had?served?four?years?in?the?Navy;?had?attended?two?colleges;?had?been?trained?as?an?electronics?technician;?had?worked?first?for?the?Atari?Company;?had?then?taken?a?job?with?IBM;?had?worked?for?six?years?for?IBM,?where?he?became?a?”senior?manufacturing?method?specialist”;?and?at?the?time?of?trial?was?a?”technical?analyst”?in?”product?development”?at?IBM. Defendant?was?also?permitted?to?call?two?character?witnesses?on?his?behalf.?The?first,?Vicki?Daybell,?was?a?clerk?in?the?Alameda?Superior?Court;?she?was?divorced?and?had?a?small?daughter.?She?had?dated?defendant?for?four?or?five?months,?and?had?stayed?in?contact?with?him?thereafter.?Ms.?Daybell?testified?that?in?the?course?of?dating?defendant?she?came?to?know?his?circle?of?friends,?and?from?that?experience?she?learned?he?has?an?excellent?reputation?for?truth?and?veracity?in?the?community.?As?Ms.?Daybell?testified,?”They?all?regard?him?very?highly?…?[f]or?being?very?honest.” The?second?witness,?Robert?Tarkanian,?had?known?defendant?for?some?11?years.?Their?friendship?began?when?they?were?in?college?together,?and?continued?when?they?both?went?to?work?for?IBM.?Tarkanian?thus?came?to?know?defendant’s?circle?of?friends?on?the?job,?and?testified?that?”He’s?well?respected?within?the?corporation,”?i.e.,?among?his?fellow?workers.?The?witness?further?testified?that?on?a?trip?to?Texas?with?defendant?they?stayed?in?defendant’s?family?home,?and?”I?was?very?proud?to?meet?his?parents.”?When?asked?about?defendant’s?reputation?among?his?fellow?workers,?Tarkanian?reiterated?that?”He’s?very?well?respected.”?And?the?witness?agreed?in?particular?that?defendant?has?”a?high?reputation?among?his?fellow?workers?for?truth?and?veracity.” In?rebuttal?the?prosecution?called?Debbie?Hill.?Like?Anita,?Ms.?Hill?was?a?single?parent?whom?defendant?had?dated.?She?was?also?the?woman?whom?[53?Cal.3d?1298]?Anita?testified?she?spoke?with?on?a?rafting?trip?shortly?after?these?events.?Ms.?Hill?testified?that?when?Anita?spoke?with?her?on?the?topic?she?was?”extremely?upset”?and?told?her?what?had?happened?between?defendant?and?Stephanie.?According?to?Ms.?Hill,?Anita?explained?that?”I?wanted?to?let?you?know?because?you?have?children?and?you?do?see?him.”?On?cross-examination?Ms.?Hill?testified?she?was?shocked?and?thereafter?”monitored”?defendant’s?interaction?with?her?children?because?she?was?afraid. The?jury?returned?a?guilty?verdict?after?45?minutes’?deliberation.?The?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed?the?ensuing?judgment?of?conviction,?and?we?granted?review. I Defendant?first?contends?the?trial?court?abused?its?discretion?in?allowing?opinion?testimony?by?an?expert?witness.?(Evid.?Code,???801.)?The?prosecutor?proposed?to?call?Police?Officer?Jeffrey?Miller?as?an?expert?on?child?molestation?investigations.?Defense?counsel?examined?Officer?Miller?at?length?on?voir?dire.?It?appeared?from?such?examination?that?the?witness?had?received?from?350?to?400?hours?of?specialized?training?in?such?topics?as?juvenile?and?adolescent?psychology,?physical,?sexual?or?emotional?abuse?of?children,?intervention?in?family?crisis?situations,?investigation?of?child?abuse?charges,?behavioral?responses?of?child?abuse?victims,?and?the?dynamics?of?child?abuse?offenders.?Officer?Miller?received?his?training?not?only?from?law?enforcement?personnel?but?also?from?physicians,?social?workers,?probation?officers,?school?administrators,?attorneys?and?judges.?The?witness?put?his?training?to?use?on?a?daily?basis?in?his?work?as?the?juvenile?investigator?for?his?local?police?department,?and?in?that?capacity?he?had?investigated?over?100?cases?of?child?abuse?or?molestation?during?the?preceding?4?years.?He?had?also?taught?and?spoken?extensively?on?the?topic,?and?had?testified?several?times?as?an?expert?witness. The?prosecutor?declared?that?she?intended?to?ask?Officer?Miller,?on?the?basis?of?his?training?and?experience,?(1)?whether?a?parent?might?not?report?a?known?child?molestation,?and?if?so,?why;?and?(2)?whether?there?is?a?profile?of?a?”typical”?child?molester.?Defense?counsel?voiced?a?rambling?and?confused?objection.fn.?3?The?trial?court?interpreted?the?objection?to?state?three?[53?Cal.3d?1299]?separate?grounds,?and?overruled?it?on?each?ground:?”On?this?matter?the?Court’s?going?to?rule?this?witness?be?allowed?to?testify?as?an?expert.?I?am?satisfied,?number?one,?he?does?possess?the?qualifications?from?the?extensive?voir?dire.?Number?two,?I?think?it?is?relevant?and,?number?three,?to?the?extent?that?the?objection?is?under?[Evidence?Code?section]?352?I?think?the?probative?value?of?this?testimony?in?light?of?the?facts?of?this?case?outweighs?its?prejudicial?nature.” Officer?Miller?then?gave?his?testimony?on?the?two?questions?propounded?by?the?prosecutor.?First,?he?listed?a?number?of?reasons?why?a?parent?might?not?report?a?known?child?molestation,?including?the?fear?of?breaking?up?the?marriage?or?harming?relations?with?other?family?members,?a?sense?of?shame?or?failure?as?a?parent,?a?psychological?refusal?to?accept?the?fact?of?the?molestation,?or?a?reluctance?to?damage?the?reputation?of?the?alleged?offender?when?the?latter?is?someone?of?good?standing?in?the?community?(e.g.,?a?schoolteacher?or?a?businessman).?In?conclusion,?Officer?Miller?testified?that?it?would?not?be?unusual?for?a?parent?to?refrain?from?reporting?a?child?molestation?until?actually?confronted?with?the?fact?by?a?law?enforcement?agency. On?the?second?question,?Officer?Miller?testified?there?is?no?profile?of?a?”typical”?child?molester;?rather,?such?an?individual?can?be?of?any?social?or?financial?status,?any?race,?any?age,?any?occupation,?any?geographical?origin,?and?any?religious?belief?or?no?religious?belief?at?all.?Finally,?Officer?Miller?testified?that?such?offenders?can?also?be?persons?of?good?or?even?impeccable?reputations?in?the?community. Opinion?testimony?by?an?expert?witness?is?admissible?if?it?is,?inter?alia,?”Related?to?a?subject?that?is?sufficiently?beyond?common?experience?that?the?opinion?of?an?expert?would?assist?the?trier?of?fact”?(Evid.?Code,???801,?subd.?(a)).?The?Court?of?Appeal?was?of?the?view?that?neither?branch?of?Officer?Miller’s?testimony?assisted?the?jury,?and?hence?that?neither?should?have?been?admitted.?Defendant?agrees,?and?adopts?that?conclusion. We?disagree.?The?governing?rules?are?well?settled.?[1]?First,?the?decision?of?a?trial?court?to?admit?expert?testimony?”will?not?be?disturbed?on?appeal?unless?a?manifest?abuse?of?discretion?is?shown.”?(People?v.?Kelly?(1976)?17?Cal.3d?24,?39?[130?Cal.Rptr.?144,?549?P.2d?1240],?and?cases?cited.)?[2]?Second,?”the?admissibility?of?expert?opinion?is?a?question?of?degree.?The?jury?need?not?be?wholly?ignorant?of?the?subject?matter?of?the?opinion?in?order?to?justify?its?admission;?if?that?were?the?test,?little?expert?[53?Cal.3d?1300]?opinion?testimony?would?ever?be?heard.?Instead,?the?statute?declares?that?even?if?the?jury?has?some?knowledge?of?the?matter,?expert?opinion?may?be?admitted?whenever?it?would?’assist’?the?jury.?It?will?be?excluded?only?when?it?would?add?nothing?at?all?to?the?jury’s?common?fund?of?information,?i.e.,?when?’the?subject?of?inquiry?is?one?of?such?common?knowledge?that?men?of?ordinary?education?could?reach?a?conclusion?as?intelligently?as?the?witness.’?”?(People?v.?McDonald?(1984)?37?Cal.3d?351,?367?[208?Cal.Rptr.?236,?690?P.2d?709,?46?A.L.R.4th?1011]).?As?will?appear,?on?this?record?the?trial?court?could?well?determine?that?both?aspects?of?Officer?Miller’s?testimony?would?assist?the?jury?in?at?least?some?degree. A [3]?We?begin?with?Officer?Miller’s?testimony?that?it?is?not?unusual?for?a?parent?to?refrain?from?reporting?a?known?molestation?of?his?or?her?child.?The?People?draw?a?helpful?analogy?to?expert?testimony?on?common?stress?reactions?of?rape?victims?(“rape?trauma?syndrome”),?which?may?include?a?failure?to?report,?or?a?delay?in?reporting,?the?sexual?assault.?In?People?v.?Bledsoe?(1984)36?Cal.3d?236,?248-251?[203?Cal.Rptr.?450,?681?P.2d?291],?we?held?that?such?testimony?is?inadmissible?when?offered?to?prove?that?the?complaining?witness?has?in?fact?been?raped.?But?we?recognized,?as?other?courts?had?held?(Delia?S.?v.?Torres?(1982)?134?Cal.App.3d?471,?478-480?[184?Cal.Rptr.?787]),?that?such?testimony?is?admissible?to?rehabilitate?the?complaining?witness?when?the?defendant?impeaches?her?credibility?by?suggesting?that?her?conduct?after?the?incident-e.g.,?a?delay?in?reporting-is?inconsistent?with?her?testimony?that?she?was?raped.?We?reasoned?that?”in?such?a?context?expert?testimony?on?rape?trauma?syndrome?would?play?a?particularly?useful?role?by?disabusing?the?jury?of?some?widely?held?misconceptions?about?rape?and?rape?victims,?so?that?it?may?evaluate?the?evidence?free?of?the?constraints?of?popular?myths.”?(36?Cal.3d?at?pp.?247-?248.) An?even?more?direct?analogy?may?be?drawn?to?expert?testimony?on?common?stress?reactions?of?children?who?have?been?sexually?molested?(“child?sexual?abuse?accommodation?syndrome”),?which?also?may?include?the?child’s?failure?to?report,?or?delay?in?reporting,?the?abuse.?In?a?series?of?decisions?the?Courts?of?Appeal?have?extended?to?this?context?both?the?rule?and?the?exception?of?People?v.?Bledsoe,?supra,?36?Cal.3d?236:?i.e.,?expert?testimony?on?the?common?reactions?of?child?molestation?victims?is?not?admissible?to?prove?that?the?complaining?witness?has?in?fact?been?sexually?abused;?it?is?admissible?to?rehabilitate?such?witness’s?credibility?when?the?defendant?suggests?that?the?child’s?conduct?after?the?incident-e.g.,?a?delay?in?reporting-is?inconsistent?with?his?or?her?testimony?claiming?molestation.?(People?v.?Bowker?(1988)?203?Cal.App.3d?385,?390-394?[249?Cal.Rptr.?886];?People?v.?Gray?(1986)?187?Cal.App.3d?213,?217-220?[231?Cal.Rptr.?658];?People?v.?Roscoe?(1985)?168?Cal.App.3d?1093,?1097-1100?[215?[53?Cal.3d?1301]?Cal.Rptr.?45].)fn.?4?”Such?expert?testimony?is?needed?to?disabuse?jurors?of?commonly?held?misconceptions?about?child?sexual?abuse,?and?to?explain?the?emotional?antecedents?of?abused?children’s?seemingly?self-impeaching?behavior.?[?]?The?great?majority?of?courts?approve?such?expert?rebuttal?testimony.”?(Myers?et?al.,?Expert?Testimony?in?Child?Sexual?Abuse?Litigation?(1989)?68?Neb.?L.?Rev.?1,?89,?fn.?omitted?(hereafter?Myers).) In?the?case?at?bar?the?challenged?expert?testimony?dealt?with?the?failure?not?of?the?child?victim,?but?of?the?child’s?parent,?to?report?the?molestation.?Yet?the?foregoing?rules?appear?equally?applicable?in?this?context.?The?prosecution?did?not?seek?to?introduce?Officer?Miller’s?evidence?for?the?purpose?of?proving?that?Stephanie?was?in?fact?molested,?but?to?rehabilitate?the?corroborating?testimony?of?Anita,?her?mother.?On?direct?examination?Anita?had?corroborated?Stephanie’s?claim?of?sexual?abuse?by?testifying?to?the?effect?that?when?Stephanie?emerged?from?defendant’s?bedroom?and?said?he?had?molested?her,?Anita?had?believed?her:?for?example,?Anita?testified?that?when?she?subsequently?broke?off?her?relationship?with?defendant?it?was?”Because?I?knew?what?Stephanie?had?told?me?was?true.”?On?cross-examination,?defendant?sought?to?impeach?Anita’s?credibility?by?strongly?implying?that?her?behavior?after?the?alleged?incident?was?inconsistent?with?that?of?a?mother?who?believed?her?daughter?had?been?molested.?Thus?when?Anita?admitted?she?had?sexual?intercourse?with?defendant?a?week?later,?defense?counsel?twice?asked?rhetorically,?”Is?that?how?you?believe?Stephanie?”?And?counsel?asked?the?same?question?when?Anita?conceded?she?did?not?report?the?molestation?to?the?police?even?though?she?knew?it?was?a?criminal?act.fn.?5?[53?Cal.3d?1302] Most?jurors,?fortunately,?have?been?spared?the?experience?of?being?the?parent?of?a?sexually?molested?child.?Lacking?that?experience,?jurors?can?rely?only?on?their?intuition?or?on?relevant?evidence?introduced?at?trial.?It?is?reasonable?to?conclude?that?on?the?basis?of?their?intuition?alone?many?jurors?would?tend?to?believe?that?a?parent?of?a?molested?child,?naturally?concerned?for?the?welfare?of?the?child?and?of?other?children,?would?promptly?report?the?crime?to?the?authorities,?just?as?a?parent?would?be?likely?to?do?if?the?child?complained?of?someone?who?had?beaten?him?or?stolen?his?pocket?money.?Yet?here?the?prosecution?had?evidence?to?the?contrary-the?expert?opinion?of?Officer?Miller?that?in?fact?it?is?not?at?all?unusual?for?a?parent?to?refrain?from?reporting?a?known?child?molestation,?for?a?number?of?reasons.?Such?evidence?would?therefore?”assist?the?trier?of?fact”?(Evid.?Code,???801,?subd.?(a))?by?giving?the?jurors?information?they?needed?to?objectively?evaluate?Anita’s?credibility.fn.?6?And?the?evidence?was?clearly?relevant?(id.,???210)?because?it?tended?to?rehabilitate?the?testimony?of?Anita?as?a?corroborating?witness.fn.?7?It?follows?that?the?trial?court?did?not?abuse?its?discretion?in?admitting?the?challenged?testimony. B [4]?Much?of?the?foregoing?analysis?also?applies?to?Officer?Miller’s?expert?testimony?that?there?is?no?profile?of?a?”typical”?child?molester,?and?that?such?persons?are?found?instead?in?all?walks?of?life.?On?this?point?it?is?reasonable?to?conclude?that?many?jurors?would?tend?to?rely?not?so?much?on?their?personal?intuition?but?on?the?widespread?public?image?of?the?child?molester?as?an?old?man?in?shabby?clothes?who?loiters?in?playgrounds?or?schoolyards?and?lures?unsuspecting?children?into?sexual?contact?by?offering?them?candy?or?money.?As?numerous?studies?by?behavioral?professionals?have?shown,?this?stereotype?is?deeply?ingrained?in?the?public?consciousness:?”The?layperson?imagines?the?child?offender?to?be?a?stranger,?an?old?man,?insane?or?retarded,?alcohol?or?drug?addicted,?sexually?frustrated?and?impotent?or?sexually?jaded,?and?looking?for?’kicks.’?He?is?’gay’?and?recruiting?little?boys?into?homosexuality?or?he?is?’straight’?and?responding?to?the?[53?Cal.3d?1303]?advances?of?a?sexually?provocative?little?girl.?…?He?is?sometimes?regarded?as?a?brutal?sex?fiend?or?as?a?shy,?passive,?sexually?inexperienced?person.?He?is?oversexed?or?he?is?undersexed;?and?so?on.?These?are?popular?notions?appealing?in?their?simplicity-even?if?they?are?self-contradicting-and?they?offer?the?advantage?of?making?the?child?offender?as?different?and?unlike?the?ordinary?person-ourselves,?our?parents,?our?children,?our?relatives,?friends,?and?teachers-as?possible.”?(Groth,?Patterns?of?Sexual?Assault?Against?Children?and?Adolescents,?in?Sexual?Assault?of?Children?and?Adolescents?(Burgess?et?al.?edits.?1978)?pp.?3-4?(hereafter?Groth);?accord,?Cerkovnik,?The?Sexual?Abuse?of?Children:?Myths,?Research,?and?Policy?Implications?(1985)?89?Dick.?L.?Rev.?691,?692-694.)fn.?8 This?stereotype,?however,?is?false.?The?same?studies?report?that?in?most?cases?the?child?molester?is?not?in?fact?a?stranger?to?his?victim,?is?not?an?old?man,?is?not?an?alcoholic,?is?not?mentally?retarded,?and?is?not?homosexual.fn.?9?A?recent?major?study?of?paraphiliacs-the?class?of?sexual?deviants?that?includes?child?molesters-found?that?their?ages?ranged?from?13?to?76,?with?a?mean?age?of?31.5?years;?many?were?well?educated;?almost?65?percent?were?employed;?they?”came?from?a?broad?spectrum?of?socioeconomic?levels,”?with?almost?one-quarter?earning?over?$25,000?per?year;?their?religious?affiliations?were?various;?and?in?sum,?they?were?”a?very?heterogeneous?group.”?(Myers,?supra,?68?Neb.?L.?Rev.?1,?130.)?”Thus,?it?is?appropriate?to?conclude?that?under?the?current?state?of?scientific?knowledge,?there?is?no?profile?of?a?’typical’?child?molester.”?(Id.?at?p.?142.) In?the?case?at?bar?Officer?Miller?was?prepared?to?give?expert?testimony?to?the?foregoing?effect.?Such?testimony?would?therefore?”assist?the?trier?of?fact”?(Evid.?Code,???801,?subd.?(a))?by?giving?the?jurors?information?they?needed?to?objectively?evaluate?the?People’s?evidence.?Of?course,?to?be?admissible?the?testimony?also?had?to?be?relevant.?(Id.,???350.)?But?”the?trial?court?is?vested?with?wide?discretion?in?determining?relevance”?under?the?Evidence?Code.?(People?v.?Green?(1980)?27?Cal.3d?1,?19?[164?Cal.Rptr.?1,?609?P.2d?468].)?Defendant?fails?to?show?an?abuse?of?such?discretion.?Although?Officer?Miller’s?testimony?was?admitted?during?the?prosecution’s?case-in-chief,?the?jurors?already?knew?much?about?defendant?at?that?point,?and?what?they?[53?Cal.3d?1304]?knew?did?not?fit?the?stereotype.?They?knew?defendant?was?not?a?stranger?to?the?victim:?the?first?witness?in?the?trial,?Stephanie’s?mother,?had?testified?that?she?dated?defendant?for?several?months?before?the?crime?took?place,?and?that?Stephanie?knew?him?through?that?relationship.?From?the?same?witness’s?testimony?that?she?had?had?sexual?intercourse?with?defendant,?the?jurors?could?reasonably?infer?he?was?not?a?homosexual.?And?the?jurors?could?obviously?see?for?themselves?that?he?was?not?an?old?man.fn.?10?In?these?circumstances?the?court?did?not?abuse?its?discretion?in?finding?that?the?proposed?expert?testimony?of?Officer?Miller?was?relevant?at?the?time?it?was?offered.?(Cf.?People?v.?Sanchez,?supra,?208?Cal.App.3d?721,?735-736?[evidence?on?child?sexual?abuse?accommodation?syndrome?admissible?in?People’s?case-in-?chief?because?issue?had?been?raised?by?earlier?testimony?of?prosecution?witnesses].) II Defendant?next?contends?the?trial?court?abused?its?discretion?in?limiting?the?scope?of?his?character?evidence.?As?noted?above,?the?court?allowed?defense?character?witnesses?Daybell?and?Tarkanian?to?testify?that?defendant?had?an?excellent?reputation?for?truth?and?veracity?in?the?relevant?community.?The?court?disallowed?additional?character?evidence?on?a?different?topic-defendant’s?sexuality-offered?by?three?witnesses?whom?defendant?did?not?identify?by?name.?Two?of?these?witnesses?were?women?who?had?dated?defendant?for?approximately?six?months,?had?been?sexually?intimate?with?him?during?that?period,?and?thereafter?had?continued?their?friendship?with?him;?each?also?had?a?daughter?of?her?own.?The?third?witness?was?a?close?male?friend?from?defendant’s?college?days?who?had?often?double-dated?with?him?and?had?met?many?of?the?women?defendant?dated. The?record?of?what?these?witnesses?would?actually?have?said?is?unsatisfactory.?Rather?than?putting?the?witnesses?on?the?stand?and?asking?them?specific?questions,?defense?counsel?presented?their?proposed?testimony?by?means?of?a?written?offer?of?proof.?Although?the?procedure?is?proper,?in?this?case?much?of?the?wording?of?counsel’s?offer?of?proof?was?ambiguous?or?conclusory,?and?counsel?did?not?further?explain?it?at?the?hearing.?The?trial?court?interpreted?the?offer?in?order?to?rule?on?it;?the?court’s?interpretation?was?reasonable,?and?counsel?apparently?accepted?it.?We?shall?therefore?be?guided?by?that?interpretation?in?the?discussion?that?follows. The?proposed?testimony?of?defendant’s?additional?character?witnesses?may?conveniently?be?grouped?into?two?categories.?[53?Cal.3d?1305] A [5a]?First,?all?three?witnesses?proposed?to?testify?that?in?their?opinion?defendant?is?not?a?”sexual?deviant.”?The?male?character?witness?would?have?based?this?opinion?on?his?observations?of?defendant’s?assertedly?normal?sexual?conduct?with?adult?women.?The?women?character?witnesses?would?have?based?their?opinions?to?this?effect?on?two?sources:?(1)?their?assertedly?normal?personal?sexual?experiences?with?defendant,?and?(2)?their?observations?of?defendant’s?conduct?with?their?daughters?during?the?period?of?their?relationship.?The?trial?court?disallowed?this?testimony?primarily?on?the?ground?that?the?question?whether?a?person?is?a?sexual?deviant?can?only?be?answered?by?expert?testimony.?Although?we?need?not?go?so?far,?on?a?related?ground?we?will?agree?with?the?ruling?in?part?and?disagree?with?it?in?part. Evidence?Code?section?1101,?subdivision?(a),?declares?the?general?rule?that?”evidence?of?a?person’s?character?or?a?trait?of?his?or?her?character?(whether?in?the?form?of?an?opinion,?evidence?of?reputation,?or?evidence?of?specific?instances?of?his?or?her?conduct)?is?inadmissible?when?offered?to?prove?his?or?her?conduct?on?a?specified?occasion.”?Section?1102?of?the?same?code?(hereafter?section?1102)?provides?the?exception?that?defendant?here?sought?to?invoke:?”In?a?criminal?action,?evidence?of?the?defendant’s?character?or?a?trait?of?his?character?in?the?form?of?an?opinion?or?evidence?of?his?reputation?is?not?made?inadmissible?by?Section?1101?if?such?evidence?is:?[?]?(a)?Offered?by?the?defendant?to?prove?his?conduct?in?conformity?with?such?character?or?trait?of?character.”?[6]?This?exception?allows?a?criminal?defendant?to?introduce?evidence,?either?by?opinion?or?reputation,?of?his?character?or?a?trait?of?his?character?that?is?”relevant?to?the?charge?made?against?him.”?(Cal.?Law?Revision?Com.?com.,?29B?West’s?Ann.?Evid.?Code?(1966?ed.)???1102,?p.?12.)?Such?evidence?is?relevant?if?it?is?inconsistent?with?the?offense?charged-e.g.,?honesty,?when?the?charge?is?theft-and?hence?may?support?an?inference?that?the?defendant?is?unlikely?to?have?committed?the?offense.?In?appropriate?cases,?such?circumstantial?evidence?”may?be?enough?to?raise?a?reasonable?doubt?in?the?mind?of?the?trier?of?fact?concerning?the?defendant’s?guilt.”?(Id.?at?p.?13;?see?also?Michelson?v.?United?States?(1948)?335?U.S.?469,?476?[93?L.Ed.?168,?174,?69?S.Ct.?213].) We?recently?held?that?a?defendant?charged?with?child?molesting?may?introduce?such?character?evidence?by?means?of?opinion?testimony?of?an?expert?witness.?(People?v.?Stoll?(1989)?49?Cal.3d?1136?[265?Cal.Rptr.?111,?783?P.2d?698]?(hereafter?Stoll).)?Following?our?decision?in?People?v.?Jones?(1954)?42?Cal.2d?219,?222-225?[266?P.2d?38],?we?held?in?Stoll?that?in?a?child?molestation?case?(1)?the?fact?that?the?defendant?is?not?a?sexual?deviant?is?a?relevant?character?trait?within?the?meaning?of?section?1102,?and?(2)?the?statute?allows?a?defendant?to?prove?that?trait?by?the?opinion?testimony?of?an?[53?Cal.3d?1306]?expert?witness.?(49?Cal.3d?at?pp.?1152-1155.)?It?is?true?that?nothing?we?said?in?Stoll?limited?such?opinion?testimony?to?that?of?an?expert;?nevertheless,?our?analysis?in?Stoll?points?the?way?for?us?today. After?concluding?that?lack?of?sexual?deviance?is?a?character?trait?subject?to?proof?by?opinion?testimony,?we?turned?in?Stoll?to?the?specific?rules?for?admitting?such?testimony.?The?Evidence?Code?sets?forth?those?rules?in?its?sections?800?(lay?opinion?testimony)?and?801?(expert?opinion?testimony).?In?Stoll?(49?Cal.3d?at?pp.?1153-1154)?we?read?the?latter?provision?into?section?1102,?and?inquired?whether?expert?opinion?testimony?concerning?a?defendant’s?lack?of?sexual?deviance?relates?to?a?subject?beyond?the?ordinary?experience?of?the?triers?of?fact?(Evid.?Code,???801,?subd.?(a))?and?is?based?on?sources?on?which?experts?may?reasonably?rely?(id.,?subd.?(b)). [5b]?Following?Stoll,?we?now?read?Evidence?Code?section?800?into?section?1102?and?inquire?whether?lay?opinion?testimony?concerning?a?defendant’s?lack?of?sexual?deviance?satisfies?the?requirements?of?the?former.?Evidence?Code?section?800?limits?lay?opinion?testimony?to?an?opinion?that?is?”(a)?Rationally?based?on?the?perception?of?the?witness;?and?(b)?Helpful?to?a?clear?understanding?of?his?testimony.”?[7]?Our?focus?is?on?the?requirement?of?subdivision?(a)?of?this?statute.fn.?11?The?meaning?of?subdivision?(a)?is?clear:?”A?witness?who?is?not?testifying?as?an?expert?may?testify?in?the?form?of?an?opinion?only?if?the?opinion?is?based?on?his?own?perception.”?(Cal.?Law?Revision?Com.?com.,?29B?West’s?Ann.?Evid.?Code?(1966?ed.)???800,?p.?376,?italics?added.)?As?the?drafters?acknowledge?(ibid.),?this?was?also?the?common?law?rule.?(See,?e.g.,?Stuart?v.?Dotts?(1949)?89?Cal.App.2d?683,?686-687?[201?P.2d?820];?Manney?v.?Housing?Authority?(1947)?79?Cal.App.2d?453,?459?[180?P.2d?69].)?[8]?In?this?context,?moreover,?the?drafters?define?”perception”?as?the?process?of?acquiring?knowledge?”through?one’s?senses”?(Evid.?Code,???170),?i.e.,?by?personal?observation.fn.?12?[53?Cal.3d?1307] The?cases?allowing?lay?opinion?testimony?uniformly?note?that?it?was?based?on?the?witness’s?personal?observation.?Thus?in?Jordan?v.?Great?Western?Motorways?(1931)?213?Cal.?606,?612?[2?P.2d?786],?this?court?reasoned:?”Over?objection?of?counsel,?plaintiff?was?allowed?to?testify?as?to?the?speed?of?the?bus?and?[her?driver’s]?automobile.?We?find?no?error?in?the?trial?court’s?ruling.?A?person?having?the?opportunity?to?observe?the?speed?of?a?moving?vehicle?is?qualified?to?give?his?opinion?as?to?such?speed,?and?his?previous?experience?or?lack?of?experience?goes?to?the?weight?rather?than?to?the?competency?of?the?testimony.?[Citations.]?[?]?Nor?do?we?find?error?in?the?ruling?permitting?a?lay?witness?to?testify?regarding?the?condition?of?plaintiff’s?health.?Lay?witnesses?having?the?requisite?opportunity?for?observation?may?testify?as?to?the?health?of?another.”?(Italics?added.) In?Kline?v.?Santa?Barbara?etc.?Ry.?Co.?(1907)?150?Cal.?741,?750?[90?P.?125],?this?court?held?admissible?lay?opinion?testimony?as?to?the?extent?of?an?accident?victim’s?pain?and?suffering:?”It?does?not?require?an?expert?to?tell?whether?a?person?suffers.?The?appearance?of?a?person?who?suffers?severely?is?sufficient?to?manifest?his?condition?to?any?one?of?ordinary?intelligence?and?experience.?These?witnesses?had?all?observed?her,?had?heard?her?groans?and?complaints,?and?were?competent?to?give?an?opinion?as?to?her?suffering.”?(Italics?added.) In?People?v.?Manoogian?(1904)?141?Cal.?592?[75?P.?177],?this?court?held?admissible?lay?opinion?testimony?as?to?whether?the?defendant?was?acting?rationally?or?irrationally.?The?court?reasoned?that?the?questions?asked?of?the?witnesses?on?this?topic?”did?not?call?for?the?opinion?of?the?witnesses?as?to?the?mental?sanity?of?the?defendant,?but?for?the?result?of?their?observations?at?the?various?times?they?came?in?contact?with?him,?as?to?his?appearance?in?the?respects?suggested.”?(Id.?at?p.?595,?italics?added.)?Summing?up,?the?court?reiterated?that?such?questions?”simply?call?for?the?result?of?the?observation?of?the?witness?as?to?the?manner?or?conduct?of?such?person?at?a?certain?time.”?(Id.?at?pp.?597-?598,?italics?added.) In?Healy?v.?Visalia?etc.?R.R.?Co.?(1894)?101?Cal.?585?[36?P.?125],?a?woman?was?thrown?from?a?railroad?car?when?it?derailed?and?a?fellow?passenger?was?asked?for?his?lay?opinion?as?to?whether?an?average?person?could?have?withstood?the?force?of?the?accident.?This?court?held?the?question?admissible,?reasoning?that?it?”did?not?call?for?an?opinion?from?[the?witness]?depending?upon?facts?which?he?had?subsequently?learned,?but?he?was?asked?to?describe?the?effect?of?the?concussion?or?jar?caused?by?the?car?leaving?the?track,?as?one?of?the?facts?out?of?which?the?injury?had?arisen,?and?which?he?[53?Cal.3d?1308]?had?personally?observed?and?felt.?[?]?…?Such?testimony?is?competent?upon?the?same?principle?that?permits?evidence?showing?the?strength?or?force?of?a?blow,?the?distance?at?which?a?sound?can?be?heard,?or?the?direction?from?which?it?comes,?the?speed?of?a?horse,?the?degree?of?cold?or?heat,?or?of?light?or?darkness.?In?any?such?instance?a?witness?who?had?a?personal?experience?or?knowledge?of?the?sensation?is?competent?to?testify,?although?his?answer?is?only?his?opinion?of?the?matter.”?(Id.?at?pp.?589-590,?italics?added.) In?People?v.?Ravey?(1954)?122?Cal.App.2d?699,?703?[265?P.2d?154],?the?court?held?admissible?lay?opinion?testimony?as?to?whether?the?defendant?was?intoxicated,?reasoning?that?”the?question?of?whether?a?person?was?intoxicated?is?not?necessarily?a?matter?of?expert?testimony,?as?any?layman?can?give?his?opinion?based?upon?his?own?observation.”?(Italics?added.)?And?in?People?v.?Williams?(1988)?44?Cal.3d?883,?914?[245?Cal.Rptr.?336,?751?P.2d?395],?the?defendant?complained?that?a?detective?and?a?jailer?in?whose?custody?he?had?spent?time?gave?nonexpert?testimony?”that?in?their?opinion?defendant?was?not?’strung?out’?[i.e.,?intoxicated?by?drugs]?when?they?observed?him.”?In?a?well-considered?dictum?we?found?no?reason?to?distinguish?lay?opinion?on?drug-induced?intoxication?from?the?settled?rule?allowing?such?opinion?on?alcohol-induced?intoxication.?(Id.?at?pp.?914-915.) […]

Colangelo?v.?State?Bar?(1991)?53?Cal.3d?1255?,?283?Cal.Rptr.?181;?812?P.2d?200 [No.?S015829.?Jul?15,?1991.] JAY?P.?COLANGELO,?Petitioner,?v.?THE?STATE?BAR?OF?CALIFORNIA,?Respondent. (Opinion?by?The?Court.?Separate?concurring?and?dissenting?opinion?by?Baxter,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?concurring.) COUNSEL Tom?Low?for?Petitioner. Diane?C.?Yu,?Richard?J.?Zanassi?and?Gregory?B.?Sloan?for?Respondent.?[53?Cal.3d?1258] OPINION THE?COURT. We?review?the?recommendation?of?the?Hearing?Department?of?the?State?Bar?Court?that?petitioner,?Jay?P.?Colangelo?(petitioner),?be?suspended?from?the?practice?of?law?for?one?year?upon?certain?conditions?and?that?the?suspension?be?stayed,?with?probation?of?eighteen?months?but?no?period?of?actual?suspension.?Petitioner?requests?that?we?either?review?the?decision?of?the?State?Bar?Court?or?that?we?remand?this?matter?to?the?State?Bar?Court?for?further?proceedings.?We?conclude?that?petitioner?is?not?entitled?to?further?proceedings?and?adopt?the?disciplinary?sanctions?recommended?by?the?hearing?department. Procedural?History?and?Facts Petitioner?was?admitted?to?the?practice?of?law?in?California?in?1981.?The?record?indicates?no?prior?discipline.?On?May?10,?1989,?a?”Notice?to?Show?Cause”?was?filed?with?the?State?Bar?Court,?alleging?that?petitioner?had?committed?various?disciplinary?violations.?The?notice?was?properly?served?upon?petitioner?on?May?12,?1989,?by?certified?mail,?and?required?that?petitioner?respond?to?the?notice?within?20?days?of?the?service?of?the?notice.?(Rule?552,?Transitional?Rules?Proc.?of?State?Bar?of?Cal.)?On?June?5,?1989,?a?”Notice?of?Time?and?Place?of?Mandatory?Settlement?Conference”?was?filed?at?the?State?Bar?Court?and?was?served?upon?petitioner.?This?notice?advised?petitioner?that?a?settlement?conference?had?been?scheduled?for?August?28,?1989.?In?the?absence?of?petitioner’s?response?to?the?first?notice,?the?State?Bar?filed?a?”Notice?of?Application?to?Enter?Default”?on?June?13,?1989,?which?advised?petitioner?that?the?State?Bar?would?seek?his?default?unless?he?filed?an?answer?to?the?notice?to?show?cause?by?July?3,?1989.?On?July?6,?1989,?a?”Notice?of?Entry?of?Default”?was?filed?with?the?State?Bar?Court?and?served?upon?petitioner. The?next?day,?July?7,?1989,?the?State?Bar?received?an?”Answer?to?the?Notice?to?Show?Cause”?from?petitioner.?The?State?Bar?Court?did?not?file?this?document?because?a?default?had?already?been?entered?and?petitioner?had?not?complied?with?the?procedural?requirements?to?set?aside?his?default.?The?answer?was?returned?to?petitioner?with?reference?to?the?default?procedures?and?the?Rules?of?Procedure?of?the?State?Bar.?The?default?hearing?was?held?on?September?5,?1989?(Goldhammer,?hg.?judge),?but?petitioner?did?not?appear,?either?in?person?or?through?counsel.?At?the?hearing?evidence?was?presented?in?the?following?matters: The?Hubbard?Matter In?April?1986,?Monica?Hubbard?hired?petitioner,?through?Drivers’?Defense?Clinic?(Drivers),?to?represent?her?after?she?was?charged?with?driving?[53?Cal.3d?1259]?under?the?influence?of?alcohol.?Petitioner?received?a?$175?advance?payable?to?Drivers,?for?which?he?negotiated?a?guilty?plea?entered?in?absentia?in?May?1986.?Despite?repeated?requests?from?Hubbard,?petitioner?never?sent?Hubbard?the?”paperwork”?from?the?plea?bargain,?including?information?on?the?sheriff’s?work?program?that?Hubbard?was?required?to?attend. Hubbard?was?arrested?on?December?2,?1986,?for?failure?to?appear?in?the?sheriff’s?work?program.?Petitioner?obtained?Hubbard’s?release?the?following?day.?He?did?not?charge?her?for?these?additional?services.?Hubbard?continued?to?call?petitioner?for?two?months?on?a?daily?basis,?seeking?the?”paperwork”?from?the?plea?bargain.?She?never?received?the?copies?of?the?court?orders?from?petitioner,?but?eventually?served?her?sentence?and?enrolled?in?a?sheriff’s?work?program?on?her?own. Hubbard?did?not?testify?at?the?default?hearing?on?September?5,?1989;?instead,?the?State?Bar?Court?relied?upon?her?declaration?and?associated?exhibits.?The?hearing?judge?expressed?confusion?as?to?exactly?what?constituted?the?”paperwork”?that?Hubbard?sought,?and?questioned?whether?petitioner?had?a?duty?to?Hubbard?after?she?entered?her?plea?in?December.?In?his?”tentative?view?as?to?culpability,”?the?hearing?judge?found?only?that?the?State?Bar?had?”established?that?[petitioner]?did?not?provide?[Hubbard]?the?paperwork,?he?should?have?done?so,?but?[the?judge?believed]?that?[the?disciplinary?violation?was]?pretty?much?limited?to?that.”?The?hearing?judge?found?petitioner’s?failure?to?send?the?documents?to?Hubbard?constituted?a?failure?to?communicate.?He?ultimately?found?that?the?State?Bar?had?not?established?that?petitioner?failed?to?refund?an?advanced?fee?by?clear?and?convincing?evidence. The?Fields?Matter In?June?1986,?Jerry?Fields?paid?petitioner?$500?to?file?a?criminal?appeal?on?behalf?of?his?father,?who?was?out?of?custody?on?bail.?Petitioner?told?Fields?at?that?time?that?he?would?postpone?filing?until?the?last?minute?to?extend?the?elder?Fields’s?time?out?of?custody.?Petitioner?occasionally?returned?Fields’s?calls,?assuring?Fields?that?all?documents?were?being?timely?filed. By?letter?dated?October?24,?1986,?petitioner?was?notified?by?the?court?that?the?opening?brief?in?People?v.?Fields?was?overdue?and?that?the?appeal?would?be?dismissed?if?the?brief?was?not?received?by?the?court?within?30?days.?Petitioner?requested?and?received?an?extension?of?time?to?file?the?opening?brief?until?December?2,?1986.?He?never?filed?the?brief,?however.?In?February?1987,?Fields’s?father?received?notice?that?he?was?to?appear?in?court?regarding?a?remittitur?that?had?been?issued.?Petitioner?advised?Fields?that?his?[53?Cal.3d?1260]?father?did?not?need?to?appear?and?that?petitioner?would?arrange?for?the?remittitur?to?be?recalled. In?April?1987,?Fields’s?father?voluntarily?appeared?in?court,?where?his?nonappearance?was?excused?and?his?bail?was?exonerated.?He?was?remanded?to?prison?because?his?appeal?had?been?dismissed.?He?served?his?sentence?and?was?released?in?February?1988. The?hearing?judge,?after?reviewing?Fields’s?declaration,?tentatively?found?that?the?State?Bar?had?”borne?out?the?charges?[filed?with?respect?to?this?matter],?…”?In?his?decision,?however,?the?judge?was?unable?to?conclude?that?Fields?had?suffered?prejudice?as?a?result?of?petitioner’s?misconduct,?observing?that?petitioner?was?”not?primarily?responsible?for?the?client?being?jailed.” The?Bilson?Matter In?September?1987,?Stephen?Bilson?gave?petitioner?a?$250?advance?fee?to?represent?Bilson?in?a?civil?suit.?Petitioner?filed?a?timely?answer?on?behalf?of?Bilson?on?October?2,?1987.?Thereafter,?Bilson?could?not?get?petitioner?to?respond?to?his?repeated?phone?calls?or?to?a?letter?sent?to?petitioner?by?certified?mail.?Bilson?finally?contacted?petitioner?in?January?1988,?a?month?before?the?trial?date,?and?requested?that?petitioner?request?a?continuance?of?the?trial?so?that?Bilson?could?hire?new?counsel.?Petitioner?appeared?at?trial?and?did?not?withdraw?as?Bilson’s?attorney;?Bilson?did?not?appear.?A?judgment?of?$22,223.50?was?entered?against?Bilson,?who?is?now?contesting?that?judgment. Bilson?did?not?appear?at?the?default?hearing?but?his?declaration?was?introduced.?The?hearing?judge?in?his?tentative?ruling?noted?that?he?was?unable?to?infer,?from?Bilson’s?declaration,?whether?petitioner?failed?to?request?a?continuance?at?trial?for?substitution?of?counsel,?or?whether?petitioner?in?fact?made?such?a?motion?which?was?denied.?However,?the?hearing?judge?did?find?petitioner?culpable?of?certain?other?disciplinary?violations?for?this?incident?in?his?October?6,?1989,?order. The?Rhodes?Matter In?August?1985,?Kendell?Rhodes’s?attorney?in?Alaska?arranged?for?petitioner?to?represent?Rhodes?by?taking?depositions?in?California?to?be?used?in?his?pending?criminal?case?in?Alaska.?Petitioner?was?paid?an?advance?fee?of?$500?in?connection?with?this?agreement.?Rhodes,?who?could?not?get?a?response?from?petitioner,?was?later?informed?by?his?attorney?in?Alaska?that?the?depositions?in?California?were?scheduled?for?November?26,?1985.?[53?Cal.3d?1261] Petitioner?did?not?appear?at?the?deposition.?Though?the?court?reporter?told?Rhodes?that?petitioner?was?sick,?Rhodes?called?petitioner’s?office?and?was?told?that?petitioner?was?out?of?the?office?on?another?matter.?After?making?several?unsuccessful?attempts?to?reach?petitioner?by?telephone,?Rhodes?terminated?his?relationship?with?petitioner?in?January?1986?and?demanded?that?his?fee?of?$500?be?returned.?Petitioner?did?not?respond.?Rhodes?won?a?small?claims?judgment?of?$509?against?petitioner?in?June?1986.?Petitioner?had?not?paid?Rhodes?as?of?the?date?of?the?hearing?of?the?State?Bar?Court. The?hearing?judge?considered?Rhodes’s?declaration?and?tentatively?determined?that?the?charges?were?”pretty?straightforward?and?borne?out.” State?Bar?Findings On?the?basis?of?the?evidence?presented?at?the?default?hearing,?the?hearing?judge?determined?that?petitioner?had?violated:?former?rule?2-111(A)(2)?of?the?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct?(withdrawing?from?employment?without?taking?reasonable?steps?to?avoid?foreseeable?prejudice?to?the?rights?of?his?clients?in?the?Hubbard,?Fields,?and?Bilson?matters);?former?rule?2-111(A)(3)?of?the?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct?(withdrawing?from?employment?without?promptly?refunding?an?unearned?advance?fee?in?the?Fields,?Bilson,?and?Rhodes?matters);?former?rule?6-101(A)(2)?of?the?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct?(intentionally?or?with?reckless?disregard?failing?to?perform?legal?services?competently?in?all?of?the?above?matters);?former?rule?6-101(B)(1)?of?the?Rules?of?Professional?Conduct?(accepting?employment?when?he?knew?that?he?did?not?have,?or?would?not?have,?or?would?not?acquire?before?performance?was?required,?sufficient?time,?resources?and?ability?to?perform?this?matter?with?competence?in?the?Hubbard?and?Fields?matters);?and?Business?and?Professions?Code?section?6068,?subdivision?(m)?(failing?to?keep?his?clients?reasonably?informed?of?significant?developments?in?all?of?the?above?matters).?As?a?result?of?these?violations,?the?hearing?judge?found?that?petitioner?violated?Business?and?Professions?Code?section?6068,?subdivision?(a)?(willfully?failing?to?support?the?laws?of?this?state),?and?that?standards?2.4(b)?and?2.6?of?the?Standards?for?Attorney?Sanctions?for?Professional?Misconduct?(Rules?Proc.?of?State?Bar,?div.?V)?and?Business?and?Professions?Code?section?6103?should?be?applied.?The?hearing?judge?recommended?that?petitioner?be?suspended?from?the?practice?of?law?for?one?year,?and?that?the?suspension?be?stayed?upon?certain?conditions?including?probation?for?eighteen?months. The?hearing?judge’s?decision?was?filed?on?October?6,?1989.?Petitioner?was?sent?a?copy?of?the?decision?and?notice?of?his?right?to?move?to?have?the?default?vacated?pursuant?to?former?State?Bar?Rules?of?Procedure,?rule?[53?Cal.3d?1262]?555.1.fn.?1?Petitioner?did?not?respond?to?this?mailing.?In?May?1990,?the?State?Bar?Court?forwarded?the?findings?and?recommendations?of?the?hearing?department?to?this?court.?Petitioner?filed?a?timely?petition?for?review?on?July?30,?1990,fn.?2?which?was?granted?August?29,?1990. Petition?for?Review?and?Assertions?Contained?Therein Petitioner?contends?that?a?physical?ailment?prevented?him?both?from?attending?the?hearing?of?the?State?Bar?Court?and?from?filing?a?motion?seeking?relief?within?the?statutory?period?for?filing?such?motions.?He?asks?this?court?to?grant?him?relief?from?his?default?and?to?remand?the?matter?to?the?State?Bar?Court?for?another?opportunity?to?present?evidence?on?the?merits.?He?claims?to?have?first?become?aware?of?the?default?in?January?1990,?long?after?the?75-day?period?for?setting?aside?the?default.?His?declaration?states?that?he?contacted?the?State?Bar?at?that?time?and?made?full?restitution?to?Rhodes.?According?to?petitioner,?the?State?Bar?advised?petitioner?on?May?30,?1990,?that?it?was?too?late?to?obtain?relief?from?default?in?the?State?Bar?Court?and?advised?him?that?the?State?Bar?Court?would?be?filing?its?recommendation?with?the?Supreme?Court?soon.?After?the?State?Bar?filed?its?recommendation?with?this?court,?petitioner?filed?a?timely?petition?for?review. In?support?of?his?request?to?be?granted?a?belated?relief?from?default,?petitioner?documents?that?he?suffers?from?”temporal?lobe?epilepsy.”?Petitioner’s?history?with?this?ailment?stems?from?an?injury?to?his?head?in?1971.?He?had?a?generalized?seizure?in?1984,?for?which?he?was?treated?with?various?drugs.?The?drugs?had?adverse?side?effects?upon?petitioner,?and?he?discontinued?their?use?in?1986?or?1987.?During?this?time,?petitioner?believed?that?he?was?suffering?from?depression?and?was?aware?of?some?memory?loss,?for?which?he?received?counseling?through?1988.?Apparently?petitioner?then?sought?no?further?aid?until?December?1989,?when?he?turned?to?a?new?doctor?for?medical?treatment.?Petitioner?found?this?treatment?ineffective?and?sought?out?another?medical?team?in?March?1990.?For?the?first?time,?petitioner’s?temporal?lobe?epilepsy?was?diagnosed?and?effectively?treated. Petitioner?argues?that?his?illness?”created?a?’false?memory’?which?prevented?him?from?defending?himself?insofar?as?he?falsely?believed?that?he?had?provided?the?State?Bar?with?exculpatory?evidence?when?in?fact?he?had?not.”?He?further?attributes?to?the?illness?his?failure?to?respond?to?the?hearing?[53?Cal.3d?1263]?judge’s?filed?decision?of?October?6,?1989.?Petitioner?thus?points?out?that?his?failure?to?file?a?request?for?review?of?the?decision?by?November?6,?1989,?was?during?”a?time?when?[petitioner]?was?not?properly?diagnosed?for?his?illness.”?Petitioner?does?not?argue?that?his?illness?was?the?underlying?cause?of?the?violations?alleged?by?the?State?Bar;fn.?3?instead,?he?argues?that?his?disability?prevented?him?from?defending?himself?in?the?State?Bar?proceedings. Petitioner?submitted?a?letter?dated?May?11,?1990,?in?which?his?physician?explains?petitioner’s?treatment?with?Tegretol,?”the?drug?of?choice?for?seizure?control?and?limbic?epilepsy.”?The?doctor?”anticipated?that?[petitioner]?will?be?stabilized?on?Tegretol?and?require?this?medication?for?life?if?it?does?control?his?symptoms.?[She?did]?not?anticipate?any?worsening?of?his?symptoms?or?the?development?of?an?actual?psychiatric?illness?at?this?point?in?his?life.”?Petitioner,?in?his?declaration?in?his?petition?for?review,?asserts?that?since?receiving?the?Tegretol?treatment,?”[he?had]?not?experienced?any?additional?lapses?of?consciousness?or?memory?problems.” Discussion   Remand?to?State?Bar?Court [1a]?Petitioner?requests?that?we?grant?him?relief?from?default?and?remand?the?matter?to?the?State?Bar?Court?for?a?new?hearing?on?the?merits.?[2]?We?are?generally?unsympathetic?to?attorneys’?claims?for?relief?from?default?in?the?State?Bar?Court.?”[A]n?accused?attorney?has?the?obligation?to?obtain?representation?if?he?wants?it,?to?appear?at?the?hearing,?and?to?present?evidence.?The?hearing?may?proceed?despite?his?voluntary?absence,?and?his?failure?to?participate?is?not?grounds?for?a?rehearing?to?present?additional?evidence.?[Citations.]”?(Hawk?v.?State?Bar?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?589,?597?[247?Cal.Rptr.?599,?754?P.2d?1096].)?Petitioner?did?not?appear.?Further,?after?the?default?was?entered,?petitioner?was?sent?notice?of?the?default?and?was?advised?that?he?had?75?days?after?the?entry?of?default?to?file?a?motion?seeking?relief.?(See?former?Rules?Proc.?of?State?Bar,?rule?555.1(b).)?He?did?not?file?such?a?motion.?Instead,?petitioner?now?seeks?relief?from?his?default?more?than?75?days?after?the?entry?of?default. [1b]?The?State?Bar?argues?that?petitioner’s?explanation?for?his?failure?to?respond?to?the?State?Bar’s?charges?is?implausible,?and?that?his?motion?to?remand?his?case?to?the?State?Bar?Court?should?be?denied?on?this?basis.fn.?4?The?[53?Cal.3d?1264]?State?Bar?presents?two?particular?indicia?that?petitioner?did?know,?or?should?have?known,?of?the?nature?and?outcome?of?the?charges?the?State?Bar?filed?against?him.?First,?during?the?period?from?May?10,?1989,?to?October?6,?1989,?petitioner?received?multiple?notices?of?the?State?Bar?proceedings?to?which?he?responded,?in?one?instance,?on?July?7,?1989.?The?State?Bar?thus?points?out?that?petitioner?knew?of?the?proceedings?at?one?point,?and?argues?that?this?knowledge?in?itself?”clearly?establishes?his?awareness?that?disciplinary?proceedings?had?not?been?terminated.” Second,?the?State?Bar?notes?that?the?letter?that?petitioner?has?submitted?from?his?supervisor?at?the?State?Public?Defender’s?office?indicates?that?from?the?first?day?of?his?employment?as?a?deputy?state?public?defender?on?December?18,?1989,?through?the?diagnosis?of?his?illness?in?March?1990,?petitioner?had?completed?his?case?assignments?(according?to?a?letter?from?the?chief?assistant?state?public?defender)?as?a?deputy?state?public?defender?in?a?”capable,?diligent?manner.”?Indeed,?the?chief?assistant?state?public?defender?noted?that?he?had?”seen?no?evidence?of?aberrant?behavior”?in?petitioner.?The?State?Bar?argues?that?it?is?curious?that?evidence?of?petitioner’s?illness?was?entirely?absent?among?the?persons?with?whom?petitioner?worked,?in?spite?of?the?fact?that?for?much?of?this?time?his?temporal?lobe?epilepsy?was?undiagnosed?and?while,?presumably,?petitioner?continued?to?suffer?from?symptoms?such?as?false?memory. We?agree?with?the?State?Bar?that?petitioner’s?claim?that?temporal?lobe?epilepsy?precluded?him?from?responding?in?the?State?Bar?proceedings?is?implausible.?Though?his?doctor?attests?that?petitioner?suffers?from?temporal?lobe?epilepsy,?the?doctor?does?not?suggest?that?this?ailment?would?account?for?petitioner’s?failure?to?respond?to?the?charges?filed?against?petitioner?by?the?State?Bar;?indeed,?after?describing?false?memory?as?a?symptom?of?temporal?lobe?epilepsy,?petitioner?notes?that?the?false?memories?are?not?permanent?but?generally?recede?”after?a?few?days.”?Yet?petitioner?implies?that?this?particular?memory,?that?the?State?Bar?charges?had?been?dismissed,?never?receded?even?in?the?face?of?notices?to?the?contrary. We?find?other?facts?which?undermine?petitioner’s?claim?regarding?the?effect?his?disability?had?on?his?ability?to?respond?to?the?State?Bar?proceedings.?As?the?State?Bar?notes,?the?fact?that?petitioner?practiced?competently?as?a?deputy?state?public?defender?for?three?and?a?half?months?before?receiving?effective?treatment?for?his?epilepsy?suggests?that?petitioner?was?capable?of?assimilating?and?acting?upon?pertinent?information.?We?see?no?reason?to?distinguish?his?clients’?cases?from?petitioner’s?own?case.?Finally,?petitioner?[53?Cal.3d?1265]?was?aware?of?recurring?problems?caused?by?symptoms?of?temporal?lobe?epilepsyfn.?5?at?the?time?of?the?State?Bar?proceedings.?This?awareness?establishes,?at?the?very?least,?petitioner’s?inexcusable?neglect?in?not?providing?some?mechanism?to?prevent?exactly?this?situation?from?arising?(e.g.,?by?retaining?counsel?to?represent?him?or?by?alerting?a?secretary?or?other?such?person?to?monitor?the?progress?of?the?proceeding).?(See?former?Rules?Proc.?of?State?Bar,?rule?555.1(a);?Code?Civ.?Proc.,???473.) For?all?of?the?above?reasons,?we?do?not?find?that?remand?of?petitioner’s?case?to?the?State?Bar?Court?is?warranted.?Accordingly,?this?request?is?denied. Review?on?the?Merits [3]?Our?principal?concerns?in?State?Bar?disciplinary?proceedings?are?always?the?protection?of?the?public,?the?preservation?of?confidence?in?the?legal?profession,?and?the?maintenance?of?the?highest?possible?professional?standards?for?attorneys.?(Young?v.?State?Bar?(1990)?50?Cal.3d?1204,?1215?[270?Cal.Rptr.?315,?791?P.2d?994].)?Though?we?exercise?our?independent?judgment?in?determining?the?discipline?to?be?imposed?on?an?attorney?for?disciplinary?violations?(Greenbaum?v.?State?Bar?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?543,?550?[237?Cal.Rptr.?168,?736?P.2d?754]),?we?accord?the?findings?and?recommendations?of?the?State?Bar?great?weight?in?determining?the?appropriate?disciplinary?sanctions.?(In?re?Basinger?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?1348,?1358?[249?Cal.Rptr.?110,?756?P.2d?833].) Petitioner?submits?his?declaration,?which?asserts?that?his?clients’?grievances?were?the?result?of?their?own?actions-not?petitioner’s?conduct.?[4]?We?have?repeatedly?asserted?our?reluctance?to?consider?evidence?that?has?not?been?presented?in?State?Bar?proceedings.?”?'[T]his?court?hesitates?to?rely?upon?any?documentary?evidence?that?is?extrinsic?to?the?record?of?the?proceedings?before?the?State?Bar.’?[Citations.]?’Such?evidence?is?virtually?impossible?to?evaluate?in?the?absence?of?cross-examination?….’?”?(Bercovich?v.?State?Bar?(1990)?50?Cal.3d?116,?126?[266?Cal.Rptr.?341,?785?P.2d?889],?italics?in?original;?see?also?Lydon?v.?State?Bar?(1988)?45?Cal.3d?1181,?1187?[248?Cal.Rptr.?830,?756?P.2d?217];?Rosenthal?v.?State?Bar?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?658,?663?[238?Cal.Rptr.?394,?738?P.2d?740].)?In?the?absence?of?cross-examination,?we?are?unable?to?evaluate?petitioner’s?”own,?self-serving,?out-of-court?statements.”?(Lydon?v.?State?Bar,?supra,?45?Cal.3d?at?p.?1187.)?[53?Cal.3d?1266]?Accordingly,?we?decline?petitioner’s?invitation?to?consider?his?declaration?as?it?relates?to?the?substantive?State?Bar?charges?and?limit?our?review?to?the?facts?described?in?the?record. [5]?In?this?case,?the?State?Bar?recommends?that?we?discipline?petitioner?for:?withdrawing?from?employment?without?taking?reasonable?steps?to?avoid?foreseeable?prejudice?to?the?rights?of?his?clients?in?the?Hubbard,?Fields,?and?Bilson?matters;?willfully?failing?to?perform?services?in?a?competent?manner?in?the?Hubbard,?Bilson,?and?Rhodes?matters;?willfully?failing?to?respond?to?a?client’s?status?inquiries?or?keep?his?client?reasonably?informed?of?significant?developments?in?the?Hubbard,?Fields,?Bilson,?and?Rhodes?matters;?and?withdrawing?from?employment?without?promptly?refunding?an?unearned?advanced?fee?in?the?Fields,?Bilson,?and?Rhodes?matters. It?is?beyond?question?that?petitioner’s?alleged?acts?of?misconduct?warrant?discipline:?”We?have?considered?abandonment?of?clients?and?retention?of?unearned?fees?as?serious?misconduct?warranting?periods?of?actual?suspension?….”?(Matthew?v.?State?Bar?(1989)?49?Cal.3d?784,?791?[263?Cal.Rptr.?660,?781?P.2d?952].)?A?summary?review?of?cases?involving?client?abandonment?and?retention?of?unearned?fees?supports?this?assertion.?In?Lester?v.?State?Bar?(1976)?17?Cal.3d?547[131?Cal.Rptr.?225,?551?P.2d?841],?four?instances?in?which?the?attorney?retained?unearned?fees?resulted?in?the?attorney’s?six-?month?actual?suspension?from?practice.?In?Smith?v.?State?Bar?(1985)38?Cal.3d?525?[213?Cal.Rptr.?236,?698?P.2d?139],?an?attorney?was?found?to?have?abandoned?one?client?(resulting?in?the?issuance?of?a?contempt?order?against?the?client)?and?retained?the?unearned?fees?of?another;?for?his?misconduct,?we?imposed?thirty?days’?actual?suspension.?In?Stuart?v.?State?Bar?(1985)?40?Cal.3d?838?[221?Cal.Rptr.?557,?710?P.2d?357],?an?attorney?who?had?been?privately?reproved?in?a?different?matter?eight?years?before?was?actually?suspended?for?thirty?days?for?one?instance?of?client?abandonment?(resulting?in?the?dismissal?of?that?client’s?case). In?light?of?this?precedent,?the?discipline?recommended?by?the?State?Bar?may?appear?lenient.fn.?6We?note,?however,?the?hearing?judge’s?obvious?concern?about?the?adequacy?of?the?case?presented?by?the?State?Bar?in?petitioner’s?absence.?In?the?Hubbard?matter?the?hearing?judge?found?the?State?Bar’s?assertions?about?petitioner’s?misconduct?insufficiently?supported?by?evidence?and?was?therefore?unable?to?conclude?that?petitioner?had?refused?to?refund?advanced?fees?or?had?abandoned?his?client.?In?the?Fields?matter?there?was?no?finding?of?prejudice?to?the?client,?and?the?decision?notes?that?”Fields?might?well?have?been?jailed?earlier?than?he?would?likely?otherwise?have?[53?Cal.3d?1267]?been”?but?for?petitioner’s?actions?on?Fields’s?behalf.?In?the?Bilson?matter?the?hearing?judge?was?skeptical?that?petitioner?went?to?the?trouble?of?showing?up?at?Bilson’s?hearing?and?then?did?absolutely?nothing,?as?the?State?Bar?suggests.fn.?7?Only?in?the?Rhodes?matter?did?the?hearing?judge?not?articulate?serious?misgivings?about?the?adequacy?of?the?evidence?presented?against?petitioner. While?the?ultimate?responsibility?for?imposing?disciplinary?sanctions?upon?attorneys?falls?to?this?court,?we?have?repeatedly?emphasized?our?reliance?on?factual?findings?made?by?hearing?judges.?”We?generally?give?more?weight?to?the?factual?findings?of?the?hearing?panel?since?it?has?a?better?opportunity?to?observe?the?testimony?of?various?witnesses.”?(In?re?Young?(1989)?49?Cal.3d?257,?264-265?[261?Cal.Rptr.?59,?776?P.2d?1021];?see?also?Hartford?v.?State?Bar?(1990)?50?Cal.3d?1139,?1149?[270?Cal.Rptr.?12,?791?P.2d?598];?Dixon?v.?State?Bar?(1982)?32?Cal.3d?728,?736?[187?Cal.Rptr.?30,?653?P.2d?321].)?In?this?instance,?the?hearing?judge’s?recommendation?followed?his?finding?that?the?State?Bar?had?failed?to?establish?several?of?the?acts?of?misconduct?that?it?alleged?petitioner?had?committed.?In?no?case?was?significant?prejudice?to?a?client?established;?it?is?clear?from?the?record?that-with?the?exception?of?Kendell?Rhodes-the?clients’?”unreturned”?fees?were?nominal.?In?sum,?we?find?that?on?the?facts?that?we?have?adopted,?the?hearing?judge’s?recommendations?state?appropriate?disciplinary?sanctions?for?petitioner’s?misconduct. “The?object?of?disciplinary?proceedings?is?to?protect?the?public?and?the?courts,?and?to?preserve?confidence?in?the?legal?profession.”?(Young?v.?State?Bar,?supra,?50?Cal.3d?at?p.?1215.)?We?find?this?objective?sufficiently?served?by?imposition?of?the?discipline?recommended?by?the?hearing?department.?Further,?in?light?of?his?treatment?with?the?appropriate?medication?and?the?assurances?of?his?employer?that?his?clients?will?be?protected?in?the?event?of?a?relapse,fn.?8?we?see?no?need?to?impose?additional?disciplinary?sanctions?as?a?prophylactic?measure. III.?Disposition […]