People?v.?Hull?(1991)?1?Cal.4th?266?,?2?Cal.Rptr.2d?526;?820?P.2d?1036 [No.?S019254.?Dec?26,?1991.] THE?PEOPLE,?Plaintiff?and?Respondent,?v.?ALMA?MAE?HULL,?Defendant?and?Appellant. (Superior?Court?of?Stanislaus?County,?No.?245290,?Donald?B.?Cantwell?and?Frank?S.?Pierson,?Judges.) (Opinion?by?Panelli,?J.,?with?Lucas,?C.?J.,?Mosk,?Arabian,?Baxter?and?George,?JJ.,?concurring.?Separate?dissenting?opinion?by?Kennard,?J.) COUNSEL Millard?A.?Murphy,?under?appointment?by?the?Supreme?Court,?for?Defendant?and?Appellant. Wilbur?F.?Littlefield,?Public?Defender?(Los?Angeles),?Laurence?M.?Sarnoff?and?John?Hamilton?Scott,?Deputy?Public?Defenders,?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Defendant?and?Appellant. John?K.?Van?de?Kamp?and?Daniel?E.?Lungren,?Attorneys?General,?Richard?B.?Iglehart?and?George?Williamson,?Chief?Assistant?Attorneys?General,?Arnold?[1?Cal.4th?268]?O.?Overoye,?Assistant?Attorney?General,?Louis?Vasquez,?Shirley?A.?Nelson,?Robert?R.?Anderson,?Michael?Weinberger?and?Carlos?A.?Martinez,?Deputy?Attorneys?General,?for?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. Michael?D.?Bradbury,?District?Attorney?(Ventura),?and?Michael?D.?Schwartz,?Deputy?District?Attorney,?as?Amici?Curiae?on?behalf?of?Plaintiff?and?Respondent. OPINION PANELLI,?J. We?granted?review?to?determine?whether?a?writ?of?mandate?under?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?section?170.3,?subdivision?(d)?fn.?1?(hereafter?section?170.3(d))?is?the?exclusive?means?by?which?a?party?may?seek?review?of?an?unsuccessful?peremptory?challenge?against?a?trial?judge.?(??170.6.)?We?conclude,?as?did?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?this?case,?that?section?170.3(d)?prescribes?the?exclusive?means?of?appellate?review?of?an?unsuccessful?peremptory?challenge. Facts Petitioner?Alma?Mae?Hull?(Hull)?was?charged?by?information?with?the?sale?of?cocaine?base?(Health?&?Saf.?Code,???11352).?fn.?2?She?waived?arraignment?and?pleaded?not?guilty.?Jury?trial?was?set?for?October?16,?1989,?at?a?pretrial?conference?held?before?Judge?Pierson.?Later,?the?case?was?assigned?to?Judge?Stone’s?courtroom.?However,?after?Presiding?Judge?Cantwell?granted?a?continuance,?another?pretrial?conference?was?set?for?October?26,?1989,?and?the?trial?was?reset?for?October?30,?1989. At?the?second?pretrial?conference,?held?before?Judge?Azevedo,?the?trial?date?of?October?30?was?confirmed.?Although?Hull’s?trial?counsel?was?not?present?at?this?pretrial?conference,?Hull?herself?was?present. On?Friday,?October?27,?1989,?Judge?Cantwell?presided?over?another?”department?setting?conference.”?As?a?result?of?this?conference,?the?case?was?assigned?to?Judge?Pierson’s?courtroom?for?trial.?Neither?Hull?nor?her?trial?counsel?was?present.?Subsequently,?on?Monday,?October?30,?Hull?filed?a?[1?Cal.4th?269]?peremptory?challenge?before?Presiding?Judge?Cantwell,?pursuant?to?section?170.6,?fn.?3?to?disqualify?Judge?Pierson.?Judge?Cantwell?denied?the?motion?as?untimely. Hull?waived?her?right?to?a?jury?trial?and?proceeded?to?trial?before?Judge?Pierson.?Judge?Pierson?found?Hull?guilty?and?also?found?true?the?alleged?prior?conviction.?The?judge?also?found?that?Hull?was?on?her?own?recognizance?pending?trial?on?still?another?charge?at?the?time?of?the?offense.?On?November?27,?1989,?Hull?was?sentenced?to?a?total?term?of?six?years?and?four?months.?This?term?was?to?run?consecutively?to?the?sentence?already?imposed?for?Hull’s?prior?offense. Hull?filed?an?appeal?from?the?judgment?of?conviction?that?raised?only?the?denial?of?her?peremptory?challenge?motion.?The?Court?of?Appeal?held?that?an?order?denying?a?peremptory?challenge?of?a?trial?judge?is?not?an?appealable?order?and?hence?was?not?reviewable?on?appeal.?Consequently,?the?Court?of?Appeal?affirmed?the?trial?court’s?judgment. Discussion [1a]?Hull?contends?that?the?Court?of?Appeal?erred?in?holding?that?review?of?a?denial?of?a?peremptory?challenge?under?section?170.6?was?subject?to?the?provisions?of?section?170.3(d).?We?disagree. Chapter?3?of?title?2?of?part?1?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure,?entitled?”Disqualification?of?Judges,”?prescribes?the?means?by?which?a?party?may?challenge?an?assigned?judge?”for?cause”?(??170.1)?or?may?exercise?a?peremptory?challenge?against?the?judge?(??170.6).?In?1984,?as?part?of?a?substantial?overhaul?of?the?provisions?of?part?1,?title?2,?chapter?3,?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure,?the?Legislature?enacted?section?170.3(d)?pertaining?to?appellate?review?of?disqualification?motions.?Section?170.3(d)?provides:?”The?determination?of?the?question?of?the?disqualification?of?a?judge?is?not?an?appealable?order?and?may?be?reviewed?only?by?a?writ?of?mandate?from?the?appropriate?court?of?appeal?sought?within?10?days?of?notice?to?the?parties?of?the?decision?and?only?by?the?parties?to?the?proceeding.”?(??170.3(d);?see?Stats.?1984,?ch.?1555,???1?et?seq.,?pp.?5479-5484.) A?split?of?authority?has?developed?in?the?Courts?of?Appeal?as?to?whether?section?170.3(d)?applies?to?both?challenges?for?cause?and?peremptory?challenges,?or?only?to?challenges?for?cause.?The?Court?of?Appeal?in?People?v.?[1?Cal.4th?270]?Jenkins?(1987)?196?Cal.App.3d?394?[241?Cal.Rptr.?827]?(hereafter?Jenkins)?addressed?challenges?for?cause?and?held?that?section?170.3(d)?makes?mandamus?the?sole?appellate?remedy?for?review?of?an?order?denying?a?motion?to?disqualify?a?judge?for?cause.?(196?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?403-404.)?According?to?the?court,?”[t]he?unambiguous?language?of?[section?170.3(d)]?indicates?that?an?order?determining?disqualification?is?reviewable?’only’?by?writ,?thereby?precluding?review?on?appeal?from?a?judgment.?The?Legislature?obviously?opted?for?speedy?review?of?a?disqualification?ruling,?since?permitting?that?ruling?to?be?attacked?later?on?appeal?of?the?judgment?could?invalidate?every?ruling?made?by?the?trial?court?judge?after?the?disqualification?motion?was?denied.”?(Ibid.)?The?Jenkins?court?did?not?address?section?170.3(d)’s?applicability?to?peremptory?challenges?under?section?170.6. In?Woodman?v.?Superior?Court?(1987)?196?Cal.App.3d?407?[241?Cal.Rptr.?818]?(hereafter?Woodman),?fn.?4?the?Court?of?Appeal?specifically?held?that?the?limitation?on?appellate?review?set?forth?in?section?170.3(d)?applies?only?to?challenges?for?cause.?The?Woodman?court?examined?the?legislative?history?of?section?170.3(d)?and?concluded?”that?the?1984?revision?of?the?challenge?for?cause?statute,?of?which?[section?170.3(d)]?is?part,?was?to?have?no?effect?on?the?peremptory?challenge?statute.”?(196?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?413-414.)?The?court?reached?this?conclusion?by?relying?on?the?statement?of?the?Senate?Final?History?of?Senate?Bill?No.?1633,?1983-1984?Regular?Session,?that?”?’Code?of?Civil?Procedure?Sec.?170.6?provides?for?the?peremptory?challenge?of?a?trial?court?judge.?This?bill?would?not?amend?that?section.’?”?(196?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?414,?italics?in?Woodman.)?The?Woodman?court?concluded?that?”the?mere?use?of?the?phrase?’disqualification?of?a?judge’?in?the?time?limitation?provision?of?section?170.3,?subdivision?(d)?does?not?evince?a?legislative?intent?that?the?limitation?apply?to?all?disqualification?motions.”?(Id.?at?p.?413.) Rejecting?Woodman,?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?Guedalia?v.?Superior?Court?(1989)?211?Cal.App.3d?1156?[260?Cal.Rptr.?99]?(hereafter?Guedalia)?held?that?section?170.3(d)?”is?the?exclusive?appellate?remedy?for?any?motion?to?disqualify?a?judge,?including?peremptory?challenges?pursuant?to?section?170.6.”?(211?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1163.)?The?Guedalia?court?expressly?agreed?with?Jenkins’s?statutory?analysis?of?section?170.3(d)?and?concluded?that?the?analysis?applies?to?both?types?of?challenges.?(211?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?1159-1160.)?Thus,?Guedalia?stated,?”the?plain?language?of?[section?170.3(d)]?does?not?purport?to?limit?its?applicability?to?challenges?’for?cause.’?To?the?contrary,?it?is?broadly?applicable?to?any?’determination?of?the?question?of?the?disqualification?of?a?judge?….’?…?The?broad?language?plainly?evinces?an?intention?that?[section?170.3(d)]?has?generic?applicability?to?all?disqualification?motions,?including?section?170.6?motions.”?(Id.?at?p.?1160.)?[1?Cal.4th?271] Moreover,?Guedalia?explained,?because?section?170.3(d)?is?part?of?the?provisions?of?part?1,?title?2,?chapter?3,?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure,?which?deals?exclusively?with?questions?of?disqualification?of?judges,?the?section’s?”limitation?on?appellate?review?of?disqualification?determinations?appears?fully?applicable?to?any?disqualification?motions?within?the?ambit?of?chapter?3,?including?motions?under?section?170.6.”?(211?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1161,?italics?in?original.) Guedalia?recognized?that?Woodman?(supra,?196?Cal.App.3d?407)?reached?a?contrary?conclusion?based?on?its?review?of?section?170.3(d)’s?legislative?history.?However,?Guedalia?stated,?its?”review?of?that?same?legislative?history?…?reveals?no?intention?to?exclude?section?170.6?determinations?from?the?appellate?review?provisions?enacted?by?the?Legislature.”?(211?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1161,?italics?in?original.)?According?to?Guedalia,?in?excluding?peremptory?challenges?from?section?170.3(d)’s?provisions,?the?Woodman?court?adopted?an?incorrect?and?unnecessarily?broad?interpretation?of?the?legislative?history.?(See?post,?p.?275.) Finally,?Guedalia?explained,?holding?section?170.3(d)’s?10-day?limitation?applicable?to?section?170.6?peremptory?challenges?had?the?added?benefit?of?promoting?the?twin?policies?advanced?by?section?170.3(d)-judicial?economy?and?elimination?of?the?unfair?manipulation?of?erroneously?denied?challenges.?(211?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?1162-1163.)?fn.?5 Hull?urges?us?to?resolve?the?split?between?Guedalia?and?Woodman?by?adopting?the?Woodman?rationale.?[2]?We?begin?our?analysis?by?noting?that?”[t]he?fundamental?purpose?of?statutory?construction?is?to?ascertain?the?intent?of?the?lawmakers?so?as?to?effectuate?the?purpose?of?the?law.?[Citations.]”?(People?v.?Pieters?(1991)?52?Cal.3d?894,?898?[276?Cal.Rptr.?918,?802?P.2d?420].)?In?determining?this?intent,?courts?look?first?to?the?words?contained?in?the?statute,?giving?them?their?usual?and?ordinary?meaning.?(City?of?Santa?Cruz?v.?Municipal?Court?(1989)?49?Cal.3d?74,?90?[260?Cal.Rptr.?520,?776?P.2d?222];?Title?Ins.?&?Trust?Co.?v.?County?of?Riverside?(1989)?48?Cal.3d?84,?91?[255?Cal.Rptr.?670,?767?P.2d?1148].) [1b]?The?term?”disqualification?of?a?judge,”?as?used?in?section?170.3(d),?has?a?usual?and?ordinary?significance?that?requires?little?interpretation.?To?[1?Cal.4th?272]?”disqualify”?means?”to?deprive?of?a?power,?right,?or?privilege.”?(Webster’s?New?Internat.?Dict.?(3d?ed.?1961)?p.?655.)?Hence,?according?to?the?ordinary?meaning?of?the?term,?a?disqualified?judge?is?deprived?of?the?power,?right?or?privilege?to?hear?a?case.?This?meaning?applies?whether?the?judge?is?challenged?for?cause?or?by?a?peremptory?challenge.?”The?broad?language?plainly?evinces?an?intention?that?[section?170.3(d)]?has?generic?applicability?to?all?disqualification?motions,?including?section?170.6?motions.”?(Guedalia,?supra,?211?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1160.) An?examination?of?the?framework?of?the?disqualification?statutes?supports?this?”ordinary?meaning”?interpretation.?[3]?”A?statute?must?be?construed?’in?the?context?of?the?entire?statutory?system?of?which?it?is?a?part,?in?order?to?achieve?harmony?among?the?parts.’?[Citation.]”?(People?v.?Woodhead?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?1002,?1009?[239?Cal.Rptr.?656,?741?P.2d?154].)?[1c]?As?noted,?section?170.3(d)?is?part?of?the?provisions?of?title?2,?chapter?3,?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure.?Both?kinds?of?disqualification?determinations,?for?cause?and?peremptory,?are?included?within?chapter?3.?(Guedalia,?supra,?211?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?1161-1162.)?Indeed,?the?entire?chapter?is?entitled?”Disqualifications?of?Judges.” Hull?maintains?that?the?division,?article,?chapter,?and?section?headings?of?the?codes?are?not?controlling,?as?they?are?not?regarded?as?official.?She?argues?that?for-cause?and?peremptory?challenges?were?simply?put?in?the?same?chapter?as?a?matter?of?organizational?convenience.?[4]?However,?it?is?well?established?that?”?’chapter?and?section?headings?[of?an?act]?may?properly?be?considered?in?determining?legislative?intent’?[citation],?and?are?entitled?to?considerable?weight.?[Citation.]”?(American?Federation?of?Teachers?v.?Board?of?Education?(1980)?107?Cal.App.3d?829,?836?[166?Cal.Rptr.?89];?see?also?City?of?Los?Angeles?v.?County?of?Los?Angeles?(1989)?216?Cal.App.3d?916,?923?[265?Cal.Rptr.?461].)?[1d]?The?fact?that?section?170.6?appears?under?the?chapter?heading?”Disqualifications?of?Judges”?provides?a?strong?indication?that?the?Legislature?intended?a?section?170.6?peremptory?challenge?to?constitute?a?”disqualification”?within?the?meaning?of?section?170.3(d). Furthermore,?one?of?the?strongest?arguments?against?Hull’s?narrow?interpretation?of?section?170.3(d)?is?that?the?public?policy?considerations?underlying?that?section?are?equally?applicable?to,?and?compelling?for,?both?challenges?for?cause?and?peremptory?challenges.?Section?170.3?has?the?dual?purpose?of?promoting?”judicial?economy”?and?”fundamental?fairness.”?(Guedalia,?supra,?211?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?1162-1163.)?The?statute?”fosters?judicial?economy?by?eliminating?the?waste?of?time?and?money?which?inheres?if?the?litigation?is?permitted?to?continue?unabated,?only?to?be?vacated?on?appeal?because?the?subsequent?rulings?and?judgment?were?declared?’void’?by?virtue?of?the?erroneously?denied?disqualification?motion.”?(Id.?at?p.?1162.)?[1?Cal.4th?273] Additionally,?if?a?peremptory?challenge?were?an?appealable?order,?the?party?requesting?such?a?challenge?might?be?given?an?”intolerable?windfall.”?If?the?ultimate?judgment?were?favorable?to?the?moving?party,?the?disqualification?issue?would?be?moot.?However,?if?the?ultimate?judgment?were?unfavorable,?the?moving?party?would?receive?a?second?”bite?at?the?apple,”?i.e.,?a?second?opportunity?to?win?the?merits?of?the?case.?(Guedalia,?supra,?211?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1162.) With?the?enactment?of?section?170.3(d),?fundamental?fairness?is?promoted?by?ensuring?that?the?parties,?through?a?petition?for?a?writ?of?mandate,?receive?”?’as?speedy?an?appellate?determination?as?possible.’?”?(Jenkins,?supra,?196?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?404,?quoting?analysis?of?Sen.?Bill?No.?598?(1983-1984?Reg.?Sess.)?provided?to?the?Sen.?Com.?on?Judiciary?by?Professor?Preble?Stolz,?Chair?of?the?State?Bar?Committee?that?drafted?the?legislation,?at?p.?15.)?There?is?no?justifiable?reason?to?presume?that?the?Legislature?would?have?granted?a?speedy?and?fundamentally?fair?avenue?to?litigants?who?make?a?for-cause?challenge?and?yet?require?parties?who?make?a?peremptory?challenge?to?suffer?possible?delay,?waste,?and?the?relitigation?of?issues. Hull?also?argues?that?in?enacting?section?170.3(d)?the?Legislature?never?expressed?an?intent?”to?break?with?its?long?standing?practice?of?keeping?separate?the?provisions?for”?section?170.1?and?section?170.6.?However,?the?Legislature’s?intent?can?most?readily?and?accurately?be?discerned?by?reading?together?all?the?provisions?contained?in?chapter?3.?(See?People?v.?Woodhead,?supra,?43?Cal.3d?at?p.?1009.)?Section?170.6,?subdivision?(7),?specifically?states?that?”[n]othing?in?[section?170.6]?shall?affect?or?limit?the?provisions?of?Section?170?…?and?this?section?shall?be?construed?as?cumulative?thereto.”?(??170.6,?subd.?(7),?italics?added.)?Accordingly,?sections?170.6?and?170?were?intended?to?be?read?together. Sections?170?and?170.6,?when?read?together?(see???170.6,?subd.?(7)),?establish?that?a?judge?who?is?successfully?challenged?under?section?170.6?is?in?fact?”disqualified,”?within?the?meaning?of?section?170.?Sections?170?and?170.3?were?enacted?together.?(Stats.?1984,?ch.?1555,????2,?7,?pp.?5479,?5481.)?If?”disqualified”?has?a?given?meaning?when?used?in?one?of?the?statutes,?it?presumably?shares?that?meaning?in?the?other.?(See?International?Business?Machines?v.?State?Bd.?of?Equalization?(1980)?26?Cal.3d?923,?932?[163?Cal.Rptr.?782,?609?P.2d?1].)?Consequently,?because?section?170’s?interpretation?of?the?word?”disqualified”?is?applicable?to?section?170.6?motions,?it?logically?follows?that?section?170.3(d)’s?use?of?the?word?”disqualification”?also?encompasses?section?170.6?motions. To?read?the?term?”disqualification?of?a?judge”?in?section?170.3(d)?as?applying?only?to?challenges?for?cause?but?not?to?peremptory?challenges?could?[1?Cal.4th?274]?lead?to?absurd?results.?As?noted?by?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?the?present?case,?section?170?provides?that?”[a]?judge?has?a?duty?to?decide?any?proceeding?in?which?he?or?she?is?not?disqualified.”?If?a?successful?section?170.6?peremptory?challenge?does?not?result?in?the?”disqualification”?of?the?judge,?then?that?judge?would?continue?to?have?a?duty,?under?section?170,?to?decide?the?proceeding?regardless?of?the?successful?motion.?This?would?create?an?absurd?result?that?could?not?have?been?the?Legislature’s?intent.?(See?Dyna-Med,?Inc.?v.?Fair?Employment?&?Housing?Com.?(1987)?43?Cal.3d?1379,?1392?[241?Cal.Rptr.?67,?743?P.2d?1323].) Hull?echoes?her?theme?that?a?judge?challenged?under?section?170.6?is?not?”disqualified,”?as?the?term?is?used?in?section?170.3(d),?by?stressing?the?differences?between?challenges?for?cause?and?peremptory?challenges.?Hence,?she?argues,?”a?judge?challenged?for?cause?can?be?’disqualified’?only?if?any?one?or?more?of?the?grounds?under?Section?170.1?are?found?to?be?true.?Such?a?’disqualified’?judge?has?no?power?to?further?act?in?the?proceeding?except?in?specified?exceptions?listed?in?Section?170.4.?…?On?the?other?hand,?a?judge?who?is?challenged?pursuant?to?Section?170.6?is?not?deemed?by?the?peremptory?challenge?statute?to?be?’disqualified,’?nor?should?he?or?she?be?so?described.?The?reason?why?such?a?judge?is?removed?from?further?participation?in?the?matter?is?because?the?explicit?provisions?of?Section?170.6?prohibit?that?judge?from?trying?any?action?or?hearing?any?matter?involving?contested?issues?of?law?or?fact.”?By?purposefully?avoiding?using?the?word?”disqualification”?when?describing?the?effect?of?section?170.6,?this?argument?elevates?semantics?over?substance.?A?judge?who?is?prohibited?from?trying?any?action,?or?hearing?any?matter,?involving?contested?issues?of?law?or?fact?(??170.6)?is?for?all?practical?purposes?disqualified.?As?indicated?above,?the?judge?is?deprived?of?a?power,?right?or?privilege. Hull?next?maintains?that?a?judge?deciding?a?peremptory?challenge?does?not?conduct?a?”determination?of?the?question?of?disqualification,”?as?the?phrase?is?used?in?section?170.3(d).?Rather,?she?argues,?”all?that?a?judge?facing?a?peremptory?challenge?has?to?do?is?the?ministerial?function?of?determining?whether?the?challenge?has?the?proper?form,?whether?the?challenge?was?presented?at?the?proper?time,?and?possibly?whether?the?party?or?attorney?is?making?more?than?one?motion?in?any?one?action?or?special?proceeding.”?We?disagree.?The?manner?and?time?in?which?prejudice?may?be?established?under?section?170.6?is?provided?by?that?statute.?(See???170.6,?subds.?(2),?(3),?(5),?and?(6).)?In?certain?situations,?the?judge?may?”determine”?that?prejudice?was?not?properly?established.?For?example,?in?the?present?case?Hull?did?not?timely?file?her?motion.?Hull?submits?an?unduly?narrow?definition?of?the?word?”determination”?by?asserting?that?the?term?includes?only?a?substantive?evaluation?of?the?merits?of?the?motion.?As?stated?earlier,?words?in?a?statute?should?[1?Cal.4th?275]?be?given?their?”usual?and?ordinary?meaning.”?(City?of?Santa?Cruz?v.?Municipal?Court,?supra,?49?Cal.3d?at?p.?90.)?Hull’s?narrow?definition?of?the?term?”determination”?is?neither?ordinary?nor?usual. Hull?further?supports?her?argument?that?appellate?review?for?challenges?for?cause?and?peremptory?challenges?must?be?different?by?relying?on?certain?comments?from?the?legislative?history?of?the?1984?revisions?to?part?1,?title?2,?chapter?3,?of?the?Code?of?Civil?Procedure.?(See?also?Woodman,?supra,?196?Cal.App.3d?at?pp.?413-414.)?These?comments?indicate?that?Senate?Bill?No.?1633,?which?”provide[s]?a?thorough?revision?of?the?law?regarding?disqualification?of?judges?for?cause,”?would?not?amend?section?170.6.?(See,?e.g.,?Sen.?Com.?on?Judiciary,?Analysis?of?Sen.?Bill?No.?1633?(1983-1984?Reg.?Sess.)?as?amended?March?29,?1984,?pp.?2-?3.)?We?believe,?as?did?the?Court?of?Appeal?in?this?case,?that?Hull?interprets?this?comment?too?broadly.?As?the?Guedalia?court?explained,?a?review?of?the?context?of?the?statements?from?the?legislative?history?reveals?that?”the?reference?[to?section?170.6]?simply?stated?the?obvious:?that?the?1984?legislation?did?not?intend?to?abrogate?the?substantive?right?to?(or?the?trial?court?procedures?for?interposing)?a?peremptory?challenge,?but?was?instead?directed?toward?substantive?and?trial?court?procedural?reforms?of?’for?cause’?challenges.?[The]?conclusion?that?appellate?relief?limitations?[in?section?170.3(d)]?are?applicable?to?peremptory?challenges?does?not?contravene?the?legislative?history,?since?application?of?appellate?relief?limitations?leaves?untouched?the?substantive?and?trial?court?procedural?aspects?of?peremptory?challenges.”?(Guedalia,?supra,?211?Cal.App.3d?at?p.?1161,?italics?in?original.) Finally,?Hull?maintains?that?if?a?peremptory?challenge?cannot?be?challenged?on?appeal,?there?will?be?no?satisfactory?method?of?appellate?review.?She?argues?that?mandamus?is?not?an?effective?remedy?because?”continuances?are?highly?disfavored.”?She?also?argues?that?section?170.3(d)?will?result?in?an?increase?of?”posttrial?mandamus.”?However,?the?adequacy?of?the?mandamus?remedy?is?not?an?issue?that?is?before?us.?The?Legislature,?through?section?170.3(d),?has?specifically?determined?that?a?writ?of?mandate?shall?be?the?exclusive?means?of?challenging?a?denial?of?a?motion?to?disqualify?a?judge.?A?party?who?is?denied?a?peremptory?challenge?can?file?a?petition?for?a?writ?of?mandate?and?a?request?for?a?stay?with?the?Court?of?Appeal.?If?the?Court?of?Appeal?determines?that?the?petition?has?merit,?the?court?will?likely?grant?a?stay?until?the?substantive?issue?is?resolved.?For?this?reason,?a?party?who?unsuccessfully?makes?a?peremptory?challenge?is?not?exclusively?subject?to?posttrial?mandamus.?Indeed,?the?immediate?pendency?of?the?trial?may?be?a?strong?factor?the?court?will?consider?in?favor?of?granting?a?stay.?[1?Cal.4th?276] Conclusion Hull?brought?a?peremptory?challenge?motion?under?section?170.6?to?disqualify?her?trial?judge.?The?motion?was?denied?as?untimely.?Hull?proceeded?to?trial?and?did?not?challenge?the?denial?by?writ?of?mandate?under?section?170.3(d).?On?appeal?Hull?attempted?to?challenge?the?denial?of?her?motion.?However,?section?170.3(d)?prescribes?the?exclusive?means?of?appellate?review?of?an?unsuccessful?peremptory?challenge?motion. For?the?foregoing?reasons,?the?judgment?of?the?Court?of?Appeal?is?affirmed. Lucas,?C.?J.,?Mosk,?J.,?Arabian,?J.,?Baxter,?J.,?and?George,?J.,?concurred. KENNARD,?J. I?dissent. The?majority?holds?that?a?party?seeking?review?of?an?unsuccessful?peremptory?challenge?to?a?trial?judge?can?do?so?only?by?petitioning?for?a?writ?of?mandate?within?10?days?of?notice?of?the?disputed?ruling,?and?not?by?postjudgment?appeal.?Although?the?majority’s?holding?has?practical?advantages-immediate?writ?review?generally?will?avoid?reversal?and?retrial,?thus?promoting?judicial?economy-it?finds?no?support?in?the?statutory?scheme. The?Two?Removal?Methods The?Code?of?Civil?Procedure?fn.?1?sets?out?two?separate?methods?by?which?a?party?may?prevent?a?trial?judge?or?other?judicial?officer?from?presiding?over?a?particular?legal?action.?A?party?can?seek?to?remove?a?judge?under?sections?170.1?and?170.3?(commonly?called?a?”for?cause”?disqualification),?or?it?can?exercise?a?peremptory?challenge?against?the?judge?under?section?170.6,?as?defendant?did?here. Section?170.1,?subdivision?(a)?lists?the?grounds?for?disqualifying?a?judge?”for?cause.”?fn.?2?Section?170.3?sets?forth?the?procedure?for?such?disqualification.?A?judge?who?”determines?himself?or?herself?to?be?disqualified”?must?notify?the?court’s?presiding?judge?of?the?recusal.?(??170.3,?subd.?(a).)?A?disqualified?[1?Cal.4th?277]?judge?may,?however,?seek?a?waiver?from?the?parties?after?disclosing?the?basis?for?disqualification?”on?the?record.”?(??170.3,?subd.?(b).) If?”a?judge?who?should?disqualify?himself?or?herself?refuses?or?fails?to?do?so,”?the?party?seeking?the?disqualification?must?file?a?verified,?written?statement?with?the?clerk?of?the?court?objecting?to?the?hearing?or?trial?before?the?judge?and?”setting?forth?the?facts?constituting?the?grounds?for?disqualification.”?(??170.3,?subd.?(c)(1).)?The?judge?can?either?consent?to?the?disqualification?or?file?a?verified?answer?admitting?or?denying?the?allegations?in?the?challenger’s?statement?and?adding?any?additional?facts?material?”to?the?question?of?disqualification.”?(??170.3,?subd.?(c)(3).)?Unless?there?is?a?recusal?by?the?challenged?judge,?the?question?of?disqualification?must?be?heard?and?”determined”?by?another?judge?agreed?to?by?the?parties.?(??170.3,?subd.?(c)(5).)?That?determination?may?be?based?on?the?challenger’s?statement?and?the?answer?filed?by?the?challenged?judge,?or?by?evidence?presented?at?a?hearing.?(??170.3,?subd.?(c)(6).)?Thus,?when?a?judge’s?disqualification?is?contested,?the?challenging?party?must?establish?the?facts?supporting?its?claim?of?bias?or?prejudice?to?the?satisfaction?of?a?neutral?judge,?who?is?to?determine?whether?there?is?”cause”?for?disqualification. As?noted?earlier,?a?party?seeking?to?remove?a?judge?from?hearing?a?particular?matter?involving?a?contested?issue?of?law?or?fact?is?not?restricted?to?filing?a?challenge?based?on?any?”cause”?contained?in?section?170.1,?but?may?seek?removal?simply?by?filing?a?peremptory?challenge?to?the?judge?under?section?170.6. Section?170.6?prohibits?a?judge,?or?other?judicial?officer,?from?hearing?a?matter?when?that?judicial?officer?is?”prejudiced”?against?any?party?or?lawyer?in?the?proceeding.?(??170.6,?subd.?(1).)?fn.?3Prejudice?under?this?section?is?established?merely?by?”an?oral?or?written?motion?without?notice”?supported?by?a?sworn?affidavit?stating?that?the?judge?is?prejudiced?against?either?the?party?or?the?attorney?for?the?party?making?the?motion?”so?that?the?party?or?attorney?cannot?or?believes?that?he?or?she?cannot?have?a?fair?and?impartial?trial?or?hearing?before?the?judge?….”?(??170.6,?subd.?(2).) […]
